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Effigies Iohannis Locke

Ex Archetypo quod in Musæo Alexandri Geekie Chirurgi adservatur expressa.



Siste Viator.

Hic juxta, situs est.

JOHANNES LOCKE

Si qualis fuerit rogas, mediocriter & suâ contentum se vixisse respondet. Literis innutritus eousq; tantum profecit, ut veritati unicè litaret hoc ex scriptis illius disce; quæ quod de eo reliquum est, majori fide tibi exhibebunt, quam epitaphii suspecta elogia, virtutes si quas habuit, minores sanè quam quas sibi laudi tibi in exemplum proponeret Vitia una sepeliantur. Morum exemplum si quæras, in Evangelio habes, vitiorum unicum nusquam, mortalium certè (quod profit) hic & ubiq;.

Natum Anno Dom. 1632. Aug. 29°.
Mortuum Anno Dom. 1704. Oct. 28°.
memorat hæc tabula brevi et
ipsa interitura.



THE

WORKS

OF

JOHN LOCKE Esq;

In Three Volumes.

The CONTENTS of which follow in the next Leaf.

With ALPHABETICAL TABLES.

VOL. I.

The Second Edition.



LONDON,
Printed for A. CHURCHILL, and A. MANSHIP, and sold by W. TAYLOR in *Pater-noster-Row*. M.DCC.XXII.

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BIBLIOTEKA WYŻSZEJ SZKOŁY HANDLOWEJ
WARSZAWA

The Contents of the Three Volumes.

VOL. I.

AN Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding. In Four Books.

A Letter to the Right Reverend *Edward* Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter*, concerning ſome Paſſages relating to *Mr.* Locke's *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, in a late Diſcourſe of his Lordſhip's, in Vindication of the Trinity.

Mr. *Locke*'s Reply to the Right Reverend the Biſhop of *Worceſter*'s Anſwer to his Letter.

Mr. *Locke*'s Reply to the Biſhop of *Worceſter*'s Anſwer to his Second Letter.

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SOME Conſiderations of the Conſequences of the lowering of Intereſt, and raiſing the Value of Money. In a Letter ſent to a Member of Parliament. 1691.

Short Obſervations on a Printed Paper, entitled, *For encouraging the coining Silver Money in* England, *and after, for keeping it here.*

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Two Treatiſes of Government. In the Former, the falſe Principles and Foundation of Sir *Robert Filmer*, and his Followers, are detected and overthrown: The Latter, is an Eſſay concerning the true Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government.

A Letter concerning Toleration.
A Second Letter concerning Toleration.
A Third Letter for Toleration: To the Author of the Third Letter concerning Toleration.
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VOL. III.

SOME Thoughts concerning Education.
A Paraphraſe and Notes on the Epiſtles of St. *Paul* to the *Galatians*, I. and II. *Corinthians*, *Romans*, and *Epheſians*. To which is prefix'd, An Eſſay for the Underſtanding of St. *Paul*'s Epiſtles, by conſulting St. *Paul* himſelf.
Poſthumous Works, *viz.*
I. Of the Conduct of the Underſtanding.
II. An Examination of *P. Malebranche*'s Opinion of *Seeing all things in God*.
III. A Diſcourſe of Miracles.
IV. Part of a Fourth Letter for Toleration.
V. Memoirs relating to the Life of *Anthony*, firſt Earl of *Shaftesbury*.
VI. A new Method of a Common-Place-Book; written originally in *French*, and tranſlated into *Engliſh*.
Some familiar Letters between Mr. *Locke* and ſeveral of his Friends.

TO THE

READER.

THOU hast here a Compleat Collection of the several Works of Mr. JOHN LOCKE, which were publish'd in his Life-time, either with or without his Name to them. And that thou mayst be assur'd that the Latter are truly his, I think it proper to transcribe the following Clause out of his last Will and Testament: "Whereas "the Reverend Dr. Hudson, Library-Keeper of the "Bodleian Library in the University of Oxford, "writ to me some time since, desiring of me, for the "said Library, the Books whereof I was the Author; "I did, in return to the honour done me therein, pre- "sent to the said Library All the Books that were "publish'd under my Name; which tho' accepted with "honourable mention of me, yet were not understood "to answer the Request made me, it being suppos'd "that there were other Treatises whereof I was the "Author, which have been publish'd without my "Name to them. In compliance therefore with what "was desir'd in the utmost Extent of it, and in ac- "knowledgment of the Honour done me, in thinking "my Writings worthy to be placed among the Works "of the Learned in that August Repository; I do here-

" *by further give to the Publick Library of*
" *the Univerſity of* Oxford, *theſe following*
" *Books*; *that is to ſay:* Three Letters concern-
" ing Toleration: Two Treatiſes of Government,
" *(whereof Mr.* Churchill *has publiſh'd ſeveral*
" *Editions, but all very incorrect)* The Reaſonable-
" neſs of Chriſtianity, as deliver'd in the Scrip-
" tures. A Vindication of the Reaſonableneſs of
" Chriſtianity from Mr. *Edwards*'s Reflections:
" *And*, A Second Vindication of the Reaſonable-
" neſs of Chriſtianity. *Theſe are all the Books,*
" *whereof I am the Author, which have been pub-*
" *liſhed without my Name to them.*"

To theſe Books publiſh'd by Mr. LOCKE *in his Life-time, are added theſe following, which have been printed ſince his Death,* viz. *His* Paraphraſe on St. *Paul*'s Epiſtles to the *Galatians, Corinthians, Romans,* and *Epheſians: To which is perfix'd,* An Eſſay for the Underſtanding of St. *Paul*'s Epiſtles, by conſulting St. *Paul* himſelf. *His* Poſthumous Works: *and* Some familiar Letters between him and his Friends.

As to this Edition of all his Works together, I have this to advertiſe the Reader, That moſt of them are printed from Copies corrected and enlarg'd under Mr. LOCKE's *own Hand; and in particular, That the* Two Treatiſes *of* Government *were never till now publiſh'd from a Copy corrected by himſelf.*

AN

ESSAY

CONCERNING

Human Understanding.

In Four BOOKS.

ECCLES. XI. 5.

As thou knoweſt not what is the Way of the Spirit, nor how the Bones do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child: Even ſo thou knoweſt not the Works of God, who maketh all things.

Quam bellum eſt velle confiteri potius neſcire quod neſcias, quam iſta effutientem nauſeare, atque ipſum ſibi diſplicere! Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 1.

AN

ESSAY

CONCERNING

Human Understanding.

In Four BOOKS.



To the Right Honourable

THOMAS

Earl of *Pembroke* and *Montgomery*,

Baron *Herbert* of *Cardiff*, Lord *Roſs* of *Kendal*, *Par*, *Fitzhugh*, *Marmion*, *St. Quintin*, and *Shurland*; Lord-Preſident of his Majeſty's moſt Honourable Privy-Council, and Lord-Lieutenant of the County of *Wilts*, and of *South-Wales*.

My Lord,

THIS Treatiſe, which is grown up under your Lordſhip's Eye, and has ventur'd into the World by your Order, does now, by a natural kind of Right, come to your Lordſhip for that Protection, which you ſeveral Years ſince promis'd it. 'Tis not that I think any Name, how great ſoever, ſet at the beginning of a Book, will be able to cover the Faults are to be found in it. Things in Print muſt ſtand and fall by their own Worth, or the Reader's Fancy. But there being nothing more to be deſir'd for Truth, than a fair unprejudic'd Hearing, no body is more likely to procure me that, than your Lordſhip; who are allow'd to have got ſo intimate an Acquaintance with her, in her more retir'd Receſſes. Your Lordſhip is known to have ſo far advanc'd your Speculations in the moſt abſtract and general Knowledg of Things, beyond the ordinary Reach, or common Methods, that your Allowance and Approbation of the Deſign of this Treatiſe, will at leaſt preſerve it from being condemn'd without reading; and

and will prevail to have thoſe Parts a little weigh'd, which might otherwiſe, perhaps, be thought to deſerve no Conſideration, for being ſomewhat out of the common Road. The Imputation of Novelty is a terrible Charge amongſt thoſe, who judg of Mens Heads, as they do of their Perukes, by the Faſhion; and can allow none to be right, but the receiv'd Doctrines. Truth ſcarce ever yet carry'd it by Vote any where at its firſt Appearance: New Opinions are always ſuſpected, and uſually oppos'd, without any other Reaſon, but becauſe they are not already common. But Truth, like Gold, is not the leſs ſo, for being newly brought out of the Mine. 'Tis Trial and Examination muſt give it Price, and not any antick Faſhion: And tho' it be not yet current by the publick Stamp; yet it may, for all that, be as old as Nature, and is certainly not the leſs genuine. Your Lordſhip can give great and convincing Inſtances of this, whenever you pleaſe to oblige the Publick with ſome of thoſe large and comprehenſive Diſcoveries you have made of Truths, hitherto unknown, unleſs to ſome few, to whom your Lordſhip has been pleas'd not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a ſufficient Reaſon, were there no other, why I ſhould dedicate this *Eſſay* to your Lordſhip; and its having ſome little Correſpondence with ſome Parts of that nobler and vaſt Syſtem of the Sciences your Lordſhip has made ſo new, exact, and inſtructive a Draught of, I think it Glory enough, if your Lordſhip permit me to boaſt, that here and there I have fallen into ſome Thoughts not wholly different from your's. If your Lordſhip think fit, that, by your Encouragement, this ſhould appear in the World, I hope it may be a Reaſon, ſome time or other, to lead your Lordſhip farther; and you will allow me to ſay, that you here give the World an Earneſt of ſomething, that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their Expectation. This, my Lord, ſhews what a Preſent I here make to your Lordſhip; juſt ſuch as the poor Man does to his rich and great Neighbour, by whom the Basket of Flowers, or Fruit, is not ill taken, tho' he has more plenty of his own Growth, and in much greater Perfection. Worthleſs Things receive a Value, when they are made the Offerings of Reſpect, Eſteem and Gratitude: Theſe you have given me ſo mighty and peculiar Reaſons to have, in the higheſt degree,

degree, for your Lordſhip, that if they can add a Price to what they go along with, proportionable to their own Greatneſs, I can with Confidence brag, I here make your Lordſhip the richeſt Preſent you ever receiv'd. This I am ſure, I am under the greateſt Obligation to ſeek all Occaſions to acknowledg a long Train of Favours, I have receiv'd from your Lordſhip; Favours, tho' great and important in themſelves, yet made much more ſo by the Forwardneſs, Concern, and Kindneſs, and other obliging Circumſtances, that never fail'd to accompany them. To all this, you are pleas'd to add that which gives yet more Weight and Reliſh to all the reſt: You vouchſafe to continue me in ſome Degrees of your Eſteem, and allow me a Place in your good Thoughts; I had almoſt ſaid, Friendſhip. This, my Lord, your Words and Actions ſo conſtantly ſhew on all Occaſions, even to others when I am abſent, that it is not Vanity in me to mention what every body knows: But it would be want of good Manners, not to acknowledg what ſo many are Witneſſes of, and every day tell me, I am indebted to your Lordſhip for. I wiſh they could as eaſily aſſiſt my Gratitude, as they convince me of the great and growing Engagements it has to your Lordſhip. This, I am ſure, I ſhould write of the *Underſtanding* without having any, if I were not extremely ſenſible of them, and did not lay hold on this Opportunity to teſtify to the World, how much I am oblig'd to be, and how much I am,

Dorſet-Court, 24*th* of *May*, 1689.

My LORD,

Your Lordſhip's

Moſt Humble, and

Moſt Obedient Servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

THE EPISTLE TO THE READER.

READER,

I Here put into thy hands, what has been the Diverſion of ſome of my idle and heavy Hours: If it has the good luck to prove ſo of any of thine, and thou haſt but half ſo much Pleaſure in reading, as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy Money, as I do my Pains, ill beſtow'd. Miſtake not this, for a Commendation of my Work; nor conclude, becauſe I was pleas'd with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it now it is done. He that hawks at Larks and Sparrows, has no leſs Sport, tho' a much leſs conſiderable Quarry, than he that flies at nobler Game: And he is little acquainted with the Subject of this Treatiſe, the UNDERSTANDING, who does not know, that as it is the moſt elevated Faculty of the Soul, ſo it is employ'd with a greater and more conſtant Delight, than any of the other. Its Searches after Truth, are a ſort of Hawking and Hunting, wherein the very Purſuit makes a great part of the Pleaſure. Every ſtep the Mind takes in its Progreſs towards Knowledg, makes ſome Diſcovery, is not only new, but the beſt too, for the time at leaſt.

For the Underſtanding, like the Eye, judging of Objects only by its own Sight, cannot but be pleas'd with what it diſcovers, having leſs Regret for what has ſcaped it, becauſe it is unknown. Thus he who has rais'd himſelf above the Alms-Basket, and not content to live lazily on Scraps of begg'd Opinions, ſets his own Thoughts on work, to find and follow Truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miſs the Hunter's Satisfaction: every moment of his Purſuit will reward his Pains with ſome Delight, and he will have reaſon to think his time not ill ſpent, even when he cannot much boaſt of any great Acquiſition.

This

This, Reader, is the Entertainment of thoſe, who let looſe their own Thoughts, and follow them in writing; which thou oughteſt not to envy them, ſince they afford thee an Opportunity of the like Diverſion, if thou wilt make uſe of thy own Thoughts in reading. 'Tis to them, if they are thy own, that I refer my ſelf: But if they are taken upon Truſt from others, 'tis no great matter what they are; they not following Truth, but ſome meaner Conſideration. And 'tis not worth while to be concern'd, what he ſays or thinks, who ſays or thinks only as he is directed by another. If thou judgeſt for thy ſelf, I know thou wilt judg candidly; and then I ſhall not be harmed or offended, whatever be thy Cenſure. For tho' it be certain, that there is nothing in this Treatiſe, of the Truth whereof I am not fully perſuaded; yet I conſider my ſelf as liable to Miſtakes, as I can think thee; and know, that this Book muſt ſtand or fall with thee, not by any Opinion I have of it, but thy own. If thou findeſt little in it new or inſtructive to thee, thou art not to blame me for it. It was not meant for thoſe that had already maſter'd this Subject, and made a thorow Acquaintance with their own Underſtandings; but for my own Information, and the Satisfaction of a few Friends, who acknowledg'd themſelves not to have ſufficiently conſider'd it. Were it fit to trouble thee with the Hiſtory of this Eſſay, I ſhould tell thee, that five or ſix Friends meeting at my Chamber, and diſcourſing on a Subject very remote from this, found themſelves quickly at a ſtand, by the Difficulties that roſe on every ſide. After we had a while puzzled our ſelves, without coming any nearer a Reſolution of thoſe Doubts which perplex'd us, it came into my Thoughts, that we took a wrong Courſe; and that before we ſet our ſelves upon Enquiries of that nature, it was neceſſary to examine our own Abilities, and ſee what Objects our Underſtandings were, or were not fitted to deal with. This I propos'd to the Company, who all readily aſſented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this ſhould be our firſt Enquiry. Some haſty and undigeſted Thoughts, on a Subject I had never before conſider'd, which I ſet down againſt our next Meeting, gave the firſt Entrance into this Diſcourſe; which having been thus begun by Chance, was continu'd by Intreaty; written by incoherent Parcels; and, after long Intervals of Neglect, reſumed again, as my Humour or Occaſions permitted; and at laſt, in a Retirement, where an Attendance on my Health gave me Leiſure, it was brought into that Order thou now ſeeſt it.

This diſcontinu'd way of writing, may have occaſion'd, beſides others, two contrary Faults, viz. That too little and too much may be ſaid in it. If thou findeſt any thing wanting, I ſhall be glad that what I have writ gives thee any Deſire that I ſhould have gone farther: If it ſeems too much to thee, thou muſt blame the Subject; for when I firſt put Pen to Paper, I thought all I ſhould have to ſay on this matter, would have been contain'd in one Sheet of Paper; but the farther I went, the larger Proſpect I had: new Diſcoveries led me ſtill on, and ſo it grew inſenſibly to the Bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but poſſibly it might be reduced to a narrower Compaſs than it is; and that ſome Parts of it might be contracted: The way it has been writ in, by Catches, and many long Intervals of Interruption, being apt to cauſe ſome Repetitions. But to confeſs the Truth, I am now too lazy, or too buſy to make it ſhorter.

I am not ignorant how little I herein conſult my own Reputation, when I knowingly let it go with a Fault, ſo apt to diſguſt the moſt judicious, who are always the niceſt Readers. But they who know Sloth is apt to content it ſelf with any Excuſe, will pardon me, if mine has prevail'd on me, where, I think, I have a very good one. I will not therefore alledg in my Defence, that

the

the ſame Notion having different Reſpects, may be convenient or neceſſary to prove or illuſtrate ſeveral Parts of the ſame Diſcourſe; and that ſo it has happen'd in many Parts of this: But waving that, I ſhall frankly avow, that I have ſometimes dwelt long upon the ſame Argument, and expreſs'd it different ways, with a quite different Deſign. I pretend not to publiſh this Eſſay for the Information of Men of large Thoughts and quick Apprehenſions; to ſuch Maſters of Knowledg, I profeſs my ſelf a Scholar, and therefore warn them before-hand not to expect any thing here, but what being ſpun out of my own coarſe Thoughts, is fitted to Men of my own ſize; to whom, perhaps, it will not be unacceptable, that I have taken ſome pains to make plain and familiar to their Thoughts ſome Truths, which eſtabliſh'd Prejudice, or the Abſtractneſs of the Ideas *themſelves, might render difficult. Some Objects had need be turn'd on every ſide; and when the Notion is new, as I confeſs ſome of theſe are to me, or out of the ordinary Road, as I ſuſpect they will appear to others, 'tis not one ſimple View of it, that will gain it Admittance into every Underſtanding, or fix it there with a clear and laſting Impreſſion. There are few, I believe, who have not obſerv'd in themſelves or others, that what in one way of propoſing was very obſcure, another way of expreſſing it has made very clear and intelligible: tho' afterward the Mind found little difference in the Phraſes, and wonder'd why one fail'd to be underſtood more than the other. But every thing does not hit alike upon every Man's Imagination. We have our Underſtandings no leſs different than our Palates; and he that thinks the ſame Truth ſhall be equally reliſh'd by every one in the ſame Dreſs, may as well hope to feaſt every one with the ſame ſort of Cookery: The Meat may be the ſame, and the Nouriſhment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that Seaſoning; and it muſt be dreſs'd another way, if you will have it go down with ſome, even of ſtrong Conſtitutions. The truth is, thoſe who adviſ'd me to publiſh it, adviſ'd me, for this reaſon, to publiſh it as it is: And ſince I have been brought to let it go abroad, I deſire it ſhould be underſtood by whoever gives himſelf the Pains to read it. I have ſo little Affection to be in Print, that if I were not flatter'd, this Eſſay might be of ſome uſe to others, as I think it has been to me; I ſhould have confin'd it to the View of ſome Friends, who gave the firſt Occaſion to it. My appearing therefore in Print, being on purpoſe to be as uſeful as I may, I think it neceſſary to make what I have to ſay, as eaſy and intelligible to all ſorts of Readers, as I can. And I had much rather the Speculative and Quick-ſighted ſhould complain of my being in ſome parts tedious, than that any one, not accuſtom'd to abſtract Speculations, or prepoſſeſs'd with different Notions, ſhould miſtake, or not comprehend my* Meaning.

It will poſſibly be cenſur'd as a great piece of Vanity or Inſolence in me, to pretend to inſtruct this our knowing Age; it amounting to little leſs, when I own, that I publiſh this Eſſay *with hopes it may be uſeful to others. But if it may be permitted to ſpeak freely of thoſe, who with a feign'd Modeſty condemn as uſeleſs, what they themſelves write, methinks it ſavours much more of Vanity or Inſolence, to publiſh a Book for any other End; and he fails very much of that Reſpect he owes the Publick, who prints, and conſequently expects Men ſhould read that, wherein he intends not they ſhould meet with any thing of uſe to themſelves or others: And ſhould nothing elſe be found allowable in this Treatiſe, yet my Deſign will not ceaſe to be ſo; and the Goodneſs of my Intention ought to be ſome Excuſe for the Worthleſneſs of my Preſent. 'Tis that chiefly which ſecures me from the Fear of Cenſure, which I expect not to eſcape more than better Writers. Mens Principles, Notions and Reliſhes are ſo different, that it is hard to find a Book which pleaſes*

ſes or diſpleaſes all Men. I acknowledg the Age we live in is not the leaſt knowing, and therefore not the moſt eaſy to be ſatisfy'd. If I have not the good Luck to pleaſe, yet no body ought to be offended with me. I plainly tell all my Readers, except half a dozen, this Treatiſe was not at firſt intended for them; and therefore they need not be at the trouble to be of that number. But yet if any one thinks fit to be angry, and rail at it, he may do it ſecurely: For I ſhall find ſome better way of ſpending my Time, than in ſuch kind of Converſation. I ſhall always have the Satisfaction to have aim'd ſincerely at Truth and Uſefulneſs, tho' in one of the meaneſt ways. The Commonwealth of Learning is not at this time without Maſter-Builders, whoſe mighty Deſigns, in advancing the Sciences, will leave laſting Monuments to the Admiration of Poſterity: But every one muſt not hope to be a Boyle, *or a* Sydenham; *and in an Age that produces ſuch Maſters, as the Great* —— Huygenius, *and the Incomparable* Mr. Newton, *with ſome other of that ſtrain; 'tis Ambition enough to be imploy'd as an Under-Labourer in clearing Ground a little, and removing ſome of the Rubbiſh that lies in the way to Knowledg: which certainly had been very much more advanc'd in the World, if the Endeavours of ingenious and induſtrious Men had not been much cumber'd with the learned, but frivolous Uſe of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible Terms introduc'd into the Sciences, and there made an Art of, to that degree, that Philoſophy, which is nothing but the true Knowledg of Things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to be brought into well-bred Company, and polite Converſation. Vague and inſignificant Forms of Speech, and Abuſe of Language, have ſo long paſs'd for Myſteries of Science; and hard or miſapply'd words, with little or no meaning, have, by Preſcription, ſuch a Right to be miſtaken for deep Learning, and heighth of Speculation, that it will not be eaſy to perſuade, either thoſe who ſpeak, or thoſe who hear them, that they are but the Covers of Ignorance, and Hindrance of true Knowledg. To break in upon the Sanctuary of Vanity and Ignorance, will be, I ſuppoſe, ſome Service to Human Underſtanding: Tho' ſo few are apt to think, they deceive or are deceiv'd in the uſe of Words; or that the Language of the Sect they are of, has any Faults in it, which ought to be examin'd or corrected; that I hope I ſhall be pardon'd, if I have in the third Book dwelt long on this Subject; and endeavour'd to make it ſo plain, that neither the Inveterateneſs of the Miſchief, nor the Prevalency of the Faſhion, ſhall be any Excuſe for thoſe, who will not take care about the meaning of their own words, and will not ſuffer the Significancy of their Expreſſions to be enquir'd into.*

I have been told, that a ſhort Epitome of this Treatiſe, which was printed 1688. *was by ſome condemn'd without reading, becauſe innate* Ideas *were deny'd in it; they too haſtily concluding, that if innate* Ideas *were not ſuppos'd, there would be little left, either of the Notion or Proof of Spirits. If any one take the like Offence at the Entrance of this Treatiſe, I ſhall deſire him to read it thorow; and then I hope he will be convinc'd, that the taking away falſe Foundations, is not to the Prejudice, but Advantage of Truth; which is never injur'd or endanger'd ſo much, as when mix'd with, or built on Falſhood. In the Second Edition I added as followeth:*

The Bookſeller will not forgive me, if I ſay nothing of this Second Edition, which he has promis'd, by the Correctneſs of it, ſhall make amends for the many Faults committed in the former. He deſires too, that it ſhould be know, that it has one whole new Chapter concerning Identity, *and many Additions and Amendments in other places. Theſe I muſt inform my Reader are not all new Matter, but moſt of them either farther Confirmation of what I had ſaid, or Explications, to prevent others being miſtaken in the Senſe of*

what was formerly printed, and not any Variation in me from it: I muſt only except the Alterations I have made in Book II. chap. 21.

What I had there writ concerning Liberty and the Will, I thought deſerv'd as accurate a View as I was capable of: Thoſe Subjects having, in all Ages, exercis'd the learned part of the World with Queſtions and Difficulties, that have not a little perplex'd Morality and Divinity; thoſe Parts of Knowledg, that Men are moſt concern'd to be clear in. Upon a cloſer Inſpection into the working of Mens Minds, and a ſtricter Examination of thoſe Motives and Views they are turn'd by, I have found Reaſon ſomewhat to alter the Thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the laſt Determination to the Will in all voluntary Actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledg to the World, with as much Freedom and Readineſs, as I at firſt publiſh'd what then ſeem'd to me to be right, thinking my ſelf more concern'd to quit and renounce any Opinion of my own, than oppoſe that of another, when Truth appears againſt it. For 'tis Truth alone I ſeek, and that will always be welcome to me, when or from whence ſoever it comes.

But what Forwardneſs ſoever I have to reſign any Opinion I have, or to recede from any thing I have writ, upon the firſt Evidence of any Error in it; yet this I muſt own, that I have not had the good Luck to receive any Light from thoſe Exceptions I have met with in Print againſt any part of my Book; nor have, from any thing has been urg'd againſt it, found Reaſon to alter my Senſe, in any of the Points have been queſtion'd. Whether the Subject I have in hand requires often more Thought and Attention, than curſory Readers, at leaſt ſuch as are prepoſſeſs'd, are willing to allow; or whether any Obſcurity in my Expreſſions caſts a Cloud over it, and theſe Notions are made difficult to others Apprehenſion in my way of treating them: So it is, that my Meaning, I find, is often miſtaken, and I have not the good Luck to be every where rightly underſtood. There are ſo many Inſtances of this, that I think it Juſtice to my Reader and my ſelf, to conclude, that either my Book is plainly enough written to be rightly underſtood by thoſe, who peruſe it with that Attention and Indifferency, which every one, who will give himſelf the Pains to read, ought to imploy in reading; or elſe that I have writ mine ſo obſcurely, that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of theſe be that Truth, 'tis my ſelf only am affected thereby, and therefore I ſhall be far from troubling my Reader with what I think might be ſaid, in anſwer to thoſe ſeveral Objections I have met with, to Paſſages here and there of my Book. Since I perſuade my ſelf, that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concern'd, whether they are true or falſe, will be able to ſee, that what is ſaid, is either not well founded, or elſe not contrary to my Doctrine, when I and my Oppoſer come both to be well underſtood.

If any, careful that none of their good Thoughts ſhould be loſt, have publiſh'd their Cenſures of my Eſſay; with this Honour done to it, that they will not ſuffer it to be an Eſſay, I leave it to the Publick to value the Obligation they have to their critical Pens, and ſhall not waſte my Reader's Time in ſo idle or ill-natur'd an Employment of mine, as to leſſen the Satisfaction any one has in himſelf, or gives to others in ſo haſty a Confutation of what I have written.

The Booksellers preparing for the fourth Edition of my Eſſay, gave me Notice of it, that I might, if I had leiſure, make any Additions or Alterations I ſhould think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertiſe the Reader, that beſides ſeveral Corrections I had made here and there, there was one Alteration which it was neceſſary to mention, becauſe it ran thro' the whole Book,

Book, and is of Conſequence to be rightly underſtood. What I thereupon ſaid, was this.

Clear and diſtinct Ideas *are Terms, which tho' familiar and frequent in Mens mouths, I have reaſon to think every one who uſes, does not perfectly underſtand. And poſſibly 'tis but here and there one, who gives himſelf the trouble to conſider them ſo far as to know what he himſelf or others preciſely mean by them: I have therefore in moſt places choſe to put* determinate *or* determined, *inſtead of* clear *and* diſtinct, *as more likely to direct Mens Thoughts to my Meaning in this matter. By thoſe Denominations, I mean ſome Object in the Mind, and conſequently* determined, *i. e. ſuch as it is there ſeen and perceiv'd to be. This, I think, may fitly be call'd a* determinate *or* determined Idea, *when ſuch as it is at any time objectively in the Mind, and ſo* determined *there, it is annex'd, and without Variation* determin'd *to a Name or articulate Sound, which is to be ſteddily the Sign of that very ſame Object of the Mind, or* determinate Idea.

To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, *when apply'd to a ſimple* Idea, *I mean that ſimple Appearance which the Mind has in its view, or perceives in it ſelf, when that* Idea *is ſaid to be in it: By* determined, *when apply'd to a* complex Idea, *I mean ſuch an one as conſiſts of a determinate Number of certain ſimple or leſs complex* Ideas, *join'd in ſuch a Proportion and Situation, as the Mind has before its view, and ſees in it ſelf when that* Idea *is preſent in it, or ſhould be preſent in it, when a Man gives a Name to it. I ſay* ſhould be; *becauſe it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is ſo careful of his Language, as to uſe no Word, till he views in his Mind the preciſe* determined Idea, *which he reſolves to make it the Sign of. The want of this, is the Cauſe of no ſmall Obſcurity and Confuſion in Mens Thoughts and Diſcourſes.*

I know there are not Words enough in any Language, to anſwer all the Variety of Ideas, *that enter into Mens Diſcourſes and Reaſonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uſes any Term, he may have in his Mind a* determin'd Idea, *which he makes it the Sign of, and to which he ſhould keep it ſteddily annex'd, during that preſent Diſcourſe. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to* clear or diſtinct Ideas: *'Tis plain his are not ſo; and therefore there can be expected nothing but Obſcurity and Confuſion, where ſuch Terms are made uſe of, which have not ſuch a preciſe Determination.*

Upon this Ground I have thought determin'd Ideas *a way of ſpeaking leſs liable to miſtake, than* clear *and* diſtinct: *And where Men have got ſuch* determin'd Ideas *of all that they reaſon, enquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their Doubts and Diſputes at an end. The greateſt part of the Queſtions and Controverſies that perplex Mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain Uſe of Words, or (which is the ſame)* indetermin'd Ideas, *which they are made to ſtand for; I have made choice of theſe Terms to ſignify,* 1. *Some immediate Object of the Mind, which it perceives and has before it, diſtinct from the Sound it uſes as a Sign of it.* 2. *That this* Idea, *thus* determin'd, *i. e. which the Mind has in it ſelf, and knows, and ſees there, be* determin'd *without any Change to that Name, and that Name* determin'd *to that preciſe* Idea. *If Men had ſuch* determin'd Ideas *in their Enquiries and Diſcourſes, they would both diſcern how far their own Enquiries and Diſcourſes went, and avoid the greateſt part of the Diſputes and Wranglings they have with others.*

Beſides

Beſides this, the Bookſeller will think it neceſſary I ſhould advertiſe the Reader, that there is an Addition of two Chapters wholly new; the one of the Aſſociation of Ideas, *the other* of Enthuſiaſm. *Theſe, with ſome other larger Additions never before printed, he has engag'd to print by themſelves after the ſame manner, and for the ſame purpoſe, as was done when this* Eſſay *had the ſecond Impreſſion.*

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16. *Our*

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SECT.
1. *No Knowledg without it.*
2. *The difference of Wit and Judgment.*
3. *Clearness alone hinders Confusion.*
4. *Comparing.*
5. *Brutes compare but imperfectly.*
6. *Compounding.*
7. *Brutes compound but little.*
8. *Naming.*
9. *Abstraction.*
10,11. *Brutes abstract not.*
12,13. *Ideots and Mad-men.*
14. *Method.*
15. *These are the Beginnings of Human Knowledg.*
16. *Appeal to Experience.*
17. *Dark Room.*

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

SECT.
1. *Made by the Mind out of simple ones.*
2. *Made voluntarily.*
3. *Are either Modes, Substances, or Relations.*
4. *Modes.*
5. *Simple and mixed Modes.*
6. *Substances single or collective.*
7. *Relation.*
8. *The abstrusest Ideas from the two Sources.*

CHAP. XIII.

Of Space, and its simple Modes.

SECT.
1. *Simple Modes.*
2. *Idea of Space.*
3. *Space and Extension.*
4. *Immensity.*
5,6. *Figure.*
7-10. *Place.*
11-14. *Extension and Body not the same.*
15-17. *Substance which we know not, no Proof against Space without Body.*
18,19. *Substance and Accidents of little use in Philosophy.*
20. *A* Vacuum *beyond the utmost Bounds of Body.*
21. *The Power of Annihilation, proves a* Vacuum.
22. *Motion proves a* Vacuum.
23. *The Ideas of Space and Body distinct.*
24,25. *Extension being inseparable from Body, proves it not the same.*
26. *Ideas of Space and Solidity distinct.*
27. *Men differ little in clear simple Ideas.*

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration.

SECT.
1. *Duration is fleeting Extension.*
2-4. *Its Idea from Reflection on the Train of our Ideas.*
5. *The Idea of Duration, applicable to things whilst we sleep.*
6-8. *The Idea of Succession, not from Motion.*
9-11. *The Train of Ideas has a certain Degree of Quickness.*
12. *This Train, the Measure of other Successions.*
13-15. *The Mind cannot fix long on one invariable Idea.*
16. *Ideas, however made, include no Sense of Motion.*
17. *Time is Duration set out by Measures.*
18. *A good Measure of Time must divide its whole Duration into equal Periods.*
19. *The Revolutions of the Sun and Moon, the propereſt Measures of Time.*
20. *But not by their Motion, but periodical Appearances.*
21. *No two parts of Duration can be certainly known to be equal.*
22. *Time not the Measure of Motion.*
23. *Minutes, Hours, and Years, not necessary Measures of Duration.*
24. *The Measure of Time two ways apply'd.*
25 27. *Our Measure of Time applicable to Duration before Time.*
28-31. *Eternity.*

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expansion consider'd together.

SECT.
1. *Both capable of greater and less.*
2. *Expansion not bounded by Matter.*
3. *Nor Duration by Motion.*
4. *Why Men more easily admit infinite Duration, than infinite Expansion.*
5. *Time to Duration, is as Place to Expansion.*
6. *Time and Place are taken for so much of either, as are set out by the Existence and Motion of Bodies.*

7. *Some-*

7. *Sometimes for ſo much of either as we deſign by Meaſures taken from the Bulk or Motion of Bodies.*
8. *They belong to all Beings.*
9. *All the Parts of Extenſion, are Extenſion; and all the Parts of Duration, are Duration.*
10. *Their Parts inſeparable.*
11. *Duration is as a Line, Expanſion as a Solid.*
12. *Duration has never two Parts together, Expanſion all together.*

CHAP. XVI.

Of Number.

SECT.
1. *Number, the ſimpleſt and moſt univerſal Idea.*
2. *Its Modes made by Addition.*
3. *Each Mode diſtinct.*
4. *Therefore Demonſtrations in Numbers, the moſt preciſe.*
5,6. *Names neceſſary to Numbers.*
7. *Why Children number not earlier.*
8. *Number meaſures all Meaſurables.*

CHAP. XVII.

Of Infinity.

SECT.
1. *Infinity in its original Intention, attributed to Space, Duration, and Number.*
2,3. *How we come by the Idea of Infinity.*
4. *Our Idea of Space boundleſs.*
5. *And ſo of Duration.*
6. *Why other Ideas are not capable of Infinity.*
7. *Difference between Infinity of Space, and Space infinite.*
8. *We have no Idea of infinite Space.*
9. *Number affords us the cleareſt Idea of Infinity.*
10,11. *Our different Conception of the Infinity of Number, Duration, and Expanſion.*
12. *Infinite Diviſibility.*
13,14. 17,18. *No poſitive Idea of Infinite.*
15,16, 19. *What is poſitive, what negative in our Idea of Infinite.*
20. *Some think they have a poſitive Idea of Eternity, and not Space.*
21. *Suppoſ'd poſitive Ideas of Infinity, Cauſe of Miſtakes.*
22. *All theſe Ideas from Senſation and Reflection.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of other ſimple Modes.

SECT.
1,2. *Modes of Motion.*
3. *Modes of Sounds.*
4. *Modes of Taſtes.*
7. *Modes of Colours.*
8. *Why ſome Modes have, and others have not Names.*

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

SECT.
1,2. *Senſation, Remembrance, Contemplation, &c.*
3. *The various Attention of the Mind in Thinking.*
4. *Hence probable that Thinking is the Action, not Eſſence of the Soul.*

CHAP. XX.

Of Modes of Pleaſure and Pain.

SECT.
1. *Pleaſure and Pain ſimple Ideas.*
2. *Good and Evil what.*
3. *Our Paſſions mov'd by Good and Evil.*
4. *Love.*
5. *Hatred.*
6. *Deſire.*
7. *Joy.*
8. *Sorrow.*
9. *Hope.*
10. *Fear.*
11. *Deſpair.*
12. *Anger.*
13. *Envy.*
14. *What Paſſions all Men have.*
15,16. *Pleaſure and Pain what.*
17. *Shame.*
18. *The Inſtances to ſhew how our Ideas of the Paſſion are got from Senſation and Reflection.*

CHAP. XXI.

Of Power.

SECT.
1. *This Idea how got.*
2. *Power active and paſſive.*
3. *Power includes Relatives.*
4. *The cleareſt Idea of active Power, had from Spirit.*
5. *Will and Underſtanding, two Powers.*
6. *Faculties.*
7. *Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Neceſſity.*
8. *Liberty what.*
9. *Suppoſes Underſtanding and Will.*
10. *Belongs not to Volition.*

11. *Voluntary oppos'd to involuntary, not to neceſſary.*
12. *Liberty what.*
13. *Neceſſity what.*
14-20. *Liberty belongs not to the Will.*
21. *But to the Agent or Man.*
22-24. *In reſpect of Willing, a Man is not free.*
25,26,27. *The Will determin'd by ſomething without it.*
28. *Volition what.*
29. *What determines the Will.*
30. *Will and Deſire muſt not be confounded.*
31. *Uneaſineſs determines the Will.*
32. *Deſire is Uneaſineſs.*
33. *The Uneaſineſs of Deſire determines the Will*
34. *This the Spring of Action.*
35. *The greateſt poſitive Good determines not the Will, but Uneaſineſs.*
36. *Becauſe the Removal of Uneaſineſs is the firſt ſtep to Happineſs.*
37. *Becauſe Uneaſineſs alone is preſent.*
38. *Becauſe all who allow the Joys of Heaven poſſible, purſue them not. But a great Uneaſineſs is never neglected.*
39. *Deſire accompanies all Uneaſineſs.*
40. *The moſt preſſing Uneaſineſs naturally determines the will.*
41. *All deſire Happineſs.*
42. *Happineſs what.*
43. *What Good is deſir'd, what not.*
44. *Why the greateſt Good is not always deſir'd.*
45. *Why not being deſir'd, it moves not the Will.*
46. *Due Conſideration raiſes Deſire.*
47. *The Power to ſuſpend the Proſecution of any Deſire, makes way for Conſideration.*
48. *To be determin'd by our own Judgment, is no Reſtraint to Liberty.*
49. *The freeſt Agents are ſo determin'd.*
50. *A conſtant Determination to a Purſuit of Happineſs, no Abridgment of Liberty.*
51. *The Neceſſity of purſuing true Happineſs, the Foundation of all Liberty.*
52. *The Reaſon of it.*
53. *Government of our Paſſions, the right Improvement of Liberty.*
54,55. *How Men come to purſue different Courſes.*
56. *How Men come to chuſe ill.*
57. *Firſt, From bodily Pains. Secondly, From wrong Deſires ariſing from wrong Judgment.*
58,59. *Our Judgment of preſent Good or Evil, always right.*
60. *From a wrong Judgment of what makes a neceſſary part of their Happineſs.*
61,62. *A more particular Account of wrong Judgments.*
63. *In comparing preſent and future.*
64,65. *Cauſes of this.*
66. *In conſidering Conſequences of Actions.*
67. *Cauſes of this.*
68. *Wrong Judgment of what is neceſſary to our Happineſs.*
69. *We can change the Agreeableneſs or Diſagreeableneſs in things.*
70,71,72,73. *Preference of Vice to Virtue, a manifeſt wrong Judgment.*

CHAP. XXII.
Of mixed Modes.

SECT.

1. *Mixed Modes, what.*
2. *Made by the Mind.*
3. *Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names.*
4. *The Name ties the Parts of the mixed Modes into one Idea.*
5. *The Cauſe of making mixed Modes.*
6. *Why Words in one Language have none anſwering in another.*
7. *And Languages change.*
8. *Mixed Modes, where they exiſt.*
9. *How we get the Ideas of mix'd Modes.*
10. *Motion, Thinking, and Power, have been moſt modify'd.*
11. *Several Words ſeeming to ſignify Action, ſignify but the Effect.*
12. *Mix'd Modes, made alſo of other Ideas.*

CHAP. XXIII.
Of the complex Ideas of Subſtances.

SECT.

1. *Ideas of Subſtances how made.*
2. *Our Idea of Subſtance in general.*
3--6. *Of the ſorts of Subſtances.*
4. *No clear Ideas of Subſtance in general.*
5. *As clear an Idea of Spirit as Body.*
7. *Powers a great part of our complex Ideas of Subſtances.*
8. *And why.*
9. *Three ſorts of Ideas make our complex ones of Subſtances.*
10,11. *The now ſecondary Qualities of Bodies would diſappear, if we could diſcover the primary ones of their minute Parts.*
12. *Our Faculties of Diſcovery ſuited to our State.*
13. *Conjecture about Spirits.*
14. *Complex Ideas of Subſtances.*
15. *Idea*

15. *Idea of Spiritual Subſtances, as clear as of bodily Subſtances.*
16. *No Idea of abſtract Subſtance.*
17. *The Coheſion of ſolid Parts, and Impulſe, the primary Ideas of Body.*
18. *Thinking and Motivity, the primary Ideas of Spirit.*
19-21. *Spirits capable of Motion.*
22. *Idea of Soul and Body compar'd.*
23-27. *Coheſion of ſolid Parts in Body, as hard to be conceiv'd, as Thinking in a Soul.*
28,29. *Communication of Motion by Impulſe, or by Thought, equally intelligible.*
30. *Ideas of Body and Spirit compar'd.*
31. *The Notion of Spirit involves no more difficulty in it than that of Body.*
32. *We know nothing beyond our ſimple Ideas.*
33-35. *Idea of God.*
36. *No Ideas in our complex one of Spirits, but thoſe got from Senſation or Reflection.*
37. *Recapitulation.*

CHAP. XXIV.
Of collective Ideas of Subſtances.
SECT.
1. *One Idea.*
2. *Made by the Power of compoſing in the Mind.*
3. *All artificial things are collective Ideas.*

CHAP. XXV.
Of Relation.
SECT.
1. *Relation, what.*
2. *Relations without correlative Terms, not eaſily perceiv'd.*
3. *Some ſeemingly abſolute Terms contain Relations.*
4. *Relation different from the things related.*
5. *Change of Relation may be without any Change in the Subject.*
6. *Relation only betwixt two things.*
7. *All things capable of Relation.*
8. *The Ideas of Relation clearer often than of the Subjects related.*
9. *Relations all terminate in ſimple Ideas.*
10. *Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated, are relative.*
11. *Concluſion.*

CHAP. XXVI.
Of Cauſe, of Effect, and other Relations.
SECT.
1. *Whence their Ideas got.*
2. *Creation, Generation, making Alteration.*
3,4. *Relations of Time.*
5. *Relations of Place and Extenſion.*
6. *Abſolute Terms often ſtand for Relations.*

CHAP. XXVII.
Of Identity and Diverſity.
SECT.
1. *Wherein Identity conſiſts.*
2. *Identity of Subſtances, Identity of Modes.*
3. Principium Individuationis.
4. *Identity of Vegetables.*
5. *Identity of Animals.*
6. *Identity of Man.*
7. *Identity ſuited to the Idea.*
8. *Same Man.*
9. *Perſonal Identity.*
10. *Conſciouſneſs makes perſonal Identity.*
11. *Perſonal Identity in change of Subſtances.*
12. *Whether in the Change of thinking Subſtances.*
16. *Conſciouſneſs makes the ſame Perſon.*
17. *Self depends on Conſciouſneſs.*
18. *Object of Reward and Puniſhment.*
21. *Difference between Identity of Man and Perſon.*
23. *Conſciouſneſs alone makes Self.*
26. *Perſon a forenſick Term.*
28. *The difficulty from ill Uſe of Names.*
29. *Continu'd Exiſtence makes Identity.*

CHAP. XXVIII.
Of other Relations.
SECT.
1. *Proportional.*
2. *Natural.*
3. *Inſtituted.*
4. *Moral.*
5. *Moral Good and Evil.*
6. *Moral Rules.*
7. *Laws.*
8. *Divine Law, the Meaſure of Sin and Duty.*
9. *Civil Law, the Meaſure of Crimes and Innocence.*
10,11. *Philoſophical Law, the Meaſure of Virtue and Vice.*
12. *Its Inforcements, Commendation, and Diſcredit.*
13. *Theſe three Laws, the Rules of moral Good and Evil.*
14,15. *Morality is the Relation of Actions to the Rules.*
16. *The Denominations of Actions often miſlead us.*
17. *Relations innumerable.*
18. *All Relations terminate in ſimple Ideas.*

19. *We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) Notion of the Relation, as of its Foundation.*
20. *The Notion of the Relation is the same, whether the Rule any Action is compar'd to, be true or false.*

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Clear and Distinct, Obscure and Confused Ideas.

SECT.
1. *Ideas, some clear and some distinct, others obscure and confused.*
2. *Clear and obscure, explain'd by Sight.*
3. *Causes of Obscurity.*
4. *Distinct and confused, what.*
5. *Objection.*
6. *Confusion of Ideas, is in reference to their Names.*
7. *Defaults which make Confusion. First, complex Ideas made up of too few simple ones.*
8. *Secondly, Or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together.*
9. *Thirdly, Or are mutable or undetermin'd.*
10. *Confusion without reference to Names, hardly conceivable.*
11. *Confusion concerns always two Ideas.*
12. *Causes of Confusion.*
13. *Complex Ideas may be distinct in one part, and confused in another.*
14. *This, if not heeded, causes Confusion in our Arguings.*
15. *Instances in Eternity.*
16,17. ——*Divisibility of Matter.*

CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantastical Ideas.

SECT.
1. *Real Ideas are conformable to their Archetypes.*
2. *Simple Ideas all real.*
3. *Complex Ideas are voluntary Combinations.*
4. *Mixed Modes made of consistent Ideas, are real.*
5. *Ideas of Substances are real, when they agree with the Existence of things.*

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

SECT.
1. *Adequate Ideas are such as perfectly represent their Archetypes.*
2. *Simple Ideas all adequate.*
3. *Modes are all adequate.*
4,5. *Modes in reference to settled Names, may be inadequate.*
6,7. *Ideas of Substances, as refer'd to real Essences, not adequate.*
8-11. *Ideas of Substances, as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.*
12. *Simple Ideas ἔκτυπα, and adequate.*
13. *Ideas of Substances are ἔκτυπα, inadequate.*
14. *Ideas of Modes and Relations are Archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.*

CHAP. XXXII.

Of true and false Ideas.

SECT.
1. *Truth and Falshood properly belongs to Propositions.*
2. *Metaphysical Truth contains a tacit Proposition.*
3. *No Idea as an Appearance in the Mind true or false.*
4. *Ideas refer'd to any thing, may be true or false.*
5. *Other Mens Ideas, real Existence, and supposed real Essences, are what Men usually refer their Ideas to.*
6-8. *The Cause of such References.*
9. *Simple Ideas may be false in reference to others of the same name, but are least liable to be so.*
10. *Ideas of mix'd Modes most liable to be false in this sense.*
11. *Or at least to be thought false.*
12. *And why.*
13. *As refer'd to real Existences, none of our Ideas can be false, but those of Substances.*
14-16. *First, Simple Ideas in this sense not false, and why.*
15. *Tho' one Man's Idea of Blue should be different from another's.*
17. *Secondly, Modes not false.*
18. *Thirdly, Ideas of Substances, when false.*
19. *Truth or Falshood always supposes Affirmation or Negation.*
20. *Ideas in themselves never true nor false.*
21. *But are false, First, when judg'd agreeable to another Man's Idea without being so.*
22. *Secondly, When judg'd to agree to real Existence, when they do not.*
23. *Thirdly, When judg'd adequate, without being so.*
24. *Fourthly, When judg'd to represent the real Essence.*
26. *Ideas when false.*
25. *More properly to be call'd right or wrong.*
27. *Conclusion.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Association of Ideas.

SECT.

1. *Something unreasonable in most Men.*
2. *Not wholly from Self love.*
3. *Nor from Education.*
4. *A Degree of Madness.*
5. *From a wrong Connection of Ideas.*
6. *This Connection how made.*
7,8. *Some Antipathies an Effect of it.*
9. *A great Cause of Errors.*
10-12. *Instances.*
13. *Why Time cures some Disorders in the Mind, which Reason cannot.*
14-16. *Farther Instances of the Effects of the Association of Ideas.*
17. *Its Influence on intellectual Habits.*
18. *Observable in different Sects.*

BOOK III.

Of Words.

CHAP. I.

Of Words, or Language in general.

SECT.

1. *Man fitted to form articulate Sounds.*
2. *To make them Signs of Ideas.*
3,4. *To make general Signs.*
5. *Words ultimately deriv'd from such as signify sensible Ideas.*
6. *Distribution.*

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

SECT.

1. *Words are sensible Signs necessary for Communication.*
2, 3. *Words are the sensible Signs of his Ideas who use them.*
4. *Words often secretly refer'd, First, to the Ideas in other Mens Minds.*
5. *Secondly, To the Reality of things.*
6. *Words by Use readily excite Ideas.*
7. *Words often used without Signification.*
8. *Their Signification perfectly arbitrary.*

CHAP. III.

Of general Terms.

SECT.

1. *The greatest part of Words general.*
2. *For every particular thing to have a Name, is impossible.*
3, 4. *And useless.*
5. *What things have proper Names.*
6, 8. *How general Words are made.*
9. *General Natures are nothing but abstract Ideas.*
10. *Why the* Genus *is ordinarily made use of in Definitions.*
11. *General and Universal are Creatures of the Understanding.*
12. *Abstract Ideas are the Essences of the* Genera *and* Species.
13. *They are the Workmanship of the Understanding, but have their Foundation in the Similitude of things.*
14. *Each distinct abstract Idea, is a distinct Essence.*
15. *Real and nominal Essence.*
16. *Constant Connection between the Name and nominal Essence.*
17. *Supposition, that Species are distinguish'd by their real Essences, useless.*
18. *Real and nominal Essence, the same in simple Ideas and Modes, different in Substances.*
19. *Essences ingenerable and incorruptible.*
20. *Recapitulation.*

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of simple Ideas.

SECT.

1. *Names of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each something peculiar.*
2. *First, Names of simple Ideas and Substances, intimate real Existence.*
3. *Secondly, Names of simple Ideas and Modes, signify always both real and nominal Essence.*
4. *Thirdly Names of simple Ideas undefinable.*
5. *If all were definable, 'twould be a* Process *in* infinitum.
6. *What a Definition is.*
7. *Simple Ideas, why undefinable.*
8, 9. *Instances. Motion.*
10. *Light.*
11. *Simple Ideas why undefinable, farther explain'd.*

12,13. *The contrary ſhew'd in complex Ideas, by Inſtances of a Statue and Rainbow.*
14. *The Names of complex Ideas, when to be made intelligible by Words.*
15. *Fourthly, Names of ſimple Ideas leaſt doubtful.*
16. *Fifthly, Simple Ideas have few Aſcents* in linea prædicamentali.
17. *Sixthly, Names of ſimple Ideas ſtand for Ideas not at all arbitrary.*

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations.

SECT.
1. *They ſtand for abſtract Ideas, as other general Names.*
2. *Firſt, the Ideas they ſtand for, are made by the Underſtanding.*
3. *Secondly, Made arbitrarily, and without Patterns.*
4. *How this is done.*
5. *Evidently arbitrary, in that the Idea is often before the Exiſtence.*
6. *Inſtances, Murder, Inceſt, Stabbing.*
7. *But ſtill ſubſervient to the End of Language.*
8. *Whereof the intranſlatable Words of divers Languages are a Proof.*
9. *This ſhews Species to be made for Communication.*
10,11. *In mixed Modes, 'tis the Name that ties the Combination together, and makes it a Species.*
12. *For the Originals of mix'd Modes, we look no farther than the Mind, which alſo ſhews them to be the Workmanſhip of the Underſtanding.*
13. *Their being made by the Underſtanding without Patterns, ſhews the reaſon why they are ſo compounded.*
14. *Names of mix'd Modes ſtand always for their real Eſſences.*
15. *Why their Names are uſually got before their Ideas.*
16. *Reaſon of my being ſo large on this Subject.*

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Subſtances.

SECT.
1. *The common Names of Subſtances ſtand for Sorts.*
2. *The Eſſence of each Sort, is the abſtract Idea.*
3. *The nominal and real Eſſence different.*
4-6. *Nothing eſſential to Individuals.*
7,8. *The nominal Eſſence bounds the Species.*
9. *Not the real Eſſence which we know not.*
10. *Not ſubſtantial Forms which we know leſs.*
11. *That the nominal Eſſence is that whereby we diſtinguiſh Species, farther evident from Spirits.*
12. *Whereof there are probably numberleſs Species.*
13. *The nominal Eſſence that of the Species, prov'd from Water and Ice.*
14-18. *Difficulties againſt a certain Number of real Eſſences.*
19. *Our nominal Eſſences of Subſtances, not perfect Collections of Properties.*
21. *But ſuch a Collection as our Name ſtands for.*
22. *Our abſtract Ideas are to us the Meaſures of Species: Inſtances in that of Man.*
23. *Species not diſtinguiſh'd by Generation.*
24. *Not by ſubſtantial Forms.*
25. *The ſpecifick Eſſences are made by the Mind.*
26. *Therefore very various and uncertain.*
27. *But not ſo arbitrarily as mix'd Modes.*
28. *Tho' very imperfect.*
29. *Which yet ſerves for common Converſe.*
30. *But makes ſeveral Eſſences ſignify'd by the ſame Name.*
31. *The more general our Ideas are, the more incompleat and partial they are.*
32. *This all accommodated to the End of Speech.*
33. *Inſtance in Caſſuaries.*
34. *Men make the Species; inſtance, Gold.*
35. *Tho' Nature make the Similitude.*
36. *And continues it in the Races of things.*
37. *Each abſtract Idea is an Eſſence.*
38. Genera *and* Species, *in order to naming; inſtance, Watch.*
39. *Species of artificial things, leſs confuſed than natural.*
40. *Artificial things of diſtinct Species.*
41. *Subſtances alone have proper Names.*
42. *Difficulty to treat of Words with Words.*
43,44. *Inſtance of mix'd Modes in* Kineah *and* Niouph.
45,46. *Inſtance of Subſtances in* Zahab.
47. *Their Ideas perfect, and therefore various.*
48. *Therefore to fix their Species, a real Eſſence is ſuppoſ'd.*

49. *Which*

49. *Which Supposition is of no use.*
50. *Conclusion.*

CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

SECT.
1. *Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together.*
2. *In them consists the Art of well speaking.*
3,4. *They shew what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.*
5. *Instance in* But.
6. *This matter but lightly touch'd here.*

CHAP. VIII.

Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.

SECT.
1. *Abstract Terms not predicable one of another, and why.*
2. *They shew the difference of our Ideas.*

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

SECT.
1. *Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.*
2. *Any Words will serve for recording.*
3. *Communication by Words, Civil or Philosophical.*
4. *The Imperfection of Words, is the Doubtfulness of their Signification.*
5. *Causes of their Imperfection.*
6. *The Names of mix'd Modes doubtful: First, Because the Ideas they stand for, are so complex.*
7. *Secondly, Because they have no Standards.*
8. *Propriety not a sufficient Remedy.*
9. *The way of learning these Names contributes also to their Doubtfulness.*
10. *Hence unavoidable Obscurity in ancient Authors.*
12. *Names of Substances refer'd, First, to real Essences that cannot be known.*
13,14. *Secondly, To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.*
15. *With this Imperfection they may serve for Civil, but not well for Philosophical Use.*
16. *Instance, Liquor of Nerves.*
17. *Instance, Gold.*
18. *The Names of simple Ideas the least doubtful.*
19. *And next to them simple Modes.*
20. *The most doubtful, are the Names of very compounded mixed Modes and Substances.*
21. *Why this Imperfection charg'd upon Words.*
22,23. *This should teach us Moderation in imposing our own Sense of old Authors.*

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

SECT.
1. *Abuse of Words.*
2,3. *First, Words without any, or without clear Ideas.*
4. *Occasion'd by learning Names before the Ideas they belong to.*
5. *Secondly, Unsteddy Application of them.*
6. *Thirdly, Affected Obscurity by wrong Application.*
7. *Logick and Dispute has much contributed to this.*
8. *Calling it Subtilty.*
9. *This Learning very little benefits Society.*
10. *But destroys the Instruments of Knowledg and Communication.*
11. *As useful as to confound the Sound of the Letters.*
12. *This Art has perplex'd Religion and Justice.*
13. *And ought not to pass for Learning.*
14. *Fourthly, Taking them for things.*
15. *Instance in Matter.*
16. *This makes Errors lasting.*
17. *Fifthly, Setting them for what they cannot signify.*
18. *V. g. putting them for the real Essences of Substances.*
19. *Hence we think every Change of our Idea in Substances, not to change the Species.*
20. *The Cause of this Abuse, a Supposition of Nature's working always regularly.*
21. *This Abuse contains two false Suppositions.*
22. *Sixthly, A Supposition, that Words have a certain and evident Signification.*
23. *The Ends of Language: First, To convey our Ideas.*
24. *Secondly, To do it with Quickness.*
25. *Thirdly, Therewith to convey the Knowledg of things.*
26-31. *How Mens words fail in all these.*
32. *How in Substances.*
33. *How in Modes and Relations.*
34. *Seventhly, Figurative Speech also an Abuse of Language.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuſes.

SECT.

1. *They are worth ſeeking.*
2. *Are not eaſy.*
3. *But yet neceſſary to Philoſophy.*
4. *Miſuſe of Words, the Cauſe of great Errors.*
5. *Obſtinacy.*
6. *And Wrangling.*
7. *Inſtance, Bat and Bird.*
8. *Firſt, Remedy, to uſe no Word without an Idea.*
9. *Secondly, To have diſtinct Ideas annex'd to them in Modes.*
10. *And diſtinct and conformable in Subſtances.*
11. *Thirdly, Propriety.*
12. *Fourthly, To make known their Meaning.*
13. *And that three ways.*
14. *Firſt, In ſimple Ideas by ſynonymous Terms or Shewing.*
15. *Secondly, in mix'd Modes by Definition.*
16. *Morality capable of Demonſtration.*
17. *Definitions can make moral Diſcourſes clear.*
18. *And is the only way.*
19. *Thirdly, In Subſtances, by ſhewing and defining.*
20,21. *Ideas of the leading Qualities of Subſtances, are beſt got by ſhewing.*
22. *The Ideas of their Powers beſt by Definition.*
23. *A Reflection on the Knowledg of Spirits.*
24. *Ideas alſo of Subſtances muſt be conformable to things.*
25. *Not eaſy to be made ſo.*
26. *Fifthly, By Conſtancy in their Signification.*
27. *When the Variation is to be explain'd.*

BOOK IV.

Of Knowledg and Opinion.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledg in general.

SECT.

1. *Our Knowledg converſant about our Ideas.*
2. *Knowledg is the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas.*
3. *This Agreement fourfold.*
4. *Firſt, Of Identity or Diverſity.*
5. *Secondly, Relation.*
6. *Thirdly, Of Co-exiſtence.*
7. *Fourthly, Of real Exiſtence.*
8. *Knowledg actual or habitual.*
9. *Habitual Knowledg twofold.*

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledg.

SECT.

1. *Intuitive.*
2. *Demonſtrative.*
3. *Depends on Proofs.*
4. *But not ſo eaſy.*
5. *Not without precedent Doubt.*
6. *Not ſo clear.*
7. *Each Step muſt have intuitive Evidence.*
8. *Hence the Miſtake* ex præcognitis & præconceſſis.
9. *Demonſtration not limited to Quantity.*
10-13. *Why it has been ſo thought.*
14. *Senſitive Knowledg of particular Exiſtence.*
15. *Knowledg not always clear, where the Ideas are ſo.*

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Human Knowledg.

SECT.

1. *Firſt, No farther than we have Ideas.*
2. *Secondly, No farther than we can perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement.*
3. *Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledg extends it ſelf not to all the Relations of all our Ideas.*
4. *Fourthly, Nor demonſtrative Knowledg.*
5. *Fifthly, Senſitive Knowledg narrower than either.*
6. *Sixthly, our Knowledg therefore narrower than our Ideas.*
7. *How far our Knowledg reaches.*
8. *Firſt, Our Knowledg of Identity and Diverſity, as far as our Ideas.*
9. *Secondly, Of Co-exiſtence a very little way.*
10. *Becauſe the Connection between moſt ſimple Ideas is unknown.*
11. *Eſpe-*

11. *Especially of secondary Qualities.*
12-14. *And farther, because all Connection between any secondary and primary Qualities is undiscoverable.*
15. *Of Repugnancy to co-exist larger.*
16. *Of the Co-existence of Powers a very little way.*
17. *Of Spirits yet narrower.*
18. *Thirdly, Of other Relations, it is not easy to say how far. Morality capable of Demonstration.*
19. *Two Things have made moral Ideas thought uncapable of Demonstration. Their Complexedness and want of sensible Representations.*
20. *Remedies of those Difficulties.*
21. *Fourthly, Of real Existence, we have an intuitive Knowledg of our own, demonstrative of God's, sensible of some few other things.*
22. *Our Ignorance great.*
23. *First, One Cause of its want of Ideas, either such as we have no Conception of, or such as particularly we have not.*
24. *Because of their Remoteness, or,*
25. *Because of their Minuteness.*
26. *Hence no Science of Bodies.*
27. *Much less of Spirits.*
28. *Secondly, Want of a discoverable Connection between Ideas we have.*
29. *Instances.*
30. *Thirdly, Want of tracing our Ideas.*
31. *Extent in respect of Universality.*

CHAP. IV.

Of the Reality of our Knowledg.

SECT.

1. *Objection. Knowledg placed in Ideas, may be all bare Vision.*
2, 3. *Answer, Not so, where Ideas agree with Things.*
4. *As, First, All simple Ideas do.*
5. *Secondly, All complex Ideas excepted.*
6. *Hence the Reality of mathematical Knowledg.*
7. *And of moral.*
8. *Existence not requir'd to make it real.*
9. *Nor will it be less true or certain, because moral Ideas are of our own making and naming.*
10. *Misnaming disturbs not the Certainty of the Knowledg.*
11. *Ideas of Substances have their Archetypes without us.*
12. *So far as they agree with those, so far our Knowledg concerning them is real.*
13. *In our Inquiries about Substances, we must consider Ideas, and not confine our Thoughts to Names or Species supposed set out by Names.*
14-17. *Objection against a Changeling being something between Man and Beast, answer'd.*
18. *Recapitulation.*

CHAP. V.

Of Truth in general.

SECT.

1. *What Truth is.*
2. *A right joining, or separating of Signs; i. e. Ideas or Words.*
3. *Which make mental or verbal Propositions.*
4. *Mental Propositions are very hard to be treated of.*
5. *Being nothing but the joining, or separating Ideas without Words.*
6. *When mental Propositions contain real Truth, and when verbal.*
7. *Objection against verbal Truth, that it may be thus all chimerical.*
8. *Answered, real Truth is about Ideas agreeing to Things.*
9. *Falsehood is the joining of Names otherwise than their Ideas agree.*
10. *General Propositions to be treated of more at large.*
11. *Moral and metaphysical Truth.*

CHAP. VI.

Of universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

SECT.

1. *Treating of Words, necessary to Knowledg.*
2. *General Truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal Propositions.*
3. *Certainty two-fold, of Truth, and of Knowledg.*
4. *No Proposition can be known to be true, where the Essence of each Species mentioned, is not known.*
5. *This more particularly concerns Substances.*
6. *The Truth of few universal Propositions concerning Substances, is to be known.*
7. *Because Co-existence of Ideas in few Cases to be known.*
8, 9. *Instance in Gold.*
10. *As far as any such Co-existence can be known, so far universal Propositions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, because,*
11, 12. *The Qualities which make our complex Ideas of Substances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceiv'd Causes.*
13. *Judg-*

13. *Judgment may reach farther, but that is not Knowledg.*
14. *What is requiſite for our Knowledg of Subſtances.*
15. *Whilſt our Ideas of Subſtances contain not their real Conſtitutions, we can make but few general certain Propoſitions concerning them.*
16. *Wherein lies the general Certainty of Propoſitions.*

CHAP. VII.
Of Maxims.

SECT.
1. *They are ſelf-evident.*
2. *Wherein that Self-evidence conſiſts.*
3. *Self-evidence not peculiar to receiv'd Axioms.*
4. *Firſt, As to Identity and Diverſity, all Propoſitions are equally ſelf-evident.*
5. *Secondly, In Co-exiſtence we have few ſelf-evident Propoſitions.*
6. *Thirdly, In other Relations we may have.*
7. *Fourthly, Concerning real Exiſtence, we have none.*
8. *Theſe Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledg.*
9, 10. *Becauſe they are not the Truths the firſt known.*
11. *What Uſe theſe general Maxims have.*
12. *Maxims, if care be not taken in the Uſe of Words, may prove Contradictions.*
13. *Inſtance in* Vacuum.
14. *They prove not the Exiſtence of things without us.*
15. *Their Application dangerous about complex Ideas.*
16-18. *Inſtance in Man.*
19. *Little Uſe of theſe Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and diſtinct Ideas.*
20. *Their Uſe dangerous, where our Ideas are confuſed.*

CHAP. VIII.
Of Trifling Propoſitions.

SECT.
1. *Some Propoſitions bring no Increaſe to our Knowledg.*
2, 3. *As, Firſt, Identical Propoſitions.*
4. *Secondly, When a part of any complex Idea is predicated of the whole.*
5. *As part of the Definition of the defined.*
6. *Inſtance, Man and Palfry.*
7. *For this teaches but the Signification of Words.*
8. *But no real Knowledg.*
9. *General Propoſitions concerning Subſtances, are often trifling.*
10. *And why.*
11. *Thirdly, Uſing Words variouſly, is trifling with them.*
12. *Marks of verbal Propoſitions. Firſt, Predication in abſtract.*
13. *Secondly, A part of the Definition predicated of any Term.*

CHAP. IX.
Of our Knowledge of Exiſtence.

SECT.
1. *General certain Propoſitions concern not Exiſtence.*
2. *A threefold Knowledge of Exiſtence.*
3. *Our Knowledg of our own Exiſtence, is intuitive.*

CHAP. X.
Of the Exiſtence of a GOD.

SECT.
1. *We are capable of knowing certainly, that there is a* GOD.
2. *Man knows, that he himſelf is.*
3. *He knows alſo, that nothing can not produce a Being, therefore ſomething Eternal.*
4. *That eternal Being muſt be moſt powerful.*
5. *And moſt knowing.*
6. *And therefore* GOD.
7. *Our Idea of a moſt perfect Being, not the ſole Proof of a* GOD.
8. *Something from Eternity.*
9. *Two ſorts of Beings, Cogitative and Incogitative.*
10. *Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative.*
11,12. *Therefore there has been an eternal Wiſdom.*
13. *Whether material or no.*
14. *Not material, Firſt, becauſe every Particle of Matter is not cogitative.*
15. *Secondly, One Particle alone of Matter cannot be cogitative.*
16. *Thirdly, A Syſtem of incogitative Matter cannot be cogitative.*
17. *Whether in Motion, or at Reſt.*
18,19. *Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind.*

CHAP. XI.
Of the Knowledg of the Exiſtence of other Things.

SECT.
1. *Is to be had only by Senſation.*
2. *Inſtance, Whiteneſs of this Paper.*
3. *This, tho' not ſo certain as Demonſtration, yet may be call'd Knowledg, and proves the Exiſtence of things without us.*
4. *Firſt,*

4. *First, Because we cannot have them but by the Inlet of the Senses.*
5. *Because an Idea from actual Sensation, and another from Memory, are very distinct Perceptions.*
6. *Thirdly, Pleasure or Pain, which accompanies actual Sensation, accompanies not the returning of those Ideas without the external Objects.*
7. *Fourthly, Our Senses assist one another's Testimony of the Existence of outward things.*
8. *This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs.*
9. *But reaches no farther than actual Sensation.*
10. *Folly to expect Demonstration in every thing.*
11. *Past Existence is known by Memory.*
12. *The Existence of Spirits not knowable.*
13. *Particular Propositions concerning Existence, are knowable.*
14. *And general Propositions concerning abstract Ideas.*

CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledg.

SECT.
1. *Knowledg is not from Maxims.*
2. *The Occasion of that Opinion.*
3. *But from the comparing clear and distinct Ideas.*
4. *Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles.*
5. *This no certain way to Truth.*
6. *But to compare clear compleat Ideas under steddy Names.*
7. *The true Method of advancing Knowledg, is by considering our abstract Ideas.*
8. *By which, Morality also may be made clearer.*
9. *But Knowledg of Bodies is to be improved only by Experience.*
10. *This may procure us Convenience, not Science.*
11. *We are fitted for moral Knowledg, and natural Improvements.*
12. *But must beware of Hypotheses and wrong Principles.*
13. *The true Use of Hypotheses.*
14. *Clear and distinct Ideas with settled Names, and the finding of those which shew their Agreement or Disagreement, are the ways to enlarge our Knowledg.*
15. *Mathematicks an Instance of it.*

CHAP. XIII.

Some other Considerations concerning our Knowledg.

SECT.
1. *Our Knowledg partly necessary, partly voluntary.*
2. *The Application voluntary; but we know as things are, not as we please.*
3. *Instances in Number.*

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

SECT.
1. *Our Knowledg being short, we want something else.*
2. *What Use to be made of this twilight Estate.*
3. *Judgment supplies the want of Knowledg.*
4. *Judgment is the presuming Things to be so, without perceiving it.*

CHAP. XV.

Of Probability.

SECT.
1. *Probability is the Appearance of Agreement upon fallible Proofs.*
2. *It is to supply the want of Knowledg.*
3. *Being that which makes us presume Things to be true, before we know them to be so.*
4. *The Grounds of Probability are two; Conformity with our own Experience, or the Testimony of others Experience.*
5. *In this all the Agreements,* pro *and* con, *ought to be examined, before we come to a Judgment.*
6. *They being capable of great Variety.*

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Assent.

SECT.
1. *Our Assent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability.*
2. *These cannot always be all actually in view, and then we must content our selves with the Remembrance that we once saw ground for such a Degree of Assent.*
3. *The ill Consequence of this, if our former Judgment were not rightly made.*
4. *The right Use of it, is mutual Charity and Forbearance.*
5. *Probability is either of Matter of Fact or Speculation.*
6. *The concurrent Experience of all other Men with our's, produces Assurance approaching to Knowledg.*
7. *Unquestionable Testimony and Experience for the most part produce Confidence.*

8. *Fair*

8. *Fair Teſtimony, and the Nature of the thing indifferent, produces alſo conſident Belief.*
9. *Experience and Teſtimonies claſhing, infinitely vary the Degrees of Probability.*
10. *Traditional Teſtimonies, the farther remov'd, the leſs their Proof.*
11. *Yet Hiſtory is of great uſe.*
12. *In thing which Senſe cannot diſcover, Analogy is the great Rule of Probability.*
13. *One Caſe where contrary Experience leſſens not the Teſtimony.*
14. *The bare Teſtimony of Revelation is the higheſt Certainty.*

CHAP. XVII.

Of Reaſon.

SECT.

1. *Various Significations of the word Reaſon.*
2. *Wherein Reaſoning conſiſts.*
3. *Its four parts.*
4. *Syllogiſm not the great Inſtrument of Reaſon.*
5. *Helps little in Demonſtration, leſs in Probability.*
6. *Serves not to increaſe our Knowledge, but fence with it.*
7. *Other Helps ſhould be ſought.*
8. *We reaſon about Particulars.*
9. *Firſt, Reaſon fails us for want of Ideas.*
10. *Secondly, Becauſe of obſcure and imperfect Ideas.*
11. *Thirdly, For want of intermediate Ideas.*
12. *Fourthly, Becauſe of wrong Principles.*
13. *Fifthly, Becauſe of doubtful Terms.*
14. *Our higheſt Degree of Knowledg is intuitive without reaſoning.*
15. *The next is Demonſtration by reaſoning.*
16. *To ſupply the Narrowneſs of this, we have nothing but Judgment upon probable Reaſoning.*
17. *Intuition, Demonſtration, Judgment.*
18. *Conſequences of Words, and Conſequences of Ideas.*
19. *Four ſorts of Arguments: Firſt,* Ad Verecundiam.
20. *Secondly,* Ad Ignorantiam.
21. *Thirdly,* Ad Hominem.
22. *Fourthly,* Ad Judicium.
23. *Above, contrary, and according to Reaſon.*
24. *Reaſon and Faith not oppoſite.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reaſon, and their diſtinct Provinces.

SECT.

1. *Neceſſary to know their Boundaries.*
2. *Faith and Reaſon, what, as contra-diſtinguiſh'd.*
3. *No new ſimple Idea can be convey'd by traditional Revelation.*
4. *Traditional Revelation may make us know Propoſitions knowable alſo by Reaſon, but not with the ſame Certainty that Reaſon doth.*
5. *Revelation cannot be admitted againſt the clear Evidence of Reaſon.*
6. *Traditional Revelation much leſs.*
7. *Things above Reaſon.*
8. *Or not contrary to Reaſon, if reveal'd, are Matter of Faith.*
9. *Revelation, in Matters where Reaſon cannot judg, or but probably, ought to be hearken'd to.*
10. *In Matters where Reaſon can afford certain Knowledg, that is to be hearken'd to.*
11. *If the Boundaries be not ſet between Faith and Reaſon, no Enthuſiaſm, or Extravagancy in Religion, can be contradicted.*

CHAP. XIX.

Of Enthuſiaſm.

SECT.

1. *Love of Truth neceſſary.*
2. *A Forwardneſs to dictate, whence.*
3. *Force of Enthuſiaſm.*
4. *Reaſon and Revelation.*
5. *Riſe of Enthuſiaſm.*
6, 7. *Enthuſiaſm.*
8, 9. *Enthuſiaſm miſtaken for ſeeing and feeling.*
10. *Enthuſiaſm how to be diſcover'd.*
11. *Enthuſiaſm fails of Evidence, that the Propoſition is from* GOD.
12. *Firmneſs of Perſuaſion, no Proof that any Propoſition is from* GOD.
13. *Light in the Mind, what.*
14. *Revelation muſt be judg'd by Reaſon.*
15. *Belief no Proof of Revelation.*

CHAP. XX.

Of wrong Aſſent, or Error.

SECT.

1. *Cauſes of Error.*
2. *Firſt, Want of Proofs.*
3. Obj. *What ſhall become of thoſe who want them, anſwer'd.*
4. *People hinder'd from Inquiry.*
5. *Secondly, Want of Skill to uſe them.*
6. *Thirdly, Want of Will to uſe them.*
7. *Fourthly, Wrong Meaſures of Probability; whereof,*
8-10. *Firſt, Doubtful Propoſitions taken for Principles.*
11. *Secondly, Receiv'd Hypotheſes.*
12. *Thirdly, Predominant Paſſions.*
13. *The Means of evading Probabilities, 1ſt, Suppos'd Fallacy.*
14. *2dly, Suppos'd Arguments for the contrary.*
15. *What Probabilities determine the Aſſent.*
16. *Where it is in our power to ſuſpend it.*
17. *Fourthly, Authority.*
18. *Men not in ſo many Errors as is imagin'd.*

CHAP. XXI.

Diviſion of the Sciences.

SECT.

1. *Three ſorts.*
2. *Firſt,* Phyſica.
3. *Secondly,* Practica.
4. *Thirdly,* Σημειωτικὴ.
5. *This is the firſt Diviſion of the Objects of Knowledg.*

OF

OF

Human Underſtanding.

BOOK I. CHAP. I.

Introduction.

§. 1. *An Inquiry into the Underſtanding, pleaſant and uſeful.*

SINCE it is the *Underſtanding* that ſets Man above the reſt of ſenſible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for its Nobleneſs, worth our Labour to enquire into. The Underſtanding, like the Eye, whilſt it makes us ſee, and perceive all other Things, takes no notice of itſelf: And it requires Art and Pains to ſet it a diſtance, and make it its own Object. But whatever be the Difficulties that lie in the way of this Enquiry; whatever it be that keeps us ſo much in the Dark to our ſelves; ſure I am, that all the Light we can let in upon our own Minds, all the Acquaintance we can make with our own Underſtandings, will not only be very pleaſant, but bring us great Advantage, in directing our Thoughts in the ſearch of other Things.

§. 2. *Deſign.* This therefore, being my *Purpoſe* to enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of Human Knowledg; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion and Aſſent: I ſhall not at preſent meddle with the Phyſical Conſideration of the Mind, or trouble my ſelf to examine, wherein its Eſſence conſiſts, or by what Motions of our Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have any Senſation by our Organs, or any *Ideas* in our Underſtandings; and whether thoſe *Ideas* do in their Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter or no. Theſe are Speculations, which however curious and entertaining, I ſhall decline, as lying out of my way, in the Deſign I am now upon. It ſhall ſuffice to my preſent Purpoſe, to conſider the diſcerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employ'd about the Objects which they have to do with: And I ſhall imagine I have not wholly diſemploy'd my ſelf in the Thoughts I ſhall have on this Occaſion, if in the following Hiſtorical, plain Method, I can give any account of the Ways whereby our Underſtandings come to attain thoſe Notions of Things we have, and can ſuppoſe any Meaſures of the Certainty of our Knowledg, or the Grounds of thoſe Perſuaſions which are to be found amongſt Men, ſo various, different, and even contradictory; and yet aſſerted ſomewhere or other with ſuch Aſſurance and Confidence, that he that ſhall take a view of the Opinions of Mankind, may well deſerve their Oppoſition, and at the ſame time conſider the Fondneſs and Devotion wherewith they are embrac'd, the Reſolution and Eagerneſs wherewith they are maintain'd; may perhaps have Reaſon to ſuſpect, that either there is no ſuch Thing as Truth at all;

be ſufficient to convince unprejudic'd Readers of the Falſeneſs of this Suppoſition, if I ſhould only ſhew (as I hope I ſhall in the following Parts of this Diſcourſe) how Men, barely by the uſe of their Natural Faculties, may attain to all the Knowledg they have, without the help of any Innate Impreſſions; and may arrive at Certainty, without any ſuch Original Notions or Principles. For I imagine any one will eaſily grant, That it would be impertinent to ſuppoſe, the *Ideas* of Colours Innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes, from External Objects: And no leſs unreaſonable would it be to attribute ſeveral Truths to the Impreſſions of Nature, and Innate Characters, when we may obſerve in our ſelves Faculties, fit to attain as eaſy and certain Knowledg of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the Mind.

But becauſe a Man is not permitted without Cenſure to follow his own Thoughts in the ſearch of Truth, when they lead him ever ſo little out of the common Road; I ſhall ſet down the Reaſons that made me doubt of the Truth of that Opinion, as an Excuſe for my Miſtake, if I be in one: which I leave to be conſider'd by thoſe, who, with me, diſpoſe themſelves to embrace Truth wherever they find it.

General Aſſent the great Argument.

§. 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain Principles both *Speculative* and *Practical* (for they ſpeak of both) univerſally agreed upon by all Mankind; which therefore they argue, muſt needs be conſtant Impreſſions, which the Souls of Men receive in their firſt Beings, and which they bring into the World with them, as neceſſarily and really as they do any of their inherent Faculties.

Univerſal Conſent proves nothing Innate.

§. 3. This Argument, drawn from *Univerſal Conſent*, has this Misfortune in it, that if it were true in Matter of Fact, That there were certain Truths, wherein all Mankind agreed, it would not prove them Innate, if there can be any other way ſhewn, how Men may come to that Univerſal Agreement in the things they do conſent in; which I preſume may be done.

What is, is; *and* 'tis impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be, *not univerſally aſſented to.*

§. 4. But, which is worſe, this Argument of Univerſal Conſent, which is made uſe of to prove Innate Principles, ſeems to me a Demonſtration that there are none ſuch; becauſe there are none to which all Mankind give an univerſal Aſſent. I ſhall begin with the Speculative, and inſtance in thoſe magnify'd Principles of Demonſtration: *Whatſoever is, is*; and *'tis impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*; which of all others, I think, have the moſt allow'd Title to Innate. Theſe have ſo ſettled a Reputation of Maxims univerſally receiv'd, that 'twill, no doubt, be thought ſtrange, if any one ſhould ſeem to queſtion it. But yet I take liberty to ſay, that theſe Propoſitions are ſo far from having an Univerſal Aſſent, that there are a great Part of Mankind, to whom they are not ſo much as known.

Not on the Mind naturally imprinted, becauſe not known to Children, Idiots, &c.

§. 5. For, firſt 'tis evident, that all *Children* and *Idiots* have not the leaſt Apprehenſion or Thought of them; and the want of that is enough to deſtroy that Univerſal Aſſent, which muſt needs be the neceſſary Concomitant of all Innate Truths: It ſeeming to me near a Contradiction, to ſay, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul, which it perceives or underſtands not; Imprinting, if it ſignify any thing, being nothing elſe, but the making certain Truths to be perceiv'd. For to imprint any thing on the Mind, without the Mind's perceiving it, ſeems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore *Children* and *Idiots* have Souls, have Minds, with thoſe Impreſſions upon them, they muſt unavoidably perceive them, and neceſſarily know and aſſent to theſe Truths, which ſince they do not, it is evident that there are no ſuch Impreſſions. For if they are not Notions naturally imprinted, how can they be Innate? And if they are Notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To ſay a Notion is imprinted on the Mind, and yet at the ſame time to ſay, that the Mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this Impreſſion nothing. No Propoſition can be ſaid to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conſcious of. For if any one may; then by the ſame Reaſon, all Propoſitions that are true, and the Mind is capable ever of aſſenting to, may be ſaid to be in the Mind, and to be imprinted: Since if any one can be ſaid to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, it muſt be only becauſe it is capable of knowing it; and ſo the Mind is of all Truths it ever ſhall know. Nay, thus

Truths

Truths may be imprinted on the Mind, which it never did, nor ever ſhall know: For a Man may live long, and die at laſt in ignorance of many Truths, which his Mind was capable of knowing, and that with Certainty. So that if the Capacity of knowing be the natural Impreſſion contended for, all the Truths a Man ever comes to know, will, by this Account, be every one of them Innate; and this great Point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of ſpeaking; which, whilſt it pretends to aſſert the contrary, ſays nothing different from thoſe who deny Innate Principles. For no body, I think, ever deny'd, that the Mind was capable of knowing ſeveral Truths. The Capacity, they ſay, is Innate, the Knowledg acquir'd. But then to what end ſuch Conteſt for certain Innate Maxims? If Truths can be imprinted on the Underſtanding without being perceiv'd, I can ſee no difference there can be between any Truths the Mind is capable of knowing, in reſpect of their Original: They muſt all be Innate, or all Adventitious: In vain ſhall a Man go about to diſtinguiſh them. He therefore that talks of Innate Notions in the Underſtanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any diſtinct ſort of Truths) mean ſuch Truths to be in the Underſtanding, as it never perceiv'd, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if theſe Words (*to be in the Underſtanding*) have any Propriety, they ſignify to be underſtood. So that, to be in the Underſtanding, and not to be underſtood; to be in the Mind, and never to be perceiv'd, is all one as to ſay, any thing is, and is not, in the Mind or Underſtanding. If therefore theſe two Propoſitions, *Whatſoever is, is*; and *'tis impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*, are by Nature imprinted, Children cannot be ignorant of them; Infants, and All that have Souls, muſt neceſſarily have them in their Underſtandings, know the Truth of them, and aſſent to it.

§. 6. To avoid this, 'tis uſually anſwer'd, That all Men know and *aſſent* to them, *when they come to the Uſe of Reaſon*; and this is enough to prove them Innate. I anſwer,

That Men know them when they come to the uſe of Reaſon, anſwer'd.

§. 7. Doubtful Expreſſions, that have ſcarce any Signification, go for clear Reaſons, to thoſe, who being pre-poſſeſs'd, take not the pains to examine even what they themſelves ſay. For to apply this Anſwer with any tolerable Senſe to our preſent Purpoſe, it muſt ſignify one of theſe two things; either, That as ſoon as Men come to the uſe of Reaſon, theſe ſuppos'd native Inſcriptions come to be known, and obſerv'd by them: or elſe, That the Uſe and Exerciſe of Men's Reaſons aſſiſts them in the Diſcovery of theſe Principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

If Reaſon diſcover'd them, that would not prove them Innate.

§. 8. If they mean that by the *Uſe of Reaſon* Men may diſcover theſe Principles; and that this is ſufficient to prove them Innate; their way of arguing will ſtand thus, (*viz.*) That whatever Truths Reaſon can certainly diſcover to us, and make us firmly aſſent to, thoſe are all naturally imprinted on the Mind: ſince that univerſal Aſſent, which is made the Mark of them, amounts to no more but this; That by the Uſe of Reaſon we are capable to come to a certain Knowledg of, and Aſſent to them: and by this means there will be no difference between the Maxims of the Mathematicians, and Theorems they deduce from them. All muſt be equally allow'd Innate, they being all Diſcoveries made by the Uſe of Reaſon, and Truths that a rational Creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his Thoughts rightly that way.

'Tis falſe that Reaſon diſcovers them.

§. 9. But how can theſe Men think the *Uſe of Reaſon* neceſſary to diſcover Principles that are ſuppos'd Innate, when Reaſon (if we may believe them) is nothing elſe, but the Faculty of deducing unknown Truths from Principles or Propoſitions that are already known? That certainly can never be thought Innate, which we have need of Reaſon to diſcover, unleſs, as I have ſaid, we will have all the certain Truths, that Reaſon ever teaches us, to be Innate. We may as well think the Uſe of Reaſon neceſſary to make our Eyes diſcover viſible Objects, as that there ſhould be need of Reaſon, or the Exerciſe thereof, to make the Underſtanding ſee what is originally engraven in it, and cannot be in the Underſtanding, before it be perceiv'd by it. So that to make Reaſon diſcover thoſe Truths thus imprinted, is to ſay, that the Uſe of Reaſon diſcovers to a Man what he knew before; and if Men have thoſe Innate impreſs'd Truths originally, and before the uſe of Reaſon, and yet are always ignorant of them till they come to the Uſe of Reaſon, 'tis in effect to ſay, that Men know, and know them not at the ſame time.

§. 10.

§. 10. 'Twill here perhaps be ſaid, That Mathematical Demonſtrations, and other Truths that are not innate, are not aſſented to, as ſoon as propos'd, wherein they are diſtinguiſh'd from theſe Maxims, and other Innate Truths. I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak of Aſſent upon the firſt propoſing, more particularly by and by. I ſhall here only, and that very readily, allow that theſe Maxims, and Mathematical Demonſtrations are in this different; That the one has need of Reaſon uſing of Proofs, to make them out, and to gain our Aſſent; but the other, as ſoon as underſtood, are, without any the leaſt reaſoning, embrac'd and aſſented to. But I withal beg leave to obſerve, that it lays open the Weakneſs of this Subterfuge, which requires the *Uſe of Reaſon* for the Diſcovery of theſe general Truths: Since it muſt be confeſs'd, that in their Diſcovery there is no Uſe made of Reaſoning at all. And I think thoſe who give this Anſwer, will not be forward to affirm, That the Knowledg of this Maxim, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be*, is a Deduction of our Reaſon. For this would be to deſtroy that Bounty of Nature they ſeem ſo fond of, whilſt they make the Knowledg of thoſe Principles to depend on the Labour of our Thoughts. For all Reaſoning is Search, and caſting about, and requires Pains and Application. And how can it with any tolerable ſenſe be ſuppos'd, that what was imprinted by Nature, as the Foundation and Guide of our Reaſon, ſhould need the Uſe of Reaſon to diſcover it?

§. 11. Thoſe who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the Operations of the Underſtanding, will find that this ready Aſſent of the Mind to ſome Truths, depends not, either on native Inſcription, or the *Uſe of Reaſon*; but on a Faculty of the Mind quite diſtinct from both of them, as we ſhall ſee hereafter. Reaſon therefore having nothing to do in procuring our Aſſent to theſe Maxims, if by ſaying, that *Men know and aſſent to them, when they come to the Uſe of Reaſon*, be meant, That the Uſe of Reaſon aſſiſts us in the Knowledg of theſe Maxims, it is utterly falſe; and were it true, would prove them not to be Innate.

The coming to the Uſe of Reaſon, not the time we come to know theſe Maxims.

§. 12. If by knowing and aſſenting to them, *when we come to the Uſe of Reaſon*, be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the Mind; and that as ſoon as Children come to the Uſe of Reaſon, they come alſo to know and aſſent to theſe Maxims; this alſo is falſe and frivolous. *Firſt*, It is falſe: Becauſe it is evident, theſe Maxims are not in the Mind ſo early as the Uſe of Reaſon: And therefore the coming to the Uſe of Reaſon is falſly aſſign'd, as the Time of their Diſcovery. How many Inſtances of the Uſe of Reaſon, may we obſerve in Children, long time before they have any knowledg of this Maxim, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be?* And a great part of illiterate People, and Savages, paſs many Years, even of their rational Age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general Propoſitions. I grant, Men come not to the knowledg of theſe general and more abſtract Truths, which are thought Innate, till they come to the Uſe of Reaſon; and I add, nor then neither. Which is ſo, becauſe till after they come to the Uſe of Reaſon, thoſe general abſtract *Ideas* are not fram'd in the Mind, about which thoſe general Maxims are, which are miſtaken for Innate Principles, but are indeed Diſcoveries made, and Verities introduc'd, and brought into the Mind by the ſame Way, and diſcover'd by the ſame Steps, as ſeveral other Propoſitions, which no body was ever ſo extravagant as to ſuppoſe Innate. This I hope to make plain in the ſequel of this Diſcourſe. I allow therefore a Neceſſity, that Men ſhould come to the Uſe of Reaſon, before they get the Knowledg of thoſe general Truths; but deny, that Men's coming to the Uſe of Reaſon is the time of their Diſcovery.

By this, they are not diſtinguiſh'd from other knowable Truths.

§. 13. In the mean time it is obſervable, that this Saying, that Men know, and aſſent to theſe Maxims, *when they come to the Uſe of Reaſon*, amounts, in reality of Fact, to no more but this, That they are never known, nor taken notice of, before the Uſe of Reaſon, but may poſſibly be aſſented to ſome time after, during a Man's Life; but when, is uncertain: And ſo may all other knowable Truths, as well as theſe which therefore have no Advantage, nor Diſtinction from others, by this Note of being known when we come to the Uſe of Reaſon; nor are thereby prov'd to be Innate, but quite the contrary.

§. 14.

§. 14. But, *Secondly*, Were it true, that the preciſe time of their being known, and aſſented to, were, when Men come to the *Uſe of Reaſon*; neither would that prove them Innate. This Way of arguing is ſo frivolous, as the Suppoſition of it ſelf is falſe. For by what kind of Logick will it appear, that any Notion is originally by Nature imprinted in the Mind in its firſt Conſtitution, becauſe it comes firſt to be obſerv'd, and aſſented to, when a Faculty of the Mind, which has quite a diſtinct Province, begins to exert it ſelf? And therefore, the coming to the Uſe of Speech, if it were ſuppos'd the time that theſe Maxims are firſt aſſented to (which it may be with as much Truth, as the time when Men come to the Uſe of Reaſon) would be as good a Proof that they were Innate, as to ſay, they are Innate becauſe Men aſſent to them, when they come to the Uſe of Reaſon. I agree then with theſe Men of Innate Principles, that there is no Knowledg of theſe general and ſelf-evident Maxims in the Mind, till it comes to the Exerciſe of Reaſon: But I deny that the coming to the Uſe of Reaſon is the preciſe time when they are firſt taken notice of; and if that were the preciſe time, I deny that it would prove them Innate. All that can with any Truth be meant by this Propoſition, That Men *aſſent to them when they come to the Uſe of Reaſon*, is no more but this, That the making of general abſtract *Ideas*, and the underſtanding of general Names, being a Concomitant of the rational Faculty, and growing-up with it, Children commonly get not thoſe general *Ideas*, nor learn the Names that ſtand for them, till having for a good while exercis'd their Reaſon about familiar and more particular *Ideas*, they are by their ordinary Diſcourſe and Actions with others, acknowledg'd to be capable of rational Converſation. If aſſenting to theſe Maxims, when Men come to the Uſe of Reaſon, can be true in any other ſenſe, I deſire it may be ſhewn; or at leaſt, how in this, or any other ſenſe it proves them Innate.

If coming to the Uſe of Reaſon were the time of their Diſcovery, it would not prove them Innate.

§. 15. The Senſes at firſt let-in particular *Ideas*, and furniſh the yet empty Cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with ſome of them, they are lodg'd in the Memory, and Names got to them. Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther, abſtracts them, and by degrees learns the Uſe of general Names. In this manner the Mind comes to be furniſh'd with *Ideas* and Language, the Materials about which to exerciſe its diſcurſive Faculty: And the Uſe of Reaſon becomes daily more viſible, as theſe Materials that give it Employment increaſe. But tho' the having of general *Ideas*, and the Uſe of general Words and Reaſon uſually grow together; yet, I ſee not, how this any way proves them Innate. The Knowledg of ſome Truths, I confeſs, is very early in the Mind; but in a way that ſhews them not to be Innate. For, if we will obſerve, we ſhall find it ſtill to be about *Ideas*, not Innate, but Acquir'd: it being about thoſe firſt, which are imprinted by external Things, with which Infants have earlieſt to do, which make the moſt frequent Impreſſions on their Senſes. In *Ideas* thus got, the Mind diſcovers, That ſome agree, and others differ, probably as ſoon as it has any Uſe of Memory; as ſoon as it is able to retain and receive diſtinct *Ideas*. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain it does ſo long before it has the Uſe of Words, or comes to that which we commonly call the *Uſe of Reaſon*. For a Child knows as certainly, before it can ſpeak, the difference between the *Ideas* of Sweet and Bitter (*i. e.* That Sweet is not Bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to ſpeak) That Wormwood and Sugar-plumbs are not the ſame thing.

The Steps by which the Mind attains ſeveral Truths.

§. 16. A Child knows not that Three and Four are equal to Seven, till he comes to be able to count to Seven, and has got the Name and *Idea* of Equality: and then upon explaining thoſe Words, he preſently aſſents to, or rather perceives the Truth of that Propoſition. But neither does he then readily aſſent, becauſe it is an Innate Truth, nor was his Aſſent wanting till then, becauſe he wanted the *Uſe of Reaſon*; but the Truth of it appears to him, as ſoon as he has ſettled in his Mind the clear and diſtinct *Ideas* that theſe Names ſtand for: And then he knows the Truth of that Propoſition, upon the ſame grounds, and by the ſame means, that he knew before, That a Rod and Cherry are not the ſame thing; and upon the ſame grounds alſo, that he may come to know afterwards, *That 'tis impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*; as ſhall be more fully ſhewn hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have thoſe general *Ideas* about which thoſe Maxims are; or to know the Signification of

thoſe

thoſe general Terms that ſtand for them; or to put together in his Mind the *Ideas* they ſtand for: the later alſo will it be before he comes to aſſent to thoſe Maxims, whoſe Terms, with the *Ideas* they ſtand for, being no more Innate than thoſe of a Cat or a Weeſel, he muſt ſtay till Time and Obſervation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a Capacity to know the Truth of theſe Maxims upon the firſt occaſion that ſhall make him put together thoſe *Ideas* in his Mind, and obſerve, whether they agree or diſagree, according as is expreſs'd in thoſe Propoſitions. And therefore it is, that a Man knows that Eighteen and Nineteen are equal to Thirty Seven, by the ſame Self-evidence that he knows One and Two to be equal to Three: Yet a Child knows this not ſo ſoon as the other, not for Want of the Uſe of Reaſon, but becauſe the *Ideas* the Words Eighteen, Nineteen, and Thirty Seven ſtand for, are not ſo ſoon got, as thoſe which are ſignify'd by One, Two, and Three.

Aſſenting, as ſoon as propos'd and underſtood, proves them not Innate.

§. 17. This Evaſion therefore of general Aſſent, when Men come to the uſe of Reaſon, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between thoſe ſuppos'd Innate, and other Truths that are afterwards acquir'd and learnt; Men have endeavour'd to ſecure an univerſal Aſſent to thoſe they call Maxims, by ſaying, they are generally *aſſented to as ſoon as propos'd*, and the Terms they are propos'd in, underſtood: Seeing all Men, even Children, as ſoon as they hear and underſtand the Terms, aſſent to theſe Propoſitions, they think it is ſufficient to prove them Innate. For ſince Men never fail, after they have once underſtood the Words, to acknowledg them for undoubted Truths, they would infer, That certainly theſe Propoſitions were firſt lodg'd in the Underſtanding; which, without any teaching, the Mind at the very firſt Propoſal immediately cloſes with, and aſſents to, and after that never doubts again.

If ſuch an Aſſent be a Mark of Innate, then that One and Two are equal to Three; that Sweetneſs is not Bitterneſs; and a Thouſand the like, muſt be Innate.

§. 18. In anſwer to this, I demand whether ready *Aſſent* given to a Propoſition *upon firſt Hearing*, and underſtanding the Terms, be a certain Mark of an Innate Principle? If it be nor, ſuch a general Aſſent is in vain urg'd as a Proof of them: If it be ſaid, that it is a Mark of Innate, they muſt then allow all ſuch Propoſitions to be Innate, which are generally aſſented to as ſoon as heard, whereby they will find themſelves plentifully ſtor'd with Innate Principles. For upon the ſame Ground (*viz.*) of Aſſent at firſt hearing and underſtanding the Terms, That Men would have thoſe Maxims paſs for Innate, they muſt alſo admit ſeveral Propoſitions about Numbers, to be Innate: And thus, *That One and Two are equal to Three*; *that Two and Two are equal to Four*; and a multitude of other the like Propoſitions in Numbers, that every body aſſents to at firſt hearing, and underſtanding the Terms, muſt have a place amongſt theſe Innate Axioms. Nor is this the Prerogative of Numbers alone, and Propoſitions made about ſeveral of them; but even Natural Philoſophy, and all the other Sciences afford Propoſitions, which are ſure to meet with Aſſent as ſoon as they are underſtood. *That two Bodies cannot be in the ſame Place*, is a Truth that no body any more ſticks at, than at this Maxim, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*; *That White is not Black*; *That a Square is not a Circle*; *That Yellowneſs is not Sweetneſs*: Theſe, and a Million of other ſuch Propoſitions as many at leaſt as we have diſtinct *Ideas* of, every Man in his Wits, at firſt hearing, and knowing what the Names ſtand for, muſt neceſſarily aſſent to. If theſe Men will be true to their own Rule, and have *Aſſent at firſt hearing and underſtanding the Terms*, to be a Mark of Innate, they muſt allow not only as many Innate Propoſitions as Men have diſtinct *Ideas*; but as many as Men can make Propoſitions wherein different *Ideas* are denied one of another. Since every Propoſition, wherein one different *Idea* is denied of another, will as certainly find Aſſent at firſt hearing and underſtanding the Terms, as this general one, *It is impoſſible for the ſame to be, and not to be*; or that which is the Foundation of it, and is the eaſier underſtood of the two, *The ſame is not different*: By which account they will have Legions of Innate Propoſitions of this one ſort, without mentioning any other. But ſince no Propoſition can be Innate, unleſs the *Ideas*, about which it is, be Innate; this will be to ſuppoſe all our *Ideas* of Colours, Sounds, Taſtes, Figure, *&c.* Innate; than which there cannot be any thing more oppoſite to Reaſon and Experience. Univerſal and ready Aſſent upon hearing and underſtanding the Terms, is (I grant) a Mark of Self-Evidence; but Self evidence depending not on Innate Impreſſions, but on ſomething

elſe

elſe (as we ſhall ſhew hereafter) belongs to ſeveral Propoſitions, which no body was yet ſo extravagant as to pretend to be Innate.

Such leſs general Propoſitions known before theſe univerſal Maxims.

§. 19. Nor let it be ſaid, that thoſe more particular ſelf-evident Propoſitions which are aſſented to at firſt hearing, as *that One and Two are equal to Three*; *that Green is not Red*, &c. are receiv'd as the Conſequences of thoſe more univerſal Propoſitions, which are look'd on as Innate Principles: ſince any one who will but take the pains to obſerve what paſſes in the Underſtanding, will certainly find, that theſe and the like leſs general Propoſitions, are certainly known and firmly aſſented to, by thoſe who are utterly ignorant of thoſe more general Maxims; and ſo, being earlier in the Mind than thoſe (as they are call'd) firſt Principles, cannot owe to them the Aſſent, wherewith they are received at firſt hearing.

One and One equal to Two, &c. not general nor uſeful, anſwer'd.

§. 20. If it be ſaid that theſe Propoſitions, *viz. Two and Two are equal to Four*; *Red is not Blue*, &c. are not general Maxims, nor of any great uſe: I anſwer, That makes nothing to the Argument of univerſal Aſſent, upon Hearing and Underſtanding. For if that be the certain Mark of Innate, whatever Propoſition can be found, that receives general Aſſent as ſoon as heard and underſtood, that muſt be admitted for an Innate Propoſition, as well as this Maxim, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*; they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this Maxim more remote from being Innate; thoſe general and abſtract *Ideas* being more ſtrangers to our firſt Apprehenſions, than thoſe of more particular ſelf-evident Propoſitions; and therefore 'tis longer before they are admitted and aſſented to by the growing Underſtanding. And as to the uſefulneſs of theſe magnify'd Maxims, that perhaps will not be found ſo great as is generally conceiv'd, when it comes to its due place to be more fully conſider'd.

Theſe Maxims not being known ſometimes till propoſed, proves them not Innate.

§. 21. But we have not yet done with *Aſſenting to Propoſitions at firſt hearing and underſtanding their Terms*; 'tis fit we firſt take notice, that this, inſtead of being a Mark that they are Innate, is a proof of the contrary: Since it ſuppoſes, that ſeveral who underſtand and know other things, are ignorant of theſe Principles till they are propos'd to them; and that one may be unacquainted with theſe Truths till he hears them from others. For if they were Innate, what need they be propos'd in order to gaining Aſſent; when by being in the Underſtanding, by a natural and original Impreſſion (if there were any ſuch) they could not but be known before? Or doth the propoſing them, print them clearer in the Mind than Nature did? If ſo, then the Conſequence will be, That a Man knows them better after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, that theſe Principles may be made more evident to us by others teaching, than Nature has made them by Impreſſion: which will ill agree with the Opinion of Innate Principles, and give but little Authority to them; but on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the Foundations of all our other Knowledg, as they are pretended to be. This cannot be deny'd, that Men grow firſt acquainted with many of theſe ſelf-evident Truths, upon their being propos'd: But it is clear, that whoſoever does ſo, finds in himſelf, that he then begins to know a Propoſition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never queſtions; not becauſe it was Innate, but becauſe the conſideration of the Nature of the things contain'd in thoſe Words, would not ſuffer him to think otherwiſe; how, or whenſoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is aſſented to at firſt hearing and underſtanding the Terms, muſt paſs for an Innate Principle, every well-grounded Obſervation drawn from Particulars into a general Rule, muſt be Innate. When yet it is certain, that not all, but only ſagacious Heads light at firſt on theſe Obſervations, and reduce them into general Propoſitions; not Innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular Inſtances. Theſe, when obſerving Men have made them, unobſerving Men, when they are propos'd to them, cannot refuſe their Aſſent to.

Implicitly known before propoſing, ſignifies that the Mind is capable of underſtanding them, or elſe ſignifies nothing.

§. 22. If it be ſaid, the Underſtanding hath an *implicit Knowledg* of theſe Principles, but not an explicit, before this firſt hearing, (as they muſt, who will ſay, That they are in the Underſtanding before they are known) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a Principle imprinted on the Underſtanding implicitly; unleſs it be this, That the Mind is capable of underſtanding

ſtanding and aſſenting firmly to ſuch Propoſitions. And thus all Mathematical Demonſtrations, as well as firſt Principles, muſt be receiv'd as native Impreſſions on the Mind; which I fear they will ſcarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonſtrate a Propoſition, than aſſent to it when demonſtrated. And few Mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the Diagrams they have drawn, were but Copies of thoſe Innate Characters which Nature had ingraven upon their Minds.

The Argument of Aſſenting on firſt hearing, is upon a falſe ſuppoſition of no precedent teaching.

§. 23. There is, I fear, this farther weakneſs in the foregoing Argument, which would perſuade us, that therefore thoſe Maxims are to be thought Innate, which Men *admit at firſt hearing*, becauſe they aſſent to Propoſitions which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any Argument or Demonſtration, but a bare Explication or Underſtanding of the Terms. Under which there ſeems to me to lie this fallacy, That Men are ſuppoſed not to be *taught*, nor to *learn* any thing *de novo*; when in truth they are taught, and do learn ſomething they were ignorant of before. For firſt it is evident, they have learned the Terms and their Signification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquir'd Knowledg in the Caſe: The *Ideas* themſelves, about which the Propoſition is, are not born with them, no more than their Names, but got afterwards. So that in all Propoſitions that are aſſented to, at firſt hearing; the Terms of the Propoſition, their ſtanding for ſuch *Ideas*, and the *Ideas* themſelves that they ſtand for, being neither of them Innate; I would fain know what there is remaining in ſuch Propoſitions that is Innate. For I would gladly have any one name that Propoſition, whoſe Terms or *Ideas* were either of them Innate. We by degrees get *Ideas* and Names, and learn their appropriated Connexion one with another; and then to Propoſitions made in ſuch Terms, whoſe Signification we have learnt, and wherein the Agreement or Diſagreement we can perceive in our *Ideas*, when put together, is expreſs'd, we at firſt hearing aſſent: tho' to other Propoſitions in themſelves as certain and evident, but which are concerning *Ideas*, not ſo ſoon or ſo eaſily got, we are at the ſame time no way capable of aſſenting. For tho' a Child quickly aſſents to this Propoſition, *That an Apple is not Fire*, when by familiar Acquaintance, he has got the *Ideas* of thoſe two different things diſtinctly imprinted on his Mind, and has learnt that the Names *Apple* and *Fire* ſtand for them; yet it will be ſome Years after, perhaps, before the ſame Child will aſſent to this Propoſition, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be.* Becauſe that tho', perhaps, the Words are as eaſy to be learnt; yet the Signification of them being more large, comprehenſive, and abſtract, than of the Names annex'd to thoſe ſenſible Things the Child hath to do with; it is longer before he learns their preciſe meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his Mind thoſe general *Ideas* they ſtand for. 'Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any Child aſſent to a Propoſition made up of ſuch general Terms; but as ſoon as ever he has got thoſe *Ideas*, and learn'd their Names, he forwardly cloſes with the one as well as the other of the foremention'd Propoſitions: and with both for the ſame Reaſon, (*viz.*) becauſe he finds the *Ideas* he has in his Mind to agree or diſagree, according as the Words ſtanding for them, are affirm'd, or denied one of another in the Propoſition. But if Propoſitions be brought to him in Words, which ſtand for *Ideas* he has not yet in his Mind; to ſuch Propoſitions, however evidently true or falſe in themſelves, he affords neither aſſent nor diſſent, but is ignorant. For Words being but empty Sounds any farther than they are ſigns of our *Ideas*, we cannot but aſſent to them, as they correſpond to thoſe *Ideas* we have, but no farther than that. But the ſhewing by what ſteps and ways Knowledg comes into our Minds, and the grounds of ſeveral degrees of Aſſent, being the buſineſs of the following Diſcourſe, it may ſuffice to have only touched on it here, as one Reaſon, that made me doubt of thoſe Innate Principles.

Not Innate, becauſe not univerſally aſſented to.

§. 24. To conclude this Argument of *Univerſal Conſent*, I agree with theſe Defenders of Innate Principles, that if they are *Innate*, they muſt needs *have univerſal Aſſent*. For that a Truth ſhould be Innate and yet not aſſented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it at the ſame time. But then by theſe Mens own Confeſſion, they cannot be Innate; ſince they are not aſſented to by thoſe who underſtand not the Terms, nor by a great part of thoſe who do underſtand them, but have yet never heard, nor thought

thought of thoſe Propoſitions; which, I think, is at leaſt one half of Mankind. But were the number far leſs, it would be enough to deſtroy *univerſal Aſſent*, and thereby ſhew theſe Propoſitions not to be Innate, if Children alone were ignorant of them.

§. 25. But that I may not be accuſed, to argue from the Thoughts of Infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude, from what paſſes in their Underſtandings, before they expreſs it; I ſay next, that theſe two general Propoſitions are not the Truths that *firſt poſſeſs the Minds* of Children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious Notions; which if they were Innate, they muſt needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when Children begin to think; and their Words and Actions do aſſure us that they do ſo. When therefore they are capable of Thought, of Knowledg, of Aſſent, can it rationally be ſuppos'd, they can be ignorant of thoſe Notions that Nature has imprinted, were there any ſuch? Can it be imagin'd, with any appearance of Reaſon, that they perceive the Impreſſions from things without; and be at the ſame time ignorant of thoſe Characters which Nature it ſelf has taken care to ſtamp within? Can they receive and aſſent to adventitious Notion, and be ignorant of thoſe which are ſuppos'd woven into the very Principles of their Being, and imprinted there in indelible Characters, to be the Foundation and Guide of all their acquir'd Knowledg, and future Reaſonings? This would be to make Nature take pains to no purpoſe, or at leaſt to write very ill; ſince its Characters could not be read by thoſe Eyes which ſaw other things very well; and thoſe are very ill ſuppoſed the cleareſt parts of Truth and the Foundations of all our Knowledg, which are not firſt known, and without which the undoubted Knowledg of ſeveral other Things may be had. The Child certainly knows that the *Nurſe* that feeds it, is neither the *Cat* it plays with, nor the *Blackmoor* it is afraid of; that the *Wormſeed* or *Muſtard* it refuſes, is not the *Apple* or *Sugar* it cries for; this it is certainly and undoubtedly aſſur'd of: But will any one ſay, it is by virtue of this Principle, *that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*, that it ſo firmly aſſents to theſe, and other parts of its Knowledg? Or that the Child has any Notion or Apprehenſion of that Propoſition at an Age, wherein yet 'tis plain, it knows a great many other Truths? He that will ſay, Children join theſe general abſtract Speculations with their Sucking-Bottles and their Rattles, may, perhaps with juſtice, be thought to have more Paſſion and Zeal for his Opinion, but leſs Sincerity and Truth than one of that Age.

Theſe Maxims not the firſt known.

§. 26. Tho' therefore there be ſeveral general Propoſitions, that meet with conſtant and ready Aſſent, as ſoon as propos'd to Men grown up, who have attained the uſe of more general and abſtract *Ideas*, and Names ſtanding for them; yet they not being to be found in thoſe of tender Years, who nevertheleſs know other things, they cannot pretend to univerſal Aſſent of intelligent Perſons, and ſo by no means can be ſuppos'd Innate; it being impoſſible that any Truth which is Innate (if there were any ſuch) ſhould be unknown, at leaſt to any one who knows any thing elſe. Since, if they are Innate Truths, they muſt be Innate Thoughts; there being nothing a Truth in the Mind that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any *Innate Truths*, they *muſt neceſſarily be the firſt of any thought on*, the firſt that appear there.

And ſo not Innate.

§. 27. That the general Maxims we are diſcourſing of are not known to *Children*, *Idiots*, and a great part of *Mankind*, we have already ſufficiently proved; whereby it is evident they have not an univerſal Aſſent, nor are general Impreſſions. But there is this farther Argument in it againſt their being Innate; that theſe Characters, if they were native and original Impreſſions, *ſhould appear faireſt and cleareſt in* thoſe Perſons in whom, yet we find no foot-ſteps of them: And 'tis, in my Opinion, a ſtrong Preſumption that they are not Innate, ſince they are leaſt known to thoſe, in whom, if they were Innate, they muſt needs exert themſelves with moſt Force and Vigour. For *Children*, *Idiots*, *Savages*, and *illiterate* People, being of all others the leaſt corrupted by Cuſtom or borrow'd Opinions; Learning and Education having not caſt their native Thoughts into new Moulds, nor by ſuper-inducing foreign and ſtudied Doctrines, confounded thoſe fair Characters Nature had written there: one might reaſonably imagine, that in their Minds theſe Innate Notions ſhould lie open fairly to every one's view,

Not Innate, becauſe they appear leaſt, where what is Innate ſhews it ſelf cleareſt.

view, as 'tis certain the Thoughts of Children do. It might very well be expected, that these Principles should be perfectly known to Naturals; which being stamp'd immediately on the Soul (as these Men suppose) can have no dependence on the Constitutions, or Organs of the Body, the only confess'd difference between them and others. One would think, according to these Mens Principles, That all these native Beams of Light (were there any such) should in those who have no Reserves, no Arts of Concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of Pleasure, and abhorrence of Pain. But alas! amongst *Children*, *Idiots*, *Savages*, and the grosly *Illiterate*, what general Maxims are to be found? What universal Principles of Knowledg? Their Notions are few and narrow, borrow'd only from those Objects they have had most to do with, and which have made upon their Senses the frequentest and strongest Impressions. A Child knows his Nurse and his Cradle, and by degrees the Play-things of a little more advanc'd Age: And a young Savage has, perhaps, his Head fill'd with Love and Hunting, according to the fashion of his Tribe. But he that from a Child untaught, or a wild Inhabitant of the Woods, will expect these abstract Maxims and reputed Principles of Sciences; will, I fear, find himself mistaken. Such kind of general Propositions are seldom mention'd in the Huts of *Indians*, much less are they to be found in the Thoughts of *Children*, or any Impressions of them on the Minds of *Naturals*. They are the Language and Business of the Schools and Academies of learned Nations, accustom'd to that sort of Conversation or Learning, where Disputes are frequent: these Maxims being suited to artificial Argumentation, and useful for Conviction; but not much conducing to the discovery of Truth, or advancement of Knowledg. But of their small use for the improvement of Knowledg, I shall have occasion to speak more at large, *l.* 4. *c.* 7.

Recapitulation.

§. 28. I know not how absurd this may seem to the Masters of Demonstration: And probably, it will hardly down with any body at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with Prejudice, and the forbearance of Censure, till I have been heard out in the Sequel of this Discourse, being very willing to submit to better Judgments. And since I impartially search after Truth, I shall not be sorry to be convinc'd that I have been too fond of my own Notions: which I confess we are all apt to be, when Application and Study have warm'd our Heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground, to think these two famed speculative Maxims Innate, since they are not universally assented to; and the Assent they so generally find, is no other than what several Propositions, not allow'd to be Innate, equally partake in with them: And since the Assent that is given them is produc'd another way, and comes not from natural Inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Discourse. And if *these first Principles* of Knowledg and Science *are* found *not* to be *Innate*, *no other speculative Maxims can* (I suppose) *with better Right pretend to be so.*

CHAP. III.

No Innate Practical Principles.

No moral Principles so clear and so generally receiv'd, as the fore-mention'd speculative Maxims.

§. 1. IF those speculative Maxims, whereof we discours'd in the foregoing Chapter, have not an actual universal Assent from all Mankind, as we there prov'd, it is much more visible concerning *Practical Principles*, that they *come short of an universal Reception*: And I think it will be hard to instance any one moral Rule, which can pretend to so general and ready an Assent, as, *What is, is*; or to be so manifest a Truth as this, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.* Whereby it is evident, that they are farther remov'd from a title to be Innate: and the doubt of their being native Impressions on the Mind, is stronger against these moral Principles than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in question. They are equally true, tho' not equally evident. Those speculative Maxims carry their own Evidence with them: But moral

moral Principles require Reaſoning and Diſcourſe, and ſome Exerciſe of the Mind, to diſcover the Certainty of their Truth. They lie not open as natural Characters ingraven on the Mind; which, if any ſuch were, they muſt needs be viſible by themſelves, and by their own light be certain and known to every body. But this is no derogation to their Truth and Certainty, no more than it is to the Truth or Certainty of the three Angles of a Triangle being equal to two right ones; becauſe it is not ſo evident, as, *The Whole is bigger than a Part*; nor ſo apt to be aſſented to at firſt hearing. It may ſuffice, that theſe moral Rules are capable of Demonſtration: And therefore it is our own fault, if we come not to a certain knowledg of them. But the Ignorance wherein many Men are of them, and the Slowneſs of Aſſent wherewith others receive them, are manifeſt proofs, that they are not Innate, and ſuch as offer themſelves to their view without ſearching.

Faith and Juſtice not own'd as Principles by all Men.

§. 2. Whether there be any ſuch moral Principles, wherein all Men do agree, I appeal to any who have been but moderately converſant in the Hiſtory of Mankind, and look'd abroad beyond the Smoak of their own Chimneys. Where is that practical Truth, that is univerſally receiv'd without doubt or queſtion, as it muſt be if Innate? *Juſtice*, and keeping of Contracts, is that which *moſt Men ſeem to agree in*. This is a Principle, which is thought to extend it ſelf to the Dens of Thieves, and the Confederacies of the greateſt Villains; and they who have gone fartheſt towards the putting off of Humanity it ſelf, keep Faith and Rules of Juſtice one with another. I grant that Out-laws themſelves do this one amongſt another; but 'tis without receiving theſe as the Innate Laws of Nature. They practiſe them as Rules of Convenience within their own Communities: But it is impoſſible to conceive, that he embraces Juſtice as a practical Principle, who acts fairly with his Fellow-Highway-men, and at the ſame time plunders or kills the next honeſt Man he meets with. Juſtice and Truth are the common Ties of Society; and therefore, even Out-laws, and Robbers, who break with all the World beſides, muſt keep Faith and Rules of Equity amongſt themſelves, or elſe they cannot hold together. But will any one ſay, That thoſe that live by Fraud and Rapine, have Innate Principles of Truth and Juſtice, which they allow and aſſent to?

Object. *Tho' Men deny them in their Practice, yet they admit them in their Thoughts, anſwer'd.*

§. 3. Perhaps it will be urg'd, That the *tacit Aſſent of their Minds agrees to what their Practice contradicts*. I anſwer, *Firſt*, I have always thought the Actions of Men the beſt Interpreters of their Thoughts. But ſince it is certain, that moſt Mens Practice, and ſome Mens open Profeſſions, have either queſtion'd or deny'd theſe Principles, it is impoſſible to eſtabliſh an Univerſal Conſent (tho' we ſhould look for it only amongſt grown Men) without which, it is impoſſible to conclude them Innate. *Secondly*, 'Tis very ſtrange and unreaſonable, to ſuppoſe Innate Practical Principles, that terminate only in Contemplation. Practical Principles deriv'd from Nature, are there for Operation, and muſt produce Conformity of Action, not barely ſpeculative Aſſent to their Truth; or elſe they are in vain diſtinguiſh'd from ſpeculative Maxims. Nature, I confeſs, has put into Man a Deſire of Happineſs, and an Averſion to Miſery: Theſe indeed are Innate Practical Principles, which (as Practical Principles ought) do continue conſtantly to operate and influence all our Actions, without ceaſing. Theſe may be obſerv'd in all Perſons and all Ages, ſteddy and univerſal; but theſe are Inclinations of the Appetite to good, not Impreſſions of Truth on the Underſtanding. I deny not, that there are natural Tendencies imprinted on the Minds of Men; and that, from the very firſt inſtances of Senſe and Perception, there are ſome things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; ſome things that they incline to, and others that they fly: But this makes nothing for Innate Characters on the Mind, which are to be the Principles of Knowledg, regulating our Practice. Such natural Impreſſions on the Underſtanding, are ſo far from being confirm'd hereby, that this is an argument againſt them; ſince if there were certain Characters imprinted by Nature on the Underſtanding, as the Principles of Knowledg, we could not but perceive them conſtantly operate in us, and influence our Knowledg, as we do thoſe others on the Will and Appetite; which never ceaſe to be the conſtant Springs and Motives of all our Actions, to which we perpetually feel them ſtrongly impelling us.

§. 4.

Moral Rules need a Proof, ergo not Innate.

§. 4. Another Reaſon that makes me doubt of any Innate Practical Principles, is, That I think *there cannot any one moral Rule be propos'd, whereof a Man may not juſtly demand a Reaſon:* Which would be perfectly ridiculous and abſurd, if they were Innate, or ſo much as ſelf-evident; which every Innate Principle muſt needs be, and not need any Proof to aſcertain its Truth, nor want any Reaſon to gain it Approbation. He would be thought void of common Senſe, who a k'd on the one ſide, or on the other ſide went to give a Reaſon, *Why it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be.* It carries its own Light and Evidence with it, and needs no other proof: He that underſtands the Terms, aſſents to it for its own ſake, or elſe nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But ſhould that moſt unſhaken Rule of Morality, and Foundation of all ſocial Virtue, *That one ſhould do as he would be done unto*, be propos'd to one who never heard before, but yet is of capacity to underſtand its meaning; might he not without any abſurdity ask a reaſon why? And were not he that propos'd it, bound to make out the Truth and Reaſonableneſs of it to him? Which plainly ſhews it not to be Innate: for if it were, it could neither want nor receive any proof; but muſt needs (at leaſt, as ſoon as heard and underſtood) be receiv'd and aſſented to, as an unqueſtionable Truth, which a Man can by no means doubt of. So that the Truth of all theſe moral Rules plainly depends upon ſome other antecedent to them, and from which they muſt be deduc'd; which could not be, if either they were Innate, or ſo much as ſelf-evident.

Inſtance in keeping Compacts.

§. 5. That Men ſhould keep their Compacts, is certainly a great and undeniable Rule in Morality: But yet, if a Chriſtian, who has the view of Happineſs and Miſery in another Life, be ask'd why a Man muſt keep his Word, he will give this as a *Reaſon*; Becauſe God, who has the power of eternal Life and Death, requires it of us. But if an *Hobbiſt* be ask'd why, he will anſwer, Becauſe the Publick requires it, and the *Leviathan* will puniſh you, if you do not. And if one of the old *Heathen* Philoſophers had been ask'd, he would have anſwer'd; Becauſe it was diſhoneſt, below the Dignity of a Man, and oppoſite to Vertue, the higheſt Perfection of human Nature, to do otherwiſe.

Vertue generally approv'd, not becauſe Innate, but becauſe profitable.

§. 6. Hence naturally flows the great variety of Opinions concerning moral Rules which are to be found amongſt Men, according to the different ſorts of Happineſs they have a proſpect of, or propoſe to themſelves: Which could not be, if practical Principles were Innate, and imprinted in our Minds immediately by the hand of God. I grant the Exiſtence of God is ſo many ways manifeſt, and the Obedience we owe him ſo congruous to the Light of Reaſon, that a great part of Mankind give teſtimony to the Law of Nature: But yet I think it muſt be allow'd, That ſeveral moral Rules may receive from Mankind a very general Approbation, without either knowing or admitting the true ground of Morality; which can only be the Will and Law of a God, who ſees Men in the dark, has in his hand Rewards and Puniſhments, and power enough to call to account the proudeſt Offender. For God having, by an inſeparable Connexion, join'd *Vertue* and *Publick Happineſs* together, and made the practice thereof neceſſary to the preſervation of Society, and viſibly *beneficial* to all with whom the Vertuous Man has to do; it is no wonder, that every one ſhould not only allow, but recommend and magnify thoſe Rules to others, from whoſe obſervance of them he is ſure to reap advantage to himſelf. He may, out of intereſt, as well as conviction, cry up that for ſacred; which if once trampled on and profan'd, he himſelf cannot be ſafe nor ſecure. This, tho' it takes nothing from the moral and eternal Obligation which theſe Rules evidently have, yet it ſhews that the outward acknowledgment Men pay to them in their words, proves not that they are Innate Principles; nay, it proves not ſo much, as that Men aſſent to them inwardly in their own Minds, as the inviolable Rules of their own Practice: ſince we find that Self-Intereſt and the Conveniences of this Life make many Men own an outward Profeſſion and Approbation of them, whoſe Actions ſufficiently prove, that they very little conſider the Law-giver that preſcrib'd theſe Rules, nor the Hell he has ordain'd for the Puniſhment of thoſe that tranſgreſs them.

§. 7. For if we will not in civility allow too much Sincerity to the Profeſſions of moſt *Men*, but think their Actions to be the Interpreters of their Thoughts,

we

we ſhall find, that they have no ſuch internal Veneration for theſe Rules, nor ſo *full a Perſuaſion of their Certainty* and Obligation. The great Principle of Morality, *To do as one would be done to*, is more commended than practis'd; but the Breach of this Rule cannot be a greater Vice than to teach others, that it is no moral Rule, nor obligatory, would be thought Madneſs, and contrary to that Intereſt Men ſacrifice to, when they break it themſelves. Perhaps *Conſcience* will be urg'd as checking us for ſuch Breaches, and ſo the internal Obligation and Eſtabliſhment of the Rule be preſerv'd.

Mens Actions convince us, that the Rule of Vertue is not their internal Principle.

§. 8. To which I anſwer, That I doubt not but, without being written on their Hearts, many Men may, by the ſame way that they come to the knowledg of other things, come to aſſent to ſeveral moral Rules, and be convinc'd of their Obligation. Others alſo may come to be of the ſame mind, from their Education, Company, and Cuſtoms of their Country; which *Perſuaſion, however got, will ſerve to ſet Conſcience on work*, which is nothing elſe but our own Opinion or Judgment of the moral Rectitude or Pravity of our own Actions. And if Conſcience be a proof of innate Principles, Contraries may be innate Principles; ſince ſome Men, with the ſame bent of Conſcience, proſecute what others avoid.

Conſcience no Proof of any innate moral Rule.

§. 9. But I cannot ſee how any *Men* ſhould ever *tranſgreſs* thoſe *Moral Rules with Confidence* and *Serenity*, were they innate, and ſtamp'd upon their Minds. View but an Army at the ſacking of a Town, and ſee what Obſervation, or ſenſe of Moral Principles, or what touch of Conſcience for all the Outrages they do. *Robberies, Murders, Rapes*, are the Sports of Men ſet at liberty from Puniſhment and Cenſure. Have there not been whole Nations, and thoſe of the moſt civiliz'd People, amongſt whom the expoſing their Children, and leaving them in the Fields to periſh by Want or Wild Beaſts, has been the practice, as little condemn'd or ſcrupled as the begetting them? Do they not ſtill, in ſome Countries, put them into the ſame Graves with their Mothers, if they die in Child-birth; or diſpatch them, if a pretended Aſtrologer declares them to have unhappy Stars? And are there not places where, at a certain Age, they kill or expoſe their Parents without any remorſe at all? In a Part of *Aſia* the Sick, when their Caſe comes to be thought deſperate, are carry'd out, and laid on the Earth before they are dead, and left there, expos'd to Wind and Weather, to periſh without Aſſiſtance or Pity. (*a*) It is familiar among the *Mengrelians*, a People profeſſing Chriſtianity, to bury their Children alive without ſcruple. (*b*) There are places where they eat their own Children. (*c*) The *Caribbes* were wont to geld their Children, on purpoſe to fat and eat them. (*d*) And *Garcilaſſo de la Vega* tells us of a People in *Peru*, which were wont to fat and eat the Children they got on their Female Captives, whom they kept as Concubines for that purpoſe; and when they were paſt breeding, the Mothers themſelves were kill'd too and eaten. (*e*) The Vertues whereby the *Toucupinambos* believ'd they merited Paradiſe, were Revenge, and eating abundance of their Enemies. (*f*) *They have not ſo much as a Name for God, and have no Religion, no Worſhip.* The Saints, who are canoniz'd amongſt the *Turks*, lead Lives, which one cannot with Modeſty relate. A remarkable Paſſage to this purpoſe, out of the Voyage of *Baumgarten*, which is a Book not every day to be met with, I ſhall ſet down at large in the Language it is publiſh'd in. *Ibi (ſc. prope* Belbes *in* Ægypto) *vidimus ſanctum unum Saracenicum inter arenarum cumulos, ita ut ex utero matris prodiit nudum ſedentem. Mos eſt, ut didicimus,* Mahometiſtis, *ut eos qui amentes & ſine ratione ſunt, pro ſanctis colant & venerentur. Inſuper & eos qui cum diu vitam egerint inquinatiſſimam, voluntariam demum pœnitentiam & paupertatem, ſanctitate venerandos deputant. Ejuſmodi verò genus hominum libertatem quandam effrænem habent, domos quas volunt intrandi, edendi, bibendi, & quod majus eſt, concumbendi; ex quo concubitu, ſi proles ſecuta fuerit, ſancta ſimiliter habetur. His ergo hominibus, dum vivunt, magnos exhibent honores; mortuis verò vel templa vel monumenta extruunt ampliſſima, eoſque contingere ac ſepelire maximæ fortunæ ducunt loco. Audivimus hæc dicta & dicenda per interpretem à Mucrelo noſtro. Inſuper ſanctum illum, quem eo loci vidimus, publicitus apprimè commendari, eum eſſe Hominem ſanctum, divinum ac integritate præcipuum; eo quod, nec fœminarum unquam eſſet, nec puerorum, ſed tantum modo aſellarum concubitor atque mularum.* Peregr. Baumgarten, l. 2. c. 1. p. 73. More of the ſame kind, concerning

Inſtances of Enormities practis'd without remorſe.

(*a*) Gruber apud Thevenot, *Part* 4. *p.* 13.
(*b*) Lambert apud Thevenot, *p.* 38.
(*c*) Voſſius de Nili Origine, *c.* 18, 19.
(*d*) P. Mart. Dec. 1.
(*e*) Hiſt. des Incas, *l.* 1. *c.* 12.
(*f*) Lery, *c.* 16, 216, 231.

concerning these precious Saints amongst the *Turks*, may be seen in *Pietro della Valle*, in his Letter of the 25th of *January*, 1616. Where then are those innate Principles of Justice, Piety, Gratitude, Equity, Chastity? Or where is that universal Consent, that assures us there are such inbred Rules? Murders in Duels, when Fashion has made them honourable, are committed without remorse of Conscience; nay, in many places, Innocence in this case is the greatest Ignominy. And if we look abroad, to take a View of Men, as they are, we shall find that they have remorse in one place for doing or omitting that, which others, in another place, think they merit by.

Men have contrary practical Principles.

§. 10. He that will carefully peruse the History of Mankind, and look abroad into the several Tribes of Men, and with Indifferency survey their Actions, will be able to satisfy himself, that there is scarce that Principle of Morality to be nam'd, or *Rule* of *Vertue* to be thought on (those only excepted, that are absolutely necessary to hold Society together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct Societies) which is not, somewhere or other *slighted* and condemn'd by the general Fashion of *whole Societies* of Men, govern'd by practical Opinions, and Rules of Living quite opposite to others.

Whole Nations reject several moral Rules.

§. 11. Here perhaps 'twill be objected, that it is no Argument that the *Rule* is *not known, because* it is *broken*. I grant the Objection good, where Men, tho' they transgress, yet disown not the Law; where fear of Shame, Censure or Punishment carries the Mark of some Awe it has upon them. But it is impossible to conceive, that a *whole Nation* of Men should all *publickly reject* and renounce what every one of them, certainly and infallibly, knew to be a Law; for so they must, who have it naturally imprinted on their Minds. 'Tis possible Men may sometimes own *Rules of Morality*, which in their private Thoughts they do not believe to be true, only to keep themselves in Reputation and Esteem amongst those who are persuaded of their Obligation. But 'tis not to be imagin'd that a whole Society of Men should publickly and professedly disown, and cast off a Rule, which they could not in their own Minds but be infallibly certain was a Law; nor be ignorant that all Men they should have to do with, knew it to be such: And therefore must every one of them apprehend from others, all the Contempt and Abhorrence due to one, who professes himself void of Humanity; and one, who confounding the known and natural Measures of Right and Wrong, cannot but be look'd on as the profess'd Enemy of their Peace and Happiness. Whatever practical Principle is innate, cannot but be known to every one to be just and good. It is therefore little less than a Contradiction to suppose, that whole Nations of Men should, both in their Professions and Practice, unanimously and universally give the Lye to what, by the most invincible Evidence, every one of them knew to be true, right and good. This is enough to satisfy us, that no practical Rule, which is any where universally, and with publick Approbation or Allowance transgress'd, can be suppos'd innate. But I have something farther to add in answer to this Objection.

§. 12. The breaking of a Rule, say you, is no Argument that it is unknown. I grant it: But the *generally allow'd Breach of it any where*, I say, *is a Proof that it is not innate*. For example; let us take any of these Rules, which being the most obvious Deductions of human Reason, and conformable to the natural Inclination of the greatest part of Men, fewest People have had the impudence to deny, or inconsideration to doubt of. If any can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none, I think, can have a fairer Pretence to be innate than this; *Parents, preserve and cherish your Children*. When therefore you say, that this is an innate Rule, what do you mean? Either that it is an innate Principle, which, upon all occasions, excites and directs the Actions of all Men; or else, that it is a Truth, which all Men have imprinted on their Minds, and which therefore they know and assent to: but in neither of these Senses is it innate. *First*, That it is not a Principle, which influences all Mens Actions, is what I have prov'd by the Examples before-cited; nor need we seek so far as *Mingrelia* or *Peru*, to find Instances of such as neglect, abuse, nay and destroy their Children; or look on it only as the more than Brutality of some savage and barbarous Nations, when we remember that it was a familiar and uncondemn'd Practice amongst the *Greeks* and *Romans*, to expose, without pity or remorse, their

their innocent Infants. *Secondly*, That it is an innate Truth, known to all Men, is alſo falſe: For *Parents, preſerve your Children*, is ſo far from an innate Truth, that it is no Truth at all; it being a Command, and not a Propoſition, and ſo not capable of Truth or Falſhood. To make it capable of being aſſented to as true, it muſt be reduc'd to ſome ſuch Propoſition as this; *It is the Duty of Parents to preſerve their Children.* But what Duty is, cannot be underſtood without a Law; nor a Law be known or ſuppos'd without a Law-maker, or without Reward and Puniſhment: So that it is impoſſible that this, or any other practical Principle ſhould be innate, *i. e.* be imprinted on the Mind as a Duty, without ſuppoſing the *Ideas* of God, of Law, of Obligation, of Puniſhment, of a Life after this, innate: For that Puniſhment follows not, in this Life, the Breach of this Rule, and conſequently that it has not the force of a Law in Countries, where the generally allow'd Practice runs counter to it, is in it ſelf evident. But theſe *Ideas* (which muſt be all of them innate, if any thing as a Duty be ſo) are ſo far from being innate, that 'tis not every ſtudious or thinking Man, much leſs every one that is born, in whom they are to be found clear and diſtinct: And that one of them, which of all others ſeems moſt likely to be innate, is not ſo, (I mean the *Idea* of God) I think, in the next Chapter, will appear very evident to any conſidering Man.

§. 13. From what has been ſaid, I think we may ſafely conclude, That *whatever practical Rule is, in any place, generally, and with Allowance broken, cannot be ſuppos'd innate*; it being impoſſible that Men ſhould, without ſhame or fear, confidently and ſerenely break a Rule, which they could not but evidently know that God had ſet up, and would certainly puniſh the breach of (which they muſt, if it were innate) to a degree to make it a very ill Bargain to the Tranſgreſſor. Without ſuch a Knowledg as this, a Man can never be certain that any thing is his Duty. Ignorance or Doubt of the Law, Hopes to eſcape the Knowledg or Power of the Law-maker, or the like, may make Men give way to a preſent Appetite: But let any one ſee the Fault, and the Rod by it, and with the Tranſgreſſion a Fire ready to puniſh it; a Pleaſure tempting, and the Hand of the Almighty viſibly held up, and prepar'd to take Vengeance (for this muſt be the Caſe where any Duty is imprinted on the Mind) and then tell me, whether it be poſſible for People with ſuch a Proſpect, ſuch a certain Knowledg as this, wantonly, and without ſcruple, to offend againſt a Law which they carry about them in indelible Characters, and that ſtares them in the face whilſt they are breaking it? Whether Men, at the ſame time that they feel in themſelves the imprinted Edicts of an Omnipotent Law-maker, can, with Aſſurance and Gaity, ſlight and trample under foot his moſt ſacred Injunctions? And laſtly, whether it be poſſible, that whilſt a Man thus openly bids defiance to this innate Law and ſupreme Law-giver, all the By-ſtanders, yea even the Governors and Rulers of the People, full of the ſame ſenſe both of the Law and Law-maker, ſhould ſilently connive, without teſtifying their diſlike, or laying the leaſt blame on it? Principles of Actions indeed there are lodg'd in Mens Appetites, but theſe are ſo far from being innate moral Principles, that if they were left to their full Swing, they would carry Men to the over-turning of all Morality. Moral Laws are ſet as a Curb and Reſtraint to theſe exorbitant Deſires, which they cannot be but by Rewards and Puniſhments, that will over-ballance the ſatisfaction any one ſhall propoſe to himſelf in the breach of the Law. If therefore any thing be imprinted on the Minds of all Men as a Law, all Men muſt have a certain and unavoidable Knowledg, that certain and unavoidable Puniſhment will attend the breach of it: For if Men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is innate, innate Principles are inſiſted on and urg'd to no purpoſe. Truth and Certainty (the things pretended) are not at all ſecur'd by them; but Men are in the ſame uncertain floating Eſtate with, as without them. An evident indubitable Knowledg of unavoidable Puniſhment, great enough to make the Tranſgreſſion very uneligible, muſt accompany an innate Law; unleſs with an innate Law, they can ſuppoſe an innate Goſpel too. I would not here be miſtaken, as if, becauſe I deny an innate Law, I thought there were none but poſitive Laws. There is a great deal of difference between an innate Law, and a Law of Nature: between ſomething imprinted on our Minds in their very Original, and ſomething that we being ignorant of may attain to the knowledg of,

by the uſe and due application of our natural Faculties. And I think they equally forſake the Truth, who running into the contrary Extremes, either affirm an innate Law, or deny that there is a Law knowable by the Light of Nature, *i. e.* without the help of poſitive Revelation.

Thoſe who maintain innate practical Principles, tell us not what they are.

§. 14. The difference there is amongſt Men in their practical Principles, is ſo evident, that, I think, I need ſay no more to evince, that it will be impoſſible to find any innate moral Rules by this mark of general Aſſent: And 'tis enough to make one ſuſpect, that the Suppoſition of ſuch innate Principles, is but an Opinion taken up at pleaſure; ſince thoſe who talk ſo confidently of them, are ſo ſparing to *tell* us *which they are*. This might with juſtice be expected from thoſe Men who lay ſtreſs upon this Opinion: And it gives occaſion to diſtruſt either their Knowledg or Charity, who declaring, that God has imprinted on the Minds of Men the Foundations of Knowledg, and the Rules of Living, are yet ſo little favourable to the Information of their Neighbours, or the Quiet of Mankind, as not to point out to them which they are, in the variety Men are diſtracted with. But, in truth, were there any ſuch innate Principles, there would be no need to teach them. Did Men find ſuch innate Propoſitions ſtamp'd on their Minds, they would eaſily be able to diſtinguiſh them from other Truths, that they afterwards learn'd and deduc'd from them; and there would be nothing more eaſy than to know what, and how many they were. There could be no more doubt about their Number, than there is about the Number of our Fingers; and 'tis like then every Syſtem would be ready to give them us by Tale. But ſince no body that I know has ventur'd yet to give a Catalogue of them, they cannot blame thoſe who doubt of theſe innate Principles; ſince even they, who require Men to believe that there are ſuch innate Propoſitions, do not tell us what they are. 'Tis eaſy to foreſee, that if different Men of different Sects ſhould go about to give us a Liſt of thoſe innate practical Principles, they would ſet down only ſuch as ſuited their diſtinct Hypotheſes, and were fit to ſupport the Doctrines of their particular Schools or Churches; a plain Evidence that there are no ſuch innate Truths. Nay, a great part of Men are ſo far from finding any ſuch innate moral Principles in themſelves, that by denying freedom to Mankind, and thereby making Men no other than bare Machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral Rules whatſoever, and leave not a poſſibility to believe any ſuch, to thoſe who cannot conceive how any thing can be capable of a Law, that is not a free Agent: And upon that Ground they muſt neceſſarily reject all Principles of Vertue, who cannot *put Morality and Mechaniſm together*, which are not very eaſy to be reconcil'd, or made conſiſtent.

Lord Herbert's innate Principles examin'd.

§. 15. When I had writ this, being inform'd that my Lord *Herbert* had, in his Books *de Veritate*, aſſign'd theſe innate Principles, I preſently conſulted him, hoping to find, in a Man of ſo great Parts, ſomething that might ſatisfy me in this Point, and put an end to my Inquiry. In his Chapter *de inſtinctu Naturali*, *p. 76. Edit. 1656.* I met with theſe ſix Marks of his *Notitiæ Communes*. 1. *Prioritas*. 2. *Independentia*. 3. *Univerſalitas*. 4. *Certitudo*. 5. *Neceſſitas*; i. e. as he explains it, *faciunt ad hominis conſervationem*. 6. *Modus conformationis*, i. e. *Aſſenſus nullâ interpoſitâ morâ*. And at the latter End of his little Treatiſe *De Religione Laici*, he ſays this of theſe innate Principles, *Adeo ut non uniuſcujuſvis Religionis confinio arctentur quæ ubique vigent veritates. Sunt enim in ipſa mente cœlitùs deſcriptæ nulliſque traditionibus, ſive ſcriptis, ſive non ſcriptis, obnoxiæ*, p. 3. And *Veritates noſtræ Catholicæ, quæ tanquam indubia Dei effata in foro interiori deſcripta*. Thus having given the Marks of the innate Principles or common Notions, and aſſerted their being imprinted on the Minds of Men by the hand of God, he proceeds to ſet them down, and they are theſe: 1. *Eſſe aliquod ſupremum Numen*. 2. *Numen illud coli debere*. 3. *Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimam eſſe rationem cultûs divini*. 4. *Reſipiſcendum eſſe à peccatis*. 5. *Dari præmium vel pœnam poſt hanc vitam tranſactam*. Tho' I allow theſe to be clear Truths, and ſuch as, if rightly explain'd, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving his Aſſent to; yet I think he is far from proving them innate Impreſſions, *in Foro interiori deſcriptæ*. For I muſt take leave to obſerve,

§. 16. *Firſt*, That theſe five Propoſitions are either not all, or more than all, thoſe common Notions writ on our Minds by the finger of God, if it were reaſonable

ſonable to believe any at all to be ſo written: Since there are other Propoſitions, which even by his own Rules have as juſt a pretence to ſuch an Original, and may be as well admitted for Innate Principles, as at leaſt ſome of theſe five he enumerates, *viz. Do as thou wouldſt be done unto*; and perhaps ſome hundreds of others, when well conſider'd.

§. 17. *Secondly*, That all his Marks are not to be found in each of his five Propoſitions, *viz.* his firſt, ſecond, and third Marks agree perfectly to neither of them; and the firſt, ſecond, third, fourth, and ſixth Marks agree but ill to his third, fourth and fifth Propoſitions. For, beſides that we are aſſur'd from Hiſtory, of many Men, nay whole Nations, who doubt or disbelieve ſome or all of them; I cannot ſee how the third, *viz. That Vertue join'd with Piety is the beſt Worſhip of God*, can be an Innate Principle, when the name or ſound, *Vertue*, is ſo hard to be underſtood; liable to ſo much uncertainty in its ſignification; and the thing it ſtands for, ſo much contended about, and difficult to be known. And therefore this can be but a very uncertain Rule of human Practice, and ſerve but very little to the conduct of our Lives, and is therefore very unfit to be aſſign'd as an Innate practical Principle.

§. 18. For let us conſider this Propoſition as to its meaning (for it is the Senſe, and not Sound, that is, and muſt be the Principle or common Notion) viz. *Vertue is the beſt Worſhip of God*, i. e. is moſt acceptable to him; which if *Vertue* be taken, as moſt commonly it is, for thoſe Actions, which, according to the different Opinions of ſeveral Countries, are accounted laudable, will be a Propoſition ſo far from being certain, that it will not be true. If *Vertue* be taken for Actions conformable to God's Will, or to the Rule preſcrib'd by God, which is the true and only meaſure of Vertue, when Vertue is us'd to ſignify what is in its own nature right and good; then this Propoſition, *That Vertue is the beſt Worſhip of God*, will be moſt true and certain, but of very little uſe in human Life: ſince it will amount to no more but this, *viz. That God is pleas'd with the doing of what he commands*; which a Man may certainly know to be true, without knowing what it is that God doth command; and ſo be as far from any Rule or Principles of his Actions, as he was before: and I think very few will take a Propoſition which amounts to no more than this, *viz.* That God is pleas'd with the doing of what he himſelf commands, for an innate moral Principle writ on the Minds of all Men (however true and certain it may be) ſince it teaches ſo little. Whoſoever does ſo, will have reaſon to think hundreds of Propoſitions Innate Principles; ſince there are many, which have as good a Title as this, to be receiv'd for ſuch, which no body yet ever put into that rank of Innate Principles.

§. 19. Nor is the fourth Propoſition, (*viz.*) *Men muſt repent of their Sins*, much more inſtructive, till what thoſe Actions are, that are meant by Sins, be ſet down: For the word *Peccata*, or *Sins*, being put, as it uſually is, to ſignify in general ill Actions, that will draw Puniſhment upon the Doers; what great Principle of Morality can that be, to tell us we ſhould be ſorry, and ceaſe to do that, which will bring miſchief upon us, without knowing what thoſe particular Actions are that will do ſo? Indeed, this is a very true Propoſition, and fit to be inculcated on, and receiv'd by thoſe who are ſuppos'd to have been taught what Actions in all kinds are *Sins*: but neither this nor the former can be imagin'd to be Innate Principles; nor to be of any uſe, if they were Innate, unleſs the particular meaſures and bounds of all Vertues and Vices, were engraven in mens Minds, and were Innate Principles alſo, which, I think, is very much to be doubted. And therefore, I imagine, it will ſcarce ſeem poſſible, that God ſhould engrave Principles in mens Minds, in words of uncertain Signification, ſuch as *Vertues* and *Sins*, which amongſt different Men ſtand for different things: Nay, it cannot be ſuppos'd to be in words at all, which, being in moſt of theſe Principles very general Names, cannot be underſtood, but by knowing the Particulars comprehended under them. And in the practical Inſtances, the meaſures muſt be taken from the knowledg of the Actions themſelves, and the Rules of them abſtracted from Words, and antecedent to the knowledg of Names; which Rules a Man muſt know, what Language ſoever he chance to learn, whether *Engliſh* or *Japan*, or if he ſhould learn no Language at all, or never ſhould underſtand the uſe of Words, as happens in the

caſe of dumb and deaf Men. When it ſhall be made out, that Men ignorant of Words, or untaught by the Laws and Cuſtoms of their Country, know that it is part of the Worſhip of God, Not to kill another Man; Not to know more Women than one; Not to procure Abortion; Not to expoſe their Children; Not to take from another what is his, tho' we want it our ſelves, but on the contrary, relieve and ſupply his Wants; and whenever we have done the contrary, we ought to repent, be ſorry, and reſolve to do ſo no more: When, I ſay, all Men ſhall be prov'd actually to know, and allow all theſe and a thouſand other ſuch Rules, all which come under theſe two general Words made uſe of above, *viz. Virtutes & Peccata, Vertues* and *Sins*; there will be more reaſon for admitting theſe and the like for common Notions, and practical Principles. Yet after all, univerſal Conſent (were there any in moral Principles) to Truths, the knowledg whereof may be attain'd otherwiſe, would ſcarce prove them to be Innate; which is all I contend for.

Obj. *Innate Principles may be corrupted, anſwer'd.*

§. 20. Nor will it be of much moment here to offer that very ready, but not very material Anſwer, (*viz.*) That the *Innate Principles* of Morality, *may, by Education, and Cuſtom,* and the general Opinion of thoſe, amongſt whom we converſe, *be darken'd,* and at laſt *quite worn out* of the Minds of Men. Which Aſſertion of theirs, if true, quite takes away the Argument of univerſal Conſent, by which this Opinion of Innate Principles is endeavour'd to be prov'd; unleſs thoſe Men will think it reaſonable, that their private Perſuaſions, or that of their Party ſhould paſs for univerſal Conſent; a thing not unfrequently done, when Men, preſuming themſelves to be the only Maſters of right Reaſon, caſt by the Votes and Opinions of the reſt of Mankind, as not worthy the reckoning. And then their Argument ſtands thus: The Principles which all Mankind allow for true, are Innate; thoſe that Men of right Reaſon admit, are the Principles allow'd by all Mankind: we and thoſe of our mind are Men of reaſon; therefore we agreeing, our Principles are Innate: which is a very pretty way of arguing, and a ſhort cut to Infallibility. For otherwiſe it will be very hard to underſtand, how there be ſome Principles, which all Men do acknowledg, and agree in; and yet there are none of thoſe *Principles,* which are *not by deprav'd Cuſtom and ill Education, blotted out* of the Minds of many Men; which is to ſay, That all Men admit, but yet many Men do deny, and diſſent from them. And indeed the Suppoſition of ſuch firſt Principles will ſerve us to very little purpoſe; and we ſhall be as much at a loſs with, as without them, if they may by any human Power, ſuch as is the Will of our Teachers or Opinions of our Companions, be alter'd or loſt in us: And notwithſtanding all this boaſt of firſt Principles, and Innate Light, we ſhall be as much in the dark and uncertainty, as if there were no ſuch thing at all; it being all one to have no Rule, and one that will warp any way; or amongſt various and contrary Rules, not to know which is the right. But concerning Innate Principles, I deſire theſe Men to ſay, whether they can, or cannot, by Education and Cuſtom, be blurr'd and blotted out: If they cannot, we muſt find them in all Mankind alike, and they muſt be clear in every body: And if they may ſuffer variation from adventitious Notions, we muſt then find them cleareſt and moſt perſpicuous, neareſt the Fountain, in Children and illiterate People, who have receiv'd leaſt impreſſion from foreign Opinions. Let them take which ſide they pleaſe, they will certainly find it inconſiſtent with viſible matter of fact, and daily obſervation.

Contrary Principles in the World.

§. 21. I eaſily grant, that there are great numbers of *Opinions,* which, by Men of different Countries, Educations and Tempers, are receiv'd and *embrac'd as firſt and unqueſtionable Principles; many whereof,* both for their Abſurdity, as well as Oppoſitions one to another, *it is impoſſible ſhould be true.* But yet all thoſe Propoſitions, how remote ſoever from Reaſon, are ſo ſacred ſomewhere or other, that Men, even of good Underſtanding in other matters, will ſooner part with their Lives, and whatever is deareſt to them, than ſuffer themſelves to doubt, or others to queſtion the truth of them.

How Men commonly come by their Principles.

§. 22. This, however ſtrange it may ſeem, is that which every day's experience confirms; and will not, perhaps, appear ſo wonderful, if we conſider the *Ways* and *Steps by which* it is brought about; and how really it may come to paſs, that *Doctrines,* that have been deriv'd from no better Original than the Superſtition of a Nurſe, or the Authority of an old Woman, may by length

of

of time, and consent of Neighbours, *grow up to the Dignity of Principles* in Religion or Morality. For such, who are careful (as they call it) to principle Children well (and few there be who have not a set of those Principles for them, which they believe in) instil into the unwary, and as yet unprejudic'd Understanding (for white Paper receives any Characters) those Doctrines they would have them retain and profess. These being taught them as soon as they have any apprehension; and still as they grow up, confirm'd to them, either by the open Profession, or tacit Consent of all they have to do with; or at least by those of whose Wisdom, Knowledg and Piety, they have an Opinion, who never suffer those Propositions to be otherwise mention'd, but as the Basis and Foundation on which they build their Religion or Manners; come, by these means, to have the reputation of unquestionable, self-evident and innate Truths.

§. 23. To which we may add, That when *Men*, so instructed, are grown up, and reflect on their own Minds, they cannot find any thing more antient there than those Opinions which were taught them before their Memory began to keep a Register of their Actions, or date the time when any new thing appear'd to them; and therefore make no scruple to conclude, *That those Propositions, of whose Knowledge they can find in themselves no Original, were certainly the impress of God and Nature* upon their Minds, and not taught them by any one else. These they entertain and submit to, as many do to their Parents, with Veneration; not because it is natural; nor do Children do it, where they are not so taught; but because, having been always so educated, and having no remembrance of the beginning of this Respect, they think it is natural.

§. 24. This will appear very likely, and almost unavoidable to come to pass, if we consider the Nature of Mankind, and the Constitution of human Affairs; wherein *most Men cannot live without employing their time in the daily Labours of their Callings; nor be at quiet in their Minds, without some Foundation or Principles to rest their Thoughts on.* There is scarce any one so floating and superficial in his Understanding, who hath not some reverenc'd Propositions, which are to him the Principles on which he bottoms his Reasonings; and by which he judgeth of Truth and Falshood, Right and Wrong: which, some wanting skill and leisure, and others the inclination, and some being taught, that they ought not to examine; there are few to be found who are not expos'd by their Ignorance, Laziness, Education, or Precipitancy to *take them upon trust.*

§. 25. This is evidently the case of all Children and young Folk; and Custom, a greater Power than Nature, seldom failing to make them worship for Divine, what she hath inur'd them to bow their Minds, and submit their Understandings to, it is no wonder that grown *Men*, either perplex'd in the necessary Affairs of Life, or hot in the pursuit of Pleasures, should *not* seriously sit down *to examine their own Tenets*; especially when one of their Principles is, That Principles ought not be question'd. And had Men Leisure, Parts, and Will, who is there almost that dare shake the Foundations of all his past Thoughts and Actions, and endure to bring upon himself the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error? Who is there, hardy enough to contend with the reproach which is every where prepar'd for those who dare venture to dissent from the receiv'd Opinions of their Country or Party? And where is the Man to be found that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name of Whimsical, Sceptical, or Atheist, which he is sure to meet with, who does in the least scruple any of the common Opinions? And he will be much more *afraid to question those Principles*, when he shall think them, as most men do, the Standards set up by God in his Mind, to be the Rule and Touchstone of all other Opinions. And what can hinder him from thinking them Sacred, when he finds them the earliest of all his own Thoughts, and the most reverenc'd by others?

§. 26. It is easy to imagine *how* by these means it comes to pass, that *Men* worship the Idols that have been set up in their Minds; grow fond of the Notions they have been long acquainted with there; and *stamp the Characters of Divinity upon Absurdities and Errors*, become zealous Votaries to Bulls and Monkeys; and contend too, fight, and die in defence of their Opinion. *Dum solos credit habendos esse Deos, quos ipse colit.* For since the reasoning Faculties of the Soul,

Soul, which are almoſt conſtantly, tho' not always warily nor wiſely employ'd, would not know how to move, for want of a foundation and footing, in moſt Men; who thro' Lazineſs or Avocation do not, or for want of time, or true helps, or for other cauſes, cannot penetrate into the Principles of Knowledg, and trace Truth to its Fountain and Original; 'tis natural for them, and almoſt unavoidable, to take up with ſome borrow'd Principles; which being reputed and preſum'd to be the evident proofs of other things, are thought not to need any other proof themſelves. Whoever ſhall receive any of theſe into his Mind, and entertain them there with the reverence uſually paid to Principles, never venturing to examine them, but accuſtoming himſelf to believe them, becauſe they are to be believ'd, may take up from his Education, and the Faſhions of his Country, any Abſurdity for innate Principles; and by long poring on the ſame Objects, ſo dim his Sight, as to take Monſters lodg'd in his own Brain, for the Images of the Deity, and the Workmanſhip of his Hands.

Principles muſt be examin'd.

§. 27. By this progreſs, how many there are who arrive at Principles, which they believe innate, may be eaſily obſerv'd, in the variety of oppoſite Principles held and contended for by all ſorts and degrees of Men. And he that ſhall deny this to be the method, wherein moſt Men proceed to the aſſurance they have of the Truth and Evidence of their Principles, will perhaps find it a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary Tenets, which are firmly believ'd, confidently aſſerted, and which great numbers are ready at any time to ſeal with their Blood. And, indeed, if it be the privilege of innate Principles, to be receiv'd upon their own Authority, without examination, I know not what may not be believ'd, or how any one's *Principles* can be queſtion'd. If they may, and *ought to be examin'd*, and try'd, I deſire to know how firſt and innate Principles can be try'd; or at leaſt it is reaſonable to demand the Marks and Characters, whereby the genuine innate Principles may be diſtinguiſh'd from others; that ſo, amidſt the great variety of Pretenders, I may be kept from miſtakes, in ſo material a point as this. When this is done, I ſhall be ready to embrace ſuch welcome and uſeful Propoſitions; and till then I may with modeſty doubt, ſince I fear univerſal Conſent, which is the only one produc'd, will ſcarce prove a ſufficient mark to direct my Choice, and aſſure me of any innate Principles. From what has been ſaid, I think it paſt doubt, that there are no Practical Principles wherein all Men agree; and therefore none Innate.

CHAP. IV.

Other Conſiderations concerning Innate Principles, both Speculative and Practical.

Principles not Innate, unleſs their Ideas *be Innate.*

§. 1. HAD thoſe, who would perſuade us that there are Innate Principles, not taken them together in groſs, but conſider'd ſeparately the parts out of which thoſe Propoſitions are made; they would not, perhaps, have been ſo forward to believe they were Innate: Since, if the *Ideas* which made up thoſe Truths were not, it was impoſſible that the Propoſitions made up of them ſhould be Innate, or our Knowledg of them be born with us. For if the *Ideas* be not *Innate*, there was a time when the Mind was without thoſe Principles; and then they will not be Innate, but be deriv'd from ſome other Original. For, where the *Ideas* themſelves are not, there can be no Knowledg, no Aſſent, no mental or verbal Propoſitions about them.

Ideas, *eſpecially thoſe belonging to Principles, not born with Children.*

§. 2. If we will attentively conſider new-born *Children*, we ſhall have little reaſon to think, that they bring many *Ideas* into the World with them. For bating perhaps ſome faint *Ideas* of Hunger, and Thirſt, and Warmth, and ſome Pains which they may *have* felt in the Womb, there is *not* the leaſt appearance of any ſettled *Ideas* at all in them; eſpecially of *Ideas, anſwering the Terms, which make up thoſe univerſal Propoſitions*, that are eſteem'd Innate Principles. One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, *Ideas* come into their Minds; and

and that they get no more, nor no other, than what Experience, and the Obſervation of things that come in their way, furniſh them with; which might be enough to ſatisfy us, that they are not original Characters, ſtamp'd on the Mind.

§. 3. *It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*, is certainly (if there be any ſuch) an Innate Principle. But can any one think, or will any one ſay, that *Impoſſibility* and *Identity* are two Innate *Ideas?* Are they ſuch as all Mankind have, and bring into the World with them? And are they thoſe that are the firſt in Children, and antecedent to all acquir'd ones? If they are Innate, they muſt needs be ſo. Hath a Child an *Idea* of *Impoſſibility* and *Identity*, before it has of *White* or *Black*, *Sweet* or *Bitter?* And is it from the Knowledg of this Principle, that it concludes, that Wormwood rubb'd on the Nipple hath not the ſame taſte that it uſed to receive from thence? Is it the actual Knowledg of *Impoſſibile eſt idem eſſe, & non eſſe*, that makes a Child diſtinguiſh between its Mother and a Stranger; or that makes it fond of the one, and fly the other? Or does the Mind regulate it ſelf and its Aſſent by *Ideas*, that it never yet had? Or the Underſtanding draw Concluſions from Principles, which it never yet knew or underſtood? The names *Impoſſibility* and *Identity* ſtand for two *Ideas*, ſo *far from being Innate*, or born with us, that I think it requires great Care and Attention to form them right in our Underſtandings. They are ſo far from being brought into the World with us, ſo remote from the Thoughts of Infancy and Childhood; that, I believe, upon examination it will be found, that many grown Men want them.

§. 4. If *Identity* (to inſtance in that alone) be a native Impreſſion, and conſequently ſo clear and obvious to us, that we muſt needs know it even from our Cradles; I would gladly be reſolv'd by one of Seven, or Seventy Years old, Whether a Man, being a Creature conſiſting of Soul and Body, be the ſame Man when his Body is chang'd? Whether *Euphorbus* and *Pythagoras*, having had the ſame Soul, were the ſame Man, tho' they liv'd ſeveral Ages aſunder? Nay, Whether the Cock too, which had the ſame Soul, were not the ſame with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear, that our *Idea of Sameneſs* is *not* ſo ſettled and clear, as to deſerve to be thought *Innate* in us. For if thoſe Innate *Ideas* are not clear and diſtinct, ſo as to be univerſally known, and naturally agreed on, they cannot be Subjects of univerſal and undoubted Truths; but will be the unavoidable Occaſion of perpetual Uncertainty. For, I ſuppoſe, every one's *Idea of Identity* will not be the ſame that *Pythagoras*, and thouſands others of his Followers have: And which then ſhall be the true? Which Innate? Or are there two different *Ideas* of *Identity*, both Innate?

Identity, an Idea *not Innate.*

§. 5. Nor let any one think, that the Queſtions I have here propos'd about the *Identity* of Man, are bare empty Speculations; which if they were, would be enough to ſhew, That there was in the Underſtandings of Men *no Innate* Idea of Identity. He that ſhall, with a little attention, reflect on the Reſurrection, and conſider that Divine Juſtice ſhall bring to Judgment, at the laſt Day, the very ſame Perſons, to be happy or miſerable in the other, who did well or ill in this Life; will find it perhaps not eaſy to reſolve with himſelf, what makes the ſame Man, or wherein *Identity* conſiſts: And will not be forward to think he, and every one, even Children themſelves, have naturally a clear *Idea* of it.

§. 6. Let us examine that Principle of Mathematicks, *viz. That the Whole is bigger than a Part.* This, I take it, is reckon'd amongſt innate Principles. I am ſure it has as good a title as any to be thought ſo; which yet no body can think it to be, when he conſiders the *Ideas* it comprehends in it, *Whole* and *Part*, are perfectly relative: but the poſitive *Ideas*, to which they properly and immediately belong, are Extenſion and Number, of which alone *Whole* and *Part* are Relations. So that if *Whole* and *Part* are innate *Ideas*, Extenſion and Number muſt be ſo too; it being impoſſible to have an *Idea* of a Relation, without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs, and in which it is founded. Now, whether the Minds of Men have naturally imprinted on them the *Ideas* of Extenſion and Number, I leave to be conſider'd by thoſe, who are the Patrons of innate Principles.

Whole and Part not Innate Ideas.

§. 7.

Idea *of Worſhip not Innate.*

§. 7. That *God is to be worſhipp'd*, is, without doubt, as great a Truth as any can enter into the Mind of Man, and deſerves the firſt place amongſt all practical Principles. But yet it can by no means be thought innate, unleſs the *Ideas* of *God* and *Worſhip* are innate. That the *Idea* the term *Worſhip* ſtands for, is not in the Underſtanding of Children, and a Character ſtamp'd on the Mind in its firſt Original, I think, will be eaſily granted by any one that conſiders how few there be amongſt grown Men, who have a clear and diſtinct Notion of it. And, I ſuppoſe, there cannot be any thing more ridiculous, than to ſay that Children have this practical Principle innate, *That God is to be worſhipp'd*; and yet, that they know not what that Worſhip of God is, which is their Duty. But to paſs by this:

Idea *of God not Innate.*

§. 8. If any *Idea* can be imagin'd *innate*, the *Idea of God* may, of all others, for many reaſons be thought ſo; ſince it is hard to conceive, how there ſhould be innate moral Principles, without an innate *Idea* of a *Deity*: Without a Notion of a Law-maker, it is impoſſible to have a Notion of a Law, and an Obligation to obſerve it. Beſides the Atheiſts, taken notice of amongſt the Antients, and left branded upon the Records of Hiſtory, hath not Navigation diſcover'd, in theſe latter Ages, whole Nations, at the Bay of *Soldania* (*a*), in *Braſil* (*b*), in *Boranday* (*c*), and the *Caribbee* Iſlands, *&c.* amongſt whom there was to be found no Notion of a God, no Religion? *Nicholaus del Techo, in literis ex Paraquaria de Caaiguarum converſione*, has theſe words (*d*): *Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere quod Deum ad hominis animam ſignificet, nulla ſacra habet, nulla Idola.* There are Inſtances of Nations where uncultivated Nature has been left to it ſelf, without the help of Letters, and Diſcipline, and the Improvements of Arts and Sciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoy'd theſe in a very great meaſure; who yet, for want of a due application of their Thoughts this way, want the *Idea* and Knowledge of God. 'Twill I doubt not be a Surprize to others, as it was to me, to find the *Siamites* of this number. But for this, let them conſult the King of *France*'s late Envoy thither (*e*), who gives no better account of the *Chineſes* themſelves (*f*). And if we will not believe *La Loubere*, the Miſſionaries of *China*, even the Jeſuits themſelves, the great Encomiaſts of the *Chineſes*, do all to a man agree and will convince us that the Sect of the *Literati*, or *Learned*, keeping to the old Religion of *China*, and the ruling Party there, are all of them *Atheiſts*. Vid. *Navarette* in the Collection of Voyages, Vol. the firſt, and *Hiſtoria Cultus Sinenſium*. And perhaps if we ſhould, with attention, mind the Lives and Diſcourſes of People not ſo far off, we ſhould have too much reaſon to fear, that many in more civiliz'd Countries have no very ſtrong and clear Impreſſions of a Deity upon their Minds; and that the Complaints of Atheiſm, made from the Pulpit, are not without reaſon. And tho' only ſome profligate Wretches own it too bare-facedly now; yet perhaps we ſhould hear more than we do of it from others, did not the fear of the Magiſtrate's Sword, or their Neighbour's Cenſure, tie up Peoples Tongues: which, were the Apprehenſions of Puniſhment or Shame taken away, would as openly proclaim their *Atheiſm*, as their Lives do.

(*a*) Rhoe apud Thevenot, *p.* 2.
(*b*) *Jo. de Lery*, c. 16.
(*c*) *Martiniere* $\frac{2\,0\,1}{3\,2\,2}$ *Terry* $\frac{1\,2}{3\,4\,5}$ & $\frac{2\,1}{3\,4\,5}$ *Ovington*, $\frac{4\,1\,2}{4\,0\,6}$.
(*d*) Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaiguarum $\frac{4}{5\,0}$.
(*e*) La Loubere du Royaume de Siam, T. 1. *c.* 9. *ſect.* 15, &c. 20. *ſect.* 22, &c. 22. *ſect.* 6.
(*f*) *Ib.* T. 1. *c.* 20. *ſect.* 4, &c. 23.

§. 9. But had all Mankind, every where, a *Notion of a God* (whereof yet Hiſtory tells us the contrary) it would *not* from thence follow, that the *Idea* of him was *innate*. For tho' no Nation were to be found without a Name, and ſome few dark Notions of him; yet that would not prove them to be natural Impreſſions on the Mind, no more than the names of Fire, or the Sun, Heat, or Number, do prove the *Ideas* they ſtand for, to be innate: becauſe the Names of thoſe things, and the *Ideas* of them, are ſo univerſally receiv'd and known amongſt Mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want of ſuch a Name, or the abſence of ſuch a Notion out of mens Minds, any Argument againſt the Being of a God; any more than it would be a Proof that there was no Load-ſtone in the World, becauſe a great part of Mankind had neither a Notion of any ſuch thing, nor a Name for it; or be any ſhew of Argument to prove, that there are no diſtinct and various Species of Angels, or intelligent Beings above us, becauſe we have no *Ideas* of ſuch diſtinct Species, or Names for them: For Men, being furniſh'd with Words by the common Language of their own Countries, can ſcarce avoid having ſome kind of *Ideas* of thoſe things, whoſe Names, thoſe they converſe with, have occaſion frequently to mention to them. And if

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it carry with it the Notion of Excellency, Greatneſs, or ſomething extraordinary; if Apprehenſion and Concernment accompany it: if the Fear of abſolute and irreſiſtible Power ſet it on upon the Mind, the *Idea* is likely to ſink the deeper, and ſpread the farther; eſpecially, if it be ſuch an *Idea*, as is agreeable to the common Light of Reaſon, and naturally deducible from every part of our Knowledg, as that of a God is. For the viſible marks of extraordinary Wiſdom and Power appear ſo plainly in all the Works of the Creation, that a rational Creature, who will but ſeriouſly reflect on them, cannot miſs the diſcovery of a *Deity*. And the influence that the diſcovery of ſuch a Being muſt neceſſarily have on the Minds of all, that have but once heard of it, is ſo great, and carries ſuch a weight of Thought and Communication with it, that it ſeems ſtranger to me, that a whole Nation of Men ſhould be any where found ſo brutiſh, as to want the Notion of a God; than that they ſhould be without any Notion of Numbers, or Fire.

§. 10. The Name of God being once mention'd in any part of the World, to expreſs a ſuperiour, powerful, wiſe, inviſible Being, the ſuitableneſs of ſuch a Notion to the Principles of common Reaſon, and the intereſt Men will always have to mention it often, muſt neceſſarily ſpread it far and wide, and continue it down to all Generations; tho' yet the general *Reception of this Name, and ſome imperfect and unſteddy Notions convey'd thereby* to the unthinking part of Mankind, *prove not the* Idea *to be innate*; but only that they, who made the diſcovery, had made a right uſe of their Reaſon, thought maturely of the Cauſes of things, and trac'd them to their Original; from whom other leſs conſidering People having once receiv'd ſo important a Notion, it could not eaſily be loſt again.

§. 11. This is all could be infer'd from the Notion of a *God*, were it to be found univerſally in all the Tribes of Mankind, and generally acknowledg'd by Men grown to maturity in all Countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended no farther than that; which, if it be ſufficient to prove the *Idea of God innate*, will as well prove the *Idea* of Fire innate: ſince, I think, it may truly be ſaid, That there is not a Perſon in the world, who has a Notion of a *God*, who has not alſo the *Idea* of Fire. I doubt not, but if a Colony of young Children ſhould be placed in an Iſland where no Fire was, they would certainly neither have any Notion of ſuch a thing, nor Name for it, how generally ſoever it were receiv'd, and known in all the World beſides: and perhaps too their Apprehenſions would be as far remov'd from any Name, or Notion of a God, till ſome one amongſt them had employ'd his Thoughts to enquire into the Conſtitution and Cauſes of things, which would eaſily lead him to the Notion of a *God*: which having once taught to others, Reaſon, and the natural Propenſity of their own Thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongſt them.

§. 12. Indeed it is urg'd, 'That it is *ſuitable to the Goodneſs of God, to imprint upon the Minds of Men, Characters and Notions of Himſelf*, and not to leave them in the dark and doubt in ſo grand a Concernment; and alſo by that means to ſecure to himſelf the Homage and Veneration due from ſo intelligent a Creature as Man; and therefore he has done it.

Suitable to GOD's *Goodneſs, that all Men ſhould have an* Idea *of him, therefore naturally imprinted by him; anſwer'd.*

This Argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than thoſe who uſe it in this caſe expect from it. For if we may conclude, that *God* hath done for Men all that Men ſhall judg is beſt for them, becauſe it is ſuitable to his Goodneſs ſo to do; it will prove not only that God has imprinted on the Minds of Men an *Idea* of Himſelf, but that he hath plainly ſtamp'd there, in fair Characters, all that Men ought to know or believe of him, all that they ought to do in obedience to his Will; and that he hath given them a Will and Affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think better for Men, than that they ſhould in the dark grope after Knowledg, as St. *Paul* tel's us all Nations did after God, *Acts* XVII. 27. than that their Wills ſhould claſh with their Underſtandings, and their Appetites croſs their Duty. The *Romaniſts* ſay, 'Tis beſt for Men, and ſo ſuitable to the Goodneſs of God, that there ſhould be an infallible Judg of Controverſies on Earth; and therefore there is one. And I, by the ſame reaſon, ſay, 'Tis better for Men that every Man himſelf ſhould be infallible. I leave them to conſider, whether by the force of this Argument they ſhall think, that every Man is ſo.

I think it a very good Argument, to ſay, the infinitely wiſe God hath made it ſo: and therefore it is beſt. But it *ſeems to me a little too much Confidence of our own Wiſdom, to ſay, I think it beſt, and therefore God hath made it ſo*; and in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from ſuch a Topick that God hath done ſo, when certain Experience ſhews us that he hath not. But the Goodneſs of God hath not been wanting to Men without ſuch original Impreſſions of Knowledg, or *Ideas* ſtamp'd on the Mind: ſince he hath furniſh'd Man with thoſe Faculties, which will ſerve for the ſufficient diſcovery of all things requiſite to the End of ſuch a Being. And I doubt not but to ſhew that a Man, by the right Uſe of his natural Abilities, may, without any innate Principles, attain the Knowledg of a God, and other things that concern him. God having endu'd Man with thoſe Faculties of Knowing which he hath, was no more oblig'd by his Goodneſs to implant thoſe innate Notions in his Mind, than that having given him Reaſon, Hands, and Materials, he ſhould build him Bridges, or Houſes; which ſome People in the World, however of good Parts, do either totally want, or are but ill-provided of, as well as others are wholly without *Ideas of God*, and Principles of Morality; or at leaſt have but very ill ones. The reaſon in both caſes being, that they never employ'd their Parts, Faculties, and Powers, induſtriouſly that way, but contented themſelves with the Opinions, Faſhions, and Things of their Country, as they found them, without looking any farther. Had you or I been born at the Bay of *Soldania*, poſſibly our Thoughts and Notions had not exceeded thoſe brutiſh ones of the *Hottentots* that inhabit there: And had the *Virginia* King *Apochancana* been educated in *England*, he had perhaps been as knowing a Divine, and as good a Mathematician, as any in it. The difference between him and a more improv'd *Engliſh*-man lying barely in this, that Exerciſe of his Faculties was bounded within the Ways, Modes, and Notions of his own Country, and never directed to any other, or farther Enquiries: And if he had not any *Idea* of a God, it was only becauſe he purſu'd not thoſe Thoughts that would have led him to it.

Ideas of GOD various in different Men.

§ 13. I grant, That *if* there were *any Ideas* to be found *imprinted* on the Minds of Men, we have reaſon to expect, *it ſhould be the Notion of his Maker*, as a mark GOD ſet on his own Workmanſhip, to mind Man of his Dependance and Duty; and that herein ſhould appear the firſt Inſtances of human Knowledg. But how late is it before any ſuch Notion is diſcoverable in Children? And when we find it there, how much more does it reſemble the Opinion and Notion of the Teacher, than repreſent the true God? He that ſhall obſerve in Children the progreſs whereby their Minds attain the Knowledg they have, will think that the Objects they do firſt and moſt familiarly converſe with, are thoſe that make the firſt impreſſions on their Underſtandings: nor will he find the leaſt footſteps of any other. It is eaſy to take notice, how their Thoughts enlarge themſelves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of ſenſible Objects, to retain the *Ideas* of them in their Memories; and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them, and ſeveral ways put them together. How by theſe means they come to frame in their Minds an *Idea* Men have of a Deity, I ſhall hereafter ſhew.

§. 14. Can it be thought, that the *Ideas* Men have of God, are the Characters and Marks of Himſelf, engraven in their Minds by his own Finger; when we ſee that in the ſame Country, under one and the ſame name, *Men have far different*, nay, often *contrary and inconſiſtent Ideas* and Conceptions *of him?* Their agreeing in a Name, or Sound, will ſcarce prove an innate Notion of Him.

§. 15. What true or tolerable Notion of a *Deity* could they have, who acknowledg'd and worſhip'd hundreds? Every Deity that they own'd above one, was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of Him, and a proof that they had no true Notion of God, where Unity, Infinity, and Eternity were excluded. To which if we add their groſs Conceptions of Corporeity, expreſs'd in their Images and Repreſentations of their Deities; the Amours, Marriages, Copulations, Luſts, Quarrels, and other mean Qualities attributed by them to their Gods; we ſhall have little reaſon to think, that the Heathen World, *i. e.* the greateſt part of Mankind, had ſuch *Ideas* of God in their Minds, as he himſelf, out of care that they ſhould not be miſtaken about Him, was Author of. And this Univerſality of Conſent, ſo much argu'd, if it prove any native

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Impreſſions, 'twill be only this, That God imprinted on the Minds of all Men, ſpeaking the ſame Language, a Name for himſelf, but not any *Idea*; ſince thoſe People, who agreed in the Name, had at the ſame time far different Apprehenſions about the thing ſignify'd. If they ſay, That the variety of Deities, worſhip'd by the Heathen World, were but figurative ways of expreſſing the ſeveral Attributes of that incomprehenſible Being, or ſeveral Parts of his Providence: I anſwer, What they might be in their Original, I will not here inquire; but that they were ſo in the Thoughts of the Vulgar, I think no body will affirm. And he that will conſult the Voyage of the Biſhop of *Beryte*, c. 13. (not to mention other Teſtimonies) will find, that the Theology of the *Siamites* profeſſedly owns a Plurality of Gods: Or, as the *Abbé de Choiſy* more judiciouſly remarks, in his Journal *du Voiage de Siam*, $\frac{12}{197}$, it conſiſts properly in acknowledging no God at all.

§. 15. If it be ſaid, That *wiſe Men* of all Nations came to *have true Conceptions* of the Unity and Infinity *of the Deity*, I grant it. But then this,

Firſt, Excludes Univerſality of Conſent in any thing but the Name; for thoſe wiſe Men being very few, perhaps one of a thouſand, this Univerſality is very narrow.

Secondly, It ſeems to me plainly to prove, that the trueſt and beſt Notions Men had of God were not imprinted, but acquir'd by Thought and Meditation; and a right uſe of their Faculties; ſince the wiſe and conſiderate Men of the World, by a right and careful Imployment of their Thoughts and Reaſon, attain'd true Notions in this as well as other things; whilſt the lazy and inconſiderate part of Men, making the far greater number, took up their Notions by chance, from common Tradition and vulgar Conceptions, without much beating their Heads about them. And if it be a reaſon to think *the Notion of God innate*, becauſe all wiſe Men had it, Vertue too muſt be thought innate, for That alſo wiſe Men have always had.

§. 16. This was evidently the Caſe of all *Gentiliſm*: Nor hath even amongſt *Jews*, *Chriſtians* and *Mahometans*, who acknowledg but one God, this Doctrine, and the Care taken in thoſe Nations to teach Men to have true Notions of a GOD, prevail'd ſo far as to make Men to have the ſame, and true *Ideas* of him. How many, even amongſt us, will be found, upon inquiry, to fancy him in the ſhape of a Man ſitting in Heaven, and to have many other abſurd and unfit Conceptions of him? Chriſtians, as well as *Turks*, have had whole Sects owning and contending earneſtly for it, that the Deity was corporeal, and of human Shape: And tho' we find few amongſt us who profeſs themſelves *Anthropomorphites* (tho' ſome I have met with that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it his buſineſs, may find amongſt the ignorant and uninſtructed Chriſtians many of that Opinion. Talk but with Country-People, almoſt of any Age, or young People, almoſt of any Condition; and you ſhall find, that tho' the Name of GOD be frequently in their Mouths; yet the Notions they apply this Name to are ſo odd, low and pitiful, that no body can imagine they were taught by a rational Man, much leſs that they were Characters writ by the Finger of God himſelf. Nor do I ſee how it derogates more from the Goodneſs of God, that he has given us Minds unfurniſh'd with theſe *Ideas* of himſelf, than that he hath ſent us into the World with Bodies uncloth'd, and that there is no Art or Skill born with us: For being fitted with Faculties to attain theſe, it is want of Induſtry and Conſideration in us, and not of Bounty in him, if we have them not. 'Tis as certain that there is a God, as that the oppoſite Angles, made by the interſection of two ſtrait Lines, are equal. There was never any rational Creature, that ſet himſelf ſincerely to examine the Truth of theſe Propoſitions, that could fail to aſſent to them; tho' yet it be paſt doubt, that there are many Men, who having not apply'd their Thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmoſt of its Extent) univerſal Conſent, ſuch an one I eaſily allow; but ſuch an univerſal Conſent as this proves not the *Idea* of *God*, no more than it does the *Idea* of ſuch Angles, *innate*.

§. 17. Since then tho' the knowledg of a GOD be the moſt natural Diſcovery of human Reaſon, yet *the Idea of him* is *not innate*, as, I think, is evident from what has been ſaid; I imagine there will ſcarce be any other *Idea* found, that can *not*.

If the Idea *of* GOD *be not innate, no other can be ſuppos'd innate.*

can pretend to it: Since if God had ſet any Impreſſion, any Character on the Underſtanding of Men, it is moſt reaſonable to expect it ſhould have been ſome clear and uniform *Idea* of himſelf, as far as our weak Capacities were capable to receive ſo incomprehenſible and infinite an Object. But our Minds being at firſt void of that *Idea*, which we are moſt concern'd to have, it *is a ſtrong Preſumption againſt all other innate Characters.* I muſt own, as far as I can obſerve, I can find none, and would be glad to be inform'd by any other.

Idea *of Subſtance not innate.*

§. 18. I confeſs there is another *Idea*, which would be of general uſe for Mankind to have, as it is of general Talk, as if they had it; and that is the *Idea of Subſtance* which we neither have, nor can have, by *Senſation* or *Reflection.* If Nature took care to provide us any *Ideas*, we might well expect they ſhould be ſuch, as by our own Faculties we cannot procure to our ſelves: but we ſee, on the contrary, that ſince by thoſe ways whereby other *Ideas* are brought into our Minds, this is not; we have no ſuch *clear Idea* at all, and therefore ſignify nothing by the word *Subſtance*, but only an uncertain ſuppoſition of we know not what (*i. e.* of ſome thing whereof we have no particular diſtinct poſitive) *Idea*, which we take to be the *Subſtratum*, or Support, of thoſe *Ideas* we do know.

No Propoſitions can be innate, ſince no Ideas *are innate.*

§. 19. Whatever then we talk of Innate, either *ſpeculative* or *practical Principles*, it may, with as much probability, be ſaid, that a Man hath 100 *l.* ſterling in his Pocket, and yet deny'd that he hath either Penny, Shilling, Crown, or any other Coin, out of which the Sum is to be made up; as to think that certain Propoſitions are innate, when the *Ideas* about which they are, can by no means be ſuppos'd to be ſo. The general Reception and Aſſent that is given, doth *not* at all prove that the *Ideas* expreſs'd in them are *innate*: For in many Caſes, however the *Ideas* came there, the Aſſent to Words, expreſſing the Agreement or Diſagreement of ſuch *Ideas*, will neceſſarily follow. Every one, that hath a true *Idea* of *God* and *Worſhip*, will aſſent to this Propoſition, That God is to be worſhip'd, when expreſs'd in a Language he underſtands: And every rational Man, that hath not thought on it to day, may be ready to aſſent to this Propoſition to morrow; and yet Millions of Men may be well ſuppos'd to want one or both of thoſe *Ideas* to Day. For if we will allow Savages and moſt Country-People to have *Ideas* of *God* and *Worſhip* (which Converſation with them will not make one forward to believe) yet I think few Children can be ſuppos'd to have thoſe *Ideas*, which therefore they muſt begin to have ſome time or other: and then they will alſo begin to aſſent to that Propoſition, and make very little queſtion of it ever after. But ſuch an Aſſent upon Hearing no more proves the *Ideas* to be innate, than it does that one born blind (with Cataracts, which will be couch'd to morrow) had the innate *Ideas* of the Sun, or Light, or Saffron, or Yellow; becauſe when his Sight is clear'd, he will certainly aſſent to this Propoſition, That the Sun is lucid, or that Saffron is yellow: and therefore if ſuch an Aſſent upon hearing cannot prove the *Ideas* innate, it can much leſs the Propoſitions made up of thoſe *Ideas.* If they have any innate *Ideas*, I would be glad to be told what, and how many they are.

No innate Ideas *in the Memory.*

§. 20. To which let me add: If there be any innate *Ideas*, any *Ideas* in the Mind, which the Mind does not actually think on, they muſt be lodg'd in the Memory, and from thence muſt be brought into view by Remembrance; *i. e.* muſt be known, when they are remember'd, to have been Perceptions in the Mind before, unleſs Remembrance can be without Remembrance. For to remember is to perceive any thing with Memory, or with a Conſciouſneſs, that it was known or perceiv'd before: without this, whatever *Idea* comes into the Mind is new, and not remember'd; this Conſciouſneſs of its having been in the Mind before, being that which diſtinguiſhes Remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever *Idea* was never perceiv'd by the Mind, was never in the Mind. Whatever *Idea* is in the Mind, is either an actual Perception; or elſe having been an actual Perception, is ſo in the Mind, that by the Memory it can be made an actual Perception again. Whenever there is the actual Perception of an *Idea* without Memory, the *Idea* appears perfectly new and unknown before to the Underſtanding. Whenever the Memory brings any *Idea* into actual view, it is with a Conſciouſneſs, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a ſtranger to the Mind. Whether this be not ſo, I appeal to

every

every one's Obervation: and then I desire an Instance of an *Idea* pretended to be innate, which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be mention'd) any one could revive and remember as an *Idea* he had formerly known, without which Consciousness of a former Perception there is no remembrance; and whatever *Idea* comes into the Mind without that Consciousness, is not remember'd, or comes not out of the Memory, nor can be said to be in the Mind before that appearance: For what is not either actually in View, or in the Memory, is in the Mind no way at all, and is all one as if it never had been there. Suppose a Child had the use of his Eyes, till he knows and distinguishes Colours; but then Cataracts shut the Windows, and he is forty or fifty Years perfectly in the dark, and in that time perfectly loses all Memory of the *Ideas* of Colours he once had. This was the Case of a blind Man I once talk'd with, who lost his Sight by the Small-Pox when he was a Child, and had no more notion of Colours than one born blind. I ask, whether any one can say this Man had then any *Ideas* of Colours in his Mind, any more than one born blind? And I think no body will say, that either of them had in his Mind any *Idea* of Colours at all. His Cataracts are couch'd, and then he has the *Ideas* (which he remembers not) of Colours, *de novo*, by his restor'd Sight convey'd to his Mind, and that without any Consciousness of a former acquaintance; and these now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this case all these *Ideas* of Colours, which when out of view can be reviv'd with a Consciousness of a former acquaintance, being thus in the Memory, are said to be in the Mind. The use I make of this, is, that whatever *Idea* being not actually in View, is in the Mind, is there only by being in the Memory; and if it be not in the Memory, it is not in the Mind; and if it be in the Memory, it cannot by the Memory be brought into actual View, without a Perception that it comes out of the Memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remember'd. If therefore there be any innate *Ideas*, they must be in the Memory, or else no where in the Mind; and if they be in the Memory, they can be reviv'd without any Impression from without; and whenever they are brought into the Mind, they are remember'd, *i. e.* they bring with them a Perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a constant and distinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the Memory, or in the Mind; that what is not in the Memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and what is in the Memory, or in the Mind, whenever it is suggested by the Memory, appears not to be new, but the Mind finds it in it self, and knows it was there before. By this it may be try'd, whether there be any innate *Ideas* in the Mind, before impression from *Sensation* or *Reflection*. I would fain meet with the Man, who when he came to the use of Reason, or at any other time, remember'd any of them: And to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are *Ideas* in the Mind, that are not in the Memory; I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible.

§. 21. Besides what I have already said, there is another Reason why I doubt that neither these nor any other Principles are innate. I that am fully persuaded, that the infinitely wise GOD made all things in perfect Wisdom, cannot satisfy my self why he should be suppos'd to print upon the Minds of Men some universal *Principles*, whereof those *that* are pretended innate, and *concern Speculation, are of no great use; and those that concern Practice, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other Truths not allow'd to be innate.* For to what purpose should Characters be graven on the Mind by the Finger of God, which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduc'd, or cannot be distinguish'd from them? If any one thinks there are such innate *Ideas* and Propositions, which by their Clearness and Usefulness are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the Mind and acquir'd, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us which they are, and then every one will be a fit Judg whether they be so or no; since if there be such innate *Ideas* and Impressions, plainly different from all other Perceptions and Knowledg, every one will find it true in himself. Of the Evidence of these suppos'd innate Maxims I have spoken already; of their Usefulness I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

Principles not innate, because of little Use, or little Certainty.

§. 22.

Difference of Mens Diſcoveries depends upon the different application of their Faculties.

§. 22. To conclude: Some *Ideas* forwardly offer themſelves to all Mens Underſtandings; ſome ſorts of Truths reſult from any *Ideas*, as ſoon as the Mind puts them into Propoſitions; other Truths require a train of *Ideas* plac'd in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention before they can be diſcover'd and aſſented to. Some of the firſt ſort, becauſe of their general and eaſy reception, have been miſtaken for innate; but the truth is, *Ideas* and Notions are no more born with us than Arts and Sciences, tho' ſome of them indeed offer themſelves to our Faculties more readily than others, and therefore are more generally receiv'd; tho' that too be according as the Organs of our Bodies and Powers of our Minds happen to be imploy'd: *God having fitted Men with Faculties and Means to diſcover, receive and retain Truths, according as they are imploy'd.* The great difference that is to be found in the Notions of Mankind, is from the different uſe they put their Faculties to; whilſt ſome (and thoſe the moſt) taking things upon truſt, miſimploy their power of Aſſent, by lazily enſlaving their Minds to the Dictates and Dominion of others, in Doctrines which it is their Duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, with an implicit Faith, to ſwallow. Others, imploying their Thoughts only about ſome few things, grow acquainted ſufficiently with them, attain great degrees of Knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their Thoughts looſe in the ſearch of other Inquiries. Thus, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, is a Truth as certain as any thing can be, and I think more evident than many of thoſe Propoſitions that go for Principles; and yet there are Millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, becauſe they never ſet their Thoughts on work about ſuch Angles: And he that certainly knows this Propoſition, may yet be utterly ignorant of the Truth of other Propoſitions, in Mathematicks it ſelf, which are as clear and evident as this; becauſe, in his ſearch of thoſe mathematical Truths, he ſtop'd his Thoughts ſhort, and went not ſo far. The ſame may happen concerning the Notions we have of the Being of a Deity; for tho' there be no Truth which a Man may more evidently make out to himſelf than the Exiſtence of a God; yet he that ſhall content himſelf with things, as he finds them in this World, as they miniſter to his Pleaſures and Paſſions, and not make inquiry a little farther into their Cauſes, Ends and admirable Contrivances, and purſue the Thoughts thereof with Diligence and Attention, may live long without any Notion of ſuch a Being. And if any Perſon hath by talk put ſuch a Notion into his Head, he may perhaps believe it; but if he hath never *examin'd* it, his knowledg of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon truſt, without examining the Demonſtration, and may yield his Aſſent as a probable Opinion, but hath no knowledg of the Truth of it; which yet his Faculties, if carefully imploy'd, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only by the by, to ſhew how much our *Knowledg depends upon the right uſe of thoſe Powers Nature hath beſtow'd upon us*, and how little upon ſuch innate Principles, as are in vain ſuppos'd to be in all Mankind for their Direction; which all Men could not but know, if they were there, or elſe they would be there to no purpoſe: And which ſince all Men do not know, nor can diſtinguiſh from other adventitious Truths, we may well conclude there are no ſuch.

Men muſt think and know for themſelves.

§. 23. What Cenſure, doubting thus of innate Principles, may deſerve from Men, who will be apt to call it pulling up the old Foundations of Knowledg and Certainty, I cannot tell; I perſuade my ſelf at leaſt, that the way I have purſu'd, being conformable to Truth, lays thoſe Foundations ſurer. This I am certain, I have not made it my buſineſs either to quit or follow any Authority in the enſuing Diſcourſe: Truth has been my only Aim, and wherever that has appear'd to lead, my Thoughts have impartially follow'd, without minding whether the Footſteps of any other lay that way or no. Not that I want a due reſpect to other Mens Opinions; but after all, the *greateſt Reverence is due to Truth:* and I hope it will not be thought Arrogance to ſay, that perhaps we ſhould make greater progreſs in the Diſcovery of rational and contemplative *Knowledg*, if we *ſought* it in the Fountain, *in the Conſideration of things themſelves*, and made uſe rather of our own Thoughts than other Mens to find it.

it: For I think we may as rationally hope to see with other Mens Eyes, as to know by other Mens Understandings. So much as we our selves consider and comprehend of Truth and Reason, so much we possess of real and true Knowledg. The floating of other Mens Opinions in our Brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, tho' they happen to be true. What in them was Science, is in us but Opiniatrety; whilst we give up our Assent only to Reverend Names, and do not, as they did, imploy our own Reason to *understand* those *Truths* which gave them Reputation. *Aristotle* was certainly a knowing Man; but no body ever thought him so, because he blindly embrac'd, and confidently vented the Opinions of another. And if the taking up of another's Principles, without examining them, made not him a Philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make any body else so. In the Sciences, every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends: What he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreds; which, however well in the whole piece, make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers them. Such borrow'd Wealth, like Fairy-mony, tho' it were Gold in the Hand from which he receiv'd it, will be but Leaves and Dust when it comes to use.

Whence the Opinion of innate Principles.

§. 24. When Men have found some general Propositions, that could not be doubted of as soon as understood, it was, I know, *a short and easy way to conclude them innate.* This being once receiv'd, it eas'd the Lazy from the pains of search, and stop'd the Inquiry of the Doubtful concerning all that was once Masters and Teachers, to make this the Principle of *Principles*, That Principles must not be question'd; for having once establish'd this Tenet, that there are innate Principles, it put their Followers upon a necessity of receiving some Doctrines as such; which was to take them off from the use of their own Reason and Judgment, and put them on believing and taking them upon trust, without farther examination: In which posture of blind Credulity, they might be more easily govern'd by, and made useful to some sort of Men, who had the Skill and Office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small Power it gives one Man over another, to have the Authority to be the Dictator of Principles and stil'd innate. And it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be Teacher of unquestionable Truths, and to make a Man swallow that for an innate Principle, which may serve to his purpose who teacheth them; whereas had they examin'd the ways whereby Men came to the knowledg of many universal *Truths*, they would have found them to result in the Minds of Men from the being of things themselves, when duly consider'd; and that they were discover'd by the application of those Faculties, that were fitted by nature to receive and judg of them, when duly imploy'd about them.

Conclusion.

§. 25. *To shew how the Understanding proceeds herein, is the Design of the following Discourse*; which I shall proceed to, when I have first premis'd, that hitherto, to clear my way to those Foundations which I conceive are the only true ones whereon to establish those Notions we can have of our own Knowledg, it hath been necessary for me to give an account of the Reasons I had to doubt of innate Principles. And since the Arguments which are against them do some of them rise from common receiv'd Opinions, I have been forc'd to take several things for granted, which is hardly avoidable to any one, whose Task it is to shew the falshood or improbability of any Tenet: it happening in Controversial Discourses, as it does in assaulting of Towns, where if the Ground be but firm whereon the Batteries are erected, there is no farther Inquiry of whom it is borrow'd, nor whom it belongs to, so it affords but a fit rise for the present purpose. But in the future part of this Discourse, designing to raise an Edifice uniform and consistent with it self, as far as my own Experience and Observation will assist me, I hope to erect it on such a Basis, that I shall not need to shore it up with Props and Buttresses, leaning on borrow'd or beg'd Foundations; or at least, if mine prove a Castle in the Air, I will endeavour it shall be all of a piece, and hang together. Wherein I warn the Reader not to expect undeniable cogent Demonstrations, unless I may be allow'd the Privilege, not seldom assum'd by others, to take my Principles for granted; and then, I doubt not, but I can demonstrate too. All that I shall say for the Principles I proceed on, is, that I can only *appeal* to Men's own unprejudic'd *Experience* and Observation, whether they be true or no; and this is enough for a Man who professes no more, than to lay down candidly and freely his own Conjectures, concerning a Subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design than an unbiass'd Inquiry after Truth.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of Ideas *in general, and their Original.*

Idea *is the Object of Thinking.*

§. 1. EVERY Man being conſcious to himſelf that he Thinks, and that which his Mind is apply'd about whilſt thinking, being the *Ideas* that are there, 'tis paſt doubt that Men have in their Minds ſeveral *Ideas*, ſuch as are thoſe expreſs'd by the words, *Whiteneſs*, *Hardneſs*, *Sweetneſs*, *Thinking*, *Motion*, *Man*, *Elephant*, *Army*, *Drunkenneſs*, and others. It is in the firſt place then to be enquir'd, how he comes by them? I know it is a receiv'd Doctrine, that Men have native *Ideas* and original Characters ſtamp'd upon their Minds in their very firſt Being. This Opinion I have at large examin'd already; and, I ſuppoſe, what I have ſaid in the foregoing Book will be much more eaſily admitted, when I have ſhewn whence the Underſtanding may get all the *Ideas* it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the Mind; for which I ſhall appeal to every one's own Obſervation and Experience.

All Ideas *come from Senſation or Reflection.*

§. 2. Let us then ſuppoſe the Mind to be, as we ſay, White-Paper, void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*; how comes it to be furniſh'd? Whence comes it by that vaſt ſtore which the buſy and boundleſs Fancy of Man has painted on it with an almoſt endleſs variety? Whence has it all the Materials of Reaſon and Knowledg? To this I anſwer, in one word, from *Experience*; In that all our Knowledg is founded, and from that it ultimately derives it ſelf. Our Obſervation employ'd either about *External ſenſible Objects*, *or about the Internal Operations of our Minds, perceiv'd and reflected on by our ſelves, is that which ſupplies our Underſtandings with all the Materials of thinking.* Theſe two are the Fountains of Knowledg, from whence all the *Ideas* we have, or can naturally have, do ſpring.

The Objects of Senſation one Source of Ideas.

§. 3. Firſt, *Our Senſes*, converſant about particular ſenſible Objects, do *convey into the Mind* ſeveral diſtinct *Perceptions* of Things, according to thoſe various ways wherein thoſe Objects do affect them: And thus we come by thoſe *Ideas* we have, of *Yellow*, *White*, *Heat*, *Cold*, *Soft*, *Hard*, *Bitter*, *Sweet*, and all thoſe which we call ſenſible Qualities; which when I ſay the Senſes convey into the Mind, I mean, they from External Objects convey into the Mind what produces there thoſe *Perceptions*. This great ſource of moſt of the *Ideas* we have, depending wholly upon our Senſes, and deriv'd by them to the Underſtanding, I call *SENSATION*.

The Operations of our Minds the other Source of them.

§. 4. Secondly, The other Fountain, from which Experience furniſheth the Underſtanding with *Ideas*, is the *Perception of the Operations of our own Mind* within us, as it is employ'd about the *Ideas* it has got; which Operations when the Soul comes to reflect on and conſider, do furniſh the Underſtanding with another ſet of *Ideas*, which could not be had from Things without; and ſuch are *Perception*, *Thinking*, *Doubting*, *Believing*, *Reaſoning*, *Knowing*, *Willing*, and all the different actings of our own Minds; which we being conſcious of and obſerving in our ſelves, do from theſe receive into our Underſtandings as diſtinct *Ideas*, as we do from Bodies affecting our Senſes. This ſource of *Ideas* every Man has wholly in himſelf: and tho' it be not Senſe, as having nothing to do with External Objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd

call'd Internal Senſe. But as I call the other *Senſation*, ſo I call this *REFLECTION*, the *Ideas* it affords being ſuch only as the Mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within it ſelf. By *REFLECTION* then, in the following part of this Diſcourſe, I would be underſtood to mean, that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the manner of them; by reaſon whereof there come to be *Ideas* of theſe Operations in the Underſtanding. Theſe two, I ſay, *viz.* External Material things, as the Objects of *SENSATION*; and the Operations of our own Minds within, as the Objects of *REFLECTION*; are to me the only Originals from whence all our *Ideas* take their beginnings. The term *Operations* here I uſe in a large ſenſe, as comprehending not barely the Actions of the Mind about its *Ideas*, but ſome ſort of Paſſions ariſing ſometimes from them, ſuch as is the ſatisfaction or uneaſineſs ariſing from any thought.

§. 5. The Underſtanding ſeems to me not to have the leaſt glimmering of any *Ideas*, which it doth not receive from one of theſe two. *External Objects furniſh the Mind with the* Ideas *of ſenſible Qualities*, which are all thoſe different Perceptions they produce in us: And the *Mind furniſhes the Underſtanding with* Ideas *of its own Operations.*

All our Ideas *are of the one or other of theſe.*

Theſe, when we have taken a full ſurvey of them and their ſeveral Modes, Combinations, and Relations, we ſhall find to contain all our whole ſtock of *Ideas*; and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of theſe two ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and thorowly ſearch into his Underſtanding; and then let him tell me whether all the original *Ideas* he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his *Senſes*, or of the Operations of his Mind, conſider'd as Objects of his *Reflection*: And how great a maſs of Knowledg ſoever he imagines to be lodg'd there, he will, upon taking a ſtrict view, ſee that he has *not any* Idea *in his Mind, but what one of theſe two have imprinted*; tho' perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarg'd by the Underſtanding, as we ſhall ſee hereafter.

§. 6. He that attentively conſiders the ſtate of a *Child*, at his firſt coming into the World, will have little reaſon to think him ſtor'd with plenty of *Ideas*, that are to be the matter of his future Knowledg: 'Tis by degrees he comes to be furniſh'd with them. And tho' the *Ideas* of obvious and familiar Qualities imprint themſelves before the Memory begins to keep a Regiſter of Time and Order; yet 'tis often ſo late before ſome unuſual Qualities come in the way, that there are few Men that cannot recollect the beginning of their Acquaintance with them: And if it were worth while, no doubt a Child might be ſo order'd as to have but a very few even of the ordinary *Ideas*, till he were grown up to a Man. But all that are born into the World being ſurrounded with Bodies that perpetually and diverſly affect them; variety of *Ideas*, whether care be taken about it or no, are imprinted on the Minds of Children. *Light* and *Colours* are buſy at hand every where, when the Eye is but open; *Sounds*, and ſome *tangible Qualities* fail not to ſollicite their proper Senſes, and force an entrance to the Mind: but yet, I think, it will be granted eaſily, that if a Child were kept in a place where he never ſaw any other but Black and White till he were a Man, he would have no more *Ideas* of Scarlet or Green, than he that from his Childhood never taſted an Oyſter or a Pine-Apple, has of thoſe particular Reliſhes.

Obſervable in Children.

§. 7. Men then come to be furniſh'd with fewer or more ſimple *Ideas* from without, according as the *Objects* they converſe with, afford greater or leſs variety; and from the Operations of their Minds within, according as they more or leſs *reflect* on them. For tho' he that contemplates the Operations of his Mind, cannot but have plain and clear *Ideas* of them; yet unleſs he turn his Thoughts that way, and conſiders them *attentively*, he will no more have clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of all the *Operations of his Mind*, and all that may be obſerved therein, than he will have all the particular *Ideas* of any Landſcape, or of the Parts and Motions of a Clock, who will not turn his Eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it. The Picture or Clock may be ſo plac'd, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confus'd *Idea* of all the parts they are made up of, till he *applies himſelf with attention* to conſider them each in particular.

Men are differently furniſh'd with theſe, according to the different Objects they converſe with.

Ideas of Reflection later, because they need Attention.

§. 8. And hence we see the reason, why 'tis pretty late before most Children get *Ideas* of the Operations of their own Minds; and some have not any very clear or perfect *Ideas* of the greatest part of them all their Lives: because tho' they pass there continually, yet like floating Visions, they make not deep Impressions enough to leave in the Mind clear distinct lasting *Ideas*, till the Understanding turns inwards upon it self, *reflects* on its own *Operations*, and makes them the Object of its own Contemplation. Children, when they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new things, which by a constant solicitation of their Senses, draw the Mind constantly to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing Objects. Thus the first Years are usually employ'd and diverted in looking abroad. Mens business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so, growing up in a constant Attention to outward Sensations, seldom make any considerable Reflection on what passes within them till they come to be of riper Years; and some scarce ever at all.

The Soul begins to have Ideas, *when it begins to perceive.*

§. 9. To ask *at what time a Man has first any* Ideas, is to ask when he begins to perceive; having *Ideas*, and Perception, being the same thing. I know it is an Opinion, that the Soul always thinks, and that it has the actual Perception of *Ideas* in it self constantly as long as it exists; and that actual Thinking is as inseparable from the Soul, as actual Extension is from the Body: which if true, to enquire after the beginning of a Man's *Ideas*, is the same as to enquire after the beginning of his Soul. For by this account, Soul and its *Ideas*, as Body and its Extension, will begin to exist both at the same time.

The Soul thinks not always; for this wants Proofs.

§. 10. But whether the Soul be suppos'd to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or some time after, the first Rudiments or Organization, or the beginnings of Life in the Body; I leave to be disputed by those who have better thought of that matter. I confess my self to have one of those dull Souls, that doth not perceive it self always to contemplate *Ideas*; nor can conceive it any more necessary for the *Soul always to think*, than for the Body always to move: the Perception of *Ideas* being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what Motion is to the Body; not its Essence, but one of its Operations. And therefore, tho' Thinking be suppos'd ever so much the proper Action of the Soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking, always in action. That perhaps is the Privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of Things, *who never slumbers nor sleeps*; but is not competent to any finite Being, at least not to the Soul of Man. We know certainly by Experience that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible Consequence, That there is something in us that has a Power to think: But whether that Substance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no farther assur'd than Experience informs us. For to say that actual Thinking is essential to the Soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to prove it by Reason; which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident Proposition. But whether this, *That the Soul always thinks* be a self-evident Proposition, that every body assents to at first hearing, I appeal to Mankind. 'Tis doubted whether I thought all last Night or no; the Question being about a Matter of Fact, 'tis begging it to bring as a proof for it, an Hypothesis which is the very thing in dispute; by which way one may prove any thing: and 'tis but supposing that all Watches, whilst the Ballance beats, think; and 'tis sufficiently prov'd, and past doubt, that my Watch thought all last Night. But he that would not deceive himself, ought to build his Hypothesis on Matter of Fact, and make it out by sensible Experience, and not presume on Matter of Fact, because of his Hypothesis; that is, because he supposes it to be so: which way of proving amounts to this, That I must necessarily think all last Night, because another supposes I always think, tho' I my self cannot perceive that I always do so.

But Men in love with their Opinions may not only suppose what is in question, but alledg wrong Matter of Fact. How else could any one make it an *Inference* of mine, *that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep?* I do not say there is no Soul in a Man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep: But I do say, he cannot think at any time waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to any thing, but

to

to our Thoughts; and to them it is, and to them it will always be neceſſary, till we can think without being conſcious of it.

§. 11. I grant that the Soul in a waking Man is never without Thought, becauſe it is the condition of being awake: but whether ſleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole Man, Mind as well as Body, may be worth a waking Man's Conſideration; it being hard to conceive, that any thing ſhould think, and not be conſcious of it. If the *Soul* doth *think in a ſleeping Man* without being conſcious of it, I ask, whether during ſuch thinking it has any Pleaſure or Pain, or be capable of Happineſs or Miſery? I am ſure the Man is not, no more than the Bed or Earth he lies on. For to be Happy or Miſerable without being conſcious of it, ſeems to me utterly inconſiſtent and impoſſible. Or if it be poſſible that the Soul can, whilſt the Body is ſleeping, have its Thinking, Enjoyments and Concerns, its Pleaſure or Pain apart, which the Man is not conſcious of nor partakes in; it is certain that *Socrates* aſleep and *Socrates* awake, is not the ſame Perſon: but his Soul when he ſleeps, and *Socrates* the Man, conſiſting of Body and Soul when he is waking, are two Perſons; ſince waking *Socrates* has no Knowledg of, or Concernment for that Happineſs or Miſery of his Soul which it enjoys alone by it ſelf whilſt he ſleeps, without perceiving any thing of it; no more than he has for the Happineſs or Miſery of a Man in the *Indies*, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly away all Conſciouſneſs of our Actions and Senſations, eſpecially of Pleaſure and Pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place perſonal Identity.

It is not always conſcious of it.

§. 12. The Soul, during ſound Sleep, thinks, ſay theſe Men. *Whilſt it thinks* and perceives, it is capable certainly of thoſe of Delight or Trouble, as well as any other Perceptions; and *it muſt neceſſarily be conſcious of its own Perceptions.* But it has all this apart; the ſleeping Man, 'tis plain is conſcious of nothing of all this. Let us ſuppoſe then the Soul of *Caſtor*, while he is ſleeping, retir'd from his Body; which is no impoſſible ſuppoſition for the Men I have here to do with, who ſo liberally allow Life, without a thinking Soul, to all other Animals: Theſe Men cannot then judge it impoſſible, or a contradiction, that the Body ſhould live without the Soul; nor that the Soul ſhould ſubſiſt and think, or have Perception, even Perception of Happineſs or Miſery, without the Body. Let us then, as I ſay, ſuppoſe the Soul of *Caſtor* ſeparated, during his Sleep, from his Body, to think apart. Let us ſuppoſe too, that it chuſes for its Scene of Thinking the Body of another Man, *v. g. Pollux*, who is ſleeping without a Soul: For if *Caſtor*'s Soul can think, whilſt *Caſtor* is aſleep, what *Caſtor* is never conſcious of, 'tis no matter what place it chuſes to think in. We have here then the Bodies of two Men with only one Soul between them, which we will ſuppoſe to ſleep and wake by turns; and the Soul ſtill thinking in the waking Man, whereof the ſleeping Man is never conſcious, has never the leaſt Perception. I ask then, whether *Caſtor* and *Pollux*, thus with only one Soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one what the other is never conſcious of, nor is concern'd for, are not two as diſtinct Perſons as *Caſtor* and *Hercules*, or as *Socrates* and *Plato* were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miſerable? Juſt by the ſame reaſon they make the Soul and the Man two Perſons, who make the Soul think apart what the Man is not conſcious of. For I ſuppoſe no body will make Identity of Perſons to conſiſt in the Soul's being united to the very ſame numerical Particles of Matter; for if that be neceſſary to Identity, 'twill be impoſſible in that conſtant flux of the Particles of our Bodies, that any Man ſhould be the ſame Perſon two Days, or two Moments together.

If a ſleeping Man thinks without knowing it, the ſleeping and waking Man are two Perſons.

§. 13. Thus, methinks, every drowſy Nod ſhakes their Doctrine, who teach, that the Soul is always thinking. Thoſe at leaſt who do at any time *ſleep without dreaming*, can never be convinc'd, that their Thoughts are ſometimes for four Hours buſy without their knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very act, wak'd in the middle of that ſleeping Contemplation, can give no manner of account of it.

Impoſſible to convince thoſe that ſleep without dreaming, that they think.

§. 14. 'Twill perhaps be ſaid, that the *Soul thinks* even *in* the ſoundeſt *Sleep*, *but the Memory retains it not.* That the Soul in a ſleeping Man ſhould be this moment buſy a thinking, and the next moment in a waking Man, not remember nor

That Men dream without remembering it, in vain urg'd

nor be able to recollect one jot of all those Thoughts, is very hard to be conceiv'd, and would need some better proof than bare Assertion to make it be believ'd. For who can without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine, That the greatest part of Men do, during all their Lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which if they were ask'd, even in the middle of these Thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Most Men, I think, pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming. I once knew a Man that was bred a Scholar, and had no bad Memory, who told me, he had never dream'd in his Life till he had that Fever he was then newly recover'd of, which was about the five or six and twentieth Year of his Age. I suppose the World affords more such Instances: At least every one's Acquaintance will furnish him with Examples enough of such as pass most of their Nights without dreaming.

Upon this Hypothesis the Thoughts of a sleeping Man ought to be most rational.

§. 15. *To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking:* And the Soul, in such a state of thinking, does very little, if at all, excel that of a Looking-glass which constantly receives variety of Images, or *Ideas*, but retains none; they disappear and vanish, and there remain no foot-steps of them; the Looking-glass is never the better for such *Ideas*, nor the Soul for such Thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, that in a waking Man the Materials of the Body are employ'd, and made use of, in thinking; and that the memory of Thoughts is retain'd by the impressions that are made on the Brain, and the traces there left after such thinking; but that in the *thinking of the Soul*, which is not perceiv'd *in a sleeping Man*, there the Soul thinks apart, and *making no use* of the Organs of *the Body*, *leaves no impressions on it, and consequently no memory* of such Thoughts. Not to mention again the absurdity of two distinct Persons, which follows from this Supposition, I answer farther, That whatever *Ideas* the Mind can receive and contemplate without the help of the Body, it is reasonable to conclude, it can retain without the help of the Body too: or else the Soul, or any separate Spirit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has no memory of its own Thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its use, and be able to recall them upon occasion; if it cannot reflect upon what is past, and make use of its former Experiences, Reasonings, and Contemplations, to what purpose does it think? They, who make the Soul a thinking thing, at this rate, will not make it a much more noble Being than those do whom they condemn, for allowing it to be nothing but the subtilest parts of Matter. Characters drawn on Dust, that the first breath of Wind effaces; or Impressions made on a heap of Atoms, or animal Spirits, are altogether as useful, and render the Subject as noble, as the Thoughts of a Soul that perish in thinking; that once out of sight, are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves behind them. Nature never makes excellent things for mean or no uses: And it is hardly to be conceiv'd, that our infinitely wise Creator should make so admirable a Faculty as the power of thinking, that Faculty which comes nearest the Excellency of his own incomprehensible Being, to be so idly and uselessly employ'd, at least a fourth part of its time here, as to think constantly, without remembering any of those Thoughts, without doing any good to it self or others, or being any way useful to any other part of the Creation. If we will examine it, we shall not find, I suppose, the motion of dull and senseless Matter any where in the Universe made so little use of, and so wholly thrown away.

On this Hypothesis the Soul must have Ideas not deriv'd from Sensation or Reflection, of which there is no appearance.

§. 16. 'Tis true, we have sometimes instances of Perception, whilst we are *asleep*, and retain the memory of those *Thoughts*: But how *extravagant* and incoherent for the most part they are; how little conformable to the Perfection and Order of a rational Being, those who are acquainted with Dreams need not be told. This I would willingly be satisfy'd in, Whether the Soul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were separate from the Body, acts less rationally than when conjointly with it or no? If its separate Thoughts be less rational, then these Men must say, That the Soul owes the perfection of rational Thinking to the Body: If it does not, 'tis a wonder that our Dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul should retain none of its more rational Soliloquies and Meditations.

If I think when I know it not, no body else can know it.

§. 17. Those who so confidently tell us, That the Soul always actually thinks, I would they would also tell us what those *Ideas* are that are in the Soul of a Child

Child before, or just at the union with the Body, before it hath receiv'd any by *Sensation?* The *Dreams* of sleeping Men *are*, as I take it, all *made up of the waking Man's* Ideas, tho' for the most part oddly put together. 'Tis strange if the Soul has *Ideas* of its own, that it deriv'd not from *Sensation* or *Reflection* (as it must have, if it thought before it receiv'd any impressions from the Body) that it should never, in its private thinking (so private, that the Man himself perceives it not) retain any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make the Man glad with new discoveries. Who can find it reasonable that the Soul should, in its retirement, during sleep, have so many hours thoughts, and yet never light on any of those *Ideas* it borrow'd not from *Sensation* or *Reflection*; or at least preserve the memory of none but such, which being occasion'd from the Body, must needs be less natural to a Spirit? 'Tis strange the Soul should never once in a Man's whole Life recall over any of its pure native Thoughts, and those *Ideas* it had before it borrow'd any thing from the Body; never bring into the waking Man's view any other *Ideas* but what have a Tang of the Cask, and manifestly derive their original from that union. If it always thinks, and so had *Ideas* before it was united, or before it receiv'd any from the Body, 'tis not to be suppos'd, but that during sleep it recollects its native *Ideas*; and during that retirement from communicating with the Body, whilst it thinks by it self, the *Ideas* it is busy'd about should be, sometimes at least, those more natural and congenial ones which it had in it self, underiv'd from the Body, or its own Operations about them: which, since the waking Man never remembers, we must from this Hypothesis conclude, either that the Soul remembers something that the Man does not; or else that Memory belongs only to such *Ideas* as are deriv'd from the Body, or the Mind's Operations about them.

§. 18. I would be glad also to learn from these Men, who so confidently pronounce, that the human Soul, or which is all one, that a Man always thinks, how they come to know it; nay, *how they come to know that themselves think, when they themselves do not perceive it?* This, I am afraid, is to be sure without Proofs; and to know, without perceiving: 'Tis, I suspect, a confus'd Notion taken up to serve an Hypothesis; and none of those clear Truths that either their own Evidence forces us to admit, or common Experience makes it impudence to deny. For the most that can be said of it, is, That 'tis possible the Soul may always think, but not always retain it in memory: And, I say, it is as possible that the Soul may not always think; and much more probable that it should sometimes not think, than that it should often think, and that a long while together, and not be conscious to it self the next moment after, that it had thought.

How knows any one that the Soul always thinks? For if it be not a self-evident Proposition, it needs proof.

§. 19. To suppose the Soul to think, and the Man not to perceive it, is, as has been said, to make two Persons in one Man: And if one considers well these Mens way of speaking, one should be led into a suspicion that they do so. For they who tell us that the Soul always thinks, do never, that I remember, say, That a Man always thinks. Can the Soul think, and not the Man? or a Man think, and not be conscious of it? This perhaps would be suspected of *Jargon* in others. If they say, the Man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it; they may as well say, his Body is extended without having Parts. For 'tis altogether as intelligible to say, that a Body is extended without Parts, as that any thing *thinks without being conscious of it*, or perceiving that it does so. They who talk thus, may with as much reason, if it be necessary to their Hypothesis, say, That a Man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it: whereas Hunger consists in that very Sensation, as Thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks. If they say, That a Man is always conscious to himself of thinking; I ask, how they know it? Consciousness is the Perception of what passes in a Man's own Mind. Can another Man perceive that I am conscious of any thing, when I perceive it not my self? No Man's Knowledg here can go beyond his Experience. Wake a Man out of a sound Sleep, and ask him, What he was that moment thinking on? If he himself be conscious of nothing he then thought on, he must be a notable Diviner of Thoughts that can assure him that he was thinking: May he not with more reason assure him he was not asleep? This is something beyond Philosophy; and it cannot be

That a Man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.

less

leſs than Revelation that diſcovers to another Thoughts in my Mind, when I can find none there my ſelf: And they muſt needs have a penetrating ſight, who can certainly ſee that I think, when I cannot perceive it my ſelf, and when I declare that I do not; and yet can ſee that Dogs or Elephants do not think, when they give all the demonſtration of it imaginable, except only telling us that they do ſo. This ſome may ſuſpect to be a ſtep beyond the *Roſecrucians*; it ſeeming eaſier to make one's ſelf inviſible to others, than to make another's Thoughts viſible to me, which are not viſible to himſelf. But, 'tis but defining the Soul to be a Subſtance that always thinks, and the buſineſs is done. If ſuch definition be of any Authority, I know not what it can ſerve for, but to make many Men ſuſpect, that they have no Souls at all, ſince they find a good part of their Lives paſs away without thinking. For no Definitions, that I know, no Suppoſitions of any Sect, are of force enough to deſtroy conſtant Experience; and perhaps 'tis the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive, that makes ſo much uſeleſs diſpute and noiſe in the World.

No Ideas *but from Senſation or Reflection, evident, if we obſerve Children.*

§. 20. I ſee no reaſon therefore to believe, that the *Soul thinks before the Senſes have furniſh'd it with Ideas* to think on; and as thoſe are increas'd and retain'd, ſo it comes, by exerciſe, to improve its Faculty of thinking, in the ſeveral parts of it, as well as afterwards, by compounding thoſe *Ideas*, and reflecting on its own Operations; it increaſes its Stock, as well as Facility, in remembering, imagining, reaſoning, and other modes of thinking.

§. 21. He that will ſuffer himſelf to be inform'd by obſervation and experience, and not make his own Hypotheſis the Rule of Nature, will find few ſigns of a Soul accuſtom'd to much thinking in a new-born Child, and much fewer of any Reaſoning at all. And yet it is hard to imagine, that the rational Soul ſhould think ſo much, and not reaſon at all. And he that will conſider, that Infants, newly come into the World, ſpend the greateſt part of their time in Sleep, and are ſeldom awake, but when either Hunger calls for the Teat, or ſome Pain (the moſt importunate of all Senſations) or ſome other violent Impreſſion upon the Body forces the Mind to perceive, and attend to it: He, I ſay, who conſiders this, will, perhaps, find reaſon to imagine, That a *Fœtus in the Mother's Womb differs not much from the State of a Vegetable*; but paſſes the greateſt part of its time without Perception or Thought, doing very little but ſleep in a Place where it needs not ſeek for Food, and is ſurrounded with Liquor, always equally ſoft, and near of the ſame Temper; where the Eyes have no Light, and the Ears ſo ſhut up, are not very ſuſceptible of Sounds; and where there is little or no variety, or change of Objects to move the Senſes.

§. 22. Follow a *Child* from its Birth, and obſerve the alterations that time makes, and you ſhall find, as the Mind by the Senſes comes more and more to be furniſh'd with *Ideas*, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. After ſome time it begins to know the Objects, which being moſt familiar with it, have made laſting Impreſſions. Thus it comes by degrees to know the Perſons it daily converſes with, and diſtinguiſh them from Strangers; which are Inſtances and Effects of its coming to retain and diſtinguiſh the *Ideas* the Senſes convey to it. And ſo we may obſerve how the Mind, *by degrees*, improves in theſe, and *advances* to the exerciſe of thoſe other Faculties of *enlarging*, *compounding*, and *abſtracting* its *Ideas*, and of reaſoning about them, and reflecting upon all theſe; of which I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more hereafter.

§. 23. If it ſhall be demanded then, *When a Man begins to have any Ideas?* I think the true Anſwer is, When he firſt has any *Senſation*. For ſince there appear not to be any *Ideas* in the Mind, before the Senſes have convey'd any in, I conceive that *Ideas* in the Underſtanding are coeval with *Senſation*; which is ſuch an Impreſſion or Motion, made in ſome part of the Body, as produces ſome Perception in the Underſtanding. 'Tis about theſe Impreſſions made on our Senſes by outward Objects, that the Mind ſeems firſt to employ it ſelf in ſuch Operations as we call *Perception*, *Remembering*, *Conſideration*, *Reaſoning*, &c.

The original of all our Knowledg.

§. 24. In time the Mind comes to reflect on its own *Operations* about the *Ideas* got by *Senſation*, and thereby ſtores it ſelf with a new Set of *Ideas*, which I call *Ideas* of *Reflection*. Theſe are the *Impreſſions* that are made on our *Senſes* by outward Objects that are extrinſecal to the Mind; and *its own Operations*, proceeding

ing from Powers intrinſecal and proper to it ſelf, which when reflected on by it ſelf, become alſo Objects of its contemplation, are, as I have ſaid, *the Original of all Knowledg*. Thus the firſt Capacity of human Intellect, is that the Mind is fitted to receive the Impreſſions made on it; either thro' the Senſes by outward Objects; or by its own Operation when it *reflects* on them. This is the firſt ſtep a Man makes towards the Diſcovery of any thing, and the ground-work whereon to build all thoſe Notions, which ever he ſhall have naturally in this World. All thoſe ſublime Thoughts, which tower above the Clouds, and reach as high as Heaven it ſelf, take their riſe and footing here: In all that great Extent wherein the Mind wanders, in thoſe remote Speculations it may ſeem to be elevated with, it ſtirs not one jot beyond thoſe *Ideas* which *Senſe* or *Reflection* have offer'd for its Contemplation.

§. 25. In this Part the *Underſtanding* is merely *paſſive*; and whether or no it will have theſe Beginnings, and as it were Materials of Knowledg, is not in its own power. For the Objects of our Senſes do, many of them, obtrude their particular *Ideas* upon our Minds whether we will or no: and the Operations of our Minds will not let us be without, at leaſt ſome obſcure Notions of them. No Man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks. Theſe *ſimple Ideas*, when offer'd to the Mind, *the Underſtanding can* no more refuſe to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones it ſelf, than a Mirror can refuſe, alter, or obliterate the images or *Ideas* which the Objects ſet before it do therein produce. As the Bodies that ſurround us do diverſly affect our Organs, the Mind is forced to receive the Impreſſions, and cannot avoid the Perception of thoſe *Ideas* that are annex'd to them.

In the reception of ſimple Ideas, the Underſtanding is for the moſt part paſſive.

CHAP. II.

Of Simple Ideas.

§. 1. THE better to underſtand the Nature, Manner, and Extent of our Knowledg, one thing is carefully to be obſerv'd concerning the *Ideas* we have; and that is, That *ſome* of them are *ſimple*, and *ſome complex*.

Uncompounded Appearances.

Tho' the Qualities that affect our Senſes are, in the things themſelves, ſo united and blended, that there is no ſeparation, no diſtance between them; yet 'tis plain, the *Ideas* they produce in the Mind enter by the Senſes ſimple and unmix'd. For tho' the Sight and Touch often take in from the ſame Object, at the ſame time, different *Ideas*; as a Man ſees at once Motion and Colour; the Hand feels Softneſs and Warmth in the ſame piece of Wax: Yet the ſimple *Ideas*, thus united in the ſame Subject, are as perfectly diſtinct as thoſe that come in by different Senſes: The Coldneſs and Hardneſs which a Man feels in a piece of *Ice*, being as diſtinct *Ideas* in the Mind, as the Smell and Whiteneſs of a Lilly; or as the Taſte of Sugar, and Smell of a Roſe. And there is nothing can be plainer to a Man, than the clear and diſtinct Perception he has of thoſe ſimple *Ideas*; which being each in it ſelf uncompounded, contains in it nothing but *one uniform Appearance*, or Conception in the Mind, and is not diſtinguiſhable into different *Ideas*.

§. 2. Theſe ſimple *Ideas*, the Materials of all our Knowledg, are ſuggeſted and furniſhed to the Mind only by thoſe two Ways above-mention'd, *viz. Senſation* and *Reflection*. When the Underſtanding is once ſtor'd with theſe ſimple *Ideas*, it has the Power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almoſt infinite Variety; and ſo can make at pleaſure new complex Ideas. But it is not in the power of the moſt exalted Wit, or enlarg'd Underſtanding, by a quickneſs or variety of Thought, to *invent or frame one new ſimple* Idea in the Mind, not taken in by the ways aforemention'd: Nor can any Force of the Underſtanding *deſtroy* thoſe that are there. The Dominion of Man, in this little World of his own Underſtanding, being much-what the ſame as it is in the great World of viſible Things; wherein his Power, however manag'd by Art and Skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the Materials that

The Mind can neither make nor deſtroy them.

are

are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the leaſt Particle of new Matter, or deſtroying one Atom of what is already in being. The ſame Inability will every one find in himſelf, who ſhall go about to faſhion in his Underſtanding any ſimple *Idea*, not receiv'd in by his Senſes from external Objects, or by Reflection from the Operations of his own Mind about them. I would have any one try to fanſy any Taſte which had never affected his Palate; or frame the *Idea* of a Scent he had never ſmelt: and when he can do this, I will alſo conclude that a blind Mind hath *Ideas* of Colours, and a deaf Man true diſtinct Notions of Sounds.

§. 3. This is the reaſon why, tho' we cannot believe it impoſſible to God to make a Creature with other Organs, and more ways to convey into the Underſtanding the notice of corporeal things than thoſe five, as they are uſually counted, which he has given to Man: yet, I think, it is *not poſſible* for any one *to imagine* any other *Qualities* in Bodies, howſoever conſtituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, beſides Sounds, Taſtes, Smells, viſible and tangible Qualities. And had Mankind been made with but four Senſes, the Qualities then, which are the Object of the fifth Senſe, had been as far from our Notice, Imagination and Conception, as now any *belonging to a ſixth, ſeventh, or eighth Senſe*, can poſſibly be: which, whether yet ſome other Creatures, in ſome other parts of this vaſt and ſtupendous Univerſe, may not have, will be a great Preſumption to deny. He that will not ſet himſelf proudly at the top of all things; but will conſider the Immenſity of this Fabrick, and the great Variety that is to be found in this little and inconſiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other Manſions of it there may be other and different intelligent Beings, of whoſe Faculties he has as little Knowledg or Apprehenſion, as a Worm ſhut up in one Drawer of a Cabinet hath of the Senſes or Underſtanding of a Man: ſuch Variety and Excellency being ſuitable to the Wiſdom and Power of the Maker. I have here follow'd the common Opinion of Man's having but five Senſes; tho', perhaps, there may be juſtly counted more: but either Suppoſition ſerves equally to my preſent purpoſe.

CHAP. III.

Of Ideas *of one Senſe.*

Diviſion of ſimple Ideas.

§. 1. THE better to conceive the *Ideas* we receive from Senſation, it may not be amiſs for us to conſider them, in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our Minds, and make themſelves perceivable by us.

Firſt, then, There are ſome which come into our Minds *by one Senſe* only.

Secondly, There are others that convey themſelves into the Mind *by more Senſes than one.*

Thirdly, Others that are had from *Reflection* only.

Fourthly, There are ſome that make themſelves way, and are ſuggeſted to the Mind *by all the Ways of Senſation and Reflection.*

We ſhall conſider them apart under theſe ſeveral Heads.

Firſt, There are *ſome* Ideas *which have admittance only through one Senſe*, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus Light and Colours, as White, Red, Yellow, Blue, with their ſeveral Degrees or Shades, and Mixtures, as Green, Scarlet, Purple, Sea-green, and the reſt; come in only by the Eyes: All kind of Noiſes, Sounds and Tones, only by the Ears: The ſeveral Taſtes and Smells, by the Noſe and Palate. And if theſe Organs, or the Nerves which are the Conduits to convey them from without to their Audience in the Brain, the Mind's Preſence-room (as I may ſo call it) are any of them ſo diſorder'd, as not to perform their Functions, they have no Poſtern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themſelves into view, and be perceiv'd by the Underſtanding.

The moſt conſiderable of thoſe belonging to the Touch, are Heat and Cold, and Solidity: all the reſt conſiſting almoſt wholly in the ſenſible Configuration,

as

as ſmooth and rough; or elſe more or leſs firm adheſion of the Parts, as hard and ſoft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

§. 2. I think, it will be needleſs to enumerate all the particular *ſimple Ideas*, belonging to each Senſe. Nor indeed is it poſſible, if we would; there being a great many *more* of them belonging to moſt of the Senſes, *than we have Names for*. The variety of Smells, which are as many almoſt, if not more, than Species of Bodies in the World, do moſt of them want Names. *Sweet* and *Stinking* commonly ſerve our turn for theſe *Ideas*, which in Effect is little more than to call them pleaſing or diſpleaſing; tho' the Smell of a Roſe and Violet, both ſweet, are certainly very diſtinct *Ideas*. Nor are the different Taſtes that by our Palates we receive *Ideas* of, much better provided with Names. Sweet, Bitter, Sour, Harſh, and Salt, are almoſt all the Epithets we have to denominate that numberleſs variety of Reliſhes, which are to be found diſtinct, not only in almoſt every ſort of Creatures, but in the different parts of the ſame Plant, Fruit, or Animal. The ſame may be ſaid of Colours and Sounds. I ſhall therefore, in the account of ſimple *Ideas* I am here giving, content my ſelf to ſet down only ſuch, as are moſt material to our preſent purpoſe, or are in themſelves leſs apt to be taken notice of, tho' they are very frequently the Ingredients of our complex *Ideas*, amongſt which, I think, I may well account Solidity; which therefore I ſhall treat of in the next Chapter.

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

§. 1. THE *Idea* of *Solidity* we receive by our Touch; and it ariſes from the reſiſtance which we find in Body, to the Entrance of any other Body into the Place it poſſeſſes, till it has left it. There is no *Idea*, which we receive more conſtantly from Senſation, than *Solidity*. Whether we move or reſt, in what poſture ſoever we are, we always feel ſomething under us that ſupports us, and hinders our farther ſinking downwards; and the Bodies which we daily handle, make us perceive, that whilſt they remain between them, they do by an inſurmountable Force hinder the approach of the parts of our Hands that preſs them. That which thus hinders the approach of two Bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call *Solidity*. I will not diſpute, whether this Acceptation of the Word *ſolid* be nearer to its original Signification, than that which Mathematicians uſe it in; it ſuffices, that I think the common Notion of Solidity will allow, if not juſtify, this Uſe of it; but if any one think it better to call it *Impenetrability*, he has my Conſent. Only I have thought the term *Solidity* the more proper to expreſs this *Idea*, not only becauſe of its vulgar uſe in that Senſe; but alſo becauſe it carries ſomething more of poſitive in it than *Impenetrability*, which is negative, and is perhaps more a Conſequence of *Solidity*, than *Solidity* it ſelf. This of all other, ſeems the *Idea* moſt intimately connected with and eſſential to Body, ſo as no where elſe to be found or imagin'd, but only in Matter. And tho' our Senſes take no notice of it, but in Maſſes of Matter, of a bulk ſufficient to cauſe a Senſation in us; yet the Mind, having once got this *Idea* from ſuch groſſer ſenſible Bodies, traces it farther: and conſiders it, as well as Figure, in the minuteſt Particle of Matter that can exiſt: and finds it inſeparably inherent in Body, whatever or however modify'd. *We receive this Idea from Touch.*

§. 2. This is the *Idea* belongs to Body, whereby we conceive it *to fill Space*. The *Idea* of which filling of ſpace, is, That where we imagine any ſpace taken up by a ſolid Subſtance, we conceive it ſo to poſſeſs it, that it excludes all other ſolid Subſtances; and will for ever hinder any two other Bodies, that move towards one another in a ſtrait Line, from coming to touch one another, unleſs it removes from between them, in a Line not parallel to that which they move in. This *Idea* of it, the Bodies which we ordinarily handle, ſufficiently furniſh us with. *Solidity fills Space.*

§. 3. This Reſiſtance, whereby it keeps other Bodies out of the ſpace which it poſſeſſes, is ſo great, that no Force, how great ſoever, can ſurmount it. All *Diſtinct from Space.*

the Bodies in the World preſſing a drop of Water on all Sides, will never be able to overcome the Reſiſtance which it will make, as ſoft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be remov'd out of their Way: Whereby our *Idea* of *Solidity* is *diſtinguiſh'd* both *from pure Space*, which is capable neither of Reſiſtance nor Motion; and from the ordinary *Idea* of *Hardneſs*. For a Man may conceive two Bodies at a Diſtance, ſo as they may approach one another, without touching or diſplacing any ſolid Thing, till their Superficies come to meet: Whereby, I think, we have the clear *Idea* of Space without *Solidity*. For (not to go ſo far as Annihilation of any particular Body) I ask, whether a Man cannot have the *Idea* of the Motion of one ſingle Body alone, without any other ſucceeding immediately into its place? I think, 'tis evident he can: The *Idea* of Motion in one Body no more including the *Idea* of Motion in another, than the *Idea* of a ſquare Figure in one Body includes the *Idea* of a ſquare Figure in another. I do not ask, whether Bodies do ſo exiſt, that the Motion of one Body cannot really be without the Motion of another. To determine this either Way, is to beg the Queſtion for or againſt a *Vacuum*. But my Queſtion is, Whether one cannot have the *Idea* of one Body mov'd, whilſt others are at reſt? And I think, this no one will deny. If ſo, then the Place it deſerted gives us the *Idea* of pure Space without Solidity, whereinto another Body may enter, without either Reſiſtance or Protruſion of any Thing. When the Sucker in a Pump is drawn, the ſpace it fill'd in the Tube is certainly the ſame, whether any other Body follows the Motion of the Sucker or no: Nor does it imply a Contradiction, that upon the Motion of one Body, another, that is only contiguous to it, ſhould not follow it. The Neceſſity of ſuch a Motion is built only on the Suppoſition that the World is full, but not on the diſtinct *Ideas* of Space and Solidity; which are as different as Reſiſtance and not Reſiſtance, Protruſion and not Protruſion. And that Men have *Ideas* of Space without Body, their very Diſputes about a *Vacuum* plainly demonſtrate; as is ſhew'd in another place.

From Hardneſs.

§. 4. *Solidity* is hereby alſo *differenced from Hardneſs*, in that Solidity conſiſts in Repletion, and ſo an utter Excluſion of other Bodies out of the Space it poſſeſſes; but Hardneſs, in a firm Coheſion of the Parts of Matter, making up Maſſes of a ſenſible bulk, ſo that the whole does not eaſily change its Figure. And indeed Hard and Soft are Names that we give to Things, only in relation to the Conſtitutions of our own Bodies; that being generally call'd hard by us, which will put us to Pain, ſooner than change Figure by the preſſure of any part of our Bodies; and that, on the contrary, ſoft, which changes the Situation of its parts upon an eaſy and unpainful touch.

But this difficulty of changing the Situation of the ſenſible parts amongſt themſelves, or of the Figure of the whole, gives no more Solidity to the hardeſt Body in the World, than to the ſofteſt; nor is an Adamant one Jot more ſolid than Water. For tho' the two flat Sides of two Pieces of Marble will more eaſily approach each other, between which there is nothing but Water or Air, than if there be a Diamond between them: Yet it is not that the parts of the Diamond are more ſolid than thoſe of Water, or reſiſt more; but becauſe the parts of Water being more eaſily ſeparable from each other, they will by a Side-Motion be more eaſily remov'd, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of Marble. But if they could be kept from making place, by that Side-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of theſe two Pieces of Marble, as much as the Diamond; and 'twould be as impoſſible by any force to ſurmount their Reſiſtance, as to ſurmount the Reſiſtance of the Parts of a Diamond. The ſofteſt Body in the World will as invincibly reſiſt the coming together of any two other Bodies, if it be not put out of the Way, but remain between them, as the hardeſt that can be found or imagin'd. He that ſhall fill a yielding ſoft Body well with Air or Water, will quickly find its Reſiſtance: And he that thinks that nothing but Bodies that are hard can keep his Hands from approaching one another, may be pleas'd to make a trial, with the Air inclos'd in a Foot-ball. The Experiment, I have been told, was made at *Florence*, with a hollow Globe of Gold fill'd with Water, and exactly clos'd; which farther ſhews the Solidity of ſo ſoft a Body as Water. For the golden Globe thus fill'd being put into a Preſs, which was driven by the extreme force of Skrews, the Water

Water made it ſelf way thro' the Pores of that very cloſe Metal; and finding no Room for a nearer approach of its Particles within, got to the outſide, where it roſe like a Dew, and ſo fell in Drops, before the Sides of the Globe could be made to yield to the violent Compreſſion of the Engine that ſqueez'd it.

§. 5. By this *Idea* of Solidity, is the Extenſion of Body diſtinguiſh'd from the Extenſion of Space: The Extenſion of Body being nothing but the Coheſion or Continuity of ſolid, ſeparable, movable Parts; and the Extenſion of Space, the Continuity of unſolid, inſeparable, and immovable Parts. *Upon the Solidity of Bodies* alſo *depends their mutual Impulſe, Reſiſtance and Protruſion.* Of pure Space then, and Solidity, there are ſeveral (amongſt which, I confeſs my ſelf one) who perſuade themſelves they have clear and diſtinct *Ideas*: and that they can think on Space, without any thing in it that reſiſts or is protruded by Body. This is the *Idea* of pure Space, which they think they have as clear, as any *Idea* they can have of the Extenſion of Body; the *Idea* of the diſtance between the oppoſite Parts of a concave Superficies, being equally as clear without as with the *Idea* of any ſolid Parts between: And on the other Side they perſuade themſelves, That they have, diſtinct from that of pure Space, the *Idea* of ſomething that fills Space, that can be protruded by the Impulſe of other Bodies, or reſiſt their Motion. If there be others that have not theſe two *Ideas* diſtinct, but confound them, and make but one of them; I know not how Men, who have the ſame *Idea* under different Names, or different *Ideas* under the ſame Name, can in that Caſe talk with one another; any more than a Man, who not being blind or deaf, has diſtinct *Ideas* of the Colour of Scarlet, and the Sound of a Trumpet, could diſcourſe concerning Scarlet-Colour with the blind Man I mention in another Place, who fanſy'd that the *Idea* of Scarlet was like the Sound of a Trumpet.

On Solidity depends Impulſe, Reſiſtance, and Protruſion.

§. 6. If any one asks me, *What this Solidity is?* I ſend him to his Senſes to inform him: Let him put a Flint or a Foot-ball between his Hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a ſufficient Explication of Solidity, what it is, and wherein it conſiſts; I promiſe to tell him what it is, and wherein it conſiſts, when he tells me what Thinking is, or wherein it conſiſts; or explains to me what Extenſion or Motion is, which perhaps ſeems much eaſier. The ſimple *Ideas* we have, are ſuch as Experience teaches them us; but if beyond that, we endeavour by Words to make them clearer in the Mind, we ſhall ſucceed no better, than if he went about to clear up the Darkneſs of a blind Man's Mind by talking; and to diſcourſe into him the *Ideas* of Light and Colours. The reaſon of this I ſhall ſhew in another Place.

What it is.

CHAP. V.

Of Simple Ideas *of divers Senſes.*

THE *Ideas* we get by more than one Senſe, are of *Space*, or *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Reſt*, and *Motion*; for theſe make perceivable Impreſſions, both on the Eyes and Touch: And we can receive and convey into our Minds the *Ideas* of the Extenſion, Figure, Motion, and Reſt of Bodies, both by ſeeing and feeling. But having Occaſion to ſpeak more at large of theſe in another place, I here only enumerate them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Simple Ideas *of Reflection.*

§. 1. THE Mind receiving the *Ideas*, mention'd in the foregoing Chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon it ſelf, and obſerves its own Actions about thoſe *Ideas* it has, takes from thence other *Ideas*, which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as any of thoſe it receiv'd from foreign Things.

Simple Ideas *are the Operations of the Mind about its other* Ideas.

The Idea *of Preception, and* Idea *of Willing, we have from Reflection.*

§. 2. The two great and principal Actions of the Mind, which are moſt frequently conſidered, and which are ſo frequent, that every one that pleaſes may take notice of 'em in himſelf, are theſe two:

Preception or *Thinking*, and
Volition, or *Willing*.

The Power of Thinking is call'd the *Underſtanding*, and the Power of Volition is call'd the *Will*; and theſe two Powers or Abilities in the Mind are denominated *Faculties*. Of ſome of the Modes of theſe ſimple *Ideas* of Reflection, ſuch as are *Remembrance*, *Diſcerning*, *Reaſoning*, *Judging*, *Knowledg*, *Faith*, &c. I ſhall have Occaſion to ſpeak hereafter.

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple Ideas *of both Senſation and Reflection.*

Pleaſure and Pain.

§. 1. THERE be other ſimple *Ideas* which convey themſelves into the Mind by all the Ways of Senſation and Reflection, *viz.*

Pleaſure or *Delight*, and its oppoſite.
Pain or *Uneaſineſs*.
Power.
Exiſtence.
Unity.

§. 2. *Delight* or *Uneaſineſs*, one or other of them join themſelves to almoſt all our *Ideas*, both of Senſation and Reflection: And there is ſcarce any Affection of our Senſes from without, any retir'd Thought of our Mind within, which is not able to produce in us *Pleaſure* or *Pain*. By *Pleaſure* and *Pain* I would be underſtood to ſignify whatſoever delights or moleſts us; whether it ariſes from the Thoughts of our Minds, or any Thing operating on our Bodies. For whether we call it Satisfaction, Delight, Pleaſure, Happineſs, *&c.* on the one Side; or Uneaſineſs, Trouble, Pain, Torment, Anguiſh, Miſery, *&c.* on the other; they are ſtill but different Degrees of the ſame Thing, and belong to the *Ideas* of *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, Delight or Uneaſineſs: Which are the Names I ſhall moſt commonly uſe for thoſe two Sorts of *Ideas*.

§. 3. The infinite wiſe Author of our Being having given us the Power over ſeveral Parts of our Bodies, to move or keep them at reſt as we think fit; and alſo by the Motion of them, to move our ſelves and other contiguous Bodies, in which conſiſt all the Actions of our Body: Having alſo given a Power to our Minds in ſeveral Inſtances, to chuſe, among its *Ideas*, which it will think on, and to purſue the Enquiry of this or that Subject with Conſideration and Attention, to excite us to theſe Actions of Thinking and Motion that we are capable of; has been pleas'd to join to ſeveral Thoughts and ſeveral Senſations, a *Perception* of *Delight*. If this were wholly ſeparated from all our outward Senſations and inward Thoughts, we ſhould have no Reaſon to prefer one Thought or Action to another; Negligence to Attention; or Motion to Reſt. And ſo we ſhould neither ſtir our Bodies nor employ our Minds, but let our Thoughts (if I may ſo call it) run a-drift, without any Direction or Deſign; and ſuffer the *Ideas* of our Minds, like unregarded Shadows, to make their appearances there, as it happen'd, without attending to them. In which ſtate Man, however furniſh'd with the Faculties of Underſtanding and Will, would be a very idle unactive Creature, and paſs his time only in a lazy lethargick Dream. It has therefore pleas'd our Wiſe Creator to annex to ſeveral Objects, and to the *Ideas* which we receive from them, as alſo to ſeveral of our Thoughts, a concomitant Pleaſure, and that in ſeveral Objects, to ſeveral Degrees; that thoſe Faculties which he had endow'd us with, might not remain wholly idle and unemploy'd by us.

§. 4. *Pain* has the ſame Efficacy and Uſe to ſet us on work that Pleaſure has, we being as ready to employ our Faculties to avoid that, as to purſue this: Only this is worth our Conſideration, that *Pain is often produc'd by the ſame Objects and* Ideas *that produce Pleaſure* in us. This their near Conjunction, which

which makes us often feel Pain in the Senſations where we expected Pleaſure, gives us new Occaſion of admiring the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of our Maker; who deſigning the Preſervation of our Being, has annex'd Pain to the application of many Things to our Bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do, and as Advices to withdraw from them. But he not deſigning our Preſervation barely, but the Preſervation of every Part and Organ in its Perfection, hath, in many Caſes, annex'd Pain to thoſe very *Ideas* which delight us. Thus Heat, that is very agreeable to us in one Degree, by a little greater increaſe of it, proves no ordinary Torment; and the moſt pleaſant of all ſenſible Objects, Light it ſelf, if there be too much of it, if increas'd beyond a due Proportion to our Eyes, cauſes a very painful Senſation. Which is wiſely and favourably ſo order'd by Nature, that when any Object does by the vehemency of its Operation, diſorder the Inſtruments of Senſation, whoſe Structures cannot but be very nice and delicate; we might by the Pain be warn'd to withdraw before the Organ be quite put out of Order, and ſo be unfited for its proper Function for the future. The Conſideration of thoſe Objects that produce it, may well perſuade us that this is the end or uſe of Pain. For tho' great Light be inſufferable to our Eyes, yet the higheſt Degree of Darkneſs does not at all diſeaſe them; becauſe that cauſing no diſorderly Motion in it, leaves that curious Organ unharm'd in its natural State. But yet exceſs of Cold as well as Heat pains us, becauſe it is equally deſtructive to that Temper which is neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life, and the exerciſe of the ſeveral Functions of the Body, and which conſiſts in a moderate degree of Warmth; or if you pleaſe, a Motion of the inſenſible Parts of our Bodies, confin'd within certain bounds.

§. 5. Beyond all this we may find another Reaſon, *why* God hath ſcatter'd up and down *ſeveral Degrees of Pleaſure and Pain, in all the Things that environ and affect us*, and blended them together in almoſt all that our Thoughts and Senſes have to do with; that we finding Imperfection, Diſſatisfaction, and want of compleat Happineſs, in all the Enjoyments which the Creatures can afford us, might be led to ſeek it in the Enjoyment of him, *with whom there is fulneſs of Joy, and at whoſe right Hand are Pleaſures for evermore.*

§. 6. Tho' what I have here ſaid, may not perhaps make the *Ideas of Pleaſure and Pain* clearer to us than our own Experience does, which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the Conſideration of the Reaſon, why they are annex'd to ſo many other *Ideas*, ſerving to give us due Sentiments of the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the ſovereign Diſpoſer of all Things, may not be unſuitable to the main end of theſe Enquiries: The Knowledg and Veneration of him being the chief end of all our Thoughts, and the proper Buſineſs of all our Underſtandings. *Pleaſure and Pain.*

§. 7. *Exiſtence* and *Unity* are two other *Ideas* that are ſuggeſted to the Underſtanding by every Object without, and every *Idea* within. When *Ideas* are in our Minds, we conſider them as being actually there, as well as we conſider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exiſt, or have *Exiſtence*: And whatever we can conſider as one Thing, whether a real Being or *Idea*, ſuggeſts to the Underſtanding the *Idea* of *Unity*. *Exiſtence and Unity.*

§. 8. *Power* alſo is another of thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which we receive from *Senſation and Reflection.* For obſerving in our ſelves, that we can at pleaſure move ſeveral Parts of our Bodies which were at reſt; the effects alſo that natural Bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our Senſes, we both theſe Ways get the *Idea* of *Power*. *Power*

§. 9. Beſides theſe there is another *Idea*, which tho' ſuggeſted by our Senſes, yet is more conſtantly offer'd us by what paſſes in our own Minds; and that is the *Idea* of *Succeſſion*. For if we look immediately into our ſelves, and reflect on what is obſervable there, we ſhall find our *Ideas* always whilſt we are awake, or have any Thought, paſſing in Train, one going and another coming, without intermiſſion. *Succeſſion.*

§. 10. Theſe, if they are not all, are at leaſt (as I think) the moſt conſiderable of thoſe *ſimple Ideas* which the Mind has, and out of which is made all its other Knowledg; all which it receives only by the two foremention'd ways of *Senſation* and *Reflection*. *Simple Ideas the Materials of all our Knowledg.*

Nor

Nor let any one think theſe too narrow bounds for the capacious Mind of Man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the Stars, and cannot be confin'd by the Limits of the World; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmoſt expanſion of Matter, and makes Excurſions into that incomprehenſible *Inane*. I grant all this, but deſire any one to aſſign any *ſimple Idea* which is not *receiv'd from* one of *thoſe Inlets* before-mention'd, or any *complex Idea* not *made out of thoſe ſimple ones*. Nor will it be ſo ſtrange to think theſe few ſimple *Ideas* ſufficient to employ the quickeſt Thought, or largeſt Capacity; and to furniſh the Materials of all that various Knowledg, and more various Fancies and Opinions of all Mankind, if we conſider how many Words may be made out of the various compoſition of twenty four Letters; or if going one ſtep farther, we will but reflect on the Variety of Combinations may be made, with barely one of the above-mention'd *Ideas*, *viz.* Number, whoſe ſtock is inexhauſtible and truly infinite: And what a large and immenſe Field doth Extenſion alone afford the Mathematicians?

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Conſiderations concerning our Simple Ideas.

Poſitive Ideas *from privative Cauſes.*

§. 1. CONcerning the ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation 'tis to be conſider'd, that whatſoever is ſo conſtituted in Nature as to be able, by affecting our Senſes, to cauſe any Preception in the Mind, doth thereby produce in the Underſtanding a ſimple *Idea*; which, whatever be the external Cauſe of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our diſcerning Faculty, it is by the Mind look'd on and conſider'd there to be a real *poſitive Idea* in the Underſtanding, as much as any other whatſoever: tho' perhaps the Cauſe of it be but a Privation in the Subject.

§. 2. Thus the *Ideas* of Heat and Cold, Light and Darkneſs, White and Black, Motion and Reſt, are equally clear and *poſitive Ideas* in the Mind; tho' perhaps ſome of *the Cauſes* which produce them are barely *Privations* in thoſe Subjects, from whence our Senſes derive thoſe *Ideas*. Theſe the Underſtanding, in its view of them, conſiders all as diſtinct poſitive *Ideas*, without taking notice of the Cauſes that produce them; which is an Enquiry not belonging to the *Idea*, as it is in the Underſtanding, but to the Nature of the Things exiſting without us. Theſe are two very different things, and carefully to be diſtinguiſh'd; it being one Thing to perceive and know the *Idea* of White or Black, and quite another to examine what kind of Particles they muſt be, and how rang'd in the Superficies, to make any Object appear White or Black.

§. 3. A Painter or Dyer who never enquir'd into their Cauſes, hath the *Ideas* of White and Black, and other Colours, as clearly, perfectly, and diſtinctly in his Underſtanding, and perhaps more diſtinctly, than the Philoſopher who hath buſy'd himſelf in conſidering their Natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cauſe Poſitive or Privative; and the *Idea of Black* is no leſs *poſitive* in his Mind, than that of White, *however the cauſe* of that Colour in the external Object may *be only a Privation*.

§. 4. If it were the Deſign of my preſent Undertaking, to enquire into the natural Cauſes and Manner of Perception, I ſhould offer this as a Reaſon *why a privative Cauſe might*, in ſome Caſes at leaſt, *produce a poſitive Idea*, *viz.* That all Senſation being produc'd in us only by different Degrees and Modes of Motion in our animal Spirits, variouſly agitated by external Objects, the abatement of any former Motion muſt as neceſſarily produce a new Senſation, as the variation or increaſe of it; and ſo introduce a new *Idea*, which depends only on a different Motion of the animal Spirits in that Organ.

§. 5. But whether this be ſo or no I will not here determine, but appeal to every one's own Experience, whether the Shadow of a Man, tho' it conſiſts of nothing but the abſence of Light (and the more the abſence of Light is, the more diſcernible is the Shadow) does not, when a Man looks on it, cauſe as clear and poſitive an *Idea* in his Mind, as a Man himſelf, tho' cover'd over with clear

clear Sun-ſhine? And the Picture of a Shadow is a poſitive thing. Indeed we have *negative Names*, which ſtand not directly for poſitive *Ideas*, but for their Abſence, ſuch as *Inſipid*, *Silence*, *Nihil*, &c. which Words denote poſitive *Ideas*; *v. g. Taſte*, *Sound*, *Being*, with a Signification of their abſence.

Poſitive Ideas *from privative Cauſes.*

§. 6. And thus one may truly be ſaid to ſee Darkneſs. For ſuppoſing a Hole perfectly Dark, from whence no Light is reflected, 'tis certain one may ſee the Figure of it, or it may be painted; or whether the Ink I write with makes any other *Idea*, is a Queſtion. The privative Cauſes I have here aſſign'd of poſitive *Ideas*, are according to the common Opinion; but in truth it will be hard to determine, whether there be really any *Ideas* from a privative Cauſe, till it be determin'd, *whether Reſt be any more a Privation than Motion.*

Ideas *in the Mind, Qualities in Bodies.*

§. 7. To diſcover the Nature of our *Ideas* the better, and to diſcourſe of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to diſtinguiſh them as they are *Ideas* or Perceptions in our Minds, and as they are modifications of Matter in the Bodies that cauſe ſuch Perceptions in us; that ſo we *may not* think (as perhaps uſually is done) that they are exactly the Images and *Reſemblances* of ſomething inherent in the ſubject; moſt of thoſe of Senſation being in the Mind no more the likeneſs of ſomething exiſting without us, than the Names that ſtand for them are the likeneſs of our *Ideas*, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us.

§. 8. Whatſoever the Mind perceives in it ſelf, or is the immediate Object of Perception, Thought, or Underſtanding, that I call *Idea*; and the Power to produce any *Idea* in our Mind, I call *Quality* of the Subject wherein that Power is. Thus a Snow-ball having the Power to produce in us the *Ideas* of *White*, *Cold*, and *Round*, the Powers produce thoſe *Ideas* in us as they are in the Snow-ball, I call *Qualities*; and as they are Senſations or Perceptions in our Underſtandings, I call them *Ideas*: Which *Ideas*, if I ſpeak of ſometimes, as in the things themſelves, I would be underſtood to mean thoſe Qualities in the Objects which produce them in us.

Primary Qualities.

§. 9. Qualities thus conſider'd in Bodies are, firſt, ſuch as are utterly inſeparable from the Body, in what Eſtate ſoever it be; ſuch as in all the Alterations and Changes it ſuffers, all the Force can be us'd upon it, it conſtantly keeps; and ſuch as Senſe conſtantly finds in every Particle of Matter which has bulk enough to be perceiv'd, and the Mind finds inſeparable from every Particle of Matter, tho' leſs than to make it ſelf ſingly be perceiv'd by our Senſes. *v. g.* Take a Grain of Wheat, divide it into two Parts, each Part has ſtill *Solidity*, *Extenſion*, *Figure*, and *Mobility*; divide it again, and it retains ſtill the ſame Qualities, and ſo divide it on till the Parts become inſenſible, they muſt retain ſtill each of them all thoſe Qualities. For Diviſion (which is all that a Mill, or Peſtle, or any other Body does upon another, in reducing it to inſenſible Parts) can never take away either Solidity, Extenſion, Figure, or Mobility from any Body, but only makes two or more diſtinct ſeparate Maſſes of Matter, of that which was but one before; all of which diſtinct Maſſes, reckon'd as ſo many diſtinct Bodies, after Diviſion make a certain Number. Theſe I call *original* or *primary Qualities* of Body, which I think we may obſerve to produce ſimple *Ideas* in us, *viz.* Solidity, Extenſion, Figure, Motion, or Reſt, and Number.

§. 10. *2dly*, Such *Qualities* which in truth are nothing in the Objects themſelves, but Powers to produce various Senſations in us by their *primary Qualities*, *i. e.* by the Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of their inſenſible Parts, as Colours, Sounds, Taſtes, &c. theſe I call *Secondary Qualities*. To theſe might be added a third Sort, which are allow'd to be barely Powers, tho they are as much real Qualities in the Subject, as thoſe which I, to comply with the common Way of ſpeaking, call *Qualities*, but for diſtinction *Secondary Qualities*. For the Power in Fire to produce a new Colour, or conſiſtency in Wax or Clay by its primary Qualities, is as much a Quality in Fire, as the Power it has to produce in me a new *Idea* or Senſation of Warmth or Burning, which I felt not before by the ſame primary Qualities, *viz.* the Bulk, Texture, and Motion of its inſenſible Parts.

How primary Qualities produce their Ideas.

§. 11. The next Thing to be conſider'd, is, how *Bodies* produce *Ideas* in us; and that is manifeſtly *by impulſe*, the only Way which we can conceive Bodies operate in.

§. 12. If then external Objects be not united to our Minds, when they produce *Ideas* in it; and yet we perceive *these original Qualities* in such of them as singly fall under our Senses, 'tis evident that some Motion must be thence continu'd by our Nerves or animal Spirits, by some Parts of our Bodies, to the Brains, or the Seat of Sensation, there to *produce in our Minds the particular* Ideas *we have of them.* And since the Extension, Figure, Number and Motion of Bodies of an observable Bigness, may be perceiv'd at a Distance *by* the Sight, 'tis evident some singly imperceptible Bodies must come from them to the Eyes, and thereby convey to the Brain some *Motion*, which produces these *Ideas* which we have of them in us.

How Secondary.

§. 13. After the same manner that the *Ideas* of these original Qualities are produc'd in us, we may conceive, that the *Ideas of Secondary Qualities* are also *produc'd*, viz. *by the Operation of insensible Particles on our Senses.* For it being manifest that there are Bodies, and good Store of Bodies, each whereof are so small, that we cannot, by any of our Senses, discover either their Bulk, Figure or Motion, as is evident in the Particles of the Air and Water, and other extreamly smaller than those, perhaps as much smaller than the Particles of Air or Water, as the Particles of Air or Water are smaller than Pease or Hail stones: Let us suppose at present, that the different Motions and Figures, Bulk and Number of such Particles, affecting the several Organs of our Senses, produce in us those different Sensations, which we have from the Colours and Smells of Bodies; *v. g.* that a Violet, by the impulse of such insensible Particles of matter of peculiar Figures and Bulks, and in different Degrees and Modifications of their Motions, causes the *Ideas* of the blue Colour, and sweet Scent of that Flower, to be produc'd in our Minds; it being no more impossible to conceive that God should annex such *Ideas* to such Motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the *Idea* of Pain to the Motion of a Piece of Steel dividing our Flesh, with which that *Idea* hath no resemblance.

§. 14. What I have said concerning *Colours* and *Smells*, may be understood also of *Tastes* and *Sounds, and other the like sensible Qualities*; which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us, and depend *on those primary Qualities*, viz. Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of Parts; as I have said.

Ideas *of primary Qualities are Resemblances; of secondary, not.*

§. 15. From whence I think it is easy to draw this Observation, That the *Ideas of primary Qualities* of Bodies *are Resemblances* of them, and their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves; but the *Ideas*, *produc'd* in us *by* these *secondary Qualities*, *have no resemblance* of them at all. There is nothing like our *Ideas* existing in the Bodies themselves. They are in the Bodies, we denominate from them only a Power to produce those Sensations in us: And what is sweet, blue or warm in *Idea*, is but the certain Bulk, Figure and Motion of the insensible Parts in the Bodies themselves, which we call so.

§. 16. *Flame* is denominated *hot* and *light*; *Snow*, *white* and *cold*; and *Manna*, *white* and *sweet*, from the *Ideas* they produce in us: Which Qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those Bodies that those *Ideas* are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a Mirror; and it would by most Men be judg'd very extravagant, if one would say otherwise. And yet he that will consider that *the same Fire*, that at one Distance *produces* in us the Sensation of *Warmth*, does at a nearer approach produce in us the far different Sensation of *Pain*, ought to bethink himself what Reason he has to say, that his *Idea* of *Warmth*, which was produc'd in him by the Fire, is actually *in the Fire*; and his *Idea* of *Pain*, which the same Fire produc'd in him the same Way, is *not* in the *Fire*. Why is Whiteness and Coldness in Snow, and Pain not, when it produces the one and the other *Idea* in us; and can do neither, but by the Bulk, Figure, Number and Motion of its solid Parts?

§. 17. The particular *Bulk, Number, Figure and Motion of the Parts of Fire, or Snow, are really in them*, whether any one's Senses perceive them or no; and therefore they may be call'd *real Qualities*, because they really exist in those Bodies: But *Light*, *Heat*, *Whiteness* or *Coldness*, *are no more really in them, than Sickness or Pain is in* Manna. Take away the Sensation of them; let not the Eyes see Light, or Colours, nor the Ears hear Sounds; let the Palate not taste,

taſte, nor the Noſe ſmell; and all Colours, Taſtes, Odours and Sounds, as they are ſuch particular *Ideas*, vaniſh and ceaſe, and are reduc'd to their Cauſes, *i. e.* Bulk, Figure and Motion of Parts.

§. 18. A piece of *Manna* of a ſenſible Bulk, is able to produce in us the *Idea* of a round or ſquare Figure, and by being remov'd from one place to another, the *Idea* of Motion. This *Idea* of Motion repreſents it, as it really is in the *Manna* moving: A Circle or Square are the ſame, whether in *Idea* or Exiſtence, in the Mind, or in the *Manna*; and this both *Motion and Figure are really in the Manna*, whether we take notice of them or no: This every body is ready to agree to. Beſides, *Manna* by the Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of its Parts, has a Power to produce the Senſations of Sickneſs, and ſometimes of acute Pains or Gripings in us. That theſe *Ideas* of *Sickneſs and Pain are not in the* Manna, but Effects of its Operations on us, and are no where when we feel them not: This alſo every one readily agrees to. And yet Men are hardly to be brought to think, that *Sweetneſs and Whiteneſs are not really in Manna*; which are but the Effects of the Operations of *Manna*, by the Motion, Size and Figure of its Particles on the Eyes and Palate; as the Pain and Sickneſs cauſed by *Manna*, are confeſſedly nothing but the Effects of its Operations on the Stomach and Guts, by the Size, Motion and Figure of its inſenſible Parts (for by nothing elſe can a Body operate, as has been prov'd:) As if it could not operate on the Eyes and Palate, and thereby produce in the Mind particular diſtinct *Ideas*, which in it ſelf it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the Guts and Stomach, and thereby produce diſtinct *Ideas*, which in it ſelf it has not. Theſe *Ideas* being all Effects of the Operations of *Manna*, on ſeveral Parts of our Bodies, by the Size, Figure, Number and Motion of its Parts; why thoſe produc'd by the Eyes and Palate ſhould rather be thought to be really in the *Manna*, than thoſe produc'd by the Stomach and Guts; or why the Pain and Sickneſs, *Ideas* that are the effects of *Manna*, ſhould be thought to be no where when they are not felt; and yet the Sweetneſs and Whiteneſs, effects of the ſame *Manna* on other parts of the Body, by ways equally as unknown, ſhould be thought to exiſt in the *Manna*, when they are not ſeen nor taſted, would need ſome Reaſon to explain.

§. 19. Let us conſider the red and white Colours in *Porphyre*: Hinder Light but from ſtriking on it, and its Colours vaniſh, it no longer produces any ſuch *Ideas* in us; upon the return of Light, it produces theſe Appearances on us again. Can any one think any real Alterations are made in the *Porphyre*, by the preſence or abſence of Light; and that thoſe *Ideas* of Whiteneſs and Redneſs, are really in *Porphyre* in the Light, when 'tis plain *it has no Colour in the dark?* It has, indeed, ſuch a Configuration of Particles, both Night and Day, as are apt by the Rays of Light rebounding from ſome Parts of that hard Stone, to produce in us the *Idea* of Redneſs, and from others the *Idea* of Whiteneſs; but Whiteneſs or Redneſs are not in it at any time, but ſuch a Texture, that hath the Power to produce ſuch a Senſation in us.

Ideas *of primary Qualities, are Reſemblances; of ſecondary, not.*

§. 20. Pound an Almond, and the clear white *Colour* will be alter'd into a dirty one, and the ſweet *Taſte* into an oily one. What real Alteration can the beating of the Peſtle make in any Body, but an Alteration of the *Texture* of it?

§. 21. *Ideas* being thus diſtinguiſh'd and underſtood, we may be able to give an account how the ſame Water, at the ſame time, may produce the *Idea* of Cold by one Hand, and of Heat by the other; whereas it is impoſſible that the ſame Water, if thoſe *Ideas* were really in it, ſhould at the ſame time be both hot and cold: For if we imagine *Warmth*, as it is *in our Hands*, to be *nothing but a certain ſort and degree of Motion in the minute Particles of our Nerves, or animal Spirits*, we may underſtand how it is poſſible that the ſame Water may, at the ſame time, produce the Senſation of Heat in one Hand, and Cold in the other; which yet Figure never does, that never producing the *Idea* of a Square by one Hand, which has produc'd the *Idea* of a Globe by another. But if the Senſation of Heat and Cold be nothing but the Increaſe or Diminution of the Motion of the minute Parts of our Bodies, caus'd by the Corpuſcles of any other Body, it is eaſy to be underſtood, that if that Motion be greater in one Hand than in the other; if a Body be apply'd to the two Hands, which has, in

its minute Particles a greater motion, than in thoſe of one of the Hands, and a leſs than in thoſe of the other; it will increaſe the Motion of the one Hand, and leſſen it in the other, and ſo cauſe the different Senſations of Heat and Cold that depend thereon.

§. 22. I have in what juſt goes before been engag'd in phyſical Enquiries a little farther than perhaps I intended. But it being neceſſary to make the Nature of Senſation a little underſtood, and to make the *difference between the Qualities in Bodies, and the* Ideas *produc'd by them in the Mind*, to be diſtinctly conceiv'd, without which it were impoſſible to diſcourſe intelligibly of them; I hope I ſhall be pardon'd this little Excurſion into natural Philoſophy, it being neceſſary in our preſent Enquiry to diſtinguiſh the *primary*, and *real Qualities* of Bodies, which are always in them, (*viz.* Solidity, Extenſion, Figure, Number, and Motion, or Reſt; and are ſometimes perceiv'd by us, *viz.* when the Bodies they are in are big enough ſingly to be diſcern'd) from thoſe *ſecondary* and *imputed Qualities*, which are but the Powers of ſeveral Combinations of thoſe primary ones, when they operate, without being diſtinctly diſcern'd; whereby we alſo may come to know what *Ideas* are, and what are not Reſemblances of ſomething really exiſting in the Bodies we denominate from them.

Three ſorts of Qualities in Bodies.

§. 23. The *Qualities* then that are in *Bodies* rightly conſider'd, are of *three Sorts.*

Firſt, The *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Number*, *Situation* and *Motion*, or *Reſt* of their ſolid Parts; thoſe are in them, whether we perceive them or no; and when they are of that Size that we can diſcover them, we have by theſe an *Idea* of the thing as it is in it ſelf, as is plain in artificial Things. Theſe I call *primary Qualities.*

Secondly, The *Power* that is in any Body, by reaſon of *its* inſenſible *primary Qualities*, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our Senſes, and thereby *produce in us* the *different Ideas* of ſeveral Colours, Sounds, Smells, Taſtes, &c. Theſe are uſually call'd ſenſible Qualities.

Thirdly, The *Power* that is in any Body, *by* reaſon of the particular Conſtitution of *its primary Qualities*, *to* make ſuch a *change* in the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Texture*, *and Motion of another Body*, as to make it operate on our Senſes differently from what it did before. Thus the Sun has a power to make Wax white, and Fire to make Lead fluid. Theſe *are* uſually call'd Powers.

The firſt of theſe, as has been ſaid, I think, may be properly call'd *real original*, or *primary Qualities*, becauſe they are in the things themſelves, whether they are perceiv'd or no; and upon their different Modifications it is, that the ſecondary Qualities depend.

The other two are only Powers to act differently upon other things, which Powers reſult from the different Modifications of thoſe primary Qualities.

The firſt are Reſemblances. The ſecond thought Reſemblances, but are not. The third neither are, nor are thought ſo.

§. 24. But tho' *theſe two later ſorts of Qualities are Powers barely*, and nothing but Powers relating to ſeveral other Bodies, and reſulting from the different Modifications of the original Qualities; yet they are generally otherwiſe thought of. For *the ſecond Sort*, *viz.* The Powers to produce ſeveral *Ideas* in us by our Senſes, *are looked upon as real Qualities*, *in the Things* thus affecting us: But *the third ſort are call'd*, *and eſteem'd barely Powers*, *v. g.* the *Idea* of Heat, or Light, which we receive by our Eyes, or touch from the Sun, are commonly thought *real Qualities*, exiſting in the Sun, and ſomething more than mere Powers in it. But when we conſider the Sun, in reference to Wax, which it melts or blanches, we look on the Whiteneſs and Softneſs produc'd in the Wax, not as Qualities in the Sun, but Effects produc'd by *Powers* in it: Whereas, if rightly conſider'd, theſe Qualities of Light and Warmth, which are Perceptions in me when I am warm'd, or enlighten'd by the Sun, are no otherwiſe in the Sun, than the changes made in the Wax, when it is blanch'd or melted, are in the Sun. They are all of them equally Powers in the Sun, depending on its primary Qualities, whereby it is able in the one Caſe, ſo to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of ſome of the inſenſible parts of my Eyes or Hands, as thereby to produce in me the *Idea* of Light or Heat; and in the other it is able ſo to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of the inſenſible Parts of the Wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the diſtinct *Ideas* of white and fluid.

§. 25. The reaſon *why the one are ordinarily taken for real Qualities, and the other only for bare Powers*, ſeems to be, becauſe the *Ideas* we have of diſtinct Colours,

Colours, Sounds, &c. containing nothing at all in them of Bulk, Figure, or Motion, we are not apt to think them the Effects of theſe primary Qualities, which appear not to our Senſes, to operate in their Production; and with which they have not any apparent Congruity, or conceivable Connexion. Hence it is that we are ſo forward to imagine, that thoſe *Ideas* are the reſemblances of ſomething really exiſting in the Objects themſelves: Since Senſation diſcovers nothing of Bulk, Figure or Motion of Parts in their Production; nor can Reaſon ſhew how Bodies, by their Bulk, Figure, and Motion ſhould produce in the Mind the *Ideas* of Blue or Yellow, &c. But in the other caſe, in the Operations of Bodies, changing the Qualities one of another, we plainly diſcover that the Quality produc'd hath commonly no reſemblance with any thing in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare Effect of Power. For tho' receiving the *Idea* of Heat, or Light from the Sun, we are apt to think 'tis a Preception and Reſemblance of ſuch a Quality in the Sun; yet when we ſee Wax, or a fair Face, receive change of Colour from the Sun, we cannot imagine that to be the Perception or Reſemblance of any thing in the Sun, becauſe we find not thoſe different Colours in the Sun it ſelf. For our Senſes being able to obſerve a likeneſs or unlikeneſs of ſenſible Qualities in two different external Objects, we forwardly enough conclude the Production of any ſenſible Quality in any Subject, to be an Effect of bare Power, and not the Communication of any Quality, which was really in the Efficient, when we find no ſuch ſenſible Quality in the thing that produc'd it. But our Senſes, not being able to diſcover any unlikeneſs between the *Idea* produc'd in us, and the Quality of the Object producing it; we are apt to imagine, that our *Ideas* are reſemblances of ſomething in the Objects, and not the Effects of certain Powers plac'd in the Modification of their primary Qualities; with which primary Qualities the *Ideas* produc'd in us have no reſemblance.

§. 26. To conclude, beſides thoſe before-mentioned, *primary Qualities* in Bodies, *viz.* Bulk, Figure, Extenſion, Number, and Motion of their ſolid Parts; all the reſt whereby we take notice of Bodies, and diſtinguiſh them one from another, are nothing elſe but ſeveral Powers in them depending on thoſe primary Qualities; whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our Bodies, to produce ſeveral different *Ideas* in us; or elſe by operating on other Bodies, ſo to change their primary Qualities, as to render them capable of producing *Ideas* in us, different from what before they did. The former of theſe, I think, may be call'd *ſecondary Qualities, immediately perceivable:* The latter, *ſecondary Qualities, mediately perceivable.*

Secondary Qualities two fold; First, immediately perceivable; Secondly, mediately perceivable.

CHAP. IX.

Of Perception.

§. 1. *Perception*, as it is the firſt Faculty of the Mind, exercis'd about our *Ideas*; ſo it is the firſt and ſimpleſt *Idea* we have from Reflection, and is by ſome call'd Thinking in general. Tho' Thinking, in the propriety of the *Engliſh* Tongue, ſignifies that ſort of Operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, wherein the Mind is active; where it, with ſome degree of voluntary Attention, conſiders any thing. For in bare naked *Perception*, the Mind is, for the moſt part, only paſſive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.

Perception the firſt ſimple Idea of Reflection.

§. 2. *What Perception is*, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himſelf, when he ſees, hears, feels, &c. or thinks, than by any diſcourſe of mine. Whoever reflects on what paſſes in his own Mind, cannot miſs it: And if he does not reflect, all the Words in the World cannot make him have any notion of it.

Is only when the Mind receives the Impreſſion.

§. 3. This is certain, That whatever Alterations are made in the Body, if they reach not the Mind; whatever impreſſions are made on the outward Parts, if they are not taken notice of within; there is no Perception. Fire may burn our Bodies, with no other effect, than it does a Billet, unleſs the Motion be

continu'd to the Brain; and there the Senſe of Heat, or *Idea* of Pain, be produc'd in the Mind, wherein conſiſts *actual Perception.*

§. 4. How often may a Man obſerve in himſelf, that whilſt his Mind is intently employ'd in the Contemplation of ſome Objects, and curiouſly ſurveying ſome *Ideas* that are there; it takes no notice of Impreſſions of ſounding Bodies made upon the Organ of Hearing, with the ſame Alteration that uſes to be for the producing the *Idea* of Sound? A ſufficient impulſe there may be on the Organ; but it not reaching the Obſervation of the Mind, there follows no Perception: And tho' the Motion that uſes to produce the *Idea* of Sound, be made in the Ear, yet no Sound is heard. Want of Senſation in this caſe, is not through any defect in the Organ, or that the Man's Ears are leſs affected than at other times when he does hear: but that which uſes to produce the *Idea*, tho' convey'd in by the uſual Organ, not being taken notice of in the Underſtanding, and ſo imprinting no *Idea* on the Mind, there follows no Senſation. *So that wherever there is Senſe,* or *Perception, there ſome* Idea *is actually produc'd, and preſent in the Underſtanding.*

Children, tho' they have Ideas *in the Womb, have none innate.*

§. 5. Therefore I doubt not but *Children,* by the exerciſe of their Senſes about Objects that affect them *in the Womb, receive ſome few* Ideas before they are born; as the unavoidable Effects, either of the Bodies that environ them, or elſe of thoſe Wants or Diſeaſes they ſuffer: Among which (if one may conjecture concerning Things not very capable of Examination) I think the *Ideas* of Hunger and Warmth are two; which probably are ſome of the firſt that Children have, and which they ſcarce ever part with again.

§. 6. But tho' it be reaſonable to imagine that *Children* receive ſome *Ideas* before they come into the World; yet theſe ſimple *Ideas* are *far from* thoſe *innate Principles* which ſome contend for, and we above have rejected. Theſe here mention'd being the effects of Senſation, are only from ſome Affections of the Body, which happen to them there, and ſo depend on ſomething exterior to the Mind; no otherwiſe differing in their manner of Production from other *Ideas* deriv'd from Senſe, but only in the precedency of Time: Whereas thoſe innate Principles are ſuppos'd to be quite of another nature; not coming into the Mind by any accidental Alterations in, or Operations on the Body; but, as it were, original Characters impreſs'd upon it, in the very firſt moment of its Being and Conſtitution.

Which Ideas *firſt, is not evident.*

§. 7. As there are ſome *Ideas* which we may reaſonably ſuppoſe may be introduc'd into the Minds of Children in the Womb, ſubſervient to the Neceſſities of their Life and Being there; ſo after they are born, *thoſe* Ideas are the *earlieſt imprinted, which happen to be the ſenſible Qualities which firſt occur* to them: Amongſt which, Light is not the leaſt conſiderable, nor of the weakeſt efficacy. And how covetous the Mind is to be furniſh'd with all ſuch *Ideas* as have no pain accompanying them, may be a little gueſs'd, by what is obſervable in Children new-born, who always turn their Eyes to that part from whence the Light comes, lay them how you pleaſe. But the *Ideas* that are moſt familiar at firſt being various, according to the divers Circumſtances of Childrens firſt entertainment in the World; the Order wherein the ſeveral *Ideas* come at firſt into the Mind, is very various and uncertain alſo; neither is it much material to know it.

Ideas *of Senſation often chang'd by the Judgment.*

§. 8. We are farther to conſider concerning Perception, that the *Ideas we receive by Senſation are often* in grown People *alter'd by the Judgment,* without our taking notice of it. When we ſet before our Eyes a round Globe, of any uniform Colour, *v. g.* Gold, Alabaſter, or Jet; 'tis certain that the *Idea* thereby imprinted in our Mind, is of a flat Circle variouſly ſhadow'd, with ſeveral degrees of Light and Brightneſs coming to our Eyes. But we having by uſe been accuſtom'd to perceive what kind of appearance convex Bodies are wont to make in us, what Alterations are made in the Reflections of Light by the difference of the ſenſible Figures of Bodies; the Judgment preſently, by an habitual cuſtom, alters the Appearances into their Cauſes: So that from that which truly is variety of Shadow or Colour, collecting the Figure, it makes it paſs for a mark of Figure, and frames to it ſelf the Perception of a convex Figure and an uniform Colour; when the *Idea* we receive from thence is only a Plain variouſly colour'd, as is evident in painting. To which purpoſe I ſhall here inſert a Problem

blem of that very ingenious and ſtudious Promoter of real Knowledg, the Learned and Worthy Mr. *Molineux*, which he was pleas'd to ſend me in a Letter ſome Months ſince; and it is this: *Suppoſe a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his Touch to diſtinguiſh between a Cube and a Sphere of the ſame metal, and nighly of the ſame bigneſs, ſo as to tell when he felt one and t'other, which is the Cube, which the Sphere. Suppoſe then the Cube and Sphere plac'd on a Table, and the blind Man to be made to ſee:* Quære, *Whether by his Sight, before he touch'd them, he could now diſtinguiſh and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube?* To which the acute and judicious Propoſer anſwers: *Not. For tho' he has obtain'd the Experience of, how a Globe, how a Cube affects his Touch; yet he has not yet attain'd the Experience, that what affects his Touch ſo or ſo, muſt affect his Sight ſo or ſo: Or that a protuberant Angle in the Cube, that preſs'd his Hand unequally, ſhall appear to his Eye as it does in the Cube.* I agree with this thinking Gentleman, whom I am proud to call my Friend, in his anſwer to this his Problem; and am of Opinion, that the blind Man, at firſt ſight, would not be able with certainty to ſay which was the Globe, which the Cube, whilſt he only ſaw them; tho' he could unerringly name them by his Touch, and certainly diſtinguiſh them by the difference of their Figures felt. This I have ſet down, and leave with my Reader, as an occaſion for him to conſider how much he may be beholden to Experience, Improvement, and acquir'd Notions, where he thinks he has not the leaſt uſe of, or help from them: And the rather, becauſe this obſerving Gentleman farther adds, That *having, upon the occaſion of my Book, propos'd this to divers very ingenious Men, he hardly ever met with one that at firſt gave the anſwer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his Reaſons they were convinc'd.*

§. 9. But this is not, I think, uſual in any of our *Ideas*, but thoſe receiv'd by *Sight*: Becauſe Sight, the moſt comprehenſive of all our Senſes, conveying to our Minds the *Ideas* of Light and Colours, which are peculiar only to that Senſe; and alſo the far different *Ideas* of Space, Figure, and Motion, the ſeveral varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper Object, *viz.* Light and Colours; we bring our ſelves by uſe to judg of the one by the other. This, in many Caſes, by a ſettled habit, in things whereof we have frequent Experience, is perform'd ſo conſtantly and ſo quick, that we take that for the Perception of our Senſation, which is an *Idea* form'd by our Judgment; ſo that one, *viz.* that of Senſation, ſerves only to excite the other, and is ſcarce taken notice of it ſelf: As a Man who reads or hears with Attention and Underſtanding, takes little notice of the Characters, or Sounds, but of the *Ideas* that are excited in him by them.

§. 10. Nor need we wonder that this is done with ſo little notice, if we conſider how very *quick* the *Actions of the Mind* are perform'd: For as it ſelf is thought to take up no Space, to have no Extenſion; ſo its Actions ſeem to require no time, but many of them ſeem to be crouded into an inſtant. I ſpeak this in compariſon to the Actions of the Body. Any one may eaſily obſerve this in his own Thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an inſtant, do our Minds with one glance ſee all the parts of a Demonſtration, which may very well be call'd a long one, if we conſider the time it will require to put it into words, and ſtep by ſtep ſhew it another? *Secondly*, We ſhall not be ſo much ſurpriz'd, that this is done in us with ſo little notice, if we conſider how the facility which we get of doing things, by a cuſtom of doing, makes them often paſs in us without our notice. *Habits*, eſpecially ſuch as are begun very early, come at laſt to *produce Actions in us, which often eſcape our Obſervation.* How frequently do we, in a Day, cover our Eyes with our Eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark? Men that by cuſtom have got the uſe of a By-word, do almoſt in every Sentence pronounce Sounds, which tho' taken notice of by others, they themſelves neither hear nor obſerve. And therefore 'tis not ſo ſtrange, that our Mind ſhould often change the *Idea* of its Senſation into that of its Judgment, and make one ſerve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.

§. 11. This Faculty of *Perception* ſeems to me to be that, which *puts the diſtinction betwixt the animal Kingdom and the inferiour parts of Nature.* For however Vegetables have, many of them, ſome degrees of Motion, and upon the different Application of other Bodies to them do very briskly alter their Figures and

Perception puts the difference between Animals and inferior Beings.

and Motions, and ſo have obtain'd the name of ſenſitive Plants, from a Motion which has ſome reſemblance to that which in Animals follows upon Senſation: yet, I ſuppoſe, it is all bare Mechaniſm; and no otherwiſe produc'd, than the turn of a wild Oat-beard, by the inſinuation of the Particles of Moiſture; or the ſhortening of a Rope, by the Affuſion of Water. All which is done without any Senſation in the Subject, or the having or receiving any *Ideas*.

§. 12. *Perception*, I believe, is in ſome degree *in all ſorts of Animals*; tho' in ſome, poſſibly, the Avenues provided by Nature for the Reception of Senſations are ſo few, and the Perception they are receiv'd with ſo obſcure and dull, that it comes extremely ſhort of the Quickneſs and Variety of Senſations which is in other Animals: But yet it is ſufficient for, and wiſely adapted to, the ſtate and Condition of that ſort of Animals, who are thus made. So that the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the Maker plainly appear in all the Parts of this ſtupendous Fabrick, and all the ſeveral Degrees and Ranks of Creatures in it.

§. 13. We may, I think, from the Make of an *Oyſter*, or *Cockle*, reaſonably conclude that it has not ſo many, nor ſo quick Senſes, as a Man, or ſeveral other Animals; nor if it had, would it, in that State and incapacity of transferring it ſelf from one Place to another, be better'd by them. What good would Sight and Hearing do to a Creature, that cannot move it ſelf to, or from the Objects, wherein at a diſtance it perceives Good or Evil? And would not Quickneſs of Senſation be an Inconvenience to an Animal that muſt lie ſtill, where Chance has once plac'd it; and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul Water, as it happens to come to it?

§. 14. But yet I cannot but think, there is ſome ſmall dull Perception, whereby they are diſtinguiſh'd from perfect Inſenſibility. And that this may be ſo we have plain inſtances, even in Mankind it ſelf. Take one, in whom decrepid old Age has blotted out the Memory of his paſt Knowledge, and clearly wiped out the *Ideas* his Mind was formerly ſtor'd with; and has, by deſtroying his Sight, Hearing, and Smell quite, and his Taſte to a great Degree, ſtop'd up almoſt all the Paſſages for new ones to enter: Or, if there be ſome of the Inlets yet half open, the Impreſſions made are ſcarce perceiv'd, or not at all retain'd. How far ſuch an one (notwithſtanding all that is boaſted of innate Principles) is in his Knowledg, and intellectual Faculties, above the Condition of a *Cockle* or an *Oyſter*, I leave to be conſider'd. And if a Man had paſs'd ſixty Years in ſuch a State, as 'tis poſſible he might, as well as three Days; I wonder what difference there would have been in any intellectual Perfections, between him and the loweſt degree of Animals.

Perception the Inlet of Knowledg.

§. 15. *Perception* then being *the firſt Step and Degree towards Knowledg, and the Inlet of all the Materials of it*; the fewer Senſes any Man, as well as any other Creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the Impreſſions are that are made by them; and the duller the Faculties are that are employ'd about them, the more remote are they from that Knowledg which is to be found in ſome Men. But this being in great variety of Degrees (as may be perceiv'd amongſt Men) cannot certainly be diſcover'd in the ſeveral Species of Animals, much leſs in their particular Individuals. It ſuffices me only to have remark'd here, that Perception is the firſt Operation of all our intellectual Faculties, and the Inlet of all Knowledg into our Minds. And I am apt too, to imagine that it is Perception in the loweſt degree of it, which puts the boundaries between Animals and the inferiour Ranks of Creatures. But this I mention only as my Conjecture by the by; it being indifferent to the matter in Hand, which way the Learned ſhall determine of it.

CHAP. X.

Of Retention.

Contemplation.

§. 1. THE next Faculty of the Mind, whereby it makes a farther progreſs towards Knowledg, is that which I call *Retention*, or the keeping of thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, which from Senſation or Reflection it hath receiv'd. This is done

done two ways: First, by keeping the *Idea*, which is brought into it, for some time actually in view; which is call'd *Contemplation*.

§. 2. The other way of Retention, is the Power to revive again in our Minds those *Ideas*, which after imprinting have disappear'd, or have been as it were laid aside out of Sight: And thus we do, when we conceive Heat or Light, Yellow or Sweet, the Object being remov'd. This is *Memory*, which is as it were the Store-house of our *Ideas*. For the narrow Mind of Man not being capable of having many *Ideas* under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary to have a Repository to lay up those *Ideas*, which at another Time it might have use of. But our *Ideas* being nothing but actual Perceptions in the Mind, which cease to be any thing when there is no Preception of them, this *laying up* of our *Ideas* in the Repository of the Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power in many Cases to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional Pereception annex'd to them, that it has had them before. And in this Sense it is, that our *Ideas* are said to be in our Memories, when indeed they are actually no where, but only there is an Ability in the Mind when it will to revive them again, and as it were paint them a-new on it self, tho' some with more, some with less difficulty; some more lively, and others more obscurely. And thus it is, by the assistance of this Faculty, that we are said to have all those *Ideas* in our Understandings, which tho' we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make appear again, and be the Objects of our Thoughts, without the help of those sensible Qualities which first imprinted them there. *Memory.*

§. 3. *Attention* and *Repetition help* much to the fixing any *Ideas* in *the Memory*: but those which naturally at first make the deepest and most lasting Impression, are those which are accompany'd with *Pleasure* or *Pain*. The great Business of the Senses being to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the Body, it is wisely order'd by Nature (as has been shewn) that Pain should accompany the Reception of several *Ideas*; which supplying the Place of Consideration and Reasoning in Children, and acting quicker than Consideration in grown Men, makes both the Old and Young avoid painful Objects, with that haste which is necessary for their Preservation; and in both settles in the Memory a Caution for the future. *Attention, Repetition, Pleasure and Pain, fix Ideas.*

§. 4. Concerning the several *Degrees of* lasting, wherewith *Ideas* are imprinted on the *Memory*, we may observe, That some of them have been produc'd in the Understanding, by an Object affecting the Senses once only, and no more than once; others that have more than once offer'd themselves to the Senses, have yet been little taken notice of: The Mind either heedless, as in Children, or otherwise employ'd, as in Men, intent only on one thing, not letting the stamp deep into it self. And in some, where they are set on with care and repeated Impressions, either thro' the Temper of the Body, or some other default, the Memory is very weak. In all these Cases, *Ideas* in the Mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the Understanding, leaving no more Foot-steps or remaining Characters of themselves, than Shadows do flying over Fields of Corn; and the Mind is as void of them, as if they never had been there. Ideas *fade in the Memory.*

§. 5. Thus many of those *Ideas*, which were produc'd in the Minds of Children, in the beginning of their Sensation, (some of which perhaps, as of some Pleasures and Pains, were before they were born, and others in their Infancy) if in the future Course of their Lives they are not repeated again, are quite lost, without the least glimpse remaining of them. This may be observ'd in those, who by some mischance have lost their sight when they were very young, in whom the *Ideas* of Colours, having been but slightly taken notice of, and ceasing to be repeated, do quite wear out; so that some Years after there is no more Notion nor Memory of Colours left in their Minds, than in those of People born blind. The Memory in some Men, 'tis true, is very tenacious, even to a miracle: But yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our *Ideas*, even of those which are struck deepest, and in Minds the most retentive; so that if they be not sometimes renew'd by repeated Exercise of the Senses, or Reflection on those kinds of Objects which at first occasion'd them, the Print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen. Thus the *Ideas*, as well as Children, of our Youth, often die before us: and our Minds represent to us those Tombs,

Tombs, to which we are approaching; where tho' the Braſs and Marble remain, yet the Inſcriptions are effaced by Time, and the Imagery moulders away. *The Pictures drawn in our Minds are laid in fading Colours*; and if not ſometimes refreſh'd, vaniſh and diſappear. How much the Conſtitution of our Bodies, and the Make of our animal Spirits are concern'd in this, and whether the Temper of the Brain make this difference, that in ſome it retains the Characters drawn on it like Marble, in others like Free-ſtone, and in others little better than Sand; I ſhall not here enquire: tho' it may ſeem probable, that the Conſtitution of the Body does ſometimes influence the Memory; ſince we oftentimes find a Diſeaſe quite ſtrip the Mind of all its *Ideas*, and the Flames of a Fever in a few Days calcine all thoſe Images to Duſt and Confuſion, which ſeem'd to be as laſting as if grav'd in Marble.

Conſtantly repeated Ideas *can ſcarce be loſt.*

§. 6. But concerning the *Ideas* themſelves it is eaſy to remark, That thoſe that are *oftenеſt refreſh'd* (amongſt which are thoſe that are convey'd into the Mind by more ways than one) by a frequent return of the Objects or Actions that produce them, *fix themſelves beſt in the Memory*, and remain cleareſt and longeſt there: And therefore thoſe which are of the original Qualities of Bodies, viz. *Solidity*, *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Motion*, and *Reſt*; and thoſe that almoſt conſtantly affect our Bodies, as *Heat* and *Cold*; and thoſe which are the Affections of all kinds of Beings, as *Exiſtence*, *Duration*, and *Number*, which almoſt every Object that affects our Senſes, every Thought which employs our Minds, bring along with them: Theſe, I ſay, and the like *Ideas*, are ſeldom quite loſt, whilſt the Mind retains any *Ideas* at all.

In remembring, the Mind is often active.

§. 7. In this ſecondary Perception, as I may ſo call it, or viewing again the *Ideas* that are lodg'd *in* the *Memory*, *the Mind is oftentimes more than barely paſſive*; the Appearance of thoſe dormant Pictures depending ſometimes on the Will. The Mind very often ſets it ſelf on work in ſearch of ſome hidden *Idea*, and turns as it were the Eye of the Soul upon it; tho' ſometimes too they ſtart up in our Minds of their own accord, and offer themſelves to the Underſtanding; and very often are rouz'd and tumbled out of their dark Cells into open Daylight, by ſome turbulent and tempeſtuous Paſſions: Our Affections bringing *Ideas* to our Memory, which had otherwiſe lain quiet and unregarded. This farther is to be obſerv'd concerning *Ideas* lodg'd in the Memory, and upon occaſion reviv'd by the Mind, that they are not only (as the word *revive* imports) none of them new ones; but alſo that the Mind takes notice of them, as of a former Impreſſion, and renews its Acquaintance with them, as with *Ideas* it had known before. So that tho' *Ideas* formerly imprinted are not at all conſtantly in view, yet in Remembrance they are conſtantly known to be ſuch as have been formerly imprinted; *i. e.* in view, and taken notice of before by the Underſtanding.

Two Defects in the Memory, Oblivion and Slowneſs.

§. 8. *Memory*, in an intellectual Creature, is neceſſary in the next Degree to Perception. It is of ſo great Moment, that where it is wanting, all the reſt of our Faculties are in a great meaſure uſeleſs: And we in our Thoughts, Reaſonings, and Knowledg, could not proceed beyond preſent Objects, were it not for the Aſſiſtance of our Memories, wherein there may be *two Defects*.

Firſt, That it *loſes the Idea* quite, and ſo far it produces perfect Ignorance. For ſince we can know nothing farther than we have the *Idea* of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect *Ignorance*.

Secondly, That it moves ſlowly, and *retrieves not the Ideas* that it has, and are laid up in Store, *quick enough* to ſerve the Mind upon Occaſions. This, if it be to a great Degree, is *Stupidity*; and he, who thro' this default in his Memory, has not the *Ideas* that are really preſerv'd there ready at hand when need and Occaſion calls for them, were almoſt as good be without them quite, ſince they ſerve him to little purpoſe. The dull Man, who loſes the Opportunity whilſt he is ſeeking in his Mind for thoſe *Ideas* that ſhould ſerve his turn, is not much more happy in his Knowledg than one that is perfectly ignorant. 'Tis the buſineſs therefore of the Memory to furniſh to the Mind thoſe dormant *Ideas* which it has preſent Occaſion for; in the having them ready at Hand on all Occaſions, conſiſts that which we call *Invention*, *Fancy*, and Quickneſs of Parts.

§. 9. Theſe are Defects, we may obſerve, in the Memory of one Man compar'd with another. There is another Defect which we may conceive to be in the Memory of Man in general, compar'd with ſome ſuperior created intellectual Beings,

Beings, which in this faculty may ſo far excel Man, that they may have conſtantly in view the whole ſcene of all their former Actions, wherein no one of the Thoughts they have ever had may ſlip out of their Sight. The Omniſcience of God, who knows all things paſt, preſent, and to come, and to whom the Thoughts of Mens Hearts always lie open, may ſatisfy us of the poſſibility of this. For who can doubt but God may communicate to thoſe glorious Spirits, his immediate Attendants, any of his Perfections, in what Proportion he pleaſes, as far as created finite Beings can be capable? 'Tis reported of that Prodigy of Parts, Monſieur *Paſcal*, that, till the Decay of his Health had impair'd his Memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought, in any part of his rational Age. This is a privilege ſo little known to moſt Men, that it ſeems almoſt incredible to thoſe, who, after the ordinary way, meaſure all others by themſelves; but yet, when conſider'd, may help us to enlarge our Thoughts towards greater Perfections of it in ſuperior ranks of Spirits. For this of Mr. *Paſcal* was ſtill with a narrowneſs that human Minds are confin'd to here, of having great variety of *Ideas* only by ſucceſſion, not all at once: Whereas the ſeveral Degrees of Angels may probably have larger views, and ſome of them be endow'd with Capacities able to retain together, and conſtantly ſet before them, as in one Picture, all their paſt Knowledge at once. This, we may conceive, would be no ſmall advantage to the Knowledg of a thinking Man, if all his paſt Thoughts and Reaſonings could be always preſent to him. And therefore we may ſuppoſe it one of thoſe Ways, wherein the Knowledg of ſeparate Spirits may exceedingly ſurpaſs ours.

§. 10. This faculty of laying up and retaining the *Ideas* that are brought into the Mind, ſeveral *other Animals* ſeem to have to a great degree, as well as Man. For to paſs by other Inſtances, Birds learning of Tunes, and the endeavours one may obſerve in them to hit the Notes right, put it paſt doubt with me, that they have Perception, and retain *Ideas* in their Memories, and uſe them for Patterns. For it ſeems to me impoſſible, that they ſhould endeavour to conform their Voices to Notes (as 'tis plain they do) of which they had no *Ideas*. For tho' I ſhould grant Sound may mechanically cauſe a certain Motion of the animal Spirits, in the Brains of thoſe Birds, whilſt the Tune is actually playing; and that Motion may be continu'd on to the Muſcles of the Wings, and ſo the Bird mechanically be driven away by certain noiſes, becauſe this may tend to the Bird's preſervation: Yet that can never be ſuppos'd a reaſon, why it ſhould cauſe mechanically, either whilſt the Tune was playing, much leſs after it has ceas'd, ſuch a motion in the Organs of the Bird's Voice, as ſhould conform it to the Notes of a foreign Sound, which Imitation can be of no uſe to the Bird's Preſervation. But, which is more, it cannot with any appearance of Reaſon be ſuppos'd (much leſs prov'd) that Birds, without Senſe and Memory, can approach their Notes nearer and nearer by degrees to a Tune play'd yeſterday; which if they have no *Idea* of in their Memory, is now no where, nor can be a Pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated Eſſays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no reaſon why the Sound of a Pipe ſhould leave traces in their Brains, which not at firſt, but by their after-endeavours, ſhould produce the like Sounds; and why the Sounds they make themſelves, ſhould not make traces which they ſhould follow, as well as thoſe of the Pipe, is impoſſible to conceive.

Brutes have Memory.

CHAP. XI.

Of Diſcerning, and other Operations of the Mind.

§. 1. ANother Faculty we may take notice of in our Minds, is that of *Diſcerning* and diſtinguiſhing between the ſeveral *Ideas* it has. It is not enough to have a confus'd Perception of ſomething in general: Unleſs the Mind had a diſtinct Perception of different Objects and their Qualities, it would be capable of very little Knowledg; tho' the Bodies that affect us were as buſy about us as they are now, and the Mind were continually employ'd in thinking. On this faculty of diſtinguiſhing one thing from another, depends the *Evidence and*

No Knowledg without Diſcerning.

Certainty of ſeveral, even very general Propoſitions, which have paſs'd for innate Truths; becauſe Men overlooking the true Cauſe why thoſe Propoſitions find univerſal Aſſent, impute it wholly to native uniform Impreſſions: whereas it in truth *depends upon this clear diſcerning Faculty* of the Mind, whereby it perceives two *Ideas* to be the ſame, or different. But of this more hereafter.

The difference of Wit and Judgment.

§. 2. How much the imperfection of accurately diſcriminating *Ideas* one from another, lies either in the dulneſs or faults of the Organs of Senſe; or want of acuteneſs, exerciſe or attention in the Underſtanding; or haſtineſs and precipitancy, natural to ſome Tempers, I will not here examine: It ſuffices to take notice, that this is one of the Operations, that the Mind may reflect on and obſerve in it ſelf. It is of that conſequence to its other Knowledg, that ſo far as this Faculty is in it ſelf dull, or not rightly made uſe of for the diſtinguiſhing one thing from another; ſo far our Notions are confus'd, and our Reaſon and Judgment diſturb'd or miſled. If in having our *Ideas* in the Memory ready at Hand, conſiſts quickneſs of Parts; in this of having them unconfus'd, and being able nicely to diſtinguiſh one thing from another, where there is but the leaſt difference, conſiſts, in a great meaſure, the exactneſs of Judgment, and clearneſs of Reaſon, which is to be obſerv'd in one Man above another. And hence perhaps may be given ſome reaſon of that common Obſervation, That Men, who have a great deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the cleareſt Judgment, or deepeſt Reaſon: For *Wit* lying moſt in the aſſemblage of *Ideas*, and putting thoſe together with quickneſs and variety, wherein can be found any reſemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleaſant Pictures, and agreeable Viſions in the Fancy; *Judgment*, on the contrary, lies quite on the other ſide, in ſeparating carefully one from another, *Ideas* wherein can be found the leaſt difference, thereby to avoid being miſled by Similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Alluſion, wherein for the moſt part lies that Entertainment and Pleaſantry of Wit, which ſtrikes ſo lively on the Fancy, and therefore is ſo acceptable to all People; becauſe its Beauty appears at firſt Sight, and there is requir'd no labour of Thought to examine what Truth or Reaſon there is in it. The Mind, without looking any farther, reſts ſatisfy'd with the agreeableneſs of the Picture, and the gaity of the Fancy: And it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the ſevere Rules of Truth and good Reaſon; whereby it appears, that it conſiſts in ſomething that is not perfectly conformable to them.

Clearneſs alone hinders Confuſion.

§. 3. To the well diſtinguiſhing our *Ideas*, it chiefly contributes, they be *clear and determinate*: And when they are ſo, *it will not breed any Confuſion* or Miſtake about them, tho' the Senſes ſhould (as ſometimes they do) convey them from the ſame Object differently, on different occaſions, and ſo ſeem to err. For tho' a Man in a Fever ſhould from Sugar have a bitter Taſte, which at another time would produce a ſweet one; yet the *Idea* of bitter in that Man's Mind, would be as clear and diſtinct from the *Idea* of ſweet, as if he had taſted only Gall. Nor does it make any more confuſion between the two *Ideas* of ſweet and bitter, that the ſame ſort of Body produces at one Time one, and at another Time another *Idea* by the Taſte, than it makes a confuſion in two *Ideas* of white and ſweet, or white and round, that the ſame piece of Sugar produces them both in the Mind at the ſame Time. And the *Ideas* of Orange-colour and Azure, that are produced in the Mind by the ſame parcel of the infuſion of *Lignum Nephriticum*, are no leſs diſtinct *Ideas*, than thoſe of the ſame Colours, taken from two very different Bodies.

Comparing.

§. 4. The *COMPARING* them one with another, in reſpect of Extent, Degrees, Time, Place, or any other Circumſtances, is another Operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, and is that upon which depends all that large Tribe of *Ideas*, comprehended under *Relation*; which of how vaſt an Extent it is, I ſhall have Occaſion to conſider hereafter.

Brutes compare but imperfectly.

§. 5. How far Brutes partake in this Faculty, is not eaſy to determine, I imagine they have it not in any great degree: For tho' they probably have ſeveral *Ideas* diſtinct enough, yet it ſeems to me to be the Prerogative of human Underſtanding, when it has ſufficiently diſtinguiſh'd any *Ideas*, ſo as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and ſo conſequently two, to caſt about and

and conſider in what Circumſtances they are capable to be compar'd: And therefore, I think, *Beaſts compare* not their *Ideas* farther than ſome ſenſible Circumſtances annex'd to the Objects themſelves. The other power of comparing, which may be obſerv'd in Men, belonging to general *Ideas*, and uſeful only to abſtract Reaſonings, we may probably conjecture Beaſts have not.

Compounding.

§. 6. The next Operation we may obſerve in the Mind about its *Ideas*, is *COMPOSITION*; whereby it puts together ſeveral of thoſe ſimple ones it has receiv'd from Senſation and Reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of Compoſition may be reckon'd alſo that of *ENLARGING*; wherein tho' the Compoſition does not ſo much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheleſs a putting ſeveral *Ideas* together, tho' of the ſame kind. Thus by adding ſeveral Units together, we make the *Idea* of a Dozen; and putting together the repeated *Ideas* of ſeveral Perches, we frame that of Furlong.

Brutes compound but little.

§. 7. In this alſo, I ſuppoſe, *Brutes* come far ſhort of Men: For tho' they take in, and retain together ſeveral Combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, as poſſibly the Shape, Smell and Voice of his Maſter make up the complex *Idea* a Dog has of him, or rather are ſo many diſtinct Marks, whereby he knows him; yet I *do not* think they do of themſelves ever compound them, and *make complex* Ideas. And perhaps even where we think they have complex *Ideas*, 'tis only one ſimple one that directs them in the knowledg of ſeveral things, which poſſibly they diſtinguiſh leſs by their Sight than we imagine: For I have been credibly inform'd, that a Bitch will nurſe, play with, and be fond of young Foxes, as much as, and in place of her Puppies, if you can but get them once to ſuck her ſo long, that her Milk may go thro' them. And thoſe Animals, which have a numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any knowledg of their number: for tho' they are mightily concern'd for any of their Young that are taken from them whilſt they are in ſight or hearing; yet if one or two of them be ſtolen from them in their abſence, or without noiſe, they appear not to miſs them, or to have any ſenſe that their number is leſſen'd

Naming.

§. 8. When Children have, by repeated Senſations, got *Ideas* fix'd in their Memories, they begin by degrees to learn the uſe of Signs. And when they have got the Skill to apply the Organs of Speech to the framing of articulate Sounds, they begin to make *uſe of Words*, to ſignify their *Ideas* to others. Theſe verbal Signs they ſometimes borrow from others, and ſometimes make themſelves, as one may obſerve among the new and unuſual Names Children often give to things in their firſt uſe of Language.

Abſtraction.

§. 9. The uſe of Words then being to ſtand as outward Marks of our internal *Ideas*, and thoſe *Ideas* being taken from particular things, if every particular *Idea* that we take in, ſhould have a diſtinct Name, Names muſt be endleſs. To prevent this, the Mind makes the particular *Ideas*, receiv'd from particular Objects, to become general; which is done by conſidering them as they are in the Mind ſuch Appearances, ſeparate from all other Exiſtences, and the Circumſtances of real Exiſtence, as Time, Place, or any other concomitant *Ideas*. This is call'd *ABSTRACTION*, whereby *Ideas*, taken from particular Beings, become general Repreſentatives of all of the ſame kind, and their Names general Names, applicable to whatever exiſts conformable to ſuch abſtract *Ideas*. Such preciſe naked Appearances in the Mind, without conſidering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the Underſtanding lays up (with Names commonly annex'd to them) as the Standards to rank real Exiſtences into ſorts, as they agree with theſe Patterns, and to *denominate* them accordingly. Thus the ſame Colour being obſerv'd to day in Chalk or Snow, which the Mind yeſterday receiv'd from Milk, it conſiders that Appearance alone, makes it a Repreſentative of all of that kind; and having given it the name *Whiteneſs*, it by that Sound ſignifies the ſame Quality, whereſoever to be imagin'd or met with: and thus Univerſals, whether *Ideas* or Terms, are made.

Brutes abſtract not.

§. 10. If it may be doubted, whether *Beaſts* compound and inlarge their *Ideas* that way to any degree; this, I think, I may be poſitive in, that the power of *Abſtracting* is not at all in them; and that the having of general *Ideas*, is that which puts a perfect diſtinction betwixt Man and Brutes, and is an Excellency

cellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident we obſerve no Footſteps in them, of making uſe of general Signs for univerſal *Ideas*; from which we have reaſon to imagine, that they have not the faculty of abſtracting, or making general *Ideas*, ſince they have no uſe of Words, or any other general Signs.

§. 11. Nor can it be imputed to their want of fit Organs to frame articulate Sounds, that they have no uſe or knowledg of general Words; ſince many of them we find, can faſhion ſuch Sounds, and pronounce Words diſtinctly enough, but never with any ſuch Application. And on the other ſide, Men who thro' ſome defect in the Organs want Words, yet fail not to expreſs their univerſal *Ideas* by ſigns, which ſerve them inſtead of general Words; a faculty which we ſee Beaſts come ſhort in. And therefore I think we may ſuppoſe, that 'tis in this that the Species of *Brutes* are diſcriminated from Man; and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly ſeparated, and which at laſt widens to ſo vaſt a diſtance: For if they have any *Ideas* at all, and are not bare Machines (as ſome would have them) we cannot deny them to have ſome Reaſon. It ſeems as evident to me, that they do ſome of them in certain Inſtances reaſon, as that they have Senſe; but it is only in particular *Ideas*, juſt as they received them from their Senſes. They are the beſt of them ty'd up within thoſe narrow bounds, and *have not* (as I think) the faculty to inlarge them by any kind of *Abſtraction*.

Idiots and Madmen.

§. 12. How far *Idiots* are concern'd in the want or weakneſs of any, or all of the foregoing Faculties, an exact Obſervation of their ſeveral ways of faltering would no doubt diſcover: For thoſe who either perceive but dully, or retain the *Ideas* that come into their Minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little matter to think on. Thoſe who cannot diſtinguiſh, compare and abſtract, would hardly be able to underſtand and make uſe of Language, or judg or reaſon to any tolerable degree; but only a little and imperfectly about things preſent, and very familiar to their Senſes. And indeed any of the forementiond Faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce ſuitable defects of Mens Underſtandings and Knowledg.

§. 13. In fine, the defect in *Naturals* ſeem to proceed from want of Quickneſs, Activity and Motion in the intellectual Faculties, whereby they are depriv'd of Reaſon; whereas *Madmen*, on the other ſide, ſeem to ſuffer by the other Extreme: For they do not appear to me to have loſt the Faculty of Reaſoning; but having join'd together ſome *Ideas* very wrongly, they miſtake them for Truths, and they err as Men do that argue right from wrong Principles. For by the violence of their Imaginations, having taken their Fancies for Realities, they make right Deductions from them. Thus you ſhall find a diſtracted Man, fanſying himſelf a King, with a right Inference require ſuitable Attendance, Reſpect and Obedience: Others, who have thought themſelves made of Glaſs, have us'd the Caution neceſſary to preſerve ſuch brittle Bodies. Hence it comes to paſs that a Man, who is very ſober, and of a right underſtanding in all other things, may in one particular be as frantick as any in *Bedlam*; if either by any ſudden very ſtrong Impreſſion, or long fixing his Fancy upon one ſort of Thoughts, incoherent *Ideas* have been cemented together ſo powerfully, as to remain united. But there are degrees of Madneſs, as of Folly; the diſorderly jumbling *Ideas* together, is in ſome more, and ſome leſs. In ſhort, herein ſeems to lie the difference between Idiots and Madmen, That Madmen put wrong *Ideas* together, and ſo make wrong Propoſitions, but argue and reaſon right from them; but Idiots make very few or no Propoſitions, and reaſon ſcarce at all.

Method.

§. 14. Theſe, I think, are the firſt Faculties and Operations of the Mind, which it makes uſe of in Underſtanding; and tho' they are exercis'd about all its *Ideas* in general, yet the Inſtances I have hitherto given have been chiefly in ſimple *Ideas*: And I have ſubjoin'd the Explication of theſe Faculties of the Mind to that of ſimple *Ideas*, before I come to what I have to ſay concerning complex ones, for theſe following Reaſons.

Firſt, Becauſe ſeveral of theſe Faculties being exercis'd at firſt principally about ſimple *Ideas*, we might, by following Nature in its ordinary Method, trace and diſcover them in their Riſe, Progreſs, and gradual Improvements.

Secondly,

Secondly, Becauſe obſerving the Faculties of the Mind, how they operate about ſimple *Ideas*, which are uſually, in moſt Mens Minds, much more clear, preciſe and diſtinct than complex ones, we may the better examine and learn how the Mind abſtracts, denominates, compares and exerciſes its other Operations about thoſe which are complex, wherein we are much more liable to miſtake.

Thirdly, Becauſe theſe very Operations of the Mind about *Ideas*, receiv'd from *Senſation*, are themſelves, when reflected on, another Set of *Ideas*, deriv'd from that other Source of our Knowledg which I call *Reflection*, and therefore fit to be conſider'd in this place after the ſimple *Ideas* of *Senſation*. Of Compounding, Comparing, Abſtracting, &c. I have but juſt ſpoken, having Occaſion to treat of them more at large in other places.

§. 15. And thus I have given a ſhort, and, I think, true *Hiſtory of the firſt Beginnings of Human Knowledg*, whence the Mind has its firſt Objects, and by what ſteps it makes its Progreſs to the laying in and ſtoring up thoſe *Ideas*, out of which is to be fram'd all the knowledg it is capable of; wherein I muſt appeal to Experience and Obſervation, whether I am in the right: The beſt way to come to Truth, being to examine things as really they are, and not to conclude they are as we fanſy of our ſelves, or have been taught by others to imagine. *These are the beginnings of human Knowledg.*

§. 16. To deal truly, *this is the only way* that I can diſcover, *whereby* the *Ideas* of things *are brought into the Underſtanding*: If other Men have either innate *Ideas*, or infus'd Principles, they have reaſon to enjoy them; and if they are ſure of it, it is impoſſible for others to deny them the Privilege that they have above their Neighbours. I can ſpeak but of what I find in my ſelf, and is agreeable to thoſe Notions; which, if we will examine the whole courſe of Men in their ſeveral Ages, Countries and Educations, ſeem to depend on thoſe Foundations which I have laid, and to correſpond with this Method in all the Parts and Degrees thereof. *Appeal to Experience.*

§. 17. I pretend not to teach, but to enquire, and therefore cannot but confeſs here again, That external and internal Senſation are the only Paſſages that I can find of Knowledg to the Underſtanding. Theſe alone, as far as I can diſcover, are the Windows by which Light is let into this *dark Room*: For methinks the Underſtanding is not much unlike a Cloſet wholly ſhut from Light, with only ſome little opening left, to let in external viſible Reſemblances, or *Ideas* of things without: Would the Pictures coming into ſuch a dark Room but ſtay there, and lie ſo orderly as to be found upon occaſion, it would very much reſemble the Underſtanding of a Man, in reference to all Objects of Sight, and the *Ideas* of them. *Dark Room.*

Theſe are my Gueſſes concerning the means whereby the Underſtanding comes to have and retain ſimple *Ideas*, and the Modes of them, with ſome other Operations about them. I proceed now to examine ſome of theſe ſimple *Ideas*, and their Modes, a little more particularly.

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

§. 1. WE have hitherto conſider'd thoſe *Ideas*, in the Reception whereof the Mind is only paſſive, which are thoſe ſimple ones receiv'd from *Senſation* and *Reflection* before-mention'd, whereof the Mind cannot make one to it ſelf, nor have any *Idea* which does not wholly conſiſt of them. But as the Mind is wholly paſſive in the reception of all its ſimple *Ideas*, ſo it exerts ſeveral Acts of its own, whereby out of its ſimple *Ideas*, as the Materials and Foundations of the reſt, the other are fram'd. The Acts of the Mind, wherein it exerts its Power over its ſimple *Ideas*, are chiefly theſe three: 1. Combining ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* into one compound one, and thus all complex *Ideas* are made. 2. The ſecond is bringing two *Ideas*, whether ſimple or complex, together, and ſetting them by one another, ſo as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its *Ideas* of Re- *Made by the Mind out of ſimple ones.*

lations.

lations. 3. The third is ſeparating them from all other *Ideas* that accompany them in their real Exiſtence; this is call'd *Abſtraction*: And thus all its general *Ideas* are made. This ſhews Man's Power, and its way of Operation, to be much-what the ſame in the material and intellectual World. For the Materials in both being ſuch as he has no power over, either to make or deſtroy, all that Man can do is either to unite them together, or to ſet them by one another, or wholly ſeparate them. I ſhall here begin with the firſt of theſe in the Conſideration of complex *Ideas*, and come to the other two in their due places. As ſimple *Ideas* are obſerv'd to exiſt in ſeveral Combinations united together, ſo the Mind has a power to conſider ſeveral of them united together as one *Idea*; and that not only as they are united in external Objects, but as it ſelf has join'd them. *Ideas* thus made up of ſeveral ſimple ones put together, I call *complex*; ſuch as are *Beauty*, *Gratitude*, *a Man*, *an Army*, *the Univerſe*; which tho' complicated of various ſimple *Ideas*, or *complex Ideas* made up of ſimple ones, yet are, when the Mind pleaſes, conſider'd each by it ſelf as one entire Thing, and ſignify'd by one Name.

Made voluntarily.

§. 2. In this faculty of repeating and joining together its *Ideas*, the Mind has great power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts, infinitely beyond what *Senſation* or *Reflection* furniſh'd it with; but all this ſtill confin'd to thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which it receiv'd from thoſe two Sources, and which are the ultimate Materials of all its Compoſitions: For ſimple *Ideas* are all from things themſelves, and of theſe *the Mind can* have no more, nor other than what are ſuggeſted to it. It can have no other *Ideas* of ſenſible Qualities than what come from without by the Senſes, nor any *Ideas* of other kind of Operations of a thinking Subſtance, than what it finds in it ſelf; but when it has once got theſe ſimple *Ideas*, it is not confin'd barely to Obſervation, and what offers it ſelf from without: It can, by its own power, put together thoſe *Ideas* it has, and *make new complex ones*, which it never receiv'd ſo united.

Are either Modes, Subſtances or Relations.

§. 3. *Complex Ideas*, however compounded and decompounded, tho' their number be infinite, and the variety endleſs, wherewith they fill and entertain the Thoughts of Men; yet, I think, they may be all reduc'd under theſe three Heads.

1. *Modes.*
2. *Subſtances.*
3. *Relations.*

Modes.

§. 4. *Firſt*, *Modes* I call ſuch complex *Ideas*, which however compounded, contain not in them the ſuppoſition of ſubſiſting by themſelves, but are conſider'd as Dependances on, or Affections of Subſtances; ſuch are the *Ideas* ſignify'd by the Words *Triangle*, *Gratitude*, *Murder*, &c. And if in this I uſe the word *Mode* in ſomewhat a different ſenſe from its ordinary ſignification, I beg pardon; it being unavoidable in Diſcourſes, differing from the ordinary receiv'd Notions, either to make new Words, or to uſe old Words in ſomewhat a new Signification: The latter whereof, in our preſent Caſe, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.

Simple and mix'd Modes.

§. 5. Of theſe *Modes*, there are two Sorts which deſerve diſtinct Conſideration. *Firſt*, There are ſome which are only Variations, or different Combinations of the ſame ſimple *Idea*, without the mixture of any other, as a dozen or ſcore; which are nothing but the *Ideas* of ſo many diſtinct Units added together: And theſe I call *ſimple Modes*, as being contain'd within the bounds of one ſimple *Idea*.

Secondly, There are others compounded of ſimple *Ideas* of ſeveral kinds, put together to make one complex one; *v. g. Beauty*, conſiſting of a certain Compoſition of Colour and Figure, cauſing Delight in the Beholder; *Theft*, which being the conceal'd Change of the poſſeſſion of any thing, without the Conſent of the Proprietor, contains, as is viſible, a Combination of ſeveral *Ideas* of ſeveral kinds: And theſe I call *mix'd Modes*.

Subſtances ſingle or collective.

§. 6. *Secondly*, The *Ideas* of *Subſtances* are ſuch Combinations or ſimple *Ideas*, as are taken to repreſent diſtinct particular things ſubſiſting by themſelves; in which the ſuppos'd or confus'd *Idea* of Subſtance, ſuch as it is, is always the firſt and chief. Thus if to Subſtance be join'd the ſimple *Idea* of a certain dull white Colour, with certain degrees of Weight, Hardneſs, Ductility and Fuſibility, we have the *Idea* of *Lead*, and a Combination of the *Ideas* of a certain

tain ſort of Figure, with the Powers of Motion, Thought and Reaſoning, join'd to Subſtance, make the ordinary *Idea* of a *Man*. Now of Subſtances alſo there are two ſorts of *Ideas*, one of ſingle Subſtances, as they exiſt ſeparately, as of *a Man* or *a Sheep*; the other of ſeveral of thoſe put together, as an *Army* of Men, or *Flock* of Sheep: Which *collective* Ideas of ſeveral *Subſtances* thus put together, are as much each of them one ſingle *Idea*, as that of a Man, or an Unit.

Relation.

§. 7. *Thirdly*, The laſt ſort of complex *Ideas*, is that we call *Relation*, which conſiſts in the Conſideration and comparing one *Idea* with another. Of theſe ſeveral kinds we ſhall treat in their order.

The abſtruſeſt Ideas from the two Sources.

§. 8. If we trace the progreſs of our Minds, and with attention obſerve how it repeats, adds together, and unites its ſimple *Ideas* receiv'd from Senſation or Reflection, it will lead us farther than at firſt perhaps we ſhould have imagin'd. And I believe we ſhall find, if we warily obſerve the Originals of our Notions, that even *the moſt abſtruſe* Ideas, how remote ſoever they may ſeem from Senſe, or from any Operation of our own Minds, are yet only ſuch as the Underſtanding frames to it ſelf, by repeating and joining together *Ideas*, that it had either from Objects of Senſe, or from its own Operations about them: So that thoſe even large *and abſtract* Ideas, *are derived from Senſation or Reflection*, being no other than what the Mind, by the ordinary uſe of its own Faculties, imploy'd about *Ideas* receiv'd from Objects of Senſe, or from the Operations it obſerves in it ſelf about them, may and does attain unto. This I ſhall endeavour to ſhew in the *Ideas* we have of *Space*, *Time* and *Infinity*, and ſome few others, that ſeem the moſt remote from thoſe Originals.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and firſt of the Simple Modes of Space.

Simple Modes.

§. 1. THO' in the foregoing Part I have often mention'd ſimple *Ideas*, which are truly the Materials of all our Knowledg; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the Mind, than as diſtinguiſh'd from others more compounded, it will not be perhaps amiſs to take a view of ſome of them again under this Conſideration, and examine thoſe different *Modifications of the ſame* Idea; which the Mind either finds in things exiſting, or is able to make within it ſelf, without the help of any extrinſecal Object, or any foreign Suggeſtion.

Thoſe *Modifications of any one ſimple* Idea (which, as has been ſaid, I call *ſimple Modes*) are as perfectly different and diſtinct *Ideas* in the Mind, as thoſe of the greateſt Diſtance or Contrariety. For the *Idea* of *Two* is as diſtinct from that of *One*, as *Blueneſs* from *Heat*, or either of them from any Number: And yet it is made up only of that ſimple *Idea* of an Unit repeated; and Repetitions of this kind join'd together, make thoſe diſtinct *ſimple Modes*, of a *Dozen*, a *Groſs*, a *Million*.

Idea of Space.

§. 2. I ſhall begin with the *ſimple Idea* of *Space*. I have ſhew'd above, *Chap.* 4. that we get the *Idea* of Space, both by our Sight and Touch; which I think, is ſo evident, that it would be as needleſs to go to prove that Men perceive, by their Sight, a Diſtance between Bodies of different Colours, or between the Parts of the ſame Body, as that they ſee Colours themſelves; nor is it leſs obvious, that they can do ſo in the dark by Feeling and Touch.

Space and Extenſion.

§. 3. This Space conſider'd barely in Length between any two Beings, without conſidering any thing elſe between them, is call'd *Diſtance*; if conſider'd in Length, Breadth and Thickneſs, I think it may be call'd *Capacity*. The Term Extenſion is uſually apply'd to it in what manner ſoever conſider'd.

Immenſity.

§. 4. Each different Diſtance is a different Modification of Space; and *each* Idea *of any different Diſtance, or Space, is a ſimple Mode of this* Idea. Men for the Uſe, and by the Cuſtom of Meaſuring, ſettle in their Minds the *Ideas* of certain ſtated Lengths, ſuch as are an *Inch*, *Foot*, *Yard*, *Fathom*, *Mile*, *Diameter of the Earth*, &c. which are ſo many diſtinct *Ideas* made up only of Space. When any ſuch ſtated Lengths or Meaſures of Space are made familiar to Mens Thoughts,

Thoughts, they can in their Minds repeat them as often as they will without mixing or joining to them the *Idea* of Body, or any thing elſe; and frame to themſelves the *Ideas* of Long, Square, or Cubick, *Feet*, *Yards*, or *Fathoms*, here amongſt the Bodies of the Univerſe, or elſe beyond the utmoſt Bounds of all Bodies; and by adding theſe ſtill one to another, enlarge their *Idea* of Space as much as they pleaſe. This Power of repeating, or doubling any *Idea* we have of any diſtance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any ſtop or ſtint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the *Idea* of *Immenſity*.

Figure. §. 5. There is another Modification of this *Idea*, which is nothing but the relation which the Parts of the Termination of Extenſion, or circumſcrib'd Space, have amongſt themſelves. This the Touch diſcovers in ſenſible Bodies, whoſe Extremities come within our reach; and the Eye takes both from Bodies and Colours, whoſe Boundaries are within its view: Where obſerving how the Extremities terminate either in ſtreight Lines, which meet at diſcernible Angles, or in crooked Lines, wherein no Angles can be perceiv'd, by conſidering theſe as they relate to one another, in all Parts of the Extremities of any Body or Space, it has that *Idea* we call *Figure*, which affords to the Mind infinite Variety. For beſides the vaſt number of different Figures, that do really exiſt in the coherent Maſſes of Matter, the Stock that the Mind has in its power, by varying the *Idea* of Space, and thereby making ſtill new Compoſitions, by repeating its own *Ideas*, and joining them as it pleaſes, is perfectly inexhauſtible: And ſo it can multiply Figures *in infinitum*.

Figure. §. 6. For the Mind having a power to repeat the *Idea* of any Length directly ſtretch'd out, and join it to another in the ſame Direction, which is to double the Length of that ſtreight Line, or elſe join it to another with what Inclination it thinks fit, and ſo make what ſort of Angle it pleaſes; and being able alſo to ſhorten any Line it imagines, by taking from it one half, or one fourth, or what part it pleaſes, without being able to come to an end of any ſuch Diviſions, it can make an Angle of any Bigneſs: So alſo the Lines that are its Sides, of what Length it pleaſes; which joining again to other Lines of different Lengths and at different Angles, till it has wholly inclos'd any Space, it is evident, that it can multiply *Figures* both in their Shape and Capacity *in infinitum*; all which are but ſo many different *ſimple Modes of Space*.

The ſame that it can do with ſtreight Lines, it can do alſo with crooked, or crooked and ſtreight together; and the ſame it can do in Lines, it can alſo in Superficies: By which we may be led into farther Thoughts of the endleſs Variety of *Figures*, that the Mind has a Power to make, and thereby to multiply the *ſimple Modes* of Space.

Place. §. 7. Another *Idea* coming under this Head, and belonging to this Tribe, is that we call *Place*. As in ſimple Space, we conſider the relation of Diſtance between any two Bodies, or Points; ſo in our *Idea* of *Place*, we conſider the relation of Diſtance betwixt any Thing, and any two or more Points, which are conſider'd as keeping the ſame diſtance one with another, and ſo conſider'd as at reſt: for when we find any thing at the ſame diſtance now, which it was yeſterday from any two or more Points, which have not ſince chang'd their diſtance one with another, and with which we then compar'd it, we ſay it hath kept the ſame *Place*; but if it hath ſenſibly alter'd its diſtance with either of thoſe Points, we ſay it hath chang'd its place: Tho' vulgarly ſpeaking, in the common Notion of *Place*, we do not always exactly obſerve the diſtance from preciſe Points; but from larger Portions of ſenſible Objects, to which we conſider the thing plac'd to bear relation, and its diſtance from which we have ſome reaſon to obſerve.

§. 8. Thus a Company of Cheſs-men ſtanding on the ſame Squares of the Cheſs-board, where we left them, we ſay they are all in the *ſame Place*, or unmov'd; tho' perhaps the Cheſs-board hath been in the mean time carry'd out of one Room into another, becauſe we compar'd them only to the Parts of the Cheſs-board, which keep the ſame diſtance one with another. The Cheſs-board, we alſo ſay, is in the *ſame Place* it was, if it remain in the ſame part of the Cabin, tho' perhaps the Ship, which it is in, ſails all the while: And the Ship is ſaid to be in the *ſame Place*, ſuppoſing it kept the ſame diſtance with the

the Parts of the neighbouring Land; tho' perhaps the Earth hath turn'd round: And ſo both Cheſs-men, and Board, and Ship, have every one *chang'd Place*, in reſpect of remoter Bodies, which have kept the ſame diſtance one with another. But yet the diſtance from certain Parts of the Board, being that which determines the Place of the Cheſs-men; and the diſtance from the fix'd Parts of the Cabin (with which we made the Compariſon) being that which determined the Place of the Cheſs-board; and the fix'd Parts of the Earth, that by which we determin'd the Place of the Ship; theſe things may be ſaid to be in the *ſame Place* in thoſe reſpects: Tho' their diſtance from ſome other things, which in this Matter we did not conſider, being vary'd, they have undoubtedly *chang'd Place* in that reſpect, and we our ſelves ſhall think ſo, when we have occaſion to compare them with thoſe other.

§. 9. But this Modification of Diſtance, we call *Place*, being made by Men, for their common Uſe, that by it they might be able to deſign the particular Poſition of things, where they had occaſion for ſuch Deſignation; Men conſider and determine of this *Place*, by reference to thoſe adjacent things which beſt ſerv'd to their preſent purpoſe, without conſidering other things, which, to another purpoſe, would better *determine the Place* of the ſame thing. Thus in the Cheſs-board, the Uſe of the *Deſignation* of the *Place* of each Cheſs-man, being determin'd only within that chequer'd piece of Wood, 'twould croſs that purpoſe, to meaſure it by any thing elſe: But when theſe very Cheſs-men are put up in a Bag, if any one ſhould ask where the black King is, it would be proper to *determine the Place* by the Parts of the Room it was *in*, and not by the Cheſs-board; there being another uſe of *deſigning the Place* it is now in, than when in Play it was on the Cheſs-board, and ſo muſt be determin'd by other Bodies. So, if any one ſhould aſk, in what place are the Verſes, which report the Story of *Niſus* and *Eurialus*, 'twould be very improper to determine this Place, by ſaying, they were in ſuch a part of the Earth, or in *Bodley*'s Library: But the right Deſignation of the Place would be by the Parts of *Virgil*'s Works; and the proper Anſwer would be, That theſe Verſes were about the middle of the ninth Book of his *Æneids*; and that they have been always conſtantly in the ſame place ever ſince *Virgil* was printed: Which is true, tho' the Book it ſelf hath mov'd a thouſand times; the uſe of the *Idea* of Place here, being to know only in what part of the Book that Story is, that ſo upon occaſion we may know where to find it, and have recourſe to it for our uſe.

§. 10. That our *Idea* of Place is nothing elſe but ſuch a relative Poſition of any Thing, as I have before mention'd, I think is plain, and will be eaſily admitted, when we conſider that we can have no *Idea* of the Place of the Univerſe, tho' we can of all the Parts of it; becauſe beyond that we have not the *Idea* of any fix'd, diſtinct, particular Beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any Relation of Diſtance; but all beyond it is one uniform Space or Expanſion, wherein the Mind finds no Variety, no Marks. For to ſay, that the World is ſomewhere, means no more than that it does exiſt: This, tho' a Phraſe borrow'd from Place, ſignifying only its Exiſtence, not Location; and when one can find out, and frame in his Mind clearly and diſtinctly the Place of the Univerſe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or ſtands ſtill in the undiſtinguiſhible *Inane* of infinite Space: tho' it be true, that the Word Place has ſometimes a more confus'd Senſe, and ſtands for that Space which any body takes up; and ſo the Univerſe is in a Place. The *Idea* therefore of *Place* we have by the ſame means that we get the *Idea* of Space, (whereof this is but a particular limited Conſideration) *viz.* by our Sight and Touch; by either of which we receive into our Minds the *Ideas* of Extenſion or Diſtance. *Place.*

§. 11. There are ſome that would perſuade us, that *Body and Extenſion are the ſame thing*; who either change the Signification of Words, which I would not ſuſpect them of, they having ſo ſeverely condemn'd the Philoſophy of others, becauſe it hath been too much plac'd in the uncertain Meaning, or deceitful Obſcurity of doubtful or inſignificant Terms. If therefore they mean by *Body and Extenſion the ſame* that other People do, *viz.* by *Body*, ſomething that is ſolid and extended, whoſe Parts are ſeparable and movible different ways; and by Extenſion only the Space that lies between the Extremities of thoſe ſolid coherent Parts, and which is poſſeſs'd by them: They confound very *Extenſion and Body, not the ſame.*

different *Ideas* one with another. For I appeal to every Man's own Thoughts, whether the *Idea* of Space be not as diſtinct from that of Solidity, as it is from the *Idea* of Scarlet-Colour? 'Tis true, Solidity cannot exiſt without Extenſion, neither can Scarlet-Colour exiſt without Extenſion; but this hinders not, but that they are diſtinct *Ideas*. Many *Ideas* require others as neceſſary to their Exiſtence or Conception, which yet are very diſtinct *Ideas*. Motion can neither be, nor be conceiv'd without Space; and yet Motion is not Space, nor Space Motion: Space can exiſt without it, and they are very diſtinct *Ideas*; and ſo, I think, are thoſe of Space and Solidity. Solidity is ſo inſeparable an *Idea* from Body, that upon that depends its filling of Space, its Contact, Impulſe, and Communication of Motion upon Impulſe. And if it be a Reaſon to prove, that Spirit is different from Body, becauſe Thinking includes not the *Idea* of Extenſion in it; the ſame Reaſon will be as valid, I ſuppoſe, to prove, that *Space is not Body*, becauſe it includes not the *Idea* of Solidity in it: *Space* and *Solidity* being as *diſtinct Ideas*, as Thinking and Extenſion, and as wholly ſeparable in the Mind one from another. *Body* then and *Extenſion*, 'tis evident, are two diſtinct *Ideas*. For,

§. 12. *Firſt*, *Extenſion* includes no Solidity, nor Reſiſtance to the Motion of *Body*, as Body does.

§. 13. *Secondly*, The Parts of pure Space are inſeparable one from the other; ſo the Continuity cannot be ſeparated, neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continu'd even ſo much as in Thought. To divide and ſeparate actually, is, as I think, by removing the Parts one from another, to make two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity: And to divide mentally, is to make in the Mind two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity, and conſider them as remov'd one from the other; which can only be done in things conſider'd by the Mind, as capable of being ſeparated; and by Separation, of acquiring new diſtinct Superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of: But neither of theſe ways of Separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure *Space*.

'Tis true, a Man may conſider ſo much of ſuch a *Space*, as is anſwerable or commenſurate to a Foot, without conſidering the reſt; which is indeed a partial Conſideration, but not ſo much as mental Separation, or Diviſion: Since a Man can no more mentally divide, without conſidering two Superficies ſeparate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two Superficies disjoin'd one from the other: But a partial Conſideration is not Separating. A Man may conſider Light in the Sun, without its Heat; or Mobility in Body without its Extenſion, without thinking of their Separation. One is only a partial Conſideration, terminating in one alone; and the other is a Conſideration of both, as exiſting ſeparately.

§. 14. *Thirdly*, The Parts of pure *Space* are immovible, which follows from their Inſeparability; *Motion* being nothing but change of diſtance between any two Things: But this cannot be between Parts that are inſeparable; which therefore muſt needs be at perpetual reſt one amongſt another.

Thus the determin'd *Idea* of ſimple *Space* diſtinguiſhes it plainly and ſufficiently from *Body*; ſince its Parts are inſeparable, immovible, and without Reſiſtance to the Motion of Body.

The Definition of Extenſion, explains it not

§. 15. If any one ask me, *What* this *Space*, I ſpeak of, *is?* I will tell him, when he tells me what his *Extenſion* is. For to ſay, as is uſually done, that Extenſion is to have *partes extra partes*, is to ſay only, that *Extenſion is Extenſion*: For what am I the better inform'd in the Nature of *Extenſion*, when I am told, that *Extenſion is to have Parts that are extended, exterior to Parts that are extended*, i. e. *Extenſion* conſiſts of extended Parts; as if one asking, what a Fibre was? I ſhould anſwer him, that it was a thing made up of ſeveral Fibres: Would he thereby be enabled to underſtand what a Fibre was better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have reaſon to think, that my Deſign was to make ſport with him, rather than ſeriouſly to inſtruct him?

Diviſion of Beings into Bodies and Spirits, proves not Space and Body the ſame.

§. 16. Thoſe who contend that *Space and Body are the ſame*, bring this *Dilemma*: Either this *Space* is ſomething or nothing; if nothing be between two Bodies, they muſt neceſſarily touch; If it be allow'd to be ſomething, they ask, whether

whether it be Body or Spirit? To which I anſwer, by another Queſtion, Who told them, that there was, or could be nothing but ſolid Beings, which could not think, and thinking Beings that were not extended? Which is all they mean by the terms *Body* and *Spirit*.

Subſtance which we know not, no proof againſt Space without Body.

§. 17. If it be demanded (as uſually it is) whether this *Space*, void of *Body*, be *Subſtance* or *Accident*; I ſhall readily anſwer, I know not; nor ſhall be aſham'd to own my Ignorance, till they that ask, ſhew me a clear diſtinct *Idea* of *Subſtance*.

§. 18. I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver my ſelf from thoſe Fallacies which we are apt to put upon our ſelves, by taking Words for Things. It helps not our Ignorance, to feign a Knowledg where we have none, by making a noiſe with Sounds, without clear and diſtinct Significations. Names made at pleaſure neither alter the nature of things, nor make us underſtand them, but as they are ſigns of, and ſtand for determin'd *Ideas*. And I deſire thoſe who lay ſo much ſtreſs on the Sound of theſe two Syllables, *Subſtance*, to conſider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehenſible GOD, to finite Spirit, and to Body, it be in the ſame ſenſe; and whether it ſtands for the ſame *Idea*, when each of thoſe three ſo different Beings are call'd *Subſtances*. If ſo, whether it will not thence follow, That God, Spirits, and Body, agreeing in the ſame common nature of *Subſtance*, differ not any otherwiſe, than in a bare different Modification of that *Subſtance*; as a Tree and a Peeble being in the ſame ſenſe Body, and agreeing in the common Nature of Body, differ only in a bare Modification of that common Matter: which will be a very harſh Doctrine. If they ſay, That they apply it to God, finite Spirits, and Matter, in three different Significations; and that it ſtands for one *Idea*, when GOD is ſaid to be a *Subſtance*; for another, when the Soul is call'd *Subſtance*; and for a third, when a Body is call'd ſo: If the name *Subſtance* ſtands for three ſeveral diſtinct *Ideas*, they would do well to make known thoſe diſtinct *Ideas*, or at leaſt to give three diſtinct names to them, to prevent in ſo important a Notion the Confuſion and Errors, that will naturally follow from the promiſcuous Uſe of ſo doubtful a Term; which is ſo far from being ſuſpected to have three diſtinct, that in ordinary uſe it has ſcarce one clear diſtinct Signification: And if they can thus make three diſtinct *Ideas* of *Subſtance*, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

Subſtance and Accidents, of little uſe in Philoſophy.

§. 19. They who firſt ran into the Notion of *Accidents*, as a ſort of real Beings that needed ſomething to inhere in, were forc'd to find out the word *Subſtance* to ſupport them. Had the poor *Indian* Philoſopher (who imagin'd that the Earth alſo wanted ſomething to bear it up) but thought of this word *Subſtance*, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an Elephant to ſupport it, and a Tortoiſe to ſupport his Elephant: the word *Subſtance* would have done it effectually. And he that enquir'd might have taken it for as good an Anſwer from an *Indian* Philoſopher, That *Subſtance*, without knowing what it is, is that which ſupports the Earth; as we take it for a ſufficient Anſwer, and good Doctrine, from our *European* Philoſophers, That *Subſtance*, without knowing what it is, is that which ſupports *Accidents*. So that of *Subſtance* we have no *Idea* of what it is, but only a confus'd obſcure one of what it does.

§. 20. Whatever a learned Man may do here, an intelligent *American*, who enquir'd into the nature of Things, would ſcarce take it for a ſatisfactory Account, if deſiring to learn our Architecture, he ſhould be told, That a Pillar was a thing ſupported by a *Baſis*, and a *Baſis* ſomething that ſupported a Pillar. Would not he think himſelf mock'd, inſtead of taught, with ſuch an account as this? And a ſtrainger to them would be very liberally inſtructed in the nature of Books, and the things they contain'd, if he ſhould be told, that all learned Books conſiſted of Paper and Letter, and that Letters were things inhering in Paper, and Paper a thing that held forth Letters: A notable way of having clear *Ideas* of Letters and Paper! But where the *Latin* words *Inhærentia* and and *Subſtantia* put into the plain *Engliſh* ones that anſwer them, and were call'd *Sticking on* and *Under-propping*, they would better diſcover to us the very great Clearneſs there is in the Doctrine of *Subſtance* and *Accidents*, and ſhew of what uſe they are in deciding of Queſtions in Philoſophy.

A Vacuum beyond the utmoſt Bounds of Body.

§. 21. But to return to our *Idea* of *Space*. If *Body* be not ſuppos'd infinite, which I think no one will affirm, I would ask, Whether if GOD plac'd a Man at

at the extremity of corporeal Beings, he could not ſtretch his Hand beyond his Body? If he could, then he would put his Arm where there was before *Space* without *Body*; and if there he ſpread his Fingers, there would ſtill be *Space* between them without *Body*. If he could not ſtretch out his Hand, it muſt be becauſe of ſome external hindrance; (for we ſuppoſe him alive, with ſuch a power of moving the Parts of his Body that he hath now, which is not in itſelf impoſſible, if GOD ſo pleas'd to have it; or at leaſt it is not impoſſible for God ſo to move him:) And then I ask, Whether that which hinders his Hand from moving outwards, be Subſtance or Accident, ſomething or Nothing? And when they have reſolv'd that, they will be able to reſolve themſelves what that is, which is or may be between two Bodies at a diſtance, that is not Body, and has no Solidity. In the mean time, the Argument is at leaſt as good, That where nothing hinders (as beyond the utmoſt Bounds of all Bodies) a *Body* put into motion may move on; as where there is nothing between, there two Bodies muſt neceſſarily touch: For pure *Space* between, is ſufficient to take away the neceſſity of mutual Contact; but bare *Space* in the way, is not ſufficient to ſtop Motion. The truth is, theſe Men muſt either own that they think Body infinite, tho' they are loth to ſpeak it out, or elſe affirm that *Space* is not *Body*. For I would fain meet with that thinking Man, that can in his Thoughts ſet any bounds to Space, more than he can to Duration; or by thinking hope to arrive at the end of either: And therefore, if his *Idea* of Eternity be infinite, ſo is his *Idea* of Immenſity; they are both finite or infinite alike.

The Power of Annihilation proves a Vacuum.

§ 22. Farther, thoſe who aſſert the Impoſſibility of *Space* exiſting without *Matter*, muſt not only make Body infinite, but muſt alſo deny a power in God to annihilate any part of Matter. No one, I ſuppoſe, will deny that God can put an end to all Motion that is in Matter, and fix all the Bodies of the Univerſe in a perfect Quiet and Reſt, and continue them ſo as long as he pleaſes. Whoever then will allow, that God can, during ſuch a general Reſt, annihilate either this Book, or the Body of him that reads it, muſt neceſſarily admit the Poſſibility of a *Vacuum*: For it is evident that the Space that was fill'd by the Parts of the annihilated Body, will ſtill remain, and be a Space without Body. For the circumambient Bodies being in perfect Reſt, are a Wall of Adamant, and in that ſtate make it a perfect Impoſſibility for any other Body to get into that Space. And indeed the neceſſary Motion of one Particle of matter into the place from whence another Particle of Matter is removed, is but a conſequence from the Suppoſition of Plenitude; which will therefore need ſome better Proof than a ſuppos'd Matter of Fact, which Experiment can never make out: our own clear and diſtinct *Ideas* plainly ſatisfying us, that there is no neceſſary Connection between *Space* and *Solidity*, ſince we can conceive the one without the other. And thoſe who diſpute for or againſt a *Vacuum*, do thereby confeſs they have diſtinct *Ideas* of *Vacuum* and *Plenum*, *i. e.* that they have an *Idea* of Extenſion void of Solidity, tho' they deny its Exiſtence; or elſe they diſpute about nothing at all. For they who ſo much alter the Signification of words, as to call *Extenſion Body*, and conſequently make the whole Eſſence of Body to be nothing but pure Extenſion without Solidity, muſt talk abſurdly whenever they ſpeak of *Vacuum*, ſince it is impoſſible for Extenſion to be without Extenſion. For *Vacuum*, whether we affirm or deny its Exiſtence, ſignifies Space without Body, whoſe very Exiſtence no one can deny to be poſſible, who will not make Matter infinite, and take from God a power to annihilate any Particle of it.

Motion proves a Vacuum.

§. 23. But not to go ſo far as beyond the utmoſt bounds of Body in the Univerſe, nor appeal to God's Omnipotency, to find a *Vacuum*, the *Motion* of Bodies that are in our view and neighbourhood ſeem to me plainly to evince it. For I deſire any one ſo to divide a ſolid Body, of any dimenſion he pleaſes, as to make it poſſible for the ſolid Parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that Superficies, if there be not left in it a void Space, as big as the leaſt part into which he has divided the ſaid ſolid Body. And if where the leaſt Particle of the Body divided is as big as a Muſtard-Seed, a void Space equal to the bulk of a Muſtard-Seed be requiſite to make room for the free Motion of the parts of the divided Body within the Bounds of its Superficies, where the Particles of Matter are 100,000,000 leſs than a Muſtard-Seed, there

there must also be a Space void of solid Matter, as big as 100,000,000 part of a Mustard-Seed; for if it hold in one, it will hold in the other, and so on *in infinitum*. And let this void Space be as little as it will, it destroys the Hypothesis of *Plenitude*. For if there can be a Space void of Body, equal to the smallest separate Particle of Matter now existing in nature, 'tis still Space without Body; and makes as great a difference between Space and Body as if it were Μέγα χάσμα, a Distance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we suppose not the void Space necessary to Motion, equal to the least parcel of the divided solid Matter, but to $\frac{1}{10}$ or $\frac{1}{1000}$ of it; the same Consequence will always follow, of Space without Matter.

The Ideas of Space & Body distinct.

§. 24. But the question being here, Whether the *Idea of Space* or *Extension* be *the same with the Idea of Body*, it is not necessary to prove the real Existence of a *Vacuum*, but the *Idea* of it; which 'tis plain Men have, when they enquire and dispute, whether there be a *Vacuum* or no. For if they had not the *Idea* of Space without Body, they could not make a question about its Existence: And if their *Idea* of Body did not include in it something more than the bare *Idea* of Space, they could have no doubt about the Plenitude of the World; and 'twould be as absurd to demand, whether there were Space without Body, as whether there were Space without Space, or Body without Body, since these were but different Names of the same *Idea*.

Extension being inseparable from Body proves it not the same.

§. 25. 'Tis true, the *Idea* of *Extension* joins it self so inseparably with all visible and most tangible Qualities, that it suffers us to see no one, or feel very few external Objects, without taking in Impressions of Extension too. This Readiness of Extension to make it self be taken notice of so constantly with other *Ideas*, has been the occasion, I guess, that some have made the whole Essence of *Body* to consist in Extension; which is not much to be wonder'd at, since some have had their Minds, by their Eyes and Touch, (the busiest of all our Senses) so fill'd with the *Idea* of Extension, and as it were wholly possess'd with it, that they allow'd no Existence to any thing that had not Extention. I shall not now argue with those Men, who take the measure and possibility of all Being, only from their narrow and gross Imaginations: But having here to do only with those who conclude the Essence of Body to be *Extension*, because they say they cannot imagine any sensible Quality of any Body without Extension; I shall desire them to consider, That had they reflected on their *Ideas* of Tastes and Smells, as much as on those of Sight and Touch; nay, had they examin'd their *Ideas* of Hunger and Thirst, and several other Pains, they would have found, that they included in them no *Idea* of Extension at all; which is but an Affection of Body, as well as the rest, discoverable by our Senses, which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure Essences of things.

§. 26. If those *Ideas*, which are constantly join'd to all others, must therefore be concluded to be the Essence of those things, which have constantly those *Ideas* join'd to them, and are inseparable from them; then Unity is without doubt the Essence of every thing. For there is not any Object of Sensation or Reflection, which does not carry with it the *Idea* of one: But the Weakness of this kind of Argument we have already shewn sufficiently.

Ideas of Space and Solidity distinct.

§. 27. To conclude, Whatever Men shall think concerning the Existence of a *Vacuum*, this is plain to me, That we have as clear an *Idea of Space distinct from Solidity*, as we have of Solidity distinct from Motion, or Motion from Space. We have not any two more distinct *Ideas*, and we can as easily conceive Space without Solidity, as we can conceive Body or Space without Motion; tho' it be ever so certain, that neither Body nor Motion can exist without Space. But whether any one will take Space to be only a Relation resulting from the Existence of other Beings at a distance, or whether they will think the words of the most knowing King *Solomon*, *The Heaven, and the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain thee*; or those more emphatical ones of the inspir'd Philosopher St. *Paul*, *In him we live, move, and have our Being*; are to be understood in a literal sense, I leave every one to consider: only our *Idea* of *Space* is, I think, such as I have mention'd, and distinct from that of *Body*. For whether we consider in Matter it self the distance of its coherent solid Parts, and call it, in respect of those solid Parts, *Extension*; or whether, considering it as lying between the Extremities of any Body in its several Dimensions, we call it *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thickness*;

Thickneſs; or elſe conſidering it as lying between any two Bodies, or poſitive Beings, without any conſideration whether there be any Matter or no between, we call it *Diſtance:* However named or conſidered, it is always the ſame uniform ſimple *Idea* of *Space*, taken from Objects about which our Senſes have been converſant; whereof having ſettled *Ideas* in our Minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another as often as we will, and conſider the Space or Diſtance ſo imagin'd, either as fill'd with ſolid Parts, ſo that another Body cannot come there, without diſplacing and thruſting out the Body that was there before; or elſe as void of Solidity, ſo that a Body of equal dimenſions to that empty or pure Space may be placed in it, without the removing or expulſion of any thing that was there. But to avoid Confuſion in Diſcourſes concerning this matter, it were poſſibly to be wiſhed that the name *Extenſion* were apply'd only to Matter, or the Diſtance of the Extremities of particular Bodies; and the term *Expanſion* to Space in general, with or without ſolid Matter poſſeſſing it, ſo as to ſay *Space* is *expanded*, and *Body extended*. But in this, every one has his liberty; I propoſe it only for the more clear and diſtinct way of ſpeaking.

Men differ little in clear ſimple Ideas.

§. 28. The knowing precisely what our Words ſtand for, would, I imagine, in this as well as a great many other caſes, quickly end the diſpute. For I am apt to think that Men, when they come to examine them, find their ſimple *Ideas* all generally to agree, tho' in diſcourſe with one another, they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that *Men* who abſtract their Thoughts, and do well examine the *Ideas* of their own Minds, *cannot much differ in thinking*; however, they may perplex themſelves with words, according to the way of ſpeaking of the ſeveral Schools or Sects they have been bred up in: tho' amongſt unthinking Men, who examine not ſcrupulouſly and carefully their own *Ideas*, and ſtrip them not from the marks Men uſe for them, but confound them with Words, there muſt be endleſs Diſpute, Wrangling, and Jargon; eſpecially if they be learned bookiſh Men, devoted to ſome Sect, and accuſtom'd to the Language of it, and have learn'd to talk after others. But if it ſhould happen, that any two thinking Men, ſhould really have different *Ideas*, I do not ſee how they could diſcourſe or argue one with another. Here I muſt not be miſtaken, to think that every floating Imagination in Mens brains, is preſently of that ſort of *Ideas* I ſpeak of. 'Tis not eaſy for the Mind to put off thoſe confus'd Notions and Prejudices it has imbib'd from Cuſtom, Inadvertency, and common Converſation: It requires Pains and Aſſiduity to examine its *Ideas*, till it reſolves them into thoſe clear and diſtinct ſimple ones out of which they are compounded; and to ſee which, amongſt its ſimple ones, have or have not a neceſſary Connexion and dependance one upon another. Till a Man doth this in the primary and original Notions of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain Principles, and will often find himſelf at a loſs.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration, and its Simple Modes.

Duration is fleeting Extenſion.

§. 1. THERE is another ſort of Diſtance or Length, the *Idea* whereof we get not from the permanent Parts of Space, but from the fleeting and perpetually periſhing Parts of Succeſſion. This we call *Duration*, the ſimple Modes whereof are any different Lengths of it, whereof we have diſtinct *Ideas*, as *Hours*, *Days*, *Years*, &c. *Time* and *Eternity*.

its Idea *from Reflection on the Train of our* Ideas.

§. 2. The Anſwer of a Great Man, to one who ask'd what Time was, *Si non rogas intelligo*, (which amounts to this; the more I ſet my ſelf to think of it, the leſs I underſtand it) might perhaps perſuade one, That *Time*, which reveals all other things, is it ſelf not to be diſcovered. *Duration*, *Time*, and *Eternity*, are not without Reaſon thought to have ſomething very abſtruſe in their nature. But however remote theſe may ſeem from our Comprehenſion, yet if we trace them right to their Originals, I doubt not but one of thoſe Sources of all our Knowledg, *viz. Senſation* and *Reflection*, will be able to furniſh us with theſe *Ideas*, as clear and diſtinct as many other which are thought much leſs obſcure; and

and we ſhall find, that the *Idea* of Eternity it ſelf is deriv'd from the ſame common Original with the reſt of our *Ideas*.

§. 3. To underſtand Time and Eternity aright, we ought with Attention to conſider what *Idea* it is we have of *Duration*, and how we came by it. 'Tis evident to any one, who will but obſerve what paſſes in his own Mind, that there is a Train of *Ideas*, which conſtantly ſucceed one another in his Underſtanding, as long as he is awake. *Reflection* on theſe Appearances of ſeveral *Ideas*, one after another, in our Minds, is that which furniſhes us with the *Idea* of *Succeſſion*: and the Diſtance between any Parts of that Succeſſion, or between the Appearance of any two *Ideas* in our Minds, is that we call *Duration*. For whilſt we are thinking, or whilſt we receive ſucceſſively ſeveral *Ideas* in our Minds, we know that we do exiſt; and ſo we call the Exiſtence, or the Continuation of the Exiſtence of our ſelves, or any thing elſe commenſurate to the Succeſſion of any *Ideas* in our Minds, the *Duration* of our ſelves, or any ſuch other Thing co-exiſting with our Thinking.

§. 4. That we have our Notion of *Succeſſion* and *Duration* from this Original, *viz.* from Reflection on the Train of *Ideas* which we find to appear one after another in our own Minds, ſeems plain to me, in that we have no Perception of *Duration*, but by conſidering the Train of *Ideas* that take their Turns in our Underſtandings. When that Succeſſion of *Ideas* ceaſes, our Perception of Duration ceaſes with it; which every one clearly experiments in himſelf, whilſt he ſleeps ſoundly, whether an Hour or a Day, a Month or a Year; of which Duration of things, whilſt he ſleeps or thinks not, he has no Perception at all, but it is quite loſt to him; and the Moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the Moment he begins to think again, ſeems to him to have no Diſtance. And ſo I doubt not it would be to a waking Man, if it were poſſible for him to keep only one *Idea* in his Mind, without Variation and the Succeſſion of others: And we ſee, that one who fixes his Thoughts very intently on one thing, ſo as to take but little notice of the Succeſſion of *Ideas* that paſs in his Mind, whilſt he is taken up with that earneſt Contemplation, lets ſlip out of his account a good Part of that Duration, and thinks that Time ſhorter than it is. But if Sleep commonly unites the diſtant Parts of Duration, it is becauſe during that Time we have no Succeſſion of *Ideas* in our Minds. For if a Man, during his Sleep, dreams, and Variety of *Ideas* make themſelves perceptible in his Mind one after another; he hath then, during ſuch a dreaming, a Senſe of *Duration*, and of the Length of it; by which it is to me very clear, that Men derive their *Ideas* of Duration from their *Reflection on the Train of the* Ideas they obſerve to ſucceed one another in their own Underſtandings; without which Obſervation they can have no Notion of *Duration*, whatever may happen in the World.

The Idea *of Duration applicable to Things whilſt we ſleep.*

§. 5. Indeed a Man having, from reflecting on the Succeſſion and Number of his own Thoughts, got the Notion or *Idea* of *Duration*, he can apply that Notion to Things which exiſt while he does not think; as he that has got the *Idea* of Extenſion from Bodies by his Sight or Touch, can apply it to Diſtances, where no Body is ſeen or felt. And therefore tho' a Man has no Perception of the Length of Duration, which paſs'd whilſt he ſlept or thought not; yet having obſerv'd the Revolution of Days and Nights, and found the Length of their Duration to be in Appearance regular and conſtant, he can, upon the Suppoſition that that Revolution has proceeded after the ſame Manner, whilſt he was aſleep or thought not, as it uſed to do at other Times; he can, I ſay, imagine and make Allowance for the Length of *Duration*, whilſt he ſlept. But if *Adam* and *Eve* (when they were alone in the World) inſtead of their ordinary Night's Sleep, had paſs'd the whole twenty four Hours in one continu'd Sleep, the Duration of that twenty four Hours had been irrecoverably loſt to them, and been for ever left out of their Account of Time.

The Idea *of Succeſſion not from Motion.*

§. 6. Thus *by reflecting on the appearing of various* Ideas *one after another in our Underſtandings, we get the Notion of Succeſſion*; which if any one ſhould think we did rather get from our Obſervation of Motion by our Senſes, he will perhaps be of my Mind, when he conſiders that even Motion produces in his Mind an *Idea* of Succeſſion, no otherwiſe than as it produces there a continu'd Train of diſtinguiſhible Ideas. For a Man, looking upon a Body really moving, perceives yet no Motion at all, unleſs that Motion produces a conſtant Train of *ſucceſſive* Ideas:

Ideas: *v. g.* a Man becalm'd at Sea, out of ſight of Land, in a fair day, may look on the Sun, or Sea, or Ship, a whole Hour together, and perceive no Motion at all in either; tho' it be certain, that two, and perhaps all of them, have mov'd during that time a great way. But as ſoon as he perceives either of them to have chang'd Diſtance with ſome other Body, as ſoon as this Motion produces any new *Idea* in him, then he perceives that there has been Motion. But wherever a Man is with all things at reſt about him, without perceiving any Motion at all; if during this Hour of Quiet he has been thinking, he will perceive the various *Ideas* of his own Thoughts in his own Mind, appearing one after another, and thereby obſerve and find Succeſſion where he could obſerve no Motion.

§. 7. And this, I think, is the Reaſon, *why Motions very ſlow*, tho' they are conſtant, *are not perceiv'd* by us; becauſe in their remove from one ſenſible part towards another, their change of Diſtance is ſo ſlow, that it cauſes no new *Ideas* in us, but a good while one after another: and ſo not cauſing a conſtant Train of new *Ideas* to follow one another immediately in our Minds, we have no Perception of Motion; which conſiſting in a conſtant Succeſſion, we cannot perceive that Succeſſion without a conſtant Succeſſion of varying *Ideas* ariſing from it.

§. 8. On the contrary, *things that move* ſo ſwift as not to affect the Senſes diſtinctly with ſeveral diſtinguiſhable Diſtances of their Motion, and ſo cauſe not any Train of *Ideas* in the Mind, *are not* alſo *perceiv'd* to move: For any thing that moves round about in a Circle, in leſs time than our *Ideas* are wont to ſucceed one another in our Minds, is not perceiv'd to move; but ſeems to be a perfect entire Circle of that Matter or Colour, and not a part of a Circle in Motion.

The Train of Ideas has a certain degree of Quickneſs.

§. 9. Hence I leave it to others to judg, whether it be not probable that our *Ideas* do, whilſt we are awake, ſucceed one another in our Minds at certain Diſtances, not much unlike the Images in the inſide of a Lanthorn, turn'd round by the Heat of a Candle. This Appearance of theirs in Train, tho' perhaps it may be ſometimes faſter, and ſometimes ſlower, yet, I gueſs, varies not very much in a waking Man. There ſeem to be *certain Bounds to the Quickneſs and Slowneſs of the Succeſſion of* thoſe *Ideas* one to another in our Minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor haſten.

§. 10. The reaſon I have for this odd Conjecture, is, from obſerving that in the Impreſſions made upon any of our Senſes, we can but to a certain degree perceive any Succeſſion; which if exceeding quick, the Senſe of Succeſſion is loſt, even in Caſes where it is evident that there is a real Succeſſion. Let a Cannon-Bullet paſs thro' a Room, and in its way take with it any Limb, or fleſhy Parts of a Man; 'tis as clear as any Demonſtration can be, that it muſt ſtrike ſucceſſively the two ſides of the Room: 'Tis alſo evident, that it muſt touch one part of the Fleſh firſt; and another after, and ſo in Succeſſion: And yet I believe no body, who ever felt the Pain of ſuch a Shot, or heard the Blow againſt the two diſtant Walls, could perceive any Succeſſion either in the Pain or Sound of ſo ſwift a Stroke. Such a part of Duration as this, wherein we perceive no ſucceſſion, is that which we may call an *inſtant*, and is *that which takes up the time of only one Idea* in our Minds, without the Succeſſion of another, wherein therefore we perceive no Succeſſion at all.

§. 11. This alſo happens, *where the Motion is* ſo *ſlow*, as not to ſupply a conſtant Train of freſh *Ideas* to the Senſes, as faſt as the Mind is capable of receiving new ones into it; and ſo other *Ideas* of our own Thoughts, having room to come into our Minds, between thoſe offer'd to our ſenſes by the moving Body, *there the Senſe of Motion is loſt*; and the Body, tho' it really moves, yet not changing perceivable Diſtance with ſome other Bodies, as faſt as the *Ideas* of our own Minds do naturally follow one another in Train, the thing ſeems to ſtand ſtill, as is evident in the Hands of Clocks and Shadows of Sun-dials, and other conſtant but ſlow Motions; where, tho' after certain Intervals, we perceive by the Change of Diſtance that it hath mov'd, yet the Motion it ſelf we perceive not.

This Train the Meaſure of other Succeſſions.

§. 12. So that to me it ſeems, that *the conſtant and regular Succeſſion of Ideas* in a waking Man, *is*, as it were, *the Meaſure* and Standard *of all other Succeſſions*, whereof

whereof if any one either exceeds the pace of our *Ideas*, as where two Sounds or Pains, *&c.* take up in their Succeſſion the Duration of but one *Idea*, or elſe where any Motion or Succeſſion is ſo ſlow, as that it keeps not pace with the *Ideas* in our Minds, or the Quickneſs in which they take their turns; as when any one or more *Ideas*, in their ordinary Courſe, come into our Mind, between thoſe which are offer'd to the Sight by the different perceptible Diſtances of a Body in Motion, or between Sounds or Smells following one another, there alſo the Senſe of a conſtant continu'd Succeſſion is loſt, and we perceive it not but with certain Gaps of Reſt between.

The Mind cannot fix long on one invariable Idea.

§. 13. If it be ſo that the *Ideas* of our Minds, whilſt we have any there, do conſtantly change and ſhift in a continual Succeſſion, it would be impoſſible, may any one ſay, for a Man to think long of any one thing. By which, if it be meant, that a Man may *have one ſelf-ſame ſingle* Idea *a long time alone in his Mind, without any Variation at all*, I think, in matter of Fact, it is *not poſſible*; for which (not knowing how the *Ideas* of our Minds are fram'd, of what Materials they are made, whence they have their Light, and how they come to make their Appearances) I can give no other reaſon but Experience: And I would have any one try whether he can keep one unvary'd ſingle *Idea* in his Mind, without any other, for any conſiderable time together.

§. 14. For trial, let him take any Figure, any degree of Light or Whiteneſs, or what other he pleaſes; and he will, I ſuppoſe, find it difficult to keep all other *Ideas* out of his Mind: But that ſome, either of another kind, or various Conſideration of that *Idea* (each of which Conſiderations is a new *Idea*) will conſtantly ſucceed one another in his Thoughts, let him be as wary as he can.

§. 15. All that is in a Man's Power in this Caſe, I think is only to mind and obſerve what the *Ideas* are, that take their turns *in* his Underſtanding; or elſe to direct the ſort, and call in ſuch as he hath a deſire or uſe of: But hinder the *conſtant Succeſſion* of freſh ones, I think he cannot, tho' he may commonly chuſe whether he will heedfully obſerve and conſider them.

Ideas, *however made include no Senſe of Motion.*

§. 16. Whether theſe ſeveral *Ideas* in a man's Mind be made by certain Motions, I will not here diſpute; but this I am ſure, that they include no *Idea* of Motion, in their Appearance; and if a Man had not the *Idea* of Motion otherwiſe, I think he would have none at all: which is enough to my preſent purpoſe, and ſufficiently ſhews, that the notice we take of the *Ideas* of our own Minds, appearing there one after another, is that which gives us the *Idea* of Succeſſion and Duration, without which we ſhould have no ſuch *Ideas* at all. 'Tis *not* then *Motion*, but the conſtant Train of *Ideas* in our Minds, whilſt we are waking, *that furniſhes us with the* Idea *of Duration*, whereof Motion no otherwiſe gives us any Perception, than as it cauſes in our Minds a conſtant Succeſſion of *Ideas*, as I have before ſhew'd: And we have as clear an *Idea* of Succeſſion and Duration, by the train of other *Ideas* ſucceeding one another in our Minds, without the *Idea* of any Motion, as by the train of *Ideas* caus'd by the uninterrupted ſenſible Change of Diſtance between two Bodies, which we have from Motion; and therefore we ſhould as well have the *Idea* of Duration, were there no Senſe of Motion at all.

Time is Duration ſet out by Meaſures.

§. 17. Having thus got the *Idea* of Duration, the next thing natural for the Mind to do, is to get ſome *Meaſure of* this common *Duration*, whereby it might judg of its different Lengths, and conſider the diſtinct Order wherein ſeveral things exiſt, without which a great part of our Knowledg would be confus'd, and a great part of Hiſtory be render'd very uſeleſs. This Conſideration of Duration, as ſet out by certain Periods, and mark'd by certain Meaſures or *Epochs*, is that, I think, which moſt properly we call *Time*.

A good Meaſure of Time muſt divide its whole Duration into equal Periods.

§. 18. In the meaſuring of Extenſion, there is nothing more requir'd but the Application of the Standard or Meaſure we make uſe of to the thing, of whoſe Extenſion we would be inform'd. But in the meaſuring of Duration, this cannot be done, becauſe no two different parts of Succeſſion can be put together to meaſure one another: And nothing being a *Meaſure of Duration* but Duration, as nothing is of Extenſion but Extenſion, we cannot keep by us any ſtanding unvarying Meaſure of Duration, which conſiſts in a conſtant fleeting Succeſſion, as we can of certain Lengths of Extenſion, as Inches, Feet, Yards,

&c. mark'd out in permanent parcels of Matter. Nothing then could ſerv well for a convenient meaſure of Time, but what has divided the whole Length of its Duration into apparently equal Portions, by conſtantly repeated Periods. What Portions of Duration are not diſtinguiſh'd, or conſider'd as diſtinguiſh'd and meaſur'd by ſuch Periods, come not ſo properly under the Notion of Time, as appears by ſuch Phraſes as theſe, *viz. Before all Time, and when Time ſhall be no more.*

The Revolutions of the Sun and Moon the propereſt Meaſures of Time.

§. 19. The diurnal and annual *Revolutions of the Sun*, as having been, from the beginning of Nature, conſtant, regular, and univerſally obſervable by all Mankind, and ſuppos'd equal to one another, have been with reaſon *made uſe of for the Meaſure of Duration.* But the diſtinction of Days and Years having depended on the Motion of the Sun, it has brought this Miſtake with it, that it has been thought that Motion and Duration were the Meaſure one of another: For Men, in the *meaſuring of the Length of Time*, having been accuſtom'd to the *Ideas* of Minutes, Hours, Days, Months, Years, *&c.* which they found themſelves upon any mention of Time or Duration preſently to think on, all which Portions of Time were meaſur'd out by the Motion of thoſe heavenly Bodies; they were apt to confound Time and Motion, or at leaſt to think that they had a neceſſary Connexion one with another: whereas any conſtant periodical Appearance, or Alteration of *Ideas* in ſeemingly equidiſtant Spaces of Duration, if conſtant and univerſally obſervable, would have as well diſtinguiſh'd the Intervals of Time, as thoſe that have been made uſe of. For ſuppoſing the Sun, which ſome have taken to be a Fire, had been lighted up at the ſame diſtance of Time that it now every day comes about to the ſame Meridian, and then gone out again about twelve Hours after, and that in the ſpace of an annual Revolution, it had ſenſibly increas'd in Brightneſs and Heat, and ſo decreas'd again; would not ſuch regular Appearances ſerve to meaſure out the Diſtances of Duration to all that could obſerve it, as well without as with Motion? For if the Appearances were conſtant, univerſally obſervable, and in equidiſtant Periods, they would ſerve Mankind for Meaſure of Time as well, were the Motion away.

But not by their Motion but periodical Appearances.

§. 20. For the freezing of Water, or the blowing of a Plant, returning at equidiſtant Periods in all Parts of the Earth, would as well ſerve Men to reckon their Years by, as the Motions of the Sun: And in effect we ſee, that ſome People in *America* counted their Years by the coming of certain Birds amongſt them at their certain Seaſons, and leaving them at others. For a Fit of an Ague, the Senſe of Hunger or Thirſt, a Smell or a Taſte, or any other *Idea* returning conſtantly at equidiſtant Periods, and making it ſelf univerſally be taken notice of, *would* not fail to *meaſure* out the Courſe of Succeſſion, and diſtinguiſh the Diſtances of *Time*. Thus we ſee that Men born blind count Time well enough by Years, whoſe Revolutions yet they cannot diſtinguiſh by Motions, that they perceive not: And I ask whether a blind Man, who diſtinguiſh'd his Years either by the Heat of Summer, or Cold of Winter; by the Smell of any Flower of the Spring, or Taſte of any Fruit of the Autumn; would not have a better Meaſure of Time than the *Romans* had before the Reformation of their *Calendar* by *Julius Cæſar*, or many other People, whoſe Years, notwithſtanding the Motion of the Sun, which they pretend to make uſe of, are very irregular? And it adds no ſmall Difficulty to Chronology, that the exact Lengths of the Years that ſeveral Nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing very much one from another, and I think I may ſay all of them from the preciſe Motion of the Sun. And if the Sun mov'd from the Creation to the Flood conſtantly in the Æquator, and ſo equally diſpers'd its Light and Heat to all the habitable Parts of the Earth, in days all of the ſame Length, without its annual Variations to the Tropicks, as a late ingenious Author ſuppoſes; I do not think it very eaſy to imagine, that (notwithſtanding the Motion of the Sun) Men ſhould in the *Antediluvian* World, from the beginning count by Years, or meaſure their Time by Periods, that had no ſenſible Marks very obvious to diſtinguiſh them by.

No two parts of Duration can be certainly known to be equal.

§. 21. But perhaps it will be ſaid, without a regular Motion, ſuch as of the Sun, or ſome other, how could it ever be known that ſuch Periods were equal? To which I anſwer, the Equality of any other returning Appearances might be known

known by the ſame way that that of Days was known, or preſum'd to be ſo at firſt; which was only by judging of them by the Train of *Ideas* which had paſs'd in Mens Minds in the Intervals: by which Train of *Ideas* diſcovering inequality in the natural Days, but none in the artificial Days, the artificial Days or νυχθήμερα were gueſs'd to be equal, which was ſufficient to make them ſerve for a Meaſure. Tho' exacter Search has ſince diſcover'd Inequality in the diurnal Revolutions of the Sun, and we know not whether the annual alſo be not unequal: Theſe yet, by their preſum'd and apparent Equality, ſerve as well to reckon Time by (tho' not to meaſure the Parts of Duration exactly) as if they could be prov'd to be exactly equal. We muſt therefore carefully diſtinguiſh betwixt Duration it ſelf, and the Meaſures we make uſe of to judg of its Length. Duration in it ſelf is to be conſider'd as going on in one conſtant, equal, uniform Courſe: But none of the Meaſures of it, which we make uſe of, can be known to do ſo; nor can we be aſſur'd, that their aſſign'd Parts or Periods are equal in Duration one to another; for two ſucceſſive Lengths of Duration, however meaſur'd, can never be demonſtrated to be equal. The Motion of the Sun, which the World us'd ſo long and ſo confidently for an exact Meaſure of Duration, has, as I ſaid, been found in its ſeveral parts unequal: And tho' Men have of late made uſe of a Pendulum, as a more ſteddy and regular Motion than that of the Sun, or (to ſpeak more truly) of the Earth; yet if any one ſhould be ask'd how he certainly knows that the two ſucceſſive Swings of a Pendulum are equal, it would be very hard to ſatisfy him that they are infallibly ſo: Since we cannot be ſure, that the Cauſe of that Motion, which is unknown to us, ſhall always operate equally; and we are ſure that the Medium in which the Pendulum moves, is not conſtantly the ſame: Either of which varying, may alter the Equality of ſuch Periods, and thereby deſtroy the Certainty and Exactneſs of the Meaſure by Motion, as well as any other Periods of other Appearances; the Notion of Duration ſtill remaining clear, tho' our Meaſures of it cannot any of them be demonſtrated to be exact. Since then no two Portions of Succeſſion can be brought together, it is impoſſible ever certainly to know their Equality. All that we can do for a Meaſure of Time, is to take ſuch as have continual ſucceſſive Appearances at ſeeming equidiſtant Periods; *of* which *ſeeming Equality we have no other Meaſure, but* ſuch as *the Train of our own Ideas* have lodg'd in our Memories, with the Concurrence of other probable Reaſons, to perſuade us of their Equality.

Time not the Meaſure of Motion.

§. 22. One thing ſeems ſtrange to me, that whilſt all Men manifeſtly meaſur'd Time by the Motion of the great and viſible Bodies of the World, *Time* yet ſhould be *deſign'd* to be the *Meaſure of Motion*; whereas 'tis obvious to every one who reflects ever ſo little on it, that to meaſure Motion, Space is as neceſſary to be conſider'd as Time; and thoſe who look a little farther, will find alſo the Bulk of the thing mov'd neceſſary to be taken into the Computation, by any one who will eſtimate or meaſure Motion, ſo as to judg right of it. Nor indeed does Motion any otherwiſe conduce to the meaſuring of Duration, than as it conſtantly brings about the Return of certain ſenſible *Ideas*, in ſeeming equidiſtant Periods. For, if the Motion of the Sun were as unequal as of a Ship driven by unſteddy Winds, ſometimes very ſlow, and at others irregularly very ſwift; or if being conſtantly equally ſwift, yet was not circular, and produc'd not the ſame Appearances, it would not at all help us to meaſure Time, any more than the ſeeming unequal Motion of a Comet does.

Minutes, Hours and Years, not neceſſary Meaſures of Duration.

§. 23. *Minutes, Hours, Days and Years,* are then *no* more *neceſſary to Time* or Duration, than Inches, Feet, Yards and Miles, mark'd out in any Matter, are to Extenſion: For tho' we in this part of the Univerſe, by the conſtant uſe of them, as of Periods ſet out by the Revolutions of the Sun, or as known Parts of ſuch Periods, have fix'd the *Ideas* of ſuch Lengths of Duration in our Minds, which we apply to all Parts of Time, whoſe Lengths we would conſider; yet there may be other Parts of the Univerſe, where they no more uſe theſe Meaſures of our's, than in *Japan* they do our Inches, Feet or Miles; but yet ſomething analogous to them there muſt be. For without ſome regular periodical Returns, we could not meaſure our ſelves, or ſignify to others the Length of any Duration, tho' at the ſame time the World were as full of Motion as it is now, but no part of it diſpos'd into regular and apparently equi-

distant Revolutions. But the different Measures that may be made use of for the account of Time, do not at all alter the notion of Duration, which is the thing to be measur'd; no more than the different Standards of a Foot and a Cubit alter the notion of Extension to those, who make use of those different Measures.

Our measure of Time applicable to Duration before Time.

§. 25. The Mind having once got such a Measure of Time as the annual Revolution of the Sun, can apply that Measure to Duration, wherein that Measure it self did not exist, and with which, in the reality of its Being, it had nothing to do: For should one say, That *Abraham* was born in the 2712*th* Year of the *Julian* Period, it is altogether as intelligible, as reckoning from the beginning of the World, tho' there were so far back no Motion of the Sun, nor any other Motion at all. For tho' the *Julian* Period be suppos'd to begin several hundred Years before there were really either Days, Nights or Years, mark'd-out by any Revolutions of the Sun; yet we reckon as right, and thereby measure Duration as well, as if really at that time the Sun had existed, and kept the same ordinary Motion it doth now. The *Idea of Duration equal to an annual Revolution of the Sun*, is as easily *applicable* in our Thoughts *to Duration, where no Sun nor Motion was*, as the *Idea* of a Foot or Yard, taken from Bodies here, can be applyed in our Thoughts to Distances beyond the Confines of the World, where are no Bodies at all.

§. 26. For supposing it were 5639 Miles, or Millions of Miles, from this place to the remotest Body of the Universe (for being finite, it must be at a certain distance) as we suppose it to be 5639 Years from this time to the first Existence of any Body in the beginning of the World; *we can*, in our Thoughts, *apply this Measure of a Year to Duration before the Creation*, or beyond the Duration of Bodies or Motion, as we can this Measure of a Mile to Space beyond the utmost Bodies; and by the one measure Duration, where there was no Motion, as well as by the other measure Space in our Thoughts, where there is no Body.

§. 27. If it be objected to me here, That in this way of explaining of Time, I have beg'd what I should not, *viz.* That the World is neither eternal nor infinite; I answer, That to my present purpose it is not needful, in this place, to make use of Arguments, to evince the World to be finite, both in Duration and Extension; but it being at least as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the liberty to suppose it, as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary: And I doubt not but that *every one* that will go about it, may easily *conceive* in his Mind *the beginning of Motion, tho' not of all Duration*, and so may come to a stop and *non ultra* in his Consideration of Motion. So also in his Thoughts he may set Limits to Body, and the Extension belonging to it, but not to Space where no Body is; the utmost bounds of Space and Duration being beyond the reach of Thought, as well as the utmost bounds of Number are beyond the largest Comprehension of the Mind; and all for the same reason, as we shall see in another Place.

Eternity.

§. 28. By the same means therefore, and from the same Original that we come to have *the Idea* of Time, we have also that *Idea* which we call *Eternity*: *viz.* having got the *Idea* of Succession and Duration, by reflecting on the Train of our own *Ideas* caus'd in us either by the natural Appearances of those *Ideas* coming constantly of themselves into our waking Thoughts, or else caus'd by external Objects successively affecting our Senses; and having from the Revolutions of the Sun got the *Ideas* of certain Lengths of Duration, we can, in our Thoughts, add such Lengths of Duration to one another as often as we please, and apply them, so added, to Durations past or to come: And this we can continue to do on, without Bounds or Limits, and proceed *in infinitum*, and apply thus the Length of the annual Motion of the Sun to Duration, suppos'd before the Sun's, or any other Motion had its Being; which is no more difficult or absurd, than to apply the Notion I have of the moving of a Shadow one Hour to Day upon the Sun-Dial, to the Duration of something last Night, *v. g.* the burning of a Candle, which is now absolutely separate from all actual Motion: And it is as impossible for the Duration of that Flame for an Hour last Night to co-exist with any Motion that now is, or ever shall be, as for any part of Duration, that was before the beginning of the World, to co-exist with the Motion of the Sun now. But yet this hinders not, but that having

having the *Idea* of the Length of the Motion of the Shadow on a Dial between the Marks of two Hours, I can as diſtinctly meaſure in my Thoughts the Duration of that Candle-light laſt night, as I can the Duration of any thing that does now exiſt: And it is no more than to think, that had the Sun ſhone then on the Dial, and mov'd after the ſame rate it doth now, the Shadow on the Dial would have paſs'd from one Hour-line to another, whilſt that Flame of the Candle laſted.

§. 29. The Notion of an Hour, Day, or Year, being only the *Idea* I have of the Length of certain periodical regular Motions, neither of which Motions do ever all at once exiſt, but only in the *Ideas* I have of them in my Memory deriv'd from my Senſes or Reflection; I can with the ſame eaſe, and for the ſame reaſon, apply it in my Thoughts to Duration, antecedent to all manner of Motion, as well as to any thing that is but a Minute, or a Day, antecedent to the Motion, that at this very moment the Sun is in. All things paſt are equally and perfectly at reſt; and to this way of Conſideration of them are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the World, or but yeſterday: *the meaſuring of* any *Duration* by ſome Motion, *depending* not at all *on* the real Co-exiſtence of that thing to that Motion, or any other Periods of Revolution, but the having *a clear Idea of the Length of ſome* periodical known Motion, or other Intervals of *Duration* in my Mind, and *applying that to the Duration of the thing I would meaſure.*

§. 30. Hence we ſee, that ſome Men imagine the Duration of the World from its firſt Exiſtence to this preſent Year 1689. to have been 5639 Years, or equal to 5639 annual Revolutions of the Sun, and others a great deal more; as the *Egyptians* of old, who, in the time of *Alexander*, counted 23000 Years from the Reign of the Sun; and the *Chineſes* now, who account the World 3,269,000 Years old, or more: which longer Duration of the World, according to their Computation, tho' I ſhould not believe to be true; yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly underſtand, and ſay one is longer than the other, as I underſtand, that *Methuſalem*'s Life was longer than *Enoch*'s. And if the common reckoning of 5639 ſhould be true, (as it may be as well as any other aſſign'd) it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the World 1000 Years older, ſince every one may with the ſame Facility imagine (I do not ſay believe) the World to be 50,000 Years old, as 5639; and may as well conceive the Duration of 50,000 Years, as 5639. Whereby it appears, that *to the meaſuring the Duration of any thing by Time*, it is not requiſite that that thing ſhould be co-exiſtent to the Motion we meaſure by, or any other periodical Revolution; but *it ſuffices* to this purpoſe, *that we have the Idea of the Length of any regular periodical Appearances*, which we can in our Minds apply to Duration, with which the Motion or Appearance never co-exiſted.

§. 31. For as in the Hiſtory of the Creation deliver'd by *Moſes*, I can imagine that Light exiſted three Days before the Sun was, or had any Motion, barely by thinking, that the Duration of Light before the Sun was created, was ſo long as (if the Sun had mov'd then, as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his diurnal Revolutions; ſo by the ſame way I can have an *Idea* of the *Chaos*, or Angels being created, before there was either Light, or any continu'd Motion, a Minute, an Hour, a Day, a Year, or 1000 Years. For if I can but conſider *Duration* equal to one Minute, before either the Being or Motion of any Body, I can add one Minute more till I come to 60; and by the ſame way of adding Minutes, Hours, or Years (*i. e.* ſuch or ſuch parts of the Sun's Revolution, or any other Period, whereof I have the *Idea*) proceed *in infinitum*, and ſuppoſe a Duration exceeding as many ſuch Periods as I can reckon, let me add whilſt I will: which I think is the Notion we have of *Eternity*, of whoſe Infinity we have no other Notion, than we have of the Infinity of Number, to which we can add for ever without end.

§. 32. And thus I think it is plain, that *from* thoſe two Fountains of all Knowledg before-mention'd, *viz. Reflection* and *Senſation*, *we get the Ideas of Duration*, and the Meaſures of it.

For *Firſt*, By obſerving what paſſes in our Minds, how our *Ideas* there in train conſtantly ſome vaniſh, and others begin to appear, we come by the *Idea* of *Succeſſion*.

Secondly, By obſerving a diſtance in the Parts of this Succeſſion, we get the *Idea* of *Duration*.

Thirdly, By Senſation obſerving certain Appearances, at certain regular and ſeeming equidiſtant Periods, we get the *Ideas* of certain Lengths or *Meaſures of Duration*, as Minutes, Hours, Days, Years, *&c.*

Fourthly, By being able to repeat thoſe Meaſures of Time, or *Ideas* of ſtated Length of Duration in our Minds, as often as we will, we can come to *imagine Duration, where nothing does really endure or exiſt*; and thus we imagine to Morrow, next Year, or ſeven Years hence.

Fifthly, By being able to repeat any ſuch *Idea* of any Length of Time, as of a Minute, a Year, or an Age, as often as we will in our own Thoughts, and adding them one to another, without ever coming to the end of ſuch Addition any nearer than we can to the end of Number, to which we can always add, we come by the *Idea* of *Eternity*, as the future eternal Durations of our Souls, as well as the Eternity of that infinite Being, which muſt neceſſarily have always exiſted.

Sixthly, By conſidering any part of infinite Duration, as ſet out by periodical Meaſures, we come by the *Idea* of what we call *Time* in general.

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expanſion, conſider'd together.

Both capable of greater and leſs.

§. 1. THO' we have in the precedent Chapters dwelt pretty long on the Conſiderations of Space and Duration; yet they being *Ideas* of general Concernment, that have ſomething very abſtruſe and peculiar in their Nature, the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of uſe for their Illuſtration; and we may have the more clear and diſtinct Conception of them, by taking a view of them together. Diſtance or Space, in its ſimple abſtract Conception, to avoid Confuſion, I call *Expanſion*, to diſtinguiſh it from *Extenſion*, which by ſome is us'd to expreſs this diſtance only, as it is in the ſolid parts of Matter, and ſo includes, or at leaſt intimates the *Idea* of Body: Whereas the *Idea* of pure Diſtance includes no ſuch thing. I prefer alſo the word *Expanſion* to *Space*, becauſe *Space* is often apply'd to diſtance of fleeting ſucceſſive parts, which never exiſt together, as well as to thoſe which are permanent. In both theſe (*viz. Expanſion* and *Duration*) the Mind has this common *Idea* of continu'd Lengths, capable of greater or leſs Quantities: For a Man has as clear an *Idea* of the difference of the Length of an Hour, and a Day, as of an Inch and a Foot.

Expanſion not bounded by Matter.

§. 2. The *Mind*, having got the *Idea* of the Length of any part of *Expanſion*, let it be a Span, or a Pace, or what Length you will, *can*, as has been ſaid, repeat that *Idea*; and ſo adding it to the former, *enlarge its Idea of Length*, and make it equal to two Spans, or two Paces, and ſo as often as it will, till it equals the diſtance of any parts of the Earth one from another, and increaſe thus, till it amounts to the diſtance of the Sun, or remoteſt Star. By ſuch a progreſſion as this, ſetting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and paſs beyond all thoſe Lengths, and find nothing to ſtop its going on, either in, or without Body. 'Tis true, we can eaſily in our Thoughts come to the end of ſolid Extenſion; the Extremity and Bounds of all Body, we have no difficulty to arrive at: But when the Mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its Progreſs into this endleſs Expanſion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor let any one ſay, That beyond the Bounds of Body, there is nothing at all, unleſs he will confine GOD within the Limits of Matter. *Solomon*, whoſe Underſtanding was fill'd and enlarg'd with Wiſdom, ſeems to have other Thoughts, when he ſays, *Heaven, and the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain Thee:* And he, I think, very much magnifies to himſelf the Capacity of his own Underſtanding, who perſwades himſelf, that he can extend his Thoughts farther than GOD exiſts, or imagine any Expanſion where he is not.

§. 3.

§. 3. Juſt ſo is it in Duration. *The Mind having got the Idea of any Length of Duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it,* not only beyond its own, but beyond the Exiſtence of all corporeal Beings, and all the Meaſures of Time, taken from the great Bodies of the World, and their Motions. But yet every one eaſily admits, That tho' we make Duration boundleſs, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all Being. GOD, every one eaſily allows, fills Eternity; and 'tis hard to find a Reaſon, why any one ſhould doubt, that he likewiſe fills Immenſity? His infinite Being is certainly as boundleſs one way as another; and methinks it aſcribes a little too much to Matter, to ſay, where there is no Body, there is nothing. *Not Duration by Motion.*

§. 4. Hence, I think, we may learn the Reaſon *why every one* familiarly, and without the leaſt heſitation, ſpeaks of, and ſuppoſes Eternity, and ſticks not to *aſcribe Infinity to Duration*; *but* 'tis *with more doubting* and reſerve, that many *admit*, or ſuppoſe *the Infinity of Space*. The Reaſon whereof ſeems to me to be this, That Duration and Extenſion being us'd as Names of Affections belonging to other Beings, we eaſily conceive in GOD infinite Duration, and we cannot avoid doing ſo: But not attributing to him Extenſion, but only to Matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the Exiſtence of Expanſion without Matter; of which alone we commonly ſuppoſe it an Attribute. And therefore when Men purſue their Thoughts of Space, they are apt to ſtop at the Confines of Body; as if Space were there at an end too, and reach'd no farther. Or if their *Ideas* upon conſideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the Limits of the Univerſe, imaginary Space; as if it were nothing, becauſe there is no Body exiſting in it. Whereas Duration, antecedent to all Body, and to the Motions which it is meaſur'd by, they never term imaginary; becauſe it is never ſuppos'd void of ſome other real Exiſtence. And if the Names of things may at all direct our Thoughts towards the Originals of Mens *Ideas* (as I am apt to think they may very much) one may have occaſion to think by the name *Duration*, that the Continuation of Exiſtence, with a kind of Reſiſtance to any deſtructive Force, and the Continuation of Solidity (which is apt to be confounded with, and if we will look into the minute anatomical parts of Matter, is little different from Hardneſs) were thought to have ſome Analogy, and gave occaſion to Words, ſo near of kin as *Durare* and *Durum eſſe*. And that *Durare* is apply'd to the *Idea* of Hardneſs, as well as that of Exiſtence, we ſee in *Horace*, *Epod.* 16. *ferro duravit ſæcula*. But be that as it will, this is certain. That whoever purſues his own Thoughts, will find them ſometimes launch out beyond the Extent of Body into the Infinity of Space or Expanſion; the *Idea* whereof is diſtinct and ſeparate from Body, and all other things: which may (to thoſe who pleaſe) be a Subject of farther Meditation. *Why Men more eaſily admit infinite Duration, than infinite Expanſion.*

§. 5. *Time* in general is to *Duration*, as *Place* to *Expanſion*. They are ſo much of thoſe boundleſs Oceans of Eternity and Immenſity, as is ſet out and diſtinguiſh'd from the reſt, as it were by Land-marks; and ſo are made uſe of to denote the Poſition of finite real Beings, in reſpect one to another, in thoſe uniform infinite Oceans of Duration and Space. Theſe rightly conſider'd are only *Ideas* of determinate Diſtances, from certain known Points fix'd in diſtinguiſhable ſenſible things, and ſuppos'd to keep the ſame diſtance one from another. From ſuch Points fix'd in ſenſible Beings we reckon, and from them we meaſure our Portions of thoſe infinite Quantities; which ſo conſider'd, are that which we call *Time* and *Place*. For Duration and Space being in themſelves uniform and boundleſs, the Order and Poſition of things, without ſuch known ſettled Points, would be loſt in them, and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable Confuſion. *Time to Duration is as Place to Expanſion.*

§. 6. *Time* and *Place* taken thus for determinate diſtinguiſhable Portions of thoſe infinite Abyſſes of Space and Duration, ſet out, or ſuppos'd to be diſtinguiſh'd from the reſt by Marks, and known Boundaries, have each of them a two fold Acceptation. *Time and Place are taken for ſo much of either, as are ſet out by the Exiſtence and Motion of Bodies.*

Firſt, *Time* in general is commonly taken for ſo much of infinite Duration, as is meaſur'd out by, and co-exiſtent with the Exiſtence and Motions of the great Bodies of the Univerſe, as far as we know any thing of them: And in this ſenſe, Time begins and ends with the Frame of this ſenſible World, as in theſe

theſe Phraſes before-mention'd, *before all Time*, or *when Time ſhall be no more*: *Place* likewiſe is taken ſometimes for that Portion of infinite Space, which is poſſeſs'd by, and comprehended within the material World; and is thereby diſtinguiſh'd from the reſt of Expanſion; tho' this may more properly be call'd *Extenſion*, than Place. Within theſe two are confin'd, and by the obſervable Parts of them are meaſur'd and determin'd the particular Time or Duration, and the particular Extenſion and Place of all corporeal Beings.

Sometimes for ſo much of either, as we deſign by Meaſures taken from the Bulk or Motion of Bodies.

§. 7. *Secondly*, Sometimes the word *Time* is us'd *in a larger Senſe*, and is apply'd to Parts of that infinite Duration, not that were really diſtinguiſh'd and meaſur'd out by this real Exiſtence, and periodical Motions of Bodies that were appointed from the Beginning to be for Signs, and for Seaſons, and for Days, and Years, and are accordingly our Meaſures of Time; but ſuch other Portions too of that infinite uniform Duration, which we, upon any occaſion, do ſuppoſe equal to certain Lengths of meaſur'd Time; and ſo conſider them as bounded and determin'd. For if we ſhould ſuppoſe the Creation, or Fall of the Angels, was at the Beginning of the *Julian* Period, we ſhould ſpeak properly enough, and ſhould be underſtood, if we ſaid, 'tis a longer time ſince the Creation of Angels, than the Creation of the World, by 764 Years: whereby we would mark out ſo much of that undiſtinguiſh'd Duration, as we ſuppoſe equal to, and would have admitted 764 annual Revolutions of the Sun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus likewiſe we ſometimes ſpeak of Place, Diſtance, or Bulk in the great *Inane* beyond the confines of the World, when we conſider ſo much of that Space as is equal to, or capable to receive a Body of any aſſign'd Dimenſions, as a Cubick-foot; or do ſuppoſe a Point in it at ſuch a certain diſtance from any part of the Univerſe.

They belong to all Beings.

§. 8. *Where* and *When* are Queſtions belonging to all finite Exiſtences, and are by us always reckon'd from ſome known Parts of this ſenſible World, and from ſome certain Epochs mark'd out to us by the Motions obſervable in it. Without ſome ſuch fix'd Parts or Periods, the Order of things would be loſt to our finite Underſtandings, in the boundleſs invariable Oceans of Duration and Expanſion; which comprehend in them all finite Beings, and in their full Extent belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do ſo often find our Thoughts at a loſs, when we would conſider them either abſtractly in themſelves, or as any way attributed to the firſt incomprehenſible Being. But when apply'd to any particular finite Beings, the Extenſion of any Body is ſo much of that infinite Space, as the Bulk of that Body takes up. And Place is the Poſition of any Body, when conſider'd at a certain diſtance from ſome other. As the *Idea* of the particular *Duration* of any thing is an *Idea* of that Portion of infinite *Duration*, which paſſes during the Exiſtence of that thing; ſo the Time *when* the thing exiſted is the *Idea* of that Space of Duration which paſs'd between ſome known and fix'd Period of Duration, and the Being of that thing. One ſhews the diſtance of the Extremities of the Bulk or Exiſtence of the ſame thing, as that it is a Foot ſquare, or laſted two Years; the other ſhews the diſtance of it in Place, or Exiſtence from other fix'd Points of Space or Duration, as that it was in the middle of *Lincolns-Inn-Fields*, or the firſt Degree of *Taurus*, and in the Year of our Lord 1671. or the 1000th Year of the *Julian* Period: All which Diſtances we meaſure by preconceiv'd *Ideas* of certain Lengths of Space and Duration, as Inches, Feet, Miles, and Degrees; and in the other, Minutes, Days, and Years, *&c.*

All the Parts of Extenſion, are Extenſion; and all the Parts of Duration, are Duration.

§. 9. There is one thing more wherein *Space* and *Duration* have a great Conformity; and that is, tho' they are juſtly reckon'd amongſt our *ſimple Ideas*, yet none of the diſtinct *Ideas* we have of either is without all manner of *Compoſition* *; it is the very Nature of both of them to conſiſt of Parts: but their Parts

* It has been objected to Mr. *Locke*, that if Space conſiſts of Parts, as 'tis confeſs'd in this Place, he ſhould not have reckon'd it in the number of Simple *Ideas*; becauſe it ſeems to be inconſiſtent with what he ſays elſewhere, That a Simple *Idea* is *uncompounded, and contains in it nothing but one uniform Appearance or Conception of the Mind, and is not diſtinguiſhable into different* Ideas. 'Tis farther objected, That Mr. *Locke* has not given in the 11th Chapter of the 2d Book,

Parts being all of the ſame kind, and without the mixture of any other *Idea* hinder them not from having a Place amongſt ſimple *Ideas*. Could the Mind, as in Number, come to ſo ſmall a part of Extenſion or Duration, as excluded Diviſibility, that would be, as it were, the indiviſible Unit, or *Idea*; by Repetition of which it would make its more enlarg'd *Ideas* of Extenſion and Duration. But ſince the Mind is not able to frame an *Idea* of any Space without Parts; inſtead thereof it makes uſe of the common Meaſures, which by familiar Uſe, in each Country, have imprinted themſelves on the Memory, (as Inches and Feet; or Cubits and Paraſangs; and ſo Seconds, Minutes, Hours, Days, and Years in Duration:) The Mind makes uſe, I ſay, of ſuch *Ideas* as theſe, as ſimple ones; and theſe are the component Parts of larger *Ideas*, which the Mind, upon occaſion, makes by the addition of ſuch known Lengths which it is acquainted with. On the other Side, the ordinary ſmalleſt Meaſure we have of either, is look'd on as an Unit in Number, when the Mind by diviſion would reduce them into leſs Fractions. Tho' on both ſides, both in Addition and Diviſion, either of Space or Duration, when the *Idea* under conſideration becomes very big or very ſmall, its preciſe Bulk becomes very obſcure and confus'd; and it is the Number of its repeated Additions or Diviſions, that alone remains clear and diſtinct, as will eaſily appear to any one who will let his Thoughts looſe in the vaſt Expanſion of Space, or Diviſibility of Matter. Every Part of Duration, is Duration too; and every Part of Extenſion, is Extenſion, both of them capable of Addition or Diviſion *in infinitum*. But the leaſt Portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, may perhaps be fitteſt to be conſider'd by us, as the ſimple *Ideas* of that kind, out of which our complex Modes of Space, Extenſion and Duration, are made up, and into which they can again be diſtinctly reſolv'd. Such a ſmall part in Duration may be call'd a *Moment*, and is the Time of one *Idea* in our Minds in the Train of their ordinary Succeſſion there. The other, wanting a proper Name, I know not whether I may be allow'd to call *a ſenſible Point*, meaning thereby the leaſt

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Book, where he begins to ſpeak of *ſimple Ideas*, an exact Definition of what he underſtands by the word *ſimple Ideas*. To theſe Difficulties Mr. *Locke* anſwers thus: To begin with the laſt, he declares, That he has not treated his Subject in an Order perfectly Scholaſtick, having not had much Familiarity with thoſe ſort of Books during the writing of his, and not remembering at all the Method in which they are written; and therefore his Readers ought not to expect Definitions regularly plac'd at the beginning of each new Subject. Mr. *Locke* contents himſelf to imploy the principal Terms that he uſes, ſo, that from his uſe of them the Reader may eaſily comprehend what he means by them. But with reſpect to the term *ſimple Idea*, he has had the good luck to define that in the Place cited in the Objection; and therefore there is no reaſon to ſupply that Defect. The Queſtion then is to know, whether the *Idea* of *Extenſion* agrees with this Definition: Which will effectually agree to it, if it be underſtood in the Senſe which Mr. *Locke* had principally in his view; for that Compoſition which he deſign'd to exclude in that Definition, was a Compoſition of different *Ideas* in the Mind, and not a Compoſition of the ſame kind in a thing whoſe Eſſence conſiſts in having Parts of the ſame kind, where you can never come to a Part entirely exempted from this Compoſition. So that if the *Idea* of *Extenſion* conſiſts in having *Partes extra Partes*, (as the Schools ſpeak) 'tis always, in the Senſe of Mr. *Locke*, a *ſimple Idea*; becauſe the *Idea* of having *Partes extra Partes*, cannot be reſolv'd into two other *Ideas*. For the remainder of the Objection made to Mr. *Locke*, with reſpect to the Nature of Extenſion, Mr. *Locke* was aware of it, as may be ſeen in §. 9. Ch. 15. of the 2d Book, where he ſays, That the leaſt Portion of Space or Extenſion, whereof we have a clear and diſtinct *Idea*, may perhaps be the fitteſt to be conſider'd by us as a *ſimple Idea* of that kind, out of which our complex Modes of Space and Extenſion are made up. So that, according to Mr. *Locke*, it may very fitly be call'd a *ſimple Idea*, ſince it is the leaſt *Idea* of Space that the Mind can form to it ſelf, and that cannot be divided by the Mind into any leſs, whereof it has in it ſelf any determin'd Perception. From whence it follows, that it is to the Mind one *ſimple Idea*; and that is ſufficient to take away this Objection: For 'tis not the deſign of Mr. *Locke*, in this place, to diſcourſe of any thing but concerning the *Ideas* of the Mind. But if this is not ſufficient to clear the Difficulty, Mr. *Locke* hath nothing more to add, but that if the *Idea* of Extenſion is ſo peculiar, that it cannot exactly agree with the Definition that he has given of thoſe *ſimple Ideas*, ſo that it differs in ſome manner from all others of that kind, he thinks 'tis better to leave it there expos'd to this Difficulty, than to make a new Diviſion in his favour. 'Tis enough for Mr. *Locke* that his Meaning can be underſtood. 'Tis very common to obſerve intelligible Diſcourſes ſpoil'd by too much Subtilty in nice Diviſions. We ought to put things together as well as we can, *Doctrinæ Cauſâ*; but after all, ſeveral things will not be bundled up together under our Terms Ways of ſpeaking.

Particle of Matter or Space we can diſcern, which is ordinarily about a Minute, and to the ſharpeſt Eyes ſeldom leſs than thirty ſeconds of a Circle, whereof the Eye is the Center.

Their Parts inſeparable.

§. 10. Expanſion and Duration have this farther Agreement, that tho' they are both conſider'd by us as having Parts, yet *their Parts* are *not ſeparable* one from another, no, not even in Thought: tho' the Parts of Bodies from whence we take our meaſure of the one, and the Parts of Motion, or rather the Succeſſion of *Ideas* in our Minds, from whence we take the meaſure of the other, may be interrupted and ſeparated; as the one is often by Reſt, and the other is by Sleep, which we call Reſt too.

Duration is as a Line, Expanſion as a Solid.

§. 11. But yet there is this manifeſt difference between them, That the *Ideas* of Length, which we have of *Expanſion, are turn'd every way*, and ſo make Figure and Breadth, and Thickneſs; but *Duration it but as it were the Length of one ſtreight Line*, extended *in infinitum*, not capable of Multiplicity, Variation, or Figure; but is one common Meaſure of all Exiſtence whatſoever, wherein all things, whilſt they exiſt, equally partake. For this preſent Moment is common to all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their Exiſtence, as much as if they were all but one ſingle Being; and we may truly ſay, they all exiſt in the ſame Moment of Time. Whether Angels and Spirits have any analogy to this in reſpect of Expanſion, is beyond my Comprehenſion: And perhaps for us, who have Underſtandings and Comprehenſions ſuited to our own Preſervation, and the Ends of our own Being, but not to the Reality and Extent of all other Beings; 'tis near as hard to conceive any Exiſtence, or to have an *Idea* of any real Being, with a perfect Negation of all manner of Expanſion; as it is to have the *Idea* of any real Exiſtence, with a perfect Negation of all manner of Duration: And therefore what Spirits have to do with Space, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know, is, that Bodies do each ſingly poſſeſs its proper Portion of it, according to the Extent of its ſolid Parts; and thereby exclude all other Bodies from having any ſhare in that particular Portion of Space, whilſt it remains there.

Duration has never two Parts together, Expanſion all together.

§. 12. *Duration*, and Time which is a part of it, *is the Idea* we have *of periſhing Diſtance, of which no two Parts exiſt together*, but follow each other in Succeſſion; as *Expanſion is the* Idea *of laſting Diſtance, all whoſe Parts exiſt together*, and are not capable of Succeſſion. And therefore tho' we cannot conceive any Duration without Succeſſion, nor can put it together in our Thoughts, that any Being does now exiſt to-morrow, or poſſeſs at once more than the preſent Moment of Duration; yet we can conceive the eternal Duration of the Almighty far different from that of Man, or any other finite Being. Becauſe Man comprehends not in his Knowledg, or Power, all paſt and future things: His Thoughts are but of yeſterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth. What is once paſt, he can never recal: and what is yet to come, he cannot make preſent. What I ſay of Man, I ſay of all finite Beings; who, tho' they may far exceed Man in Knowledg and Power, yet are no more than the meaneſt Creature, in compariſon with God himſelf. Finite of any Magnitude, holds not any Proportion to Infinite. God's infinite Duration being accompany'd with infinite Knowledg, and infinite Power, he ſees all things paſt and to come; and they are no more diſtant from his Knowledg, no farther remov'd from his ſight than the preſent: They all lie under the ſame view; and there is nothing which he cannot make exiſt each Moment he pleaſes. For the Exiſtence of all things depending upon his good-pleaſure, all things exiſt every moment that he thinks fit to have them exiſt. To conclude, Expanſion and Duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every Part of Space being in every Part of Duration, and every Part of Duration in every Part of Expanſion. Such a Combination of two diſtinct *Ideas*, is, I ſuppoſe, ſcarce to be found in all that great Variety we do or can conceive, and may afford matter to farther Speculation.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Number.

§. 1. AMongſt all the *Ideas* we have, as there is none ſuggeſted to the Mind by more ways, ſo there is none more ſimple, than that of *Unity*, or One. It has no ſhadow of Variety or Compoſition in it; every Object our Senſes are employ'd about, every *Idea* in our Underſtandings, every Thought of our Minds, brings this *Idea* along with it. And therefore it is the moſt intimate to our Thoughts, as well as it is in its agreement to all other things, the moſt univerſal *Idea* we have. For Number applies it ſelf to Men, Angels, Actions, Thoughts, every thing that either doth exiſt, or can be imagin'd. *Number the ſimpleſt and moſt univerſal* Idea.

§. 2. By repeating this *Idea* in our Minds, and adding the Repetitions together, we come by the *complex* Ideas *of the Modes of it*. Thus by adding one to one, we have the complex *Idea* of a Couple; by putting twelve Units together, we have the complex *Idea* of a Dozen; and of a Score, or a Million, or any other Number. *Its Modes made by Addition.*

§. 3. *The ſimple Modes of Number are of all other the moſt diſtinct*; every the leaſt Variation, which is an Unit, making each Combination as clearly different from that which approacheth neareſt to it, as the moſt remote: Two being as diſtinct from One, as Two hundred; and the *Idea* of Two as diſtinct from the *Idea* of Three, as the Magnitude of the whole Earth is from that of a Mite. This is not ſo in other ſimple Modes, in which it is not ſo eaſy, nor perhaps poſſible for us to diſtinguiſh betwixt two approaching *Ideas*, which yet are really different. For who will undertake to find a difference between the White of this Paper, and that of the next degree to it; or can form diſtinct *Ideas* of every the leaſt Exceſs in Extenſion? *Each Mode diſtinct.*

§. 4. The Clearneſs and *Diſtinctneſs of each Mode of Number* from all others, even thoſe that approach neareſt, makes me apt to think that Demonſtrations in Numbers, if they are not more evident and exact than in Extenſion, yet they are more general in their Uſe, and more determinate in their Application. Becauſe the *Ideas* of Numbers are more preciſe and diſtinguiſhable, than in Extenſion, where every Equality and Exceſs are not ſo eaſy to be obſerv'd or meaſur'd; becauſe our Thoughts cannot in Space arrive at any determin'd Smallneſs, beyond which it cannot go, as an Unit; and therefore the Quantity or Proportion of any the leaſt Exceſs cannot be diſcover'd: which is clear otherwiſe in Number, where, as has been ſaid, 91 is as diſtinguiſhible from 90, as from 9000, tho' 91 be the next immediate Exceſs to 90. But it is not ſo in Extenſion, where whatſoever is more than juſt a Foot or an Inch, is not diſtinguiſhible from the Standard of a Foot or an Inch; and in Lines which appear of an equal length, one may be longer than the other by innumerable Parts; nor can any one aſſign an Angle, which ſhall be the next biggeſt to a right one. *Therefore Demonſtrations in Numbers the moſt preciſe.*

§. 5. By the repeating, as has been ſaid, of the *Idea* of an Unit, and joining it to another Unit, we make thereof one collective *Idea*, mark'd by the name *Two*. And whoſoever can do this, and proceed on, ſtill adding one more to the laſt collective *Idea* which he had of any Number, and give a name to it, may count, or have *Ideas* for ſeveral Collections of Units, diſtinguiſh'd one from another, as far as he hath a Series of Names for following Numbers, and a Memory to retain that Series, with their ſeveral Names: All *Numeration* being but ſtill the adding of one Unit more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended in one *Idea*, a new or diſtinct Name or Sign, whereby to know it from thoſe before and after, and diſtinguiſh it from every ſmaller or greater multitude of Units. So that he that can add one to one, and ſo to two, and ſo go on with his Tale, taking ſtill with him the diſtinct Names belonging to every Progreſſion; and ſo again, by abſtracting an Unit from each Collection, retreat and leſſen them, is capable of all the *Ideas* of Numbers within the compaſs of his Language, or for which he hath Names, tho' not perhaps of more. For the ſeveral ſimple Modes of Numbers, being in our Minds but ſo many *Names neceſſary to Numbers.*

Combinations of Units, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other difference but more or less, Names or Marks for each distinct Combination seem more necessary than in any other sort of *Ideas*. For without such Names or Marks we can hardly well make use of Numbers in reckoning, especially where the Combination is made up of any great multitude of Units; which put together without a Name or Mark, to distinguish that precise Collection, will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion.

Names necessary to Numbers.

§. 6. This I think to be the reason, why some *Americans* I have spoken with, (who were otherwise of quick and rational Parts enough) could not, as we do, by any means count to 1000; nor had any distinct *Idea* of that Number, tho' they could reckon very well to 20. Because their Language being scanty, and accommodated only to the few Necessaries of a needy simple Life, unacquainted either with Trade or Mathematicks, had no words in it to stand for 1000; so that when they were discours'd with of those greater Numbers, they would shew the Hairs of their Head, to express a great multitude which they could not number: which Inability, I suppose, proceeded from their want of Names. The *Tououpinambos* had no Names for Numbers above 5; any Number beyond that, they made out by shewing their Fingers, and the Fingers of others who were present. And I doubt not but we our selves might distinctly number in words a great deal farther than we usually do, would we find out but some fit Denominations to signify them by; whereas in the way we take now to name them by Millions of Millions of Millions, &c. it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or at most four and twenty decimal Progressions, without confusion. But to shew how much *distinct Names conduce to our well reckoning*, or having useful *Ideas* of Numbers, let us set all these following Figures in one continu'd Line, as the Marks of one Number; *v. g.*

Histoire d'un Voiage fait en la Terre du Bresil, par Jean de Lery, c. 20. $\frac{201}{382}$.

Nonilions.	Octilions.	Septilions.	Sextilions.	Quintilions.	Quartilions.	Trilions.	Bilions.	Millions.	Units.
857324.	162486.	345896.	437916.	423147.	248106.	235421.	261734.	368149.	623137.

The ordinary way of naming this Number in *English*, will be the often repeating of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, (which is the Denomination of the second six Figures. In which way, it will be very hard to have any distinguishing Notions of this Number: But whether, by giving every six Figures a new and orderly Denomination, these and perhaps a great many more Figures in progression, might not easily be counted distinctly, and *Ideas* of them both got more easily to our selves, and more plainly signify'd to others, I leave it to be consider'd. This I mention only to shew how necessary distinct Names are to Numbering, without pretending to introduce new ones of my Invention.

Why Children number not earlier.

§. 7. Thus Children, either for want of Names to mark the several Progressions of Numbers, or not having yet the Faculty to collect scatter'd *Ideas* into complex ones, and range them in a regular order, and so retain them in their Memories, as is necessary to reckoning; do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it very far or steddily, till a good while after they are well furnish'd with good store of other *Ideas:* and one may often observe them discourse and reason pretty well, and have very clear Conceptions of several other things, before they can tell 20. And some, thro' the default of their Memories, who cannot retain the several Combinations of Numbers, with their Names annex'd in their distinct orders, and the dependence of so long a Train of numeral Progressions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their lifetime to reckon or regularly go over any moderate Series of Numbers. For he that will count Twenty, or have any *Idea* of that Number, must know that Nineteen went before, with the distinct Name or Sign of every one of them, as they stand mark'd in their Order; for wherever this fails, a Gap is made, the Chain breaks, and the Progress in numbering can go no farther. So that *to reckon right, it is requir'd*, 1. That the Mind distinguish carefully two *Ideas*, which are different one from another only by the Addition or Subtraction of one Unit. 2. That it retain in Memory the Names or Marks of the several Combinations, from an Unit to that Number; and that not confusedly, and at random, but in that exact Order, that the Numbers follow one another: in either of which, if it trips, the whole Business of Numbering will be disturb'd, and

and there will remain only the confus'd *Idea* of Multitude, but the *Ideas* neceſſary to diſtinct Numeration will not be attain'd to.

§. 8. This farther is obſervable in *Number*, That it is that which the Mind makes uſe of in *meaſuring all things* that by us are meaſurable, which principally are *Expanſion and Duration*; and our *Idea* of Infinity, even when apply'd to thoſe, ſeems to be nothing but the Infinity of Number. For what elſe are our *Ideas* of Eternity and Immenſity, but the repeated Additions of certain *Ideas* of imagin'd Parts of Duration and Expanſion, with the Infinity of Number, in which we can come to no end of Addition? For ſuch an inexhauſtible Stock, Number, of all other our *Ideas*, moſt clearly furniſhes us with, as is obvious to every one. For let a Man collect into one Sum as great a Number as he pleaſes, this multitude, how great ſoever, leſſens not one jot the power of adding to it, or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhauſtible Stock of Number, where ſtill there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this endleſs *Addition* or *Addibility* (if any one like the word better) of Numbers, ſo apparent to the Mind, is that, I think, which gives us the cleareſt and moſt diſtinct *Idea* of Infinity: of which more in the following Chapter.

Number meaſures all Meaſurables.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Infinity.

§. 1. HE that would know what kind of *Idea* it is, to which we give the name of *Infinity*, cannot do it better, than by conſidering to what Infinity is by the Mind more immediately attributed, and then how the Mind comes to frame it.

Infinity, in its original Intention, attributed to Space, Duration and Number.

Finite and *Infinite* ſeem to me to be look'd upon by the Mind as the *Modes of Quantity*, and to be attributed primarily in their firſt Deſignation only to thoſe things which have Parts, and are capable of Increaſe or Diminution, by the Addition or Subtraction of any the leaſt Part: And ſuch are the *Ideas* of Space, Duration, and Number, which we have conſider'd in the foregoing Chapters. 'Tis true, that we cannot but be aſſur'd, That the Great GOD, of whom and from whom are all things, is incomprehenſibly Infinite: But yet when we apply to that firſt and ſupreme Being our *Idea* of Infinite, in our weak and narrow Thoughts, we do it primarily in reſpect of his Duration and Ubiquity; and I think, more figuratively to his Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, and other Attributes, which are properly inexhauſtible and incomprehenſible, *&c.* For when we call them Infinite, we have no other *Idea* of this Infinity, but what carries with it ſome Reflection on, and Intimation of that Number or Extent of the Acts or Objects of God's Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, which can never be ſuppos'd ſo great or ſo many, which theſe Attributes will not always ſurmount and exceed, let us multiply them in our Thoughts as far as we can, with all the Infinity of endleſs Number. I do not pretend to ſay how theſe Attributes are in GOD, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capacities. They do, without doubt, contain in them all poſſible Perfection: but this, I ſay, is our way of conceiving them, and theſe our *Ideas* of their Infinity.

§. 2. Finite then, and Infinite, being by the Mind look'd on as Modifications of Expanſion and Duration, the next thing to be conſider'd, is, *How the Mind comes by* them. As for the *Idea of Finite*, there is no great difficulty. The obvious Portions of Extenſion that affect our Senſes, carry with them into the Mind the *Idea* of Finite: And the ordinary Periods of Succeſſion, whereby we meaſure Time and Duration, as Hours, Days, and Years, are bounded Lengths. The difficulty is, how we come by thoſe boundleſs *Ideas* of *Eternity* and *Immenſity*, ſince the Objects which we converſe with, come ſo much ſhort of any Approach or Proportion to that Largeneſs.

The Idea *of Finite eaſily got.*

§. 3. Every one that has any *Idea* of any ſtated Lengths of Space, as a Foot, finds that he can repeat that *Idea*; and joining it to the former, make the *Idea* of two Feet; and by the addition of a third, three Feet; and ſo on, without ever coming to an end of his Additions, whether of the ſame *Idea* of a Foot, or

How we come by the Idea *of Infinity.*

or if he pleaſes of doubling it, or any other *Idea* he has of any Length, as a Mile, or Diameter of the Earth, or of the *Orbis Magnus*: For whichſoever of theſe he takes, and how often ſoever he doubles, or any otherwiſe multiplies it, he finds that after he has continu'd his doubling in his Thoughts, and enlarg'd his *Idea* as much as he pleaſes, he has no more reaſon to ſtop, nor is one jot nearer the end of ſuch Addition, than he was at firſt ſetting-out. The power of enlarging his *Idea* of Space by farther Additions remaining ſtill the ſame, he hence takes *the Idea of infinite Space.*

Our Idea *of Space boundleſs.*

§. 4. This, I think, is the way whereby the Mind gets the *Idea of infinite Space.* 'Tis a quite different Conſideration, to examine, whether the Mind has the *Idea* of ſuch a *boundleſs Space actually exiſting*, ſince our *Ideas* are not always Proofs of the Exiſtence of things; but yet, ſince this comes here in our way, I ſuppoſe I may ſay, that we are apt to think, that Space in it ſelf is actually boundleſs; to which Imagination, the *Idea* of Space or Expanſion of it ſelf naturally leads us. For it being conſider'd by us, either as the Extenſion of Body, or as exiſting by it ſelf, without any ſolid Matter taking it up, (for of ſuch a void Space we have not only the *Idea*, but I have prov'd, as I think, from the Motion of Body, its neceſſary Exiſtence) it is impoſſible the Mind ſhould be ever able to find or ſuppoſe any end of it, or be ſtop'd any where in its progreſs in this Space, how far ſoever it extends its Thoughts. Any bounds made with Body, even Adamantine Walls, are ſo far from putting a ſtop to the Mind in its farther Progreſs in Space and Extenſion, that it rather facilitates and enlarges it; for ſo far as that Body reaches, ſo far no one can doubt of Extenſion: and when we are come to the utmoſt Extremity of Body, what is there that can there put a ſtop, and ſatisfy the Mind that it is at the end of Space, when it perceives it is not; nay, when it is ſatisfy'd that Body it ſelf can move into it? For if it be neceſſary for the Motion of Body, that there ſhould be an empty Space, tho' ever ſo little, here amongſt Bodies; and if it be poſſible for Body to move in or thro' that empty Space; nay, it is impoſſible for any Particle of Matter to move but into an empty Space; the ſame Poſſibility of a Body's moving into a void Space, beyond the utmoſt Bounds of Body, as well as into a void Space interſpers'd amongſt Bodies, will always remain clear and evident: the *Idea* of empty pure Space, whether within or beyond the Confines of all Bodies, being exactly the ſame, differing not in nature, tho' in bulk; and there being nothing to hinder Body from moving into it. So that wherever the Mind places it ſelf by any Thought, either amongſt or remote from all Bodies, it can in this uniform *Idea* of Space no-where find any Bounds, any End; and ſo muſt neceſſarily conclude it, by the very Nature and *Idea* of each part of it, to be actually infinite.

And ſo of Duration.

§. 5. As by the Power we find in our ſelves of repeating, as often as we will, any *Idea* of Space, we get the *Idea* of Immenſity; ſo, by being able to repeat the *Idea* of any Length of Duration we have in our Minds, with all the endleſs Addition of Number, we come by the *Idea* of *Eternity*. For we find in our ſelves, we can no more come to an end of ſuch repeated *Ideas*, than we can come to the end of Number, which every one perceives he cannot. But here again 'tis another queſtion, quite different from our having an *Idea* of Eternity, to know whether there were *any real Being*, whoſe Duration has been *eternal*. And as to this, I ſay, he that conſiders ſomething now exiſting, muſt neceſſarily come to ſomething eternal. But having ſpoke of this in another place, I ſhall ſay here no more of it, but proceed on to ſome other Conſiderations of our *Idea* of Infinity.

Why other Ideas *are not capable of Infinity.*

§. 6. If it be ſo, that our *Idea* of Infinity be got from the Power we obſerve in our ſelves, of repeating without end our own *Ideas*; it may be demanded, *Why we do not attribute Infinite to other* Ideas, *as well as thoſe of Space and Duration*; ſince they may be as eaſily, and as often repeated in our Minds, as the other; and yet no body ever thinks of infinite Sweetneſs, or infinite Whiteneſs, tho' he can repeat the *Idea* of Sweet or White, as frequently as thoſe of a Yard, or a Day? To which I anſwer: All the *Ideas* that are conſider'd as having Parts, and are capable of Increaſe by the Addition of any equal or leſs Parts, afford us by their Repetition the *Idea* of Infinity; becauſe with this endleſs Repetition, there is continu'd an Enlargement, of which there can be no end. But in other *Ideas* it is not ſo; for to the largeſt *Idea* of Extenſion or Duration that I at preſent

ſent have, the Addition of any the leaſt part makes an Increaſe; but to the perfecteſt *Idea* I have of the whiteſt Whiteneſs, if I add another of a leſs or equal Whiteneſs (and of a whiter than I have, I cannot add the *Idea*) it makes no Increaſe, and enlarges not my *Idea* at all: and therefore the different *Ideas* of Whiteneſs, *&c.* are call'd Degrees. For thoſe *Ideas* that conſiſt of Parts, are capable of being augmented by every Addition of the leaſt Part; but if you take the *Idea* of White, which one parcel of Snow yielded yeſterday to your Sight, and another *Idea* of White from another parcel of Snow you ſee to day, and put them together in your Mind, they embody, as it were, and run into one, and the *Idea* of Whiteneſs is not at all increas'd; and if we add a leſs degree of Whiteneſs to a greater, we are ſo far from increaſing, that we diminiſh it. Thoſe *Ideas* that conſiſt not of Parts, cannot be augmented to what proportion Men pleaſe, or be ſtretch'd beyond what they have receiv'd by their Senſes; but Space, Duration, and Number, being capable of Increaſe by Repetition, leave in the Mind an *Idea* of an endleſs room for more: nor can we conceive any where a ſtop to a farther Addition or Progreſſion, and ſo thoſe *Ideas* alone lead our Minds towards the Thought of Infinity.

Difference between Infinity of Space, and Space infinite.

§. 7. Tho' our *Idea* of Infinity ariſe from the Contemplation of Quantity, and the endleſs Increaſe the Mind is able to make in Quantity, by the repeated Additions of what Portions thereof it pleaſes; yet I gueſs we cauſe great confuſion in our Thoughts, when we join Infinity to any ſuppos'd *Idea* of Quantity the Mind can be thought to have, and ſo diſcourſe or reaſon about an infinite Quantity, *viz.* an infinite Space, or an infinite Duration. For, *our Idea of Infinity* being, as I think, *an endleſs growing Idea*, but the *Idea* of any Quantity the Mind has, being at that time terminated in that *Idea*, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is) to join Infinity to it, is to adjuſt a ſtanding Meaſure to a growing Bulk; and therefore I think it is not an inſignificant Subtilty, if I ſay that we are carefully to diſtinguiſh between the *Idea* of the Infinity of Space, and the *Idea* of a Space infinite: The firſt is nothing but a ſuppos'd endleſs Progreſſion of the Mind, over what repeated *Ideas* of Space it pleaſes; but to have actually in the Mind the *Ideas* of a Space infinite, is to ſuppoſe the Mind already paſs'd over, and actually to have a view of all thoſe repeated *Ideas* of Space, which an endleſs Repetition can never totally repreſent to it; which carries in it a plain Contradiction.

We have no Idea of infinite Space.

§. 8. This perhaps will be a little plainer, if we conſider it in Numbers. The Infinity of Numbers, to the end of whoſe Addition every one perceives there is no approach, eaſily appears to any one that reflects on it: but how clear ſoever this *Idea* of the Infinity of Number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the Abſurdity of the actual *Idea* of an infinite Number. Whatſoever poſitive *Ideas* we have in our Minds of any Space, Duration, or Number, let them be ever ſo great, they are ſtill finite; but when we ſuppoſe an inexhauſtible Remainder, from which we remove all Bounds, and wherein we allow the Mind an endleſs Progreſſion of Thought, without ever compleating the *Idea*, there we have our *Idea* of Infinity, which tho' it ſeems to be pretty clear when we conſider nothing elſe in it but the Negation of an End, yet when we would frame in our Minds the *Idea* of an infinite Space or Duration, that *Idea* is very obſcure and confus'd, becauſe it is made up of two Parts, very different, if not inconſiſtent. For let a Man frame in his Mind an *Idea* of any Space or Number, as great as he will; 'tis plain the Mind reſts and terminates in that *Idea*, which is contrary to the *Idea of Infinity*, which *conſiſts in a ſuppos'd endleſs Progreſſion.* And therefore I think it is, that we are ſo eaſily confounded, when we come to argue and reaſon about infinite Space or Duration, *&c.* Becauſe the Parts of ſuch an *Idea* not being perceiv'd to be, as they are, inconſiſtent, the one ſide or other always perplexes whatever Conſequences we draw from the other; as an *Idea* of Motion not paſſing on, would perplex any one, who ſhould argue from ſuch an *Idea*, which is not better than an *Idea* of Motion at reſt: and ſuch another ſeems to me to be the *Idea* of a Space, or (which is the ſame thing) a Number infinite, *i. e.* of a Space or Number which the Mind actually has, and ſo views, and terminates in; and of a Space or Number, which in a conſtant and endleſs enlarging and progreſſion, it can in Thought never attain to. For how large ſoever an *Idea* of Space I have in my Mind, it

is no larger than it is that inſtant that I have it, tho' I be capable the next inſtant to double it, and ſo on *in infinitum:* For that alone is infinite, which has no bounds; and that the *Idea* of Infinity, in which our Thoughts can find none.

Number affords us the cleareſt Idea *of Infinity.*

§. 9. But of all other *Ideas*, it is *Number*, as I have ſaid, which I think *furniſhes us with the cleareſt and moſt diſtinct* Idea *of Infinity* we are capable of. For even in Space and Duration, when the Mind purſues the *Idea* of Infinity, it there makes uſe of the *Ideas* and Repetitions of Numbers, as of Millions of Millions of Miles, or Years, which are ſo many diſtinct *Ideas*, kept beſt by Number from running into a confus'd heap, wherein the Mind loſes it ſelf; and when it has added together as many Millions, *&c.* as it pleaſes, of known Lengths of Space or Duration, the cleareſt *Idea* it can get of Infinity, is the confus'd incomprehenſible Remainder of endleſs addible Numbers, which affords no proſpect of Stop or Boundary.

Our different Conception of Infinity of Number, Duration, and Expanſion.

§. 10. It will perhaps give us a little farther Light into the *Idea* we have *of Infinity*, and diſcover to us that it *is nothing but the Infinity of Number apply'd to determinate Parts*, of which we have in our Minds the diſtinct *Ideas*, if we conſider, that Number is not generally thought by us infinite, whereas Duration and Extenſion are apt to be ſo; which ariſes from hence, that in Number we are at one end as it were: For there being in Number nothing leſs than an Unit, we there ſtop, and are at an end; but in Addition or Increaſe of Number, we can ſet no Bounds: And ſo it is like a Line, whereof one end terminating with us, the other is extended ſtill forwards beyond all that we can conceive; but in Space and Duration it is otherwiſe. For in Duration we conſider it, as if this Line of Number were extended both ways to an unconceivable, undeterminate, and infinite Length; which is evident to any one that will but reflect on what Conſideration he hath of Eternity; which, I ſuppoſe, he will find to be nothing elſe, but the turning this Infinity of Number both ways, *à parte ante*, and *à parte poſt*, as they ſpeak. For when we would conſider Eternity, *à parte ante*, what do we but, beginning from our ſelves and the preſent time we are in, repeat in our Minds the *Ideas* of Years, or Ages, or any other aſſignable Portion of Duration paſt, with a Proſpect of proceeding in ſuch Addition, with all the Infinity of Number? And when we would conſider Eternity, *à parte poſt*, we juſt after the ſame rate begin from our ſelves, and reckon by multiply'd Periods yet to come, ſtill extending that Line of Number, as before. And theſe two being put together, are that infinite Duration we call *Eternity*; which, as we turn our View either way, forwards or backwards, appears infinite, becauſe we ſtill turn that way the infinite End of Number, *i. e.* the Power ſtill of adding more.

Infinite Diviſibility.

§. 11. The ſame happens alſo in Space, wherein, conceiving our ſelves to be as it were in the Center, we do on all ſides purſue thoſe indeterminable Lines of Number; and reckoning any way from our ſelves, a Yard, Mile, Diameter of the Earth, or *Orbis Magnus*, by the Infinity of Number, we add others to them as often as we will; and having no more reaſon to ſet Bounds to thoſe repeated *Ideas* than we have to ſet Bounds to Number, we have that indeterminable *Idea of Immenſity.*

No poſitive Idea *of Infinite.*

§. 12. And ſince in any bulk of Matter our Thoughts can never arrive at the utmoſt *Diviſibility*, therefore there is an apparent Infinity to us alſo in that which has the Infinity alſo of Number; but with this difference, that in the former Conſiderations of the Infinity of Space and Duration, we only uſe Addition of Numbers; whereas this is like the diviſion of an Unit into its Fractions, wherein the Mind alſo can proceed *in infinitum*, as well as in the former Additions, it being indeed but the Addition ſtill of new Numbers: Tho' in the Addition of the one, we can have no more the poſitive *Idea* of a Space infinitely great, than in the Diviſion of the other, we can have the *Idea* of a Body infinitely little; our *Idea* of Infinity being, as I may ſay, a growing and fugitive *Idea*, ſtill in a boundleſs Progreſſion, that can ſtop no where.

§. 13. Tho' it be hard, I think, to find any one ſo abſurd as to ſay, he has the poſitive *Idea* of an actual infinite Number; the Infinity whereof lies only in a power ſtill of adding any Combination of Units to any former Number, and that as long and as much as one will; the like alſo being in the Infinity of Space and Duration, which power leaves always to the Mind room for endleſs

leſs Additions; yet there be thoſe, who imagine they have *poſitive* Ideas *of infinite* Duration and Space. It would, I think, be enough to deſtroy any ſuch poſitive *Idea* of Infinite, to ask him that has it, whether he could add to it or no; which would eaſily ſhew the miſtake of ſuch a poſitive *Idea*. We can, I think, have no poſitive *Idea* of any Space or Duration which is not made up, and commenſurate to repeated numbers of Feet or Yards, or Days and Years, which are the common Meaſures, whereof we have the *Ideas* in our Minds, and whereby we judg of the greatneſs of theſe ſort of Quantities. And therefore, ſince an *Idea* of infinite Space or Duration muſt needs be made up of infinite Parts, it can have no other Infinity than that of Number, capable ſtill of farther Addition, but not an actual poſitive *Idea* of a Number infinite. For, I think, it is evident that the Addition of finite things together (as are all Lengths, whereof we have the poſitive *Ideas*) can never otherwiſe produce the *Idea* of Infinite, than as Number does; which, conſiſting of Additions of finite Units one to another, ſuggeſts the *Idea* of Infinite, only by a power we find we have of ſtill increaſing the Sum, and adding more of the ſame kind, without coming one jot nearer the end of ſuch Progreſſion.

§. 14. They who would prove their *Idea of Infinite to be poſitive*, ſeem to me to do it by a pleaſant Argument, taken from the Negation of an end; which being negative, the Negation of it is poſitive. He that conſiders that the End is, in Body, but the Extremity or Superficies of that Body, will not perhaps be forward to grant that the End is a bare Negative: And he that perceives the end of his Pen is black or white, will be apt to think that the end is ſomething more than a pure Negation. Nor is it, when apply'd to Duration, the bare Negation of Exiſtence, but more properly the laſt moment of it. But if they will have the End to be nothing but the bare Negation of Exiſtence, I am ſure they cannot deny but the Beginning is the firſt inſtant of Being, and is not by any body conceiv'd to be a bare Negation; and therefore by their own Argument, the *Idea* of Eternal, *a parte ante*, or of a Duration without a Beginning, is but a negative *Idea*.

What is poſitive, what negative in our Idea of Infinite.

§. 15. The *Idea* of Infinite has, I confeſs, ſomething of poſitive in all thoſe things we apply to it. When we would think of infinite Space or Duration, we at firſt ſtep uſually make ſome very large *Idea*, as perhaps of Millions of Ages, or Miles, which poſſibly we double and multiply ſeveral times. All that we thus amaſs together in our Thoughts is poſitive, and the aſſemblage of a great number of poſitive *Ideas* of Space or Duration. But what ſtill remains beyond this, we have no more a poſitive diſtinct Notion of, than a Mariner has of the depth of the Sea; where having let down a large portion of his Sounding-line, he reaches no bottom: Whereby he knows the depth to be ſo many Fathoms, and more; but how much that more is, he hath no diſtinct Notion at all: And could he always ſupply new Line, and find the Plummet always ſink, without ever ſtopping, he would be ſomething in the poſture of the Mind reaching after a compleat and poſitive *Idea* of Infinity. In which caſe let this Line be 10, or 10,000 Fathoms long, it equally diſcovers what is beyond it; and gives only this confus'd and comparative *Idea*, that this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the Mind comprehends of any Space, it has a poſitive *Idea* of: But in endeavouring to make it Infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the *Idea* is ſtill imperfect and incompleat. So much Space as the Mind takes a view of in its Contemplation of Greatneſs, is a clear Picture and poſitive in the Underſtanding: but Infinite is ſtill greater. 1. Then, *the* Idea *of ſo much, is poſitive* and clear. 2. *The* Idea *of Greater is alſo clear, but it* is but a *comparative* Idea. 3. *The* Idea *of ſo much greater as cannot be comprehended*; and this is *plain negative*, not poſitive. For he has no poſitive clear *Idea* of the largeneſs of any Extenſion, (which is that ſought for in the *Idea* of Infinite) that has not a comprehenſive *Idea* of the Dimenſions of it: And ſuch no body, I think, pretends to in what is Infinite. For to ſay a Man has a poſitive clear *Idea* of any Quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reaſonable as to ſay, he has the poſitive clear *Idea* of the Number of the Sands on the Sea-ſhore, who knows not how many they be; but only that they are more than twenty. For juſt ſuch a perfect and poſitive *Idea* has he of an infinite Space or Duration, who ſays it is larger than the Extent or Duration of 10, 100, 1000, or any

other number of Miles, or Years, whereof he has, or can have a positive *Idea*; which is all the *Idea* I think, we have of Infinite. So that what lies beyond our positive *Idea* towards Infinity, lies in Obscurity; and has the indeterminate confusion of a negative *Idea*, wherein I know I neither do nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow Capacity: And that cannot but be very far from a positive compleat *Idea*, wherein the greatest part of what I would comprehend is left out, under the undeterminate intimation of being still greater: For to say, that having in any Quantity measur'd so much, or gone so far, you are not yet at the end, is only to say, that that Quantity is greater. So that the Negation of an End in any Quantity, is in other words, only to say, that it is bigger: and a total Negation of an End is but carrying this bigger still with you, in all the progressions your Thoughts shall make in Quantity; and adding this *Idea* of still greater to all the *Ideas* you have, or can be suppos'd to have, of Quantity. Now whether such an *Idea* as that be positive, I leave any one to consider.

We have no positive Idea *of an infinite Duration.*

§. 16. I ask those who say they have a *positive* Idea of *Eternity*, whether their *Idea* of Duration includes in it Succession, or not? If it does not, they ought to shew the Difference of their Notion of Duration, when apply'd to an eternal Being, and to a finite: since perhaps there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this Point; and acknowledg, that the Notion they have of Duration forces them to conceive, that whatever has Duration, is of a longer continuance to-Day than it was Yesterday. If to avoid Succession in eternal Existence, they recur to the *Punctum Stans* of the Schools, I suppose they will thereby very little mend the Matter, or help us to a more clear and positive *Idea* of infinite Duration, there being nothing more inconceivable to me than Duration without Succession. Besides that *Punctum Stans*, if it signify any thing, being not *Quantum*, finite or infinite, cannot belong to it. But if our weak apprehensions cannot separate Succession from any Duration whatsoever, our *Idea* of Eternity can be nothing but of infinite Succession of moments of Duration, wherein any thing does exist; and whether any one has, or can have a positive *Idea* of an actual infinite Number, I leave him to consider, till his infinite Number be so great that he himself can add no more to it; and as long as he can increase it, I doubt he himself will think the *Idea* he hath of it, a little too scanty for positive Infinity.

§. 17. I think it unavoidable for every considering rational Creature, that will but examine his own or any other Existence, to have the Notion of an eternal wise Being, who had no Beginning: And such an *Idea* of infinite Duration I am sure I have. But this *Negation of a Beginning* being but the Negation of a positive thing, *scarce gives* me *a positive* Idea *of Infinity*; which whenever I endeavour to extend my Thoughts to, I confess my self at a loss, and find I cannot attain any clear comprehension of it.

No positive Idea *of infinite Space.*

§. 18. He that thinks he has a positive *Idea* of infinite Space, will, when he considers it, find that he can *no* more have a *positive Idea* of the greatest, than he has *of the least Space*. For in this latter, which seems the easier of the two, and more within our Comprehension, we are capable only of a comparative *Idea* of Smallness, which will always be less than any one whereof we have the positive *Idea*. All our positive *Ideas* of any Quantity, whether great or little, have always bounds; tho' our comparative *Idea*, whereby we can always add to the one and take from the other, hath no Bounds: For that which remains either great or little, not being comprehended in that positive *Idea* which we have, lies in obscurity; and we have no other *Idea* of it, but of the Power of enlarging the one and distinguishing the other, without ceasing. A Pestle and Mortar will as soon bring any Particle of Matter to Indivisibility, as the acutest Thought of a Mathematician: And a Surveyor may as soon with his Chain measure out infinite Space, as a Philosopher by the quickest flight of Mind reach it, or by thinking comprehend it; which is to have a positive *Idea* of it. He that thinks on a Cube of an Inch Diameter, has a clear and positive *Idea* of it in his Mind, and so can frame one of $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$, and so on till he has the *Idea* in his Thoughts of something very little; but yet reaches not the *Idea* of that incomprehensible Littleness which Division can produce. What remains of Smallness, is as far from his Thoughts as when he first began; and therefore he never comes at all

all to have a clear and positive *Idea* of that Smallneſs, which is conſequent to infinite Diviſibility.

What is poſitive, what negative, in our Idea of Infinite.

§. 19. Every one that looks towards Infinity, does, as I have ſaid, at firſt glance make ſome very large *Idea* of that which he applies it to, let it be Space or Duration; and poſſibly he wearies his Thoughts, by multiplying in his Mind that firſt large *Idea*; But yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a *poſitive clear Idea* of what remains to make up a poſitive infinite, than the Country-fellow had of the Water, which was yet to come and paſs the Chanel of the River where he ſtood:

Ruſticus expectat dum tranſeat amnis, at ille
Labitur, & labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

Some think they have a poſitive Idea of Eternity, and not of infinite Space.

§. 20. There are ſome I have met with, that put ſo much difference between infinite Duration and infinite Space, that they perſuade themſelves that they have a *poſitive* Idea *of Eternity*; *but* that they *have not*, nor can have any *Idea of infinite Space.* The reaſon of which miſtake I ſuppoſe to be this, That finding by a due Contemplation of Cauſes and Effects, that it is neceſſary to admit ſome eternal Being, and ſo to conſider the real Exiſtence of that Being, as taking up and commenſurate to their *Idea* of Eternity; but on the other ſide, not finding it neceſſary, but on the contrary, apparently abſurd that Body ſhould be infinite; they forwardly conclude, they can have no *Idea* of infinite Space, becauſe they can have no *Idea* of infinite Matter. Which conſequence, I conceive, is very ill collected; becauſe the Exiſtence of Matter is no ways neceſſary to the Exiſtence of Space, no more than the Exiſtence of Motion, or the Sun, is neceſſary to Duration, tho' Duration uſes to be meaſur'd by it: And I doubt not but a Man may have the *Idea* of 10,000 Miles ſquare, without any Body ſo big, as well as the *Idea* of 10,000 Years, without any Body ſo old. It ſeems as eaſy to me to have the *Idea* of Space empty of Body, as to think of the capacity of a Buſhel without Corn, or the hollow of a Nutſhel without a Kernel in it: It being more neceſſary that there ſhould be exiſting a ſolid Body infinitely extended, becauſe we have an *Idea* of the Infinity of Space, than it is neceſſary that the World ſhould be Eternal, becauſe we have an *Idea* of infinite Duration. And why ſhould we think our *Idea* of infinite Space requires the real Exiſtence of Matter to ſupport it, when we find that we have as clear an *Idea* of infinite Duration to come, as we have of infinite Duration paſt? Tho', I ſuppoſe, no body thinks it conceivable, that any thing does, or has exiſted in that future Duration. Nor is it poſſible to join our *Idea* of future Duration with preſent or paſt Exiſtence, any more than it is poſſible to make the *Ideas* of Yeſterday, to Day, and to-Morrow, to be the ſame; or bring Ages paſt and future together, and make them contemporary. But if theſe Men are of the Mind, that they have clearer *Ideas* of infinite Duration than of infinite Space; becauſe it is paſt doubt, that GOD has exiſted from all Eternity, but there is no real Matter co-extended with infinite Space: yet thoſe Philoſophers who are of Opinion, that Infinite Space is poſſeſs'd by GOD's infinite Omnipreſence, as well as infinite Duration by his eternal Exiſtence, muſt be allow'd to have as clear an *Idea* of infinite Space as of infinite Duration; tho' neither of them, I think, has any *poſitive* Idea *of Infinity* in either Caſe. For whatſoever poſitive *Ideas* a Man has in his Mind of any Quantity, he can repeat it, and add it to the former as eaſy as he can add together the *Ideas* of two Days, or two Paces; which are poſitive *Ideas* of Lengths he has in his Mind, and ſo on as long as he pleaſes: Whereby if a Man had a poſitive *Idea* of infinite, either Duration or Space, he could add two Infinites together; nay, make one Infinite infinitely bigger than another: Abſurdities too groſs to be confuted.

Suppoſed poſitive Ideas of Infinity, cauſe of Miſtakes.

§. 21. But yet after all this, there being Men who perſuade themſelves that they have clear poſitive comprehenſive *Ideas* of Infinity, 'tis fit they enjoy their Privilege: And I ſhould be very glad (with ſome others that I know, who acknowledg they have none ſuch) to be better inform'd by their Communication. For I have been hitherto apt to think, that the great and *inextricable Difficulties* which perpetually involve all Diſcourſes *concerning Infinity*, whether of Space, Duration, or Diviſibility, have been the certain *marks of a Defect in our* Ideas *of Infinity*, and the diſproportion the Nature thereof has to the Compre-

henſion of our narrow Capacities. For whilſt Men talk and diſpute of infinite Space or Duration, as if they had as compleat and poſitive *Ideas* of them, as they have of the Names they uſe for them, or as they have of a Yard, or an Hour, or any other determinate Quantity; it is no wonder if the incomprehenſible Nature of the thing they diſcourſe of or reaſon about, leads them into Perplexities and Contradictions; and their Minds be overlaid by an Object too large and mighty to be ſurvey'd and manag'd by them.

All theſe Ideas from Senſation and Reflection.

§. 22. If I have dwelt pretty long on the Conſiderations of Duration, Space, and Number, and what ariſes from the Contemplation of them, Infinity; 'tis poſſibly no more than the Matter requires, there being few ſimple *Ideas*, whoſe Modes give more exercise to the of Thoughts Men than theſe do. I pretend not to treat of them in their full Latitude; it ſuffices to my Deſign, to ſhew how the Mind receives them, ſuch as they are, from *Senſation* and *Reflection*; and how even the *Idea* we have of *Infinity*, how remote ſoever it may ſeem to be from any Object of Senſe, or Operation of our Mind, has nevertheleſs, as all our other *Ideas*, its Original there. Some Mathematicians perhaps of advanc'd Speculations, may have other ways to introduce into their Minds *Ideas* of Infinity; but this hinders not, but that they themſelves, as well as all other Men, got the firſt *Ideas* which they had of Infinity, from Senſation and Reflection, in the Method we have here ſet down.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of other ſimple Modes.

Modes of Motion.

§. 1. THO' I have in the foregoing Chapters ſhewn, how from ſimple *Ideas* taken in by Senſation, the Mind comes to extend it ſelf even to Infinity; which however it may, of all others, ſeem moſt remote from any ſenſible Perception; yet at laſt hath nothing in it but what is made out of ſimple *Ideas*, receiv'd into the Mind by the Senſes, and afterwards there put together by the Faculty the Mind has to repeat its own *Ideas*: Tho' I ſay, theſe might be Inſtances enough of ſimple Modes of the ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation and ſuffice to ſhew how the Mind comes by them; yet I ſhall for Method's ſake, tho' briefly, give an account of ſome few more, and then proceed to more complex *Ideas*.

§. 2. To *ſlide*, *roll*, *tumble*, *walk*, *creep*, *run*, *dance*, *leap*, *ſkip*, and abundance others that might be named, are words which are no ſooner heard, but every one who underſtands *Engliſh*, has preſently in his Mind diſtinct *Ideas*, which are all but the different Modifications of Motion. *Modes of Motion* anſwer thoſe of Extenſion: *Swift and Slow* are two different *Ideas* of Motion, the Meaſures whereof are made of the diſtances of Time and Space put together; ſo they are complex *Ideas* comprehending Time and Space with Motion.

Modes of Sounds.

§. 3. The like variety have we in Sounds. Every articulate word is a different *Modification of Sound*: By which we ſee, that from the Senſe of Hearing by ſuch Modifications, the Mind may be furniſh'd with diſtinct *Ideas* to almoſt an infinite number. Sounds alſo, beſides the diſtinct Cries of Birds and Beaſts, are modify'd by diverſity of Notes of different length put together, which make that complex *Idea* call'd a *Tune*, which a Muſician may have in his Mind when he hears or makes no Sound at all, by reflecting on the *Ideas* of thoſe Sounds ſo put together ſilently in his own Fancy.

Modes of Colours.

§. 4. Thoſe of Colours are alſo very various: Some we take notice of as the different Degrees, or, as they are term'd, *Shades of the ſame Colour*. But ſince we very ſeldom make aſſemblages of Colours either for Uſe or Delight, but Figure is taken in alſo and has its part in it; as in Painting, Weaving, Needle-Works, &c. thoſe which are taken notice of, do moſt commonly belong to mix'd Modes, as being made-up of *Ideas* of divers kinds, *viz.* Figure and Colour, ſuch as *Beauty*, *Rainbow*, &c.

Modes of Taſte.

§. 5. All *compounded Taſtes and Smells* are alſo Modes made up of the ſimple *Ideas* of thoſe Senſes. But they being ſuch as generally we have no names for, are

are leſs taken notice of, and cannot be ſet down in writing; and therefore muſt be left without Enumeration to the Thoughts and Experience of my Reader.

§. 6. In general it may be obſerv'd, that thoſe *ſimple Modes which are conſider'd but as different Degrees of the ſame ſimple* Idea, tho' they are in themſelves many of them very diſtinct *Ideas*, yet *have ordinarily no diſtinct names*, nor are much taken notice of as diſtinct *Ideas*, where the difference is but very ſmall between them. Whether Men have neglected theſe Modes, and given no Names to them, as wanting Meaſures nicely to diſtinguiſh them; or becauſe when they were ſo diſtinguiſh'd, that Knowledg would not be of general or neceſſary Uſe, I leave it to the Thoughts of others: it is ſufficient to my purpoſe to ſhew, that all our ſimple *Ideas* come to our Minds only by Senſation and Reflection; and that when the Mind has them, it can variouſly repeat and compound them, and ſo make new complex *Ideas*. But tho' White, Red, or Sweet, *&c.* have not been modify'd or made into complex *Ideas*, by ſeveral Combinations ſo as to be named, and thereby rank'd into Species; yet ſome others of the ſimple *Ideas*, *viz.* thoſe of Unity, Duration, Motion, *&c.* above inſtanc'd in, as alſo Power and Thinking, have been thus modify'd to a great variety of complex *Ideas*, with Names belonging to them.

§. 7. *The reaſon whereof*, I ſuppoſe, has been this, That the great Concernment of Men being with Men one amongſt another, the knowledg of Men and their Actions, and the ſignifying of them to one another, was moſt neceſſary; and therefore they made *Ideas* of Actions very nicely modify'd, and gave thoſe complex *Ideas* Names, that they might the more eaſily record, and diſcourſe of thoſe things they were daily converſant in, without long Ambages and Circumlocutions; and that the things they were continually to give and receive Information about, might be the eaſier and quicker underſtood. That this is ſo, and that Men in framing different complex *Ideas*, and giving them Names, have been much govern'd by the end of Speech in general, (which is a very ſhort and expedite way of conveying their Thoughts one to another) is evident in the Names, which in ſeveral Arts have been found out, and apply'd to ſeveral complex *Ideas* of modify'd Actions belonging to their ſeveral Trades, for diſpatch-ſake, in their Direction or Diſcourſes about them. Which *Ideas* are not generally fram'd in the Minds of Men, not converſant about theſe Operations. And thence the words that ſtand for them, by the greateſt part of Men of the ſame Language, are not underſtood: *v. g. Coliſbire*, *Drilling*, *Filtration*, *Cohobation*, are words ſtanding for certain complex *Ideas*, which being ſeldom in the Minds of any but thoſe few whoſe particular Imployments do at every turn ſuggeſt them to their Thoughts, thoſe Names of them are not generally underſtood but by Smiths and Chymiſts; who having fram'd the complex *Ideas* which theſe words ſtand for, and having given Names to them, or received them from others upon hearing of theſe Names in communication, readily conceived thoſe *Ideas* in their Minds; as by *Cohobation* all the ſimple *Ideas* of Diſtilling, and the pouring the Liquor diſtill'd from any thing, back upon the remaining Matter, and diſtilling it again. Thus we ſee that there are great varieties of ſimple *Ideas*, as of Taſtes and Smells, which have no Names; and of Modes many more. Which either not having been generally enough obſerv'd, or elſe not being of any great uſe to be taken notice of in the Affairs and Converſe of Men, they have not had Names given to them, and ſo paſs not for Species. This we ſhall have occaſion hereafter to conſider more at large, when we come to ſpeak of Words.

Why ſome Modes have, and others have not Names.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

§. 1. WHEN the Mind turns its View inwards upon it ſelf, and contemplates its own Actions, *Thinking* is the firſt that occurs. In it the Mind obſerves a great variety of Modifications, and from thence receives diſtinct *Ideas*. Thus the Perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed

Senſation, Remembrance, Contemplation, &c.

to

to any Impreſſion on the Body, made by an external Object, being diſtinct from all other Modifications of *Thinking*, furniſhes the Mind with a diſtinct *Idea*, which we call *Senſation*; which is, as it were, the actual Entrance of any *Idea* into the Underſtanding by the Senſes. The ſame *Idea*, when it again recurs without the Operation of the like Object on the external Senſory, is *Remembrance*: If it be ſought after by the Mind, and with Pain and Endeavour found, and brought again in view, 'tis *Recollection*; if it be held there long under attentive Conſideration, 'tis *Contemplation*. When *Ideas* float in our Mind, without any Reflection or Regard of the Underſtanding, it is that which the *French* call *Reverie*, our Language has ſcarce a Name for it. When the *Ideas* that offer themſelves (for, as I have obſerv'd in another place, whilſt we are awake, there will always be a Train of *Ideas* ſucceeding one another in our Minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, regiſter'd in the Memory, it is *Attention*. When the Mind with great Earneſtneſs, and of Choice, fixes its View on any *Idea*, conſiders it on all ſides, and will not be call'd off by the ordinary Sollicitation of other *Ideas*, it is that we call *Intention*, or *Study*: Sleep, without dreaming, is Reſt from all theſe: And *Dreaming* it ſelf, is the having of *Ideas* (whilſt the outward Senſes are ſtop'd, ſo that they receive not outward Objects with their uſual Quickneſs) in the Mind, not ſuggeſted by any external Objects, or known Occaſion, nor under any Choice or Conduct of the Underſtanding at all. And whether that, which we call *Extaſy*, be not dreaming with the Eyes open, I leave to be examin'd.

§. 2. Theſe are ſome few Inſtances of thoſe various *Modes of Thinking*, which the Mind may obſerve in it ſelf, and ſo have as diſtinct *Ideas* of, as it hath of *White*, and *Red*, a *Square* or a *Circle*. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this Set of *Ideas*, which are got from *Reflection*: That would be to make a Volume. It ſuffices to my preſent purpoſe to have ſhewn here, by ſome few Examples, of what ſort theſe *Ideas* are, and how the Mind comes by them; eſpecially ſince I ſhall have occaſion hereafter to treat more at large of *Reaſoning*, *Judging*, *Volition* and *Knowledg*, which are ſome of the moſt conſiderable Operations of the Mind, and *Modes of Thinking*.

The various Attention of the Mind in Thinking.

§. 3. But perhaps it may not be an unpardonable Digreſſion, nor wholly impertinent to our preſent Deſign, if we reflect here upon *the different State of the Mind in Thinking*, which thoſe Inſtances of Attention, *Reverie* and Dreaming, *&c.* before-mention'd, naturally enough ſuggeſt. That there are *Ideas*, ſome or other, always preſent in the Mind of a waking Man, every one's Experience convinces him, tho' the Mind imploys it ſelf about them with ſeveral Degrees of Attention. Sometimes the Mind fixes it ſelf with ſo much Earneſtneſs on the Contemplation of ſome Objects, that it turns their *Ideas* on all ſides, remarks their Relations and Circumſtances, and views every part ſo nicely, and with ſuch Intention, that it ſhuts out all other Thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary Impreſſions made then on the Senſes, which at another ſeaſon would produce very ſenſible Perceptions: At other times it barely obſerves the Train of *Ideas* that ſucceed in the Underſtanding, without directing and purſuing any of them; and at other times it lets them paſs almoſt quite unregarded, as faint Shadows that make no Impreſſion.

Hence 'tis probable that Thinking is the Action, not Eſſence of the Soul.

§. 4. This Difference of *Intention*, and *Remiſſion* of the Mind in thinking, with a great variety of Degrees between earneſt Study, and very near minding nothing at all; every one, I think, has experimented in himſelf. Trace it a little farther, and you find the Mind in Sleep retir'd as it were from the Senſes, and out of the reach of thoſe Motions made on the Organs of Senſe, which at other times produce very vivid and ſenſible *Ideas*. I need not for this inſtance in thoſe who ſleep out whole ſtormy Nights, without hearing the Thunder, or ſeeing the Lightning, or feeling the ſhaking of the Houſe, which are ſenſible enough to thoſe who are waking: But in this Retirement of the Mind from the Senſes, it often retains a yet more looſe and incoherent manner of *Thinking*, which we call *Dreaming*; and laſt of all, ſound Sleep cloſes the Scene quite, and puts an end to all Appearances. This, I think, almoſt every one has experience of in himſelf, and his own Obſervation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, That ſince the Mind can ſenſibly put on, at ſeveral times, ſeveral degrees of *Thinking*, and be

be ſometimes even in a waking Man ſo remiſs, as to have Thoughts dim and obſcure to that degree, that they are very little remov'd from none at all; and at laſt, in the dark Retirements of ſound Sleep, loſes the Sight perfectly of all *Ideas* whatſoever: Since, I ſay, this is evidently ſo in Matter of Fact, and conſtant Experience, I ask whether it be not probable that *Thinking is the Action, and not the Eſſence of the Soul?* Since the Operations of Agents will eaſily admit of Intention and Remiſſion, but the Eſſences of things are not conceiv'd capable of any ſuch Variation. But this by the By.

CHAP. XX.

Of Modes of Pleaſure and Pain.

Pleaſure and Pain ſimple Ideas.

§. 1. AMONGST the ſimple *Ideas*, which we receive both from *Senſation* and *Reflection*, *Pain* and *Pleaſure* are two very conſiderable ones. For, as in the Body there is Senſation barely in it ſelf, or accompany'd with *Pain* or *Pleaſure*; ſo the Thought or Preception of the mind is ſimply ſo, or elſe accompany'd alſo with *Pleaſure* or *Pain*, Delight or Trouble, call it how you pleaſe. Theſe, like other ſimple *Ideas*, cannot be deſcrib'd, nor their Names defin'd; the way of knowing them, is, as of the ſimple *Ideas* of the Senſes, only by Experience. For to define them by the Preſence of Good or Evil, is no otherwiſe to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in our ſelves, upon the ſeveral and various Operations of Good and Evil upon our Minds, as they are differently apply'd to or conſider'd by us.

Good and Evil, what.

§. 2. Things then are Good or Evil, only in reference to Pleaſure or Pain. That we call *Good*, which *is apt to cauſe or increaſe Pleaſure, or diminiſh Pain in us; or elſe to procure or preſerve us the Poſſeſſion of any other Good, or Abſence of any Evil.* And on the contrary, we name that *Evil*, which *is apt to produce or increaſe any Pain, or diminiſh any Pleaſure in us; or elſe to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good.* By Pleaſure and Pain, I muſt be underſtood to mean of Body or Mind, as they are commonly diſtinguiſh'd; tho' in truth they be only different Conſtitutions of the Mind, ſometimes occaſion'd by Diſorder in the Body, ſometimes by Thoughts of the Mind.

Our Paſſions mov'd by Good and Evil.

§. 3. *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, and that which cauſes them, Good and Evil, are the Hinges on which our *Paſſions* turn: And if we reflect on our ſelves, and obſerve how theſe, under various Conſiderations, operate in us; what Modifications or Tempers of Mind, what internal Senſations (if I may ſo call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to our ſelves the *Ideas* of our *Paſſions*.

Love.

§. 4. Thus any one reflecting upon the Thought he has of the Delight, which any preſent or abſent thing is apt to produce in him, has the *Idea* we call *Love*. For when a Man declares in Autumn, when he is eating them, or in Spring, when there are none, that he *loves* Grapes, it is no more but that the Taſte of Grapes delights him; let an Alteration of Health or Conſtitution deſtroy the Delight of their Taſte, and he then can be ſaid to *love* Grapes no longer.

Hatred.

§. 5. On the contrary, the Thought of the Pain, which any thing preſent or abſent is apt to produce in us, is what we call *Hatred*. Were it my buſineſs here to enquire any farther than into the bare *Ideas* of our Paſſions, as they depend on different Modifications of Pleaſure and Pain, I ſhould remark, that our *Love* and *Hatred* of inanimate inſenſible Beings, is commonly founded on that Pleaſure and Pain which we receive from their Uſe and Application any way to our Senſes, tho' with their Deſtruction: But *Hatred* or *Love*, to Beings capable of Happineſs or Miſery, is often the Uneaſineſs or Delight, which we find in ourſelves ariſing from a Conſideration of their very Being or Happineſs. Thus the Being and Welfare of a Man's Children or Friends, producing conſtant Delight in him, he is ſaid conſtantly to *love* them. But it ſuffices to note, that our *Ideas* of *Love* and *Hatred* are but the Diſpoſitions of the Mind, in reſpect of Pleaſure and Pain in general, however caus'd in us.

§. 6.

Deſire. §. 6. The Uneaſineſs a Man finds in himſelf upon the Abſence of any thing, whoſe preſent Enjoyment carries the *Idea* of Delight with it, is that we call *Deſire*; which is greater or leſs, as that Uneaſineſs is more or leſs vehement. Where by the By, it may perhaps be of ſome uſe to remark, that the chief, if not only Spur to humane Induſtry and Action, is Uneaſineſs. For whatever Good is propos'd, if its Abſence carries no Diſpleaſure nor Pain with it, if a Man be eaſy and content without it, there is no Deſire of it, nor Endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare *Velleity*, the term us'd to ſignify the loweſt degree of Deſire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is ſo little Uneaſineſs in the Abſence of any thing, that it carries a Man no farther than ſome faint Wiſhes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous Uſe of the Means to attain it. *Deſire* alſo is ſtopp'd or abated by the Opinion of the Impoſſibility or Unattainableneſs of the Good propos'd, as far as the Uneaſineſs is cur'd or allay'd by that Conſideration. This might carry our Thoughts farther, were it ſeaſonable in this place.

Joy. §. 7. *Joy* is a delight of the Mind, from the Conſideration of the preſent or aſſur'd approaching poſſeſſion of a Good; and we are then poſſeſs'd of any Good, when we have it ſo in our power, that we can uſe it when we pleaſe. Thus a Man almoſt ſtarv'd has *Joy* at the arrival of Relief, even before he has the Pleaſure of uſing it: And a Father, in whom the very Well-being of his Children cauſes Delight, is always, as long as his Children are in ſuch a State, in the poſſeſſion of that Good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that Pleaſure.

Sorrow. §. 8. *Sorrow* is Uneaſineſs in the Mind, upon the thought of a Good loſt, which might have been enjoy'd longer; or the Senſe of a preſent Evil.

Hope. §. 9. *Hope* is that Pleaſure in the Mind, which every one finds in himſelf, upon the thought of a profitable future Enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him.

Fear. §. 10. *Fear* is an Uneaſineſs of the Mind, upon the thought of future Evil likely to befal us.

Deſpair. §. 11. *Deſpair* is the Thought of the Unattainableneſs of any Good, which works differently in Mens Minds, ſometimes producing Uneaſineſs or Pain, ſometimes Reſt and Indolency.

Anger. §. 12. *Anger* is Uneaſineſs or Diſcompoſure of the Mind, upon the receipt of any Injury, with a preſent purpoſe of Revenge.

Envy. §. 13. *Envy* is an Uneaſineſs of Mind, caus'd by the Conſideration of a Good we deſire, obtain'd by one we think ſhould not have had it before us.

What Paſſions all Men have. §. 14. Theſe two laſt, *Envy* and *Anger*, not being caus'd by Pain and Pleaſure ſimply in themſelves, but having in them ſome mix'd Conſiderations of our ſelves and others, are not therefore to be found in all Men, becauſe thoſe other Parts of valuing their Merits, or intending Revenge, is wanting in them: but all the reſt terminated purely in Pain and Pleaſure, are I think, to be found in all Men. For we *love*, *deſire*, *rejoice*, and *hope*, only in reſpect of Pleaſure; we *hate*, *fear*, and *grieve*, only in reſpect of Pain ultimately: In fine, all theſe Paſſions are mov'd by things, only as they appear to be the Cauſes of Pleaſure and Pain, or to have Pleaſure or Pain ſome way or other annex'd to them. Thus we extend our Hatred uſually to the Subject (at leaſt if a ſenſible or voluntary Agent) which has produc'd Pain in us, becauſe the Fear it leaves is a conſtant Pain: But we do not ſo conſtantly love what has done us good; becauſe Pleaſure operates not ſo ſtrongly on us as Pain, and becauſe we are not ſo ready to have hope it will do ſo again. But this by the By.

Pleaſure and Pain what. §. 15. By *Pleaſure and Pain*, Delight and Uneaſineſs, I muſt all along be underſtood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily Pain and Pleaſure, but whatſoever *Delight* or *Uneaſineſs* is felt by us, whether riſing from any grateful or unacceptable Senſation or Reflection.

§. 16. 'Tis farther to be conſider'd, that in reference to the Paſſions, the removal or *leſſening of a Pain is* conſider'd, and operates as a *Pleaſure*; and the loſs or diminiſhing of a Pleaſure, as a Pain.

Shame. §. 17. The Paſſions too have moſt of them in moſt Perſons Operations on the Body, and cauſe various Changes in it, which, not being always ſenſible, do not make a neceſſary part of the *Idea* of each Paſſion. For *Shame*, which is an Uneaſineſs

Uneaſineſs of the Mind upon the Thought of having done ſomething which is indecent, or will leſſen the valu'd Eſteem which others have for us, has not always bluſhing accompanying it.

§. 18. I would not be miſtaken here, as if I meant this as a Diſcourſe of the *Paſſions*; they are *many more than thoſe* I have here nam'd: And thoſe I have taken notice of, would each of them require a much larger, and more accurate Diſcourſe. I have only mention'd theſe here as ſo many Inſtances of Modes of Pleaſure and Pain reſulting in our Minds from various Conſiderations of Good and Evil. I might perhaps have inſtanc'd in other Modes of Pleaſure and Pain more ſimple than theſe, as the Pain of *Hunger* and *Thirſt*, and the Pleaſure of Eating and Drinking to remove them; the Pain of tender Eyes, and the Pleaſure of Muſick; Pain from captious uninſtructive Wrangling, and the Pleaſure of rational Converſation with a Friend, or of well-directed Study in the Search and Diſcovery of Truth. But the Paſſions being of much more Concernment to us, I rather made choice to inſtance in them, and ſhew how the *Ideas* we have of them are deriv'd from Senſation and Reflection. *Theſe Inſtances to ſhew how our Ideas of the Paſſions are got from Senſation and Reflection.*

CHAP. XXI.

Of Power.

§. 1. THE Mind being every day inform'd, by the Senſes, of the Alteration of thoſe ſimple *Ideas* it obſerves in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceaſes to be, and another begins to exiſt which was not before; reflecting alſo on what paſſes within it ſelf, and obſerving a conſtant Change of its *Ideas*, ſometimes by the Impreſſion of outward Objects on the Senſes, and ſometimes by the Determination of its own Choice; and concluding from what it has ſo conſtantly obſerv'd to have been, that the like Changes will for the future be made in the ſame things by like Agents, and by the like Ways; conſiders in one thing the Poſſibility of having any of its ſimple *Ideas* chang'd, and in another the Poſſibility of making that Change; and ſo comes by that *Idea* which we call *Power*. Thus we ſay, Fire has a *Power* to melt Gold, *i. e.* to deſtroy the Conſiſtency of its inſenſible Parts, and conſequently its Hardneſs, and make it fluid; and Gold has a *Power* to be melted: That the Sun has a *Power* to blanch Wax, and Wax a *Power* to be blanch'd by the Sun, whereby the Yellowneſs is deſtroy'd, and Whiteneſs made to exiſt in its room. In which, and the like Caſes, the *Power* we conſider is in reference to the Change of perceivable *Ideas*: For we cannot obſerve any alteration to be made in, or operation upon any thing, but by the obſervable Change of its ſenſible *Ideas*: nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a Change of ſome of its *Ideas*. *This Idea how got.*

§. 2. *Power*, thus conſider'd, is two-fold, *viz.* as able to make, or able to receive any Change: The one may be call'd *Active*, and the other *Paſſive Power*. Whether Matter be not wholly deſtitute of *Active Power*, as its Author GOD is truly above all *paſſive Power*; and whether the intermediate State of created Spirits be not that alone which is capable of both *active* and *paſſive Power*, may be worth conſideration. I ſhall not now enter into that Enquiry; my preſent Buſineſs being not to ſearch into the Original of Power, but how we come by the *Idea* of it. But ſince *active Powers* make ſo great a part of our complex *Ideas* of natural Subſtances, (as we ſhall ſee hereafter) and I mention them as ſuch according to common Apprehenſion; yet they being not perhaps ſo truly *active Power*, as our haſty Thoughts are apt to repreſent them, I judg it not amiſs, by this Intimation, to direct our Minds to the conſideration of GOD and Spirits, for the cleareſt *Idea* of *active Powers*. *Power active and paſſive.*

§. 3. I confeſs *Power includes in it ſome kind of Relation*, (a Relation to Action or Change) as indeed which of our *Ideas*, of what kind ſoever, when attentively conſider'd, does not? For our *Ideas* of Extenſion, Duration, and Number, do they not all contain in them a ſecret Relation of the Parts? Figure and Motion have ſomething relative in them much more viſibly: And ſenſible Qua- *Power includes Relation.*

lities, as Colours and Smells, &c. what are they but the *Powers* of different Bodies, in relation to our Perception? &c. And if conſider'd in the things themſelves, do they not depend on the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of the Parts? All which include ſome kind of Relation in them. Our *Idea* therefore of *Power*, I think, may well have a place amongſt other ſimple *Ideas*, and be conſider'd as one of them, being one of thoſe that make a principal Ingredient in our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, as we ſhall hereafter have occaſion to obſerve.

The cleareſt Idea of active Power had from Spirit.

§. 4. We are abundantly furniſh'd with the *Idea* of *paſſive Power* by almoſt all ſorts of ſenſible things. In moſt of them we cannot avoid obſerving their ſenſible Qualities; nay, their very Subſtances to be in a continual Flux: And therefore with reaſon we look on them as liable ſtill to the ſame Change. Nor have we of *active Power* (which is the more proper Signification of the word *Power*) fewer Inſtances: Since whatever Change is obſerv'd, the Mind muſt collect a Power ſomewhere able to make that Change, as well as a Poſſibility in the thing it ſelf to receive it. But yet, if we will conſider it attentively, Bodies, by our Senſes, do not afford us ſo clear and diſtinct an *Idea* of *active Power*, as we have from Reflection on the Operations of our Minds. For all *Power* relating to Action, and there being but two ſorts of Action, whereof we have any *Idea*, *viz.* Thinking and Motion; let us conſider whence we have the cleareſt *Ideas* of the *Powers*, which produce theſe Actions. 1. Of Thinking, Body affords us no *Idea* at all, it is only from Reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from Body any *Idea* of the beginning of Motion. A Body at reſt affords us no *Idea* of any *active Power* to move; and when it is ſet in Motion it ſelf, that Motion is rather a Paſſion, than an Action in it. For when the Ball obeys the Stroke of a Billiard-ſtick, it is not any Action of the Ball, but bare Paſſion: Alſo when by Impulſe it ſets another Ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the Motion it had receiv'd from another, and loſes in it ſelf ſo much as the other receiv'd; which gives us but a very obſcure *Idea*, of an *active Power* of moving in Body, whilſt we obſerve it only to tranſfer but not produce any Motion. For it is but a very obſcure *Idea* of *Power*, which reaches not the Production of the Action, but the Continuation of the Paſſion. For ſo is Motion in a Body impell'd by another: The Continuation of the Alteration made in it from Reſt to Motion, being little more an Action than the Continuation of the Alteration of its Figure by the ſame Blow, is an Action. The *Idea* of the beginning of Motion we have only from Reflection on what paſſes in our ſelves, where we find by Experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a Thought of the Mind, we can move the Parts of our Bodies, which were before at reſt. So that it ſeems to me, we have from the Obſervation of the Operation of Bodies by our Senſes but a very imperfect obſcure *Idea* of *active Power*, ſince they afford us not any *Idea* in themſelves of the *Power* to begin any Action, either Motion or Thought. But if, from the Impulſe Bodies are obſerv'd to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear *Idea* of *Power*, it ſerves as well to my purpoſe, *Senſation* being one of thoſe Ways whereby the Mind comes by its *Ideas*: Only I thought it worth while to conſider here by the way, whether the Mind doth not receive its *Idea* of *active Power* clearer from Reflection on its own Operations, than it doth from any external Senſation.

Will and Underſtanding, two Powers.

§. 5. This at leaſt I think evident, That we find in our ſelves a *Power* to begin or forbear, continue or end ſeveral Actions of our Minds, and Motions of our Bodies, barely by a Thought or Preference of the Mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing ſuch or ſuch a particular Action. This *Power* which the Mind has thus to order the conſideration of any *Idea*, or the forbearing to conſider it; or to prefer the Motion of any part of the Body to its Reſt, and *vice verſa* in any particular Inſtance, is that which we call the *Will*. The actual Exerciſe of that Power, by directing any particular Action, or its Forbearance, is that which we call *Volition* or *Willing*. The Forbearance of that Action, conſequent to ſuch Order or Command of the Mind, is call'd *Voluntary*. And whatſoever Action is perform'd without ſuch a Thought of the Mind, is call'd *Involuntary*. The Power of Perception is that which we call the *Underſtanding*. Perception, which we make the Act of the Underſtanding, is of three ſorts: 1. The Perception of *Ideas* in our Mind. 2. The Perception

of

of the Signification of Signs. 3. The Perception of the Connexion or Repugnancy, Agreement or Diſagreement, that there is between any of our *Ideas*. All theſe are attributed to the *Underſtanding*, or perceptive Power, tho' it be the two latter only that Uſe allows us to ſay we underſtand.

Faculties.

§. 6. Theſe Powers of the Mind, *viz.* of *Perceiving*, and of *Preferring*, are uſually call'd by another Name: And the ordinary way of ſpeaking is, That the *Underſtanding* and *Will* are two *Faculties* of the Mind; a Word proper enough if it be us'd as all Words ſhould be, ſo as not to breed any Confuſion in Mens Thoughts, by being ſuppos'd (as I ſuſpect it has been) to ſtand for ſome real Beings in the Soul that perform'd thoſe Actions of Underſtanding and Volition. For when we ſay the *Will* is the commanding and ſuperior Faculty of the Soul; that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior Faculties; that it follows the Dictates of the *Underſtanding*, *&c.* tho' theſe, and the like Expreſſions, by thoſe that carefully attend to their own *Ideas*, and conduct their Thoughts more by the Evidence of Things, than the Sound of Words, may be underſtood in a clear and diſtinct Senſe: Yet I ſuſpect, I ſay, that this way of ſpeaking of *Faculties*, has miſled many into a confus'd Notion of ſo many diſtinct Agents in us, which had their ſeveral Provinces and Authorities, and did command, obey, and perform ſeveral Actions, as ſo many diſtinct Beings; which has been no ſmall occaſion of Wrangling, Obſcurity, and Uncertainty in Queſtions relating to them.

Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Neceſſity.

§. 7. Every one, I think, finds in himſelf a *Power* to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to ſeveral Actions in himſelf. From the Conſideration of the Extent of this Power of the Mind over the Actions of the Man, which every one finds in himſelf, ariſe the *Ideas* of *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*.

Liberty what.

§. 8. All the Actions that we have any *Idea* of, reducing themſelves, as has been ſaid, to theſe two, *viz.* Thinking and Motion; ſo far as a Man has a Power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the Preference or Direction of his own Mind, ſo far is a Man *free*. Wherever any Performance or Forbearance are not equally in a Man's Power; wherever doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the Preference of his Mind directing it, there he is not *free*, tho' perhaps the Action may be voluntary. So that the *Idea* of *Liberty* is the *Idea* of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular Action, according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is prefer'd to the other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be produc'd by him according to his *Volition*, there he is not at *Liberty*, that Agent is under *Neceſſity*. So that *Liberty* cannot be where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no *Liberty*. A little Conſideration of an obvious Inſtance or two, may make this clear.

Suppoſes the Underſtanding and Will.

§. 9. A Tennis-ball, whether in Motion by the Stroke of a Racket, or lying ſtill at reſt, is not by any one taken to be a *free Agent*. If we enquire into the reaſon, we ſhall find it is becauſe we conceive not a Tennis-ball to think, and conſequently not to have any Volition, or Preference of Motion to Reſt, or *vice verſa*; and therefore has not *Liberty*, is not a free Agent; but all its both Motion and Reſt, come under our *Idea* of *Neceſſary*, and are ſo call'd. Likewiſe a Man falling into the Water (a Bridge breaking under him) has not herein Liberty, is not a free Agent. For tho' he has Volition, tho' he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the Forbearance of that Motion not being in his Power, the Stop or Ceſſation of that Motion follows not upon his Volition; and therefore therein he is not *free*. So a Man ſtriking himſelf, or his Friend, by a convulſive Motion of his Arm, which it is not in his power, by Volition or the Direction of his Mind, to ſtop, or forbear, no body thinks he has in this *Liberty*; every one pities him, as acting by Neceſſity and Conſtraint.

Belongs not to Volition.

§. 10. Again, ſuppoſe a Man be carry'd, whilſt faſt aſleep, into a Room, where is a Perſon he longs to ſee and ſpeak with; and be there lock'd faſt in, beyond his Power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himſelf in ſo deſirable Company, which he ſtays willingly in, *i. e.* prefers his ſtay to going away. I ask, Is not this ſtay voluntary? I think no body will doubt it; and yet being lock'd faſt in, 'tis evident he is not at Liberty not to ſtay, he has not Freedom to be gone. So that *Liberty is not an* Idea *belonging to Volition*, or

preferring; but to the Perſon having the Power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the Mind ſhall chuſe or direct. Our *Idea* of Liberty reaches as far as that Power, and no farther. For wherever Reſtraint comes to check that Power, or Compulſion takes away that Indifferency of Ability on either ſide to act, or to forbear acting; there *Liberty*, and our Notion of it, preſently ceaſes.

Voluntary oppos'd to Involuntary, not to Neceſſary.

§. 11. We have Inſtances enough, and often more than enough in our own Bodies. A Man's Heart beats, and the Blood circulates, which 'tis not in his power by any Thought or Volition to ſtop; and therefore in reſpect of theſe Motions, where Reſt depends not on his Choice, nor would follow the Determination of his Mind, if it ſhould prefer it, he is not a *free Agent*. Convulſive Motions agitate his Legs, ſo that, tho' he *wills* it ever ſo much, he cannot by any Power of his Mind ſtop their Motion, (as in that odd Diſeaſe call'd *Chorea Sancti Viti*) but he is perpetually dancing: He is not at liberty in this Action, but under as much neceſſity of moving, as a Stone that falls, or a Tennis-ball ſtruck with a Racket. On the other ſide, a Palſy or the Stocks hinder his Legs from obeying the Determination of his Mind, if it would thereby transfer his Body to another place. In all theſe there is want of *Freedom*; tho' the ſitting ſtill even of a Paralytick, whilſt he prefers it to a Removal, is truly voluntary. *Voluntary* then *is not oppos'd to Neceſſary, but to Involuntary*. For a Man may prefer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the State he is in, to its Abſence or Change, tho' Neceſſity has made it in it ſelf unalterable.

Liberty what.

§. 12. As it is in the Motions of the Body, ſo it is in the Thoughts of our Minds: where any one is ſuch, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the Preference of the Mind, there we are *at liberty*. A waking Man being under the neceſſity of having ſome *Ideas* conſtantly in his Mind, is not at *liberty* to think, or not to think; no more than he is at *liberty*, whether his Body ſhall touch any other or no: But whether he will remove his Contemplation from one *Idea* to another, is many times in his Choice; and then he is in reſpect of his *Ideas* as much at *liberty*, as he is in reſpect of Bodies he reſts on: he can at pleaſure remove himſelf from one to another. But yet ſome *Ideas* to the Mind, like ſome Motions to the Body, are ſuch as in certain Circumſtances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their abſence by the utmoſt Effort it can uſe. A Man on the Rack is not at *liberty* to lay by the *Idea* of Pain, and divert himſelf with other Contemplations: And ſometimes a boſterous Paſſion hurries our Thoughts as a Hurricane does our Bodies, without leaving us the Liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chuſe. But as ſoon as the Mind regains the Power to ſtop or continue, begin or forbear, any of theſe Motions of the Body without, or Thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then conſider the Man as a *free Agent* again.

Neceſſity what

§. 13. Wherever Thought is wholly wanting, or the Power to act or forbear according to the Direction of Thought, there *Neceſſity* takes place. This in an Agent capable of Volition, when the Beginning or Continuation of any Action is contrary to that Preference of his Mind, is call'd *Compulſion*, when the hindering or ſtopping any Action is contrary to his Volition, it is call'd *Reſtraint*. Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing *neceſſary* Agents.

Liberty belongs not to the Will.

§. 14. If this be ſo (as I imagine it is) I leave it to be conſider'd, whether it may not help to put an end to that long-agitated, and I think unreaſonable, becauſe unintelligible Queſtion, *viz. Whether Man's Will be free, or no?* For if I miſtake not, it follows from what I have ſaid, that the Queſtion it ſelf is altogether improper; and it is as inſignificant to ask, whether Man's *Will* be free, as to ask whether his Sleep be ſwift, or his Vertue ſquare; *Liberty* being as little applicable to the *Will*, as Swiftneſs of Motion is to Sleep, or Squareneſs to Vertue. Every one would laugh at the Abſurdity of ſuch a Queſtion as either of theſe; becauſe it is obvious, that the Modifications of Motion belong not to Sleep, nor the Difference of Figure to Vertue: And when any one well conſiders it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that *Liberty*, which is but a Power, belongs only to Agents, and cannot be an Attribute or Modification of the *Will*, which is alſo but a Power.

§. 15.

§. 15. Such is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear Notions of internal Actions by Sounds, that I muſt here warn my Reader that *Ordering*, *Directing*, *Chuſing*, *Preferring*, &c. which I have made uſe of will not diſtinctly enough expreſs *Volition*, unleſs he will reflect on what he himſelf does when he *wills*. For example, *Preferring*, which ſeems perhaps beſt to expreſs the Act of *Volition*, does it not preciſely. For tho' a Man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can ſay he ever *wills* it? *Volition*, 'tis plain, is an Act of the Mind knowingly exerting that Dominion it takes it ſelf to have over any part of a Man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from any particular Action. And what is the *Will*, but the Faculty to do this? And is that Faculty any thing more in effect than a Power, the Power of the Mind to determine its Thought, to the producing, continuing, or ſtopping any Action, as far as it depends on us? For can it be deny'd, that whatever Agent has a Power to think on its own Actions, and to prefer their doing or omiſſion either to other, has that Faculty call'd *Will*? *Will* then is nothing but ſuch a Power. *Liberty*, on the other ſide, is the Power a Man has to do or forbear doing any particular Action, according as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the Mind; which is the ſame thing as to ſay, according as he himſelf *wills* it. *Volition.*

§. 16. 'Tis plain then, that the *Will* is nothing but one Power or Ability, and freedom another Power or Ability: ſo that to ask, whether the *Will* has *Freedom*, is to ask whether one Power has another Power, one Ability another Ability; a Queſtion at firſt ſight too groſly abſurd to make a diſpute, or need an anſwer. For who is it that ſees not that *Powers* belong only to *Agents*, and *are Attributes only of Subſtances, and not of Powers* themſelves? So that this Way of putting the Queſtion, *viz.* Whether the *Will be free?* is in effect to ask, Whether the *Will* be a Subſtance, an Agent? or at leaſt to ſuppoſe it, ſince Freedom can properly be attributed to nothing elſe. If Freedom can with any Propriety of Speech be apply'd to Power, it may be attributed to the Power that is in a Man to produce, or forbear producing Motion in parts of his Body, by Choice or Preference; which is that which denominates him free, and is Freedom it ſelf. But if any one ſhould ask, whether Freedom were free, he would be ſuſpected not to underſtand well what he ſaid; and he would be thought to deſerve *Midas*'s Ears, who knowing that rich was a Denomination from the Poſſeſſion of Riches, ſhould demand whether Riches themſelves were rich. *Powers belong to Agents.*

§. 17. However the name *Faculty*, which Men have given to this Power call'd the *Will*, and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the *Will* as acting, may, by an Appropriation that diſguiſes its true Senſe, ſerve a little to palliate the Abſurdity; yet the *Will* in truth ſignifies nothing but a Power, or Ability, to prefer or chuſe: And when the *Will*, under the name of a *Faculty*, is conſider'd as it is, barely as an Ability to do ſomething, the Abſurdity in ſaying it is free, or not free, will eaſily diſcover it ſelf. For if it be reaſonable to ſuppoſe and talk of *Faculties*, as diſtinct Beings that can act, (as we do, when we ſay the *Will* orders, and the *Will* is free) 'tis fit that we ſhould make a ſpeaking *Faculty*, and a walking *Faculty*, and a dancing *Faculty*, by which thoſe Actions are produc'd, which are but ſeveral Modes of Motion; as well as we make the *Will* and *Underſtanding* to be *Faculties*, by which the Actions of Chuſing and Perceiving are produc'd, which are but ſeveral Modes of Thinking: And we may as properly ſay, that 'tis the ſinging *Faculty* ſings, and the dancing *Faculty* dances; as that the *Will* chuſes, or that the *Underſtanding* conceives; or, as is uſual, that the *Will* directs the *Underſtanding*, or the *Underſtanding* obeys, or obeys not the *Will*: It being altogether as proper and intelligible to ſay, that the Power of Speaking directs the Power of Singing, or the Power of Singing obeys or diſobeys the Power of Speaking.

§. 18. This way of talking, nevertheleſs, has prevail'd, and, as I gueſs, produced great Confuſion. For theſe being all different Powers in the Mind, or in the Man, to do ſeveral Actions, he exerts them as he thinks fit: but the Power to do one Action, is not operated on by the Power of doing another Action. For the Power of Thinking operates not on the Power of Chuſing, nor the Power of Chuſing on the Power of Thinking; no more than the Power of Dancing operates on the Power of Singing, or the Power of Singing on the Power of Dancing; as any one, who reflects on it, will eaſily perceive: And

yet

yet this is it which we ſay, when we thus ſpeak, That *the Will operates on the Underſtanding, or the Underſtanding on the Will.*

§. 19. I grant, that this or that actual Thought may be the Occaſion of Volition, or exerciſing the Power a Man has to chuſe; or the actual Choice of the Mind, the Cauſe of actual thinking on this or that thing: as the actual ſinging of ſuch a Tune, may be the Occaſion of dancing ſuch a Dance, and the actual dancing of ſuch a Dance the occaſion of ſinging ſuch a Tune. But in all theſe it is not one *Power* that operates on another: But it is the Mind that operates, and exerts theſe Powers; it is the Man that does the Action, it is the Agent that has Power, or is able to do. For *Powers* are Relations, not Agents: And *that which has the Power, or not the Power to operate, is that alone which is or is not free*, and not the Power it ſelf. For Freedom, or not Freedom, can belong to nothing, but what has or has not a Power to act.

Liberty belongs not to the Will.

§. 20. The attributing to *Faculties* that which belong'd not to them, has given occaſion to this way of talking: But the introducing into Diſcourſes concerning the Mind, with the name of *Faculties*, a Notion of their operating, has, I ſuppoſe, as little advanc'd our Knowledg in that part of our ſelves, as the great uſe and mention of the like Invention of *Faculties*, in the Operations of the Body, has help'd us in the Knowledg of Phyſick. Not that I deny there are *Faculties*, both in the Body and Mind: They both of them have their *Powers* of Operating, elſe neither the one nor the other could operate. For nothing can operate, that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate, that has no *Power* to operate. Nor do I deny, that thoſe Words, and the like, are to have their place in the common Uſe of Languages, that have made them current. It looks like too much Affectation wholly to lay them by: And Philoſophy it ſelf, tho' it likes not a gaudy Dreſs, yet when it appears in publick, muſt have ſo much Complacency, as to be clothed in the ordinary Faſhion and Language of the Country, ſo far as it can conſiſt with Truth and Preſpicuity. But the fault has been, that Faculties have been ſpoken of and repreſented as ſo many diſtinct Agents. For it being ask'd, what it was that digeſted the Meat in our Stomachs? It was a ready and very ſatisfactory Anſwer, to ſay, that it was the *digeſtive Faculty*. What was it that made any thing come out of the Body? the *expulſive Faculty*. What moved? the *motive Faculty*. And ſo in the Mind, the *intellectual Faculty*, or the Underſtanding, underſtood; and the *elective Faculty*, or the Will, willed or commanded. Which is in ſhort to ſay, That the Ability to digeſt, digeſted; and the Ability to move, moved; and the Ability to underſtand, underſtood. For *Faculty*, *Ability*, and *Power*, I think, are but different names of the ſame things: which ways of ſpeaking, when put into more intelligible words, will I think amount to thus much; that Digeſtion is perform'd by ſomething that is able to digeſt, Motion by ſomething able to move, and Underſtanding by ſomething able to underſtand. And in truth it would be very ſtrange if it ſhould be otherwiſe; as ſtrange as it would be, for a Man to be free without being able to be free.

But to the Agent or Man.

§. 21. To return then to the Enquiry about Liberty, I think *the Queſtion is not proper, whether the Will be free, but whether a Man be free.* Thus, I think,

1. That ſo far as any one can, by the Direction or Choice of his Mind, preferring the Exiſtence of any Action to the Non-exiſtence of that Action, and *vice verſa* make it to exiſt or not exiſt; ſo far he is *free*. For if I can, by a Thought directing the Motion of my Finger, make it move when it was at reſt, or *vice verſa*; 'tis evident, that in reſpect of that I am free: and if I can, by a like Thought of my Mind, preferring one to the other, produce either Words or Silence, I am at liberty to ſpeak, or hold my peace; and *as far as this Power reaches, of acting, or not acting, by the Determination of his own Thought preferring either, ſo far is a Man free.* For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will? And ſo far as any one can, by preferring any Action to its not being, or Reſt to any Action, produce that Action or Reſt, ſo far can he do what he will. For ſuch a preferring of Action to its abſence, is the willing of it; and we can ſcarce tell how to imagine any *Being* freer, than to be able to do what he *wills*. So that in reſpect of Actions within the reach of ſuch a Power in him, a Man ſeems as free, as 'tis poſſible for Freedom to make him.

§. 22.

§. 22. But the inquisitive Mind of Man, willing to shift off from himself, as far as he can, all Thoughts of Guilt, tho' it be by putting himself into a worse state than that of fatal Necessity, is not content with this: Freedom, unless it reaches farther than this, will not serve the turn: And it passes for a good Plea, that a Man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will, as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a Man's Liberty, there yet therefore is rais'd this farther Question, *Whether a Man be free to will?* which I think is what is meant, when it is disputed whether the *Will* be free. And as to that I imagine, *In respect of willing, a Man is not free.*

§. 23. 2. That *Willing*, or *Volition*, being an Action, and Freedom consisting in a Power of acting or not acting, *a Man in respect of willing, or the Act of Volition, when any Action in his power is once propos'd to his Thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free.* The reason whereof is very manifest: For it being unavoidable that the Action depending on his *Will* should exist, or not exist; and its Existence, or not Existence, following perfectly the Determination and Preference of his Will, he cannot avoid willing the Existence, or not Existence of that Action; it is absolutely necessary that he *will* the one, or the other, *i. e. prefer* the one to the other: since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the Choice and Determination of his Mind, that is, by his *willing it*: for if he did not *will* it, it would not be. So that in respect of the Act of *Willing*, a Man in such a case is not free: Liberty consisting in a Power to act, or not to act; which, in regard of Volition, a Man, upon such a proposal, has not. For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an Action in a Man's power, which is once so propos'd to his Thoughts; a Man must necessarily *will* the one or the other of them, upon which Preference or Volition, the Action or its Forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the Act of Volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a Man in respect of that Act of *Willing*, is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless Necessity and Freedom can consist together, and a Man can be free and bound at once.

§. 24. This then is evident, That in all Proposals of present Action, *a Man is not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot forbear willing*: Liberty consisting in a Power to act or to forbear acting, and in that only. For a Man that sits still, is said yet to be at liberty, because he can walk if he *wills* it, But if a Man sitting still has not a Power to remove himself, he is not at liberty; so likewise a Man falling down a Precipice, tho' in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would. This being so, 'tis plain that a Man that is walking, to whom it is propos'd to give off walking, is not at liberty whether he *will* determine himself to walk, or give off walking, or no: He must necessarily prefer one, or t'other of them, walking or not walking; and so it is in regard of all other Actions in our power so propos'd, which are the far greater number. For considering the vast number of voluntary Actions that succeed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our Lives, there are but few of them that are thought on or propos'd to the *Will*, till the time they are to be done: And in all such Actions, as I have shewn, the Mind in respect of *willing* has not a power to act, or not to act, wherein consists Liberty. The Mind in that case has not a power to forbear *willing*; it cannot avoid some Determination concerning them, let the Consideration be as short, the Thought as quick as it will, it either leaves the Man in the state he was before thinking, or changes it; continues the Action, or puts an end to it. Whereby it is manifest, that it orders and directs one, in preference to or with neglect of the other, and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

§. 25. Since then it is plain, that in most cases a Man is not at liberty, whether he will or no; the next thing demanded, is, *Whether a Man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, Motion or Rest?* This Question carries the Absurdity of it so manifestly in it self, that one might thereby sufficiently be convinc'd that Liberty concerns not the Will. For to ask, whether a Man be at liberty to will either Motion or Rest, Speaking or Silence, which he pleases; is to ask, whether a Man can *will* what he *wills*, or be pleas'd with what he is pleas'd with. A Question which, I think, needs no Answer; and they who can make *The Will determin'd by something without it.*

a Queſtion of it, muſt ſuppoſe one Will to determine the Acts of another, and another to determine that; and ſo on *in infinitum.*

§. 26. To avoid theſe and the like Abſurdities, nothing can be of greater uſe, than to eſtabliſh in our Minds determin'd *Ideas* of the things under conſideration. If the *Ideas* of Liberty and Volition were well fix'd in our Underſtandings, and carry'd along with us in our Minds, as they ought, thro' all the Queſtions that are rais'd about them; I ſuppoſe a great part of the Difficulties that perplex Mens Thoughts, and entangle their Underſtandings, would be much eaſier reſolv'd; and we ſhould perceive where the confus'd Signification of Terms, or where the nature of the thing caus'd the Obſcurity.

Freedom. §. 27. *Firſt* then, it is carefully to be remember'd, That *Freedom conſiſts in the Dependence of the Exiſtence, or not Exiſtence of any Action, upon our Volition of it; and not in the Dependence of any Action, or its contrary, on our preference.* A Man ſtanding on a Cliff, is at liberty to leap twenty Yards downwards into the Sea, not becauſe he has a power to do the contrary Action, which is to leap twenty Yards upwards, for that he cannot do: but he is therefore free, becauſe he has a power to leap or not to leap. But if a greater Force than his either holds him faſt, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that caſe: becauſe the doing or forbearance of that particular Action, is no longer in his Power. He that is a cloſe Priſoner in a Room twenty foot ſquare, being at the North-ſide of his Chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty foot Southward, becauſe he can walk or not walk it; but is not, at the ſame time, at liberty to do the contrary, and to walk twenty foot Northward.

In this then conſiſts Freedom, *viz.* in our being able to act or not to act, according as we ſhall chuſe or *will.*

Volition what. §. 28. *Secondly*, We muſt remember, that *Volition* or *Willing*, is an Act of the Mind directing its Thought to the Production of any Action, and thereby exerting its Power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word *Action*, to comprehend the forbearance too of any Action propos'd; *ſitting ſtill*, or *holding one's peace*, when *walking* or *ſpeaking* are propos'd, tho' mere Forbearances, requiring as much the Determination of the *Will*, and being often as weighty in their Conſequences as the contrary Actions, may, on that conſideration, well enough paſs for Actions too: But this I ſay, that I may not be miſtaken, if for brevity ſake I ſpeak thus.

What determines the Will. §. 29. *Thirdly*, The *Will* being nothing but a Power in the Mind to direct the operative Faculties of a Man to Motion or Reſt, as far as they depend on ſuch Direction: To the Queſtion, What is it determines the Will? the true and proper Anſwer is, The Mind. For that which determines the general Power of directing to this or that particular Direction, is nothing but the Agent it ſelf exerciſing the Power it has that particular way. If this Anſwer ſatisfies not, 'tis plain the meaning of the Queſtion, *What determines the Will?* is this, what moves the Mind, in every particular Inſtance to determine its general Power of directing to this or that particular Motion or Reſt? And to this I anſwer, The Motive for continuing in the ſame State or Action, is only the preſent Satisfaction in it; the Motive to change, is always ſome *Uneaſineſs*: nothing ſetting us upon the change of State, or upon any new Action, but ſome *Uneaſineſs*. This is the great Motive that works on the Mind to put it upon Action, which for ſhortneſs ſake we will call *determining of the Will*; which I ſhall more at large explain.

Will and Deſire muſt not be confounded. §. 30. But in the way to it, it will be neceſſary to premiſe, that tho' I have above endeavour'd to expreſs the Act of *Volition* by *Chuſing*, *Preferring*, and the like terms, that ſignify *Deſire* as well as *Volition*, for want of other words to mark that Act of the Mind, whoſe proper Name is *Willing* or *Volition*; yet it being a very ſimple Act, whoſoever deſires to underſtand what it is, will better find it by reflecting on his own Mind, and obſerving what it does when it *wills*, than by any variety of articulate Sounds whatſoever. This Caution of being careful not to be miſled by Expreſſions that do not enough keep up the difference between the *Will* and ſeveral Acts of the Mind that are quite diſtinct from it, I think the more neceſſary; becauſe I find the Will often confounded with ſeveral of the Affections, eſpecially *Deſire*, and one put for the other; and that by Men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very diſtinct Notions

Notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no ſmall occaſion of Obſcurity and Miſtake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that ſhall turn his Thoughts inwards upon what paſſes in his Mind when he *wills*, ſhall ſee that the *Will* or Power of *Volition* is converſant about nothing, but that particular Determination of the Mind, whereby barely by a Thought the Mind endeavours to give Riſe, Continuation, or Stop to any Action which it takes to be in its power. This well conſider'd, plainly ſhews that the *Will* is perfectly diſtinguiſh'd from *Deſire*; which in the very ſame Action may have a quite contrary Tendency from that which our *Will* ſets us upon. A Man whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to uſe Perſuaſions to another, which, at the ſame time I am ſpeaking, I may wiſh may not prevail on him. In this caſe, 'tis plain the *Will* and *Deſire* run counter. I will the Action that tends one way, whilſt my Deſire tends another, and that the direct contrary. A Man who by a violent Fit of the Gout in his Limbs finds a Dozineſs in his Head, or a Want of Appetite in his Stomach remov'd, deſires to be eaſed too of the Pain of his Feet or Hands (for wherever there is Pain, there is a Deſire to be rid of it) tho' yet, whilſt he apprehends that the removal of the Pain may tranſlate the noxious Humour to a more vital part, his *Will* is never determin'd to any one Action that may ſerve to remove this Pain. Whence it is evident, that *Deſiring* and *Willing* are two diſtinct Acts of the Mind; and conſequently that the *Will*, which is but the Power of *Volition*, is much more diſtinct from *Deſire*.

§. 31. To return then to the Enquiry, *What is it that determines the Will in regard to our Actions?* And that, upon ſecond thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally ſuppos'd, the greater Good in view; but ſome (and for the moſt part the moſt preſſing) *Uneaſineſs* a Man is at preſent under. This is that which ſucceſſively determines the *Will*, and ſets us upon thoſe Actions we perform. This *Uneaſineſs* we may call, as it is, *Deſire*; which is an *Uneaſineſs* of the Mind for want of ſome abſent Good. All Pain of the Body, of what ſort ſoever, and Diſquiet of the Mind, is *Uneaſineſs*: And with this is always join'd Deſire, equal to the Pain or *Uneaſineſs* felt, and is ſcarce diſtinguiſhable from it. For *Deſire* being nothing but an *Uneaſineſs* in the want of an abſent Good, in reference to any Pain felt, Eaſe is that abſent Good; and till that Eaſe be attain'd, we may call it *Deſire*, no body feeling Pain that he wiſhes not to be eaſed of, with a Deſire equal to that Pain, and inſeparable from it. Beſides this Deſire of Eaſe from Pain, there is another of abſent poſitive Good; and here alſo the Deſire and Uneaſineſs is equal. As much as we deſire any abſent Good, ſo much are we in pain for it. But here all abſent Good does not, according to the Greatneſs it has, or is acknowledg'd to have, cauſe Pain equal to that Greatneſs; as all Pain cauſes Deſire equal to it ſelf: becauſe the Abſence of Good is not always a Pain, as the Preſence of Pain is. And therefore abſent Good may be look'd on, and conſider'd without *Deſire*. But ſo much as there is any where of *Deſire*, ſo much there is of *Uneaſineſs*. *Uneaſineſs determines the Will.*

§. 32. That *Deſire* is a State of *Uneaſineſs*, every one who reflects on himſelf will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in *Deſire* what the Wiſe Man ſays of Hope, (which is not much different from it) that it being *defer'd makes the Heart ſick?* and that ſtill proportionable to the Greatneſs of the *Deſire*; which ſometimes raiſes the *Uneaſineſs* to that pitch, that it makes People cry out, *Give me Children*, give me the thing deſir'd, *or I die?* Life it ſelf, and all its Enjoyments, is a Burden cannot be born under the laſting and unremov'd Preſſure of ſuch an *Uneaſineſs*. *Deſire is Uneaſineſs.*

§. 33. Good and Evil, preſent and abſent, 'tis true, work upon the Mind: but that which immediately determines the *Will*, from time to time, to every voluntary Action, is the Uneaſineſs of *Deſire*, fix'd on ſome abſent Good; either negative, as Indolence to one in Pain, or poſitive, as Enjoyment of Pleaſure. That it is this *Uneaſineſs* that determines the *Will* to the ſucceſſive voluntary Actions, whereof the greateſt part of our Lives is made up, and by which we are conducted thro' different Courſes to different Ends; I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, both from Experience and the Reaſon of the thing. *The Uneaſineſs of Deſire determines the Will.*

§. 34. When a Man is perfectly content with the State he is in, which is when he is perfectly without any *Uneaſineſs*, what Induſtry, what Action, what *This the Spring of Action.*

Will is there left, but to continue in it? Of this every Man's Obſervation will ſatisfy him. And thus we ſee our All-wiſe Maker, ſuitable to our Conſtitution and Frame, and knowing what it is that determines the *Will*, has put into Man the *Uneaſineſs* of Hunger and Thirſt, and other natural Deſires, that return at their Seaſons, to move and determine their *Wills*, for the Preſervation of themſelves, and the Continuation of their Species. For I think we may conclude, that if the bare Contemplation of theſe good Ends, to which we are carry'd by theſe ſeveral *Uneaſineſſes*, had been ſufficient to determine the *Will*, and ſet us on work, we ſhould have had none of theſe natural Pains, and perhaps in this World little or no Pain at all. *It is better to marry than to burn*, ſays St. *Paul*; where we may ſee what it is that chiefly drives Men into the Enjoyments of a conjugal Life. A little burning felt, puſhes us more powerfully, than greater Pleaſures in proſpect draw or allure.

The greateſt poſitive Good determines not the Will, but Uneaſineſs.

§. 35. It ſeems ſo eſtabliſh'd and ſettled a Maxim by the general Conſent of all Mankind, That Good, the greater Good determines the Will, that I do not at all wonder, that when I firſt publiſh'd my Thoughts on this Subject, I took it for granted; and I imagine that by a great many I ſhall be thought more excuſable, for having then done ſo, than that now I have ventur'd to recede from ſo receiv'd an Opinion. But yet upon a ſtricter Inquiry, I am forc'd to conclude, that *Good*, the *greater Good*, tho' apprehended and acknowledg'd to be ſo, does not determine the *Will*, until our Deſire, rais'd proportionably to it, makes us *uneaſy* in the want of it. Convince a Man ever ſo much, that Plenty has its Advantages over Poverty; make him ſee and own, that the handſome Conveniencies of Life are better than naſty Penury; yet as long as he is content with the latter, and finds no *Uneaſineſs* in it, he moves not: his *Will* never is determin'd to any Action that ſhall bring him out of it. Let a Man be ever ſo well perſuaded of the Advantages of Vertue, that it is as neceſſary to a Man who has any great Aims in this World, or Hopes in the next, as Food to Life; yet till he *hungers and thirſts after Righteouſneſs*, till he feels an *Uneaſineſs* in the want of it, his *Will* will not be determin'd to any Action in purſuit of this confeſs'd greater Good; but any other *Uneaſineſſes* he feels in himſelf, ſhall take place, and carry his *Will* to other Actions. On the other ſide, let a Drunkard ſee that his Health decays, his Eſtates waſtes; Diſcredit and Diſeaſes, and the want of all things, even of his beloved Drink, attends him in the Courſe he follows; yet the Returns of *Uneaſineſs* to miſs his Companions, the habitual Thirſt after his Cups, at the uſual time, drives him to the Tavern, tho' he has in his view the Loſs of Health and Plenty, and perhaps of the Joys of another Life: the leaſt of which is no inconſiderable Good, but ſuch as he confeſſes is far greater than the tickling of his Palat with a Glaſs of Wine, or the idle Chat of a ſoaking Club. 'Tis not for want of viewing the greater Good; for he ſees and acknowledges it, and in the Intervals of his drinking Hours, will take Reſolutions to purſue the greater Good; but when the *Uneaſineſs* to miſs his accuſtom'd Delight returns, the greater acknowledg'd Good loſes its hold, and the preſent *Uneaſineſs* determines the *Will* to the accuſtom'd Action; which thereby gets ſtronger footing to prevail againſt the next occaſion tho' he at the ſame time makes ſecret Promiſes to himſelf, that he will do ſo no more; this is the laſt time he will act againſt the Attainment of thoſe greater Goods. And thus he is from time to time in the State of that unhappy Complainer, *Video meliora proboque, deteriora ſequor*: Which Sentence, allow'd for true, and made good by conſtant Experience, may this, and poſſibly no other way, be eaſily made intelligible.

Becauſe the removal of Uneaſineſs is the firſt Step to Happineſs.

§. 36. If we enquire into the Reaſon of what Experience makes ſo evident in Fact, and examine why 'tis *Uneaſineſs* alone operates on the *Will*, and determines it in its Choice; we ſhall find that we being capable but of one Determination of the *Will* to one Action at once; the preſent *Uneaſineſs* that we are under does naturally determine the Will, in order to that Happineſs which we all aim at in all our Actions; foraſmuch as whilſt we are under any *Uneaſineſs*, we cannot apprehend our ſelves happy, or in the way to it. Pain and *Uneaſineſs* being, by every one, concluded and felt to be inconſiſtent with Happineſs, ſpoiling the Reliſh even of thoſe good things which we have; a little Pain ſerving to marr all the Pleaſure we rejoic'd in. And therefore that which of

courſe

Courſe determines the Choice of our *Will* to the next Action, will always be the removing of Pain, as long as we have any left, as the firſt and neceſſary Step towards Happineſs.

§. 37. Another Reaſon why 'tis *Uneaſineſs* alone determines the Will, may be this; becauſe that alone is preſent, and 'tis againſt the nature of things, that what is abſent ſhould operate where it is not. It may be ſaid, that abſent Good may by Contemplation be brought home to the Mind, and made preſent. The *Idea* of it indeed may be in the Mind, and view'd as preſent there; but nothing will be in the Mind as a preſent Good, able to counter-ballance the Removal of any *Uneaſineſs* which we are under, till it raiſes our Deſire; and the *Uneaſineſs* of that has the Prevalency in determining the *Will*. Till then the *Idea* in the Mind of whatever Good, is there only like other *Ideas*, the Object of bare unactive Speculation, but operates not on the *Will*, nor ſet us on work; the Reaſon whereof I ſhall ſhew by and by. How many are to be found, that have had lively Repreſentations ſet before their Minds of the unſpeakable Joys of Heaven, which they acknowledg both poſſible and probable too, who yet would be content to take up with their Happineſs here? And ſo the prevailing *Uneaſineſſes* of their Deſires, let looſe after the Enjoyments of this Life, take their Turns in the determining their *Wills*; and all that while they take not one ſtep, are not one jot mov'd towards the good things of another Life, conſider'd as ever ſo great. *Becauſe Uneaſineſs alone is preſent.*

§. 38. Were the *Will* determin'd by the Views of Good, as it appears in Contemplation greater or leſs to the Underſtanding, which is the State of all abſent Good, and that which in the receiv'd Opinion the *Will* is ſuppos'd to move to, and to be mov'd by, I do not ſee how it could ever get looſe from the infinite eternal Joys of Heaven, once propos'd and conſider'd as poſſible. For all abſent Good, by which alone, barely propos'd and coming in view, the *Will* is thought to be determin'd, and ſo to ſet us on Action, being only poſſible but not infallibly certain; 'tis unavoidable that the infinitely greater poſſible Good ſhould regularly and conſtantly determine the *Will* in all the ſucceſſive Actions it directs: and then we ſhould keep conſtantly and ſteddily in our Courſe towards Heaven, without ever ſtanding ſtill, or directing our Actions to any other end. The eternal Condition of a future State infinitely outweighing the Expectation of Riches, or Honour, or any other worldly Pleaſure which we can propoſe to our ſelves, tho' we ſhould grant theſe the more probable to be attain'd: For nothing future is yet in poſſeſſion, and ſo the Expectation even of theſe may deceive us. If it were ſo, that the greater Good in view determines the *Will*, ſo great a Good once propos'd could not but ſeize the *Will*, and hold it faſt to the Purſuit of this infinitely greateſt Good, without ever letting it go again: For the *Will* having a Power over, and directing the Thoughts as well as other Actions, would, if it were ſo, hold the Contemplation of the Mind fix'd to that Good. *Becauſe all who allow the Joys of Heaven poſſible, purſue them not.*

This would be the State of the Mind, and regular Tendency of the *Will* in all its Determinations, were it determin'd by that which is conſider'd, and in View the greater Good; but that it is not ſo, is viſible in Experience: The infinitely greateſt confeſs'd Good being often neglected, to ſatisfy the ſucceſſive *Uneaſineſs* of our Deſires purſuing Trifles. But tho' the greateſt allow'd, even everlaſting unſpeakable Good, which has ſometimes mov'd and affected the Mind, does not ſtedfaſtly hold the *Will*, yet we ſee any very great and prevailing *Uneaſineſs*, having once laid hold on the *Will*, lets it not go; by which we may be convinc'd, what it is that determines the *Will*. Thus any vehement Pain of the Body, the ungovernable Paſſion of a Man violently in Love, or the impatient Deſire of Revenge, keeps the *Will* ſteddy and intent; and the *Will* thus determin'd never lets the Underſtanding lay-by the Object, but all the Thoughts of the Mind, and Powers of the Body are uninterruptedly imploy'd that way, by the Determinations of the *Will*, influenc'd by that topping *Uneaſineſs* as long as it laſts; whereby it ſeems to me evident, that the *Will* or Power of ſetting us upon one Action in preference to all other, is determined in us by *Uneaſineſs*. And whether this be not ſo, I deſire every one to obſerve in himſelf. *But any great Uneaſineſs is never neglected.*

Desire accompanies all Uneasiness.

§. 39. I have hitherto chiefly instanc'd in the *Uneasiness* of Desire, as that which determines the *Will*; because that is the chief and most sensible, and the *Will* seldom orders any Action, nor is there any voluntary Action perform'd, without some *Desire* accompanying it; which I think is the Reason why the *Will* and *Desire* are so often confounded. But yet we are not to look upon the *Uneasiness* which makes up, or at least accompanies most of the other Passions, as wholly excluded in the Case. *Aversion, Fear, Anger, Envy, Shame*, &c. have each their *Uneasiness* too, and thereby influence the *Will*. These Passions are scarce any of them in Life and Practice simple and alone, and wholly unmix'd with others; tho' usually in Discourse and Contemplation, that carries the Name which operates strongest, and appears most in the present State of the Mind: Nay there is, I think, scarce any of the Passions to be found without *Desire* join'd with it. I am sure, wherever there is *Uneasiness*, there is *Desire*: For we constantly desire Happiness; and whatever we feel of *Uneasiness*, so much 'tis certain we want of Happiness, even in our own Opinion, let our State and Condition otherwise be what it will. Besides, the present Moment not being our Eternity, whatever our Enjoyment be, we look beyond the present, and Desire goes with our Foresight, and that still carries the *Will* with it. So that even in *Joy* it self, that which keeps up the Action, whereon the Enjoyment depends, is the Desire to continue it, and Fear to lose it: And whenever a greater *Uneasiness* than that takes place in the Mind, the *Will* presently is by that determin'd to some new Action, and the present Delight neglected.

The most pressing Uneasiness naturally determines the Will.

§. 40. But we being in this World beset with sundry *Uneasinesses*, distracted with different *Desires*, the next Inquiry naturally will be, which of them has the Precedency in determining the *Will* to the next Action? and to that the Answer is, That ordinarily which is the most pressing of those that are judg'd capable of being then remov'd. For the *Will*, being the Power of directing our operative Faculties to some Action, for some End, cannot at any time be mov'd towards what is judg'd at that time unattainable: That would be to suppose an intelligent Being designedly to act for an End, only to lose its Labour, for so it is to act for what is judg'd not attainable; and therefore very great *Uneasinesses* move not the *Will*, when they are judg'd not capable of a Cure: They, in that Case, put us not upon Endeavours. But these set a-part, the most important and urgent *Uneasiness* we at that time feel, is that which ordinarily determines the *Will* successively, in that Train of voluntary Actions which makes up our Lives. The greatest present *Uneasiness* is the Spur to Action, that is constantly felt, and for the most part determines the *Will* in its choice of the next Action. For this we must carry along with us, that the proper and only Object of the *Will* is some Action of our's, and nothing else: For we producing nothing by our *willing* it, but some Action in our Power, 'tis there the *Will* terminates, and reaches no farther.

All desire Happiness.

§. 41. If it be farther ask'd what 'tis moves *Desire*? I answer, Happiness, and that alone. *Happiness* and *Misery* are the Names of two Extremes, the utmost Bounds whereof we know not; 'tis what *Eye hath not seen, Ear hath not heard, nor hath it enter'd into the Heart of Man to conceive.* But of some Degrees of both we have very lively Impressions, made by several Instances of Delight and Joy on the one side, and Torment and Sorrow on the other; which, for shortness sake, I shall comprehend under the names of Pleasure and Pain, there being Pleasure and Pain of the Mind as well as the Body: *With him is fulness of Joy, and Pleasure for evermore.* Or, to speak truly, they are all of the Mind; tho' some have their rise in the Mind from Thought, others in the Body from certain Modifications of Motion.

Happiness what.

§. 42. *Happiness* then in its full Extent is the utmost Pleasure we are capable of, and *Misery* the utmost Pain: And the lowest Degree of what can be call'd *Happiness*, is so much Ease from all Pain, and so much present Pleasure, as without which any one cannot be content. Now because Pleasure and Pain are produc'd in us by the Operation of certain Objects, either on our Minds or our Bodies, and in different Degrees: Therefore what has an aptness to produce Pleasure in us, is that we call *Good*; and what is apt to produce Pain in us we call *Evil*, for no other reason, but for its aptness to produce Pleasure and

Pain

Pain in us, wherein conſiſts our *Happineſs* and *Miſery*. Farther, tho' what is apt to produce any Degree of Pleaſure, be in it ſelf *Good*; and what is apt to produce any Degree of Pain, be *Evil*: yet it often happens, that we do not call it ſo, when it comes in competition with a greater of its ſort; becauſe when they come in competition, the Degrees alſo of Pleaſure and Pain have juſtly a Preference. So that if we will rightly eſtimate what we call *Good* and *Evil*, we ſhall find it lies much in compariſon: For the cauſe of every leſs Degree of Pain, as well as every greater Degree of Pleaſure, has the nature of *Good*, and *vice verſa*.

What Good is deſir'd, what not.

§. 43. Tho' this be that which is call'd *Good* and *Evil*; and all Good be the proper Object of *Deſire* in general; yet all Good, even ſeen, and confeſs'd to be ſo, does not neceſſarily move every particular Man's *Deſire*, but only that part, or ſo much of it as is conſider'd and taken to make a neceſſary part of his Happineſs. All other Good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a Man's *Deſires*, who looks not on it to make a part of that Happineſs, wherewith he, in his preſent Thoughts, can ſatisfy himſelf. *Happineſs*, under this view, every one conſtantly purſues, and *deſires* what makes any part of it: other things, acknowledg'd to be Good, he can look upon without *Deſire*, paſs by, and be content without. There is no body, I think, ſo ſenſeleſs, as to deny, that there is Pleaſure in Knowledg: And for the Pleaſures of Senſe, they have too many Followers to let it be queſtion'd, whether Men are taken with them or no. Now let one Man place his ſatisfaction in ſenſual Pleaſures, another in the delight of Knowledg: Tho' each of them cannot but confeſs, there is great Pleaſure in what the other purſues; yet neither of them making the other's Delight a part of his Happineſs, their *Deſires* are not mov'd, but each is ſatisfy'd without what the other enjoys, and ſo his Will is not determin'd to the purſuit of it. But yet as ſoon as the ſtudious Man's Hunger and Thirſt makes him *uneaſy*, he, whoſe *Will* was never determin'd to any purſuit of good Chear, poinant Sauces, delicious Wine, by the pleaſant Taſte he has found in them, is, by the *Uneaſineſs* of Hunger and Thirſt, preſently determin'd to Eating and Drinking, tho' poſſibly with great indifferency, what wholeſome Food comes in his way. And on the other ſide, the Epicure buckles to Study, when Shame, or the deſire to recommend himſelf to his Miſtreſs, ſhall make him *uneaſy* in the want of any ſort of Knowledg. Thus how much ſoever Men are in earneſt, and conſtant in purſuit of Happineſs, yet they may have a clear view of Good, great and confeſs'd Good, without being concern'd for it, or mov'd by it, if they think they can make up their Happineſs without it. Tho' as to Pain, that they are always concern'd for; they can feel no *Uneaſineſs* without being mov'd. And therefore being *uneaſy* in the want of whatever is judg'd neceſſary to their Happineſs, as ſoon as any Good appears to make a part of their proportion of Happineſs, they begin to *deſire* it.

Why the greateſt Good is not always deſir'd

§. 44. This, I think, any one may obſerve in himſelf, and others, That the *greater viſible Good* does not always raiſe Mens *Deſires*, in proportion to the Greatneſs, it appears, and is acknowledg'd to have: tho' every little Trouble moves us, and ſets us on work to get rid of it. The Reaſon whereof is evident from the Nature of our *Happineſs* and *Miſery* it ſelf. All preſent Pain, whatever it be, makes a part of our preſent *Miſery*: But all abſent Good does not at any time make a neceſſary part of our preſent *Happineſs*, nor the abſence of it make a part of our *Miſery*. If it did, we ſhould be conſtantly and infinitely miſerable; there being infinite degrees of Happineſs, which are not in our poſſeſſion. All *Uneaſineſs* therefore being remov'd, a moderate portion of Good ſerves at preſent to content Men; and ſome few degrees of Pleaſure in a ſucceſſion of ordinary Injoyments make up a Happineſs, wherein they can be ſatisfy'd. If this were not ſo, there cou'd be no room for thoſe indifferent and viſibly trifling Actions, to which our *Wills* are ſo often determin'd, and wherein we voluntarily waſte ſo much of our Lives; which remiſſneſs could by no means conſiſt with a conſtant determination of *Will* or *Deſire* to the greateſt apparent Good. That this is ſo, I think few People need go far from home to be convinc'd. And indeed in this Life there are not many whoſe Happineſs reaches ſo far as to afford them a conſtant train of moderate mean Pleaſures, without any mixture of *Uneaſineſs*; and yet they could be content to ſtay here

for

for ever: tho' they cannot deny, but that it is poſſible there may be a State of eternal durable Joys after this Life, far ſurpaſſing all the Good that is to be found here. Nay, they cannot but ſee, that it is more poſſible than the Attainment and Continuation of that Pittance of Honour, Riches or Pleaſure, which they purſue, and for which they neglect that eternal State: But yet in full view of this Difference, ſatisfy'd of the Poſſibility of a perfect, ſecure, and laſting Happineſs in a future State, and under a clear Conviction, that it is not to be had here, whilſt they bound their Happineſs within ſome little Enjoyment, or Aim of this Life, and exclude the Joys of Heaven from making any neceſſary part of it; their Deſires are not mov'd by this greater apparent Good, nor their *Wills* determin'd to any Action, or Endeavour for its Attainment.

Why not being deſir'd, it moves not the Will.

§. 45. The ordinary Neceſſities of our Lives fill a great part of them with the *Uneaſineſs* of *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, *Heat*, *Cold*, *Wearineſs* with Labour, and *Sleepineſs* in their conſtant Returns, *&c.* To which, if beſides accidental Harms, we add the fantaſtical *Uneaſineſs*, (as Itch after *Honour*, *Power*, or *Riches*, &c.) which acquir'd Habits by Faſhion, Example, and Education, have ſettled in us, and a thouſand other irregular Deſires, which Cuſtom has made natural to us; we ſhall find, that a very little part of our Life is ſo vacant from theſe *Uneaſineſſes*, as to leave us free to the Attraction of remoter abſent Good. We are ſeldom at eaſe, and free enough from the Solicitation of our natural or adopted Deſires, but a conſtant Succeſſion of *Uneaſineſſes* out of that Stock, which natural Wants or acquir'd Habits have heaped up, take the *Will* in their turns: and no ſooner is one Action diſpatch'd, which by ſuch a Determination of the *Will* we are ſet upon, but another *Uneaſineſs* is ready to ſet us on work. For the removing of the Pains we feel, and are at preſent preſs'd with, being the getting out of Miſery, and conſequently the firſt thing to be done in order to Happineſs, abſent Good, tho' thought on, confeſs'd, and appearing to be good, not making any part of this Unhappineſs in its Abſence, is juſtled out to make way for the Removal of thoſe *Uneaſineſſes* we feel; till due and repeated Contemplation has brought it nearer to our Mind, given ſome reliſh of it, and rais'd in us ſome Deſire: which then beginning to make a part of our preſent *Uneaſineſs*, ſtands upon fair terms with the reſt, to be ſatisfy'd; and ſo, according to its Greatneſs and Preſſure, comes in its turn to determine the *Will*.

Due Conſideration raiſes Deſire.

§. 46. And thus by a due Conſideration, and examining any Good propos'd, it is in our Power to raiſe our Deſires in a due proportion to the value of that Good, whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon the *Will*, and be purſu'd. For Good, tho' appearing, and allow'd ever ſo great, yet till it has rais'd Deſires in our Minds, and thereby made us *uneaſy* in its want, it reaches not our *Wills*; we are not within the Sphere of its Activity; our *Wills* being under the Determination only of thoſe *Uneaſineſſes*, which are preſent to us, which (whilſt we have any) are always ſoliciting, and ready at hand to give the *Will* its next Determination: the ballancing, when there is any in the Mind, being only which Deſire ſhall be next ſatisfy'd, which *Uneaſineſs* firſt remov'd. Whereby it comes to paſs, that as long as any *Uneaſineſs*, any Deſire remains in our Mind, there is no room for *Good*, barely as ſuch, to come at the *Will*, or at all to determine it. Becauſe, as has been ſaid, the firſt Step in our Endeavours after Happineſs being to get wholly out of the Confines of Miſery, and to feel no part of it, the *Will* can be at leiſure for nothing elſe, till every *Uneaſineſs* we feel, be perfectly remov'd: which, in the multitude of Wants and Deſires we are beſet with in this imperfect State, we are not like to be ever freed from in this World.

The Power to ſuſpend the Proſecution of any Deſire, makes way for Conſideration.

§. 47. There being in us a great many *Uneaſineſſes* always ſoliciting, and ready to determine the *Will*, it is natural, as I have ſaid, that the greateſt and moſt preſſing ſhould determine the *Will* to the next Action; and ſo it does for the moſt part, but not always. For the Mind having in moſt caſes, as is evident in Experience, a Power to *ſuſpend* the Execution and Satisfaction of any of its Deſires, and ſo all, one after another; is at liberty to conſider the Objects of them, examine them on all ſides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the Liberty Man has; and from the not uſing of it right, comes all that Variety of Miſtakes, Errors, and Faults which we run into in the Conduct of our Lives, and our Endeavours after Happineſs; whilſt we precipitate the

the Determination of our *Wills*, and engage too ſoon before due *Examination*. To prevent this, we have a Power to *ſuſpend* the Proſecution of this or that Deſire, as every one daily may experiment in himſelf. This ſeems to me the Source of all Liberty; in this ſeems to conſiſt that which is (as I think improperly) call'd *Free-Will*. For during this *Suſpenſion* of any Deſire, before the *Will* be determin'd to Action, and the Action (which follows that Determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judg of the Good or Evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due *Examination*, we have judg'd we have done our Duty, all that we can or ought to do in purſuit of our Happineſs; and 'tis not a Fault, but a Perfection of our Nature to deſire, will, and act according to the laſt Reſult of a fair *Examination*.

To be determin'd by our own Judgment, is no Reſtraint to Liberty.

§. 48. This is ſo far from being a Reſtraint or Diminution of *Freedom*, that it is the very Improvement and Benefit of it; 'tis not an Abridgment, 'tis the End and Uſe of our *Liberty*; and the farther we are remov'd from ſuch a Determination, the nearer we are to Miſery and Slavery. A perfect Indifferency in the Mind, not determinable by its laſt Judgment of the Good or Evil that is thought to attend its Choice, would be ſo far from being an Advantage and Excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great an Imperfection, as the want of Indifferency to act or not to act till determin'd by the *Will*, would be an Imperfection on the other ſide. A Man is at liberty to lift up his Hand to his Head, or let it reſt quiet: He is perfectly indifferent in either? and it would be an Imperfection in him, if he wanted that Power, if he were depriv'd of that Indifferency. But it would be as great an Imperfection if he had the ſame Indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his Hand, or its remaining in reſt, when it would ſave his Head or Eyes from a Blow he ſees coming: *'Tis* as much *a Perfection, that Deſire, or the Power of preferring, ſhould be determin'd by Good*, as that the Power of acting ſhould be determin'd by the *Will*; and the certainer ſuch Determination is, the greater is the Perfection. Nay, were we determin'd by any thing but the laſt Reſult of our own Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Action, we were not free. The very End of our Freedom being, that we may attain the Good we chuſe. And therefore every Man is put under a neceſſity by his Conſtitution, as an intelligent Being, to be determin'd in *willing* by his own Thought and Judgment what is beſt for him to do: elſe he would be under the Determination of ſome other than himſelf, which is want of Liberty. And to deny that a Man's *Will*, in every Determination, follows his own Judgment, is to ſay, that a Man *wills* and acts for an End that he would not have, at the time that he *wills* and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his preſent Thoughts before any other, 'tis plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unleſs he can have, and not have it; *will* and not *will* it at the ſame time; a Contradiction too manifeſt to be admitted!

The freeſt Agents are ſo determin'd.

§. 49. If we look upon thoſe *ſuperior Beings* above us, who enjoy perfect Happineſs, we ſhall have reaſon to judg that they are more ſteadily *determin'd in their Choice of Good* than we; and yet we have no reaſon to think they are leſs happy, or leſs free than we are. And if it were fit for ſuch poor finite Creatures as we are to pronounce what infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs could do, I think we might ſay, that God himſelf cannot chuſe what is not good; the Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determin'd by what is beſt.

A conſtant Determination to a purſuit of Happineſs, no Abridgment of Liberty.

§. 50. But to give a right view of this miſtaken part of Liberty, let me ask, Would any one be a Changeling, becauſe he is leſs determin'd by wiſe Conſiderations than a wiſe Man? Is it worth the Name of *Freedom*, to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw Shame and Miſery upon a Man's ſelf? If to break looſe from the Conduct of Reaſon, and to want that Reſtraint of Examination and Judgment, which keeps us from chuſing or doing the worſe, be *Liberty*, true Liberty, Madmen and Fools are the only Free-men: But yet, I think, no body would chuſe to be mad for the ſake of ſuch *Liberty*, but he that is mad already. The conſtant Deſire of Happineſs, and the Conſtraint it puts upon us to act for it, no body, I think, accounts an Abridgment of *Liberty*, or at leaſt an Abridgment of *Liberty* to be complain'd of. God Almighty himſelf is under the neceſſity of being happy; and the more any intelligent Being is ſo, the nearer is its approach to infinite Perfection and Happineſs. That in this ſtate of Ignorance

rance we ſhort-ſighted Creatures might not miſtake true Felicity, we are endow'd with a power to ſuſpend any particular Deſire, and keep it from determining the *Will*, and engaging us in Action. This is *ſtanding ſtill*, where we are not ſufficiently aſſur'd of the way: Examination, is *conſulting a Guide*. The Determination of the *Will* upon enquiry, is *following the Direction of that Guide*: And he that has a power to act or not to act, according as ſuch Determination directs, is a *free Agent*; ſuch Determination abridges not that Power wherein Liberty conſiſts. He that has his Chains knock'd off, and the Priſon-doors ſet open to him, is perfectly at *liberty*, becauſe he may either go or ſtay, as he beſt likes; tho' his Preference be determin'd to ſtay, by the Darkneſs of the Night, or Illneſs of the Weather, or Want of other Lodging. He ceaſe not to be free, tho' the Deſire of ſome Convenience to be had there abſolutely determines his Preference, and makes him ſtay in his Priſon.

The Neceſſity of purſuing true Happineſs, the Foundation of Liberty.

§. 51. As therefore the higheſt Perfection of intellectual Nature lies in a careful and conſtant Purſuit of true and ſolid Happineſs, ſo the Care of our ſelves, that we miſtake not imaginary for real Happineſs, is the neceſſary Foundation of our *Liberty*. The ſtronger Ties we have to an unalterable Purſuit of Happineſs in general, which is our greateſt Good, and which, as ſuch, our Deſires always follow, the more are we free from any neceſſary Determination of our *Will* to any particular Action, and from a neceſſary Compliance with our Deſire, ſet upon any particular, and then appearing preferable Good, till we have duly examin'd, whether it has a tendency to, or be inconſiſtent with our real Happineſs: And therefore till we are as much inform'd upon this Enquiry, as the Weight of the Matter, and the Nature of the Caſe demands; we are, by the neceſſity of preferring and purſuing true Happineſs as our greateſt Good, oblig'd to ſuſpend the Satisfaction of our Deſire in particular Caſes.

The Reaſon of it.

§. 52. This is the Hinge on which turns the *Liberty* of intellectual Beings, in their conſtant Endeavours after and ſteddy Proſecution of true Felicity, that they can *ſuſpend* this Proſecution in particular Caſes, till they have look'd before them, and inform'd themſelves whether that particular thing, which is then propos'd or deſir'd, lie in the way to their main End, and make a real Part of that which is their greateſt Good: for the Inclination and Tendency of their Nature to Happineſs, is an Obligation and Motive to them, to take care not to miſtake or miſs it; and ſo neceſſarily puts them upon Caution, Deliberation, and Warineſs, in the Direction of their particular Actions, which are the means to obtain it. Whatever Neceſſity determines to the purſuit of real Bliſs, the ſame Neceſſity with the ſame Force eſtabliſhes *Suſpence*, *Deliberation*, and Scrutiny of each ſucceſſive Deſire, whether the Satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true Happineſs, and miſlead us from it. This, as ſeems to me, is the great Privilege of finite intellectual Beings; and I deſire it may be well conſider'd, whether the great Inlet and Exerciſe of all the *Liberty* Men have, are capable of, or can be uſeful to them, and that whereon depends the Turn of their Actions, does not lie in this, that they can *ſuſpend* their Deſires, and ſtop them from determining their *Wills* to any Action, till they have duly and fairly *examin'd* the Good and Evil of it, as far forth as the Weight of the thing requires. This we are able to do; and when we have done it, we have done our Duty, and all that is in our power, and indeed all that needs. For ſince the *Will* ſuppoſes Knowledg to guide its Choice, all that we can do, is to hold our *Wills* undetermin'd, till we have *examin'd* the Good and Evil of what we deſire. What follows after that, follows in a Chain of Conſequences link'd one to another, all depending on the laſt Determination of the Judgment; which, whether it ſhall be upon a haſty and precipitate View, or upon a due and mature *Examination*, is in our power: Experience ſhewing us, that in moſt Caſes we are able to ſuſpend the preſent Satisfaction of any Deſire.

Government of our Paſſions, the right Improvement of Liberty.

§. 53. But if any extreme Diſturbance (as ſometimes it happens) poſſeſſes our whole Mind, as when the Pain of the Rack, an impetuous *Uneaſineſs*, as of Love, Anger, or any other violent Paſſion, running away with us, allows us not the Liberty of Thought, and we are not Maſters enough of our own Minds to conſider thorowly and examine fairly; God, who knows our Frailty, pities our Weakneſs, and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and ſees what was and what was not in our power, will judg as a kind and merciful Father.

But

But the Forbearance of a too hasty Compliance with our Desires, the Moderation and Restraint of our Passions, so that our Understandings may be *free* to examine, and Reason unbiass'd give its Judgment, being that whereon a right Direction of our Conduct to true Happiness depends; 'tis in this we should employ our chief Care and Endeavours. In this we should take pains to suit the Relish of our Minds to the true intrinsick Good or Ill that is in things, and not permit an allow'd or suppos'd possible great and weighty Good to slip out of our Thoughts, without leaving any Relish, any Desire of it self there, till by a due Consideration of its true Worth, we have form'd Appetites in our Minds suitable to it, and made our selves uneasy in the want of it, or in the fear of losing it. And how much this is in every one's Power, by making Resolutions to himself, such as he may keep, is easy for every one to try. Nor let any one say, he cannot govern his Passions, nor hinder them from breaking out, and carrying him into Action; for what he can do before a Prince, or a Great Man, he can do alone, or in the presence of God, if he will.

How Men come to pursue different Courses.

§. 54. From what has been said, it is easy to give account, how it comes to pass, that tho' all Men desire Happiness, yet their *Wills carry them so contrarily*, and consequently some of them to what is evil. And to this I say, that the various and contrary Choices that Men make in the World, do not argue that they do not all pursue Good; but that the same thing is not good to every Man alike. This Variety of Pursuits shews, that every one does not place his Happiness in the same thing, or chuse the same way to it. Were all the Concerns of Man terminated in this Life, why one follow'd Study and Knowledg, and another Hawking and Hunting; why one chose Luxury and Debauchery, and another Sobriety and Riches; would not be, because every one of these did not aim at his own Happiness, but because their *Happiness* was placed in different things. And therefore 'twas a right Answer of the Physician to his Patient that had sore Eyes: If you have more pleasure in the Taste of Wine than in the Use of your Sight, Wine is good for you; but if the pleasure of Seeing be greater to you than that of Drinking, Wine is naught.

§. 55. The Mind has a different Relish, as well as the Palat; and you will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight all Men with Riches or Glory (which yet some Men place their Happiness in) as you would to satisfy all Mens Hunger with Cheese or Lobsters; which tho' very agreeable and delicious Fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and offensive: And many People would with reason prefer the Griping of an hungry Belly, to those Dishes which are a Feast to others. Hence it was, I think, that the Philosophers of old did in vain enquire, whether *Summum Bonum* consisted in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Vertue, or Contemplation. And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best Relish were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts; and have divided themselves into Sects upon it. For as pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves, but their Agreeableness to this or that particular Palat, wherein there is great Variety; so the greatest Happiness consists in the having those things which produce the greatest Pleasure, and in the absence of those which cause any Disturbance, any Pain. Now these, to different Men, are very different things. If therefore Men in this Life only have Hope, if in this Life they can only enjoy, 'tis not strange nor unreasonable, that they should seek their Happiness by avoiding all things that disease them here, and by pursuing all that delight them; wherein it will be no wonder to find variety and difference. For if there be no prospect beyond the Grave, the Inference is certainly right, *Let us eat and drink*, let us enjoy what we delight in, *for to-morrow we shall die*. This, I think, may serve to shew us the reason, why, tho' all Mens Desires tend to Happiness, yet they are not mov'd by the same Object. Men may chuse different things, and yet all chuse right; supposing them only like a Company of poor Insects, whereof some are Bees, delighted with Flowers and their Sweetness; others Beetles, delighted with other kind of Viands; which having enjoy'd for a season, they should cease to be, and exist no more for ever.

How Men come to chuse ill.

§. 56. These things duly weigh'd, will give us, as I think, a clear View into the state of human Liberty. Liberty, 'tis plain, consists in a Power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing as we *will*. This cannot be deny'd. But this seeming to comprehend only the Actions of a Man consecutive to Volition,

it is farther enquir'd, whether he be at liberty to *will* or no. And to this it has been answer'd, That in moſt caſes a Man is not at liberty to forbear the Act of Volition; he muſt exert an Act of his *Will*, whereby the Action propos'd is made to exiſt, or not to exiſt. But yet there is a Caſe wherein a Man is at liberty in reſpect of *Willing*, and that is the chuſing of a remote Good as an End to be purſu'd. Here a Man may ſuſpend the Act of his Choice from being determin'd for or againſt the thing propos'd, till he has examin'd whether it be really of a nature in it ſelf and Conſequences to make him happy or no. For when he has once choſen it, and thereby it is become a part of his Happineſs, it raiſes Deſire, and that proportionably gives him uneaſineſs, which determines his *Will*, and ſets him at work in purſuit of his Choice on all occaſions that offer. And here we may ſee how it comes to paſs, that a Man may juſtly incur Puniſhment, tho' it be certain that in all the particular Actions that he *wills*, he does, and neceſſarily does will that which he then judges to be good. For tho' his *Will* be always determin'd by that which is judged good by his Underſtanding, yet it excuſes him not: becauſe by a too haſty Choice of his own making, he has impos'd on himſelf wrong Meaſures of Good and Evil; which, however falſe and fallacious, have the ſame influence on all his future Conduct, as if they were true and right. He has vitiated his own Palat, and muſt be anſwerable to himſelf for the Sickneſs and Death that follows from it. The eternal Law and Nature of things muſt not be alter'd, to comply with his ill-order'd Choice. If the Neglect or Abuſe of the Liberty he had to examine what would really and truly make for his Happineſs miſleads him, the Miſcarriages that follow on it, muſt be imputed to his own Election. He had a power to ſuſpend his Determination: it was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own Happineſs, and look that he were not deceiv'd. And he could never judg, that it was better to be deceiv'd than not, in a matter of ſo great and near concernment.

What has been ſaid, may alſo diſcover to us the reaſon why Men in this World prefer different things, and purſue Happineſs by contrary Courſes. But yet ſince Men are always conſtant, and in earneſt, in matter of Happineſs and Miſery, the Queſtion ſtill remains, *How Men come often to prefer the worſe to the better*; and to chuſe that, which by their own Confeſſion has made them miſerable.

§. 57. To account for the various and contrary ways Men take, tho' all aim at being happy, we muſt conſider whence the various *Uneaſineſſes*, that determine the Will in the Preference of each voluntary Action, have their Riſe.

From bodily Pain.

1. Some of them come from Cauſes not in our Power, ſuch as are often the Pains of the Body from Want, Diſeaſe, or outward Injuries, as the Rack, *&c.* which when preſent and violent, operate for the moſt part forcibly on the *Will*, and turn the Courſes of Mens Lives from Vertue, Piety, and Religion, and what before they judg'd to lead to Happineſs; every one not endeavouring, or thro' diſuſe not being able, by the Contemplation of remote and future Good, to raiſe in himſelf Deſires of them ſtrong enough to counter-ballance the Uneaſineſs he feels in thoſe bodily Torments, and to keep his *Will* ſteddy in the Choice of thoſe Actions which lead to future Happineſs. A neighbour Country has been of late a tragical Theatre, from which we might fetch Inſtances, if there needed any, and the World did not in all Countries and Ages furniſh examples enough to confirm that receiv'd Obſervation, *Neceſſitas cogit ad Turpia*; and therefore there is great reaſon for us to pray, *Lead us not into Temptation.*

From wrong Deſires ariſing from wrong Judgment.

2. Other *Uneaſineſſes* ariſe from our Deſires of abſent Good; which Deſires always bear proportion to, and depend on the Judgment we make, and the Reliſh we have of any abſent Good: in both which we are apt to be variouſly miſled, and that by our own fault.

Our Judgment of preſent Good or Evil always right.

§. 58. In the firſt place, I ſhall conſider the wrong Judgments Men make of future Good and Evil, whereby their Deſires are miſled. For as to preſent Happineſs and Miſery, when that alone comes in conſideration, and the Conſequences are quite remov'd, *a Man never chuſes amiſs*; he knows what beſt pleaſes him, and that he actually prefers. Things in their preſent Enjoyment are what they ſeem; the apparent and real good are, in this caſe, always the ſame. For the Pain or Pleaſure being juſt ſo great, and no greater than it is felt, the preſent

ſent Good or Evil is really ſo much as it appears. And therefore were every Action of our's concluded within it ſelf, and drew no Conſequences after it, we ſhould undoubtedly never err in our Choice of Good; we ſhould always infallibly prefer the beſt. Were the Pains of honeſt Induſtry, and of ſtarving with Hunger and Cold, ſet together before us, no body would be in doubt which to chuſe: Were the Satisfaction of a Luſt, and the Joys of Heaven, offer'd at once to any one's preſent Poſſeſſion, he would not ballance, or err in the Determination of his Choice.

§. 59. But ſince our voluntary Actions carry not all the Happineſs and Miſery that depend on them, along with them in their preſent Performance, but are the precedent Cauſes of Good and Evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themſelves are paſs'd and ceaſe to be; our Deſires look beyond our preſent Enjoyments, and carry the Mind out to abſent *Good*, according to the Neceſſity which we think there is of it, to the making or increaſe of our Happineſs. 'Tis our Opinion of ſuch a Neceſſity, that gives it its Attraction: without that, we are not mov'd by abſent *Good*. For in this narrow Scantling of Capacity, which we are accuſtom'd to, and ſenſible of here, wherein we enjoy but one Pleaſure at once, which, when all Uneaſineſs is away, is, whilſt it laſts, ſufficient to make us think our ſelves happy; 'tis not all remote, and even apparent Good, that affects us. Becauſe the Indolency and Enjoyment we have, ſufficing for our preſent Happineſs, we deſire not to venture the Change; ſince we judg that we are happy already, being content, and that is enough. For who is content, is happy. But as ſoon as any new Uneaſineſs comes in, this Happineſs is diſturb'd, and we are ſet a-freſh on work in the purſuit of Happineſs.

§. 60. Their Aptneſs therefore to conclude that they can be happy without it, is one great Occaſion that Men often are not rais'd to the Deſire of the greateſt abſent *Good*. For whilſt ſuch Thoughts poſſeſs them, the Joys of a future State move them not; they have little Concern or Uneaſineſs about them; and the *Will*, free from the Determination of ſuch Deſires, is left to the purſuit of nearer Satisfactions, and to the removal of thoſe Uneaſineſſes which it then feels, in its want of and longings after them. Charge but a Man's View of theſe things; let him ſee, that Virtue and Religion are neceſſary to his Happineſs; let him look into the future State of Bliſs or Miſery, and ſee there God, the righteous Judg, ready to *render to every Man according to his Deeds; to them who by patient continuance in well-doing ſeek for Glory, and Honour, and Immortality, eternal Life; but unto every Soul that doth evil, Indignation and Wrath, Tribulation and Anguiſh*: To him, I ſay, who hath a proſpect of the different State of perfect Happineſs or Miſery, that attends all Men after this Life, depending on their Behaviour here, the Meaſures of Good and Evil, that govern his Choice, are mightily chang'd. For ſince nothing of Pleaſure and Pain in this Life can bear any proportion to endleſs Happineſs, or exquiſite Miſery of an immortal Soul hereafter; Actions in his power will have their preference, not according to the tranſient Pleaſure or Pain that accompanies or follows them here, but as they ſerve to ſecure that perfect durable Happineſs hereafter. *From a wrong Judgment of what makes a neceſſary part of their Happineſs.*

§. 61. But to account more particularly for the Miſery that Men often bring on themſelves, notwithſtanding that they do all in earneſt purſue Happineſs, we muſt conſider how *Things* come to be *repreſented* to our Deſires, *under deceitful Appearances*: And that is *by the Judgment* pronouncing wrongly concerning them. To ſee how far this reaches, and what are the Cauſes of wrong Judgment, we muſt remember that things are judg'd good or bad in a double ſenſe. *A more particular Account of wrong Judgments.*

Firſt, That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely Pleaſure or Pain.

Secondly, But becauſe not only preſent Pleaſure and Pain, but that alſo which is apt by its Efficacy or Conſequences to bring it upon us at a diſtance, is a proper Object of our Deſires, and apt to move a Creature that has foreſight; therefore *things* alſo *that draw after them Pleaſure and Pain, are conſider'd as Good and Evil.*

§. 62. The *wrong Judgment* that *miſleads us*, and makes the Will often faſten on the worſe ſide, lies in miſreporting upon the various Compariſons of theſe. The *wrong Judgment* I am here ſpeaking of, is not what one Man may think of the Determination of another, but what every Man himſelf muſt confeſs to be wrong.

wrong. For ſince I lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent Being really ſeeks Happineſs, which conſiſts in the Enjoyment of Pleaſure, without any conſiderable Mixture of Uneaſineſs; 'tis impoſſible any one ſhould willingly put into his own Draught any bitter Ingredient, or leave out any thing in his power, that would tend to his Satisfaction, and the compleating of his Happineſs, but only by *wrong Judgment*. I ſhall not here ſpeak of that Miſtake which is the Conſequence of invincible Error, which ſcarce deſerves the name of *wrong Judgment*; but of that *wrong Judgment* which every Man himſelf muſt confeſs to be ſo.

In comparing preſent and future.

§. 63. I. Therefore as to preſent Pleaſure and Pain, the Mind, as has been ſaid, never miſtakes that which is really Good or Evil; that which is the greater Pleaſure, or the greater Pain, is really juſt as it appears. But tho' preſent Pleaſure and Pain ſhew their difference and degrees ſo plainly, as not to leave room for miſtake; yet *when we compare preſent Pleaſure or Pain with future*, (which is uſually the Caſe in the moſt important Determinations of the Will) *we often make wrong Judgments* of them, taking our meaſures of them in different Poſitions of Diſtance. Objects, near our view, are apt to be thought greater than thoſe of a larger ſize, that are more remote: and ſo it is with Pleaſures and Pains; the preſent is apt to carry it, and thoſe at a diſtance have the diſadvantage in the compariſon. Thus moſt Men, like ſpend-thrift Heirs, are apt to judge a little in hand better than a great deal to come; and ſo for ſmall matters in Poſſeſſion, part with great ones in Reverſion. But that this is a *wrong Judgment*, every one muſt allow, let his Pleaſure conſiſt in whatever it will: ſince that which is future, will certainly come to be preſent; and then having the ſame advantage of Nearneſs, will ſhew it ſelf in its full Dimenſions, and diſcover his wilful Miſtake, who judg'd of it by unequal Meaſures. Were the Pleaſure of Drinking accompany'd, the very moment a Man takes off his Glaſs, with that ſick Stomach and aking Head, which, in ſome Men are ſure to follow not many hours after; I think no body, whatever pleaſure he had in his Cups, would, on theſe conditions, ever let Wine touch his Lips; which yet he daily ſwallows, and the evil ſide comes to be choſen only by the Fallacy of a little difference in time. But if Pleaſure or Pain can be ſo leſſen'd only by a few hours removal, how much more will it be ſo by a farther diſtance, to a Man that will not by a right Judgment do what Time will, *i. e.* bring it home upon himſelf, and conſider it as preſent, and there take its true dimenſions? This is the way we uſually impoſe on our ſelves, in reſpect of bare Pleaſure and Pain, or the true degrees of Happineſs or Miſery: The future loſes its juſt Proportion, and what is preſent obtains the preference as the greater. I mention not here the *wrong Judgment*, whereby the abſent are not only leſſen'd, but reduc'd to perfect nothing; when Men enjoy what they can in preſent, and make ſure of that, concluding amiſs that no Evil will thence follow. For that lies not in comparing the Greatneſs of future Good and Evil, which is that we are here ſpeaking of; but in another ſort of *wrong Judgment*, which is concerning Good or Evil, as it is conſider'd to be the Cauſe and Procurement of Pleaſure or Pain, that will follow from it.

Cauſes of this.

§. 64. *The Cauſe of our judging amiſs*, when we compare our preſent Pleaſure or Pain with future, ſeems to me to be *the weak and narrow Conſtitution of our Minds*. We cannot well enjoy two Pleaſures at once, much leſs any Pleaſure almoſt, whilſt Pain poſſeſſes us. The preſent Pleaſure, if it be not very languid, and almoſt none at all, fills our narrow Souls, and ſo takes up the whole Mind, that it ſcarce leaves any thought of things abſent: or if among our Pleaſures, there are ſome which are not ſtrong enough to exclude the Conſideration of things at a diſtance; yet we have ſo great an abhorrence of Pain, that a little of it extinguiſhes all our Pleaſures: a little Bitter mingled in our Cup, leaves no Reliſh of the Sweet. Hence it comes, that at any rate we deſire to be rid of the preſent Evil, which we are apt to think nothing abſent can equal; becauſe under the preſent Pain, we find not our ſelves capable of any the leaſt degree of Happineſs. Mens daily Complaints are a loud proof of this: The Pain that any one actually feels, is ſtill of all other the worſt; and 'tis with anguiſh they cry out, *Any rather than this; nothing can be ſo intolerable as what I now ſuffer.* And therefore our whole Endeavours and Thoughts are intent to get rid

rid of the preſent Evil, before all things, as the firſt neceſſary Condition to our Happineſs, let what will follow. Nothing, as we paſſionately think, can exceed, or almoſt equal, the Uneaſineſs that ſits ſo heavy upon us. And becauſe the Abſtinence from a preſent Pleaſure that offers it ſelf, is a Pain, nay oftentimes a very great one, the Deſire being inflam'd by a near and tempting Object; 'tis no wonder that that operates after the ſame manner Pain does, and leſſens in our Thoughts what is future; and ſo forces us, as it were, blindfold into its Embraces.

§. 65. Add to this, that abſent Good, or which is the ſame thing, future Pleaſure, eſpecially if of a ſort we are unacquainted with, ſeldom is able to counter-ballance any Uneaſineſs, either of Pain or Deſire, which is preſent. For its Greatneſs being no more than what ſhall be really taſted when enjoy'd, Men are apt enough to leſſen that, to make it give place to any preſent Deſire; and conclude with themſelves, that when it comes to Trial, it may poſſibly not anſwer the Report, or Opinion, that generally paſſes of it; they having often found, that not only what others have magnify'd, but even what they themſelves have enjoy'd with great Pleaſure and Delight at one time, has prov'd inſipid or nauſeous at another; and therefore they ſee nothing in it for which they ſhould forego a preſent Enjoyment. But that this is a *falſe* way of *judging*, when apply'd to the Happineſs of another Life, they muſt confeſs; unleſs they will ſay, God cannot make thoſe happy he deſigns to be ſo. For that being intended for a State of Happineſs, it muſt certainly be agreeable to every one's Wiſh and Deſire: Could we ſuppoſe their Reliſhes as different there as they are here, yet the Manna in Heaven will ſuit every one's Palat. Thus much of the *wrong Judgment* we make of preſent and future Pleaſure and Pain, when they are compar'd together, and ſo the abſent conſider'd as future.

§. 66. II. *As to things good or bad in their Conſequences*, and by the aptneſs is in them to procure us Good or Evil in the future, *we judg amiſs ſeveral ways.* *In conſidering Conſequences of Actions.*

1. When we *judg* that ſo much Evil does not really depend on them, as in Truth there does.

2. When we *judg*, that tho' the Conſequence be of that Moment, yet it is not of that Certainty, but that it may otherwiſe fall out, or elſe by ſome Means be avoided, as by Induſtry, Addreſs, Change, Repentance, *&c.* That theſe are *wrong* ways of *judging*, were eaſy to ſhew in every Particular, if I would examine them at large ſingly: But I ſhall only mention this in general, *viz.* That it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater Good for a leſs, upon uncertain Gueſſes, and before a due Examination be made proportionable to the Weightineſs of the Matter, and the Concernment it is to us not to miſtake. This, I think, every one muſt confeſs, eſpecially if he conſiders the uſual *Cauſes* of this *wrong Judgment*, whereof theſe following are ſome.

§. 67. I. *Ignorance:* He that judges without informing himſelf to the utmoſt that he is capable, cannot acquit himſelf of *judging amiſs.* *Cauſes of this.*

II. *Inadvertency:* When a Man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and preſent Ignorance, which miſleads our Judgments as much as the other. Judging is as it were ballancing an Account, and determining on which ſide the odds lie. If therefore either ſide be huddled up in haſte, and ſeveral of the Sums, that ſhould have gone into the Reckoning, be overlook'd and left out, this Precipitancy cauſes as *wrong* a *Judgment*, as if it were a perfect Ignorance. That which moſt commonly cauſes this, is the Prevalency of ſome preſent Pleaſure or Pain, heighten'd by our feeble paſſionate Nature, moſt ſtrongly wrought-on by what is preſent. To check this Precipitancy, our Underſtanding and Reaſon was given us, if we will make a right uſe of it, to ſearch, and ſee, and then judge thereupon. Without Liberty, the Underſtanding would be to no purpoſe: And without Underſtanding, Liberty (if it could be) would ſignify nothing. If a Man ſees what would do him good or harm, what would make him happy or miſerable, without being able to move himſelf one ſtep towards or from it, what is he the better for ſeeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble in perfect Darkneſs, what is his Liberty better, than if he were driven up and down as a Bubble by the force of the Wind? The being acted by a blind Impulſe from without, or from within, is

little

little odds. The firſt therefore, and great uſe of Liberty, is to hinder blind Precipitancy; the principal Exerciſe of Freedom is to ſtand ſtill, open the Eyes, look about, and take a View of the Conſequence of what we are going to do, as much as the Weight of the Matter require. How much Sloth and Negligence, Heat and Paſſion, the Prevalency of Faſhion, or acquir'd Indiſpoſitions, do ſeverally contribute on occaſion to theſe *wrong Judgments*, I ſhall not here farther enquires. I ſhall only add one other falſe Judgment, which I think neceſſary to mention, becauſe perhaps it is little taken notice of, tho' of great Influence.

Wrong Judgment of what is neceſſary to our Happineſs.

§. 68. All Men deſire Happineſs, that's paſt doubt; but, as has been already obſerv'd, when they are rid of Pain, they are apt to take up with any Pleaſure at hand, or that Cuſtom has endear'd to them, to reſt ſatisfy'd in that; and ſo being happy, till ſome new Deſire, by making them uneaſy, diſturbs that Happineſs, and ſhews them that they are not ſo, they look no farther; nor is the Will determin'd to any Action, in purſuit of any other known or apparent Good. For ſince we find, that we cannot enjoy all ſorts of Good, but one excludes another; we do not fix our Deſires on every apparent greater Good, unleſs it be judg'd to be neceſſary to our Happineſs; if we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not. This is another occaſion to Men of *judging wrong*, when they take not that to be neceſſary to their Happineſs, which really is ſo. This Miſtake miſleads us both in the Choice of the Good we aim at, and very often in the Means to it, when it is a remote Good. But which way ever it be, either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the Means as not neceſſary to it; when a Man miſſes his great End, Happineſs, he will acknowledg he judg'd not right. That which contributes to this Miſtake, is the real or ſuppos'd Unpleaſantneſs of the Actions, which are the way to this end; it ſeeming ſo prepoſterous a thing to Men, to make themſelves unhappy in order to Happineſs, that they do not eaſily bring themſelves to it.

We can change the Agreeableneſs of Diſagreeableneſs in things.

§. 69. The laſt Enquiry therefore concerning this matter is, Whether it be in a Man's power to change the Pleaſantneſs and Unpleaſantneſs that accompanies any ſort of Action? and to that it is plain, in many caſes he can. Men may and ſhould correct their Palats, and give a reliſh to what either has, or they ſuppoſe has none. The Reliſh of the Mind is as various as that of the Body, and like that too may be alter'd; and 'tis a miſtake to think, that Men cannot change the Diſpleaſingneſs or Indifferency that is in Actions into Pleaſure and Deſire, if they will do but what is in their power. A due Conſideration will do it in ſome caſes; and Practice, Application and Cuſtom in moſt: Bread or Tobacco may be neglected, where they are ſhewn to be uſeful to Health, becauſe of an Indifferency or Diſreliſh to them; Reaſon and Conſideration at firſt recommends, and begins their Trial, and Uſe finds, or Cuſtom makes them pleaſant. That this is ſo in Vertue too, is very certain. Actions are pleaſing or diſpleaſing, either in themſelves, or conſider'd as a means to a greater and more deſirable End. The eating of a well-ſeaſon'd Diſh, ſuited to a Man's Palat, may move the Mind by the Delight it ſelf that accompanies the eating, without reference to any other End: To which the Conſideration of the Pleaſure there is in Health and Strength (to which that Meat is ſubſervient) may add a new Guſto, able to make us ſwallow an ill-reliſh'd Potion. In the latter of theſe, any Action is render'd more or leſs pleaſing, only by the Contemplation of the End, and the being more or leſs perſuaded of its Tendency to it, or neceſſary Connexion with it: But the Pleaſure of the Action it ſelf is beſt acquir'd or increas'd by Uſe and Practice. Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a diſtance we look'd on with Averſion; and by Repetitions wear us into a liking of what poſſibly, in the firſt Eſſay, diſpleas'd us. Habits have powerful Charms, and put ſo ſtrong Attractions of Eaſineſs and Pleaſure into what we accuſtom our ſelves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at leaſt be eaſy in the Omiſſion of Actions, which habitual Practice has ſuited, and thereby recommends to us. Tho' this be very viſible, and every one's Experience ſhews him he can do; yet it is a part in the Conduct of Men towards their Happineſs, neglected to a degree, that it will be poſſibly entertain'd as a Paradox, if it be ſaid, that Men can make Things or Actions more or leſs pleaſing

to

to themſelves; and thereby remedy that, to which one may juſtly impute a great deal of their wandring. Faſhion and the common Opinion having ſettled wrong Notions, and Education and Cuſtom ill Habits, the juſt Values of things are miſplac'd, and the Palats of Men corrupted. Pains ſhould be taken to rectify theſe; and contrary Habits change our Pleaſures, and give a reliſh to that which is neceſſary or conducive to our Happineſs. This every one muſt confeſs he can do, and when Happineſs is loſt, and Miſery overtakes him, he will confeſs he did amiſs in neglecting it, and condemn himſelf for it: And I ask every one, whether he has not often done ſo?

§. 70. I ſhall not now enlarge any farther on the *wrong Judgments* and Neglect of what is in their power, whereby Men miſlead themſelves. This would make a Volume, and is not my buſineſs. But whatever falſe Notions, or ſhameful Neglect of what is in their power, may put Men out of their way to Happineſs, and diſtract them, as we ſee, into ſo different Courſes of Life, this yet is certain, that Morality, eſtabliſh'd upon its true Foundations, cannot but determine the Choice in any one that will but conſider: And he that will not be ſo far a rational Creature as to reflect ſeriouſly upon infinite Happineſs and Miſery, muſt needs condemn himſelf as not making that uſe of his Underſtanding he ſhould. The Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life, which the Almighty has eſtabliſh'd as the Enforcements of his Law, are of weight enough to determine the Choice, againſt whatever Pleaſure or Pain this Life can ſhew, when the eternal State is conſider'd but in its bare Poſſibility, which no body can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquiſite and endleſs Happineſs to be but the poſſible Conſequence of a good Life here, and the contrary State the poſſible Reward of a bad one; muſt own himſelf to judg very much amiſs if he does not conclude, that a vertuous Life, with the certain Expectation of everlaſting Bliſs which may come, is to be prefer'd to a vicious one, with the Fear of that dreadful State of Miſery, which 'tis very poſſible may overtake the Guilty; or at beſt the terrible uncertain Hope of Annihilation. This is evidently ſo, tho' the vertuous Life here had nothing but Pain, and the vicious continual Pleaſure: which yet is, for the moſt part, quite otherwiſe, and wicked Men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their preſent Poſſeſſion; nay, all things rightly conſider'd, have, I think, even the worſt part here. But when infinite Happineſs is put in one Scale againſt infinite Miſery in the other; if the worſt that comes to the pious Man, if he miſtakes, be the beſt that the Wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, who can without Madneſs run the venture? Who in his Wits would chuſe to come within a Poſſibility of infinite Miſery, which if he miſs, there is yet nothing to be got by that Hazard? Whereas on the other ſide, the ſober Man ventures nothing againſt infinite Happineſs to be got, if his Expectation comes to paſs. If the good Man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he miſtakes, he is not miſerable, he feels nothing. On the other ſide, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy; if he miſtakes, he is infinitely miſerable. Muſt it not be a moſt manifeſt wrong Judgment, that does not preſently ſee to which ſide, in this caſe, the Preference is to be given? I have forborn to mention any thing of the Certainty or Probability of a future State, deſigning here to ſhew the *wrong Judgment* that any one muſt allow he makes upon his own Principles, laid how he pleaſes, who prefers the ſhort Pleaſures of a vicious Life upon any Conſideration, whilſt he knows, and cannot but be certain, that a future Life is at leaſt poſſible.

Preference of Vice to Vertue a manifeſt wrong Judgment.

§. 71. To conclude this Enquiry into human Liberty, which as it ſtood before, I my ſelf from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious Friend of mine, ſince the Publication, ſuſpecting to have ſome miſtake in it, tho' he could not particularly ſhew it me, I was put upon a ſtricter Review of this Chapter. Wherein lighting upon a very eaſy and ſcarce obſervable Slip I have made, in putting one ſeemingly indifferent Word for another, that Diſcovery open'd to me this preſent view, which here, in this *ſecond* Edition, I ſubmit to the learned World, and which in ſhort is this: *Liberty* is a Power to act or not to act, according as the Mind directs. A Power to direct the operative Faculties to Motion or Reſt in particular Inſtances, is that which we call the *Will*. That which in the Train of our voluntary Actions determines the *Will* to any Change of

Recapitulation.

of Operation, is ſome preſent Uneaſineſs; which is, or at leaſt is always accompany'd with that of *Deſire*. Deſire is always mov'd by Evil, to fly it; becauſe a total Freedom from Pain always makes a neceſſary part of our Happineſs: But every *Good*, nay every *greater Good*, does not conſtantly move *Deſire*, becauſe it may not make, or may not be taken to make any neceſſary part of our Happineſs. For all that we deſire, is only to be happy. But tho' this general *Deſire* of Happineſs operates conſtantly and invariably, yet the Satisfaction of any particular *Deſire* can be ſuſpended from determining the *Will* to any ſubſervient Action, till we have maturely examin'd, whether the particular apparent Good, which we then deſire, makes a part of our real Happineſs, or be conſiſtent or inconſiſtent with it. The Reſult of our Judgment upon that Examination is what ultimately determines the Man, who could not be *free* if his *Will* were determin'd by any thing, but his own *Deſire* guided by his own *Judgment*. I know that Liberty by ſome is plac'd in an *Indifferency* of the Man, antecedent to the Determination of his *Will*. I wiſh they, who lay ſo much ſtreſs on ſuch an *antecedent Indifferency*, as they call it, had told us plainly, whether this ſuppos'd *Indifferency* be antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the Underſtanding, as well as to the Decree of the *Will*. For it is pretty hard to ſtate it between them; *i. e.* immediately after the Judgment of the Underſtanding, and before the Determination of the *Will*, becauſe the Determination of the *Will* immediately follows the Judgment of the Underſtanding: and to place Liberty in an *Indifferency*, antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the Underſtanding, ſeems to me to place Liberty in a State of Darkneſs, wherein we can neither ſee nor ſay any thing of it; at leaſt it places it in a Subject incapable of it, no Agent being allow'd capable of Liberty, but in conſequence of Thought and Judgment. I am not nice about Phraſes, and therefore conſent to ſay with thoſe that love to ſpeak ſo, that Liberty is plac'd in *Indifferency*; but 'tis in an *Indifferency* which remains after the Judgment of the Underſtanding; yea, even after the Determination of the *Will*: And that is an Indifferency not of the Man, (for after he has once judg'd which is beſt, *viz.* to do, or forbear, he is no longer indifferent) but an *Indifferency* of the operative Powers of the Man, which remaining equally able to operate, or to forbear operating after, as before the Decree of the *Will*, are in a State, which, if one pleaſes, may be call'd *Indifferency*; and as far as this *Indifferency* reaches, a Man is free, and no farther: *v. g.* I have the Ability to move my Hand, or let it reſt, that operative Power is indifferent to move, or not to move my Hand: I am then in that reſpect perfectly free. My *Will* determines that operative Power to Reſt, I am yet free, becauſe the *Indifferency* of that my operative Power to act, or not to act, ſtill remains; the Power of moving my Hand is not at all impair'd by the Determination of my *Will*, which at preſent orders Reſt; the *Indifferency* of that Power to act, or not to act, is juſt as it was before, as will appear, if the *Will* puts it to the Trial, by ordering the contrary. But if during the Reſt of my Hand, it be ſeiz'd by a ſudden Palſy, the *Indifferency* of that operative Power is gone, and with it my Liberty, I have no longer Freedom in that reſpect, but am under a Neceſſity of letting my Hand reſt. On the other ſide, if my Hand be put into motion by a Convulſion, the *Indifferency* of that operative Faculty is taken away by that Motion, and my Liberty in that caſe is loſt: For I am under a neceſſity of having my Hand move. I have added this, to ſhew in what ſort of *Indifferency* Liberty ſeems to me to conſiſt, and not in any other, real or imaginary.

§. 72. True Notions concerning the Nature and Extent of *Liberty* are of ſo great Importance, that I hope I ſhall be pardon'd this Digreſſion, which my Attempt to explain it, has led me into. The *Ideas* of *Will*, *Volition*, *Liberty*, and *Neceſſity*, in this Chapter of Power, came naturally in my way. In the former Edition of this Treatiſe I gave an account of my Thoughts concerning them, according to the Light I then had: And now, as a Lover of Truth, and not a Worſhipper of my own Doctrines, I own ſome Change of my Opinion, which I think I have diſcover'd ground for. In what I firſt writ, I with an unbiaſs'd Indifferency follow'd Truth, whither I thought ſhe led me. But neither being ſo vain as to fanſy Infallibility, nor ſo diſingenuous as to diſſemble my Miſtakes for fear of blemiſhing my Reputation, I have with the ſame ſincere Deſign

Deſign for Truth only, not been aſham'd to publiſh what a ſeverer Enquiry has ſuggeſted. It is not impoſſible but that ſome may think my former Notions right, and ſome (as I have already found) theſe latter; and ſome neither. I ſhall not at all wonder at this Variety in Mens Opinions; impartial Deductions of Reaſon in controverted Points being ſo rare, and exact ones in abſtract Notions not ſo very eaſy, eſpecially if of any Length. And therefore I ſhould think my ſelf not a little beholden to any one, who would upon theſe, or any other grounds, fairly clear this Subject of *Liberty* from any Difficulties that may yet remain.

Before I cloſe this Chapter, it may perhaps be to our purpoſe, and help to give us clearer Conceptions about *Power*, if we make our Thoughts take a little more exact Survey of *Actions*. I have ſaid above, that we have *Ideas* but of two ſorts of *Action*, viz. *Motion* and *Thinking*. Theſe, in truth, tho' call'd and counted *Actions*, yet, if nearly conſider'd, will not be found to be always perfectly ſo. For, if I miſtake not, there are Inſtances of both kinds, which, upon due Conſideration, will be found rather *Paſſions* than *Actions*, and conſequently ſo far the Effects barely of paſſive Powers in thoſe Subjects, which yet on their account are thought *Agents*. For in theſe Inſtances, the Subſtance that hath Motion or Thought, receives the Impreſſion, whereby it is put into that *Action* purely from without, and ſo acts merely by the Capacity it has to receive ſuch an Impreſſion from ſome external Agent; and ſuch a *Power* is not properly an *active Power*, but a mere paſſive Capacity in the Subject. Sometimes the Subſtance or Agent puts it ſelf into *Action* by its own Power, and this is properly *active Power*. Whatſoever Modification a Subſtance has, whereby it produces any Effect, that is call'd *Action*, *v. g.* a ſolid Subſtance by Motion operates on, or alters the ſenſible *Ideas* of another Subſtance, and therefore this Modification of Motion we call Action. But yet this Motion in that ſolid Subſtance is, when rightly conſider'd, but a Paſſion, if it receiv'd it only from ſome external Agent. So that the *active Power* of Motion is in no Subſtance which cannot begin Motion in it ſelf, or in another Subſtance, when at reſt. So likewiſe in *Thinking*, a Power to receive *Ideas* or Thoughts, from the Operation of any external Subſtance, is call'd a *Power* of thinking: But this is but a *paſſive Power*, or Capacity. But to be able to bring into view *Ideas* out of ſight at one's own Choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an *active Power*. This Reflection may be of ſome uſe to preſerve us from Miſtakes about *Powers* and *Actions*, which Grammar, and the common Frame of Languages may be apt to lead us into; ſince what is ſignify'd by *Verbs* that Grammarians call *active*, does not always ſignify Action: *v. g.* this Propoſition, I ſee the Moon, or a Star, or I feel the Heat of the Sun, tho' expreſs'd by a *Verb active*, does not ſignify any *Action* in me, whereby I operate on thoſe Subſtances; but the Reception of the *Ideas* of Light, Roundneſs and Heat, wherein I am not active, but barely paſſive, and cannot in that Poſition of my Eyes, or Body, avoid receiving them. But when I turn my Eyes another way, or remove my Body out of the Sun-beams, I am properly active; becauſe of my own choice, by a Power within my ſelf, I put my ſelf into that Motion. Such an *Action* is the Product of *active Power*.

§. 73. And thus I have, in a ſhort Draught, given a view of our *original Ideas*, from whence all the reſt are deriv'd, and of which they are made up; which, if I would conſider, as a Philoſopher, and examine on what Cauſes they depend, and of what they are made, I believe they all might be reduc'd to theſe very few primary and original ones, *viz.*

Extenſion,
Solidity,
Mobility, or the Power of being mov'd;

which by our Senſes we receive from Body:

Perceptivity, or the Power of Perception, or Thinking;
Motivity, or the Power of moving;

which by Reflection we receive from our Minds. I crave leave to make uſe of theſe two new Words, to avoid the Danger of being miſtaken in the uſe of thoſe which are equivocal. To which if we add

Exiſtence,
Duration,
Number;

which belong both to the one and the other; we have, perhaps, all the original *Ideas*, on which the reſt depend. For by theſe, I imagine, might be explain'd the nature of Colours, Sounds, Taſtes, Smells, and all other *Ideas* we have, if we had but Faculties acute enough to perceive the ſeverally modify'd Extenſions, and Motions of theſe minute Bodies, which produce thoſe ſeveral Senſations in us. But my preſent purpoſe being only to enquire into the Knowledg the Mind has of Things, by thoſe *Ideas* and Appearances, which *God* has fitted it to receive from them, and how the Mind comes by that Knowledg, rather than into their Cauſes, or manner of Production; I ſhall not, contrary to the Deſign of this Eſſay, ſet my ſelf to enquire philoſophically into the peculiar Conſtitution of Bodies, and the Configuration of Parts, whereby they have the power to produce in us the *Ideas* of their ſenſible Qualities: I ſhall not enter any farther into that Diſquiſition, it ſufficing to my purpoſe to obſerve, That Gold or Saffron has a power to produce in us the *Idea* of Yellow, and Snow or Milk the *Idea* of White; which we can only have by our Sight, without examining the Texture of the Parts of thoſe Bodies, or the particular Figures or Motion of the Particles which rebound from them, to cauſe in us that particular Senſation: Tho' when we go beyond the bare *Ideas* in our Minds, and would enquire into their Cauſes, we cannot conceive any thing elſe to be in any ſenſible Object, whereby it produces different *Ideas* in us, but the different Bulk, Figure, Number, Texture, and Motion of its inſenſible Parts.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Mix'd Modes.

Mix'd Modes what.

§. 1. HAVING treated of *Simple Modes* in the foregoing Chapters, and given ſeveral Inſtances of ſome of the moſt conſiderable of them, to ſhew what they are, and how we come by them; we are now in the next place to conſider thoſe we call *mix'd Modes*: ſuch are the complex *Ideas* we mark by the names *Obligation*, *Drunkenneſs*, a *Lye*, &c. which, conſiſting of ſeveral Combinations of ſimple *Ideas* of different kinds, I have call'd *mix'd Modes*, to diſtinguiſh them from the more ſimple Modes, which conſiſt only of ſimple *Ideas* of the ſame kind. Theſe mix'd Modes, being alſo ſuch Combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, as are not look'd upon to be Characteriſtical Marks of any real Beings that have a ſteddy Exiſtence, but ſcatter'd and independent *Ideas* put together by the Mind, are thereby diſtinguiſh'd from the complex *Ideas* of Subſtances.

Made by the Mind.

§. 2. That the Mind, in reſpect of its ſimple *Ideas*, is wholly paſſive, and receives them all from the Exiſtence and Operations of Things, ſuch as Senſation or Reflection offers them, without being able to make any one *Idea*, Experience ſhews us: But if we attentively conſider theſe *Ideas* I call *mix'd Modes*, we are now ſpeaking of, we ſhall find their Original quite different: *The Mind* often *exerciſes an active Power in making theſe* ſeveral *Combinations*: For it being once furniſh'd with ſimple *Ideas*, it can put them together in ſeveral Compoſitions, and ſo make variety of complex *Ideas*, without examining whether they exiſt ſo together in Nature. And hence I think it is that theſe *Ideas* are call'd *Notions*, as if they had their Original and conſtant Exiſtence more in the thoughts of Men, than in the reality of Things; and to form ſuch *Ideas*, it ſuffic'd, that the Mind puts the Parts of them together, and that they were conſiſtent in the Underſtanding, without conſidering whether they had any real Being: Tho' I do not deny, but ſeveral of them might be taken from Obſervation, and the Exiſtence of ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* ſo combin'd, as they are put together in the Underſtanding. For the Man who firſt fram'd the *Idea* of *Hypocriſy*, might have either taken it at firſt from the Obſervation of one, who made ſhew of good Qualities which he had not, or elſe have fram'd that *Idea* in his Mind, without having any ſuch Pattern to faſhion it by: For it is evident, that in the beginning of Languages and Societies of Men, ſeveral

ral of thoſe complex *Ideas*, which were conſequent to the Conſtitutions eſtabliſh'd amongſt them, muſt needs have been in the Minds of Men before they exiſted any where elſe; and that many Names that ſtood for ſuch complex *Ideas* were in uſe, and ſo thoſe *Ideas* fram'd, before the Combinations they ſtood for, ever exiſted.

§. 3. Indeed now that Languages are made, and abound with Words ſtanding for ſuch Combinations, *an uſual way of getting theſe complex Ideas, is by the Explication of thoſe Terms that ſtand for them.* For conſiſting of a Company of ſimple *Ideas* combin'd, they may by Words, ſtanding for thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, be repreſented to the Mind of one who underſtands thoſe Words, tho' that complex Combination of ſimple *Ideas* were never offer'd to his Mind by the real Exiſtence of Things. Thus a Man may come to have the *Idea* of *Sacrilege* or *Murder*, by enumerating to him the ſimple *Ideas* which theſe words ſtand for, without ever ſeeing either of them committed. *Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names.*

§. 4. Every *mix'd Mode* conſiſting of many diſtinct ſimple *Ideas*, it ſeems reaſonable to enquire, *whence it has its Unity*, and how ſuch a preciſe Multitude comes to make but one *Idea*, ſince that Combination does not always exiſt together in Nature. To which I anſwer, It is plain it has its Unity from an Act of the Mind combining thoſe ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* together, and conſidering them as one complex one, conſiſting of thoſe Parts; and the Mark of this Union, or that which is look'd on generally to compleat it, is one Name given to that Combination. For 'tis by their Names that Men commonly regulate their Account of their diſtinct Species of mix'd Modes, ſeldom allowing or conſidering any Number of ſimple *Ideas* to make one complex one, but ſuch Collections as there be Names for. Thus, tho' the killing of an old Man be as fit in Nature to be united into one complex *Idea*, as the killing a Man's Father; yet there being no name ſtanding preciſely for the one, as there is the name of *Parricide* to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex *Idea* nor a diſtinct Species of Actions, from that of killing a young Man, or any other Man. *The Name ties the Parts of mix'd Modes into one Idea.*

§. 5. If we ſhould enquire a little farther, to ſee *what* it is that *occaſions Men to make ſeveral Combinations of ſimple* Ideas into diſtinct, and, as it were, ſettled *Modes*, and neglect others which, in the nature of Things themſelves, have as much an aptneſs to be combin'd and make diſtinct *Ideas*, we ſhall find the Reaſon of it to be the End of Language; which being to mark or communicate Mens Thoughts to one another with all the Diſpatch that may be, they uſually make ſuch Collections of *Ideas* into complex Modes, and affix Names to them, as they have frequent Uſe of in their way of Living and Converſation, leaving others, which they have but ſeldom an occaſion to mention, looſe and without Names that tie them together; they rather chuſing to enumerate (when they have need) ſuch *Ideas* as make them up, by the particular Names that ſtand for them, than to trouble their Memories by multiplying of complex *Ideas* with Names to them, which they ſhall ſeldom or never have any occaſion to make uſe of. *The Cauſe of making mix'd Modes.*

§. 6. This ſhews us *how it comes to paſs, that there are in every Language many particular Words, which cannot be render'd by any one ſingle Word of another.* For the ſeveral Faſhions, Cuſtoms and Manners of one Nation, making ſeveral Combinations of *Ideas* familiar and neceſſary in one, which another People have never had any occaſion to make, or perhaps ſo much as take notice of; Names come of courſe to be annex'd to them, to avoid long Periphraſes in things of daily Converſation, and ſo they become ſo many diſtinct complex *Ideas* in their Minds. Thus ὀσφρησιμὸς amongſt the *Greeks*, and *Proſcriptio* amongſt the *Romans*, were words which other Languages had no names that exactly anſwer'd, becauſe they ſtood for complex *Ideas*, which were not in the Minds of the Men of other Nations. Where there was no ſuch Cuſtom, there was no Notion of any ſuch Actions; no Uſe of ſuch Combinations of *Ideas* as were united, and as it were tied together by thoſe Terms: And therefore in other Countries there were no Names for them. *Why Words in one Language have none anſwering in another.*

§. 7. Hence alſo we may ſee the Reaſon *why Languages conſtantly change*, take up new, and lay by old Terms; becauſe change of Cuſtoms and Opinions bringing with it new Combinations of *Ideas*, which it is neceſſary frequently to *And Languages change.*

think on, and talk about new Names, to avoid long Deſcriptions, are annex'd to them, and ſo they become new Species of complex Modes. What a number of different *Ideas* are by this means wrap'd up in one ſhort Sound, and how much of our Time and Breath is thereby ſav'd, any one will ſee, who will but take the pains to enumerate all the *Ideas* that either *Reprieve* or *Appeal* ſtand for; and inſtead of either of thoſe Names, uſe a Periphraſis, to make any one underſtand their Meaning.

Mix'd Modes, where they exiſt.

§. 8. Tho' I ſhall have occaſion to conſider this more at large, when I come to treat of Words and their Uſe; yet I could not avoid to take thus much notice here of the Names of *mix'd Modes*; which being fleeting, and tranſient Combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, which have but a ſhort Exiſtence any where but in the Minds of Men, and there too have no longer any Exiſtence, than whilſt they are thought on, *have not ſo much any where the Appearance of a conſtant and laſting Exiſtence, as in their Names:* which are therefore, in theſe ſort of *Ideas*, very apt to be taken for the *Ideas* themſelves. For if we ſhould enquire where the *Idea* of a *Triumph*, or *Apotheoſis* exiſts, it is evident they could neither of them exiſt altogether any where in the things themſelves, being Actions that requir'd Time to their Performance, and ſo could never all exiſt together: And as to the Minds of Men, where the *Ideas* of theſe Actions are ſuppos'd to be lodg'd, they have there too a very uncertain Exiſtence; and therefore we are apt to annex them to the Names that excite them in us.

How we get the Ideas of mix'd Modes.

§. 9. There are therefore *three ways whereby we get the complex* Ideas *of mix'd Modes.* 1. By Experience and *Obſervation* of things themſelves. Thus by ſeeing two Men wreſtle, or fence, we get the *Idea* of Wreſtling or Fencing. 2. By *Invention*, or voluntary putting together of ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* in our own Minds: So he that firſt invented Printing, or Etching, had an *Idea* of it in his Mind before it ever exiſted. 3. Which is the moſt uſual way, by *explaining the Names* of Actions we never ſaw, or Notions we cannot ſee; and by enumerating, and thereby as it were, ſetting before our Imaginations all thoſe *Ideas* which go to the making them up, and are the conſtituent Parts of them. For, having by *Senſation* and *Reflection* ſtor'd our Minds with ſimple *Ideas*, and by Uſe got the Names that ſtand for them, we can by thoſe Names repreſent to another any complex *Idea* we would have him conceive, ſo that it has in it no ſimple *Ideas* but what he knows, and has with us the ſame Name for. For all our complex *Ideas* are ultimately reſolvible into ſimple *Ideas*, of which they are compounded and originally made up, tho' perhaps their immediate Ingredients, as I may ſo ſay, are alſo complex *Ideas*. Thus the *mix'd Mode*, which the word *Lye* ſtands for, is made of theſe ſimple *Ideas*: 1. Articulate Sounds. 2. Certain *Ideas* in the Mind of the Speaker. 3. Thoſe words the Signs of thoſe *Ideas*. 4. Thoſe Signs put together by Affirmation or Negation, otherwiſe than the *Ideas* they ſtand for are in the mind of the Speaker. I think I need not go any farther in the Analyſis of that complex *Idea*, we call a *Lye*: What I have ſaid, is enough to ſhew, that it is made up of ſimple *Ideas*: And it could not be but an offenſive Tediouſneſs to my Reader, to trouble him with a more minute Enumeration of every particular ſimple *Idea*, that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been ſaid, he cannot but be able to make out to himſelf. The ſame may be done in all our complex *Ideas* whatſoever; which, however compounded and decompounded, may at laſt be reſolv'd into ſimple *Ideas*, which are all the Materials of Knowledg or Thought we have, or can have. Nor ſhall we have reaſon to fear that the Mind is hereby ſtinted to too ſcant a number of *Ideas*, if we conſider what an inexhauſtible Stock of ſimple Modes, Number and Figure alone affords us. How far then *mix'd Modes*, which admit of the various Combinations of different ſimple *Ideas*, and their infinite Modes, are from being few and ſcanty, we may eaſily imagine. So that before we have done, we ſhall ſee that no body need be afraid, he ſhall not have Scope and Compaſs enough for his Thoughts to range in, tho' they be as I pretend, confin'd only to ſimple *Ideas* receiv'd from Senſation or Reflection, and their ſeveral Combinations.

Motion, Thinking and Power have been moſt modify'd.

§. 10. It is worth our obſerving, *which of all our ſimple* Ideas *have been moſt modify'd, and had moſt mix'd Modes made out of them, with Names given to them:* And thoſe have been theſe three; Thinking and Motion (which are the two

two *Ideas* which comprehend in them all Action) and Power, from whence these Actions are conceiv'd to flow. These simple *Ideas*, I say, of Thinking, Motion, and Power, have been those which have been most modify'd, and out of whose Modifications have been made most complex Modes, with Names to them. For Action being the great Business of Mankind, and the whole Matter about which all Laws are conversant, it is no wonder that the several Modes of Thinking and Motion should be taken notice of, the *Ideas* of them observ'd, and laid up in the Memory, and have Names assign'd to them; without which, Laws could be but ill made, or Vice and Disorder repress'd. Nor could any Communication be well had amongst Men, without such complex *Ideas*, with Names to them: And therefore Men have settled Names, and suppos'd settled *Ideas*, in their Minds, of Modes of Actions distinguish'd by their Causes, Means, Objects, Ends, Instruments, Time, Place, and other Circumstances; and also of their Powers fitted for those Actions: *v. g.* Boldness is the Power to speak or do what we intend, before others, without Fear or Disorder; and the *Greeks* call the Confidence of Speaking by a peculiar name, παῤῥησία: which Power or Ability in Man, of doing any thing, when it has been acquir'd by frequent doing the same thing, is that *Idea* we name *Habit*; when it is forward, and ready upon every occasion to break into Action, we *call* it *Disposition*. Thus *Testiness* is a Disposition or Aptness to be angry.

To conclude: Let us examine any *Modes of Action*, v. g. *Consideration* and *Assent*, which are Actions of the Mind; *Running* and *Speaking*, which are Actions of the Body; *Revenge* and *Murder*, which are Actions of both together: and we shall find them but so many *Collections of simple Ideas*, which together make up the complex ones signify'd by those Names.

§. 11. *Power* being the Source from whence all Action proceeds, the Substances wherein these Powers are, when they exert this Power into Act, are call'd *Causes*; and the Substances which thereupon are produc'd, or the simple *Ideas* which are introduc'd into any Subject by the exerting of that Power, are call'd *Effects*. The *Efficacy* whereby the new Substance or *Idea* is produc'd, is call'd, in the Subject exerting that Power, *Action*; but in the Subject, wherein any simple *Idea* is chang'd or produc'd, it is call'd *Passion*: which Efficacy, however various, and the Effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual Agents, to be nothing else but Modes of Thinking and Willing; in corporeal Agents, nothing else but Modifications of Motion. I say, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two: For whatever sort of Action, besides these, produces any Effects, I confess my self to have no Notion nor *Idea* of; and so it is quite remote from my Thoughts, Apprehensions, and Knowledg; and as much in the dark to me as five other Senses, or as the *Ideas* of Colours to a blind Man: And therefore *many Words, which seem to express some Action*, signify nothing of the Action or *Modus Operandi* at all, *but* barely *the Effect*, with some Circumstances of the Subject wrought on, or Cause operating; *v. g.* Creation, Annihilation, contain in them no *Idea* of the Action or Manner whereby they are produc'd, but barely of the Cause, and the Thing done. And when a Country-man says the Cold freezes Water, tho' the word Freezing seems to import some *Action*, yet truly it signifies nothing but the Effect, *viz.* that Water that was before fluid, is become hard and consistent, without containing any *Idea* of the Action whereby it is done.

Several Words seeming to signify Action, signify but the Effect.

§. 12. I think I shall not need to remark here, that tho' Power and Action make the greatest part of mix'd Modes, mark'd by Names, and familiar in the Minds and Mouths of Men; yet other simple *Ideas*, and their several Combinations, are *not* excluded: much less, I think, will it be *necessary* for me *to enumerate all the mix'd Modes*, which have been settled, with Names to them. That would be to make a Dictionary of the greatest part of the words made use of in Divinity, Ethicks, Law and Politicks, and several other Sciences. All that is requisite to my present Design, is, to shew what sort of *Ideas* those are which I call *mix'd Modes*, how the Mind comes by them, and that they are Compositions made up of simple *Ideas* got from Sensation and Reflection; which, I suppose, I have done.

Mix'd Modes made also of other Ideas.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas *of Subſtances.*

Ideas of Subſtances, how made.

§. 1. THE Mind being, as I have declar'd, furniſh'd with a great number of the ſimple *Ideas*, convey'd in by the *Senſes*, as they are found in exteriour things, or by *Reflection* on its own Operations, takes notice alſo, that a certain number of theſe ſimple *Ideas* go conſtantly together; which being preſum'd to belong to one thing, and words being ſuited to common Apprehenſions, and made uſe of for quick Diſpatch, are call'd, ſo united in one Subject, by one name; which, by Inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of, and conſider as one ſimple *Idea*, which indeed is a Complication of many *Ideas* together: Becauſe, as I have ſaid, not imagining how theſe ſimple *Ideas* can ſubſiſt by themſelves, we accuſtom our ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum* wherein they do ſubſiſt, and from which they do reſult; which therefore we call *Subſtance*.

Our Idea *of Subſtance in general.*

§. 2. So that if any one will examine himſelf concerning his *Notion of pure Subſtance in general*, he will find he has no other *Idea* of it at all, but only a Suppoſition of he knows not what Support of ſuch Qualities, which are capable of producing ſimple *Ideas* in us; which Qualities are commonly call'd Accidents. If any one ſhould be ask'd, what is the Subject wherein Colour or Weight inheres, he would have nothing to ſay, but the ſolid extended Parts: And if he were demanded, what is it that Solidity and Extenſion inhere in, he would not be in a much better caſe than the *Indian* before-mention'd, who, ſaying that the World was ſupported by a great Elephant, was ask'd what the Elephant reſted on; to which his Anſwer was, A great Tortoiſe. But being again preſs'd to know what gave ſupport to the broad-back'd Tortoiſe, reply'd, Something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other caſes where we uſe words without having clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, we talk like Children; who being queſtion'd what ſuch a thing is, which they know not, readily give this ſatisfactory Anſwer, That it is *ſomething*: which in truth ſignifies no more, when ſo uſed either by Children or Men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no diſtinct *Idea* of at all, and ſo are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The *Idea* then we have, to which we give the general name Subſtance, being nothing but the ſuppos'd, but unknown Support of thoſe Qualities we find exiſting, which we imagine cannot ſubſiſt, *ſine re ſubſtante*, without ſomething to ſupport them, we call that Support *Subſtantia*; which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain *Engliſh*, *ſtanding under* or *upholding*.

Of the ſorts of Subſtances.

§. 3. An obſcure and relative *Idea* of Subſtance in general being thus made, we come to have the *Ideas of particular Sorts of Subſtances*, by collecting ſuch Combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, as are by Experience and Obſervation of Mens Senſes taken notice of to exiſt together, and are therefore ſuppos'd to flow from the particular internal Conſtitution, or unknown Eſſence of that Subſtance. Thus we come to have the *Ideas* of a Man, Horſe, Gold, Water, *&c.* of which Subſtances, whether any one has any other clear *Idea*, farther than of certain ſimple *Ideas* co-exiſting together, I appeal to every one's own Experience. 'Tis the ordinary Qualities obſervable in Iron, or a Diamond, put together, that make the true complex *Idea* of thoſe Subſtances, which a Smith or a Jeweller commonly knows better than a Philoſopher; who, whatever ſubſtantial Forms he may talk of, has no other *Idea* of thoſe Subſtances, than what is fram'd by a Collection of thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which are to be found in them: only we muſt take notice, that our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, beſides all theſe ſimple *Ideas* they are made up of, have always the confus'd *Idea* of *ſomething* to which they belong, and in which they ſubſiſt. And therefore when we ſpeak of any ſort of Subſtance, we ſay it is a *thing* having ſuch or ſuch Qualities; as Body is a *thing* that is extended, figur'd, and capable of Motion; Spirit, a *thing* capable of thinking; and ſo Hardneſs, Friability, and Power to draw Iron, we ſay, are

Qualities

Qualities to be found in a Loadſtone. Theſe, and the like faſhions of ſpeaking, intimate, that the Subſtance is ſuppos'd always *ſomething* beſides the Extenſion, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking, or other obſervable *Ideas*, tho' we know not what it is.

No clear Idea *of Subſtance in general.*

§. 4. Hence, when we talk or think of any particular ſort of corporeal Subſtances, as *Horſe*, *Stone*, &c. tho' the *Idea* we have of either of them, be but the Complication or Collection of thoſe ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* of ſenſible Qualities, which we uſe to find united in the thing call'd *Horſe* or *Stone*; yet becauſe we cannot conceive how they ſhould ſubſiſt alone, nor one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in and ſupported by ſome common Subject; *which Support we denote by the name Subſtance*, tho' it be certain we have no clear or diſtinct *Idea* of that thing we ſuppoſe a Support.

As clear an Idea *of Spirit, as Body.*

§. 5. The ſame happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, *viz.* Thinking, Reaſoning, Fearing, *&c.* which concluding not to ſubſiſt of themſelves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produc'd by it, we are apt to think theſe the Actions of ſome other *Subſtance*, which we call *Spirit*: whereby yet it is evident, that having no other *Idea* or Notion of Matter, but *ſomething* wherein thoſe many ſenſible Qualities which affect our Senſes, do ſubſiſt; by ſuppoſing a Subſtance, wherein *Thinking*, *Knowing*, *Doubting*, and a Power of Moving, *&c.* do ſubſiſt, *we have as clear a Notion of the Subſtance of Spirit, as we have of Body*: the one being ſuppos'd to be (without knowing what it is) the *Subſtratum* to thoſe ſimple *Ideas* we have from without; and the other ſuppos'd (with a like Ignorance of what it is) to be the *Subſtratum* to thoſe Operations we experiment in our ſelves within. 'Tis plain then, that the *Idea* of corporeal *Subſtance* in Matter, is as remote from our Conceptions and Apprehenſions, as that of ſpiritual *Subſtance* or *Spirit*: and therefore from our not having any Notion of the *Subſtance* of Spirit, we can no more conclude its Non-exiſtence, than we can for the ſame reaſon deny the Exiſtence of Body; it being as rational to affirm there is no Body, becauſe we have no clear and diſtinct *Idea* of the *Subſtance* of Matter, as to ſay there is no Spirit, becauſe we have no clear and diſtinct *Idea* of the *Subſtance* of a Spirit.

Of the ſorts of Subſtances.

§. 6. Whatever therefore be the ſecret and abſtract Nature of *Subſtance* in general, all *the* Ideas *we have of particular diſtinct ſorts of Subſtance*, are nothing but ſeveral Combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, co-exiſting in ſuch, tho' unknown, Cauſe of their Union, as makes the whole ſubſiſt of it ſelf. 'Tis by ſuch Combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, and nothing elſe, that we repreſent particular ſorts of *Subſtances* to our ſelves; ſuch are the *Ideas* we have of their ſeveral Species in our Minds; and ſuch only do we, by their ſpecifick Names, ſignify to others, *v. g. Man*, *Horſe*, *Sun*, *Water*, *Iron*: upon hearing which words, every one who underſtands the Language, frames in his Mind a Combination of thoſe ſeveral ſimple *Ideas*, which he has uſually obſerv'd, or fancy'd to exiſt together under that Denomination; all which he ſuppoſes to reſt in, and be as it were adherent to that unknown common Subject, which inheres not in any thing elſe. Tho' in the mean time it be manifeſt, and every one upon enquiry into his own Thoughts will find, that he has no other *Idea* of any *Subſtance*, *v. g.* let it be *Gold*, *Horſe*, *Iron*, *Man*, *Vitriol*, *Bread*, but what he has barely of thoſe ſenſible Qualities, which he ſuppoſes to inhere, with a Suppoſition of ſuch a *Subſtratum*, as gives as it were a Support to thoſe Qualities or ſimple *Ideas*, which he has obſerv'd to exiſt united together. Thus the *Idea* of the *Sun*, what is it but an Aggregate of thoſe ſeveral ſimple *Ideas*, Bright, Hot, Roundiſh, having a conſtant regular Motion, at a certain diſtance from us, and perhaps ſome other? As he who thinks and diſcourſes of the *Sun*, has been more or leſs accurate in obſerving thoſe ſenſible Qualities, *Ideas*, or Properties, which are in that thing which he calls the *Sun*.

Power a great part of our complex Ideas *or Subſtances.*

§. 7. For he has the perfecteſt *Idea* of any of the particular ſorts of *Subſtances*, who has gather'd and put together moſt of thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which do exiſt in it, among which are to be reckon'd its active Powers, and paſſive Capacities; which tho' not ſimple *Ideas*, yet in this reſpect, for brevity ſake, may conveniently enough be reckon'd amongſt them. Thus the Power of drawing Iron, is one of the *Ideas* of the complex one of that Subſtance we call a *Load-ſtone*; and a Power to be ſo drawn, is a part of the complex one we call *Iron*: which Powers paſs for inherent Qualities in thoſe Subjects. Becauſe every *Subſtance* being

being as apt, by the Powers we obſerve in it, to change ſome ſenſible Qualities in other Subjects, as it is to produce in us thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which we receive immediately from it, does, by thoſe new ſenſible Qualities introduc'd into other Subjects, diſcover to us thoſe Powers, which do thereby mediately affect our Senſes, as regularly as its ſenſible Qualities do it immediately: *v. g.* we immediately by our Senſes perceive in *Fire* its Heat and Colour; which are, if rightly conſider'd, nothing but Powers in it to produce thoſe *Ideas* in us: We alſo by our Senſes perceive the Colour and Brittleneſs of *Charcoal*, whereby we come by the Knowledg of another Power in Fire, which it has to change the Colour and Conſiſtency of Wood. By the former Fire immediately, by the latter it mediately diſcovers to us theſe ſeveral Powers, which therefore we look upon to be a part of the Qualities of Fire, and ſo make them a part of the complex *Ideas* of it. For all thoſe Powers that we take cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of ſome ſenſible Qualities in thoſe Subjects on which they operate, and ſo making them exhibit to us new ſenſible *Ideas*; therefore it is that I have reckon'd theſe Powers amongſt the ſimple *Ideas*, which make the complex ones of the ſorts of *Subſtances*; tho' theſe Powers, conſider'd in themſelves, are truly complex *Ideas*. And in this looſer ſenſe I crave leave to be underſtood, when I name any of theſe *Potentialities amongſt the ſimple Ideas*, which we recollect in our Minds, when we think of *particular Subſtances*. For the Powers that are ſeverally in them, are neceſſary to be conſider'd, if we will have true diſtinct Notions of the ſeveral ſorts of Subſtances.

And why. §. 8. Nor are we to wonder, that *Powers make a great part of our complex* Ideas *of Subſtances*; ſince their ſecondary Qualities are thoſe, which in moſt of them ſerve principally to diſtinguiſh Subſtances one from another, and commonly make a conſiderable part of the complex *Idea* of the ſeveral ſorts of them. For our Senſes failing us in the Diſcovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the minute parts of Bodies, on which their real Conſtitutions and Differences depend, we are fain to make uſe of their ſecondary Qualities, as the characteriſtical Notes and Marks, whereby to frame *Ideas* of them in our Minds, and diſtinguiſh them one from another. All which ſecondary Qualities, as has been ſhewn, are nothing but bare Powers. For the Colour and Taſte of *Opium* are, as well as its ſoporifick or anodyne Virtues, mere Powers depending on its primary Qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different Operations on different parts of our Bodies.

Three ſorts of Ideas *make our complex ones of Subſtances.* §. 9. *The* Ideas *that make our complex ones of corporeal Subſtances*, are of theſe three ſorts. *Firſt*, The *Ideas* of the primary Qualities of things, which are diſcover'd by our Senſes, and are in them even when we perceive them not; ſuch are the Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, and Motion of the parts of Bodies, which are really in them, whether we take notice of them or no. *Secondly*, The ſenſible ſecondary Qualities, which depending on theſe, are nothing but the Powers thoſe Subſtances have to produce ſeveral *Ideas* in us by our Senſes; which *Ideas* are not in the things themſelves, otherwiſe than as any thing is in its Cauſe. *Thirdly*, The Aptneſs we conſider in any Subſtance to give or receive ſuch Alterations of primary Qualities, as that the Subſtance ſo alter'd, ſhould produce in us different *Ideas* from what it did before; theſe are call'd active and paſſive Powers: All which Powers, as far as we have any Notice or Notion of them, terminate only in ſenſible ſimple *Ideas*. For whatever Alteration a *Load-ſtone* has the power to make in the minute Particles of Iron, we ſhould have no Notion of any power it had at all to operate on Iron, did not its ſenſible Motion diſcover it: and I doubt not, but there are a thouſand Changes, that Bodies we daily handle have a power to cauſe in one another, which we never ſuſpect, becauſe they never appear in ſenſible Effects.

Powers make a great part of our complex Ideas *of Subſtances.* §. 10. *Powers* therefore juſtly *make a great part of our complex* Ideas *of Subſtances*. He that will examine his complex *Idea* of Gold, will find ſeveral of its *Ideas* that make it up, to be only Powers: as the Power of being melted, but of not ſpending it ſelf in the Fire; of being diſſolv'd in *Aq. Regia*; are *Ideas* as neceſſary to make up our complex *Idea* of Gold, as its Colour and Weight: which, if duly conſider'd, are alſo nothing but different Powers. For to ſpeak truly, Yellowneſs is not actually in Gold; but is a Power in Gold to produce that *Idea* in us by our Eyes, when placed in a due light: And the Heat, which

we

we cannot leave out of our *Idea* of the Sun, is no more really in the Sun, than the white Colour it introduces into Wax. Theſe are both equally Powers in the Sun, operating, by the Motion and Figure of its inſenſible Parts, ſo on a Man, as to make him have the *Idea* of Heat: and ſo on Wax, as to make it capable to produce in a Man the *Idea* of White.

The more ſecondary Qualities of Bodies would diſappear, if we could diſcover the primary ones of their minute Parts.

§. 11. Had we Senſes acute enough to diſcern the minute Particles of Bodies, and the real Conſtitution on which their ſenſible Qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different *Ideas* in us; and that which is now the yellow Colour of Gold, would then diſappear, and inſtead of it we ſhould ſee an admirable Texture of parts of a certain Size and Figure. This, Microſcopes plainly diſcover to us: For what to our naked Eyes produces a certain Colour, is, by thus augmenting the Acuteneſs of our Senſes, diſcover'd to be quite a different thing; and the thus altering, as it were, the Proportion of the Bulk of the minute Parts of a colour'd Object to our uſual Sight, produces different *Ideas* from what it did before. Thus Sand or pounded Glaſs, which is opake, and white to the naked Eye, is pellucid in a Microſcope; and a Hair ſeen this way, loſes its former Colour, and is in a great meaſure pellucid, with a mixture of ſome bright ſparkling Colours, ſuch as appear from the Refraction of Diamonds, and other pellucid Bodies. Blood to the naked Eye appears all red; but by a good Microſcope, wherein its leſſer Parts appear, ſhews only ſome few Globules of Red, ſwimming in a pellucid Liquor: and how theſe red Globules would appear, if Glaſſes could be found that yet could magnify them 1000 or 10,000 times more, is uncertain.

Our Faculties of Diſcovery ſuited to our State.

§. 12. The infinite wiſe Contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our Senſes, Faculties, and Organs, to the Conveniences of Life, and the Buſineſs we have to do here. We are able, by our Senſes, to know and diſtinguiſh things; and to examine them ſo far, as to apply them to our Uſes, and ſeveral ways to accommodate the Exigences of this Life. We have Inſight enough into their admirable Contrivances and wonderful Effects, to admire and magnify the Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs of their Author. Such a Knowledg as this, which is ſuited to our preſent Condition, we want not Faculties to attain. But it appears not, that God intended we ſhould have a perfect, clear, and adequate Knowledg of them: That perhaps is not in the Comprehenſion of any finite Being. We are furniſh'd with Faculties (dull and weak as they are) to diſcover enough in the Creatures, to lead us to the Knowledg of the Creator, and the Knowledg of our Duty; and we are fitted well enough with Abilities, to provide for the Conveniences of Living: Theſe are our Buſineſs in this World. But were our Senſes alter'd, and made much quicker and acuter, the Appearance and outward Scheme of Things would have quite another face to us; and I am apt to think, would be inconſiſtent with our Being, or at leaſt Well-being in this part of the Univerſe, which we inhabit. He that conſiders how little our Conſtitution is able to bear a Remove into parts of this Air, not much higher than that we commonly breathe in, will have reaſon to be ſatisfy'd, that in this Globe of Earth allotted for our Manſion, the all-wiſe Architect has ſuited our Organs, and the Bodies that are to affect them, one to another. If our Senſe of Hearing were but a 1000 times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual Noiſe diſtract us? And we ſhould in the quieteſt Retirement be leſs able to ſleep or meditate, than in the middle of a Sea-fight. Nay, if that moſt inſtructive of our Senſes, Seeing, were in any Man 1000 or 100,000 times more acute than it is now by the beſt Microſcope, things ſeveral Millions of times leſs than the ſmalleſt Object of his Sight now, would then be viſible to his naked Eyes, and ſo he would come nearer the Diſcovery of the Texture and Motion of the minute Parts of corporeal things; and in many of them, probably get *Ideas* of their internal Conſtitutions. But then he would be in a quite different World from other People: Nothing would appear the ſame to him, and others; the viſible *Ideas* of every thing would be different. So that I doubt, whether he and the reſt of Men could diſcourſe concerning the Objects of Sight, or have any Communication about Colours, their Appearances being ſo wholly different. And perhaps ſuch a Quickneſs and Tenderneſs of Sight could not endure bright Sun-ſhine, or ſo much as open Day-light; nor take in but a very ſmall part of any Object at once, and that too

only at a very near diſtance. And if by the help of ſuch Microſcopical Eyes (if I may ſo call them) a Man could penetrate farther than ordinary into the ſecret Compoſition and radical Texture of Bodies, he would not make any great advantage by the Change, if ſuch an acute Sight would not ſerve to conduct him to the Market and Exchange; if he could not ſee things he was to avoid, at a convenient diſtance, nor diſtinguiſh things he had to do with, by thoſe ſenſible Qualities others do. He that was ſharp-ſighted enough to ſee the Configuration of the minute Particles of the Spring of a Clock, and obſerve upon what peculiar Structure and Impulſe its elaſtick Motion depends, would no doubt diſcover ſomething very admirable: But if Eyes ſo fram'd could not view at once the Hand, and the Characters of the Hour-plate, and thereby at a diſtance ſee what a clock it was, their Owner could not be much benefited by that Acuteneſs; which, whilſt it diſcover'd the ſecret Contrivance of the Parts of the Machine, made him loſe its Uſe.

Conjecture about Spirits.

§. 13. And here give me leave to propoſe an extravagant Conjecture of mine, *viz.* That ſince we have ſome reaſon (if there be any Credit to be given to the Report of things, that our Philoſophy cannot account for) to imagine, that Spirits can aſſume to themſelves Bodies of different Bulk, Figure and Conformation of Parts; whether one great Advantage ſome of them have over us, may not lie in this, that they can ſo frame and ſhape to themſelves Organs of Senſation or Perception, as to ſuit them to their preſent Deſign, and the Circumſtances of the Object they would conſider. For how much would that Man exceed all others in Knowledg, who had but the Faculty ſo to alter the Structure of his Eyes, that one Senſe, as to make it capable of all the ſeveral degrees of Viſion, which the Aſſiſtance of Glaſſes (caſually at firſt light-on) has taught us to conceive? What Wonders would he diſcover, who could ſo fit his Eye to all ſorts of Objects, as to ſee, when he pleas'd, the Figure and Motion of the minute Particles in the Blood, and other Juices of Animals, as diſtinctly as he does, at other times, the Shape and Motion of the Animals themſelves? But to us, in our preſent ſtate, unalterable Organs ſo contriv'd as to diſcover the Figure and Motion of the minute Parts of Bodies, whereon depend thoſe ſenſible Qualities we now obſerve in them, would perhaps be of no advantage. God has, no doubt, made us ſo, as is beſt for us in our preſent Condition. He hath fitted us for the Neighbourhood of the Bodies that ſurround us, and we have to do with: And tho' we cannot, by the Faculties we have, attain to a perfect Knowledg of things, yet they will ſerve us well enough for thoſe Ends abovemention'd, which are our great Concernment. I beg my Reader's Pardon, for laying before him ſo wild a Fancy, concerning the ways of Perception in Beings above us: But how extravagant ſoever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the Knowledge of Angels, but after this manner, ſome way or other in proportion to what we find and obſerve in our ſelves. And tho' we cannot but allow, that the infinite Power and Wiſdom of God may frame Creatures with a thouſand other Faculties and Ways of perceiving things without them, than what we have; yet our Thoughts can go no farther than our own: ſo impoſſible it is for us to enlarge our very Gueſſes beyond the *Ideas* receiv'd from our own Senſation and Reflection. The Suppoſition at leaſt, that Angels do ſometimes aſſume Bodies, needs not ſtartle us; ſince ſome of the moſt antient and moſt learned Fathers of the Church ſeem'd to believe, that they had Bodies: And this is certain, that their State and Way of Exiſtence is unknown to us.

Complex Ideas of Subſtances.

§. 14. But to return to the matter in hand: The *Ideas* we have of Subſtances, and the Ways we come by them; I ſay, *our ſpecifick* Ideas *of Subſtances* are nothing elſe but *a Collection of a certain number of ſimple* Ideas, *conſider'd as united in one thing*. Theſe *Ideas* of Subſtances, tho' they are commonly call'd ſimple Apprehenſions, and the names of them ſimple Terms; yet in effect are complex and compounded. Thus the *Idea* which an *Engliſhman* ſignifies by the name *Swan* is white Colour, long Neck, red Beak, black Legs, and whole Feet, and all theſe of a certain ſize, with a power of ſwimming in the Water, and making a certain kind of noiſe; and perhaps, to a Man who has long obſerv'd thoſe kind of Birds, ſome other Properties which all terminate in ſenſible ſimple *Ideas*, all united in one common Subject.

§. 15.

§. 15. Beſides the complex *Ideas* we have of material ſenſible Subſtances, of which I have laſt ſpoken, by the ſimple *Ideas* we have taken from thoſe Operations of our own Minds, which we experiment daily in our ſelves, as Thinking, Underſtanding, Willing, Knowing, and Power of beginning Motion, &c. co-exiſting in ſome Subſtance; we are able to frame *the complex* Idea *of an immaterial Spirit.* And thus, by putting together the *Ideas* of Thinking, Perceiving, Liberty and Power of moving themſelves and other things, we have as clear a Perception and Notion of immaterial Subſtances, as we have of material. For putting together the *Ideas* of Thinking and Willing, or the Power of moving or quieting corporeal Motion, join'd to Subſtance, of which we have no diſtinct *Idea*, we have the *Idea* of an immaterial Spirit; and by putting together the *Ideas* of coherent ſolid Parts, and a power of being mov'd, join'd with Subſtance, of which likewiſe we have no poſitive *Idea*, we have the *Idea* of Matter. The one is as clear and diſtinct an *Idea* as the other: The *Idea* of Thinking, and moving a Body, being as clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, as the *Ideas* of Extenſion, Solidity, and being mov'd. For our *Idea* of Subſtance is equally obſcure, or none at all in both; it is but a ſuppos'd I know not what, to ſupport thoſe *Ideas* we call Accidents. It is for want of Reflection that we are apt to think, that our Senſes ſhew us nothing but material things. Every Act of Senſation, when duly conſider'd, gives us an equal View of both Parts of Nature, the Corporeal and Spiritual. For whilſt I know, by Seeing or Hearing, &c. that there is ſome corporeal Being without me, the Object of that Senſation; I do more certainly know, that there is ſome ſpiritual Being within me that ſees and hears. This, I muſt be convinc'd, cannot be the Action of bare inſenſible Matter; nor ever could be, without an immaterial thinking Being.

Idea of Spiritual Subſtances as clear as of bodily Subſtances.

§. 16. By the complex *Idea* of extended, figur'd, colour'd, and all other ſenſible Qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the *Idea* of the Subſtance of Body, as if we knew nothing at all: *Nor* after all the Acquaintance and Familiarity, which we imagine we *have* with Matter, and the many Qualities *Men* aſſure themſelves they perceive and know in Bodies, will it perhaps upon Examination be found, that they have any *more, or clearer, primary* Ideas *belonging to Body, than they have belonging to immaterial Spirit.*

No Idea *of abſtract Subſtance.*

§. 17. *The primary* Ideas *we have peculiar to Body*, as contra-diſtinguiſh'd to Spirit, *are the Cohesion of ſolid, and conſequently ſeparable, Parts, and a Power of communicating Motion by Impulſe.* Theſe, I think, are the original *Ideas* proper and peculiar to Body; for Figure is but the Conſequence of finite Extenſion.

The Cohesion of ſolid Parts and Impulſe, the primary Ideas *of Body.*

§. 18. *The* Ideas *we have* belonging, and *peculiar to Spirit, are Thinking and Will*, or a Power of putting Body into Motion by Thought, and, which is conſequent to it, Liberty. For as Body cannot but communicate its Motion by Impulſe to another Body which it meets with at reſt; ſo the Mind can put Bodies into Motion, or forbear to do ſo as it pleaſes. The *Ideas* of Exiſtence, Duration, and Mobility, are common to them both.

Thinking and Motivity the primary Ideas *of Spirit.*

§. 19. There is no reaſon why it ſhould be thought ſtrange, that I make *Mobility belong to Spirit:* For having no other *Idea* of Motion, but Change of Diſtance with other Beings that are conſider'd as at reſt; and finding, that Spirits, as well as Bodies, cannot operate but where they are, and that Spirits do operate at ſeveral times in ſeveral places, I cannot but attribute Change of Place to all finite Spirits; (for of the infinite Spirit I ſpeak not here.) For my Soul, being a real Being as well as my Body, is certainly as capable of changing Diſtance with any other Body, or Being, as Body it ſelf; and ſo is capable of Motion. And if a Mathematician can conſider a certain Diſtance, or a Change of that Diſtance between two Points, one may certainly conceive a Diſtance, and a Change of Diſtance between two Spirits; and ſo conceive their Motion, their Approach or Removal, one from another.

Spirits capable of Motion.

§. 20. Every one finds in himſelf, that his Soul can think, will, and operate on his Body in the place where that is; but cannot operate on a Body, or in a Place an hundred Miles diſtant from it. No body can imagine, that his Soul can think, or move a Body at *Oxford*, whilſt he is at *London*; and cannot but know, that being united to his Body, it conſtantly changes place all the whole Journey between *Oxford* and *London*, as the Coach or Horſe does that carries him, and I think may be ſaid to be truly all that while in motion; or if that will not be allow'd to afford us a clear *Idea* enough of its Motion, its being ſe-

parated from the Body in Death, I think, will: For to conſider it as going out of the Body, or leaving it, and yet to have no *Idea* of its Motion, ſeems to me impoſſible.

§. 21. If it be ſaid by any one, that it cannot change place, becauſe it hath none, for Spirits are not *in Loco*, but *Ubi*; I ſuppoſe that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many, in an Age that is not much diſpos'd to admire, or ſuffer themſelves to be deceiv'd by ſuch unintelligible ways of ſpeaking. But if any one thinks there is any Senſe in that Diſtinction, and that it is applicable to our preſent Purpoſe, I deſire him to put it into intelligible *Engliſh*; and then from thence draw a Reaſon to ſhew, that immaterial Spirits are not capable of Motion. Indeed Motion cannot be attributed to GOD, not becauſe he is an immaterial, but becauſe he is an infinite Spirit.

Idea of Soul and Body compar'd.

§. 22. Let us *compare* then our complex *Idea* of an immaterial Spirit with our complex *Idea* of Body, and ſee whether there be any more Obſcurity in one than in the other, and in which moſt. Our *Idea* of Body, as I think, is an extended ſolid Subſtance, capable of communicating Motion by Impulſe: And our *Idea* of Soul, as an immaterial Spirit, is of a Subſtance that thinks, and has a power of exciting Motion in Body, by Will or Thought. Theſe, I think, are *our complex* Ideas *of Soul and Body, as contra-diſtinguiſh'd*; and now let us examine which has moſt Obſcurity in it, and Difficulty to be apprehended. I know, that People, whoſe Thoughts are immers'd in Matter, and have ſo ſubjected their Minds to their Senſes, that they ſeldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to ſay, they connot comprehend a thinking thing, which perhaps is true: But I affirm, when they conſider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.

Coheſion of ſolid Parts in Body, as hard to be conceiv'd as Thinking in a Soul.

§. 23. If any one ſay, he knows not what 'tis thinks in him; he means, he knows not what the Subſtance is of that thinking thing: No more, ſay I, knows he what the Subſtance is of that Solid thing. Farther, if he ſays he knows not how he thinks; I anſwer, Neither knows he how he is extended; how the ſolid Parts of Body are united, or cohere together to make Extenſion. For tho' the Preſſure of the Particles of Air may account for the *Coheſion of ſeveral parts of Matter*, that are groſſer than the Particles of Air, and have Pores leſs than the Corpuſcles of Air; yet the Weight, or Preſſure of the Air, will not explain, nor can be a cauſe of the Coherence of the Particles of Air themſelves. And if the Preſſure of the Æther, or any ſubtiler Matter than the Air, may unite, and hold faſt together the Parts of a Particle of Air, as well as other Bodies; yet it cannot make Bonds for it ſelf, and hold together the Parts that make up every the leaſt Corpuſcle of that *Materia ſubtilis*. So that that Hypotheſis, how ingeniouſly ſoever explain'd, by ſhewing, that the Parts of ſenſible Bodies are held together by the Preſſure of other external inſenſible Bodies, reaches not the Parts of the Æther it ſelf: And by how much the more evident it proves, that the Parts of other Bodies are held together by the external preſſure of the Æther, and can have no other conceivable Cauſe of their Coheſion and Union, by ſo much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the Coheſion of the Parts of the Corpuſcles of the Æther it ſelf; which we can neither conceive without Parts, they being Bodies, and diviſible; nor yet how their Parts cohere, they wanting that Cauſe of Coheſion, which is given of the Coheſion of the Parts of all other Bodies.

§. 24. But in truth *the Preſſure of any ambient Fluid*, how great ſoever, *can be no* intelligible *Cauſe of the Coheſion of the ſolid Parts of Matter*. For tho' ſuch a Preſſure may hinder the Avulſion of two poliſh'd Superficies one from another, in a Line perpendicular to them, as in the Experiment of two poliſh'd Marbles; yet it can never, in the leaſt, hinder the Separation by a Motion, in a Line parallel to thoſe Surfaces. Becauſe the ambient Fluid, having a full Liberty to ſucceed in each Point of Space, deſerted by a lateral Motion, reſiſts ſuch a Motion of Bodies ſo join'd, no more than it would reſiſt the Motion of that Body, where it on all ſides inviron'd by that Fluid, and touch'd no other Body: And therefore, if there were no other cauſe of Coheſion, all Parts of Bodies muſt be eaſily ſeparable by ſuch a lateral ſliding Motion. For if the Preſſure of the Æther be the adequate Cauſe of Coheſion, wherever that Cauſe operates not, there can be no Coheſion. And ſince it cannot operate againſt ſuch a lateral Separation, (as has been ſhewn) therefore in every imaginary Plain,

Plain, interſecting any Maſs of Matter, there could be no more Coheſion, than of two poliſh'd Surfaces, which will always, notwithſtanding any imaginable Preſſure of a Fluid, eaſily ſlide one from another. So that perhaps, how clear an *Idea* ſoever we think we have of the Extenſion of Body, which is nothing but the Coheſion of ſolid Parts, he that ſhall well conſider it in his Mind, may have reaſon to conclude, That 'tis *as eaſy* for him *to have a clear* Idea, *how the Soul thinks, as how Body is extended.* For ſince Body is no farther, nor otherwiſe extended, than by the Union and Coheſion of its ſolid Parts, we ſhall very ill comprehend the *Extenſion* of Body, without underſtanding wherein conſiſts the Union and Coheſion of its Parts; which ſeems to me as incomprehenſible, as the manner of Thinking, and how it is perform'd.

§. 25. I allow it is uſual for moſt People to wonder, how any one ſhould find a Difficulty in what they think they every day obſerve. Do we not ſee, will they be ready to ſay, the Parts of Bodies ſtick firmly together? Is there any thing more common? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like, I ſay, concerning *Thinking*, and *voluntary Motion?* Do we not every moment experiment it in our ſelves; and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confeſs; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and conſider how it is done, there I think we are at a loſs, both in the one, and the other; and can as little underſtand how the Parts of Body cohere, as how we our ſelves perceive, or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the Parts of Gold, or Braſs, (that but now in fuſion were as looſe from one another, as the Particles of Water, or the Sands of an Hour-glaſs) come in a few Moments to be ſo united, and adhere ſo ſtrongly one to another, that the utmoſt Force of Mens Arms cannot ſeparate them; A conſidering Man will, I ſuppoſe, be here at a loſs, to ſatisfy his own, or another Man's Underſtanding.

§. 26. The little Bodies that compoſe that Fluid we call *Water*, are ſo extremely ſmall, that I have never heard of any one, who by a Microſcope (and yet I have heard of ſome that have magnify'd to 10,000; nay, to much above 100,000 times) pretended to perceive their diſtinct Bulk, Figure, or Motion: And the Particles of *Water* are alſo ſo perfectly looſe one from another, that the leaſt Force ſenſibly ſeparates them. Nay, if we conſider their perpetual Motion, we muſt allow them to have no Coheſion one with another; and yet let but a ſharp Cold come, and they unite, they conſolidate, theſe little Atoms cohere, and are not, without great Force, ſeparable. He that could find the Bonds that tie theſe heaps of looſe little Bodies together ſo firmly; he that could make known the Cement that makes them ſtick ſo faſt one to another, would diſcover a great, and yet unknown Secret: And yet when that was done, would he be far enough from making the Extenſion of Body (which is the Coheſion of its ſolid Parts) intelligible, till he could ſhew wherein conſiſted the Union, or Conſolidation of the Parts of thoſe Bonds, or of that Cement, or of the leaſt Particle of Matter that exiſts. Whereby it appears, that this primary and ſuppos'd obvious Quality of Body, will be found, when examin'd, to be as incomprehenſible as any thing belonging to our Minds, and *a ſolid extended Subſtance as hard to be conceiv'd as a thinking immaterial one*, whatever Difficulties ſome would raiſe againſt it.

§. 27. For, to extend our Thoughts a little farther, that Preſſure, which is brought to explain the Coheſion of Bodies, is as unintelligible as the Coheſion it ſelf. For if Matter be conſider'd, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one ſend his Contemplation to the Extremities of the Univerſe, and there ſee what conceivable Hoops, what Bond he can imagine to hold this Maſs of Matter in ſo cloſe a Preſſure together; from whence Steel has its Firmneſs, and the Parts of a Diamond their Hardneſs and Indiſſolubility. If Matter be finite, it muſt have its Extremes; and there muſt be ſomething to hinder it from ſcattering aſunder. If, to avoid this Difficulty, any one will throw himſelf into the Suppoſition of an Abyſs of infinite Matter, let him conſider what Light he thereby brings to the *Coheſion* of Body, and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by reſolving it into a Suppoſition, the moſt abſurd and moſt incomprehenſible of all other: So far is our Extenſion of Body (which is nothing but the Coheſion of ſolid Parts) from being clearer, or more diſtinct, when

we

we would enquire into the Nature, Cauſe, or Manner of it, than the *Idea* of Thinking.

Communication of Motion by Impulſe or by Thought, equally intelligible.

§. 28. Another *Idea* we have of Body, is the Power of *Communication of Motion by Impulſe*; and of our Souls, the Power of *exciting Motion by Thought*. Theſe *Ideas*, the one of Body, the other of our Minds, every day's Experience clearly furniſhes us with: But if here again we enquire how this is done, we *are equally in the dark*. For in the Communication of Motion by Impulſe, wherein as much Motion is loſt to one Body, as is got to the other, which is the ordinarieſt Caſe, we can have no other Conception, but of the paſſing of Motion out of one Body into another; which, I think, is as obſcure and unconceivable, as how our Minds move or ſtop our Bodies by Thought; which we every moment find they do. The Increaſe of Motion by Impulſe, which is obſerv'd or believ'd ſometimes to happen, is yet harder to be underſtood. We have by daily Experience clear Evidence of Motion produc'd both by Impulſe and by Thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our Comprehenſion; we are equally at a loſs in both. So that however we conſider Motion, and its Communication, either from Body or Spirit, *the* Idea *which belongs to Spirit is at leaſt as clear as that which belongs to Body*. And if we conſider the active Power of moving, or, as I may call it, *Motivity*, it is much clearer in Spirit than Body; ſince two Bodies, plac'd by one another at reſt, will never afford us the *Idea* of a Power in the one to move the other, but by a borrow'd Motion: Whereas the Mind, every day, affords us *Ideas* of an active Power of moving of Bodies; and therefore it is worth our Conſideration, whether active Power be not the proper Attribute of Spirits, and paſſive Power of Matter. Hence may be conjectur'd, that created Spirits are not totally ſeparate from Matter, becauſe they are both active and paſſive. Pure Spirit, *viz.* God, is only active; pure Matter is only paſſive; thoſe Beings that are both active and paſſive, we may judg to partake of both. But be that as it will, I think, we have as many, and as clear *Ideas* belonging to Spirit, as we have belonging to Body, the Subſtance of each being equally unknown to us; and the *Idea* of Thinking in Spirit, as clear as of Extenſion in Body; and the Communication of Motion by Thought, which we attribute to Spirit, is as evident as that by Impulſe, which we aſcribe to Body. Conſtant experience makes us ſenſible of both of theſe, tho' our narrow Underſtandings can comprehend neither. For when the Mind would look beyond thoſe original *Ideas* we have from Senſation or Reflection, and penetrate into their Cauſes, and manner of Production, we find ſtill it diſcovers nothing but its own Short-ſightedneſs.

§. 29. To conclude, Senſation convinces us, that there are ſolid extended Subſtances; and Reflection, that there are thinking ones: Experience aſſures us of the Exiſtence of ſuch Beings; and that the one hath a power to move Body by Impulſe, the other by Thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I ſay, every moment furniſhes us with the clear *Ideas*, both of the one and the other. But beyond theſe *Ideas*, as receiv'd from their proper Sources, our Faculties will not reach. If we would enquire farther into their Nature, Cauſes, and Manner, we perceive not the Nature of Extenſion clearer than we do of Thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as eaſy as the other; and there is no more Difficulty to conceive how a Subſtance we know not, ſhould by Thought ſet Body into Motion, than how a Subſtance we know not, ſhould by Impulſe ſet Body into Motion. So that we are no more able to diſcover wherein the *Ideas* belonging to Body conſiſt, than thoſe belonging to Spirit. From whence it ſeems probable to me, that the ſimple *Ideas* we receive from Senſation and Reflection, are the Boundaries of our Thoughts; beyond which the Mind, whatever Efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any Diſcoveries, when it would pry into the Nature and hidden Cauſes of thoſe *Ideas*.

Idea of Body & Spirit compar'd.

§. 30. So that, in ſhort, *the Idea* we have *of Spirit, compar'd with the Idea* we have *of Body*, ſtands thus: The Subſtance of Spirit is unknown to us; and ſo is the Subſtance of Body equally unknown to us. Two primary Qualities or Properties of Body, *viz.* ſolid coherent Parts and Impulſe, we have diſtinct clear *Ideas* of: ſo likewiſe we know, and have diſtinct clear *Ideas* of two primary Qualities or Properties of Spirit, *viz.* Thinking, and a power of Action; *i. e.* a

Power

Power of beginning or ſtopping ſeveral Thoughts or Motions. We have alſo the *Ideas* of ſeveral Qualities inherent in Bodies, and have the clear diſtinct *Ideas* of them: which Qualities are but the various Modifications of the Extenſion of cohering ſolid Parts, and their Motion. We have likewiſe the *Ideas* of the ſeveral Modes of Thinking, *viz.* Believing, Doubting, Intending, Fearing, Hoping; all which are but the ſeveral Modes of Thinking. We have alſo the *Ideas* of willing, and moving the Body conſequent to it, and with the Body it ſelf too; for, as has been ſhewn, Spirit is capable of Motion.

The Notion of Spirit involves no more Difficulty in it than that of Body.

§. 31. Laſtly, If this Notion of immaterial Spirit may have perhaps ſome Difficulties in it, not eaſy to be explain'd, we have therefore no more reaſon to deny or doubt the Exiſtence of ſuch Spirits, than we have to deny or doubt the Exiſtence of Body; becauſe the Notion of Body is cumber'd with ſome Difficulties very hard, and perhaps impoſſible to be explain'd or underſtood by us. For I would fain have inſtanc'd any thing in our Notion of Spirit more perplex'd, or nearer a Contradiction, than the very Notion of Body includes in it; the Diviſibility *in infinitum* of any finite Extenſion, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in Conſequences impoſſible to be explicated or made in our Apprehenſions conſiſtent; Conſequences that carry greater Difficulty, and more apparent Abſurdity, than any thing can follow from the Notion of an immaterial knowing Subſtance.

We know nothing beyond our ſimple Ideas.

§. 32. Which we are not at all to wonder at, ſince we, having but ſome few ſuperficial *Ideas* of things, diſcover'd to us only by the Senſes from without, or by the Mind, reflecting on what it experiments in it ſelf within, have no knowledg beyond that, much leſs of the internal Conſtitution, and true Nature of things, being deſtitute of Faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and diſcovering in our ſelves Knowledg, and the Power of voluntary Motion, as certainly as we experiment, or diſcover in things without us, the Coheſion and Separation of ſolid Parts, which is the Extenſion and Motion of Bodies; *we have as much reaſon to be ſatisfy'd with our Notion of immaterial Spirit, as with our Notion of Body, and the Exiſtence of the one as well as the other.* For it being no more a Contradiction that Thinking ſhould exiſt, ſeparate and independent from Solidity, than it is a Contradiction that Solidity ſhould exiſt, ſeparate and independent from Thinking, they being both but ſimple *Ideas*, independent one from another; and having as clear and diſtinct *Ideas* in us of Thinking, as of Solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without Solidity, *i. e. immaterial*, to exiſt, as a ſolid thing without Thinking, *i. e. Matter*, to exiſt; eſpecially ſince it is not harder to conceive how Thinking ſhould exiſt without Matter, than how Matter ſhould think. For whenſoever we would proceed beyond theſe ſimple *Ideas* we have from Senſation and Reflection, and dive farther into the Nature of things, we fall preſently into Darkneſs and Obſcurity, Perplexedneſs and Difficulties; and can diſcover nothing farther but our own Blindneſs and Ignorance. But which-ever of theſe complex *Ideas* be cleareſt, that of Body, or immaterial Spirit, this is evident, that the ſimple *Ideas* that make them up, are no other than what we have receiv'd from Senſation or Reflection; and ſo is it of all our other *Ideas* of Subſtances, even of God himſelf.

Idea of God.

§. 33. For if we examine the *Idea* we have of the incomprehenſible ſupreme Being, we ſhall find, that we come by it the ſame way; and that the complex *Ideas* we have both of God and ſeparate Spirits, are made up of the ſimple *Ideas* we receive from *Reflection*; *v. g.* having from what we experiment in our ſelves, got the *Ideas* of Exiſtence and Duration; of Knowledg and Powers, of Pleaſure and Happineſs; and of ſeveral other Qualities and Powers, which it is better to have than to be without: when we would frame an *Idea* the moſt ſuitable we can to the ſupreme Being, we enlarge every one of theſe with our *Idea* of Infinity; and ſo putting them together, make our complex *Idea of God.* For that the Mind has ſuch a Power of enlarging ſome of its *Ideas*, receiv'd from Senſation and Reflection, has been already ſhewn.

§. 34. If I find that I know ſome few things, and ſome of them, or all, perhaps imperfectly, I can frame an *Idea* of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to Number; and thus enlarge my *Idea* of Knowledg, by extending its Comprehenſion to all things exiſting, or poſſible.

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The ſame alſo I can do of knowing them more perfectly; *i. e.* all their Qualities, Powers, Cauſes, Conſequences, and Relations, *&c.* till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can any way relate to them; and thus frame the *Idea* of infinite or boundleſs Knowledg. The ſame may alſo be done of Power, till we come to that we call infinite; and alſo of the Duration of Exiſtence, without Beginning or End; and ſo frame the *Idea* of an eternal Being. The Degrees or Extent wherein we aſcribe Exiſtence, Power, Wiſdom, and all other Perfection (which we can have any *Ideas* of) to that Sovereign Being which we call God, being all boundleſs and infinite, we frame the beſt *Idea* of him our Minds are capable of: All which is done, I ſay, by enlarging thoſe ſimple *Ideas* we have taken from the Operations of our own Minds, by Reflection; or by our Senſes, from exteriour things, to that Vaſtneſs to which Infinity can extend them.

Idea *of God.*

§. 35. For it is Infinity, which join'd to our *Ideas* of Exiſtence, Power, Knowledg, *&c.* makes that complex *Idea*, whereby we repreſent to our ſelves, the beſt we can, the ſupreme Being. For tho' in his own Eſſence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real Eſſence of a Pebble, or a Fly, or of our own ſelves) God be ſimple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may ſay we have no other *Idea* of him, but a complex one of Exiſtence, Knowledg, Power, Happineſs, *&c.* infinite and eternal: which are all diſtinct *Ideas*, and ſome of them being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been ſhewn, originally got from *Senſation* and *Reflection*, go to make up the *Idea* or Notion we have of God.

No Ideas *in our complex one of Spirits, but thoſe got from Senſation or Reflection.*

§. 36. This farther is to be obſerv'd, that there is no *Idea* we attribute to God, bating Infinity, which is not alſo a part of our complex *Idea* of other Spirits. Becauſe, being capable of no other ſimple *Ideas*, belonging to any thing but Body, but thoſe which by Reflection we receive from the Operation of our own Minds, we can attribute to Spirits no other but what we receive from thence: And all the difference we can put between them in our Contemplation of Spirits, is only in the ſeveral Extents and Degrees of their Knowledg, Power, Duration, Happineſs, *&c.* For that in our *Ideas*, as well of *Spirits*, as of other things, we are *reſtrain'd to thoſe we receive from Senſation and Reflection*, is evident from hence; That in our *Ideas* of Spirits, how much ſoever advanc'd in Perfection beyond thoſe of Bodies, even to that of Infinite, we cannot yet have any *Idea* of the manner wherein they diſcover their Thoughts one to another: tho' we muſt neceſſarily conclude, that ſeparate Spirits, which are Beings that have perfecter Knowledg and greater Happineſs than we, muſt needs have alſo a perfecter way of communicating their Thoughts than we have, who are fain to make uſe of corporeal Signs and particular Sounds; which are therefore of moſt general uſe, as being the beſt and quickeſt we are capable of. But of immediate Communication, having no experiment in our ſelves, and conſequently no Notion of it at all, we have no *Idea* how Spirits, which uſe not Words, can with Quickneſs, or much leſs, how Spirits, that have no Bodies, can be Maſters of their own Thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleaſure, tho' we cannot but neceſſarily ſuppoſe they have ſuch a Power.

Recapitulation.

§. 37. And thus we have ſeen, *what kind of* Ideas *we have of Subſtances of all kinds*, wherein they conſiſt, and how we come by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

Firſt, That all our *Ideas* of the ſeveral ſorts of Subſtances, are nothing but Collections of ſimple *Ideas*, with a Suppoſition of ſomething to which they belong, and in which they ſubſiſt; tho' of this ſuppos'd Something, we have no clear diſtinct *Idea* at all.

Secondly, That all the ſimple *Ideas*, that thus united in one common *Subſtratum*, make up our complex *Ideas* of ſeveral ſorts of the Subſtances, are no other but ſuch as we have receiv'd from *Senſation* or *Reflection*. So that even in thoſe which we think we are moſt intimately acquainted with, and that come neareſt the Comprehenſion of our moſt enlarg'd Conceptions, we cannot go beyond thoſe ſimple *Ideas*. And even in thoſe which ſeem moſt remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely ſurpaſs any thing we can perceive in our ſelves by *Reflection*, or diſcover by *Senſation* in other things, we can attain to nothing but thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, which we originally receiv'd from *Senſation* or *Reflection*; as

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is evident in the complex *Ideas* we have of Angels, and particularly of God himſelf.

Thirdly, That moſt of the ſimple *Ideas*, that make up our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, when truly conſider'd, are only Powers, however we are apt to take them for poſitive Qualities; *v. g.* the greateſt part of the *Ideas* that make our complex *Idea* of *Gold*, are Yellowneſs, great Weight, Ductility, Fuſibility, and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, *&c.* all united together in an unknown *Subſtratum*: all which *Ideas* are nothing elſe but ſo many Relations to other Subſtances, and are not really in the Gold, conſider'd barely in it ſelf, tho' they depend on thoſe real and primary Qualities of its internal Conſtitution, whereby it has a Fitneſs differently to operate, and be operated-on by ſeveral other Subſtances.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Collective Ideas *of Subſtances.*

One Idea.

§. 1. BESIDES theſe complex *Ideas* of ſeveral ſingle Subſtances, as of Man, Horſe, Gold, Violet, Apple, *&c.* the Mind hath alſo *complex collective Ideas* of Subſtances; which I ſo call, becauſe ſuch *Ideas* are made up of many particular Subſtances conſider'd together, as united into one *Idea*, and which ſo join'd are look'd on as one: *v. g.* the *Idea* of ſuch a Collection of Men as make an Army, tho' conſiſting of a great number of diſtinct Subſtances, is as much one *Idea*, as the *Idea* of a Man: And the great collective *Idea* of all Bodies whatſoever, ſignify'd by the name World, is as much one *Idea*, as the *Idea* of any the leaſt Particle of Matter in it; it ſufficing to the Unity of any *Idea*, that it be conſider'd as one Repreſentation or Picture, tho' made up of ever ſo many Particulars.

Made by the Power of compoſing in the Mind.

§. 2. Theſe collective *Ideas* of Subſtances, the Mind makes by its Power of Compoſition, and uniting ſeverally, either ſimple or complex *Ideas* into one, as it does by the ſame Faculty make the complex *Ideas* of particular Subſtances, conſiſting of an Aggregate of divers ſimple *Ideas* united in one Subſtance: And as the Mind, by putting together the repeated *Ideas* of Unity, makes the collective Mode, or complex *Idea* of any Number, as a Score, or a Groſs, *&c.* ſo by putting together ſeveral particular Subſtances, it makes collective *Ideas* of Subſtances, as a Troop, an Army, a Swarm, a City, a Fleet; each of which every one finds, that he repreſents to his own Mind by one *Idea*, in one View; and ſo under that Notion conſiders thoſe ſeveral things as perfectly one, as one Ship, or one Atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an Army of ten thouſand Men ſhould make one *Idea*, than how a Man ſhould make one *Idea*; it being as eaſy to the Mind to unite into one the *Idea* of a great number of Men, and conſider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular, all the diſtinct *Ideas* that make-up the Compoſition of a Man, and conſider them all together as one.

All artificial things are collective Ideas.

§. 3. Amongſt ſuch kind of collective *Ideas*, are to be counted moſt part of artificial things, at leaſt ſuch of them as are made-up of diſtinct Subſtances: And, in truth, if we conſider all theſe collective *Ideas* aright; as *Army*, *Conſtellation*, *Univerſe*, as they are united into ſo many ſingle *Ideas*, they are but the artificial Draughts of the Mind; bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one View, the better to contemplate and diſcourſe of them, united into one Conception, and ſignify'd by one Name. For there are no things ſo remote, nor ſo contrary, which the Mind cannot, by this Art of Compoſition, bring into one *Idea*; as is viſible in that ſignify'd by the Name *Univerſe*.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Relation.

Relation what

§. 1. BESIDES the *Ideas*, whether ſimple or complex, that the Mind has of things, as they are in themſelves, there are others it gets from their Compariſon one with another. The Underſtanding, in the Conſideration of any thing, is not confin'd to that preciſe Object: It can carry any *Idea* as it were beyond it ſelf, or at leaſt look beyond it, to ſee how it ſtands in conformity to any other. When the Mind ſo conſiders one thing, that it does as it were, bring it to, and ſet it by another, and carry its View from one to t'other: This is, as the words import, *Relation* and *Reſpect*; and the Denominations given to poſitive things, intimating that Reſpect, and ſerving as Marks to lead the Thoughts beyond the Subject it ſelf denominated to ſomething diſtinct from it, are what we call *Relatives*; and the things ſo brought together, *Related*. Thus, when the Mind conſiders *Caius* as ſuch a poſitive Being, it takes nothing into that *Idea*, but what really exiſts in *Caius*; *v. g.* when I conſider him as a Man, I have nothing in my Mind but the complex *Idea* of the Species, Man. So likewiſe, when I ſay *Caius* is a white Man, I have nothing but the bare Conſideration of Man, who hath that white Colour. But when I give *Caius* the name *Husband*, I intimate ſome other Perſon; and when I give him the name *Whiter*, I intimate ſome other thing: in both caſes my Thought is led to ſomething beyond *Caius*, and there are two things brought into conſideration. And ſince any *Idea*, whether ſimple or complex, may be the occaſion why the Mind thus brings two things together, and as it were takes a view of them at once, tho' ſtill conſider'd as diſtinct; therefore any of our *Ideas* may be the Foundation of Relation. As in the above-mention'd Inſtance, the Contract and Ceremony of Marriage with *Sempronia*, is the Occaſion of the Denomination or Relation of Husband; and the Colour White, the occaſion why he is ſaid whiter than Free-ſtone.

Relations without correlative Terms, not eaſily perceiv'd.

§. 2. Theſe, and the like *Relations*, *expreſs'd by relative Terms that have others anſwering them, with a reciprocal Intimation*, as Father and Son, Bigger and Leſs, Cauſe and Effect, *are very obvious* to every one, and every body at firſt ſight perceives the Relation. For Father and Son, Husband and Wife, and ſuch other correlative Terms, ſeem ſo nearly to belong one to another, and thro' Cuſtom do ſo readily chime and anſwer one another in Peoples Memories, that upon the naming of either of them, the Thoughts are preſently carry'd beyond the thing ſo nam'd; and no body overlooks or doubts of a Relation, where it is ſo plainly intimated. But where Languages have fail'd to give correlative Names, there the Relation is not always ſo eaſily taken notice of. *Concubine* is, no doubt, a relative Name, as well as Wife: But in Languages where this, and the like words, have not a correlative Term, there People are not ſo apt to take them to be ſo, as wanting that evident Mark of Relation which is between Correlatives, which ſeem to explain one another, and not to be able to exiſt, but together. Hence it is, that many of thoſe Names which, duly conſider'd, do include evident Relations, have been call'd external Denominations. But all Names, that are more than empty Sounds, muſt ſignify ſome *Idea*, which is either in the thing to which the Name is apply'd; and then it is poſitive, and is look'd on as united to, and exiſting in the thing to which the Denomination is given: or elſe it ariſes from the Reſpect the Mind finds in it to ſomething diſtinct from it, with which it conſiders it; and then it includes a Relation.

Some ſeemingly abſolute Terms contain Relations.

§. 3. Another ſort of *relative Terms* there is, which are not look'd on to be either relative, or ſo much as external Denominations; which yet, under the form and appearance of ſignifying ſomething abſolute in the Subject, do conceal a tacit, tho' leſs obſervable Relation. Such are the *ſeemingly poſitive* Terms of *Old*, *Great*, *Imperfect*, &c. whereof I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large in the following Chapters.

§. 4. This farther may be obſerv'd, That the *Ideas* of Relation may be the ſame in Men, who have far different *Ideas* of the things that are related, or that are thus compar'd; *v. g.* thoſe who have far different *Ideas* of a *Man*, may yet agree in the Notion of a *Father*: which is a Notion ſuperinduc'd to the Subſtance, or Man, and refers only to an Act of that thing call'd Man, whereby he contributed to the Generation of one of his own kind, let Man be what it will. *Relation different from the things related.*

§. 5. The *Nature* therefore of *Relation* conſiſts in the referring or comparing two things one to another; from which Compariſon, one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of thoſe things be remov'd or ceaſe to be, the Relation ceaſes, and the Denomination conſequent to it, tho' the other receive in it ſelf no Alteration at all: *v. g. Caius*, whom I conſider to day as a Father, ceaſes to be ſo to morrow, only by the Death of his Son, without any Alteration made in himſelf. Nay, barely by the Mind's changing the Object to which it compares any thing, the ſame thing is capable of having contrary Denominations at the ſame time: *v. g. Caius*, compar'd to ſeveral Perſons, may truly be ſaid to be older and younger, ſtronger and weaker, *&c.* *Change of Relation may be without any Change in the Subject.*

§. 6. Whatſoever doth or can exiſt, or be conſider'd as one thing, is poſitive: And ſo not only ſimple *Ideas* and Subſtances, but Modes alſo are poſitive Beings; tho' the Parts of which they conſiſt, are very often relative one to another; but the whole together conſider'd as one thing, and producing in us the complex *Idea* of one thing; which *Idea* is in our Minds, as one Picture, tho' an Aggregate of divers Parts, and under one Name, it is a poſitive or abſolute Thing, or *Idea*. Thus a Triangle, tho' the Parts thereof compar'd one to another be *relative*, yet the *Idea* of the whole is a poſitive abſolute *Idea*. The ſame may be ſaid of a Family, a Tune, *&c.* for there can be no Relation, but betwixt two things conſider'd as two things. There muſt always be in Relation two *Ideas*, or Things, either in themſelves really ſeparate, or conſider'd as diſtinct, and then a ground or occaſion for their Compariſon. *Relation only betwixt two things.*

§. 7. Concerning Relation in general, theſe things may be conſider'd:

Firſt, That there is *no one Thing*, whether ſimple *Idea*, Subſtance, Mode, or Relation, or Name of either of them, *which is not capable of almoſt an infinite number of* Conſiderations, in reference to other things; and therefore this makes no ſmall part of Mens Thoughts and Words: *v. g.* one ſingle Man may at once be concern'd in, and ſuſtain all theſe following *Relations*, and many more, *viz.* Father, Brother, Son, Grand-father, Grand-ſon, Father-in-Law, Son-in-Law, Husband, Friend, Enemy, Subject, General, Judg, Patron, Client, Profeſſor, *European*, *Engliſhman*, Iſlander, Servant, Maſter, Poſſeſſor, Captain, Superiour, Inferiour, Bigger, Leſs, Older, Younger, Contemporary, Like, Unlike, *&c.* to an almoſt infinite Number: he being capable of as many Relations, as there can be Occaſions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of Agreement, Diſagreement, or Reſpect whatſoever. For, as I ſaid, *Relation* is a way of comparing or conſidering two things together, and giving one, or both of them ſome Appellation from that Compariſon; and ſometimes giving even the Relation it ſelf a Name. *All things capable of Relation.*

§. 8. *Secondly*, This farther may be conſider'd concerning *Relation*, That tho' it be not contain'd in the real Exiſtence of things, but ſomething extraneous and ſuper-induc'd; yet the *Ideas* which relative Words ſtand for, are often clearer and more diſtinct, than of thoſe Subſtances to which they do belong. The Notion we have of a Father, or Brother, is a great deal clearer and more diſtinct, than that we have of a Man; or, if you will, *Paternity* is a thing whereof 'tis eaſier to have a clear *Idea*, than of *Humanity*: And I can much eaſier conceive what a Friend is, than what GOD. Becauſe the Knowledg of one Action, or one ſimple *Idea*, is oftentimes ſufficient to give me the Notion of a Relation: but to the knowing of any ſubſtantial Being, an accurate Collection of ſundry *Ideas* is neceſſary. A Man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be ſuppos'd not to know what it is, wherein he compares them: ſo that when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a very clear *Idea* of that Relation. The *Ideas* then of *Relations are capable* at leaſt *of being more perfect and diſtinct in our Minds, than thoſe of Subſtances.* Becauſe it is commonly hard to know all the ſimple *Ideas* which are really in any Subſtance, *The Ideas of Relations clearer often, than of the Subjects related.*

but for the moſt part eaſy enough to know the ſimple *Ideas* that make up any Relation I think on, or have a Name for: *v. g.* Comparing two Men, in reference to one common Parent, it is very eaſy to frame the *Ideas* of Brothers, without having yet the perfect *Idea* of a Man. For ſignificant relative Words, as well as others, ſtanding only for *Ideas*; and thoſe being all either ſimple, or made up of ſingle ones, it ſuffices for the knowing the preciſe *Idea* the relative Term ſtands for, to have a clear Conception of that which is the Foundation of the Relation; which may be done without having a perfect and clear *Idea* of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the Notion, that one laid the Egg out of which the other was hatch'd, I have a clear *Idea* of the Relation of *Dam* and *Chick*, between the two Caſſiowaries in *St. James's* Park; tho' perhaps I have but a very obſcure and imperfect *Idea* of thoſe Birds themſelves.

Relations all terminate in ſimple Ideas.

§. 9. *Thirdly*, Tho' there be a great number of Conſiderations, wherein things may be compar'd one with another, and ſo a multitude of *Relations*; yet they *all terminate in*, and are concern'd about thoſe *ſimple Ideas*, either of Senſation or Reflection: which I think to be the whole Materials of all our Knowledg. To clear this, I ſhall ſhew it in the moſt conſiderable Relations that we have any Notion of, and in ſome that ſeem to be the moſt remote from *Senſe* or *Reflection*; which yet will appear to have their *Ideas* from thence, and leave it paſt doubt, that the Notions we have of them are but certain ſimple *Ideas*, and ſo originally deriv'd from Senſe or Reflection.

Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated, are relative.

§. 10. *Fourthly*, That *Relation* being the conſidering of one thing with another, which is extrinſecal to it, it is evident, that all Words that neceſſarily lead the Mind to any other *Ideas* than are ſuppos'd really to exiſt in that thing, to which the Word is apply'd, are *relative Words: v. g.* A *Man Black*, *Merry*, *Thoughtful*, *Thirſty*, *Angry*, *Extended*; theſe, and the like, are all abſolute, becauſe they neither ſignify nor intimate any thing, but what does or is ſuppos'd really to exiſt in the Man thus denominated: But *Father*, *Brother*, *King*, *Husband*, *Blacker*, *Merrier*, &c. are Words which, together with the thing they denominate, imply alſo ſomething elſe ſeparate and exteriour to the Exiſtence of that thing.

Concluſion.

§. 11. Having laid down theſe Premiſes concerning *Relation* in general, I ſhall now proceed to ſhew, in ſome Inſtances, how all the *Ideas* we have of *Relation* are made up, as the others are, only of ſimple *Ideas*; and that they all, how refin'd or remote from Senſe ſoever they ſeem, terminate at laſt in ſimple *Ideas*. I ſhall begin with the moſt comprehenſive Relation, wherein all things that do or can exiſt, are concern'd; and that is, the Relation of *Cauſe* and *Effect*. The *Idea* whereof, how deriv'd from the two Fountains of all our Knowledg, *Senſation* and *Reflection*, I ſhall in the next place conſider.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Cauſe and Effect, and other Relations.

Whence their Ideas *get.*

§. 1. IN the notice that our Senſes take of the conſtant Viciſſitude of things, we cannot but obſerve, that ſeveral particular, both Qualities and Subſtances, begin to exiſt; and that they receive this their Exiſtence from the due Application and Operation of ſome other Being. From this Obſervation, we get our *Ideas* of *Cauſe* and *Effect*. That which produces any ſimple or complex *Idea*, we denote by the general name *Cauſe*; and that which is produc'd, *Effect*. Thus finding that in that Subſtance which we call Wax, Fluidity, which is a ſimple *Idea* that was not in it before, is conſtantly produc'd by the Application of a certain Degree of Heat; we call the ſimple *Idea* of Heat, in relation to Fluidity in Wax, the Cauſe of it, and Fluidity the Effect. So alſo finding that the Subſtance Wood, which is a certain Collection of ſimple *Ideas* ſo call'd, by the Application of Fire is turn'd into another Subſtance call'd Aſhes; *i. e.* another complex *Idea*, conſiſting of a Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, quite different from that complex *Idea* which we call Wood; we conſider Fire, in relation to Aſhes, as Cauſe, and the Aſhes as Effect. So that whatever is conſider'd by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular ſimple *Idea*, or Collection of

of ſimple *Ideas*, whether Subſtance or Mode, which did not before exiſt, hath thereby in our Minds the Relation of a Cauſe, and ſo is denominated by us.

§. 2. Having thus, from what our Senſes are able to diſcover in the Operations of Bodies on one another, got the Notion of *Cauſe* and *Effect*, *viz.* That a *Cauſe* is that which makes any other thing, either ſimple *Idea*, Subſtance or Mode begin to be; and an *Effect* is that, which had its beginning from ſome other thing: The Mind finds no great Difficulty to diſtinguiſh the ſeveral Originals of things into two ſorts. *Creation, Generation, making Alteration.*

Firſt, When the thing is wholly made new, ſo that no part thereof did ever exiſt before; as when a new Particle of Matter doth begin to exiſt, *in rerum natura*, which had before no Being, and this we call *Creation*.

Secondly, When a thing is made up of Particles, which did all of them before exiſt, but that every thing ſo conſtituted of pre-exiſting Particles, which, conſider'd all together, make up ſuch a Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, had not any *Exiſtence* before, as this Man, this Egg, Roſe or Cherry, *&c.* And this, when refer'd to a Subſtance, produc'd in the ordinary Courſe of Nature by an internal Principle, but ſet on work by, and receiv'd from ſome external Agent or Cauſe, and working by inſenſible ways, which we perceive not, we call *Generation*: When the Cauſe is extrinſecal, and the Effect produc'd by a ſenſible Separation, or *Juxta*-Poſition of diſcernible Parts, we call it *Making*; and ſuch are all artificial things. When any ſimple *Idea* is produc'd, which was not in that Subject before, we call it *Alteration*. Thus a Man is generated, a Picture made, and either of them alter'd, when any new ſenſible Quality or ſimple *Idea* is produc'd in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exiſt, which were not there before, are *Effects*; and thoſe things, which operated to the Exiſtence, *Cauſes*. In which, and all other Caſes, we may obſerve, that the Notion of *Cauſe* and *Effect*, has its Riſe from *Ideas*, receiv'd by Senſation or Reflection; and that this Relation, how comprehenſive ſoever, terminates at laſt in them. For to have the *Idea* of *Cauſe* and *Effect*, it ſuffices to conſider any ſimple *Idea*, or Subſtance, as beginning to exiſt by the Operation of ſome other, without knowing the manner of that Operation.

§. 3. *Time* and *Place* are alſo the Foundations of very large Relations, and all finite Beings at leaſt are concern'd in them. But having already ſhewn, in another place, how we get theſe *Ideas*, it may ſuffice here to intimate, that moſt of the Denominations of things, receiv'd from time, are only Relations. Thus when any one ſays, that Queen *Elizabeth* liv'd ſixty nine, and reign'd forty five Years, theſe words import only the Relation of that Duration to ſome other, and means no more than this, That the Duration of her Exiſtence was equal to ſixty nine, and the Duration of her Government to forty five annual Revolutions of the Sun; and ſo are all words anſwering *How long*. Again, *William* the Conquerer invaded *England* about the year 1070. which means this; That taking the Duration from our Saviour's Time till now, for one entire great Length of Time, it ſhews at what Diſtance this Invaſion was from the two Extremes: And ſo do all words of Time, anſwering to the Queſtion *When*, which ſhew only the Diſtance of any Point of Time, from the Period of a longer Duration from which we meaſure, and to which we thereby conſider it as related. *Relations of Time.*

§. 4. There are yet, beſides thoſe, other words of Time, that ordinarily are thought to ſtand for poſitive *Ideas*, which yet will, when conſider'd, be found to be relative, ſuch as are *Young*, *Old*, &c. which include and intimate the Relation any thing has to a certain Length of Duration, whereof we have the *Idea* in our Minds. Thus having ſettled in our Thoughts the *Idea* of the ordinary Duration of a Man to be ſeventy Years, when we ſay a Man is *Young*, we mean that his Age is yet but a ſmall part of that which uſually Men attain to: And when we denominate him *Old*, we mean that his Duration is run out almoſt to the end of that which Men do not uſually exceed. And ſo 'tis but comparing the particular Age, or Duration of this or that Man, to the *Idea* of that Duration which we have in our Minds, as ordinarily belonging to that ſort of Animals: which is plain, in the Application of theſe Names to other things; for a Man is called young at twenty Years, and very young at ſeven Years old: But yet a Horſe we call old at twenty, and a Dog at ſeven Years; becauſe in

each of theſe, we compare their Age to different *Ideas* of Duration, which are ſettled in our Minds, as belonging to theſe ſeveral ſorts of Animals, in the ordinary Courſe of Nature. But the Sun and Stars, tho' they have out-laſted ſeveral Generations of Men, we call not old, becauſe we do not know what period GOD hath ſet to that ſort of Beings. This Term belonging properly to thoſe things which we can obſerve, in the ordinary Courſe of things, by a natural Decay, to come to an end in a certain period of Time; and ſo have in our Minds, as it were, a Standard to which we can compare the ſeveral Parts of their Duration; and by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young or old: which we cannot therefore do to a Ruby or a Diamond, things whoſe uſual Periods we know not.

Relations of Place and Extenſion.

§. 5. The *Relation* alſo that things have to one another in their Places and Diſtances, is very obvious to obſerve; as Above, Below, a Mile diſtant from *Charing Croſs*, in *England*, and in *London*. But as in Duration, ſo in Extenſion and Bulk, there are ſome *Ideas* that are relative, which we ſignify by Names that are thought poſitive; as *Great* and *Little* are truly *Relations*. For here alſo having, by Obſervation, ſettled in our Minds the *Ideas* of the Bigneſs of ſeveral Species of things, from thoſe we have been moſt accuſtom'd to, we make them as it were the Standards whereby to denominate the Bulk of others. Thus we call a great Apple, ſuch a one as is bigger than the ordinary ſort of thoſe we have been uſed to; and a little Horſe, ſuch a one as comes not up to the ſize of that *Idea* which we have in our Minds to belong ordinarily to Horſes: And that will be a great Horſe to a *Welſhman*, which is but a little one to a *Fleming*; they two having, from the different Breed of their Countries, taken ſeveral ſiz'd *Ideas* to which they compare, and in relation to which they denominate their Great and their Little.

Abſolute Terms often ſtand for Relations.

§. 6. So likewiſe *Weak* and *Strong* are but *relative Denominations* of Power, compar'd to ſome *Ideas* we have, at that time, of greater or leſs Power. Thus when we ſay a Weak Man, we mean one that has not ſo much Strength or Power to move, as uſually Men have, or uſually thoſe of his ſize have; which is a comparing his Strength to the *Idea* we have of the uſual Strength of Men, or Men of ſuch a ſize. The like, when we ſay the Creatures are all weak things; Weak, there, is but a relative Term, ſignifying the Diſproportion there is in the Power of GOD and the Creatures. And ſo abundance of Words, in ordinary Speech, ſtand only for Relations (and perhaps the greateſt part) which at firſt ſight ſeem to have no ſuch Signification: *v. g.* The Ship has neceſſary Stores. *Neceſſary* and *Stores* are both relative Words; one having a Relation to the accompliſhing the Voyage intended, and the other to future Uſe. All which Relations, how they are confin'd to and terminate in *Ideas* deriv'd from *Senſation* or *Reflection*, is too obvious to need any Explication.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diverſity.

Wherein Identity conſiſts.

§. 1. ANOTHER occaſion the Mind often takes of comparing, is the very Being of Things, when conſidering any thing as exiſting at any determin'd Time and Place, we compare it with it ſelf exiſting at another time, and thereon form the *Ideas* of *Identity* and *Diverſity*. When we ſee any thing to be in any place in any Inſtant of Time, we are ſure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that ſame time exiſts in another place, how like and undiſtinguiſhible ſoever it may be in all other reſpects: And in this conſiſts *Identity*, when the *Ideas* it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we conſider their former Exiſtence, and to which we compare the preſent. For we never finding, nor conceiving it poſſible, that two things of the ſame kind ſhould exiſt in the ſame place at the ſame time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exiſts any where at any time, excludes all of the ſame kind, and is there it ſelf alone. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the ſame or no; it refers always to ſomething

that

that exiſted ſuch a time in ſuch a place, which 'twas certain at that inſtant was the ſame with it ſelf, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two Beginnings of Exiſtence, nor two things one Beginning; it being impoſſible for two things of the ſame kind to be or exiſt in the ſame inſtant, in the very ſame place, or one and the ſame thing in different places. That therefore that had one Beginning, is the ſame thing; and that which had a different Beginning in time and place from that, is not the ſame, but diverſe. That which has made the difficulty about this Relation, has been the little Care and Attention uſed in having preciſe Notions of the things to which it is attributed.

§. 2. We have the *Ideas* but of three ſorts of Subſtances; 1. God. 2. Finite Intelligences. 3. *Bodies*. Firſt, GOD is without Beginning, eternal, unalterable, and every where; and therefore concerning his Identity, there can be no doubt. Secondly, Finite Spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exiſt, the Relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its Identity, as long as it exiſts. Thirdly, The ſame will hold of every Particle of Matter, to which no Addition or Subtraction of Matter being made, it is the ſame. For tho' theſe three ſorts of Subſtances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the ſame place; yet we cannot conceive but that they muſt neceſſarily each of them exclude any of the ſame kind out of the ſame place: or elſe the Notions and Names of Identity and Diverſity would be in vain, and there could be no ſuch diſtinction of Subſtances, or any thing elſe one from another. For example: Could two Bodies be in the ſame place at the ſame time, then thoſe two Parcels of Matter muſt be one and the ſame, take them great or little; nay, all Bodies muſt be one and the ſame. For by the ſame reaſon that two Particles of Matter may be in one place, all Bodies may be in one place: which, when it can be ſuppos'd, takes away the Diſtinction of Identity and Diverſity of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a Contradiction, that two or more ſhould be one, Identity and Diverſity are Relations and Ways of comparing well founded, and of uſe to the Underſtanding. All other things being but Modes or Relations ultimately terminated in Subſtances, the Identity and Diverſity of each particular Exiſtence of them too will be by the ſame way determin'd: only as to things whoſe Exiſtence is in Succeſſion; ſuch as are the Actions of finite Beings, *v. g. Motion* and *Thought*, both which conſiſt in a continu'd Train of Succeſſion, concerning their Diverſity, there can be no queſtion: Becauſe each periſhing the moment it begins, they cannot exiſt in different times, or in different places, as permanent Beings can at different times exiſt in diſtant places; and therefore no Motion or Thought, conſider'd as at different times, can be the ſame, each part thereof having a different Beginning of Exiſtence.

Identity of Subſtances.

Identity of Modes.

§. 3. From what has been ſaid, 'tis eaſy to diſcover what is ſo much enquir'd after, the *Principium Individuationis*; and that, 'tis plain, is Exiſtence it ſelf, which determines a Being of any ſort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the ſame kind. This, tho' it ſeems eaſier to conceive in ſimple Subſtances or Modes, yet when reflected on, is not more difficult in compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is apply'd: *v. g.* Let us ſuppoſe an Atom, *i. e.* a continu'd Body under one immutable Superficies, exiſting in a determin'd time and place; 'tis evident that, conſider'd in any inſtant of its Exiſtence, it is in that inſtant the ſame with it ſelf. For being at that inſtant what it is, and nothing elſe, it is the ſame, and ſo muſt continue as long as its Exiſtence is continu'd; for ſo long it will be the ſame, and no other. In like manner, if two or more Atoms be join'd together into the ſame Maſs, every one of thoſe Atoms will be the ſame, by the foregoing Rule: And whilſt they exiſt united together, the Maſs, conſiſting of the ſame Atoms, muſt be the ſame Maſs, or the ſame Body, let the Parts be ever ſo differently jumbled. But if one of theſe Atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the ſame Maſs, or the ſame Body. In the State of living Creatures, their Identity depends not on a Maſs of the ſame Particles, but on ſomething elſe. For in them the Variation of great Parcels of Matter alters not the Identity: An Oak growing from a Plant to a great Tree, and then lop'd, is ſtill the ſame Oak; and a Colt grown-up to a Horſe, ſometimes fat, ſometimes lean, is all the while the

Principium Individuationis.

the ſame Horſe: tho', in both theſe caſes, there may be a manifeſt Change of the Parts; ſo that truly they are not either of them the ſame Maſſes of Matter, tho' they be truly one of them the ſame Oak, and the other the ſame Horſe. The reaſon whereof is, that in theſe two Caſes of a Maſs of Matter, and a living Body, *Identity* is not apply'd to the ſame thing.

Identity of Vegetables. §. 4. We muſt therefore conſider wherein an Oak differs from a Maſs of Matter, and that ſeems to me to be in this; that the one is only the Coheſion of Particles of Matter any how united, the other ſuch a diſpoſition of them as conſtitutes the Parts of an Oak; and ſuch an Organization of thoſe Parts as is fit to receive and diſtribute Nouriſhment, ſo as to continue and frame the Wood, Bark, and Leaves, *&c.* of an Oak, in which conſiſts the vegetable Life. That being then one Plant which has ſuch an Organization of Parts in one coherent Body partaking of one common Life, it continues to be the ſame Plant as long as it partakes of the ſame Life, tho' that Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant, in a like continu'd Organization conformable to that ſort of Plants. For this Organization being at any one Inſtant in any one Collection of *Matter*, is in that particular Concrete diſtinguiſh'd from all other, and is that individual Life, which exiſting conſtantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the ſame Continuity of inſenſibly ſucceeding Parts united to the living Body of the Plant, it has that Identity which makes the ſame Plant, and all the Parts of it Parts of the ſame Plant, during all the time that they exiſt united in that continu'd Organization, which is fit to convey that common Life to all the Parts ſo united.

Identity of Animals. §. 5. The caſe is not ſo much different in *Brutes*, but that any one may hence ſee what makes an Animal, and continues it the ſame. Something we have like this in Machines, and may ſerve to illuſtrate it. For example, what is a Watch? 'Tis plain 'tis nothing but a fit Organization, or Conſtruction of Parts, to a certain End, which when a ſufficient Force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would ſuppoſe this Machine one continu'd Body, all whoſe organiz'd Parts were repair'd, increas'd or diminiſh'd by a conſtant Addition or Separation of inſenſible Parts, with one common Life, we ſhould have ſomething very much like the Body of an Animal; with this Difference, That in an Animal the Fitneſs of the Organization, and the Motion wherein Life conſiſts, begin together, the Motion coming from within; but in Machines, the Force coming ſenſibly from without, is often away when the Organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

Identity of Man. §. 6. This alſo ſhews wherein the Identity of the ſame *Man* conſiſts, *viz.* in nothing but a Participation of the ſame continu'd Life, by conſtantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in Succeſſion vitally united to the ſame organiz'd Body. He that ſhall place the *Identity* of Man in any thing elſe, but like that of other Animals in one fitly organiz'd Body, taken in any one Inſtant, and from thence continu'd under one Organization of Life in ſeveral ſucceſſively fleeting Particles of Matter united to it, will find it hard to make an *Embryo*, one of Years, mad and ſober, the ſame Man, by any Suppoſition, that will not make it poſſible for *Seth*, *Iſmael*, *Socrates*, *Pilate*, St. *Auſtin*, and *Cæſar Borgia*, to be the ſame Man. For if the *Identity* of Soul alone makes the ſame Man, and there be nothing in the Nature of Matter, why the ſame individual Spirit may not be united to different Bodies, it will be poſſible that thoſe Men living in diſtant Ages, and of different Tempers, may have been the ſame Man: which way of ſpeaking muſt be, from a very ſtrange uſe of the word *Man*, apply'd to an *Idea*, out of which Body and Shape is excluded. And that way of ſpeaking would agree yet worſe with the Notions of thoſe Philoſophers who allow of Tranſmigration, and are of opinion that the Souls of Men may, for their Miſcarriages, be detruded into the Bodies of Beaſts, as fit Habitations, with Organs ſuited to the Satisfaction of their brutal Inclinations. But yet, I think, no body, could he be ſure that the Soul of *Heliogabalus* were in one of his Hogs, would yet ſay, that Hog were a *Man* or *Heliogabalus*.

Identity ſuited to the Idea. §. 7. 'Tis not therefore Unity of Subſtance, that comprehends all ſorts of *Identity*, or will determine it in every caſe: But to conceive and judg of it a-right, we muſt conſider what *Idea* the word it is apply'd to, ſtands for; it being one thing to be the ſame *Subſtance*, another the ſame *Man*, and a third

the

the ſame *Perſon*, if *Perſon*, *Man*, and *Subſtance* are three Names ſtanding for three different *Ideas*; for ſuch as is the *Idea* belonging to that Name, ſuch muſt be the *Identity*: which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would poſſibly have prevented a great deal of that Confuſion, which often occurs about this matter, with no ſmall ſeeming Difficulties, eſpecially concerning *Perſonal Identity*, which therefore we ſhall in the next place a little conſider.

Same Man.

§. 8. An Animal is a living organiz'd Body; and conſequently the ſame Animal, as we have obſerv'd, is the ſame continu'd Life communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen ſucceſſively to be united to that organiz'd living Body. And whatever is talk'd of other Definitions, ingenuous Obſervation puts it paſt doubt, that the *Idea* in our Minds, of which the Sound *Man* in our Mouths is the Sign, is nothing elſe but of an Animal of ſuch a certain Form: ſince I think I may be confident, that whoever ſhould ſee a Creature of his own Shape and Make, tho' it had no more Reaſon all its Life than a *Cat* or a *Parrot*, would call him ſtill a *Man*; or whoever ſhould hear a *Cat* or a *Parrot* diſcourſe, reaſon and philoſophize, would call or think it nothing but a *Cat* or a *Parrot*; and ſay, the one was a dull irrational *Man*, and the other a very intelligent rational *Parrot*. A Relation we have in an Author of great Note, is ſufficient to countenance the Suppoſition of a rational *Parrot*. His Words * are:

* *Memoirs of what paſs'd in* Chriſtendom *from* 1672 *to* 1679 p. 352.

" I had a mind to know from Prince *Maurice's* own Mouth the Account of " a common, but much credited Story, that I had heard ſo often from many " others, of an old *Parrot* he had in *Braſil* during his Government there, that " ſpoke, and ask'd, and anſwer'd common Queſtions like a reaſonable Creature: " ſo that thoſe of his Train there generally concluded it to be Witchery or " Poſſeſſion; and one of his Chaplains, who liv'd long afterwards in *Holland*, " would never from that time endure a *Parrot*, but ſaid, they all had a Devil " in them. I had heard many Particulars of this Story, and aſſever'd by Peo- " ple hard to be diſcredited, which made me ask Prince *Maurice* what there " was of it. He ſaid, with his uſual Plainneſs and Dryneſs in Talk, there " was ſomething true, but a great deal falſe of what had been reported. I de- " ſir'd to know of him what there was of the firſt? He told me ſhort and " coldly, that he had heard of ſuch an old *Parrot* when he came to *Braſil*; and " tho' he believ'd nothing of it, and 'twas a good way off, yet he had ſo much " Curioſity as to ſend for it: that 'twas a very great and a very old one, and " when it came firſt into the Room where the Prince was, with a great many " *Dutch-men* about him, it ſaid preſently, *What a Company of white Men are here?* " They ask'd it what he thought that Man was, pointing at the Prince? It " anſwer'd, *Some General or other*; when they brought it cloſe to him, he ask'd " it, * *D'ou venes vous?* It anſwer'd, *De Marinnan.* The Prince *A qui eſtes* " *vous?* The Parrot, *A un Portugais.* Prince, *Que fais tula?* Parrot, *Ie garde* " *les poulles.* The Prince laugh'd, and ſaid, *Vous gardes le poulles?* The Parrot " anſwer'd, *Ouy, moy & je ſcay bien faire*; and made the Chuck four or five " times that People uſe to make to Chickens when they call them. I ſet down " the Words of this worthy Dialogue in *French*, juſt as Prince *Maurice* ſaid " them to me. I ask'd him in what Language the *Parrot* ſpoke, and he ſaid, " in *Braſilian*; I ask'd whether he underſtood *Braſilian*, he ſaid, no, but he had " taken care to have two Interpreters by him, the one a *Dutch-man* that ſpoke " *Braſilian*, and the other a *Braſilian* that ſpoke *Dutch*; that he ask'd them ſe- " parately and privately, and both of them agreed in telling him juſt the ſame " thing that the *Parrot* ſaid. I could not but tell this odd Story, becauſe it is " ſo much out of the way, and from the firſt Hand, and what may paſs for a " good one; for I dare ſay this Prince at leaſt believ'd himſelf in all he told " me, having ever paſs'd for a very honeſt and pious Man: I leave it to Na- " turaliſts to reaſon, and to other Men to believe as they pleaſe upon it; how- " ever, it is not perhaps amiſs to relieve or enliven a buſy Scene ſometimes with " ſuch Digreſſions, whether to the purpoſe or no."

* *Whence come ye? It anſwered, From* Marinnan. *The* Prince, *To whom do you belong? The* Parrot, *To a* Portugueze. Prince, *What do you there?* Parrot, *I look after the Chickens. The* Prince laugh'd, and ſaid, *You look after the Chickens? The* Parrot anſwer'd, *Yes I, and I know well enough how to do it.*

Same Man.

I had taken care that the Reader ſhould have the Story at large in the Author's own words, becauſe he ſeems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagin'd that ſo able a Man as he, who had Sufficiency enough

to warrant all the Teſtimonies he gives of himſelf, ſhould take ſo much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin ſo cloſe not only on a Man whom he mentions as his Friend, but on a Prince in whom he acknowledges very great Honeſty and Piety, a Story which if he himſelf thought incredible, he could not but alſo think ridiculous. The Prince, 'tis plain, who vouches this Story, and our Author, who relates it from him, both of them call this Talker a *Parrot*; and I ask any one elſe, who thinks ſuch a Story fit to be told, whether if this *Parrot*, and all of its kind, had always talk'd, as we have a Prince's Word for it, as this one did, whether, I ſay, they would not have paſs'd for a Race of *rational Animals*: but yet whether for all that they would have been allow'd to be Men, and not *Parrots*? For I preſume 'tis not the *Idea* of a thinking or rational Being alone that makes the *Idea* of a *Man* in moſt Peoples Senſe, but of a Body, ſo and ſo ſhap'd, join'd to it; and if that be the *Idea* of a *Man*, the ſame ſucceſſive Body not ſhifted all at once, muſt, as well as the ſame immaterial Spirit, go to the making of the ſame *Man*.

Perſonal Identity.

§. 9. This being premis'd to find wherein *perſonal Identity* conſiſts, we muſt conſider what *Perſon* ſtands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has Reaſon and Reflection, and can conſider it ſelf as it ſelf, the ſame thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that Conſciouſneſs which is inſeparable from thinking, and as it ſeems to me eſſential to it: it being impoſſible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. When we ſee, hear, ſmell, taſte, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do ſo. Thus it is always as to our preſent Senſations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to himſelf that which he calls *Self*; it not being conſider'd in this caſe, whether the ſame *Self* be continu'd in the ſame or divers Subſtances. For ſince Conſciouſneſs always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that that makes every one to be what he calls *Self*, and thereby diſtinguiſhes himſelf from all other thinking things; in this alone conſiſts *perſonal Identity*, *i. e.* the Sameneſs of a rational Being: And as far as this Conſciouſneſs can be extended backwards to any paſt Action or Thought, ſo far reaches the Identity of that *Perſon*; it is the ſame *Self* now it was then; and 'tis by the ſame *Self* with this preſent one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.

Conſciouſneſs makes perſonal Identity.

§. 10. But it is farther enquir'd, whether it be the ſame Identical Subſtance? This few would think they had reaſon to doubt of, if theſe Perceptions, with their Conſciouſneſs, always remain'd preſent in the Mind, whereby the ſame thinking thing would be always conſciouſly preſent, and, as would be thought, evidently the ſame to it ſelf. But that which ſeems to make the Difficulty is this, that this Conſciouſneſs being interrupted always by Forgetfulneſs, there being no moment of our Lives wherein we have the whole Train of all our paſt Actions before our Eyes in one view, but even the beſt Memories loſing the Sight of one part whilſt they are viewing another; and we ſometimes, and that the greateſt part of our Lives, not reflecting on our paſt Selves, being intent on our preſent Thoughts, and in ſound Sleep, having no Thoughts at all, or at leaſt none with that Conſciouſneſs which remarks our waking Thoughts: I ſay, in all theſe caſes, our Conſciouſneſs being interrupted, and we loſing the Sight of our paſt *Selves*, Doubts are rais'd whether we are the ſame thinking thing, *i. e.* the ſame Subſtance or no. Which, however reaſonable or unreaſonable, concerns no *perſonal Identity* at all: The Queſtion being, what makes the ſame *Perſon*, and not whether it be the ſame Identical Subſtance, which always thinks in the ſame Perſon; which in this caſe matters not at all: Different Subſtances, by the ſame Conſciouſneſs, (where they do partake in it) being united into one Perſon, as well as different Bodies by the ſame Life are united into one Animal, whoſe *Identity* is preſerv'd, in that Change of Subſtances, by the Unity of one continu'd Life. For it being the ſame Conſciouſneſs that makes a Man be himſelf to himſelf, *perſonal Identity* depends on that only, whether it be annex'd only to one individual Subſtance, or can be continu'd in a Succeſſion of ſeveral Subſtances. For as far as any intelligent Being can repeat the *Idea* of any paſt Action with the ſame Conſciouſneſs it had of it at firſt, and with the ſame Conſciouſneſs it has of any preſent Action; ſo far it is the ſame *perſonal Self*. For it is by the Conſciouſneſs it has of its preſent

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Thoughts and Actions, that it is *Self* to it *Self* now, and ſo will be the ſame *Self*, as far as the ſame Conſciouſneſs can extend to Actions paſt or to come; and would be by Diſtance of Time, or Change of Subſtance, no more two *Perſons*, than a Man be two Men by wearing other Clothes to day than he did yeſterday, with a long or ſhort Sleep between: The ſame Conſciouſneſs uniting thoſe diſtant Actions into the ſame *Perſon*, whatever Subſtances contributed to their Production.

Perſonal Identity in Change of Subſtances.

§. 11. That this is ſo, we have ſome kind of Evidence in our very Bodies, all whoſe Particles, whilſt vitally united to this ſame thinking conſcious Self, ſo that we feel when they are touch'd, and are affected by, and conſcious of Good or Harm that happens to them, are a part of our *Selves*; *i.e.* of our thinking conſcious *Self*. Thus the *Limbs* of his Body is to every one a part of *himſelf*: he ſympathizes and is concern'd for them. Cut off an Hand, and thereby ſeparate it from that Conſciouſneſs we had of its Heat, Cold, and other Affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is *himſelf*, any more than the remoteſt part of Matter. Thus we ſee the *Subſtance*, whereof *perſonal Self* conſiſted at one time, may be vary'd at another, without the Change of perſonal *Identity*; there being no queſtion about the ſame Perſon, tho' the Limbs, which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

§. 12. But the queſtion is, whether if the ſame Subſtance which thinks be chang'd, it can be the ſame Perſon; or remaining the ſame, it can be different Perſons.

Whether in the Change of thinking Subſtances.

And to this I anſwer, firſt, This can be no Queſtion at all to thoſe who place Thought in a purely material animal Conſtitution, void of an immaterial Subſtance. For whether their Suppoſition be true or no, 'tis plain they conceive perſonal Identity preſerv'd in ſomething elſe than Identity of Subſtance; as animal Identity is preſerv'd in Identity of Life, and not of Subſtance. And therefore thoſe who place Thinking in an immaterial Subſtance only, before they can come to deal with theſe Men, muſt ſhew why perſonal Identity cannot be preſerv'd in the Change of immaterial Subſtances or Variety of particular immaterial Subſtances, as well as animal Identity is preſerv'd in the Change of material Subſtances, or Variety of particular Bodies: unleſs they will ſay, 'tis one immaterial Spirit that makes the ſame Life in Brutes, as it is one immaterial Spirit that makes the ſame Perſon in Men; which the *Carteſians* at leaſt will not admit, for fear of making Brutes thinking things too.

§. 13. But next, as to the firſt part of the Queſtion, Whether if the ſame thinking Subſtance (ſuppoſing immaterial Subſtances only to think) be chang'd, it can be the ſame Perſon? I anſwer, That cannot be reſolv'd, but by thoſe who know what kind of Subſtances they are that do think, and whether the Conſciouſneſs of paſt Actions can be tranſfer'd from one thinking Subſtance to another. I grant, were the ſame Conſciouſneſs the ſame individual Action, it could not: but it being but a preſent Repreſentation of a paſt Action, why it may not be poſſible, that that may be repreſented to the Mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be ſhewn. And therefore how far the Conſciouſneſs of paſt Actions is annex'd to any individual Agent, ſo that another cannot poſſibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of Action it is that cannot be done without a reflex Act of Perception accompanying it, and how perform'd by thinking Subſtances, who cannot think without being conſcious of it. But that which we call the *ſame Conciouſneſs*, not being the ſame individual Act, why one intellectual Subſtance may not have repreſented to it, as done by it ſelf, what it never did, and was perhaps done by ſome other Agent; why, I ſay, ſuch a Repreſentation may not poſſibly be without Reality of Matter of Fact, as well as ſeveral Repreſentations in Dreams are, which yet whilſt dreaming we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is ſo, will by us, till we have clearer Views of the nature of thinking Subſtances, be beſt reſolv'd into the Goodneſs of God, who, as far as the Happineſs or Miſery of any of his ſenſible Creatures is concern'd in it, will not by a fatal Error of theirs tranſfer from one to another that Conſciouſneſs which draws Reward or Puniſhment with it. How far this may be an Argument againſt thoſe who would place Thinking in a Syſtem of fleeting animal Spirits, I leave to be conſider'd. But

yet to return to the Queſtion before us, it muſt be allow'd, That if the ſame Conſciouſneſs (which, as has been ſhewn, is quite a different thing from the ſame numerical Figure or Motion in Body) can be tranſfer'd from one thinking Subſtance to another, it will be poſſible that two thinking Subſtances may make but one Perſon. For the ſame Conſciouſneſs being preſerv'd, whether in the ſame or different Subſtances, the perſonal Identity is preſerv'd.

§. 14. As the ſecond part of the Queſtion, Whether the ſame immaterial Subſtance remaining, there may be two diſtinct Perſons? which Queſtion ſeems to me to be built on this, Whether the ſame immaterial Being, being conſcious of the Actions of its paſt Duration, may be wholly ſtrip'd of all the Conſciouſneſs of its paſt Exiſtence, and loſe it beyond the Power of ever retrieving again; and ſo as it were beginning a new Account from a new Period, have a Conſciouſneſs that cannot reach beyond this new State. All thoſe who hold Pre-exiſtence are evidently of this mind, ſince they allow the Soul to have no remaining Conſciouſneſs of what it did in that pre-exiſtent State, either wholly ſeparate from Body, or informing any other Body; and if they ſhould not, 'tis plain, Experience would be againſt them. So that perſonal Identity reaching no farther than Conſciouſneſs reaches, a pre-exiſtent Spirit not having continu'd ſo many Ages in a State of Silence, muſt needs make different Perſons. Suppoſe a *Chriſtian Platoniſt* or *Pythagorean* ſhould, upon God's having ended all his Works of Creation the ſeventh Day, think his Soul hath exiſted ever ſince; and ſhould imagine it has revolv'd in ſeveral human Bodies, as I once met with one, who was perſwaded his had been the Soul of *Socrates*: (how reaſonably I will not diſpute; this I know, that in the Poſt he fill'd, which was no inconſiderable one, he paſs'd for a very rational Man, and the Preſs has ſhewn that he wanted not Parts or Learning) would any one ſay, that he being not conſcious of any of *Socrates*'s Actions or Thoughts, could be the ſame Perſon with *Socrates*? Let any one reflect upon himſelf, and conclude that he has in himſelf an immaterial Spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the conſtant Change of his Body keeps him the ſame; and is that which he calls himſelf: Let him alſo ſuppoſe it to be the ſame Soul that was in *Neſtor* or *Therſites*, at the Siege of *Troy* (for Souls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their nature, indifferent to any Parcel of Matter, the Suppoſition has no apparent Abſurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now, the Soul of any other Man: But he now having no Conſciouſneſs of any of the Actions either of *Neſtor* or *Therſites*, does or can he conceive himſelf the ſame Perſon with either of them? Can he be concern'd in either of their Actions? attribute them to himſelf, or think them his own more than the Actions of any other Man that ever exiſted? So that this Conſciouſneſs not reaching to any of the Actions of either of thoſe Men, he is no more one *Self* with either of them, than if the Soul or immaterial Spirit that now informs him, had been created, and began to exiſt, when it began to inform his preſent Body; tho' it were ever ſo true, that the ſame Spirit that inform'd *Neſtor's* or *Therſites's* Body, were numerically the ſame that now informs his. For this would no more make him the ſame Perſon with *Neſtor*, than if ſome of the Particles of Matter that were once a part of *Neſtor*, were now a part of this Man; the ſame immaterial Subſtance, without the ſame Conſciouſneſs, no more making the ſame Perſon by being united to any Body, than the ſame Particle of Matter, without Conſciouſneſs united to any Body, makes the ſame Perſon. But let him once find himſelf conſcious of any of the Actions of *Neſtor*, he then finds himſelf the ſame Perſon with *Neſtor*.

§. 15. And thus we may be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the ſame Perſon at the Reſurrection, tho' in a Body not exactly in Make or Parts the ſame which he had here, the ſame Conciouſneſs going along with the Soul that inhabits it. But yet the Soul alone, in the Change of Bodies, would ſcarce to any one, but to him that makes the Soul the *Man*, be enough to make the ſame *Man*. For ſhould the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the Conſciouſneſs of the Prince's paſt Life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobler, as ſoon as deſerted by his own Soul, every one ſees he would be the ſame Perſon with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince's Actions: But who would ſay it was the ſame Man? The Body too goes to the making the Man, and would, I gueſs, to every body determine the Man in this caſe; wherein the Soul, with all its Princely

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Thoughts about it, would not make another Man: but he would be the ſame Cobler to every one beſides himſelf. I know that in the ordinary way of ſpeaking, the ſame Perſon, and the ſame Man, ſtand for one and the ſame thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to ſpeak as he pleaſes, and to apply what articulate Sounds to what *Ideas* he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleaſes. But yet when we will enquire what makes the ſame *Spirit*, *Man*, or *Perſon*, we muſt fix the *Ideas* of *Spirit*, *Man*, or *Perſon* in our Minds; and having reſolv'd with our ſelves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the *ſame*, and when not.

Conſciouſneſs makes the ſame Perſon.

§ 16. But tho' the ſame immaterial Subſtance or Soul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatſoever State, make the ſame Man; yet 'tis plain Conſciouſneſs, as far as ever it can be extended, ſhould it be to Ages paſt, unites Exiſtences and Actions, very remote in time, into the ſame Perſon, as well as it does the Exiſtences and Actions of the immediately preceding Moment: So that whatever has the Conſciouſneſs of preſent and paſt Actions, is the ſame Perſon to whom they both belong. Had I the ſame Conſciouſneſs that I ſaw the Ark and *Noah*'s Flood, as that I ſaw an overflowing of the *Thames* laſt Winter, or as that I write now; I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that ſaw the *Thames* overflow'd laſt Winter, and that view'd the Flood at the general Deluge, was the ſame *Self*, place that *Self* in what Subſtance you pleaſe, than that I who write this am the ſame *my ſelf* now whilſt I write (whether I conſiſt of all the ſame Subſtance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yeſterday. For as to this point of being the ſame *Self*, it matters not whether this preſent *Self* be made up of the ſame or other Subſtances; I being as much concern'd, and as juſtly accountable for any Action was done a thouſand Years ſince, appropriated to me now by this Self-conſciouſneſs, as I am for what I did the laſt Moment.

Self depends on Conſciouſneſs.

§. 17. *Self* is that conſcious thinking thing (whatever Subſtance made up of, whether ſpiritual or material, ſimple or compounded, it matters not) which is ſenſible, or conſcious of Pleaſure and Pain, capable of Happineſs or Miſery, and ſo is concern'd for it *ſelf*, as far as that Conſciouſneſs extends. Thus every one finds, that whilſt comprehended under that Conſciouſneſs, the little Finger is as much a part of it *ſelf*, as what is moſt ſo. Upon Separation of this little Finger, ſhould this Conſciouſneſs go along with the little Finger, and leave the reſt of the Body, 'tis evident the little Finger would be the *Perſon*, the *ſame Perſon*; and Self then would have nothing to do with the reſt of the Body. As in this caſe it is the Conſciouſneſs that goes along with the Subſtance, when one part is ſeparate from another, which makes the ſame *Perſon*, and conſtitutes this inſeparable *Self*; ſo it is in reference to Subſtance remote in time. That with which the *Conſciouſneſs* of this preſent thinking thing can join it ſelf, makes the ſame *Perſon*, and is one *Self* with it, and with nothing elſe; and ſo attributes to it *ſelf*, and owns all the Actions of that thing as its own, as far as that Conſciouſneſs reaches, and no farther: as every one who reflects, will perceive.

Object of Reward and Puniſhment.

§. 18. In this *perſonal Identity*, is founded all the Right and Juſtice of Reward and Puniſhment; Happineſs and Miſery being that for which every one is concern'd for *himſelf*, not mattering what becomes of any Subſtance, not join'd to, or affected with that Conſciouſneſs. For as it is evident in the Inſtance I gave but now, if the Conſciouſneſs went along with the little Finger when it was cut off, that would be the ſame *Self* which was concern'd for the whole Body yeſterday, as making a part of it *ſelf*, whoſe Actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Tho' if the ſame Body ſhould ſtill live, and immediately, from the Separation of the little Finger, have its own peculiar Conſciouſneſs, whereof the little Finger knew nothing; it would not at all be concern'd for it, as a part of it *ſelf*, or could own any of its Actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§. 19. This may ſhew us wherein *perſonal Identity* conſiſts, not in the Identity of Subſtance, but, as I have ſaid, in the Identity of *Conſciouſneſs*; wherein, if *Socrates* and the preſent Mayor of *Queenborough* agree, they are the ſame Perſon: If the ſame *Socrates* waking and ſleeping do not partake of the ſame *Conſciouſneſs*, *Socrates* waking and ſleeping is not the ſame Perſon. And to puniſh *Socra-*

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tes waking for what ſleeping *Socrates* thought, and waking *Socrates* was never conſcious of, would be no more of Right, than to puniſh one Twin for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, becauſe their Outſides were ſo like, that they could not be diſtinguiſh'd; for ſuch Twins have been ſeen.

§. 20. But yet poſſibly it will ſtill be objected, Suppoſe I wholly looſe the Memory of ſome parts of my Life, beyond a poſſibility of retrieving them, ſo that perhaps I ſhall never be conſcious of them again; yet am I not the ſame Perſon that did thoſe Actions, had thoſe Thoughts that I was once conſcious of, tho' I have now forgot them? To which I anſwer, That we muſt here take notice what the Word *I* is apply'd to; which, in this caſe, is the Man only. And the ſame Man being preſum'd to be the ſame Perſon, *I* is eaſily here ſuppos'd to ſtand alſo for the ſame Perſon. But if it be poſſible for the ſame Man to have diſtinct incommunicable Conſciouſneſs at different times, it is paſt doubt the ſame Man would at different times make different Perſons; which, we ſee, is the Senſe of Mankind in the ſolemneſt Declaration of their Opinions, human Laws not puniſhing the *Mad Man* for the *Sober Man's* Actions, nor the *Sober Man* for what the *Mad Man* did, thereby making them two Perſons: which is ſomewhat explain'd by our way of ſpeaking in *Engliſh*, when we ſay ſuch an one *is not himſelf*, or is *beſides himſelf*; in which Phraſes it is inſinuated, as if thoſe who now, or at leaſt firſt uſed them, thought that *Self* was chang'd, the *ſelf*-ſame Perſon was no longer in that Man.

Difference between Identity of Man and Perſon.

§. 21. But yet 'tis hard to conceive that *Socrates*, the ſame individual Man, ſhould be two Perſons. To help us a little in this, we muſt conſider what is meant by *Socrates*, or the ſame individual *Man*.

Firſt, It muſt be either the ſame individual, immaterial, thinking Subſtance; in ſhort, the ſame numerical Soul, and nothing elſe.

Secondly, Or the ſame Animal, without any regard to an immaterial Soul.

Thirdly, Or the ſame immaterial Spirit united to the ſame Animal.

Now take which of theſe Suppoſitions you pleaſe, it is impoſſible to make perſonal Identity to conſiſt in any thing but Conſciouſneſs, or reach any farther than that does.

For by the firſt of them, it muſt be allow'd poſſible, that a Man born of different Women, and in diſtant Times, may be the ſame Man. A way of ſpeaking, which whoever admits, muſt allow it poſſible for the ſame Man to be two diſtinct Perſons, as any two that have liv'd in different Ages, without the knowledg of one another's Thoughts.

By the ſecond and third, *Socrates* in this Life, and after it, cannot be the ſame Man any way, but by the ſame Conſciouſneſs; and ſo making *human Identity* to conſiſt in the ſame thing wherein we place *perſonal Identity*, there will be no difficulty to allow the ſame Man to be the ſame Perſon. But then they who place *human Identity* in Conſciouſneſs only, and not in ſomething elſe, muſt conſider how they will make the Infant *Socrates* the ſame Man with *Socrates* after the Reſurrection. But whatſoever to ſome Men makes a *Man*, and conſequently the ſame individual Man, wherein perhaps few are agreed, perſonal Identity can by us be placed in nothing but Conſciouſneſs (which is that alone which makes what we call *Self*) without involving us in great Abſurdities.

§. 22. But is not a Man drunk and ſober the ſame Perſon, why elſe is he puniſh'd for the Fact he commits when drunk, tho' he be never afterwards conſcious of it? Juſt as much the ſame Perſon, as a Man that walks, and does other things in his Sleep, is the ſame Perſon, and is anſwerable for any miſchief he ſhall do in it. Human Laws puniſh both, with a Juſtice ſuitable to their way of Knowledg; becauſe in theſe caſes, they cannot diſtinguiſh certainly what is real, what counterfeit: and ſo the Ignorance in Drunkenneſs or Sleep, is not admitted as a Plea. For tho' Puniſhment be annex'd to Perſonality, and Perſonality to Conſciouſneſs, and the Drunkard perhaps be not conſcious of what he did; yet human Judicatures juſtly puniſh him, becauſe the Fact is prov'd againſt him, but want of Conſciouſneſs cannot be prov'd for him. But in the great Day, wherein the Secrets of all Hearts ſhall be laid open, it may be reaſonable to think, no one ſhall be made to anſwer for what he knows nothing of; but ſhall receive his Doom, his Conſcience accuſing or excuſing him.

§. 23.

§. 23. Nothing but Conſciouſneſs can unite remote Exiſtences into the ſame Perſon, the Identity of Subſtance will not do it. For whatever Subſtance there is, however fram'd, without Conſciouſneſs there is no Perſon: And a Careaſe may be a Perſon, as well as any ſort of Subſtance be ſo without Conſciouſneſs. *Conſciouſneſs, alone makes Self.*

Could we ſuppoſe two diſtinct incommunicable Conſciouſneſſes acting the ſame Body, the one conſtantly by Day, the other by Night; and, on the other ſide, the ſame Conſciouſneſs acting by Intervals two diſtinct Bodies: I ask in the firſt caſe, Whether the *Day* and the *Night-man* would not be two as diſtinct Perſons, as *Socrates* and *Plato*? And whether, in the ſecond caſe, there would not be one Perſon in two diſtinct Bodies, as much as one Man is the ſame in two diſtinct Clothings? Nor is it at all material to ſay, that this ſame, and this diſtinct *Conſciouſneſs*, in the Caſes abovemention'd, is owing to the ſame and diſtinct immaterial Subſtances, bringing it with them to thoſe Bodies; which, whether true or no, alters not the Caſe: ſince 'tis evident the *perſonal Identity* would equally be determin'd by the Conſciouſneſs, whether that Conſciouſneſs were annex'd to ſome individual immaterial Subſtance or no. For granting, that the thinking Subſtance in Man muſt be neceſſarily ſuppos'd immaterial, 'tis evident that immaterial thinking thing may ſometimes part with its paſt Conſciouſneſs, and be reſtor'd to it again, as appears in the Forgetfulneſs Men often have of their paſt Actions; and the Mind many times recovers the Memory of a paſt Conſciouſneſs, which it had loſt for twenty Years together. Make the Intervals of Memory and Forgetfulneſs to take their turns regularly by Day and Night, and you have two Perſons with the ſame immaterial Spirit, as much as in the former Inſtance two Perſons with the ſame Body. So that *Self* is not determin'd by Identity or Diverſity of Subſtance, which it cannot be ſure of, but only by Identity of Conſciouſneſs.

§. 24. Indeed it may conceive the Subſtance, whereof it is now made up, to have exiſted formerly, united in the ſame conſcious Being: but Conſciouſneſs remov'd, that Subſtance is no more it *ſelf*, or makes no more a part of it, than any other Subſtance; as is evident in the Inſtance we have already given of a Limb cut off, of whoſe Heat, or Cold, or other Affections, having no longer any Conſciouſneſs, it is no more of a Man's ſelf, than any other Matter of the Univerſe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial Subſtance, which is void of that Conſciouſneſs, whereby I am my *ſelf* to my *ſelf*: If there be any part of its Exiſtence, which I cannot upon Recollection join with that preſent Conſciouſneſs whereby I am now my *ſelf*, it is in that part of its Exiſtence no more my *ſelf*, than any other immaterial Being. For whatſoever any Subſtance has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my Conſciouſneſs make my own Thought and Action, it will no more belong to me, whether a Part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial Being any where exiſting.

§. 25. I agree, the more probable Opinion is, That this Conſciouſneſs is annex'd to, and the Affection of one individual immaterial Subſtance.

But let Men, according to their diverſe Hypotheſes, reſolve of that as they pleaſe. This every intelligent Being, ſenſible of Happineſs or Miſery, muſt grant, that there is ſomething that is *himſelf* that he is concern'd for, and would have happy; that this *Self* has exiſted in a continu'd Duration more than one Inſtant, and therefore 'tis poſſible may exiſt, as it has done, Months and Years to come, without any certain Bounds to be ſet to its Duration; and may be the ſame *Self*, by the ſame Conſciouſneſs continu'd on for the future. And thus, by this Conſciouſneſs, he finds himſelf to be the *ſame Self* which did ſuch or ſuch an Action ſome Years ſince, by which he comes to be happy or miſerable now. In all which account of *Self*, the ſame numerical Subſtance is not conſider'd as making the ſame *Self*; but the ſame continu'd Conſciouſneſs, in which ſeveral Subſtances may have been united, and again ſeparated from it, which, whilſt they continu'd in a vital Union with that, wherein this Conſciouſneſs then reſided, made a part of that ſame *Self*. Thus any part of our Bodies vitally united to that which is conſcious in us, makes a part of our *Selves*: But upon Separation from the vital Union, by which that Conſciouſneſs is communicated, that which a moment ſince was part of our *Selves*, is no more ſo, than a part of another Man's *Self* is a part of me; and 'tis not impoſſible, but

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in a little time may become a real Part of another Perſon. And ſo we have the ſame numerical Subſtance become a Part of two different Perſons; and the ſame Perſon preſerv'd under the Change of various Subſtances. Could we ſuppoſe any Spirit wholly ſtrip'd of all its Memory or Conſciouſneſs of paſt Actions, as we find our Minds always are of a great part of ours, and ſometimes of them all; the Union or Separation of ſuch a ſpiritual Subſtance would make no variation of perſonal Identity, any more than that of any Particle of Matter does. Any Subſtance vitally united to the preſent thinking Being, is a part of that very *ſame Self* which now is: Any thing united to it by a Conſciouſneſs of former Actions, makes alſo a part of the *ſame Self*, which is the ſame both then and now.

Perſon, a Forenſick Term. §. 26. *Perſon*, as I take it, is the Name for this *Self*. Wherever a Man finds what he calls *Himſelf*, there I think another may ſay is the *ſame Perſon*. It is a forenſick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and ſo belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happineſs and Miſery. This Perſonality extends it *ſelf* beyond preſent Exiſtence to what is paſt, only by Conſciouſneſs, whereby it becomes concern'd and accountable, owns and imputes to it *ſelf* paſt Actions, juſt upon the ſame ground, and for the ſame reaſon that it does the preſent. All which is founded in a Concern for Happineſs, the unavoidable Concomitant of Conſciouſneſs; that which is conſcious of Pleaſure and Pain, deſiring that that Self that is conſcious ſhould be happy. And therefore whatever paſt Actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that preſent *Self* by Conſciouſneſs, it can be no more concern'd in, than if they had never been done: And to receive Pleaſure or Pain, *i. e.* Reward or Puniſhment, on the account of any ſuch Action, is all one as to be made happy or miſerable in its firſt Being, without any Demerit at all. For ſuppoſing a Man puniſh'd now for what he had done in another Life, whereof he could be made to have no Conſciouſneſs at all, what difference is there between that Puniſhment, and being created miſerable? And therefore conformable to this the Apoſtle tells us, that at the Great Day, when every one ſhall *receive according to his Doings, the Secrets of all Hearts ſhall be laid open.* The Sentence ſhall be juſtify'd by the Conſciouſneſs all Perſons ſhall have, that they *themſelves*, in what Bodies ſoever they appear, or what Subſtances ſoever that Conſciouſneſs adheres to, are the *ſame* that committed thoſe Actions, and deſerve that Puniſhment for them.

§. 27. I am apt enough to think I have, in treating of this Subject, made ſome Suppoſitions that will look ſtrange to ſome Readers, and poſſibly they are ſo in themſelves. But yet, I think, they are ſuch as are pardonable in this Ignorance we are in of the Nature of that thinking thing that is in us, and which we look on as our *Selves*. Did we know what it was, or how it was ty'd to a certain Syſtem of fleeting animal Spirits; or whether it could or could not perform its Operations of Thinking and Memory out of a Body organiz'd as ours is; and whether it has pleas'd God, that no one ſuch Spirit ſhall ever be united to any but one ſuch Body, upon the right Conſtitution of whoſe Organs its Memory ſhould depend; we might ſee the Abſurdity of ſome of thoſe Suppoſitions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark concerning theſe Matters) the Soul of a Man, for an immaterial Subſtance, independent from Matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the Nature of things be no Abſurdity at all to ſuppoſe, that the ſame Soul may, at different times, be united to different Bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one Man: As well as we ſuppoſe a Part of a Sheep's Body yeſterday ſhould be a Part of a Man's Body to morrow, and in that Union make up a vital Part of *Melibœus* himſelf, as well as it did of his Ram.

The Difficulty from ill uſe of Names. §. 28. To conclude, whatevet Subſtance begins to exiſt, it muſt, during its Exiſtence, neceſſarily be the ſame: Whatever Compoſitions of Subſtances begin to exiſt during the Union of thoſe Subſtances, the Concrete muſt be the ſame: Whatſoever Mode begins to exiſt, during its Exiſtence, it is the ſame: And ſo if the Compoſition be of diſtinct Subſtances and different Modes, the ſame Rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the Difficulty or Obſcurity that has been about this Matter, rather riſes from the Names ill us'd, than from any Obſcurity in things themſelves. For whatever makes the ſpecifick *Idea* to which the Name is apply'd, if that *Idea* be ſteddily kept to, the Diſtinction of any thing

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into the ſame, and divers will eaſily be conceiv'd, and there can ariſe no Doubt about it.

§. 29. For ſuppoſing a rational Spirit be the *Idea* of a *Man*, 'tis eaſy to know what is the *ſame Man*, viz. the *ſame Spirit*, whether ſeparate or in a Body, will be the *ſame Man*. Suppoſing a rational Spirit vitally united to a Body of a certain Conformation of Parts to make a *Man*, whilſt that rational Spirit, with that vital Conformation of Parts, tho' continu'd in a fleeting ſucceſſive Body, remains, it will be the *ſame Man*. But if to any one the *Idea* of a *Man* be but the vital Union of Parts in a certan Shape; as long as that vital Union and Shape remains, in a Concrete no otherwiſe the ſame, but by a continu'd Succeſſion of fleeting Particles, it will be the ſame *Man*. For whatever be the Compoſition, whereof the complex *Idea* is made, whether Exiſtence makes it one particular thing under any Denomination, the ſame Exiſtence continu'd, preſerves it the ſame Individual under the ſame Denomination. *Continu'd Exiſtence makes Identity.*

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

§. 1. BESIDES the before-mention'd Occaſions of Time, Place, and Cauſality of comparing, or referring things one to another, there are, as I have ſaid, infinite others, ſome whereof I ſhall mention. *Proportional.*

Firſt, The firſt I ſhall name is ſome one ſimple *Idea*; which being capable of Parts or Degrees, affords an occaſion of comparing the Subjects wherein it is to one another, in reſpect of that ſimple *Idea*, v. g. *Whiter*, *Sweeter*, *Bigger*, *Equal*, *More*, &c. Theſe Relations depending on the Equality and Exceſs of the ſame ſimple *Idea*, in ſeveral Subjects, may be call'd, if one will, *Proportional*; and that theſe are only converſant about thoſe ſimple *Ideas* receiv'd from Senſation or Reflection, is ſo evident, that nothing need be ſaid to evince it.

§. 2. *Secondly*, Another occaſion of comparing things together, or conſidering one thing, ſo as to include in that Conſideration ſome other thing, is the Circumſtances of their Origin or Beginning; which being not afterwards to be alter'd, make the Relations depending thereon as laſting as the Subjects to which they belong; *v. g. Father* and *Son*, *Brothers*, *Couſin-Germans*, &c. which have their Relations by one Community of Blood, wherein they partake in ſeveral Degrees; *Country-men*, *i. e.* thoſe who were born in the ſame Country, or Tract of Ground; and theſe I call *natural Relations*: wherein we may obſerve, that Mankind have fitted their Notions and Words to the uſe of common Life, and not to the Truth and Extent of things. For 'tis certain, that in reality the Relation is the ſame betwixt the Begetter and the Begotten, in the ſeveral Races of other Animals as well as Men: But yet 'tis ſeldom ſaid, This Bull is the Grandfather of ſuch a Calf; or that two Pigeons are Couſin-Germans. It is very convenient, that by diſtinct Names theſe Relations ſhould be obſerv'd, and mark'd out in Mankind; there being occaſion, both in Laws, and other Communications one with another, to mention and take notice of Men under theſe Relations: from whence alſo ariſe the Obligations of ſeveral Duties amongſt Men. Whereas in Brutes, Men having very little or no cauſe to mind theſe Relations, they have not thought fit to give them diſtinct and peculiar Names. This, by the way, may give us ſome Light into the different State and Growth of Languages; which being ſuited only to the Convenience of Communication, are proportion'd to the Notions Men have, and the Commerce of Thoughts familiar amongſt them; and not to the Reality or Extent of things, nor to the various Reſpects might be found among them, nor the different abſtract Conſiderations might be fram'd about them. Where they had no Philoſophical Notions, there they had no Terms to expreſs them: And 'tis no wonder Men ſhould have fram'd no Names for thoſe things they found no occaſion to diſcourſe of. From whence it is eaſy to imagine, why, as in ſome Countries, they may not have ſo much as the Name for a Horſe; and in others, where they are more careful of the Pedigrees of their Horſes than of their *Natural.*

own, that there they may have not only Names for particular Horſes, but alſo of their ſeveral Relations of Kindred one to another.

Inſtituted. §. 3. *Thirdly*, Sometimes the Foundation of conſidering things, with reference to one another, is ſome Act whereby any one comes by a moral Right, Power, or Obligation to do ſomething. Thus a *General* is one that hath Power to command an Army; and an Army under a General is a Collection of arm'd Men oblig'd to obey one Man. A *Citizen*, or a *Burgher*, is one who has a Right to certain Privileges in this or that Place. All this ſort depending upon Mens Wills, or Agreement in Society, I call *inſtituted*, or *voluntary*; and may be diſtinguiſh'd from the natural, in that they are moſt, if not all of them, ſome way or other alterable, and ſeparable from the Perſons to whom they have ſometimes belong'd, tho' neither of the Subſtances, ſo related, be deſtroy'd. Now, tho' theſe are all reciprocal, as well as the reſt, and contain in them a Reference of two things one to another; yet, becauſe one of the two things often wants a relative Name, importing that Reference, Men uſually take no notice of it, and the Relation is commonly over-look'd: *v. g.* a *Patron* and *Client* are eaſily allow'd to be Relations, but a *Conſtable* or *Dictator* are not ſo readily, at firſt hearing, conſider'd as ſuch; becauſe there is no peculiar Name for thoſe who are under the Command of a Dictator, or Conſtable, expreſſing a Relation to either of them; tho' it be certain, that either of them hath a certain Power over ſome others; and ſo is ſo far related to them, as well as a Patron is to his Client, or General to his Army.

Moral. §. 4. *Fourthly*, There is another ſort of Relation which is the Conformity, or Diſagreement, Mens voluntary Actions have to a Rule to which they are refer'd, and by which they are judg'd of; which, I think, may be call'd *Moral Relation*, as being that which denominates our moral Actions, and deſerves well to be examin'd, there being no Part of Knowledge wherein we ſhould be more careful to get determin'd *Ideas*, and avoid, as much as may be, Obſcurity and Confuſion. Human Actions, when with their various Ends, Objects, Manners, and Circumſtances, they are fram'd into diſtinct complex *Ideas*, are, as has been ſhewn, ſo many *mix'd Modes*, a great Part whereof have Names annex'd to them. Thus, ſuppoſing Gratitude to be a Readineſs to acknowledge and return Kindneſs receiv'd, Polygamy to be the having more Wives than one at once; when we frame theſe Notions thus in our Minds, we have there ſo many determin'd *Ideas* of mix'd Modes. But this is not all that concerns our Actions; it is not enough to have determin'd *Ideas* of them, and to know what Names belong to ſuch and ſuch Combinations of *Ideas*. We have a farther and greater Concernment, and that is, to know whether ſuch Actions ſo made up are morally good or bad.

Moral Good and Evil. §. 5. Good and Evil, as hath been ſhewn, B. II. Ch. 20. §. 2. and Ch. 21. §. 42. are nothing but Pleaſure or Pain, or that which occaſions, or procures Pleaſure or Pain to us. *Moral Good* and *Evil* then is only the Conformity or Diſagreement of our voluntary Actions to ſome Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us by the Will and Power of the Law-Maker; which Good and Evil, Pleaſure or Pain, attending our Obſervance, or Breach of the Law, by the Decree of the Law-maker, is that we call *Reward* and *Puniſhment*.

Moral Rules. §. 6. Of theſe *Moral Rules*, or Laws, to which Men generally refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of their Actions, there ſeem to me to be *three ſorts*, with their three different Enforcements, or Rewards and Puniſhments. For ſince it would be utterly in vain to ſuppoſe a Rule ſet to the free Actions of Man, without annexing to it ſome Enforcement of Good and Evil to determine his Will, we muſt, where-ever we ſuppoſe a Law, ſuppoſe alſo ſome Reward or Puniſhment annex'd to that Law. It would be in vain for one intelligent Being to ſet a Rule to the Actions of another, if he had it not in his Power to reward the Compliance with, and puniſh Deviation from his Rule, by ſome Good and Evil, that is not the natural Product and Conſequence of the Action it ſelf. For that being a natural Convenience, or Inconvenience, would operate of it ſelf without a Law. This, if I miſtake not, is the true Nature of all *Law*, properly ſo call'd.

Laws. §. 7. The Laws that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Rectitude, or Obliquity, ſeem to me to be theſe three. 1. The *Divine* Law.

2. The

2. The *Civil* Law. 3. The Law of *Opinion* or *Reputation*, if I may ſo call it. By the Relation they bear to the firſt of theſe, Men judge whether their Actions are Sins or Duties; by the Second, whether they be Criminal or Innocent; and by the third, whether they be Vertues or Vices.

§. 8. *Firſt*, The *Divine* Law, whereby I mean that Law which God has ſet to the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the Light of Nature or the Voice of Revelation. That God has given a Rule whereby Men ſhould govern themſelves, I think there is no body ſo brutiſh as to deny. He has a Right to do it, we are his Creatures: He has Goodneſs and Wiſdom to direct our Actions to that which is beſt; and he has power to enforce it by Rewards and Puniſhments, of infinite Weight and Duration, in another Life; for no body can take us out of his hands. This is the only true Touchſtone of *moral Rectitude*, and by comparing them to this Law it is, that Men judge of the moſt conſiderable *moral Good* or *Evil* of their Actions: that is, whether as *Duties* or *Sins* they are like to procure them Happineſs or Miſery from the hands of the ALMIGHTY. *Divine Law, the Meaſure of Sin and Duty.*

§. 9. *Secondly*, The *Civil* Law, the Rule ſet by the Commonwealth to the Actions of thoſe who belong to it, is another Rule to which Men refer their Actions, to judge whether they be *criminal* or no. This Law no body overlooks; the Rewards and Puniſhments that enforce it being ready at hand, and ſuitable to the Power that makes it which is the Force of the Commonwealth, engag'd to protect the Lives, Liberties, and Poſſeſſions of thoſe who live according to its Laws, and has power to take away Life, Liberty, or Goods from him who diſobeys: which is the Puniſhment of Offences committed againſt this Law. *Civil Law, the Meaſure of Crimes and Innocence.*

§. 10. *Thirdly*, The *Law of Opinion or Reputation.* Vertue and Vice are Names pretended and ſuppos'd every where to ſtand for Actions in their own nature right and wrong; and as far as they really are ſo apply'd, they ſo far are coincident with the *Divine Law* above-mention'd. But yet whatever is pretended, this is viſible, that theſe Names *Vertue* and *Vice*, in the particular Inſtance of their Application, thro' the ſeveral Nations and Societies of Men in the World, are conſtantly attributed only to ſuch Actions, as in each Country and Society are in Reputation or Diſcredit. Nor is it to be thought ſtrange, that Men every where ſhould give the name of *Vertue* to thoſe Actions, which amongſt them are judg'd praiſe-worthy; and call that *Vice*, which they account blameable: ſince otherwiſe they would condemn themſelves, if they ſhould think any thing *right*, to which they allow'd Commendation; any thing *wrong*, which they let paſs without Blame. Thus the Meaſure of what is every where call'd and eſteem'd *Vertue* and *Vice* is this Approbation or Diſlike, Praiſe or Blame, which by a ſecret and tacit Conſent eſtabliſhes it ſelf in the ſeveral Societies, Tribes, and Clubs of Men in the World; whereby ſeveral Actions come to find Credit or Diſgrace amongſt them, according to the Judgment, Maxims, or Faſhions of that place. For tho' Men uniting into politick Societies have reſign'd up to the Publick the diſpoſing of all their Force, ſo that they cannot employ it againſt any Fellow-Citizens any farther than the Law of the Country directs; yet they retain ſtill the Power of thinking well or ill, approving or diſapproving of the Actions of thoſe whom they live amongſt, and converſe with: And by this Approbation and Diſlike, they eſtabliſh amongſt themſelves what they will call *Vertue* and *Vice*. *Philoſophical Law, the Meaſure of Vertue and Vice.*

§. 11. That this is the common *Meaſure of Vertue and Vice* will appear to any one who conſiders, that tho' that paſſes for *Vice* in one Country, which is counted a *Vertue*, or at leaſt not *Vice* in another, yet every where *Vertue* and Praiſe, *Vice* and Blame go together. *Vertue* is every where that which is thought praiſe-worthy; and nothing elſe but that which has the allowance of publick Eſteem, is call'd *Vertue* *. *Vertue* and Praiſe are ſo united, that they are call'd often

* *Our Author, in his Preface to the fourth Edition, taking notice how apt Men have been to miſtake him, added what here follows.* Of this the Ingenious Author of the *Diſcourſe concerning the Nature of Man*, has given me a late Inſtance, to mention no other. For the Civility of his Expreſſions, and the Candor that belongs to his Order, forbid me to think, that he would have cloſed his

often by the ſame name. *Sunt ſua præmia Laudi*, ſays *Virgil*; and ſo *Cicero*, *Nihil habet natura præſtantius, quam Honeſtatem, quam Laudem, quam Dignitatem, quam Decus*; which, he tells you, are all names for the ſame thing, *Tuſc. l.* 2. This is the Language of the Heathen Philoſophers, who well underſtood wherein their Notions of *Vertue* and *Vice* conſiſted. And tho' perhaps by the different Temper, Education, Faſhion, Maxims, or Intereſt of different ſorts of Men, it fell out that what was thought Praiſe-worthy in one place, eſcap'd not Cenſure in another; and ſo in different Societies, *Vertues* and *Vices* were chang'd: yet, as to the main, they for the moſt part kept the ſame every where. For ſince nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with Eſteem and Reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame and diſcountenance the contrary; 'tis no wonder that Eſteem and Diſcredit, Vertue and Vice, ſhould in a great meaſure every where correſpond with the unchangeable Rule of Right or Wrong, which the Law of God hath eſtabliſh'd: there being nothing that ſo directly and viſibly ſecures and advances the general Good of Mankinnd in this World, as Obedience to the Laws he has ſet them; and nothing that breeds ſuch Miſchiefs and Confuſion, as the Neglect of them. And therefore Men, without renouncing all Senſe and Reaſon, and their own Intereſt, which they are ſo conſtantly true to, could not generally miſtake in placing their Commendation and Blame on that ſide that really deſerv'd it not. Nay, even thoſe Men whoſe Practice was otherwiſe, fail'd not to give their Approbation right; few being deprav'd to that degree, as not to condemn, at leaſt in others the Fault they themſelves were guilty of: whereby, even in the Corruption of Manners, the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preſerv'd. So that even the Exhortations of inſpir'd Teachers have not fear'd to appeal to common Repute: *Whatſoever is lovely, whatſoever is of good report, if there be any Vertue, if there be any Praiſe*, &c. Phil. 4. 8.

§. 12.

Preface with an Inſinuation, as if in what I had ſaid, *Book* 2. *Chap.* 28. concerning the third Rule which Men refer their Actions to, I went about to make *Vertue Vice*, and *Vice-Vertue*, unleſs he had miſtaken my Meaning; which he could not have done, if he had but given himſelf the trouble to conſider what the Argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief Deſign of that Chapter, plainly enough ſet down in the fourth Section, and thoſe following. For I was there not laying down moral Rules, but ſhewing the Original and Nature of moral *Ideas*, and enumerating the Rules Men make uſe of in moral Relations, whether thoſe Rules were true or falſe: And purſuant thereunto, I tell what has every where that Denomination, which in the Language of that place anſwers to *Vertue* and *Vice* in ours, which *Alters not the Nature of things*, tho' often do generally judge of, and denominate their Actions according to the Eſteem and Faſhion of the Place, or Sect they are of.

If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had ſaid, *B.* 1. *c.* 13. §. 18. and in this preſent Chapter, §. 13, 14, 15, and 20. he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable Nature of Right and Wrong, and what I call *Vertue* and *Vice*: And if he had obſerv'd, that in the place he quotes, I only report, as Matter of Fact, what others call *Vertue* and *Vice*, he would not have found it liable to any great Exception. For, I think, I am not much out in ſaying, that one of the Rules made uſe of in the World for a ground or meaſure of a moral Relation, is that Eſteem and Reputation which ſeveral ſorts of Actions find variouſly in the ſeveral Societies of Men, according to which they are there call'd *Vertue* or *Vices*: And whatever Authority the learned Mr. *Lowde* places in his *Old Engliſh Diſtionary*, I dare ſay it no where tells him (if I ſhould appeal to it) that the ſame Action is not in Credit, call'd and counted a *Vertue* in one place, which being in Diſrepute, paſſes for and under the name of *Vice* in another. The taking notice that Men beſtow the Names of *Vertue* and *Vice* according to this Rule of Reputation, is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards the making *Vice Vertue*, and *Vertue Vice*. But the good Man does well, and as becomes his Calling, to be watchful in ſuch Points, and to take the alarm, even at Expreſſions, which ſtanding alone by themſelves might ſound ill, and be ſuſpected.

'Tis to this Zeal, allowable in his Function, that I forgive his citing, as he does, theſe words of mine, in §. 11. of this Chapter: *The Exhortations of inſpir'd Teachers have not fear'd to appeal to common Repute; Whatſoever things are lovely, whatſoever things are good report, if there be any Vertue, if there be any Praiſe*, &c. Phil. 4. 8. without taking notice of thoſe immediately preceding, which introduce them, run thus: *Whereby in the Corruption of Manners, the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preſerv'd; ſo that even the Exhortations of inſpir'd Teachers*, &c. By which words, and the reſt of that Section, it is plain that I brought that Paſſage of St. *Paul*, not to prove that the general Meaſure of what Men call *Vertue* and *Vice*, throughout the World, was the Reputation and Faſhion of each

§. 12. If any one ſhall imagine that I have forgot my own Notion of a Law, when I make *the Law*, whereby Men judge of *Vertue* and *Vice*, to be nothing elſe but the Conſent of private Men, who have not Authority enough to make a Law; eſpecially wanting that, which is ſo neceſſary and eſſential to a Law, a Power to enforce it: I think I may ſay, that he who imagines Commendation and Diſgrace not to be ſtrong Motives on Men, to accommodate themſelves to the Opinions and Rules of thoſe with whom they converſe, ſeems little skill'd in the Nature or Hiſtory of Mankind: the greateſt part whereof he ſhall find to govern themſelves chiefly, if not ſolely, by this Law of Faſhion; and ſo they do that which keeps them in Reputation with their Company, little regard the Laws of God, or the Magiſtrate. The Penalties that attend the Breach of God's Laws, ſome, nay, perhaps moſt Men ſeldom ſeriouſly reflect on; and amongſt thoſe that do, many whilſt they break the Law, entertain thoughts of future Reconciliation, and making their peace for ſuch Breaches. And as to the Puniſhments due from the Laws of the Commonwealth, they frequently flatter themſelves with the hopes of Impunity. But no Man eſcapes the Puniſhment of their Cenſure and Diſlike, who offends againſt the Faſhion and Opinion of the Company he keeps, and would recommend himſelf to. Nor is there one of ten thouſand, who is ſtiff and inſenſible enough to bear up under the conſtant Diſlike and Condemnation of his own Club. He muſt be of a ſtrange and unuſual Conſtitution, who can content himſelf to live in conſtant Diſgrace and Diſrepute with his own particular Society. Solitude many Men have ſought, and been reconcil'd to: but no body, that has the leaſt Thought or Senſe of a Man about him, can live in Society under the conſtant Diſlike and ill Opinion of his Familiars, and thoſe he converſes with. This is a Burden too heavy for human Sufferance: And he muſt be made up of irreconcilable Contradictions who can take pleaſure in Company, and yet be inſenſible of Contempt and Diſgrace from his Companions.

Its Inforcements, Commendation and Diſcredit.

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each particular Society within it ſelf; but to ſhew, that tho' it were ſo, yet, for reaſons I there give, Men, in that way of denominating their Actions, did not for the moſt part much vary from the Law of Nature; which is that ſtanding and unalterable Rule, by which they ought to judge of the moral Rectitude and Pravity of their Actions, and accordingly denominate them *Vertues* or *Vices*. Had Mr. *Lowde* conſider'd this, he would have found it little to his purpoſe, to have quoted that Paſſage in a ſenſe I uſed it not; and would, I imagine, have ſpar'd the Explication he ſubjoins to it, as not very neceſſary. But I hope this ſecond Edition will give him Satisfaction in the point, and that this matter is now ſo expreſs'd, as to ſhew him there was no cauſe of Scruple.

Tho' I am forc'd to differ from him in thoſe Apprehenſions he has expreſs'd in the latter end of his Preface, concerning what I had ſaid about *Vertue* and *Vice*; yet we are better agreed than he thinks, in what he ſays in his third Chapter, *p.* 78. concerning *natural Inſcription* and *innate Notions*. I ſhall not deny him the Privilege he claims, *p.* 52. to ſtate the Queſtion as he pleaſes, eſpecially when he ſtates it ſo, as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have ſaid: For, according to him, *innate Notion being conditional things, depending upon the Concurrence of ſeveral other Circumſtances, in order to the Soul's exerting them*; all that he ſays for *innate, imprinted, impreſs'd Notions* (for of *innate Ideas* he ſays nothing at all) amounts at laſt only to this: That there are certain Propoſitions, which tho' the Soul from the beginning, or when a Man is born, does not know, yet by *Aſſiſtance from the outward Senſes, and the Help of ſome previous Cultivation*, it may afterwards come certainly to know the truth of; which is no more than what I have affirm'd in my firſt Book. For I ſuppoſe, by the *Soul's* exerting them, he means its beginning to know them, or elſe the *Soul's exerting of Notions* will be to me a very unintelligible Expreſſion; and I think at beſt is a very unfit one in this Caſe, it miſleading Mens Thoughts by an Inſinuation, as if theſe Notions were in the Mind before the *Soul exerts them*, i. e. before they are known: whereas truly before they are known, there is nothing of them in the Mind, but a Capacity to know them, when the *Concurrence of thoſe Circumſtances*, which this ingenious Author thinks neceſſary *in order to the Soul's exerting them*, brings them into our Knowledge.

P. 52. I find him expreſs it thus: *Theſe natural Notions are not ſo imprinted upon the Soul, as they naturally and neceſſarily exert themſelves (even in Children and Ideots) without any Aſſiſtance from the outward Senſes, or without the Help of ſome previous Cultivation.* Here he ſays *they exert themſelves*, as *p.* 78. that the *Soul exerts them*. When he has explain'd to himſelf or others what he means by the *Soul's exerting innate Notions*, or *their exerting themſelves*, and what that *previous Cultivation* and *Circumſtances, in order* to their being *exerted*, are; he will, I ſuppoſe, find there is ſo little of Controverſy between him and me in the Point, bating that he calls that *exerting of Notions*, which I in a more vulgar Stile call *knowing*, that I have reaſon to think he brought in my Name upon this occaſion only out of the pleaſure he has to ſpeak civilly of me; which I muſt gratefully acknowledge he has done every where he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as ſome others have done, a Title I have no right to.

§. 13.

These three Laws the Rules of Moral Good and Evil.

§. 13. These three then, *First*, The Law of God; *Secondly*, The Law of politick Societies; *Thirdly*, The Law of Fashion, or private Censure, are those to which Men variously compare their Actions: And 'tis by their Conformity to one of these Laws that they take their Measures, when they would judge of their moral Rectitude, and denominate their Actions good or bad.

Morality is the Relation of Actions to these Rules.

§. 14. Whether the Rule, to which, as to a Touchstone, we bring our voluntary Actions, to examine them by, and try their Goodness, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the Mark of the Value we set upon them: whether, I say, we take that Rule from the Fashion of the Country, or the Will of a Law-maker, the Mind is easily able to observe the Relation any Action hath to it, and to judge whether the Action agrees or disagrees with the Rule; and so hath a Notion of *Moral Goodness* or *Evil*, which is either Conformity or not Conformity of any Action to that Rule: and therefore is often call'd moral Rectitude. This Rule being nothing but a Collection of several simple *Ideas*, the Conformity thereto is but so ordering the Action, that the simple *Ideas* belonging to it may correspond to those which the Law requires. And thus we see how moral Beings and Notions are founded on, and terminated in these simple *Ideas* we have receiv'd from Sensation or Reflection. For example, let us consider the complex *Idea* we signify by the word Murder; and when we have taken it asunder, and examin'd all the Particulars, we shall find them to amount to a Collection of simple *Ideas* deriv'd from Reflection or Sensation, *viz. First*, From Reflection on the Operations of our Minds, we have the *Ideas* of Willing, Considering, Purposing before-hand, Malice, or wishing Ill to another; and also of Life, or Perception, and Self-motion. *Secondly*, From Sensation we have the Collection of those simple sensible *Ideas* which are to be found in a Man, and of some Action, whereby we put an end to Perception and Motion in the Man; all which simple *Ideas* are comprehended in the word Murder. This Collection of simple *Ideas* being found by me to agree or disagree with the Esteem of the Country I have been bred in, and to be held by most Men there worthy Praise or Blame, I call the Action vertuous or vicious: If I have the Will of a supreme invisible Law-maker for my Rule; then, as I suppos'd the Action commanded or forbbiden by God, I call it Good or Evil, Sin or Duty: And if I compare it to the Civil Law, the Rule made by the Legislative Power of the Country, I call it Lawful or Unlawful, a Crime or no Crime. So that whencesoever we take the Rule of moral Actions, or by what Standard soever we frame in our Minds the *Ideas* of Vertues or Vices, they consist only and are made up of Collections of simple *Ideas*, which we originally receiv'd from Sense or Reflection, and their Rectitude or Obliquity consists in the Agreement or Disagreement with those Patterns prescrib'd by some Law.

§. 15. To conceive rightly of *Moral Actions*, we must take notice of them under this twofold Consideration. *First*, As they are in themselves each made up of such a Collection of simple *Ideas*. Thus *Drunkenness*, or *Lying*, signify such or such a Collection of simple *Ideas*, which I call mix'd Modes: And in this sense they are as much *positive absolute Ideas*, as the drinking of a Horse, or speaking of a Parrot. *Secondly*, Our Actions are consider'd as good, bad, or indifferent; and in this respect they are *relative*, it being their Conformity to, or Disagreement with some Rule that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad: And so, as far as they are compar'd with a Rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under Relation. Thus the challenging and fighting with a Man, as it is a certain positive Mode, or particular sort of Action, by particular *Ideas*, distinguish'd from all others, is call'd *Dueling*: Which, when consider'd, in relation to the Law of God, will deserve the name Sin, to the Law of Fashion, in some Countries, Valour and Vertue; and to the municipal Law of some Governments, a capital Crime. In this case, when the positive Mode has one Name, and another Name as it stands in relation to the Law, the Distinction may as easily be observ'd, as it is in Substances, where one Name, *v. g. Man*, is us'd to signify the thing; another, *v. g. Father* to signify the Relation.

The Denominations of Actions often mislead us.

§. 16. But because very frequently the positive *Idea* of the Action, and its Moral Relation, are comprehended together under one Name, and the same Word made use of to express both the Mode or Action, and its moral Rectitude

tude or Obliquity; therefore the Relation it ſelf is leſs taken notice of, and there is often no *Diſtinction* made *between the poſitive* Idea of the Action, *and the Reference it has to a Rule.* By which Confuſion of theſe two diſtinct Conſiderations under one Term, thoſe who yield too eaſily to the Impreſſions of Sounds, and are forward to take Names for Things, are often miſled in their Judgment of Actions. Thus the taking from another what is his, without his Knowledge or Allowance, is properly call'd *Stealing*; but that Name being commonly underſtood to ſignify alſo the moral Pravity of the Action, and to denote its Contrariety to the Law, Men are apt to condemn whatever they hear call'd Stealing, as an ill Action, diſagreeing with the Rule of Right. And yet the private taking away his Sword from a Madman, to prevent his doing Miſchief, tho' it be properly denominated *Stealing*, as the name of ſuch a *mix'd Mode*; yet when compar'd to the Law of God, and conſider'd in its Relation to that Supreme Rule, it is no Sin or Tranſgreſſion, tho' the name *Stealing* ordinarily carries ſuch an Intimation with it.

§. 17. And thus much for the Relation of human Actions to a Law, which therefore I call *moral Relations.* *Relations innumerable.*

'Twould make a Volume to go over all ſorts of *Relations*; 'tis not therefore to be expected, that I ſhould here mention them all. It ſuffices to our preſent purpoſe, to ſhew by theſe, what the *Ideas* are we have of this comprehenſive Conſideration, call'd *Relation*: Which is ſo *various*, and the Occaſions of it ſo *many* (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another) that it is not very eaſy to reduce it to Rules, or under juſt Heads. Thoſe I have mention'd, I think, are ſome of the moſt conſiderable, and ſuch as may ſerve to let us ſee from whence we get our *Ideas* of Relations, and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this Argument, from what has been ſaid, give me leave to obſerve;

§. 18. *Firſt*, That it is evident, that *all Relation terminates in*, and is ultimately founded on thoſe *ſimple Ideas* we have *got from Senſation or Reflection*: So that all that we have in our Thoughts our ſelves (if we think of any thing, or have any meaning) or would ſignify to others, when we uſe Words ſtanding for Relations, is nothing but ſome ſimple *Ideas*, or Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, compar'd one with another. This is ſo manifeſt in that ſort call'd *Proportional*, that nothing can be more: For when a Man ſays, Honey is ſweeter than Wax, it is plain that his Thoughts in this Relation terminate in this ſimple *Idea*, Sweetneſs, which is equally true of all the reſt; tho' where they are compounded or decompounded, the ſimple *Ideas* they are made up of, are, perhaps, ſeldom taken notice of. *V. g.* when the Word Father is mention'd; *Firſt*, There is meant that particular Species, or collective *Idea*, ſignified by the word Man. *Secondly*, Thoſe ſenſible ſimple *Ideas*, ſignified by the word Generation: And, *Thirdly*, The Effects of it, and all the ſimple *Ideas* ſignify'd by the word Child. So the word Friend being taken for a Man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all theſe following *Ideas* to the making of it up: *Firſt*, All the ſimple *Ideas*, comprehended in the word Man, or intelligent Being. *Secondly*, The *Idea* of Love. *Thirdly*, The *Idea* of Readineſs or Diſpoſition. *Fourthly*, The *Idea* of Action, which is any kind of Thought or Motion. *Fifthly*, The *Idea* of Good, which ſignifies any thing that may advance his Happineſs, and terminates at laſt, if examin'd, in particular ſimple *Ideas*; of which the word *Good* in general ſignifies any one, but if remov'd from all ſimple *Ideas* quite, it ſignifies nothing at all. And thus alſo all moral words terminate at laſt, tho' perhaps more remotely, in a Collection of ſimple *Ideas*: The immediate ſignification of relative Words, being very often other ſuppos'd known Relations; which, if trac'd one to another, ſtill end in ſimple *Ideas*. *All Relations terminate in ſimple Ideas.*

§. 19. *Secondly*, That in Relations, we have for the moſt part, if not always, *as clear a Notion of the Relation, as we have of theſe ſimple* Ideas *wherein it is founded.* Agreement or Diſagreement, whereon Relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear *Ideas*, as of any other whatſoever; it being but the diſtinguiſhing ſimple *Ideas*, or their Degrees one from another, without which we could have no diſtinct Knowledge at all. For if I have a clear *Idea* of Sweetneſs, Light or Extenſion, I have too, of equal, or more or leſs of each of theſe: If I know what it is for one Man to be born of a Woman, *viz. Sempronia*, I know what it is for another Man to be born of the ſame *We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) Notion of the Relation, as of its Foundation.*

Woman

Woman *Sempronia*; and ſo have as clear a Notion of Brothers, as of Births, and perhaps clearer. For if I believ'd that *Sempronia* dug *Titus* out of the Parſly-Bed (as they uſe to tell Children) and thereby became his Mother; and that afterwards, in the ſame manner, ſhe dug *Caius* out of the Parſly-Bed, I had as clear a Notion of the Relation of Brothers between them, as if I had all the Skill of a Midwife: the Notion that the ſame Woman contributed, as Mother, equally to their Births (tho' I were ignorant or miſtaken in the manner of it) being that on which I grounded the Relation, and that they agreed in that Circumſtance of Birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their Deſcent from the ſame Perſon, without knowing the particular Circumſtances of that Deſcent, is enough to found my Notion of their having or not having the Relation of Brothers. But tho' the *Ideas* of particular *Relations* are capable of being as clear and diſtinct in the Minds of thoſe who will duly conſider them, as thoſe of mix'd Modes, and more determinate than thoſe of Subſtances; yet the Names belonging to *Relation*, are often of as doubtful and incertain Signification, as thoſe of Subſtances or mix'd Modes, and much more than thoſe of ſimple *Ideas*; becauſe relative Words being the Marks of this Compariſon which is made only by Mens Thoughts, and is an *Idea* only in Mens Minds, Men frequently apply them to different Compariſons of Things, according to their own Imaginations, which do not always correſpond with thoſe of others uſing the ſame Names.

The Notion of the Relation is the ſame, whether the Rule any Action is compar'd to, be true or falſe.

§. 20. *Thirdly*, That in theſe I call *Moral Relations*, I have a true Notion of Relation, by comparing the Action with the Rule, whether the Rule be true or falſe. For if I meaſure any thing by a Yard, I know whether the thing I meaſure be longer or ſhorter than that ſuppos'd Yard, tho' perhaps the Yard I meaſure by be not exactly the Standard; which indeed is another Inquiry. For tho' the Rule be erroneous, and I miſtaken in it; yet the Agreement or Diſagreement obſervable in that which I compare with it, makes me perceive the Relation. Tho' meaſuring by a wrong Rule, I ſhall thereby be brought to judge amiſs of its moral Rectitude, becauſe I have try'd it by that which is not the true Rule; but I am not miſtaken in the Relation which that Action bears to that Rule I compare it to, which is Agreement or Diſagreement.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Clear and Obſcure, Diſtinct and Confus'd Ideas.

Ideas ſome clear and diſtinct, others obſcure and confus'd.

§. 1. HAVING ſhewn the Original of our *Ideas*, and taken a View of their ſeveral ſorts; conſider'd the Difference between the ſimple and the complex, and obſerv'd how the complex ones are divided into thoſe of Modes, Subſtances and Relations; all which, I think, is neceſſary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himſelf thoroughly with the Progreſs of the Mind in its Apprehenſion and Knowledge of Things: it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the Examination of *Ideas*. I muſt, nevertheleſs, crave Leave to offer ſome few other Conſiderations concerning them. The firſt is, That ſome are *clear*, aad others *obſcure*; ſome *diſtinct*, and others *confus'd*.

Clear and obſcure explain'd by Sight.

§. 2. The Perception of the Mind being moſt aptly explain'd by Words relating to the Sight, we ſhall beſt underſtand what is meant by *clear* and *obſcure* in our *Ideas*, by reflecting on what we call *clear* and *obſcure* in the Objects of Sight. Light being that which diſcovers to us viſible Objects, we give the Name of *obſcure* to that which is not plac'd in a Light ſufficient to diſcover minutely to us the Figure and Colours which are obſervable in it, and which, in a better Light, would be diſcernible. In like manner our *ſimple Ideas* are *clear*, when they are ſuch as the Objects themſelves, from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well-order'd Senſation or Perception, preſent them. Whilſt the Memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the Mind, whenever it has occaſion to conſider them, they are *clear Ideas*. So far as they either want any thing of that original Exactneſs, or have loſt any of their firſt Freſhneſs, and are, as it were, faded or tarniſh'd by time, ſo far are they *obſcure*. *Complex*

Ideas,

Ideas, as they are made up of ſimple ones, ſo they are *clear*, when the *Ideas* that go to their Compoſition are clear; and the Number and Order of thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, that are the Ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain.

§. 3. The *Cauſe* of *Obſcurity* in ſimple *Ideas*, ſeems to be either dull Organs, or very ſlight and tranſient Impreſſions made by the Objects, or elſe a Weakneſs in the Memory not able to retain them as receiv'd. For to return again to viſible Objects, to help us to apprehend this Matter: If the Organs or Faculties of Perception, like Wax over-harden'd with Cold, will not receive the Impreſſion of the Seal, from the uſual Impulſe wont to imprint it; or, like Wax of a Temper too ſoft, will not hold it well when well imprinted; or elſe ſuppoſing the Wax of a Temper fit, but the Seal not apply'd with a ſufficient Force to make a clear Impreſſion: in any of theſe Caſes, the Print left by the Seal will be *obſcure*. This, I ſuppoſe, needs no Application to make it plainer. *Cauſes of Obſcurity.*

§. 4. As a *clear Idea* is that whereof the Mind has ſuch a full and evident Perception, as it does receive from an outward Object operating duly on a well-diſpos'd Organ, ſo a *diſtinct Idea* is that wherein the Mind perceives a difference from all other; and a *confuſed Idea* is ſuch an one, as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhible from another, from which it ought to be different. *Diſtinct and confuſed, what.*

§. 5. If no *Idea* be *confus'd*, but ſuch as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhible from another, from which it ſhould be different; it will be hard, may any one ſay, to find any where a *confuſed Idea*. For let any *Idea* be as it will, it can be no other but ſuch as the Mind perceives it to be; and that very Perception ſufficiently diſtinguiſhes it from all other *Ideas*, which cannot be other, *i. e.* different, without being perceiv'd to be ſo. No *Idea* therefore can be undiſtinguiſhible from another, from which it ought to be different, unleſs you would have it different from it ſelf: for from all other it is evidently different. *Objection.*

§. 6. To remove this Difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the *Confuſion Ideas* are at any time chargeable with, we muſt conſider, that things rank'd under diſtinct Names, are ſuppos'd different enough to be diſtinguiſh'd, that ſo each ſort by its peculiar name may be mark'd, and diſcours'd of a-part upon any occaſion: And there is nothing more evident, than that the greateſt part of different names are ſuppos'd to ſtand for different things. Now, every *Idea* a Man has, being viſibly what it is, and diſtinct from all other *Ideas* but it ſelf; that which makes it *confus'd*, is, when it is ſuch, that it may as well be call'd by another name, as that which it is expreſs'd by: the Difference which keeps the things (to be rank'd under theſe two different names) diſtinct, and makes ſome of them belong rather to the one, and ſome of them to the other of thoſe names, being left out; and ſo the Diſtinction, which was intended to be kept up by thoſe different Names, is quite loſt. *Confuſion of Ideas, is in reference to their Names.*

§. 7. The *Defaults which* uſually *occaſion* this *Confuſion*, I think, are chiefly theſe following: *Defaults which make Confuſion*

Firſt, When any complex *Idea* (for 'tis complex *Ideas* that are moſt liable to Confuſion) is made up of *too ſmall a Number of ſimple Ideas*, and ſuch only as are common to other things, whereby the Differences that make it deſerve a different name, are left out. Thus he that has an *Idea* made up of barely the ſimple ones of a Beaſt with Spots, has but a confus'd *Idea* of a Leopard; it not being thereby ſufficiently diſtinguiſh'd from a Lynx, and ſeveral other ſorts of Beaſts that are ſpotted. So that ſuch an *Idea*, tho' it hath the peculiar name Leopard, is not diſtinguiſhible from thoſe deſign'd by the names Lynx or Panther, and may as well come under the name Lynx as Leopard. How much the Cuſtom of defining of Words by general Terms, contributes to make the *Ideas* we would expreſs by them confus'd and undetermin'd, I leave others to conſider. This is evident, that confus'd *Ideas* are ſuch as render the Uſe of Words uncertain, and take away the benefit of diſtinct Names. When the *Ideas*, for which we uſe different Terms, have not a Difference anſwerable to their diſtinct Names, and ſo cannot be diſtinguiſh'd by them, there it is that they are truly confus'd. *First, complex Ideas made up of too few ſimple ones.*

§. 8. *Secondly*, Another Default which makes our *Ideas* confus'd, is, when tho' the Particulars that make up any *Idea* are in number enough; yet they are ſo *jumbled together*, that it is not eaſily diſcernible, whether it more belongs to the Name that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make *Secondly, Or its ſimple ones jumbled diſorderly together.*

us conceive this Confusion, than a sort of Pictures usually shewn as surprising Pieces of Art, wherein the Colours, as they are laid by the Pencil on the Table it self, mark out very odd and unusual Figures, and have no discernible Order in their Position. This Draught, thus made up of Parts wherein no Symmetry nor Order appears, is in it self no more a confus'd thing, than the Picture of a cloudy Sky; wherein tho' there be as little Order of Colours or Figures to be found, yet no body thinks it a confus'd Picture. What is it then that makes it be thought confus'd, since the want of Symmetry does not? As it is plain it does not; for another Draught made, barely in imitation of this, could not be call'd confus'd. I answer, That which makes it be thought confus'd, is, the applying it to some Name, to which it does no more discernibly belong, than to some other: *v. g.* When it is said to be the Picture of a Man, or *Cæsar*, then any one with reason counts it confus'd: because it is not discernible, in that State, to belong more to the name Man, or *Cæsar*, than to the name Baboon, or *Pompey*; which are suppos'd to stand for different *Ideas* from those signify'd by Man, or *Cæsar*. But when a cylindrical Mirrour, plac'd right, hath produc'd those irregular Lines on the Table into their due Order and Proportion, then the Confusion ceases, and the Eye presently sees that it is a Man, or *Cæsar*, i. e. that it belongs to those Names; and that it is sufficiently distinguishible from a Baboon, or *Pompey*, i. e. from the *Ideas* signify'd by those Names. Just thus it is with our *Ideas*, which are as it were the Pictures of things. No one of these mental Draughts, however the Parts are put together, can be call'd confus'd (for they are plainly discernible as they are) till it be rank'd under some ordinary Name, to which it cannot be discern'd to belong, any more than it does to some other Name of an allow'd different Signification.

Thirdly, Or are mutable and undetermin'd.

§. 9. *Thirdly*, A third Defect that frequently gives the name of confus'd to our *Ideas*, is, when any one of them is *uncertain* and *undetermin'd*. Thus we may observe Men, who not forbearing to use the ordinary Words of their Language, till they have learn'd their precise Signification, change the *Idea* they make this or that Term stand for, almost as often as they use it. He that does this, out of uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his *Idea* of *Church* or *Idolatry*, every time he thinks of either, and holds not steddy to any one precise Combination of *Ideas* that makes it up, is said to have a confus'd *Idea* of Idolatry or the Church: tho' this be still for the same reason that the former, *viz.* because a mutable *Idea* (if we will allow it to be one *Idea*) cannot belong to one Name rather than another; and so loses the Distinction that distinct Names are design'd for.

Confusion without reference to Names, hardly conceivable.

§. 10. By what has been said, we may observe how much *Names*, as suppos'd steddy Signs of things, and by their difference to stand for and keep things distinct that in themselves are different, are the *Occasion of denominating* Ideas *distinct or confus'd*, by a secret and unobserv'd Reference the Mind makes of its *Ideas* to such Names. This perhaps will be fuller understood, after what I say of Words, in the third Book, has been read and consider'd. But without taking notice of such a Reference of *Ideas*, to distinct Names, as the Signs of distinct things, it will be hard to say what a *confus'd Idea* is. And therefore when a Man designs, by any Name, a sort of things, or any one particular thing, distinct from all others; the complex *Idea* he annexes to that Name, is the more distinct, the more particular the *Ideas* are, and the greater and more determinate the Number and Order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more it has of these, the more has it still of the perceivable Differences, whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all *Ideas* belonging to their Names, even those that approach nearest to it, and thereby all Confusion with them is avoided.

Confusion concerns always two Ideas.

§. 11. *Confusion*, making it a difficulty to separate two things that should be separated, *concerns always two Ideas*; and those most, which most approach one another. Whenever therefore we suspect any *Idea* to be *confus'd*, we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be separated from: and that will always be found an *Idea* belonging to another Name, and so should be a different thing, from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct, being either the same with it, or making a Part of it, or at least as properly call'd by that Name, as the other it is rank'd under; and so

keeps

keeps not that Difference from that other *Idea*, which the different Names import.

§. 12. This, I think, is the *Confuſion* proper to *Ideas*, which ſtill carries with it a ſecret Reference to Names. At leaſt, if there be any other Confuſion of *Ideas*, this is that which moſt of all diſorders Mens Thoughts and Diſcourſes: *Ideas*, as rank'd under Names, being thoſe that for the moſt part Men reaſon of within themſelves, and always thoſe which they commune about with others. And therefore where there are ſuppos'd two different *Ideas* mark'd by two different Names, which are not as diſtinguiſhible as the Sounds that ſtand for them, there never fails to be *Confuſion*: And where any *Ideas* are diſtinct, as the *Ideas* of thoſe two Sounds they are mark'd by, there can be between them no *Confuſion*. *The Way to prevent it*, is to collect and unite into our complex *Idea*, as preciſely as is poſſible, all thoſe Ingredients whereby it is differenc'd from others; and to them ſo united in a determinate Number and Order, apply ſteddily the ſame Name. But this neither accommodating Men's Eaſe or Vanity, or ſerving any Deſign but that of naked Truth, which is not always the thing aim'd at, ſuch Exactneſs is rather to be wiſh'd than hoped for. And ſince the looſe Application of Names to undetermin'd, variable, and almoſt no *Ideas*, ſerves both to cover our own Ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for Learning and Superiority in Knowledge, it is no wonder that moſt Men ſhould uſe it themſelves, whilſt they complain of it in others. Tho', I think, no ſmall part of the *Confuſion* to be found in the Notions of Men, might by Care and Ingenuity be avoided, yet I am far from concluding it every where wilful. Some *Ideas* are ſo complex, and made up of ſo many Parts, that the Memory does not eaſily retain the very ſame preciſe Combination of ſimple *Ideas* under one Name; much leſs are we able conſtantly to divine for what preciſe complex *Idea* ſuch a Name ſtands in another Man's Uſe of it. From the firſt of theſe, follows *Confuſion* in a Man's own Reaſonings and Opinions within himſelf; from the latter, frequent *Confuſion* in diſcourſing and arguing with others. But having more at large treated of Words, their Defects and Abuſes, in the following Book, I ſhall here ſay no more of it.

Causes of Confuſion.

§. 13. Our *complex Ideas* being made up of Collections, and ſo Variety of ſimple ones, *may* accordingly *be very clear and diſtinct in one part, and very obſcure and confuſed in another*. In a Man who ſpeaks of a *Chiliaedron*, or a Body of a thouſand Sides, the *Idea* of the Figure may be very confus'd, tho' that of the Number be very diſtinct; ſo that he being able to diſcourſe and demonſtrate concerning that part of his complex *Idea*, which depends upon the Number of a Thouſand, he is apt to think he has a diſtinct *Idea* of a *Chiliaedron*; tho' it be plain, he has no preciſe *Idea* of its Figure, ſo as to diſtinguiſh it by that, from one that has but 999 Sides: the not obſerving whereof, cauſes no ſmall Error in Mens Thoughts, and Confuſion in their Diſcourſes.

Complex Ideas may be diſtinct in one part, and confus'd in another.

§. 14. He that thinks he has a diſtinct *Idea* of the Figure of a *Chiliaedron*, let him for trial-ſake take another parcel of the ſame uniform Matter, *viz.* Gold, or Wax, of an equal Bulk, and make it into a Figure of 999 Sides: He will, I doubt not, be able to diſtinguiſh theſe two *Ideas* one from another, by the number of Sides; and reaſon and argue diſtinctly about them, whilſt he keeps his Thoughts and Reaſoning to that part only of theſe *Ideas*, which is contain'd in their Numbers; as that the Sides of the one could be divided into two equal Numbers, and of the other not, *&c.* But when he goes about to diſtinguiſh them by their Figure, he will there be preſently at a loſs, and not be able, I think, to frame in his Mind two *Ideas*, one of them diſtinct from the other, by the bare Figure of theſe two Pieces of Gold; as he could, if the ſame parcels of Gold were made one into a Cube, the other a Figure of five Sides. In which incompleat *Ideas*, we are very apt to impoſe on our ſelves, and wrangle with others, eſpecially where they have particular and familiar Names. For being ſatisfy'd in that part of the *Idea*, which we have clear; and the Name which is familiar to us, being apply'd to the whole, containing that part alſo which is imperfect and obſcure; we are apt to uſe it for that confuſed Part, and draw Deductions from it, in the obſcure part of its Signification, as confidently as we do from the other.

This, if not heeded, cauſes Confuſion in our Arguings.

Instance in Eternity.

§. 15. Having frequently in our Mouths the Name *Eternity*, we are apt to think we have a positive comprehensive *Idea* of it, which is as much as to say, that there is no part of that Duration which is not clearly contain'd in our *Idea*. 'Tis true, that he that thinks so may have a clear *Idea* of Duration; he may also have a very clear *Idea* of a very great Length of Duration; he may also have a clear *Idea* of the Comparison of that great one with still a greater: But it not being possible for him to include in his *Idea* of any Duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole Extent together of a Duration where he supposes no End, that Part of his *Idea*, which is still beyond the Bounds of that large Duration, he represents to his own Thoughts, is very obscure and undetermin'd. And hence it is, that in Disputes and Reasonings concerning Eternity, or any other *Infinite*, we are apt to blunder, and involve our selves in manifest Absurdities.

Divisibility of Matter.

§. 16. In Matter we have no clear *Ideas* of the Smallness of Parts much beyond the smallest that occur to any of our Senses: and therefore when we talk of the Divisibility of Matter *in infinitum*, tho' we have clear *Ideas* of Division and Divisibility, and have also clear *Ideas* of Parts made out of a whole by Division; yet we have but very obscure and confus'd *Ideas* of Corpuscles, or minute Bodies so to be divided, when by former Divisions they are reduc'd to a Smallness much exceeding the Perception of any of our Senses; and so all that we have clear and distinct *Ideas* of, is of what Division in general or abstractly is, and the Relation of *Totum* and *Pars*: But of the Bulk of the Body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain Progressions, I think, we have no clear nor distinct *Idea* at all. For I ask any one, Whether taking the smallest Atom of Dust he ever saw, he has any distinct *Idea* (bating still the Number which concerns not Extension) betwixt the 100,000, and the 1000,000 Part of it. Or if he thinks he can refine his *Ideas* to that degree, without losing sight of them, let him add ten Cyphers to each of those Numbers. Such a degree of Smallness is not unreasonable to be suppos'd, since a Division carry'd on so far, brings it no nearer the End of infinite Division, than the first Division into two Halfs does. I must confess, for my part, I have no clear distinct *Ideas* of the different Bulk or Extension of those Bodies, having but a very obscure one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of Division of Bodies *in infinitum*, our *Idea* of their distinct Bulks, which is the Subject and Foundation of Division, comes, after a little Progression, to be confounded, and almost lost in Obscurity. For that *Idea*, which is to represent only Bigness, must be very obscure and confus'd, which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big, but only by Number; so that we have clear distinct *Ideas*, we may say, of ten and one, but no distinct *Ideas* of two such Extensions. 'Tis plain from hence, that when we talk of infinite Divisibility of Body, or Extension, our distinct and clear *Ideas* are only of Numbers; but the clear distinct *Ideas* of Extension, after some Progress of Division, is quite lost: and of such minute Parts we have no distinct *Ideas* at all; but it returns, as all our *Ideas* of Infinite do, at last to that of Number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any distinct *Idea* of actual infinite Parts. We have, 'tis true, a clear *Idea* of Division, as often as we think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear *Idea* of infinite Parts in Matter, than we have a clear *Idea* of an infinite Number, by being able still to add new Numbers to any assign'd Number we have: Endless Divisibility giving us no more a clear and distinct *Idea* of actually infinite Parts, than endless Addibility (if I may so speak) gives us a clear and distinct *Idea* of an actually infinite Number; they both being only in a Power still of increasing the Number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what remains to be added (wherein consists the Infinity) we have but an obscure, imperfect, and confus'd *Idea*; from or about which we can argue or reason with no Certainty or Clearness, no more than we can in Arithmetick, about a Number of which we have no such distinct *Idea* as we have of 4 or 100; but only this relative obscure one, that compar'd to any other, it is still bigger: And we have no more a clear positive *Idea* of it when we say or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we should say it is bigger than 40, or 4; 400,000,000, having no nearer a Proportion to the End of Addition, or Number, than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and so proceeds, shall as soon come to the End of all

all Addition, as he that adds 400,000,000, to 400,000,000. And ſo likewiſe in Eternity, he that has an *Idea* of but four Years, has as much a poſitive compleat *Idea* of Eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of Years: For what remains of Eternity beyond either of theſe two Numbers of Years, is as clear to the one as the other; *i. e.* neither of them has any clear poſitive *Idea* of it at all. For he that adds only 4 Years to 4, and ſo on, ſhall as ſoon reach Eternity, as he that adds 400,000,000 of Years, and ſo on; or if he pleaſe, doubles the Increaſe as often as he will: The remaining Abyſs being ſtill as far beyond the End of all theſe Progreſſions, as it is from the Length of a Day or an Hour. For nothing finite bears any Proportion to infinite; and therefore our *Ideas*, which are all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is alſo in our *Idea* of *Extenſion*, when we increaſe it by Addition, as well as when we diminiſh it by Diviſion, and would enlarge our Thoughts to infinite Space. After a few Doublings of thoſe *Ideas* of Extenſion, which are the largeſt we are accuſtom'd to have, we loſe the clear diſtinct *Idea* of that Space: It becomes a confuſedly great one, with a Surplus of ſtill greater; about which, when we would argue or reaſon, we ſhall always find our ſelves at a loſs; confus'd *Ideas* in our Arguings and Deductions from that part of them which is confus'd, always leading us into Confuſion.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantaſtical Ideas.

§. 1. BESIDES what we have already mention'd concerning *Ideas*, other Conſiderations belong to them, in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which they may be ſuppos'd to repreſent: and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold Diſtinction; and are,

Real Ideas are conformable to their Archetypes.

First, Either real or fantaſtical.

Secondly, Adequate or inadequate.

Thirdly, True or falſe.

First, By *real Ideas*, I mean ſuch as have a Foundation in Nature; ſuch as have a Conformity with the real Being and Exiſtence of things, or with their Archetypes. *Fantaſtical* or *Chimerical*, I call ſuch as have no Foundation in Nature, nor have any Conformity with that Reality of Being to which they are tacitly refer'd as to their Archetypes. If we examine the ſeveral ſorts of *Ideas* before-mention'd, we ſhall find that,

§. 2. *First*, Our *ſimple* Ideas *are all real*, all agree to the Reality of things. Not that they are all of them the Images or Repreſentations of what does exiſt; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary Qualities of Bodies, hath been already ſhewn. But tho' Whiteneſs and Coldneſs are no more in Snow than Pain is; yet thoſe *Ideas* of Whiteneſs and Coldneſs, Pain, *&c.* being in us the Effects of Powers in things without us, ordain'd by our Maker to produce in us ſuch Senſations; they are real *Ideas* in us, whereby we diſtinguiſh the Qualities that are really in things themſelves. For theſe ſeveral Appearances being deſign'd to be the Marks whereby we are to know and diſtinguiſh things which we have to do with, our *Ideas* do as well ſerve us to that purpoſe, and are as real diſtinguiſhing Characters, whether they be only conſtant Effects, or elſe exact Reſemblances of ſomething in the things themſelves; the Reality lying in that ſteddy Correſpondence they have with the diſtinct Conſtitutions of real Beings. But whether they anſwer to thoſe Conſtitutions, as to Cauſes or Patterns, it matters not; it ſuffices that they are conſtantly produc'd by them. And thus our ſimple *Ideas* are all real and true, becauſe they anſwer and agree to thoſe Powers of things which produce them in our Minds, that being all that is requiſite to make them real, and not Fictions at Pleaſure. For in ſimple *Ideas* (as has been ſhewn) the Mind is wholly confin'd to the Operation of things upon it, and can make to it ſelf no ſimple *Idea*, more than what it has receiv'd.

Simple Ideas all real.

Complex Ideas *are voluntary Combinations.*

§. 3. Tho' the Mind be wholly paſſive in reſpect of its ſimple *Ideas*; yet, I think, we may ſay, it is not ſo in reſpect of its complex *Ideas*: for thoſe being Combinations of ſimple *Ideas* put together, and united under one general Name; 'tis plain that the Mind of Man uſes ſome kind of Liberty, in forming thoſe complex *Ideas*: How elſe comes it to paſs that one Man's *Idea* of Gold, or Juſtice, is different from another's? but becauſe he has put in or left out of his ſome ſimple *Idea*, which the other has not. The Queſtion then is, Which of theſe are real, and which barely imaginary Combinations? What Collections agree to the Reality of things, and what not? And to this I ſay, That,

Mix'd Modes made of conſiſtent Ideas, *are real.*

§. 4. *Secondly*, *Mix'd Modes and Relations* having no other *Reality* but what they have in the Minds of Men, there is nothing more requir'd to thoſe kind of *Ideas* to make them *real*, but that they be ſo fram'd, that there be a Poſſibility of exiſting conformable to them. Theſe *Ideas* themſelves being Archetypes, cannot differ from their Archetypes, and ſo *cannot be chimerical*, unleſs any one will jumble together in them inconſiſtent *Ideas*. Indeed, as any of them have the Names of a known Language aſſign'd to them, by which he that has them in his Mind would ſignify them to others, ſo bare Poſſibility of exiſting is not enough; they muſt have a Conformity to the ordinary Signification of the Name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantaſtical: as if a Man would give the Name of Juſtice to that *Idea*, which common Uſe calls Liberality. But this Fantaſticalneſs relates more to Propriety of Speech, than Reality of *Ideas*: For a Man to be undiſturb'd in Danger, ſedately to conſider what is fitteſt to be done, and to execute it ſteddily, is a mix'd Mode, or a complex *Idea* of an Action which may exiſt. But to be undiſturb'd in Danger, without uſing one's Reaſon or Induſtry, is what is alſo poſſible to be; and ſo is as real an *Idea* as the other. Tho' the firſt of theſe having the Name *Courage* given to it, may, in reſpect of that Name, be a right or wrong *Idea*: But the other, whilſt it has not a common receiv'd Name of any known Language aſſign'd to it, is not capable of any Deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but it ſelf.

Ideas of Subſtances are real, when they agree with the Exiſtence of things.

§. 5. *Thirdly*, Our *complex* Ideas *of Subſtances* being made all of them in reference to things exiſting without us, and intended to be Repreſentations of Subſtances, as they really are, are no farther *real*, than as they are ſuch Combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, as are really united, and co-exiſt in things without us. On the contrary, thoſe are *fantaſtical* which are made up of ſuch Collections of ſimple *Ideas* as were really never united, never were found together in any Subſtance; *v. g.* a rational Creature, conſiſting of a Horſe's Head, join'd to a Body of human Shape, or ſuch as the *Centaurs* are deſcrib'd: or, a Body yellow, very maleable, fuſible, and fix'd; but lighter than common Water: or an uniform, unorganiz'd Body, conſiſting, as to Senſe, all of ſimilar Parts, with Perception and voluntary Motion join'd to it. Whether ſuch Subſtances as theſe can poſſibly exiſt or no, 'tis probable we do not know: But be that as it will, theſe *Ideas* of Subſtances being made conformable to no Pattern exiſting that we know, and conſiſting of ſuch Collections of *Ideas*, as no Subſtance ever ſhew'd us united together, they ought to paſs with us for barely imaginary: But much more are thoſe complex *Ideas* ſo, which contain in them any Inconſiſtency or Contradiction of their Parts.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

Adequate Ideas are ſuch as perfectly repreſent their Archetypes.

§. 1. OF our real *Ideas*, ſome are adequate, and ſome are inadequate. Thoſe I call *adequate*, which perfectly repreſent thoſe Archetypes which the Mind ſuppoſes them taken from; which it intends them to ſtand for, and to which it refers them. *Inadequate Ideas* are ſuch, which are but a partial or incompleat Repreſentation of thoſe Archetypes to which they are refer'd. Upon which account it is plain,

§. 2.

§. 2. *First*, That *all our ſimple* Ideas *are adequate*. Becauſe being nothing but the Effects of certain Powers in things, fitted and ordain'd by GOD to produce ſuch Senſations in us, they cannot but be correſpondent and adequate to thoſe Powers: and we are ſure they agree to the Reality of things. For if Sugar produce in us the *Ideas* which we call Whiteneſs and Sweetneſs, we are ſure there is a Power in Sugar to produce thoſe *Ideas* in our Minds, or elſe they could not have been produc'd by it. And ſo each Senſation anſwering the Power that operates on any of our Senſes, the *Idea* ſo produc'd is a real *Idea*, (and not a Fiction of the Mind, which has no Power to produce any ſimple *Idea*;) and cannot but be adequate, ſince it ought only to anſwer that Power: And ſo all ſimple *Ideas* are adequate. 'Tis true, the things producing in us theſe ſimple *Ideas* are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the Cauſes of them; but as if thoſe *Ideas* were real Beings in them. For tho' Fire be call'd painful to the Touch, whereby is ſignify'd the Power of producing in us the *Idea* of Pain, yet it is denominated alſo Light and Hot; as if Light and Heat were really ſomething in the Fire more than a Power to excite theſe *Ideas* in us; and therefore are call'd *Qualities* in, or of the Fire. But theſe being nothing, in truth, but Powers to excite ſuch *Ideas* in us, I muſt, in that ſenſe, be underſtood when I ſpeak of ſecondary *Qualities*, as being in things; or of their *Ideas*, as being in the Objects that excite them in us. Such ways of ſpeaking, tho' accommodated to the vulgar Notions, without which one cannot be well underſtood; yet truly ſignify nothing but thoſe Powers which are in things to excite certain Senſation or *Ideas* in us: ſince were there no fit Organs to receive the Impreſſions Fire makes on the Sight and Touch, nor a Mind join'd to thoſe Organs to receive the *Ideas* of Light and Heat by thoſe Impreſſions from the Fire or the Sun, there would yet be no more Light or Heat in the World, than there would be Pain, if there were no ſenſible Creature to feel it, tho' the Sun ſhould continue juſt as it is now, and Mount *Ætna* flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and Extenſion, and the Termination of it, Figure, with Motion and Reſt, whereof we have the *Ideas*, would be really in the World as they are, whether there were any ſenſible Being to perceive them or no: And therefore we have reaſon to look on thoſe as the real Modifications of Matter, and ſuch as are the exciting Cauſes of all our various Senſations from Bodies. But this being an Enquiry not belonging to this Place, I ſhall enter no farther into it, but proceed to ſhew what complex *Ideas* are *adequate*, and what not.

Simple Ideas all adequate.

§. 3. *Secondly*, Our *complex* Ideas *of Modes*, being voluntary Collections of ſimple *Ideas* which the Mind puts together without reference to any real Archetypes or ſtanding Patterns exiſting any where, *are* and cannot but be *adequate Ideas*. Becauſe they not being intended for Copies of things really exiſting, but for Archetypes made by the Mind to rank and denominate things by, cannot want any thing; they having each of them that Combination of *Ideas*, and thereby that Perfection which the Mind intended they ſhould: ſo that the Mind acquieſces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the *Idea* of a Figure, with three Sides meeting in three Angles, I have a compleat *Idea*, wherein I require nothing elſe to make it perfect. That the Mind is ſatisfy'd with the Perfection of this its *Idea*, is plain in that it does not conceive, that any Underſtanding hath, or can have a more compleat or perfect *Idea* of that thing it ſignifies by the word *Triangle*, ſuppoſing it to exiſt, than it ſelf has in that complex *Idea* of three Sides, and three Angles; in which is contain'd all that is, or can be eſſential to it, or neceſſary to compleat it, whereever or however it exiſts. But in our *Ideas* of *Subſtances* it is otherwiſe. For there deſiring to copy things as they really do exiſt, and to repreſent to our ſelves that Conſtitution on which all their Properties depend, we perceive our *Ideas* attain not that Perfection we intend: We find they ſtill want ſomething we ſhould be glad were in them; and ſo are all *inadequate*. But *mix'd Modes* and *Relations*, being Archetypes without Patterns, and ſo having nothing to repreſent but themſelves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being ſo to it ſelf. He that at firſt put together the *Idea* of Danger perceiv'd, Abſence of Diſorder from Fear, ſedate Conſideration from what was juſtly to be done, and executing of that without Diſturbance, or being deter'd by the

Modes are all adequate.

Danger

Danger of it, had certainly in his Mind that complex *Idea* made up of that Combination; and intending to be nothing elſe, but what it is, nor to have in it any other ſimple *Ideas*, but what it hath, it could not alſo but be an *adequate Idea*: And laying this up in his Memory, with the name *Courage* annex'd to it, to ſignify it to others, and denominate from thence any Action he ſhould obſerve to agree with it, had thereby a Standard to meaſure and denominate Actions by, as they agreed to it. This *Idea* thus made, and laid up for a Pattern, muſt neceſſarily be *adequate*, being refer'd to nothing elſe but it ſelf, nor made by any other Original, but the Good-liking and Will of him that firſt made this Combination.

Modes in reference to ſettled Names, may be inadequate.

§. 4. Indeed another coming after, and in Converſation learning from him the word *Courage*, may make an *Idea*, to which he gives that name *Courage*, different from what the firſt Author apply'd it to, and has in his Mind, when he uſes it. And in this Caſe, if he deſigns that his *Idea* in Thinking ſhould be conformable to the other's *Idea*, as the name he uſes in ſpeaking is conformable in Sound to his, from whom he learn'd it, his *Idea* may be very wrong and *inadequate*: Becauſe in this Caſe, making the other Man's *Idea* the Pattern of his *Idea* in thinking, as the other Man's Word or Sound is the Pattern of his in ſpeaking, his *Idea* is ſo far defective and *inadequate*, as it is diſtant from the Archetype and Pattern he refers it to, and intends to expreſs and ſignify by the Name he uſes for it; which Name he would have to be a Sign of the other Man's *Idea* (to which, in it's proper Uſe, it is primarily annex'd) and of his own, as agreeing to it: To which, if his own does not exactly correſpond, it is faulty and inadequate.

§. 5. Therefore theſe *complex* Ideas *of Modes*, when they are refer'd by the Mind, and intended to correſpond to the *Ideas* in the Mind of ſome other intelligent Being, expreſs'd by the Names we apply to them, they *may be* very deficient, wrong and *inadequate*; becauſe they agree not to that, which the Mind deſigns to be their Archetype and Pattern: In which reſpect only, any *Idea* of *Modes* can be wrong, imperfect or *inadequate*. And on this Account our *Ideas* of *mix'd Modes* are the moſt liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper ſpeaking, than knowing right.

Ideas of Subſtances, as refer'd to real Eſſences, not adequate.

§. 6. *Thirdly*, What *Ideas we have of Subſtances*, I have above ſhewn. Now thoſe *Ideas* have in the Mind a double Reference: 1. Sometimes they are refer'd to a ſuppos'd real Eſſence of each Species of Things. 2. Sometimes they are only deſign'd to be Pictures and Repreſentations in the Mind of Things that do exiſt by *Ideas* of thoſe Qualities that are diſcoverable in them. In both which ways, theſe Copies of thoſe Originals and Archetypes, are imperfect and *inadequate*.

Firſt, It is uſual for Men to make the Names of Subſtances ſtand for Things, as ſuppos'd to have certain real Eſſences, whereby they are of this or that Species: And Names ſtanding for nothing but the *Ideas* that are in Mens Minds, they muſt conſequently refer their *Ideas* to ſuch real Eſſences, as to their Archetypes. That Men (eſpecially ſuch as have been bred up in the Learning taught in this Part of the World) do ſuppoſe certain ſpecifick Eſſences of Subſtances, which each Individual, in its ſeveral kinds, is made conformable to, and partakes of; is ſo far from needing Proof, that it will be thought ſtrange if any one ſhould do otherwiſe. And thus they ordinarily apply the ſpecifick Names they rank particular Subſtances under, to Things as diſtinguiſh'd by ſuch ſpecifick real Eſſences. Who is there almoſt, who would not take it amiſs, if it ſhould be doubted, whether he call'd himſelf Man, with any other Meaning, than as having the real Eſſence of a Man? And yet if you demand what thoſe real Eſſences are, 'tis plain Men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the *Ideas* they have in their Minds, being refer'd to real Eſſences, as to Architypes which are unknown, muſt be ſo far from being *adequate*, that they cannot be ſuppos'd to be any Repreſentation of them at all. The complex *Ideas* we have of Subſtances, are, as it has been ſhewn, certain Collections of ſimple *Ideas* that have been obſerv'd or ſuppos'd conſtantly to exiſt together. But ſuch a complex *Idea* cannot be the real Eſſence of any Subſtance; for then the Properties we diſcover in that Body, would depend on that complex *Idea*, and be deducible from it, and their neceſſary Con-

nection

nection with it be known; as all Properties of a Triangle depend on, and as far as they are diſcoverable, are deducible from the complex *Idea* of three Lines, including a Space. But it is plain, that in our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, are not contain'd ſuch *Ideas*, on which all the other Qualities, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common *Idea* Men have of *Iron*, is a Body of a certain Colour, Weight and Hardneſs; and a Property that they look on as belonging to it, is Malleableneſs. But yet this Property has no neceſſary Connection with that complex *Idea*, or any part of it: And there is no more reaſon to think that Malleableneſs depends on that Colour, Weight and Hardneſs, than that that Colour, or that Weight depends on its Malleableneſs. And yet, tho' we know nothing of theſe real Eſſence, there is nothing more ordinary, than that Men ſhould attribute the ſorts of Things to ſuch Eſſences. The particular parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring I have on my Finger, is forwardly, by moſt Men, ſuppos'd to have a real Eſſence, whereby it is *Gold*; and from whence thoſe Qualities flow, which I find in it, *viz.* its peculiar Colour, Weight, Hardneſs, Fuſibility, Fixedneſs, and change of Colour upon a ſlight touch of Mercury, *&c.* This Eſſence, from which all theſe Properties flow, when I enquire into it, and ſearch after it, I plainly perceive I cannot diſcover: The fartheſt I can go, is only to preſume, that it being nothing but Body, its real Eſſence, or internal Conſtitution, on which theſe Qualities depend, can be nothing but the Figure, Size and Connection of its ſolid Parts; of neither of which, having any diſtinct Perception at all, can I have any *Idea* of its Eſſence, which is the Cauſe that it has that particular ſhining Yellowneſs, a greater Weight than any thing I know of the ſame Bulk, and a Fitneſs to have its Colour chang'd by the touch of Quick-ſilver. If any one will ſay, that the real Eſſence and internal Conſtitution, on which theſe Properties depend, is not the Figure, Size and Arangement or Connection of its ſolid Parts, but ſomething elſe, call'd its particular *Form*; I am farther from having any *Idea* of its real Eſſence, than I was before: for I have an *Idea* of a Figure, Size and Situation of ſolid Parts in general, tho' I have none of the particular Figure, Size, or putting together of Parts, whereby the Qualities above-mention'd are produc'd; which Qualities I find in that particular parcel of Mattet that is on my Finger, and not in another parcel of Matter, with which I cut the Pen I write with. But when I am told, that ſomething beſides the Figure, Size and Poſture of the ſolid Parts of that Body, is its Eſſence, ſomething call'd *ſubſtantial Form*; of that, I confeſs, I have no *Idea* at all, but only of the Sound *Form*, which is far enough from an *Idea* of its real Eſſence, or Conſtitution. The like Ignorance as I have of the real Eſſence of this particular Subſtance, I have alſo of the real Eſſence of all other natural ones: Of which Eſſences, I confeſs I have no diſtinct *Ideas* at all; and I am apt to ſuppoſe others, when they examine their own Knowledg, will find in themſelves, in this one Point, the ſame ſort of Ignorance.

§. 7. Now then, when Men apply to this particular parcel of Matter on my Finger, a general Name already in Uſe, and denominate it *Gold*, do they not ordinarily, or are they not underſtood to give it that Name as belonging to a particular Species of Bodies, having a real internal Eſſence; by having of which Eſſence, this particular Subſtance comes to be of that Species, and to be call'd by that Name? If it be ſo, as it is plain it is, the Name, by which Things are mark'd, as having that Eſſence, muſt be refer'd primarily to that Eſſence; and conſequently the *Idea* to which that Name is given, muſt be refer'd alſo to that Eſſence, and be intended to repreſent it. Which Eſſence, ſince they, who ſo uſe the Names, know not, their Ideas *of Subſtances* muſt be *all adequate* in that reſpect, as not containing in them that real Eſſence which the Mind intends they ſhould.

§. 8. *Secondly*, Thoſe who neglecting that uſeleſs Suppoſition of unknown real Eſſences, whereby they are diſtinguiſh'd, endeavour to copy the Subſtances that exiſt in the World, by putting together the *Ideas* of thoſe ſenſible Qualities which are found co-exiſting in them, tho' they come much nearer a Likeneſs of them, than thoſe who imagine they know not what real ſpecifick Eſſences; yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate *Ideas* of thoſe Subſtances they would thus copy into their Minds; nor do thoſe Copies exactly and fully contain all

Ideas *of Subſtances, as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.*

that is to be found in their Archetypes. Becauſe thoſe Qualities, and Powers of Subſtances, whereof we make their complex *Ideas*, are ſo many and various, that no Man's complex *Idea* contains them all. That our abſtract *Ideas* of Subſtances do not contain in them all the ſimple *Ideas* that are united in the things themſelves, is evident, in that Men do rarely put into their complex *Idea* of any Subſtance, all the ſimple *Ideas* they do know to exiſt in it. Becauſe endeavouring to make the Signification of their ſpecifick Names as clear, and as little cumberſom as they can, they make their ſpecifick *Ideas* of the ſorts of Subſtances, for the moſt part, of a few of thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which are to be found in them: But theſe having no original Precedency, or Right to be put in, and make the ſpecifick *Idea* more than others that are left out, 'tis plain that both theſe ways *our* Ideas *of Subſtances* are deficient and *inadequate*. The ſimple *Ideas*, whereof we make our complex ones of Subſtances, are all of them (bating only the Figure and Bulk of ſome ſorts) Powers, which being Relations to other Subſtances, we can never be ſure that we know all the Powers that are in any one Body, till we have try'd what Changes it is fitted to give to, or receive from other Subſtances, in their ſeveral ways of Application: Which being impoſſible to be try'd upon any one Body, much leſs upon all, it is impoſſible we ſhould have adequate *Ideas* of any Subſtance, made up of a Collection of all its Properties.

§. 9. Whoſoever firſt lit on a parcel of that ſort of Subſtance we denote by the word *Gold*, could not rationally take the Bulk and Figure he obſerv'd in that Lump, to depend on its real Eſſence or internal Conſtitution. Therefore thoſe never went into his *Idea* of that Species of Body; but its peculiar Colour, perhaps, and Weight, were the firſt he abſtracted from it, to make the complex *Idea* of that Species. Which both are but Powers; the one to affect our Eyes after ſuch a manner, and to produce in us that *Idea* we call Yellow; and the other to force upwards any other Body of equal Bulk, they being put into a pair of equal Scales, one againſt another. Another perhaps added to theſe the *Ideas* of Fuſibility and Fixedneſs, two other paſſive Powers, in relation to the Operation of Fire upon it; another, its Ductility and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, two other Powers relating to the Operation of other Bodies, in changing its outward Figure or Separation of it into inſenſible Parts. Theſe, or part of theſe, put together, uſually make the complex *Idea* in Mens Minds, of that ſort of Body we call *Gold*.

§. But no one, who hath conſider'd the Properties of Bodies in general, or this ſort in particular, can doubt that this call'd *Gold* has infinite other Properties, not contain'd in that *complex Idea*. Some who have examin'd this Species more accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many Properties in *Gold*, all of them as inſeparable from its internal Conſtitution, as its Colour or Weight: And, 'tis probable, if any one knew all the Properties that are by divers Men known of this Metal, there would an hundred times as many *Ideas* go to the complex *Idea* of *Gold*, as any one Man yet has in his; and yet perhaps that not be the thouſandth part of what is to be diſcover'd in it. The Changes which that one Body is apt to receive, and make in other Bodies, upon a due Application, exceeding far not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear ſo much a Paradox to any one, who will but conſider how far Men are yet from knowing all the Properties of that one, no very compound Figure, a *Triangle*; tho' it be no ſmall number that are already by Mathematicians diſcover'd of it.

Ideas of Subſtances, as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.

§. 11. So that *all our complex* Ideas *of Subſtances are* imperfect and *inadequate*. Which would be ſo alſo in Mathematical Figures, if we were to have our complex *Ideas* of them, only by collecting their Properties in reference to other Figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our *Ideas* be of an *Ellipſis*, if we had no other *Idea* of it, but ſome few of its Properties? Whereas having in our plain *Idea* the whole Eſſence of that Figure, we from thence diſcover thoſe Properties, and demonſtratively ſee how they flow, and are inſeparable from it.

Simple Ideas *ἐκτυπα, and adequate.*

§. 12. Thus the Mind has three ſorts of abſtract *Ideas* or nominal Eſſences:

Firſt, Simple Ideas, which are *ἐκτυπα*, or *Copies*; but yet certainly *adequate*. Becauſe being intended to expreſs nothing but the Power in things to produce in the Mind ſuch a Senſation, that Senſation, when it is produc'd, cannot but be

be the Effect of that Power. So the Paper I write on, having the Power, in the Light (I ſpeak according to the common Motion of Light) to produce in me the Senſation which I call White, it cannot but be the Effect of ſuch a Power, in ſomething without the Mind; ſince the Mind has not the Power to produce any ſuch *Idea* in it ſelf, and being meant for nothing elſe but the Effect of ſuch a Power, that ſimple *Idea* is real and *adequate*: the Senſation of White, in my mind, being the Effect of that Power; which is in the Paper to produce it, is perfectly *adequate* to that Power; or elſe, that Power would produce a different *Idea*.

Ideas *of Subſtances are* ἐκτυπα, *inadequate.*

§. 13. *Secondly*, The *complex* Ideas *of Subſtances are Ectypes, Copies* too; but not perfect ones, not *adequate*: which is very evident to the Mind, in that it plainly perceives that whatever Collection of ſimple *Ideas* it makes of any Subſtance that exiſts, it cannot be ſure that it exactly anſwers all that are in that Subſtance: ſince not having try'd all the Operations, of all other Subſtances upon it, and found all the Alterations it would receive from, or cauſe in other Subſtances, it cannot have an exact *adequate* Collection of all its active and paſſive Capacities; and ſo *not* have an *adequate* complex *Idea* of the Powers of any Subſtance exiſting, and its Relations, which is that ſort of complex *Idea* of Subſtances we have. And after all, if we could have, and actually had, in our complex *Idea*, an exact Collection of all the ſecondary Qualities or Powers of any Subſtance, we ſhould not yet thereby have an *Idea* of the Eſſence of that thing. For ſince the Powers or Qualities that are obſervable by us, are not the real Eſſence of that Subſtance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any Collection whatſoever of theſe Qualities, cannot be the real Eſſence of that thing. Whereby it is plain, that our *Ideas* of Subſtances are not *adequate*; are not what the Mind intends them to be. Beſides, a Man has no *Idea* of Subſtance in general, nor knows what Subſtance is in it ſelf.

Ideas *of Modes and Relations, are Archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.*

§. 14. *Thirdly*, *Complex* Ideas *of Modes and Relations, are* Originals, and Archetypes; are not Copies, nor made after the Pattern of any real Exiſtence, to which the Mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to anſwer. Theſe being ſuch Collections of ſimple *Ideas*, that the Mind it ſelf puts together, and ſuch Collections, that each of them contains in it preciſely all that the Mind intends it ſhould, they are Archetypes and Eſſences of Modes that may exiſt; and ſo are deſign'd only for, and belong only to ſuch Modes, as when they do exiſt, have an exact Conformity with thoſe complex *Ideas*. The *Ideas* therefore of Modes and Relations cannot but be *adequate*.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of True and False Ideas.

Truth and Falſhood properly belong to Propoſitions.

§. 1. THO Truth and Falſhood belong, in Propriety of Speech, only to Propoſitions; yet *Ideas* are oftentimes term'd *true* or *falſe* (as what Words are there, that are not uſed with great Latitude, and with ſome Deviation from their ſtrict and proper Significations?) Tho', I think, that when *Ideas* themſelves are term'd true or falſe, there is ſtill ſome ſecret or tacit Propoſition, which is the Foundation of that Denomination: as we ſhall ſee, if we examine the particular Occaſions wherein they come to be call'd true or falſe. In all which, we ſhall find ſome kind of Affirmation or Negation, which is the reaſon of that Denomination. For our *Ideas* being nothing but bare Appearances or Perceptions in our Minds, cannot properly and ſimply in themſelves be ſaid to be *true* or *falſe*, no more than a ſingle Name of any thing can be ſaid to be *true* or *falſe*.

Metaphyſical Truth contains a tacit Propoſition.

§. 2. Indeed both *Ideas* and Words *may* be ſaid to be *true in a metaphyſical ſenſe* of the word Truth, as all other things, that any way exiſt, are ſaid to be true; *i. e.* really to be ſuch as they exiſt. Tho' in things call'd *true*, even in that ſenſe, there is perhaps a ſecret Reference to our *Ideas*, look'd upon as the Standards of that Truth, which amounts to a mental Propoſition, tho' it be uſually not taken notice of.

No Idea, *as an Appearance in the Mind, true or false.*

§. 3. But 'tis not in that metaphysical Sense of Truth which we enquire here, when we examine whether our *Ideas* are capable of being *true* or *false*; but in the more ordinary Acceptation of those words: And so I say, that the *Ideas* in our Minds being only so many Perception, or Appearances there, none of them are *false*; the *Idea* of a Centaur having no more Falshood in it, when it appears in our Minds, than the name Centaur has Falshood in it, when it is pronounc'd by our Mouths or written on Paper. For Truth or Falshood lying always in some Affirmation, or Negation, mental or verbal, our *Ideas* are *not capable*, any of them, *of being false*, till the Mind passes some Judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of them.

Ideas *refer'd to any thing, may be true or false.*

§. 4. Whenever the Mind refers any of its *Ideas* to any thing extraneous to them, they are then *capable to be call'd true or false.* Because the Mind in such a Reference makes a tacit Supposition of their Conformity to that thing: which Supposition, as it happens to be *true* or *false*, so the *Ideas* themselves come to be denominated. The most usual Cases wherein this happens, are these following:

Other Mens Ideas, *real Existence, and supposed real Essences, are what Men usually refer their* Ideas *to.*

§. 5. *First*, When the Mind supposes any *Idea* it has, *conformable to* that in *other Mens* Minds, call'd by the same common Name; *v. g.* when the Mind intends or judges its *Ideas* of *Justice*, *Temperance*, *Religion*, to be the same with what other Men give those Names to.

Secondly, When the Mind supposes any *Idea* it has in it self, to be *conformable to some real Existence.* Thus the two *Ideas*, of a Man and a Centaur, suppos'd to be the *Ideas* of real Substances, are the one *true*, and the other *false*; the one having a Conformity to what has really existed, the other not.

Thirdly, When the Mind *refers* any of its *Ideas* to that *real* Constitution and *Essence* of any thing, whereon all its properties depend: and thus the greatest part, if not all our *Ideas* of Substances, are *false*.

The Cause of such References.

§. 6. These Suppositions the Mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own *Ideas*. But yet, if we will examine it, we shall find it is chiefly, if not only, concerning its abstract complex *Ideas*. For the natural Tendency of the Mind being towards Knowledg; and finding that, if it should proceed by and dwell upon only particular things, its Progress would be very slow, and its Work endless: Therefore to shorten its way to Knowledg, and make each Perception more comprehensive; the first thing it does, as the Foundation of the easier enlarging its Knowledg, either by Contemplation of the things themselves that it would know, or Conference with others about them, is to bind them into Bundles, and rank them so into Sorts, that what Knowledg it gets of any of them, it may thereby with Assurance extend to all of that sort; and so advance by larger Steps in that, which is its great business, Knowledg. This, as I have elsewhere shew'd, is the reason why we collect things under comprehensive *Ideas*, with Names annex'd to them, into *Genera* and *Species*, *i. e.* into Kinds and Sorts.

§. 7. If therefore we will warily attend to the Motions of the Mind, and observe what Course it usually takes in its way to Knowledg; we shall, I think, find that the Mind having got any *Idea*, which it thinks may have use of, either in Contemplation or Discourse, the first thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a name to it; and so lay it up in its Store-house, the Memory, as containing the Essence of a sort of things, of which that Name is always to be the Mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe, that when any one sees a new thing of a kind that he knows not, he presently asks what it is, meaning by that Enquiry nothing but the Name. As if the Name carry'd with it the Knowledg of the Species, or the Essence of it: whereof it is indeed used as the Mark, and is generally suppos'd annex'd to it.

Cause of such References.

§. 8. But this abstract *Idea* being something in the Mind between the Thing that exists, and the Name that is given to it; it is in our *Ideas*, that both the Rightness of our Knowledg, and the Propriety or Intelligibleness of our Speaking, consists. And hence it is, that Men are so forward to suppose, that the abstract *Ideas* they have in their Minds, are such as agree to the things existing without them, to which they are refer'd; and are the same also, to which the Names they give them do by the Use and Propriety of that Language belong. For without this *double Conformity* of their *Ideas*, they find they should both

both think amiſs of things in themſelves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

Simple Ideas *may be falſe, in reference to others of the ſame Name, but are leaſt liable to be ſo.*

§. 9. *Firſt* then, I ſay, That *when the Truth of our* Ideas *is judg'd of, by the Conformity they have to the* Ideas *which other Men have, and commonly ſignify by the ſame Name, they may be any of them falſe.* But yet *ſimple Ideas are leaſt of all liable to be ſo miſtaken*; becauſe a Man by his Senſes, and every Day's Obſervation, may eaſily ſatisfy himſelf what the ſimple *Ideas* are, which their ſeveral Names that are in common uſe ſtand for; they being but few in number, and ſuch as if he doubts or miſtakes in, he may eaſily rectify by the Objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is ſeldom, that any one miſtakes in his Names of ſimple *Ideas*; or applies the Name *Red*, to the *Idea Green*; or the Name *Sweet*, to the *Idea Bitter*: much leſs are Men apt to confound the Names of *Ideas*, belonging to different Senſes; and call a Colour by the name of a Taſte, *&c.* whereby it is evident, that the ſimple *Ideas* they call by any Name, are commonly the ſame that others have and mean when they uſe the ſame Names.

Ideas of mix'd Modes moſt liable to be falſe in this Senſe.

§. 10. *Complex* Ideas *are much more liable to be falſe in this reſpect; and the complex* Ideas *of mix'd Modes, much more than thoſe of Subſtances:* Becauſe in Subſtances (eſpecially thoſe which the common and unborrow'd Names of any Language are apply'd to) ſome remarkable ſenſible Qualities, ſerving ordinarily to diſtinguiſh one ſort from another, eaſily preſerve thoſe, who take any care in the Uſe of their words, from applying them to ſorts of Subſtances, to which they do not at all belong. But in mix'd Modes we are much more uncertain; it being not ſo eaſy to determine of ſeveral Actions, whether they are to be call'd *Juſtice* or *Cruelty*, *Liberality* or *Prodigality*. And ſo in referring our *Ideas* to thoſe of other Men, call'd by the ſame Names, ours may be *falſe*; and the *Idea* in our Minds, which we expreſs by the word *Juſtice*, may perhaps be that which ought to have another Name.

Or at leaſt to be thought falſe.

§. 11. But whether or no, our *Ideas* of mix'd Modes are more liable than any ſort to be different from thoſe of other Men, which are mark'd by the ſame Names; this at leaſt is certain, That *this ſort of Falſhood is much more familiarly attributed to our* Ideas *of mix'd Modes, than to any other.* When a Man is thought to have a falſe *Idea* of *Juſtice*, or *Gratitude*, or *Glory*, it is for no other reaſon, but that his agrees not with the *Ideas* which each of thoſe Names are the Signs of in other Men.

And why.

§. 12. The *Reaſon* whereof ſeems to me to be this, That the abſtract *Ideas* of mix'd Modes, being Mens voluntary Combinations of ſuch a preciſe Collection of ſimple *Ideas*; and ſo the Eſſence of each Species being made by Men alone, whereof we have no other ſenſible Standard exiſting any where, but the Name it ſelf, or the Definition of that Name: we have nothing elſe to refer theſe our *Ideas* of mix'd Modes to, as a Standard to which we would conform them, but the *Ideas* of thoſe who are thought to uſe thoſe Names in their moſt proper Significations; and ſo as our *Ideas* conform or differ from them, they paſs for true or falſe. And thus much concerning the *Truth* and *Falſhood* of our *Ideas*, in reference to their Names.

As refer'd to real Exiſtences none of our Ideas *can be falſe, but thoſe of Subſtances.*

§. 13. *Secondly*, As to the *Truth* and *Falſhood* of our *Ideas*, in reference to the *real Exiſtence* of things, when that is made the Standard of their Truth, none of them can be term'd falſe, but only our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances.

Firſt, Simple Ideas *in this ſenſe not falſe, and why.*

§. 14. *Firſt*, Our ſimple *Ideas* being barely ſuch Perceptions as God has fitted us to receive, and given Power to external Objects to produce in us by eſtabliſh'd Laws and Ways, ſuitable to his Wiſdom and Goodneſs, tho' incomprehenſible to us, their Truth conſiſts in nothing elſe but in ſuch Appearances as are produc'd in us, and muſt be ſuitable to thoſe Powers he has plac'd in external Objects, or elſe they could not be produc'd in us: And thus anſwering thoſe Powers, they are what they ſhould be, *true Ideas*. Nor do they become liable to any Imputation of *Falſhood*, if the Mind (as in moſt Men I believe it does) judges theſe *Ideas* to be in the things themſelves. For God, in his Wiſdom, having ſet them as Marks of Diſtinction in things, whereby we may be able to diſcern one thing from another, and ſo chuſe any of them for our Uſes, as we have occaſion; it alters not the nature of our ſimple *Idea*, whether we think that the *Idea* of Blue be in the Violet it ſelf, or in our Mind only; and only the Power of producing it by the Texture of its Parts, reflecting the Particles of Light,

Light, after a certain manner, to be in the Violet it ſelf. For that Texture in the Object, by a regular and conſtant Operation, producing the ſame *Idea* of Blue in us, it ſerves us to diſtinguiſh, by our Eyes, that from any other thing, whether that diſtinguiſhing Mark, as it is really in the *Violet*, be only a peculiar Texture of Parts, or elſe that very Colour, the *Idea* whereof (which is in us) is the exact Reſemblance. And it is equally from that Appearance to be denominated *Blue*, whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that cauſes in us that *Idea*: ſince the name *Blue* notes properly nothing, but that Mark of Diſtinction that is in a *Violet*, diſcernible only by our Eyes, whatever it conſiſts in, that being beyond our Capacities diſtinctly to know, and perhaps would be of leſs uſe to us, if we had Faculties to diſcern.

Tho' one Man's Idea *of Blue ſhould be different from another's.*

§. 15. Neither would it carry any Imputation of *Falſhood* to our ſimple *Ideas*, if by the different Structure of our Organs it were ſo order'd, that *the ſame Object ſhould produce in ſeveral Mens Minds different Ideas* at the ſame time; *v. g.* if the *Idea* that a *Violet* produc'd in one Mans Mind by his Eyes were the ſame that a *Marigold* produc'd in another Man's, and *vice verſa*. For ſince this could never be known, becauſe one Man's Mind could not paſs into another's Man's Body, to perceive what Appearances were produc'd by thoſe Organs; neither the *Ideas* hereby, nor the Names would be at all confounded, or any *Falſhood* be in either. For all things that had the Texture of a *Violet*, producing conſtantly the *Idea* which he call'd *Blue*; and thoſe which had the Texture of a *Marigold*, producing conſtantly the *Idea* which he has conſtantly call'd *Yellow*; whatever thoſe Appearances were in his Mind, he would be able as regularly to diſtinguiſh things for his Uſe by thoſe Appearances, and underſtand and ſignify thoſe Diſtinctions mark'd by the Names *Blue* and *Yellow*, as if the Appearances, or *Ideas* in his Mind, receiv'd from thoſe two Flowers, were exactly the ſame with the *Ideas* in other Mens Minds. I am nevertheleſs very apt to think, that the ſenſible *Ideas* produc'd by any Object in different mens Minds, are moſt commonly very near and undiſcernibly alike. For which Opinion, I think, there might be many Reaſons offer'd: But that being beſides my preſent Buſineſs, I ſhall not trouble my Reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary Suppoſition, if it could be prov'd, is of little uſe, either for the Improvement of our Knowledg, or Conveniency of Life; and ſo we need not trouble our ſelves to examine it.

Firſt, Simple Ideas *in this Senſe not falſe, and why.*

§. 16. From what has been ſaid concerning our ſimple *Ideas*, I think it evident, That our *ſimple* Ideas can *none of them* be *falſe in reſpect of things* exiſting without us. For the Truth of theſe Appearances, or Perceptions in our Minds, conſiſting, as has been ſaid, only in their being anſwerable to the Powers in external Objects, to produce by our Senſes ſuch Appearances in us; and each of them being in the Mind, ſuch as it is, ſuitable to the Power that produc'd it, and which alone it repreſents; it cannot upon that account, or as refer'd to ſuch a Pattern, be *falſe*. *Blue* or *Yellow*, *Bitter* or *Sweet*, can never be falſe *Ideas*; theſe Perceptions in the Mind are juſt ſuch as they are there, anſwering the Powers appointed by God to produce them; and ſo are truely what they are and are intended to be. Indeed the Names may be miſapply'd; but that in this reſpect makes no Falſhood in the *Ideas*: as if a Man ignorant in the *Engliſh* Tongue ſhould call *Purple Scarlet*,

Secondly, Modes not falſe.

§. 17. *Secondly, Neither can* our *complex* Ideas *of Modes, in reference to the Eſſence of any thing really exiſting, be falſe.* Becauſe whatever complex *Idea* I have of any Mode, it hath no reference to any Pattern exiſting, and made by Nature: It is not ſuppos'd to contain in it any other *Ideas* than what it hath; nor to repreſent any thing but ſuch a Complication of *Ideas* as it does. Thus when I have the *Idea* of ſuch an Action of a Man, who forbears to afford himſelf ſuch Meat; Drink, and Clothing, and other Conveniences of Life as his Riches and Eſtate will be ſufficient to ſupply, and his Station requires, I have no *falſe Idea*; but ſuch an one as repreſents an Action, either as I find or imagine it; and ſo is capable of neither *Truth* or *Falſhood*. But when I give the Name *Frugality*, or *Vertue* to this Action, then it may be call'd a *falſe Idea*, if thereby it be ſuppos'd to agree with that *Idea*, to which, in Propriety of Speech, the Name of *Frugality* doth belong; or to be conformable to that Law, which is the Standard of Vertue and Vice.

§. 18.

§. 18. *Thirdly*, Our *complex* Ideas *of Substances, being all refer'd to Patterns in things themselves, may be false.* That they are all *false*, when look'd upon as the Representations of the unknown Essences of things, is so evident, that there needs nothing to be said of it. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical Supposition, and consider them as Collections of simple *Ideas* in the Mind, taken from Combinations of simple *Ideas* existing together constantly in things, of which Patterns they are the suppos'd Copies: And in this Reference of them, to the Existence of things, they *are false* Ideas. 1. *When* they put together simple *Ideas*, which in the real Existence of things have no Union; as when to the Shape and Size that exist together in a Horse, is join'd, in the same complex *Idea*, the Power of barking like a Dog: which three *Ideas*, however put together into one in the Mind, were never united in Nature; and this therefore may be call'd a *false Idea* of an Horse. 2. *Ideas* of Substances are, in this respect, also *false*, when from any Collection of simple *Ideas* that do always exist together, there is separated, by a direct Negation, any other simple *Idea* which is constantly join'd with them. Thus, if to Extension, Solidity, Fusibility, the peculiar Weightiness, and yellow Colour of Gold, any one join in his Thoughts the Negation of a greater Degree of Fixedness than is in Lead or Copper, he may be said to have a false complex *Idea* as well as when he joins to those other simple ones the *Idea* of perfect absolute Fixedness. For either way, the complex *Idea* of Gold being made up of such simple ones as have no Union in Nature, may be term'd false. But if he leave out of this his complex *Idea*, that of Fixedness quite, without either actually joining to, or separating of it from the rest in his Mind, it is, I think, to be look'd on as an inadequate and imperfect *Idea* rather than a false one; since tho' it contains not all the simple *Ideas* that are united in Nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exist together.

Thirdly, Ideas *of Substances when false.*

§. 19. Tho' in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking I have shew'd in what sense, and upon what ground our *Ideas* may be sometimes call'd *true* or *false*; yet if we will look a little nearer into the Matter, in all cases where any *Idea* is call'd *true* or *false*, it is from some Judgment that the Mind makes, or is suppos'd to make, that is *true* or *false*. For *Truth* or *Falsehood*, being *never without some Affirmation or Negation*, express or tacit, it is not to be found but where Signs are join'd or separated, according to the Agreement or Disagreement of the things they stand for. The Signs we chiefly use are either *Ideas* or Words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal Propositions. *Truth* lies in so joining or separating these Representatives, as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or disagree; and *Falsehood* in the contrary, as shall be more fully shew'd hereafter.

Truth or Falsehood always supposes Affirmation or Negation.

§. 20. Any *Idea* then which we have in our Minds, whether conformable or not to the Existence of things, or to any *Ideas* in the Minds of other Men, cannot properly for this alone be call'd *false*. For these Representations, if they have nothing in them but what is really existing in things without, cannot be thought *false*, being exact Representations of something: Nor yet if they have any thing in them differing from the Reality of things, can they properly be said to be false Representations, or *Ideas* of things they do not represent. But the Mistake and *Falsehood* is,

Ideas in themselves neither true nor false.

§. 21. *First, When the Mind* having any *Idea*, it *judges* and concludes *it the same that is in other mens Minds, signify'd by the same Name*; or that it is conformable to the ordinary receiv'd Signification or Definition of that Word, when indeed it is not: which is the most usual Mistake in mix'd Modes, tho' other *Ideas* also are liable to it.

But are false, 1. *When judg'd agreeable to another Man's Idea, without being so.*

§. 22. *Secondly*, When it having a complex *Idea* made up of such a Collection of simple ones, as Nature never puts together, *it judges it to agree to a Species of Creatures really existing*; as when it joins the Weight of Tin, to the Colour, Fusibility, and Fixedness of Gold.

2. *When judg'd to agree to real Existence, when they do not.*

§. 23. *Thirdly*, When in its complex *Idea* it has united a certain Number of simple *Ideas* that do really exist together in some sort of Creatures, but has also left out others as much inseparable, *it judges this to be a perfect compleat* Idea *of a sort of things which really it is not*; *v. g.* having join'd the *Ideas* of Substance, yellow, malleable, most heavy, and fusible, it takes that complex *Idea* to be the

3. *When judg'd adequate, without being so.*

the compleat *Idea* of Gold, when yet its peculiar Fixedneſs and Solubility in *Aqua Regia* are as inſeparable from thoſe other *Ideas* or Qualities of that Body, as they are one from another.

4. When judg'd to repreſent the real Eſſence.

§. 24. *Fourthly*, The Miſtake is yet greater, *when I judg, that this complex* Idea, *contains in it the real Eſſence of any Body exiſting*; when at leaſt it contains but ſome few of thoſe Properties which flow from its real Eſſence and Conſtitution. I ſay, only ſome few of thoſe Properties; for thoſe Properties conſiſting moſtly in the active and paſſive Powers it has, in reference to other things, all that are vulgarly known of any one Body, and of which the complex *Idea* of that kind of things is uſually made, are but a very few, in compariſon of what a Man, that has ſeveral ways try'd and examin'd it, knows of that one ſort of things; and all that the moſt expert Man knows, are but few, in compariſon of what are really in that Body, and depend on its internal or eſſential Conſtitution. The Eſſence of a Triangle lies in a very little Compaſs, conſiſts in a very few *Ideas*; three Lines including a Space make up that Eſſence: But the Properties that flow from this Eſſence, are more than can be eaſily known or enumerated. So I imagine it is in Subſtances, their real Eſſences lie in a little Compaſs; tho' the Properties flowing from that internal Conſtitution are endleſs.

Ideas when falſe.

§. 25. To conclude, a Man having no Notion of any thing without him, but by the *Idea* he has of it in his Mind (which *Idea* he has a Power to call by what Name he pleaſes) he may indeed make an *Idea* neither anſwering the Reality of things, nor agreeing to the *Ideas* commonly ſignify'd by other Peoples words; but cannot make a wrong or *falſe Idea* of a thing, which is no otherwiſe known to him but by the *Idea* he has of it: *v. g.* When I frame an *Idea* of the Legs, Arms, and Body of a Man, and join to this a Horſe's Head and Neck, I do not make a *falſe Idea* of any thing; becauſe it repreſents nothing without me. But when I call it a *Man* or *Tartar*, and imagine it either to repreſent ſome real Being without me, or to be the ſame *Idea* that others call by the ſame Name; in either of theſe caſes I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be term'd a *falſe Idea*; tho' indeed the *Falſhood* lies not in the *Idea*. but in that tacit mental Propoſition, wherein a Conformity and Reſemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having fram'd ſuch an *Idea* in my Mind, without thinking either that Exiſtence, or the Name *Man* or *Tartar*, belongs to it, I will call it *Man* or *Tartar*, I may be juſtly thought fantaſtical in the naming, but not erroneous in my Judgment; nor the *Idea* any way *falſe*.

More properly to be call'd Right or Wrong.

§. 26. Upon the whole matter, I think, That our *Ideas*, as they are conſider'd by the Mind, either in reference to the proper Signification of their Names, or in reference to the Reality of things, *may* very fitly *be call'd right or wrong* Ideas, according as they agree or diſagree to thoſe Patterns to which they are refer'd. But if any one had rather call them *true* or *falſe*, 'tis fit he uſe a Liberty, which every one has, to call things by thoſe Names he thinks beſt; tho' in Propriety of Speech, *Truth* or *Falſhood*, will, I think, ſcarce agree to them, but as they, ſome way or other, virtually contain in them ſome mental Propoſition. The *Ideas* that are in a Man's Mind, ſimply conſider'd, cannot be wrong, unleſs complex ones, wherein inconſiſtent Parts are jumbled together, All other *Ideas* are in themſelves right, and the Knowledg about them right and true Knowledg: But when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their Patterns and Archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they diſagree with ſuch Archetypes.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Aſſociation of Ideas.

Something unreaſonable in moſt Men.

§. 1. THERE is ſcarce any one that does not obſerve ſomething that ſeems odd to him, and is in it ſelf really extravagant in the Opinions, Reaſonings, and Actions of other Men. The leaſt Flaw of this kind, if at all different

different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to espy in another, and will by the Authority of Reason forwardly condemn, tho' he be guilty of much greater Unreasonableness in his own Tenets and Conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinc'd of.

Not wholly from Self-love.

§. 2. This proceeds not wholly from Self-love, tho' that has often a great hand in it. Men of fair Minds, and not given up to the over-weening of Self-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in many Cases one with Amazement hears the Arguings, and is astonish'd at the Obstinacy of a worthy Man, who yields not to the Evidence of Reason, tho' laid before him as clear as Day-light.

Nor from Education.

§. 3. This sort of Unreasonableness is usually imputed to Education and Prejudice, and for the most part truly enough, tho' that reaches not the bottom of the Disease, nor shews distinctly enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assign'd for the Cause, and Prejudice is a good general Name for the thing it self: But yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther, who would trace this sort of Madness to the Root it springs from, and so explain it, as to shew whence this Flaw has its Original in very sober and rational Minds, and wherein it consists.

A degree of Madness.

§. 4. I shall be pardon'd for calling it by so harsh a Name as *Madness*, when it is consider'd, that Opposition to Reason deserves that Name, and is really Madness; and there is scarce a Man so free from it, but that if he should always, on all occasions, argue or do as in some cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for *Bedlam* than civil Conversation. I do not here mean when he is under the Power of an unruly Passion, but in the steddy calm Course of his Life. That which will yet more apologize for this harsh Name and ungrateful Imputation on the greatest part of Mankind, is, that enquiring a little by the by into the Nature of Madness, B. II. C. 11. §. 13. I found it to spring from the very same Root, and to depend on the very same Cause we are here speaking of. This Consideration of the thing it self, at a time when I thought not the least on the Subject which I am now treating of, suggested it to me. And if this be a Weakness to which all Men are so liable; if this be a Taint which so universally infects Mankind, the greater Care should be taken to lay it open under its due Name, thereby to excite the greater Care in its Prevention and Cure.

From a wrong Connection of Ideas.

§. 5. Some of our *Ideas* have a natural Correspondence and Connection one with another: It is the Office and Excellency of our Reason to trace these and hold them together in that Union and Correspondence which is founded in their peculiar Beings. Besides this, there is another Connection of *Ideas* wholly owing to Chance or Custom: *Ideas* that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some Mens Minds, that 'tis very hard to separate them, they always keep in Company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the Understanding, but its Associate appears with it; and if they are more than two, which are thus united, the whole Gang, always inseparable, shew themselves together.

This Connection how made.

§. 6. This strong Combination of *Ideas*, not ally'd by Nature, the Mind makes in it self either voluntarily or by chance; and hence it comes in different Men to be very different, according to their different Inclinations, Education, Interests, &c. Custom settles Habits of Thinking in the Understanding, as well as of Determining in the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which seems to be but Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a going, continue in the same Steps they have been us'd to; which, by often treading, are worn into a smooth Path, and the Motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend Thinking, thus *Ideas* seem to be produc'd in our Minds; or if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual Train, when once they are put into that Track, as well as it does to explain such Motions of the Body. A Musician us'd to any Tune, will find, that let it but once begin in his Head, the *Ideas* of the several Notes of it will follow one another orderly in his Understanding, without any Care or Attention, as regularly as his Fingers move orderly over the Keys of the Organ to play out the Tune he has begun, tho' his unattentive Thoughts be elsewhere a wandring. Whether the natural Cause of these *Ideas*, as well as of that regular Dancing of his Fingers, be the Motion of his animal Spirits, I will

will not determine, how probable ſoever, by this Inſtance, it appears to be ſo: But this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual Habits, and of the tying together of *Ideas*.

Some Antipathies an Effect of it.

§. 7. That there are ſuch Aſſociations of them made by Cuſtom in the Minds of moſt Men, I think no body will queſtion, who has well conſider'd himſelf or others; and to this, perhaps, might be juſtly attributed moſt of the Sympathies and Antipathies obſervable in Men, which work as ſtrongly, and produce as regular Effects as if they were natural, and are therefore call'd ſo, tho' they at firſt had no other Original but the accidental Connection of two *Ideas*, which either the Strength of the firſt Impreſſion, or future Indulgence ſo united, that they always afterwards kept company together in that Man's Mind, as if they were but one *Idea*. I ſay moſt of the Antipathies, I do not ſay all, for ſome of them are truly natural, depend upon our original Conſtitution, and are born with us; but a great Part of thoſe which are counted natural, would have been know to be from unheeded, tho', perhaps, early Impreſſions, or wanton Fancies at firſt, which would have been acknowledg'd the Original of them, if they had been warily obſerv'd. A grown Perſon ſurfeiting with Honey, no ſooner hears the Name of it, but his Fancy immediately carries Sickneſs and Qualms to his Stomach, and he cannot bear the very *Idea* of it; other *Ideas* of Diſlike, and Sickneſs, and Vomiting, preſently accompany it, and he is diſturb'd, but he knows from whence to date this Weakneſs, and can tell how he got this Indiſpoſition. Had this happen'd to him by an Over-Doſe of Honey, when a Child, all the ſame Effects would have follow'd, but the Cauſe would have been miſtaken, and the Antipathy counted natural.

§ 8. I mention this not out of any great neceſſity there is in this preſent Argument, to diſtinguiſh nicely between natural and acquir'd Antipathies; but I take notice of it for another purpoſe, (*viz.*) That thoſe who have Children, or the Charge of their Education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue Connection of *Ideas* in the Minds of young People. This is the Time moſt ſuſceptible of laſting Impreſſions; and tho' thoſe relating to the Health of the Body, are by diſcreet People minded and fenc'd againſt, yet I am apt to doubt, that thoſe which relate more peculiarly to the Mind, and terminate in the Underſtanding or Paſſions, have been much leſs heeded than the thing deſerves: nay, thoſe relating purely to the Underſtanding, have, as I ſuſpect, been by moſt Men wholly overlook'd.

A great Cauſe of Errors.

§. 9. This wrong Connection in our Minds of *Ideas* in themſelves, looſe and independent one of another, has ſuch an Influence, and is of ſo great Force to ſet us awry in our Actions, as well Moral as Natural, Paſſions, Reaſonings and Notions themſelves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deſerves more to be look'd after.

Inſtances.

§. 10. The *Ideas* of *Goblins* and *Sprights*, have really no more to do with Darkneſs, than Light; yet let but a fooliſh Maid inculcate theſe often on the Mind of a Child, and raiſe them there together, poſſibly he ſhall never be able to ſeparate them again ſo long as he lives: but Darkneſs ſhall ever afterwards bring with it thoſe frightful *Ideas*, and they ſhall be ſo join'd, that he can no more bear the one than the other.

§. 11. A Man receives a ſenſible Injury from another, thinks on the Man and that Action over and over; and by ruminating on them ſtrongly, or much in his Mind, ſo cements thoſe two *Ideas* together, that he makes them almoſt one; never thinks on the Man, but the Pain and Diſpleaſure he ſuffer'd comes into his Mind with it, ſo that he ſcarce diſtinguiſhes them, but has as much an Averſion for the one as the other. Thus Hatreds are often begotten from ſlight and almoſt innocent Occaſions, and Quarrels propagated and continu'd in the World.

§. 12. A Man has ſuffer'd Pain or Sickneſs in any place, he ſaw his Friend die in ſuch a Room; tho' theſe have in nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the *Idea* of the Place occurs to his Mind, it brings (the Impreſſion being once made) that of the Pain and Diſpleaſure with it; he confounds them in his Mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

§. 13. When this Combination is ſettled, and whilſt it laſts, it is not in the Power of Reaſon to help us, and relieve us from the Effects of it. *Ideas* in our Minds,

Minds, when they are there, will operate according to their Natures and Circumſtances; and here we ſee the Cauſe why Time cures certain Affections, which Reaſon, tho' in the right, and allow'd to be ſo, has not Power over, nor is able againſt them to prevail with thoſe who are apt to hearken to it in other Caſes. The Death of a Child, that was the daily Delight of his Mother's Eyes, and Joy of her Soul, rends from her Heart the whole Comfort of her Life, and gives her all the Torment imaginable: Uſe the Conſolations of Reaſon in in this Caſe, and you were as good preach Eaſe to one on the Rack, and hope to allay, by rational Diſcourſes, the Pain of his Joints tearing aſunder. Till Time has by Diſuſe ſeparated the Senſe of that Enjoyment, and its Loſs from the *Idea* of the Child returning to her Memory, all Repreſentations, tho' ever ſo reaſonable, are in vain; and therefore ſome in whom the Union between theſe *Ideas* is never diſſolv'd, ſpend their Lives in Mourning, and carry an incurable Sorrow to their Graves.

Why Time cures ſome Diſorders in the Mind, which Reaſon cannot.

§. 14. A Friend of mine knew one perfectly cur'd of Madneſs by a very harſh and offenſive Operation. The Gentleman, who was thus recover'd, with great Senſe of Gratitude and Acknowledgment, own'd the Cure all his Life after, as the greateſt Obligation he could have receiv'd; but whatever Gratitude and Reaſon ſuggeſted to him, he could never bear the Sight of the Operator: That Image brought back with it the *Idea* of that Agony which he ſuffer'd from his Hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.

Farther Inſtances of the Effect of the Aſſociation of Ideas.

§. 15. Many Children imputing the Pain they endur'd at School to their Books they were corrected for, ſo join thoſe *Ideas* together, that a Book becomes their Averſion, and they are never reconcil'd to the Study and Uſe of them all their Lives after; and thus Reading become a Torment to them, which otherwiſe poſſibly they might have made the great Pleaſure of their Lives. There are Rooms convenient enough, that ſome Men cannot ſtudy in, and Faſhions of Veſſels, which tho' ever ſo clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of, and that by reaſon of ſome accidental *Ideas* which are annex'd to them, and make them offenſive: and who is there that hath not obſerv'd ſome Man to flag at the Appearance, or in the Company of ſome certain Perſon not otherwiſe ſuperior to him, but becauſe having once on ſome occaſion got the Aſcendant, the *Idea* of Authority and Diſtance goes along with that of the Perſon, and he that has been thus ſubjected, is not able to ſeparate them?

§. 16. Inſtances of this kind are ſo plentiful every where, that if I add one more, it is only for the pleaſant Oddneſs of it. It is of a young Gentleman, who having learnt to dance, and that to great Perfection, there happen'd to ſtand an old Trunk in the Room where he learnt. The *Idea* of this remarkable piece of Houſhold-Stuff, had ſo mix'd it ſelf with the Turns and Steps of all his Dances, that tho' in that Chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was only whilſt that Trunk was there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unleſs that or ſome ſuch other Trunk had its due Poſition in the Room. If this Story ſhall be ſuſpected to be dreſs'd up with ſome comical Circumſtances a little beyond preciſe Nature; I anſwer for my ſelf, that I had it ſome Years ſince from a very ſober and worthy Man, upon his own knowledg, as I report it: and I dare ſay, there are very few inquiſitive Perſons, who read this, who have not met with Accounts, if not Examples of this nature, that may parallel, or at leaſt juſtify this.

§. 17. Intellectual Habits and Defects this way contracted, are not leſs frequent and powerful, tho' leſs obſerv'd. Let the *Ideas* of Being and Matter be ſtrongly join'd either by Education or much Thought, whilſt theſe are ſtill combin'd in the Mind, what Notions, what Reaſonings will there be about ſeparate Spirits? Let Cuſtom from the very Childhood have join'd Figure and Shape to the *Idea* of God, and what Abſurdities will that Mind be liable to about the Deity?

Its Influence on intellectual Habits.

Let the *Idea* of Infallibility be inſeparably join'd to any Perſon, and theſe two conſtantly together poſſeſs the Mind; and then one Body, in two Places at once, ſhall unexamin'd be ſwallow'd for a certain Truth, by an implicit Faith, whenever that imagin'd infallible Perſon dictates and demands Aſſent without Inquiry.

Obſervable in different Sects.

§. 18. Some ſuch wrong and unnatural Combinations of *Ideas* will be found to eſtabliſh the irreconcilable Oppoſition between different Sects of Philoſophy and Religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their Followers to impoſe wilfully on himſelf, and knowingly refuſe Truth offer'd by plain Reaſon. Intereſt, tho' it does a great deal in the Caſe, yet cannot be thought to work whole Societies of Men to ſo univerſal a Perverſneſs, as that every one of them to a Man ſhould knowingly maintain Falſhood: Some at leaſt muſt be allow'd to do what all pretend to, *i. e.* to purſue Truth ſincerely; and therefore there muſt be ſomething that blinds their Underſtandings, and makes them not ſee the Falſhood of what they embrace for real Truth, That which thus captivates their Reaſons, and leads Men of Sincerity blindfold from common Senſe, will, when examin'd, be found to be what we are ſpeaking of: Some independent *Ideas*, of no Alliance to one another, are by Education, Cuſtom, and the conſtant Din of their Party, ſo coupled in their Minds, that they always appear there together; and they can no more ſeparate them in their Thoughts, than if they were but one *Idea*, and they operate as if they were ſo. This gives Senſe to *Jargon*, Demonſtration to Abſurdities, and Conſiſtency to Nonſenſe, and is the Foundation of the greateſt, I had almoſt ſaid of all the Errors in the World; or if it does not reach ſo far, it is at leaſt the moſt dangerous one, ſince ſo far as it obtains, it hinders Men from ſeeing and examining. When two things in themſelves disjoin'd, appear to the Sight conſtantly united; if the Eye ſees theſe things riveted, which are looſe, where will you begin to rectify the Miſtakes that follow in two *Ideas*, that they have been accuſtom'd ſo to join in their Minds, as to ſubſtitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themſelves? This, whilſt they are under the Deceit of it, makes them uncapable of Conviction, and they applaud themſelves as zealous Champions for Truth, when indeed they are contending for Error; and the Confuſion of two different *Ideas*, which a cuſtomary Connection of them in their Minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their Heads with falſe Views, and their Reaſonings with falſe Conſequences.

Concluſion.

§. 19. Having thus given an Account of the Original, Sorts and Extent of our *Ideas*, with ſeveral other Conſiderations, about theſe (I know not whether I may ſay) Inſtruments or Materials of our Knowledg; the Method I at firſt propos'd to my ſelf, would now require, that I ſhould immediately proceed to ſhew what Uſe the Underſtanding makes of them, and what Knowledg we have by them. This was that which, in the firſt general View I had of this Subject, was all that I thought I ſhould have to do: But upon a nearer Approach, I find that there is ſo cloſe a Connection between *Ideas* and Words; and our abſtract *Ideas*, and general Words have ſo conſtant a Relation one to another, that it is impoſſible to ſpeak clearly and diſtinctly of our Knowledg, which all conſiſts in Propoſitions, without conſidering, firſt, the Nature, Uſe and Signification of Language; which therefore muſt be the Buſineſs of the next Book.

BOOK.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language in General.

§. 1. GOD having design'd Man for a sociable Creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnish'd him also with Language, which was to be the great Instrument and common Tie of Society. *Man* therefore had by Nature his Organs so fashion'd, as to be *fit to frame articulate Sounds*, which we call Words. But this was not enough to produce Language? for Parrots, and several other Birds, will be taught to make articulate Sounds distinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of Language. *Man fitted to form articulate Sounds.*

§. 2. Besides articulate Sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should be *able to use these Sounds as Signs of internal Conceptions*; and to make them stand as Marks for the *Ideas* within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Mens Minds be convey'd from one to another. *To make them Signs of Ideas.*

§. 3. But neither was this sufficient to make Words so useful as they ought to be. It is not enough for the perfection of Language, that Sounds can be made Signs of *Ideas*, unless those *Signs* can be so made use of, as *to comprehend several particular Things*: For the Multiplication of Words would have perplex'd their Use, had every particular thing need of a distinct Name to be signify'd by. To remedy this Inconvenience, Language had yet a farther Improvement in the use of general Terms, whereby one Word was made to mark a multitude of particular Existences: which advantageous use of Sounds was obtain'd only by the Difference of the *Ideas* they were made Signs of; those Names becoming general, which are made to stand for general *Ideas*, and those remaining particular, where the *Ideas* they are us'd for are particular. *To make general Signs.*

§. 4. Besides these Names which stand for *Ideas*, there be other Words which Men make use of, not to signify any *Idea*, but the want or absence of some *Ideas* simple or complex, or all *Ideas* together; such as are *Nihil* in Latin, and in English, *Ignorance* and *Barrenness*. All which negative or privative Words, cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify no *Ideas*: for then they would be perfectly insignificant Sounds; but they relate to positive *Ideas*, and signify their Absence. *To make general Signs.*

§. 5. It may also lead us a little towards the Original of all our Notions and Knowledg, if we remark how great a Dependance our *Words* have on common sensible *Ideas*; and how those, which are made use of to stand for Actions and Notions quite remov'd from Sense, *have their Rise from thence, and from obvious sensible* Ideas *are transfer'd to more abstruse Significations*, and made to stand for *Ideas* that come not under the cognizance of our Senses; *v. g.* to *Imagine*, *Apprehend*, *Comprehend*, *Adhere*, *Conceive*, *Instil*, *Disgust*, *Disturbance*, *Tranquillity*, &c. are all Words taken from the Operations of sensible Things, and apply'd to certain Modes of Thinking. *Spirit*, in its primary signification, is Breath; *Angel*, a Messenger: And I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their Sources, we should find, in all Languages, the Names, which stand for Things that fall not under our Senses, to have had their first rise from sensible *Ideas*. By which *Words ultimately deriv'd from such as signify sensible* Ideas.

which we may give ſome kind of gueſs, what kind of Notions they were, and whence deriv'd, which fill'd their Minds who were the firſt Beginners of Languages; and how Nature, even in the naming of things, unawares ſuggeſted to Men the Originals and Principles of all their Knowledg: whilſt, to give Names that might make known to others any Operations they felt in themſelves, or any other *Ideas* that came not under their Senſes, they were fain to borrow Words from ordinary known *Ideas* of Senſation, by that means to make others the more eaſily to conceive thoſe Operations they experimented in themſelves, which made no outward ſenſible Appearances: and then when they had got known and agreed Names, to ſignify thoſe internal Operations of their own Minds, they were ſufficiently furniſh'd to make known by Words all their other *Ideas*; ſince they could conſiſt of nothing, but either of outward ſenſible Perceptions, or of the inward Operations of their Minds about them: we having, as has been prov'd, no *Ideas* at all, but what originally come either from ſenſible Objects without, or what we feel within our ſelves, from the inward Workings of our own Spirits, of which we are conſcious to our ſelves within.

Diſtribution. §. 6. But to underſtand better the Uſe and Force of Language, as ſubſervient to Inſtruction and Knowledg, it will be convenient to conſider,

Firſt, *To what it is that Names, in the uſe of Language, are immediately apply'd.*

Secondly, Since all (except proper) Names are general, and ſo ſtand not particularly for this or that ſingle thing, but for Sorts and Ranks of things; it will be neceſſary to conſider, in the next place, what the Sorts and Kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin Names, *what the* Species *and* Genera *of Things* are; wherein they conſiſt, and how they come to be made. Theſe being (as they ought) well look'd into, we ſhall the better come to find the right Uſe of Words, the natural Advantages and Defects of Language, and the Remedies that ought to be uſed, to avoid the Inconveniences of Obſcurity or Uncertainty in the ſignification of Words, without which it is impoſſible to diſcourſe with any Clearneſs, or Order, concerning Knowledg: which being converſant about Propoſitions, and thoſe moſt commonly univerſal ones, has greater connection with Words then perhaps is ſuſpected.

Theſe Conſiderations therefore ſhall be the matter of the following Chapters.

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

Words are ſenſible Signs neceſſary for Communication. §. 1. MAN, tho' he has great variety of Thoughts, and ſuch, from which others, as well as himſelf, might receive Profit and Delight; yet they are all within his own Breaſt, inviſible, and hidden from others, nor can of themſelves be made appear. The Comfort and Advantage of Society not being to be had without Communication of Thoughts, it was neceſſary that Man ſhould find out ſome external ſenſible Signs, whereby thoſe inviſible *Ideas*, which his Thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpoſe nothing was ſo fit, either for Plenty or Quickneſs, as thoſe articulate Sounds, which with ſo much Eaſe and Variety he found himſelf able to make. Thus we may conceive how *Words*, which were by nature ſo well adapted to that purpoſe, come to be made uſe of by Men, as the *Signs* of their *Ideas*; not by any natural Connection that there is between particular articulate Sounds and certain *Ideas*, for then there would be but one Language amongſt all Men; but by a voluntary Impoſition, whereby ſuch a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of ſuch an *Idea*. The Uſe then of Words is to be ſenſible Marks of *Ideas*; and the *Ideas* they ſtand for, are their proper and immediate Signification.

Words are the ſenſible Signs of his Ideas *who uſe them.* §. 2. The uſe Men have of theſe Marks, being either to record their own Thoughts for the aſſiſtance of their own Memory, or as it were to bring out their *Ideas*, and lay them before the view of others; *Words in their primary or immediate Signification ſtand for nothing but the* Ideas *in the Mind of him that uſes them*, how imperfectly ſoever or careleſly thoſe *Ideas* are collected from the things

things which they are ſuppos'd to repreſent. When a Man ſpeaks to another, it is that he may be underſtood; and the End of Speech is, that thoſe Sounds, as Marks, may make known his *Ideas* to the Hearer. That then which Words are the Marks of, are the *Ideas* of the Speaker: nor can any one apply them, as Marks, immediately to any thing elſe, but the *Ideas* that he himſelf hath. For this would be to make them Signs of his own Conceptions, and yet apply them to other *Ideas*; which would be to make them Signs, and not Signs of his *Ideas* at the ſame time; and ſo in effect to have no Signification at all. Words being voluntary Signs, they cannot be voluntary Signs impos'd by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them Signs of nothing, Sounds without Signification. A Man cannot make his Words the Signs either of Qualities in things, or of Conceptions in the Mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till he has ſome *Ideas* of his own, he cannot ſuppoſe them to correſpond with the Conceptions of another Man; nor can he uſe any Signs for them: for thus they would be the Signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the Signs of nothing. But when he repreſents to himſelf other Mens *Ideas* by ſome of his own, if he conſent to give them the ſame Names that other Men do, 'tis ſtill to his own *Ideas*; to *Ideas* that he has, and not to *Ideas* that he has not.

§. 3. This is ſo neceſſary in the Uſe of Language, that in this reſpect the Knowing and the Ignorant, the Learned and Unlearned, uſe the *Words* they ſpeak (with any meaning) all alike. They, *in every Man's Mouth, ſtand for the* Ideas *he has*, and which he would expreſs by them. A Child having taken notice of nothing in the Metal he hears call'd Gold, but the bright ſhining yellow Colour, he applies the word Gold only to his own *Idea* of that Colour, and nothing elſe; and therefore calls the ſame Colour in a Peacock's Tail, Gold. Another that hath better obſerv'd, adds to ſhining yellow great Weight: And then the Sound Gold, when he uſes it, ſtands for a complex *Idea* of a ſhining yellow and very weighty Subſtance. Another adds to thoſe Qualities Fuſibility: and then the word Gold to him ſignifies a Body, bright, yellow fuſible, and very heavy. Another adds Malleability: Each of theſe uſes equally the word Gold, when they have occaſion to expreſs the *Idea* which they have apply'd it to: but it is evident, that each can apply it only to his own *Idea*; nor can he make it ſtand as a Sign of ſuch a complex *Idea* as he has not.

Words are the ſenſible Signs of his Ideas who uſes them.

§. 4. But tho' Words, as they are uſed by Men, can properly and immediately ſignify nothing but the *Ideas* that are in the Mind of the Speaker; yet they in their Thoughts give them a ſecret reference to two other things.

Words often ſecretly refer'd, Firſt, to the Ideas *in other Mens Minds.*

Firſt, They ſuppoſe their Words to be Marks of the Ideas *in the Minds alſo of other Men, with whom they communicate:* For elſe they ſhould talk in vain, and could not be underſtood, if the Sounds they apply'd to one *Idea*, were ſuch as by the Hearer were apply'd to another; which is to ſpeak two Languages. But in this, Men ſtand not uſually to examine, whether the *Idea* they and thoſe they diſcourſe with have in their Minds, be the ſame: but think it enough that they uſe the Word, as they imagine, in the common Acceptation of that Language; in which they ſuppoſe, that the *Idea* they make it a ſign of, is preciſely the ſame, to which the underſtanding Men of that Country apply that Name.

§. 5. *Secondly*, Becauſe *Men* would not be thought to talk *barely* of their own Imaginations, but of things as really they are; therefore they *often ſuppoſe their Words to ſtand alſo for the Reality of things.* But this relating more particularly to Subſtances, and their Names, as perhaps the former does to ſimple *Ideas* and Modes, we ſhall ſpeak of theſe two different ways of applying Words more at large, when we come to treat of the Names of mix'd Modes, and Subſtances, in particular: Tho' give me leave here to ſay, that it is a perverting the uſe of Words, and brings unavoidable Obſcurity and Confuſion into their Signification, whenever we make them ſtand for any thing, but thoſe *Ideas* we have in our own Minds.

Secondly, to the Reality of things.

§. 6. Concerning Words alſo it is farther to be conſider'd: *Firſt*, That they being immediately the Signs of Mens *Ideas*, and by that means the Inſtruments whereby Men communicate their Conceptions, and expreſs to one another thoſe Thoughts and Imaginations they have within their own Breaſts; *there comes by conſtant Uſe* to be ſuch *a Connection between certain Sounds, and the* Ideas *they ſtand for*, that the Names heard almoſt as readily excite certain *Ideas*, as if the Objects themſelves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect

Words by uſe readily excite Ideas.

affect the Senſes. Which is manifeſtly ſo in all obvious ſenſible Qualities; and in all Subſtances, that frequently and familiarly occur to us.

Words often uſed without Signification.

§. 7. *Secondly*, That tho' the proper and immediate Signification of Words are *Ideas* in the Mind of the Speaker, yet becauſe by familiar uſe from our Cradles we come to learn certain articulate Sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our Tongues, and always at hand in our Memories, but yet are not always careful to examine, or ſettle their Significations perfectly; it *often* happens that *Men*, even when they would apply themſelves to an attentive Conſideration, do *ſet their thoughts more on Words than Things*. Nay, becauſe Words are many of them learn'd, before the *Ideas* are known for which they ſtand; therefore ſome, not only Children, but Men, ſpeak ſeveral words no otherwiſe than Parrots do, only becauſe they have learn'd them, and have been accuſtom'd to thoſe Sounds. But ſo far as Words are of uſe and ſignification, ſo far is there a conſtant Connection between the Sound and the *Idea*, and a Deſignation that the one ſtand for the other; without which Application of them they are nothing but ſo much inſignificant Noiſe.

Their Signification perfectly arbitrary.

§. 8. *Words* by long and familiar uſe, as has been ſaid, come to excite in Men certain *Ideas* ſo conſtantly and readily, that they are apt to ſuppoſe a natural Connection between them. But that they *ſignify* only Mens peculiar *Ideas*, and that *by a perfectly arbitrary Impoſition*, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that uſe the ſame Language) the ſame *Ideas* we take them to be the ſigns of: And every Man has ſo inviolable a Liberty, to make Words ſtand for what *Ideas* he pleaſes, that no one hath the Power to make others have the ſame *Ideas* in their Minds, that he has when they uſe the ſame words that he does. And therefore the great *Auguſtus* himſelf, in the poſſeſſion of that Power which rul'd the World, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin Word: which was as much as to ſay, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what *Idea* any Sound ſhould be a ſign of, in the Mouths and common Language of his Subjects. 'Tis true, common Uſe by a tacit Conſent appropriates certain Sounds to certain *Ideas* in all Languages, which ſo far limits the Signification of that Sound, that unleſs a Man applies it to the ſame *Idea*, he does not ſpeak properly: And let me add, that unleſs a Man's Words excite the ſame *Ideas* in the Hearer, which he makes them ſtand for in ſpeaking, he does not ſpeak intelligibly. But whatever be the conſequence of any Man's uſing of Words differently, either from their general Meaning, or the particular Senſe of the Perſon to whom he addreſſes them, this is certain, their Signification, in his uſe of them, is limited to his *Ideas*, and they can be Signs of nothing elſe,

CHAP. III.

Of General Terms.

The greateſt part of Words general.

§. 1. ALL things that exiſt being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reaſonable that Words, which ought to be conform'd to Things, ſhould be ſo too; I mean, in their Signification: but yet we find the quite contrary. The far *greateſt part of Words*, that make all Languages, *are general Terms*; which has not been the Effect of Neglect or Chance, but of Reaſon and Neceſſity.

For every particular thing to have a Name is impoſſible.

§. 2. *Firſt, It is impoſſible that every particular Thing ſhould have a diſtinct peculiar Name.* For the Signification and Uſe of Words, depending on that Connection which the Mind makes between its *Ideas* and the Sounds it uſes as Signs of them, it is neceſſary, in the Application of Names to Things, that the Mind ſhould have diſtinct *Ideas* of the Things, and retain alſo the particular Name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar Appropriation to that *Idea*. But it is beyond the Power of human Capacity to frame and retain diſtinct *Ideas* of all the particular things we meet with: every Bird and Beaſt Men ſaw, every Tree and Plant that affected the Senſes, could not find a place in the moſt capacious Underſtanding. If it be look'd on as an inſtance of a prodigious Memory, that ſome Generals have been able to call every Soldier in their Army by his proper

proper Name; we may eaſily find a reaſon, why Men have never attempted to give Names to each Sheep in their Flock, or Crow that flies over their Heads; much leſs to call every Leaf of Plants, or Grain of Sand that came in their way, by a peculiar Name.

§. 3. *Secondly*, If it were poſſible, *it would yet be uſeleſs*; becauſe it would not ſerve to the chief end of Language. Men would in vain heap up Names of particular Things, that would not ſerve them to communicate their Thoughts. Men learn Names, and uſe them in Talk with others, only that they may be underſtood: which is then only done, when by Uſe or Conſent the Sound I make by the Organs of Speech, excites in another Man's Mind, who hears it, the *Idea* I apply it to in mine, when I ſpeak it. This cannot be done by Names apply'd to particular Things, whereof I alone having the *Ideas* in my Mind, the Names of them could not be ſignificant or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all thoſe very particular Things which had fallen under my Notice. *And uſeleſs.*

§. 4. *Thirdly*, But yet granting this alſo feaſible (which I think is not) yet a *diſtinct Name for every particular Thing would not be of any great uſe for the Improvement of Knowledg*: which tho' founded in particular things, enlarges it ſelf by general Views; to which, things reduc'd into Sorts under general Names, are properly ſubſervient. Theſe, with the Names belonging to them, come within ſome compaſs, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the Mind can contain, or Uſe requires: And therefore, in theſe Men, have for the moſt part ſtop'd; but yet not ſo as to hinder themſelves from diſtinguiſhing particular things, by appropriated Names, where Convenience demands it. And therefore in their own Species, which they have moſt to do with, and wherein they have often occaſion to mention particular Perſons, they make uſe of proper Names; and there diſtinct Individuals have diſtinct Denominations.

§. 5. Beſides Perſons, Countries alſo, Cities, Rivers, Mountains, and other the like Diſtinctions of Place, have uſually found peculiar Names, and that for the ſame reaſon; they being ſuch as Men have often an occaſion to mark particularly, and as it were ſet before others in their Diſcourſes with them. And I doubt not, but if we had reaſon to mention particular Horſes, as often as we have to mention particular Men, we ſhould have *proper Names* for the one, as familiar as for the other, and *Bucephalus* would be a word as much in uſe, as *Alexander*. And therefore we ſee that amongſt Jockeys, Horſes have their proper Names to be known and diſtinguiſh'd by, as commonly as their Servants; becauſe, amongſt them, there is often occaſion to mention this or that particular Horſe, when he is out of ſight. *What things have proper Names.*

§. 6. The next thing to be conſider'd, is, *How general Words come to be made.* For ſince all things that exiſt are only particulars, how come we by general Terms, or where find we thoſe general Natures they are ſuppos'd to ſtand for? Words become general, by being made the ſigns of general *Ideas*; and *Ideas* become general, by ſeparating from them the Circumſtances of Time, and Place, and any other *Ideas*, that may determine them to this or that particular Exiſtence. By this way of abſtraction they are made capable of repreſenting more Individuals than one; each of which having in it a conformity to that abſtract *Idea*, is (as we call it) of that ſort. *How general Words are made.*

§. 7. But to deduce this a little more diſtinctly, it will not perhaps be amiſs to trace our Notions and Names from their beginning, and obſerve by what degrees we proceed, and by what ſteps we enlarge our *Ideas* from our firſt Infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the *Ideas* of the Perſons Children converſe with (to inſtance in them alone) are like the Perſons themſelves only particular. The *Ideas* of the Nurſe, and the Mother, are well framed in their Minds; and, like Pictures of them there, repreſent only thoſe Individuals. The Names they firſt gave to them, are confin'd to theſe Individuals; and the names of *Nurſe* and *Mamma* the Child uſes, determine themſelves to thoſe Perſons. Afterwards, when Time and a larger Acquaintance has made them obſerve, that there are a great many other things in the World that in ſome common Agreements of Shape, and ſeveral other Qualities, reſemble their Father and Mother, and thoſe Perſons they have been uſed to, they frame an *Idea*, which they find thoſe many Particulars do partake in; and to that they give,

with others, the name *Man* for example. And *thus they come to have a general Name*, and a general *Idea*. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex *Idea* they had of *Peter* and *James*, *Mary* and *Jane*, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

§. 8. By the ſame way that they come by the general Name and *Idea* of *Man*, they eaſily *advance to more general Names* and Notions. For obſerving that ſeveral things that differ from their *Idea* of *Man*, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that Name, have yet certain Qualities wherein they agree with *Man*, by retaining only thoſe Qualities, and uniting them into one *Idea*, they have again another and a more general *Idea*; to which having given a Name, they make a Term of a more comprehenſive extenſion: Which new *Idea* is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the ſhape, and ſome other Properties ſignify'd by the name *Man*, and retaining only a Body, with Life, Senſe, and ſpontaneous Motion, comprehended under the name *Animal*.

General Natures are nothing but abſtract Ideas.

§. 9. That this is the *way whereby Men firſt form'd general* Ideas, *and general Names to them*, I think, is ſo evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the conſidering of a Man's ſelf or others, and the ordinary Proceedings of their Minds in Knowledg: And he that thinks general Natures or Notions are any thing elſe but ſuch abſtract and partial *Ideas* of more complex ones, taken at firſt from particular Exiſtences, will, I fear, be at a loſs where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his *Idea* of *Man* differ from that of *Peter* and *Paul*, or his *Idea* of *Horſe* from that of *Bucephalus*, but in the leaving out ſomething that is peculiar to each Individual, and retaining ſo much of thoſe particular complex *Ideas* of ſeveral particular Exiſtences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex *Ideas* ſignify'd by the names *Man* and *Horſe*, leaving out but thoſe particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only thoſe wherein they agree, and of thoſe making a new diſtinct complex *Idea*, and giving the name *Animal* to it; one has a more general Term, that comprehends with Man ſeveral other Creatures. Leave out of the *Idea* of *Animal*, Senſe and ſpontaneous Motion; and the remaining complex *Idea*, made up of the remaining ſimple ones of Body, Life, and Nouriſhment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehenſive Term *Vivens*. And not to dwell longer upon this particular, ſo evident in it ſelf, by the ſame way the Mind proceeds to *Body*, *Subſtance*, and at laſt to *Being*, *Thing*, and ſuch univerſal Terms, which ſtand for any of our *Ideas* whatſoever. To conclude, this whole *Myſtery* of *Genera* and *Species*, which make ſuch a noiſe in the Schools, and are with juſtice ſo little regarded out of them, is nothing elſe but abſtract *Ideas*, more or leſs comprehenſive, with names annex'd to them. In all which, this is conſtant and invariable, That every more general Term ſtands for ſuch an *Idea*, as is but a part of any of thoſe contain'd under it.

Why the Genus is ordinarily made uſe of in Definitions.

§. 10. This may ſhew us the reaſon, *why, in the defining of Words*, which is nothing but declaring their ſignification, *we make uſe of the Genus*, or next general Word that comprehends it. Which is not out of neceſſity, but only to ſave the labour of enumerating the ſeveral ſimple *Ideas*, which the next general Word or *Genus* ſtands for; or, perhaps, ſometimes the ſhame of not being able to do it. But tho' defining by *Genus* and *Differentia* (I crave leave to uſe theſe Terms of Art, tho' originally Latin, ſince they moſt properly ſuit thoſe Notions they are apply'd to) I ſay, tho' defining by the *Genus* be the ſhorteſt way, yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the beſt. This I am ſure, it is not the only, and ſo not abſolutely neceſſary. For Definition being nothing but making another underſtand by Words, what *Idea* the Term defin'd ſtands for, a Definition is beſt made by enumerating thoſe ſimple *Ideas* that are combin'd in the ſignification of the Term defin'd: and if inſtead of ſuch an Enumeration, Men have accuſtom'd themſelves to uſe the next general Term; it has not been out of neceſſity, or for greater clearneſs, but for quickneſs and diſpatch ſake. For, I think, that to one who deſir'd to know what *Ideas* the word *Man* ſtood for, if it ſhould be ſaid, that Man was a ſolid extended Subſtance, having Life, Senſe, ſpontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of Reaſoning; I doubt not but the meaning of the Term *Man* would be as well underſtood, and the *Idea* it ſtands for be at leaſt as clearly made known, as when it is defin'd to be a *rational Animal*:

mal: which by the ſeveral Definitions of *Animal*, *Vivens*, and *Corpus*, reſolves it ſelf into thoſe enumerated *Ideas*. I have, in explaining the Term *Man*, follow'd here the ordinary Definition of the Schools: which tho', perhaps, not the moſt exact, yet ſerves well enough to my preſent purpoſe. And one may, in this inſtance, ſee what gave occaſion to the Rule, that a Definition muſt conſiſt of *Genus* and *Differentia*: and it ſuffices to ſhew us the little neceſſity there is of ſuch a Rule, or advantage in the ſtrict obſerving of it. For Definitions, as has been ſaid, being only the explaining of one Word by ſeveral others, ſo that the Meaning or *Idea* it ſtands for may be certainly known; Languages are not always ſo made according to the Rules of Logick, that every Term can have its Signification exactly and clearly expreſs'd by two others. Experience ſufficiently ſatisfies us to the contrary; or elſe thoſe who have made this Rule, have done ill, that they have given us ſo few Definitions conformable to it. But of Definitions, more in the next Chapter.

General and Univerſal are Creatures of the Underſtanding.

§. 11. To return to general Words, it is plain by what has been ſaid, That *General* and *Univerſal* belong not to the real Exiſtence of things; but *are the Inventions and Creatures of the Underſtanding*, made by it for its own uſe, and concern only Signs, whether Words or *Ideas*. Words are general, as has been ſaid, when uſed for Signs of general *Ideas*, and ſo are applicable indifferently to many particlar things; and *Ideas* are general, when they are ſet up as the Repreſentatives of many particular things: but Univerſality belongs not to things themſelves, which are all of them particular in their Exiſtence; even thoſe Words and *Ideas*, which in their ſignification are general. When therefore we quit Particulars, the Generals that reſt are only Creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the Capacity they are put into by the Underſtanding, of ſignifying or repreſenting many particulars. For the Signification they have, is nothing but a Relation, that by the Mind of Man is added to them.

Abſtract Ideas are the Eſſences of the Genera and Species.

§. 12. The next thing therefore to be conſider'd, is, *What kind of Signification it is, that General Words have.* For as it is evident, that they do not ſignify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general Terms, but proper Names: ſo on the other ſide 'tis as evident, they do not ſignify a plurality; for Man and Men would then ſignify the ſame, and the Diſtinction of Numbers (as the Grammarians call them) Would be ſuperfluous and uſeleſs. That then which general Words ſignify, is a ſort of things; and each of them does that, by being a ſign of an abſtract *Idea* in the Mind, to which *Idea*, as things exiſting are found to agree, ſo they come to be rank'd under that name; or, which is all one, be of that ſort. Whereby it is evident, that the *Eſſences* of the ſorts, or (if the Latin Word pleaſes better) *Species* of things, are nothing elſe but theſe abſtract *Ideas*. For the having the Eſſence of any Species, being that which makes any thing to be of that Species, and the Conformity to the *Idea* to which the Name is annex'd, being that which gives a right to that Name; the having the Eſſence, and the having that Conformity, muſt needs be the ſame thing: ſince to be of any Species, and to have a right to the name of that Species, is all one. As for example, to be a *Man*, or of the Species *Man*, and to have right to the name *Man*, is the ſame thing. Again, to be a *Man*, or of the Species *Man*, and have the Eſſence of a *Man*, is the ſame thing. Now ſince nothing can be a *Man*, or have a right to the name *Man*, but what has a conformity to the abſtract *Idea* the name *Man* ſtands for; nor any thing be a Man, or have a right to the Species *Man*, but what has the Eſſence of that Species, It follows, that the abſtract *Idea* for which the name ſtands, and the Eſſence of the Species is one and the ſame. From whence it is eaſy to obſerve, that the Eſſences of the ſorts of things, and conſequently the ſorting of this, is the Workmanſhip of the Underſtanding, that abſtracts and makes thoſe general *Ideas*.

They are the Workmanſhip of the Underſtanding, but have their foundation in the Similitude of things.

§. 13. I would not here be thought to forget, much leſs to deny, that Nature in the production of things makes ſeveral of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, eſpecially in the Races of Animals, and all things propagated by Seed. But yet, I think, we may ſay the *ſorting* of them under Names *is the Workmanſhip of the Underſtanding, taking occaſion from the Similitude* it obſerves amongſt them to make abſtract general *Ideas*, and ſet them up in the Mind, with Names annex'd to them as Patterns or Forms, (for in that ſenſe the word

Form has a very proper Signification) to which as particular things exiſting are found to agree, ſo they come to be of that Species, have that Denomination, or are put into that *Claſſis*. For when we ſay, this is a *Man*, that a *Horſe*; this *Juſtice*, that *Cruelty*; this a *Watch*, that a *Jack*; what do we elſe but rank things under different ſpecifick Names, as agreeing to thoſe abſtract *Ideas*, of which we have made thoſe Names the ſigns? And what are the Eſſences of thoſe Species ſet out and mark'd by Names, but thoſe abſtract *Ideas* in the Mind; which are as it were the Bonds between particular things that exiſt, and the Names they are to be rank'd under? And when general Names have any connection with particular Beings, theſe abſtract *Ideas* are the *Medium* that unites them: ſo that the Eſſences of Species, as diſtinguiſh'd and denominated by us, neither are nor can be any thing but thoſe preciſe abſtract *Ideas* we have in our Minds. And therefore the ſuppos'd real Eſſences of Subſtances, if different from our abſtract *Ideas*, cannot be the Eſſences of the Species we rank things into. For two Species may be one as rationally, as two different Eſſences be the Eſſence of one Species: And I demand what are the alterations may or may not be in a *Horſe* or *Lead*, without making either of them to be of another Species? In determining the Species of things by our abſtract *Ideas*, this is eaſy to reſolve: but if any one will regulate himſelf herein by ſuppos'd real Eſſences, he will, I ſuppoſe, be at a loſs; and he will never be able to know when any thing preciſely ceaſes to be of the Species of a *Horſe* or *Lead*.

Each diſtinct abſtract Idea *is a diſtinct Eſſence.*

§. 14. Nor will any one wonder, that I ſay theſe *Eſſences*, or abſtract *Ideas*, (which are meaſures of Name, and the Boundaries of Species) are *the Workmanſhip of the Underſtanding*, who conſiders, that at leaſt the complex ones are often, in ſeveral Men, different Collections of ſimple *Ideas*: and therefore that is *Covetouſneſs* to one Man, which is not ſo to another. Nay, even in Subſtances, where their abſtract *Ideas* ſeem to be taken from the things themſelves, they are not conſtantly the ſame; no not in that Species which is moſt familiar to us, and with which we have the moſt intimate acquaintance: It having been more than once doubted, whether the *Fœtus* born of a Woman were a *Man*, even ſo far, as that it hath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nouriſh'd and baptiz'd: which could not be, if the abſtract *Idea* of Eſſence, to which the Name Man belong'd, were of Nature's making; and were not the uncertain and various Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, which the Underſtanding puts together, and then abſtracting it, affix'd a Name to it. So that in truth *every diſtinct abſtract* Idea *is a diſtinct Eſſence*: and the Names that ſtand for ſuch diſtinct *Ideas* are the Names of things eſſentially different. Thus a Circle is as eſſentially different from an Oval, as a Sheep from a Goat: and Rain is as eſſentially different from Snow, as Water from Earth; that abſtract *Idea* which is the Eſſence of one, being impoſſible to be communicated to the other. And thus any two abſtract *Ideas*, that in any part vary one from another, with two diſtinct Names annex'd to them, conſtitute two diſtinct ſorts, or, if you pleaſe, *Species*, as eſſentially different as any two the moſt remote, or oppoſite in the World.

Real and Nominal Eſſence.

§. 15. But ſince the *Eſſences* of things are thought, by ſome, (and not without reaſon) to be wholly unknown; it may not be amiſs to conſider the *ſeveral Significations of the word Eſſence.*

Firſt, *Eſſence* may be taken for the Being of any thing, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally in Subſtances unknown, Conſtitution of things, whereon their diſcoverable Qualities depend, may be call'd their *Eſſence*. This is the proper original Signification of the Word, as is evident from the Formation of it; *Eſſentia*, in its primary notation, ſignifying properly *Being*. And in this ſenſe it is ſtill us'd, when we ſpeak of the *Eſſence* of particular things, without giving them any name.

Secondly, The Learning and Diſputes of the Schools having been much buſy'd about *Genus* and *Species*, the word *Eſſence* has almoſt loſt its primary Signification: and inſtead of the real Conſtitution of things, has been almoſt wholly apply'd to the artificial Conſtitution of *Genus* and *Species*. 'Tis true, there is ordinarily ſuppos'd a real Conſtitution of the ſorts of things; and 'tis paſt doubt, there muſt be ſome real Conſtitution, on which any Collection of ſimple *Ideas* co-exiſting, muſt depend. But it being evident, that things are rank'd under

under Names into Sorts or *Species*, only as they agree to certain abſtract *Ideas*, to which we have annex'd thoſe Names; the *Eſſence* of each *Genus*, or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abſtract *Idea*, which the General, or *Sortal* (if I may have leave ſo to call it from *Sort*, as I do *General* from *Genus*) Name ſtands for. And this we ſhall find to be that which the word *Eſſence* imports in its moſt familiar uſe. Theſe two ſorts of *Eſſences*, I ſuppoſe, may not unfitly be term'd, the one the *Real*, the other the *Nominal Eſſence*.

§. 16. *Between the Nominal Eſſence, and the Name*, there is ſo *near a Connection*, that the Name of any ſort of things cannot be attributed to any particular Being but what has this *Eſſence*, whereby it anſwers that abſtract *Idea*, whereof that Name is the Sign. *Conſtant Connection between the Name and nominal Eſſence.*

§. 17. Concerning the real Eſſences of corporeal Subſtances, (to mention thoſe only) there are, if I miſtake not, two Opinions. The one is of thoſe, who uſing the word *Eſſence* for they know not what, ſuppoſe a certain number of thoſe *Eſſences*, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and ſo become of this or that *Species*. The other, and more rational Opinion, is of thoſe who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown Conſtitution of their inſenſible Parts; from which flow thoſe ſenſible Qualities, which ſerve us to diſtinguiſh them one from another, according as we have occaſion to rank them into ſorts under common Denominations. The former of theſe Opinions, which ſuppoſes theſe *Eſſences*, as a certain Number of Forms or Molds, wherein all natural things, that exiſt, are caſt, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplex'd the Knowledg of natural things. The frequent Productions of Monſters, in all the Species of Animals, and of Changelings, and other ſtrange Iſſues of human Birth, carry with them difficulties, not poſſible to conſiſt with this *Hypotheſis*: Since it is as impoſſible, that two things, partaking exactly of the ſame real *Eſſence*, ſhould have different Properties, as that the two Figures partaking in the ſame real Eſſence of a Circle ſhould have different Properties. But were there no other reaſon againſt it, yet the *Suppoſition of Eſſences that cannot be known*, and the making them nevertheleſs to be that which diſtinguiſhes the Species of things, *is ſo wholly uſeleſs*, and unſerviceable to any part of our Knowledg, that that alone were ſufficient to make us lay it by, and content our ſelves with ſuch *Eſſences* of the Sorts or Species of things as come within the reach of our Knowledg: which, when ſeriouſly conſider'd, will be found, as I have ſaid, to be nothing elſe but thoſe abſtract complex *Ideas*, to which we have annex'd diſtinct general Names. *Suppoſition that Species are diſtinguiſh'd by their real Eſſences, uſeleſs.*

§. 18. *Eſſences* being thus diſtinguiſh'd into *Nominal* and *Real*, we may farther obſerve, that *in* the Species of *ſimple* Ideas *and Modes*, they *are always the ſame*; but *in Subſtances always quite different*. Thus a Figure including a Space between three Lines, is the real as well as nominal *Eſſence* of a Triangle; it being not only the abſtract *Idea* to which the general Name is annex'd, but the very *Eſſentia* or Being of the thing it ſelf, that Foundation from which all its Properties flow, and to which they are all inſeparably annex'd. But it is far otherwiſe concerning that parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring on my Finger, wherein theſe two *Eſſences* are apparently different. For it is the real Conſtitution of its inſenſible Parts, on which depend all thoſe Properties of Colour, Weight, Fuſibility, Fixedneſs, &c. which makes it to be *Gold*, or gives it a right to that Name which is therefore its nominal *Eſſence*: Since nothing can be call'd *Gold* but what has a Conformity of Qualities to that abſtract complex *Idea*, to which that Name is annex'd. But this Diſtinction of *Eſſences*, belonging particularly to Subſtances, we ſhall, when we come to conſider their Names, have an occaſion to treat of more fully. *Real and nominal Eſſence the ſame in ſimple* Ideas *and Modes, different in Subſtances.*

§. 19. That ſuch *abſtract* Ideas, *with Names to them*, as we have been ſpeaking of, *are Eſſences*, may farther appear by what we are told concerning *Eſſences*, *viz.* that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real Conſtitutions of things which begin and periſh with them. All things that exiſt, beſides their Author, are all liable to change; eſpecially thoſe things we are acquainted with, and have rank'd into Bands under diſtinct Names or Enſigns. Thus that which was Graſs to day, is to morrow the Fleſh of a Sheep; and within few days after becomes part of a Man: In all which, and the like Changes, *Eſſences ingenerable and incorruptible.*

Changes, 'tis evident their real *Eſſence, i. e.* that Conſtitution, whereon the Properties of theſe ſeveral things depended, is deſtroy'd, and periſhes with them. But *Eſſences* being taken for *Ideas*, eſtabliſh'd in the Mind, with Names annex'd to them, they are ſuppos'd to remain ſteddily the ſame, whatever Mutations the particular Subſtances are liable to. For whatever becomes of *Alexander* and *Bucephalus*, the *Ideas* to which *Man* and *Horſe* are annex'd, are ſuppos'd nevertheleſs to remain in the ſame; and ſo the *Eſſences* of thoſe Species are preſerv'd whole and undeſtroyed, whatever Changes happen to any, or all of the Individuals of thoſe *Species*. By this means the *Eſſence* of a *Species* reſts ſafe and entire, without the Exiſtence of ſo much as one Individual of that kind. For were there now no Circle exiſting any where in the World, (as perhaps that Figure exiſts not any where exactly mark'd out) yet the *Idea* annex'd to that Name would not ceaſe to be what it is; not ceaſe to be as a Pattern to determine which of the particular Figures we meet with have or have not a right to the name *Circle*, and ſo to ſhew which of them, by having that Eſſence, was of that *Species*. And tho' there neither were nor had been in Nature ſuch a Beaſt as an *Unicorn*, or ſuch a Fiſh as a *Mermaid*; yet ſuppoſing thoſe Names to ſtand for complex abſtract *Ideas* that contain'd no Inconſiſtency in them, the *Eſſence* of a *Mermaid* is as intelligible as that of a *Man*; and the the *Idea* of an *Unicorn* as certain, ſteddy, and permanent as that of a Horſe. From what has been ſaid it is evident, that the Doctrine of the Immutability of *Eſſences* proves them to be only abſtract *Ideas*; and is founded on the Relation eſtabliſh'd between them, and certain Sounds as Signs of them; and will always be true as long as the ſame Name can have the ſame Signification.

Recapitulation.

§. 20. To conclude, this is that which in ſhort I would ſay, *viz.* That all the great Buſineſs of *Genera* and *Species*, and their *Eſſences*, amounts to no more but this, That Men making abſtract *Ideas*, and ſettling them in their Minds with Names annex'd to them, do thereby enable themſelves to conſider things, and diſcourſe of them, as it were in Bundles, for the eaſier and readier Improvement and Communication of their Knowledg; which would advance but ſlowly, were their Words and Thoughts confin'd only to Particulars.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of ſimple Ideas.

Name of ſimple Ideas, *Modes, and Subſtances, have each ſomething peculiar.*

§. 1. THO' all Words, as I have ſhewn, ſignify nothing immediately but the *Ideas* in the Mind of the Speaker; yet upon a nearer Survey we ſhall find that the *Names of ſimple* Ideas, *mix'd Modes*, (under which I compriſe Relations too) *and natural Subſtances, have each of them ſomething peculiar* and different from the other. For example:

1. *Names of ſimple* Ideas *and Subſtances, intimate real Exiſtence.*

§. 2. *Firſt*, The *Names of ſimple* Ideas *and Subſtances*, with the abſtract *Ideas* in the Mind, which they immediately ſignify, *intimate* alſo *ſome real Exiſtence*, from which was deriv'd their original Pattern. But the *Names of mix'd Modes terminate in the* Idea that is in the Mind, and lead not the Thoughts any farther, as we ſhall ſee more at large in the following Chapter.

2. *Names of ſimple* Ideas *and Modes ſignify always both real and nominal Eſſence.*

§. 3. *Secondly*, The *Names of ſimple* Ideas *and Modes ſignify always the real as well as nominal Eſſence of their Species.* But *the Names of natural Subſtances ſignify* rarely, if ever, any thing but *barely the nominal Eſſences* of thoſe Species, as we ſhall ſhew in the Chapter that treats of the Names of Subſtances in particular.

3. *Names of ſimple* Ideas *undefinable.*

§. 4. *Thirdly*, The *Names of ſimple* Ideas *are not capable of any Definitions*; the Names of all complex *Ideas* are. It has not, that I know, been yet obſerv'd by any body, what Words are, and what are not capable of being defin'd; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not ſeldom the occaſion of great wrangling and obſcurity in mens Diſcourſes, whilſt ſome demand Definitions of Terms that cannot be defin'd: and others think they ought to reſt ſatisfy'd in an Explication made by a more general Word, and its Reſtriction, or to ſpeak in Terms of Art, by a Genus and Difference) when even after ſuch Definition made according to rule, thoſe who hear it, have often no more a clear Conception of the meaning of the Word

Word than they had before. This at leaſt I think, that the ſhewing what Words are, and what are not capable of Definitions, and wherein conſiſts a good Definition, is not wholly beſides our preſent purpoſe; and perhaps will afford ſo much Light to the Nature of theſe Signs, and our *Ideas*, as to deſerve a more particular Conſideration.

§. 5. I will not here trouble my ſelf, to prove that all Terms are not definable from that Progreſs, *in infinitum*, which it will viſibly lead us into, if we ſhould allow that all Names could be defin'd. For if the Terms of one Definition were ſtill to be defin'd by another, where at laſt ſhould we ſtop? But I ſhall from the nature of our *Ideas*, and the ſignification of our Words ſhew, *why ſome Names can, and others cannot be defin'd*, and which they are. *If all were definable, 'twould be a Proceſs* in infinitum.

§. 6. I think, it is agreed, that *a Definition is* nothing elſe, but *the ſhewing the meaning of one Word by ſeveral other not ſynonymous Terms.* The meaning of words being only the *Ideas* they are made to ſtand for by him that uſes them; the meaning of any Term is then ſhew'd, or the Word is defin'd, when by other Words, the *Idea* it is made the Sign of, and annex'd to in the Mind of the Speaker, is as it were repreſented, or ſet before the View of another; and thus its Signification aſcertain'd: This is the only Uſe and End of Definitions; and therefore the only meaſure of what is, or is not a good Definition. *What a Definition is.*

§. 7. This being premis'd, I ſay, that *the Names of ſimple* Ideas, and thoſe only, *are incapable of being defin'd.* The reaſon whereof is this, That the ſeveral Terms of a Definition, ſignifying ſeveral *Ideas*, they can all together by no means repreſent an *Idea*, which has no Compoſition at all: And therefore a Definition, which is properly nothing but the ſhewing the meaning of one Word by ſeveral others not ſignifying each the ſame thing, can in the Names of ſimple *Ideas* have no place. *Simple* Ideas *why undefinable.*

§. 8. The not obſerving this Difference in our *Ideas*, and their Names, has produc'd that eminent trifling in the Schools, which is ſo eaſy to be obſerv'd in the Definitions they give us of ſome few of theſe ſimple *Ideas*. For as to the greateſt part of them, even thoſe Maſters of Definitions were fain to leave them untouch'd, merely by the impoſſibility they found in it. What more exquiſite *Jargon* could the Wit of Man invent, than this Definition, *The Act of a Being in Power, as far forth as in Power?* which would puzzle any rational Man, to whom it was not already know by its famous Abſurdity, to gueſs what word it could ever be ſuppos'd to be the Explication of. If *Tully* asking a *Dutchman* what *Beweeginge* was, ſhould have receiv'd this Explication in his own Language, that it was *Actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia*; I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have underſtood what the word *Beweeginge* ſignify'd, or have gueſs'd what *Idea* a *Dutchman* ordinarily had in his Mind, and would ſignify to another when he us'd that Sound. *Inſtances; Motion.*

§. 9. Nor have the modern Philoſophers, who have endeavour'd to throw off the *Jargon* of the Schools, and ſpeak intelligibly, much better ſucceeded in defining ſimple *Ideas*, whether by explaining their Cauſes, or any otherwiſe. The *Atomiſts*, who define Motion to be a *Paſſage from one Place to another*, what do they more than put one ſynonymous word for another? For what is *Paſſage*, other than *Motion?* And if they were ask'd what Paſſage was, how would they better define it than by *Motion?* For is it not at leaſt as proper and ſignificant to ſay, *Paſſage is a Motion from one Place to another*, as to ſay, *Motion is a Paſſage*, &c? This is to tranſlate, and not to define, when we change two words of the ſame Signification one for another; which, when one is better underſtood than the other, may ſerve to diſcover what *Idea* the unknown ſtands for; but is very far from a *Definition*, unleſs we will ſay every *Engliſh* word in the Dictionary is the Definition of the *Latin* word it anſwers, and that Motion is a Definition of *Motus*. *Nor will the ſucceſſive Application of the Parts of the* Superficies *of one Body, to thoſe of another*, which the *Carteſians* give us, prove a much better Definition of Motion, when well examin'd.

§. 10. *The Act of Perſpicuous, as far forth as perſpicuous*, is another Peripatetick Definition of a ſimple *Idea*; which tho' not more abſurd than the former of *Motion*, yet betrays its Uſeleſneſs and Inſignificancy more plainly, becauſe Experience will eaſily convince any one, that it cannot make the meaning of the word *Light* (which it pretends to define) at all underſtood by a blind Man; but *Light.*

but the Definition of *Motion* appears not at firſt ſight ſo uſeleſs, becauſe it ſcapes this way of Trial. For this ſimple *Idea*, entering by the Touch as well as Sight, 'tis impoſſible to ſhew an Example of any one, who has no other way to get the *Idea* of *Motion*, but barely by the Definition of that Name. Thoſe who tell us, that *Light* is a great number of little Globules, ſtriking briskly on the bottom of the Eye, ſpeak more intelligibly than the Schools; but yet theſe words ever ſo well underſtood would make the *Idea* the word *Light* ſtands for, no more known to a Man that underſtands it not before, than if one ſhould tell him, that *Light* was nothing but a Company of little Tennis-Balls, which Fairies all day long ſtruck with Rackets againſt ſome Mens Foreheads, whilſt they paſs'd by others. For granting this Explication of the thing to be true; yet the *Idea* of the Cauſe of *Light*, if we had it ever ſo exact, would no more give us the *Idea* of *Light* it ſelf, as it is ſuch a particular Perception in us, than the *Idea* of the Figure and Motion of a ſharp piece of Steel, would give us the *Idea* of that Pain which it is able to cauſe in us. For the Cauſe of any Senſation, and the Senſation it ſelf, in all the ſimple *Ideas* of one Senſe, are two *Ideas*; and two *Ideas* ſo different and diſtant one from another, that no two can be more ſo. And therefore ſhould *Des Cartes*'s Globules ſtrike ever ſo long on the *Retina* of a Man, who was blind by a *Gutta Serena*, he would thereby never have any *Idea* of *Light*, or any thing approaching it, tho' he underſtood what little Globules were, and what ſtriking on another Body was, ever ſo well. And therefore the *Carteſians* very well diſtinguiſh between that Light which is the Cauſe of that Senſation in us, and the *Idea* which is produc'd in us by it, and is that which is properly Light.

Simple Ideas *why undefinable, farther explain'd.*

§. 11. *Simple Ideas*, as has been ſhewn *are only* to be *got* by thoſe *Impreſſions*, Objects themſelves make on our Minds, by the proper Inlets appointed to each ſort. If they are not receiv'd this way, all the *Words* in the World, *made uſe of to explain, or define any of their Names, will never be able to produce in us the* Idea *it ſtands for*. For Words being Sounds, can produce in us no other ſimple *Ideas*, than of thoſe very Sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary Connection, which is known to be between them, and thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, which common Uſe has made them Signs of. He that thinks otherwiſe, let him try if any words can give him the Taſte of a Pine-Apple, and make him have the true *Idea* of the Reliſh of that celebrated delicious Fruit. So far as he is told it as a reſemblance with any Taſtes, whereof he has the *Ideas* already in his Memory, imprinted there by ſenſible Objects not ſtrangers to his Palate, ſo far may he approach that reſemblance in his Mind. But this is not giving us that *Idea* by a *Definition*, but exciting in us other ſimple *Ideas*, by their known Names; which will be ſtill very different from the true Taſte of that Fruit it ſelf. In Light and Colours, and all other ſimple *Ideas*, it is the ſame thing; for the Signification of Sounds is not natural, but only impos'd and arbitrary. And no Definition of *Light*, or *Redneſs*, is more fitted, or able to produce either of thoſe *Ideas* in us, than the Sound *Light* or *Red* by it ſelf. For to hope to produce an *Idea* of Light, or Colour, by a Sound, however form'd, is to expect that Sounds ſhould be viſible, or Colours audible, and to make the Ears do the Office of all the other Senſes. Which is all one as to ſay, that we might taſte, ſmell and ſee by the Ears; a ſort of Philoſophy worthy only of *Sancho Pancha*, who had the Faculty to ſee *Dulcinea* by Hearſay. And therefore he that has not before receiv'd into his Mind, by the proper Inlet, the ſimple *Idea* which any word ſtands for, can never come to know the ſignification of that word by any other Words or Sounds whatſoever put together, according to any Rules of Definition. The only way is, by applying to his Senſes the proper Object; and ſo producing that *Idea* in him, for which he has learn'd the name already. A ſtudious blind Man, who had mightily beat his Head about viſible Objects, and made uſe of the Explication of his Books and Friends, to underſtand thoſe Names of Light and Colours, which often came in his way, brag'd one Day, that he now underſtood what *Scarlet* ſignify'd. Upon which his Friend demanding, what *Scarlet* was? the blind Man anſwer'd, It was like the Sound of a Trumpet. Juſt ſuch an underſtanding of the Name of any other ſimple *Idea* will he have, who hopes to get it only from a Definition, or other words made uſe of to explain it.

§. 12.

§. 12. The Caſe is quite otherwiſe *in complex Ideas*; which conſiſting of ſeveral ſimple ones, it is in the power of words, ſtanding for the ſeveral *Ideas* that make that Compoſition, to imprint complex *Ideas* in the Mind, which were never there before, and ſo make their Names be underſtood. In ſuch Collections of *Ideas*, paſſing under one name, *Definition*, or the teaching the ſignification of one word by ſeveral others, has place, and *may make us underſtand the Names* of Things, which never came within the reach of our Senſes: and frame *Ideas* ſutable to thoſe in other Mens Minds, when they uſe thoſe Names: provided that none of the Terms of the Definition ſtand for any ſuch ſimple *Ideas*, which he to whom the Explication is made, has never yet had in his Thought. Thus the word *Statue* may be explain'd to a blind Man by other words, when *Picture* cannot; his Senſes having given him the *Idea* of Figure, but not of Colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gain'd the Prize to the Painter againſt the Statuary: each of which contending for the Excellency of his Art, and the Statuary bragging that his was to be prefer'd, becauſe it reach'd farther, and even thoſe who had loſt their Eyes, could yet perceive the Excellency of it; the Painter agreed to refer himſelf to the Judgment of a blind Man; who being brought where there was a Statue made by the one, and a Picture drawn by the other, he was firſt led to the Statue, in which he trac'd with his Hands all the Lineaments of the Face and Body, and with great admiration applauded the Skill of the Workman, But being led to the Picture, and having his Hands laid upon it, was told, That now he touch'd the Head, and then the Forehead, Eyes, Noſe, *&c.* as his Hand mov'd over the Parts of the Picture on the Cloth, without finding any the leaſt diſtinction: Whereupon he cry'd out, that certainly that muſt needs be a very admirable and divine piece of Workmanſhip, which could repreſent to them all thoſe Parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing.

The contrary ſhew'd in complex Ideas *by Inſtances of a Statue and Rainbow.*

§. 14. He that ſhould uſe the word *Rainbow* to one who knew all thoſe Colours, but yet had never ſeen that *Phænomenon*, would, by enumerating the Figure, Largeneſs, Poſition and Order of the Colours, ſo well define that word, that it might be perfectly underſtood. But yet that *Definition*, how exact and perfect ſoever, would never make a blind Man underſtand it; becauſe ſeveral of the ſimple *Ideas* that make that complex one, being ſuch as he never receiv'd by Senſation and Experience, no words are able to excite them in his Mind.

§. 14. Simple *Ideas*, as has been ſhew'd, can only be got by Experience, from thoſe Objects, which are proper to produce in us thoſe Perceptions. *When* by this means we have our Minds ſtor'd with them, and know the Names for them, then *we are in a Condition to define*, and by *Definition* to underſtand the Names of complex *Ideas*, that are made up of them. But when any Term ſtands for a ſimple *Idea*, that a Man has never yet had in his Mind, it is impoſſible, by any words to make known its meaning to him. When any Term ſtands for an *Idea* a Man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that Term is the ſign of it, there another Name, of the ſame *Idea* which he has been accuſtom'd to, may make him underſtand its meaning. But in no caſe whaſoever is any Name of any ſimple *Idea*, capable of a *Definition*.

The Names of complex Ideas *when to be made intelligible by Words.*

§. 15. *Fourthly*, But tho' the Names of *ſimples Ideas* have not the help of *Definition* to determine their ſignification, yet that hinders not but that they *are generally leſs doubtful and uncertain, than thoſe of mix'd Modes and Subſtances*: Becauſe they ſtanding only for one ſimple Perception, Men for the moſt part, eaſily and perfectly agree in their ſignification; and there is little room for Miſtake and Wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once that Whiteneſs is the name of that Colour he has obſerv'd in Snow or Milk, will not be apt to miſapply that word as long as he retains that *Idea*; which when he has quite loſt, he is not apt to miſtake the meaning of it, but perceives he underſtands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of ſimple *Ideas* to be put together, which makes the Doubtfulneſs in the names of mix'd Modes; nor a ſuppos'd, but an unknown real Eſſence, with Properties depending thereon, the preciſe number whereof are alſo unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of Subſtances. But, on the contrary, in ſimple *Ideas* the whole ſignification of the Name is known at once, and conſiſts not of Parts, whereof more

4. *Names of ſimple* Ideas *leaſt doubtful.*

or leſs being put in, the *Idea* may be vary'd, and ſo the ſignification of its Name be obſcure or uncertain.

5. *Simple* Ideas *have few Aſcents* in Linea Predicamentali.

§. 16. *Fifthly*, This farther may be obſerv'd concerning *ſimple* Ideas, and their Names, that they *have but few Aſcents* in Lineæ Prædicamentali (as they call it) *from the loweſt Species to the* Summum Genus. The reaſon whereof is, that the loweſt Species being but one ſimple *Idea*, nothing can be left out of it; that ſo the difference being taken away, it may agree with ſome other thing in one *Idea* common to them both; which having one Name, is the *Genus* of the other two: *v. g.* There is nothing can be left out of the *Idea* of White and Red, to make them agree in one common Appearance, and ſo have one general Name; as *Rationality* being left out of the complex *Idea* of *Man*, makes it agree with Brute, in the more general *Idea* and Name of *Animal*: And therefore when to avoid unpleaſant Enumerations. Men would comprehend both *White* and *Red*, and ſeveral other ſuch ſimple *Ideas*, under one general Name; they have been fain to do it by a word, which denotes only the way they get into the Mind. For when *White*, *Red* and *Yellow* are all comprehended under the *Genus* or name *Colour*, it ſignifies no more but ſuch *Ideas* as are produc'd in the Mind only by the Sight, and have entrance only thro' the Eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general Term, to comprehend both *Colours* and *Sounds*, and the like ſimple *Ideas*, they do it by a word that ſignifies all ſuch as come into the Mind only by one Senſe: And ſo the general term *Quality*, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends Colours, Sounds, Taſtes, Smells and tangible Qualities, with diſtinction from Extenſion, Number, Motion, Pleaſure and Pain, which make Impreſſions on the Mind, and introduce their *Ideas* by more Senſes than one.

6. *Names of ſimple* Ideas *ſtand for* Ideas *not at all arbitrary.*

§. 17. *Sixthly*, The Names of ſimple *Ideas*, Subſtances, and mix'd Modes, have alſo this difference; That thoſe *of mix'd Modes* ſtand for *Ideas* perfectly *arbitrary*; thoſe *of Subſtances* are not perfectly ſo, but *refer to a Pattern, tho' with ſome Latitude*; *and thoſe of ſimple* Ideas *are* perfectly taken from the Exiſtence of Things, and are *not arbitrary at all.* Which, what difference it makes in the ſignifications of their Names, we ſhall ſee in the following Chapters.

The Names of ſimple Modes differ little from thoſe of ſimple *Ideas.*

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of mix'd Modes and Relations.

They ſtand for abſtract Ideas, *as other general Names.*

§. 1. THE Names of mix'd Modes being general, they ſtand, as has been ſhewn, for Sorts or Species of Things, each of which has its peculiar Eſſence. The Eſſences of theſe Species alſo, as has been ſhew'd, are nothing but the abſtract *Ideas* in the Mind, to which the Name is annex'd. Thus far the Names and Eſſences of mix'd Modes, have nothing but what is common to them with other *Ideas*: But if we take a little nearer Survey of them, we ſhall find that they have ſomething peculiar, which perhaps may deſerve our Attention.

1. *The* Ideas *they ſtand for, are made by the Underſtanding.*

§. 2. The firſt Particularity I ſhall obſerve in them, is, That the abſtract *Ideas*, or, if you pleaſe, the Eſſences of the ſeveral Species of *mix'd Modes are made by the Underſtanding*, wherein they differ from thoſe of ſimple *Ideas*: In which ſort, the Mind has no Power to make any one, but only receives ſuch as are preſented to it, by the real Exiſtence of things operating upon it.

2. *Made arbitrarily, and without Patterns.*

§. 3. In the next place, theſe *Eſſences of the Species of mix'd Modes, are* not only *made* by the Mind, but made *very arbitrarily*, made without Patterns, or reference to any real Exiſtence. Wherein they differ from thoſe of Subſtances, which carry with them the Suppoſition of ſome real Being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex *Ideas* of mix'd Modes, the Mind takes a Liberty not to follow the Exiſtence of Things exactly. It unites and retains certain Collections, as ſo many diſtinct ſpecifick *Ideas*, whilſt others, that as often occur in Nature, and are as plainly ſuggeſted by outward Things, paſs neglected, without particular Names or Specifications.

Nor

Nor does the Mind, in theſe of mix'd Modes, as in the complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, examine them by the real Exiſtence of things; or verify them by Patterns, containing ſuch peculiar Compoſitions in Nature. To know whether his *Idea* of *Adultery* or *Inceſt* be right, will a Man ſeek it any where amongſt things exiſting? Or is it true, becauſe any one has been witneſs to ſuch an Action? No: but it ſuffices here, that Men have put together ſuch a Collection into one complex *Idea*, that makes the *Archetype* and ſpecifick *Idea*, whether ever any ſuch Action were committed *in rerum natura* or no.

§. 4. To underſtand this aright, we muſt conſider *wherein this making of theſe complex* Ideas *conſiſts*; and that is not in the making any new *Idea*, but putting together thoſe which the Mind had before. Wherein the Mind does theſe three things: Firſt, It chuſes a certain Number: Secondly, It gives them Connection, and makes them into one *Idea*: Thirdly, It ties them together by a Name. If we examine how the Mind proceeds in theſe, and what liberty it takes in them, we ſhall eaſily obſerve how theſe Eſſences of the Species of mix'd Modes are the Workmanſhip of the Mind, and conſequently, that the Species themſelves are of Mens making. *How this is done.*

§. 5. No body can doubt, but that theſe *Ideas* of mix'd Modes are made by a voluntary Collection of *Ideas* put together in the Mind, independent from any original Patterns in Nature, who will but reflect that this ſort of complex *Ideas* may be made, abſtracted, and have names given them, and ſo a Species be conſtituted, before any one Individual of that Species ever exiſted. Who can doubt but the *Ideas of Sacrilege* or *Adultery* might be framed in the Mind of Men, and have names given them; and ſo theſe Species of mix'd Modes be conſtituted, before either of them was ever committed; and might be as well diſcours'd of, and reaſon'd about, and as certain Truths diſcover'd of them, whilſt yet they had no being but in the Underſtanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real Exiſtence? Whereby it is plain, how much *the ſorts of mix'd Modes are the Creatures of the Underſtanding*, where they have a Being as ſubſervient to all the Ends of real Truth and Knowledg, as when they really exiſt: And we cannot doubt but Law-makers have often made Laws about Species of Actions, which were only the Creatures of their own Underſtandings; Beings that had no other exiſtence, but in their own Minds. And I think no body can deny, but that the *Reſurrection* was a Species of mix'd Modes in the Mind, before it really exiſted. *Evidently arbitrary, that the Idea is often before the Exiſtence.*

§. 6. To ſee *how arbitrarily theſe Eſſences of mix'd Modes are made* by the Mind, we need but take a view of almoſt any of them. A little looking into them will ſatisfy us, that 'tis the Mind that combines ſeveral ſcatter'd independent *Ideas* into one complex one, and by the common name it gives them, makes them the Eſſence of a certain Species, without regulating it ſelf by any Connection they have in Nature. For what greater Connection in Nature has the *Idea* of a Man, than the *Idea* of a Sheep, with killing; that this is made a particular Species of Action, ſignify'd by the word *Murder*, and the other not? Or what Union is there in Nature between the *Idea* of the Relation of a Father, with Killing, than that of a Son, or Neighbour; that thoſe are combin'd into one complex *Idea*, and thereby made the Eſſence of the diſtinct Species *Parricide*, whilſt the other make no diſtinct Species at all? But tho' they have made killing a Man's Father, or Mother, a diſtinct Species from killing his Son, or Daughter; yet in ſome other caſes, Son and Daughter are taken in too, as well as Father and Mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the ſame Species, as in that of *Inceſt*. Thus the Mind in mix'd Modes arbitrarily unites into complex *Ideas*, ſuch as it finds convenient; whilſt others that have altogether as much Union in Nature, are left looſe, and never combin'd into one *Idea*, becauſe they have no need of one name. 'Tis evident then, that the Mind by its free choice gives a Connection to a certain number of *Ideas*, which in nature have no more Union with with one another, than others that it leaves out: Why elſe is the part of the Weapon, the beginning of the Wound is made with, taken notice of, to make the diſtinct Species call'd *Stabbing*, and the Figure and Matter of the Weapon left out? I do not ſay this is done without reaſon, as we ſhall ſee more by and by; but this I ſay, that it is done by the free choice of the Mind, purſuing its own ends; and that therefore theſe Species of mix'd Modes are the Workmanſhip of the Underſtanding: And there is nothing more *Inſtances; Murder, Inceſt, Stabbing.*

evident, than that for the moſt part, in the framing theſe *Ideas*, the Mind ſearches not its Patterns in Nature, nor refers the *Ideas* it makes to the real Exiſtence of things; but puts ſuch together, as may beſt ſerve its own purpoſes, without tying it ſelf to a preciſe Imitation of any thing that really exiſts.

But ſtill ſubſervient to the end of Language.

§. 7. But tho' theſe complex *Ideas*, or *Eſſences of mix'd Modes*, depend on the Mind, and are made by it with great liberty; yet they *are not made at random*, and jumbled together without any reaſon at all. Tho' theſe complex *Ideas* be not always copy'd from Nature, yet they are always ſuited to the End for which abſtract *Ideas* are made: And tho' they be Combinations made of *Ideas* that are looſe enough, and have as little Union in themſelves, as ſeveral other to which the Mind never gives a Connection that combines them into one *Idea*; yet they are always made for the convenience of Communication, which is the chief End of Language. The Uſe of Language is, by ſhort Sounds to ſignify with eaſe and diſpatch general Conceptions; wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contain'd, but alſo a great variety of independent *Ideas* collected into one complex one. In the making therefore of the Species of mix'd Modes, Men have had regard only to ſuch Combinations as they had occaſion to mention one to another. Thoſe they have combin'd into diſtinct complex *Ideas*, and given Names to; whilſt others that in Nature have as near an Union, are left looſe and unregarded. For to go no farther than human Actions themſelves, if they would make diſtinct abſtract *Ideas* of all the Varieties might be obſerv'd in them, the Number muſt be infinite, and the Memory confounded with the Plenty, as well as overcharg'd to little purpoſe. It ſuffices, that Men make and name ſo many complex *Ideas* of theſe mix'd Modes, as they find they have occaſion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their Affairs. If they join to the *Idea* of Killing, the *Idea* of Father, or Mother, and ſo make a diſtinct Species from killing a Man's Son or Neighbour, it is becauſe of the different Heinouſneſs of the Crime, and the diſtinct Puniſhment is due to the murdering a Man's Father and Mother, different from what ought to be inflicted on the Murder of a Son or Neighbour; and therefore they find it neceſſary to mention it by a diſtinct Name, which is the end of making that diſtinct Combination. But tho' the *Ideas* of Mother and Daughter are ſo differently treated, in reference to the *Idea* of Killing, that the one is join'd with it, to make a diſtinct abſtract *Idea* with a name, and ſo a diſtinct Species, and the other not; yet in reſpect of carnal Knowledg, they are both taken in under *Inceſt*: and that ſtill for the ſame convenience of expreſſing under one Name, and reckoning of one Species, ſuch unclean Mixtures as have a peculiar Turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid Circumlocutions, and tedious Deſcriptions.

Whereof the intranſlatable Words of divers Languages are a proof.

§. 8. A moderate Skill in *different Languages* will eaſily ſatisfy one of the truth of this; it being ſo obvious to obſerve great ſtore of *Words in one* Language, *which have not any that anſwer them in another*. Which plainly ſhews, that thoſe of one Country, by their Cuſtoms and Manner of Life, have found occaſion to make ſeveral complex *Ideas*, and give names to them, which others never collected into ſpecifick *Ideas*. This could not have happen'd, if theſe Species were the ſteddy Workmanſhip of Nature, and not Collections made and abſtracted by the Mind, in order to naming, and for the convenience of Communication. The Terms of our Law, which are not empty Sounds, will hardly find Words that anſwer them in the *Spaniſh* or *Italian*, no ſcanty Languages; much leſs, I think, could any one tranſlate them into the *Caribees* or *Weſtoe* Tongues: And the *Verſura* of the *Romans*, or *Corban* of the *Jews*, have no Words in other Languages to anſwer them; the reaſon whereof is plain, from what has been ſaid. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly into this matter, and exactly compare different Languages, we ſhall find, that tho' they have Words which in Tranſlations and Dictionaries are ſuppos'd to anſwer one another, yet there is ſcarce one of ten amongſt the Names of complex *Ideas*, eſpecially of mix'd Modes, that ſtands for the ſame preciſe *Idea*, which the Word does that in Dictionaries it is render'd by. There are no *Ideas* more common, and leſs compounded, than the Meaſures of Time, Extenſion, and Weight, and the *Latin* Names, *Hora*, *Pes*, *Libra*, are without difficulty render'd by the *Engliſh* Names, *Hour*, *Foot*, and *Pound*: but yet there is nothing more evident, than that the *Ideas* a *Roman* annex'd to theſe *Latin* Names, were very far different from

thoſe which an *Engliſhman* expreſſes by thoſe *Engliſh* ones. And if either of theſe ſhould make uſe of the meaſures that thoſe of the other Language deſign'd by their Names, he would be quite out in his account. Theſe are too ſenſible proofs to be doubted; and we ſhall find this much more ſo, in the Names of more abſtract and compounded *Ideas*, ſuch as are the greateſt part of thoſe which make up moral Diſcourſes: whoſe Names, when Men come curiouſly to compare with thoſe they are tranſlated into, in other Languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correſpond in the whole extent of their Significations.

This ſhews Species to be made for Communication.

§. 9. The reaſon why I take ſo particular notice of this, is, that we may not be miſtaken about *Genera* and *Species*, and their *Eſſences*, as if they were things regularly and conſtantly made by Nature, and had a real Exiſtence in things; when they appear, upon a more wary Survey, to be nothing elſe but an Artifice of the Underſtanding, for the eaſier ſignifying ſuch Collections of *Ideas*, as it ſhould often have occaſion to communicate by one general Term; under which divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that abſtract *Idea*, might be comprehended. And if the doubtful Signification of the word *Species* may make it ſound harſh to ſome, that I ſay that the Species of mix'd Modes are made by the Underſtanding; yet, I think, it can by no body be deny'd, that 'tis the Mind makes thoſe abſtract complex *Ideas*, to which ſpecifick Names are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the Mind makes the Patterns for ſorting and naming of things, I leave it to be conſider'd who makes the Boundaries of the Sort or *Species*; ſince with me, *Species* and *Sort* have no other difference, than than that of a *Latin* and *Engliſh Idiom*.

In mix'd Modes 'tis the Name that ties the Combination together, and makes it a Species.

§. 10. *The near Relation* that there is *between Species, Eſſences*, and their *general Name*, at leaſt *in mix'd Modes*, will farther appear, when we conſider that it is the Name that ſeems to preſerve thoſe *Eſſences*, and give them their laſting duration. For the Connection between the looſe parts of thoſe complex *Ideas* being made by the Mind, this Union, which has no particular foundation in Nature, would ceaſe again, were there not ſomething that did as it were hold it together, and keep the parts from ſcattering. Tho' therefore it be the Mind that makes the Collection, 'tis the Name which is as it were the Knot that ties them faſt together. What a vaſt variety of different *Ideas* does the word *Triumphus* hold together, and deliver to us as one *Species!* Had this Name been never made or quite loſt, we might, no doubt, have had deſcriptions of what paſs'd in that Solemnity: but yet, I think, that which holds thoſe different parts together, in the Unity of one complex *Idea*, is that very word annex'd to it; without which, the ſeveral parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing, than any other Shew, which having never been made but once, had never been united into one complex *Idea*, under one denomination. How much therefore, in mix'd Modes, the Unity neceſſary to any Eſſence depends on the Mind, and how much the Continuation and fixing of that Unity depends on the Name in common uſe annex'd to it; I leave to be conſider'd by thoſe, who look upon *Eſſences* and *Species* as real eſtabliſh'd things in Nature.

§. 11. Suitable to this, we find, that *Men ſpeaking of mix'd Modes, ſeldom* imagine or *take any other for Species of them, but ſuch as are ſet out by name*: becauſe they being of Man's making only, in order to naming, no ſuch *Species* are taken notice of, or ſuppos'd to be, unleſs a *Name* be join'd to it, as the ſign of Man's having combin'd into one *Idea* ſeveral looſe ones; and by that *Name* giving a laſting Union to the Parts, which would otherwiſe ceaſe to have any, as ſoon as the Mind laid by that abſtract *Idea*, and ceas'd actually to think on it. But when a Name is once annex'd to it, wherein the parts of that complex *Idea* have a ſettled and permanent Union; then is the *Eſſence* as it were eſtabliſh'd, and the *Species* look'd on as compleat. For to what purpoſe ſhould the Memory charge it ſelf with ſuch Compoſitions, unleſs it were by Abſtraction to make them general? And to what purpoſe make them general, unleſs it were that they might have general *Names*, for the convenience of Diſcourſe and Communication? Thus we ſee, that killing a Man with a Sword or a Hatchet, are look'd on as no diſtinct Species of Action: but if the Point of the Sword firſt enter the Body, it paſſes for a diſtinct *Species*, where it has a diſtinct *Name*; as in *England*, in whoſe Language it is call'd *Stabbing*: But in another Country, where it has not happen'd to be ſpecify'd under a peculiar *Name*, it paſſes not

for

for a distinct *Species*. But in the *Species* of corporeal Substances, tho' it be the Mind that makes the nominal Essence; yet since those *Ideas* which are combin'd in it are suppos'd to have an Union in Nature, whether the Mind joins them or no, therefore those are look'd on as distinct *Species*, without any Operation of the Mind, either abstracting or giving a *Name* to that complex *Idea*.

For the Originals of mix'd Modes, we look no farther than the Mind, which also shews them to be the Workmanship of the Understanding.

§. 12. Conformable also to what has been said, concerning the *Essences* of the *Species* of *mix'd Modes*, that they are the Creatures of the Understanding, rather than the Works of Nature: Conformable, I say to this, we find that *their Names lead our Thoughts to the Mind, and no farther*. When we speak of *Justice*, or *Gratitude*, we frame to our selves no Imagination of any thing existing, which we would conceive; but our Thoughts terminate in the abstract *Ideas* of those Vertues, and look not farther: as they do, when we speak of a *Horse* or *Iron*, whose specifick *Ideas* we consider not, as barely in the Mind, but as in things themselves, which afford the original Patterns of those *Ideas*. But in mix'd Modes, at least the most considerable parts of them, which are moral Beings, we consider the original Patterns as being in the Mind; and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular Beings under Names. And hence I think it is, That these *Essences* of the *Species* of mix'd Modes are by a more particular Name call'd *Notions*; as by a peculiar Right, appertaining to the Understanding.

Their being made by the Understanding without Patterns, shews the reason why they are so compounded.

§. 13. Hence likewise we may learn, *Why the complex* Ideas *of mix'd Modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded, than those of natural Substances*. Because they being the Workmanship of the Understanding, pursuing only its own ends, and the conveniency of expressing in short those *Ideas* it would make known to another, does with great liberty unite often into one abstract *Idea* things that in their Nature have no coherence; and so, under one Term, bundle together a great variety of compounded and decompounded *Ideas*. Thus the Name of *Procession*, what a great mixture of independent *Ideas* of Persons, Habits, Tapers, Orders, Motions, Sounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together, to express by that one Name? Whereas the complex *Ideas* of the sorts of Substances are usually made up of only a small number of simple ones; and in the Species of Animals, these two, *viz.* Shape and Voice, commonly make the whole nominal Essence.

Names of mix'd Modes stand always for their real Essences.

§. 14. Another thing we may observe from what has been said, is, That *the Names of mix'd Modes always signify* (when they have any determin'd Signification) *the real Essences of their Species*. For these abstract *Ideas* being the Workmanship of the Mind, and not refer'd to the real Existence of things, there is no Supposition of any thing more signify'd by that Name, but barely that complex *Idea* the Mind it self has form'd, which is all it would have express'd by it; and is that, on which all the Properties of the *Species* depend, and from which alone they all flow: and so in these the *real* and *nominal Essence* is the same; which of what Concernment it is to the certain Knowledg of general Truth we shall see hereafter.

Why their Names are usually got before their Ideas.

§. 15. This also may shew us the reason, *Why for the most part the Names of mix'd Modes are got, before the* Ideas *they stand for are perfectly known*. Because there being no *Species* of these ordinarily taken notice of, but what have Names, and those *Species*, or rather their Essences, being abstract complex *Ideas* made arbitrarily by the Mind, it is convenient, if not necessary, to know the Names, before one endeavour to frame these complex *Ideas*: unless a Man will fill his Head with a company of abstract complex *Ideas*, which others having no Names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. I confess, that in the beginning of Languages it was necessary to have the *Idea*, before one gave it the Name: And so it is still, where making a new complex *Idea*, one also, by giving it a new Name, makes a new Word. But this concerns not Languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for *Ideas*, which Men have frequent occasion to have and communicate: And in such, I ask, whether it be not the ordinary method, that Children learn the Names of mix'd Modes, before they have their *Ideas*? What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract *Idea* of *Glory* and *Ambition*, before he has heard the Name of them? In simple *Ideas* and Substances, I grant it is otherwise; which being such *Ideas* as have a real Existence and Union in Nature, the *Ideas* or Names are got one before the other, as it happens.

§. 16.

§. 16. What has been ſaid here of mix'd Modes, is with very little difference applicable alſo to Relations; which, ſince every Man himſelf may obſerve, I may ſpare my ſelf the pains to enlarge on: Eſpecially, ſince what I have here ſaid concerning Words in this third Book, will poſſibly be thought by ſome to be much more than what ſo ſlight a Subject requir'd. I allow it might be brought into a narrower Compaſs: but I was willing to ſtay my Reader on an Argument that appears to me new, and a little out of the way, (I am ſure 'tis one I thought not of when I began to write) That by ſearching it to the bottom, and turning it on every ſide, ſome part or other might meet with every one's Thoughts, and give occaſion to the moſt averſe or negligent to reflect on a general Miſcarriage; which, tho' of great conſequence, is little taken notice of. When it is conſider'd what a pudder is made about *Eſſences*, and how much all ſorts of Knowledg, Diſcourſe, and Converſation are peſter'd and diſorder'd by the careleſs and confus'd Uſe and Application of Words, it will perhaps be thought worth while thorowly to lay it open. And I ſhall be pardon'd if I have dwelt long on an Argument which I think therefore needs to be inculcated; becauſe the Faults, Men are uſually guilty of in this kind, are not only the greateſt hinderances of true Knowledg, but are ſo well thought of, as to paſs for it. Men would often ſee what a ſmall Pittance of Reaſon and Truth, or poſſibly none at all, is mix'd with thoſe huffing Opinions they are ſwell'd with; if they would but look beyond faſhionable Sounds, and obſerve what *Ideas* are, or are not comprehended under thoſe words with which they are ſo arm'd at all points, and with which they ſo confidently lay about them. I ſhall imagine I have done ſome ſervice to Truth, Peace and Learning, if, by any enlargement on this Subject, I can make Men reflect on their own Uſe of Language; and give them reaſon to ſuſpect, that ſince it is frequent for others, it may alſo be poſſible for them to have ſometimes very good and approv'd Words in their Mouths and Writings, with very uncertain, little, or no Signification. And therefore it is not unreaſonable for them to be wary herein themſelves, and not to be unwilling to have them examin'd by others. With this deſign therefore I ſhall go on with what I have farther to ſay concerning this matter.

Reaſon of my being ſo large on this Subject.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Subſtances.

§. 1. THE *common Names of Subſtances*, as well as other general Terms, *ſtand for Sorts*; which is nothing elſe but the being made Signs of ſuch complex *Ideas*, wherein ſeveral particular Subſtances do or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common Conception, and ſignify'd by one Name. I ſay, do or might agree: for tho' there be but one Sun exiſting in the World, yet the *Idea* of it being abſtracted, ſo that more Subſtances (if there were ſeveral) might each agree in it; it is as much a Sort, as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars. They want not their Reaſons who think there are, and that each fix'd Star would anſwer the *Idea* the Name *Sun* ſtands for, to one who were plac'd in a due diſtance; which, by the way, may ſhew us how much the Sorts, or, if you pleaſe, *Genera* and *Species* of things (for thoſe *Latin* Terms ſignify to me no more than the *Engliſh* word *Sort*) depend on ſuch Collections of *Ideas* as Men have made, and not on the real Nature of things; ſince 'tis not impoſſible, but that in propriety of Speech, that might be a Sun to one, which is a Star to another.

The common Names of Subſtances ſtand for Sorts.

§. 2. The Meaſure and Boundary of each Sort, or *Species*, whereby it is conſtituted that particular Sort, and diſtinguiſh'd from others, is that we call its *Eſſence*, which *is* nothing but that *abſtract* Idea *to which the Name is annex'd*: ſo that every thing contain'd in that *Idea* is eſſential to that Sort. This, tho' it be all the *Eſſence* of natural Subſtances that we know, or by which we diſtinguiſh them into Sorts; yet I call it by a peculiar Name, the *nominal Eſſence*, to diſtinguiſh it from that real Conſtitution of Subſtances, upon which depends this

The Eſſence of each ſort is the abſtract Idea.

this *nominal Essence*, and all the Properties of that Sort; which therefore, as has been said, may be call'd the *real Essence*: *v. g.* the *nominal Essence* of *Gold* is that complex *Idea* the Word *Gold* stands for, let it be, for instance, a Body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fix'd. But the *real Essence* is the Constitution of the insensible Parts of that Body, on which those Qualities, and all the other Properties of Gold depend. How far these two are different, tho' they are both call'd *Essence*, is obvious at first sight to discover.

The nominal and real Essence different.

§. 3. For tho' perhaps voluntary Motion, with Sense and Reason, join'd to a Body of a certain Shape, be the complex *Idea* to which I, and others, annex the name *Man*, and so be the *nominal Essence* of the *Species* so call'd; yet no body will say that that complex *Idea* is the *real Essence* and Source of all those Operations which are to be found in any Individual of that Sort. The Foundation of all those Qualities, which are the Ingredients of our complex *Idea*, is something quite different: And had we such a Knowledg of that Constitution of *Man*, from which his Faculties of Moving, Sensation, and Reasoning, and other Powers flow; and on which his so regular Shape depends, as 'tis possible Angels have, and 'tis certain his Maker has; we should have a quite other *Idea* of his *Essence* than what now is contain'd in our Definition of that *Species*, be it what it will: And our *Idea* of any individual *Man* would be as far different from what it now is, as is his who knows all theSprings and Wheels and other Contrivances within, of the famous Clock at *Strasburgh*, from that which a gazing Country-man has of it, who barely sees the Motion of the Hand, and hears the Clock strike, and observes only some of the outward Appearances.

Nothing essential to Individuals,

§. 4. That *Essence*, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to *Sorts*; and that it is consider'd in particular Beings no farther than as they are rank'd into *Sorts*, appears from hence: That take but away the abstract *Ideas*, by which we sort Individuals, and rank them under common Names, and then the thought of any thing *essential* to any of them, instantly vanishes; we have no notion of the one without the other; which plainly shews their relation. 'Tis necessary for me to be as I am; GOD and Nature has made me so: but there is nothing, I have is essential to me. An Accident, or Disease, may very much alter my Colour, or Shape; a Fever, or Fall, may take away my Reason or Memory or both; and an Apoplexy leave neither Sense nor Understanding, no nor Life. Other Creatures of my Shape may be made with more, and better, or fewer, and worse Faculties than I have: and others may have Reason and Sense in a Shape and Body very different from mine. None of these are essential to the one, or the other, or to any Individual whatsoever, till the Mind refers it to some Sort or *Species* of things; and then presently, according to the abstract *Idea* of that Sort, something is found *essential*. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and he will find that as soon as he supposes or speaks of *Essential*, the Consideration of some *Species*, or the complex *Idea*, signify'd by some general Name, comes into his Mind: And 'tis in reference to that, that this or that Quality is said to be *essential*. So that if it be ask'd, whether it be *essential* to me or any other particular corporeal Being to have Reason? I say no; no more than it is *essential* to this white thing I write on, to have words in it. But if that particular Being be to be counted of the sort *Man*, and to have the name *Man* given it, then Reason is *essential* to it, supposing Reason to be a part of the complex *Idea* the name *Man* stands for: as it is *essential* to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give it the name *Treatise*, and rank it under that *Species*. So that *essential, and not essential, relate only to our abstract* Ideas, *and the Names annex'd to them*; which amounts to no more but this, That whatever particular thing has not in it those Qualities, which are contain'd in the abstract *Idea*, which any general Term stands for, cannot be rank'd under that *Species*, nor be call'd by that name, since that abstract *Idea* is the very *Essence* of that *Species*.

§. 5. Thus if the *Idea* of *Body*, with some People, be bare Extension or Space, then Solidity is not *essential* to Body: If others make the *Idea*, to which they give the name *Body*, to be Solidity and Extension, then Solidity is essential to *Body*. That therefore, and *that alone is* consider'd as *essential, which makes a part of the complex* Idea *the Name of a Sort stands for*, without which no particular thing can be reckon'd of that Sort, nor be entitled to that Name. Should

there

there be found a parcel of Matter that had all the other Qualities that are in *Iron*, but wanted Obedience to the Load-ſtone: and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive Direction from it, Would any one queſtion, whether it wanted any thing *eſſential*? It would be abſurd to ask, Whether a thing really exiſting wanted any thing *eſſential* to it. Or could it be demanded, Whether this made an *eſſential* or *ſpecifick* difference or no; ſince we have no other meaſure of *eſſential* or *ſpecifick*, but our abſtract *Ideas*? And to talk of ſpecifick Differences in Nature, without reference to general *Ideas* and Names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, What is ſufficient to make an *eſſential* difference in Nature, between any two particular Beings, without any regard had to ſome abſtract *Idea*, which is look'd upon as the Eſſence and Standard of a *Species*? All ſuch Patterns and Standards, being quite laid aſide, particular Beings, conſider'd barely in themſelves, will be found to have all their Qualities equally *eſſential*; and every thing, in each Individual, will be *eſſential* to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For tho' it may be reaſonable to ask, Whether obeying the Magnet be *eſſential* to *Iron*? yet, I think, it is very improper and inſignificant to ask, Whether it be *eſſential* to the particular parcel of Matter I cut my Pen with, without conſidering it under the name *Iron*, or as being of a certain *Species*? And it, as has been ſaid, our abſtract *Ideas*, which have Names annex'd to them, are the Boundaries of *Species*, nothing can be *eſſential* but what is contain'd in thoſe *Ideas*.

§. 6. 'Tis true, I have often mention'd a *real Eſſence*, diſtinct in Subſtances from thoſe abſtract *Ideas* of them, which I call their *nominal Eſſence*. By this *real Eſſence* I mean that real Conſtitution of any thing, which is the Foundation of all thoſe Properties that are combin'd in, and are conſtantly found to coexiſt with the *nominal Eſſence*; that particular Conſtitution which every thing has within it ſelf, without any relation to any thing without it. But *Eſſence*, even in this ſence, *relates to a Sort*, and ſuppoſes a *Species*: For being that real Conſtitution, on which the Properties depend, it neceſſarily ſuppoſes a ſort of things, Properties belonging only to *Species*, and not to Individuals; *v. g.* Suppoſing the nominal Eſſence of *Gold* to be Body of ſuch a peculiar Colour and Weight, with Malleability and Fuſibility, the real Eſſence is that Conſtitution of the Parts of Matter, on which theſe Qualities, and their Union, depend; and is alſo the Foundation of its Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, and other Properties accompanying that complex *Idea*. Here are *Eſſences* and *Properties*, but all upon ſuppoſition of a Sort, or general abſtract *Idea*, which is conſider'd as immutable: but there is no individual Parcel of Matter, to which any of theſe Qualities are ſo annex'd, as to be *eſſential* to it, or inſeparable from it, That which is *eſſential* belongs to it as a Condition, whereby it is of this or that Sort: But take away the Conſideration of its being rank'd under the Name of ſome abſtract *Idea*, and then there is nothing neceſſary to it, nothing inſeparable from it. Indeed, as to the *real Eſſences* of Subſtances, we only ſuppoſe their Being, without preciſely knowing what they are: But that which annexes them ſtill to the *Species*, is the nominal Eſſence, of which they are the ſuppos'd Foundation and Cauſe.

§. 7. The next thing to be conſider'd, is, by which of thoſe Eſſences it is that *Subſtances are determin'd into* Sorts, or *Species*; and that, 'tis evident, is *by the nominal Eſſence*. For 'tis that alone that the Name, which is the mark of the Sort, ſignifies. 'Tis impoſſible therefore that any thing ſhould determine the Sorts of things, which we rank under general Names, but that *Idea* which that Name is deſign'd as a mark for; which is that, as has been ſhewn, which we call the *nominal Eſſence*. Why do we ſay, This is a *Horſe*, and that a *Mule*; this is an *Animal*, that an *Herb*? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that *Sort*, but becauſe it has that nominal Eſſence, or, which is all one, agrees to that abſtract *Idea* that Name is annex'd to? And I deſire any one but to reflect on his own Thoughts when he hears or ſpeaks any of thoſe, or other Names of Subſtances, to know what ſort of *Eſſences* they ſtand for. *The nominal Eſſence bounds the Species.*

§. 8. And that the *Species of things to us are nothing but the ranking them under diſtinct Names, according to the complex* Ideas *in us*; and not according to preciſe, diſtinct, real *Eſſences* in them, is plain from hence, That we find many of the Individuals that are rank'd into one Sort, call'd by one common Name, and ſo-

receiv'd as being of one *Species*, have yet Qualities depending on their real Constitutions, as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ *specifically*. This as it is easy to be observ'd by all who have to do with natural Bodies, so Chymists especially are often, by sad Experience, convinc'd of it, when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same Qualities in one parcel of Sulphur, Antimony or Vitriol, which they have found in others. For tho' they are Bodies of the same *Species*, having the same nominal *Essence*, under the same Name; yet do they often, upon severe ways of Examination, betray Qualities so different one from another; as to frustrate the Expectation and Labour of very wary Chymists. But if Things were distinguish'd into *Species*, according to their real Essences, it would be as impossible to find different Properties in any two individual Substances of the same *Species*, as it is to find different Properties in two Circles, or two equilateral Triangles. That is properly the *Essence* to us, which determines every particular to this or that *Classis*; or, which is the same thing, to this or that general Name: And what can that be else, but that abstract *Idea*, to which that Name is annex'd? and so has, in truth, a Reference, not so much to the being of particular things, as to their general Denominations.

Not the real Essence which we know not.

§. 9. Nor indeed *can we* rank, and *sort Things*, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate them *by their real Essences*, because we know them not. Our Faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledg and distinction of Substances, than a Collection of those sensible *Ideas* which we observe in them; which however made with the greatest Diligence and Exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal Constitution, from which those Qualities flow, than, as I said, a Countryman's *Idea* is from the inward Contrivance of that famous Clock at *Strasburg*, whereof he only sees the outward Figure and Motions. There is not so contemptible a plant or Animal that does not confound the most inlarg'd Understanding. Tho' the familiar use of Things about us, take off our Wonder; yet it cures not our Ignorance. When we come to examine the Stones we tread on, or the Iron we daily handle, we presently find we know not their Make, and can give no reason of the different Qualities we find in them. 'Tis evident the internal Constitution, whereon their Properties depend, is unknown to us. For to go no farther than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them, What is that Texture of Parts, that real *Essence*, that makes Lead and Antimony fusible; Wood and Stones not? What makes Lead and Iron malleable, Antimony and Stones not? And yet how infinitely these come short of the fine Contrivances, and unconceivable *real Essences* of Plants or Animals, every one knows. The workmanship of the All-wise and Powerful God, in the great Fabrick of the Universe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the Capacity and Comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent Man, than the best Contrivance of the most ingenious Man doth the Conceptions of the most ignorant of rational Creatures, Therefore we in vain pretend to range Things into Sorts, and dispose them into certain Glasses, under Names, by their *real Essences*, that are so far from our Discovery or Comprehension. A blind Man may as soon sort things by their Colours, and he that has lost his Smell, as well distinguish a Lilly and a Rose by their Odors, as by those internal Constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish Sheep and Goats by their real Essences, that are unknown to him, may be pleas'd to try his Skill in those *Species*, call'd *Cassowary* and *Querechinchio*; and by their internal real Essences determine the Boundaries of those *Species*, without knowing the complex *Idea* of sensible Qualities, that each of those stand for, in the Countries where those Animals are to be found.

Not substantial Forms which we know less.

§. 10. Those therefore who have been taught, that the several *Species* of Substances had their distinct internal *substantial Forms*; and that it was those *Forms* which made the distinction of Substances into their true *Species* and *Genera*, were led yet farther out of the way, by having their Minds set upon fruitless Enquiries after *substantial Forms*, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure, or confus'd Conception in general.

§. 11. That our *ranking* and distinguishing natural *Substances into Species, consists in the Nominal Essences* the Mind makes, and not in the real Essences to be found

found in the Things themſelves, is farther evident from our *Ideas* of *Spirits*. For the Mind getting, only by reflecting on its own Operations, thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which it attributes to *Spirits*, it hath, or can have no other Notion of *Spirit*, but by attributing all thoſe Operations, it finds in it ſelf, to a ſort of Beings, without conſideration of Matter. And even the moſt advanc'd Notion we have of God, is but attributing the ſame ſimple *Ideas* which we have got from Reflection on what we find in our ſelves, and which we conceive to have more Perfection in them, than would be in their Abſence; attributing, I ſay, thoſe ſimple *Ideas* to him in an unlimited degree. Thus having got, from reflecting on our ſelves, the *Idea* of Exiſtence, Knowledg, Power and Pleaſure, each of which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of each, the better; joining all theſe together, with Infinity to each of them, we have the complex *Idea* of an eternal, omniſcient, omnipotent, infinitely wiſe and happy Being. And tho' we are told, that there are different *Species of Angels*; yet we know not how to frame diſtinct ſpecifick *Ideas* of them: not out of any Conceit that the Exiſtence of more *Species* than one of *Spirits* is impoſſible, but becauſe having no more ſimple *Ideas* (nor being able to frame more) applicable to ſuch Beings, but only thoſe few taken from our ſelves, and from the Actions of our own Minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving ſeveral Parts of our Bodies, we can no otherwiſe diſtinguiſh in our Conceptions the ſeveral *Species of Spirits*, one from another, but by attributing thoſe Operations and Powers, we find in our ſelves, to them in a higher or lower degree; and ſo have no very diſtinct ſpecifick *Ideas* of *Spirits*, except only of GOD, to whom we attribute both Duration, and all thoſe other *Ideas* with Infinity; to the other *Spirits*, with limitation. Nor as I humbly conceive do we, between GOD and them in our *Ideas*, put any difference by any number of ſimple *Ideas*, which we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of Infinity. All the particular *Ideas* of Exiſtence, Knowledg, Will, Power, and Motion, *&c.* being *Ideas* deriv'd from the Operations of our Minds, we attribute all of them to all ſorts of *Spirits*, with the difference only of degrees, to the utmoſt we can, imagine, even Infinity, when we would frame, as well as we can, an *Idea* of the firſt Being; who yet, 'tis certain, is infinitely more remote in the real Excellency of his Nature, from the higheſt and perfecteſt of all created Beings, than the greateſt Man, nay pureſt Seraphim, is from the moſt contemptible part of Matter; and conſequently muſt infinitely exceed what our narrow Underſtandings can conceive of him.

That the nominal Eſſence is that whereby we diſtinguiſh Species, farther evident from Spirits.

§. 12. It is not impoſſible to conceive, nor repugnant to Reaſon, that there may be many *Species of Spirits*, as much ſeparated and diverſify'd one from another, by diſtinct Properties, whereof we have no *Ideas*, as the *Species* of ſenſible Things are diſtinguiſh'd one from another by Qualities, which we know and obſerve in them. That there ſhould be more *Species* of intelligent Creatures above us, than there are of ſenſible and material below us, is probable to me from hence, That in all the viſible corporeal World, we ſee no Chaſms or Gaps. All quite down from us, the Deſcent is by eaſy Steps, and a continu'd Series of Things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are Fiſhes that have Wings, that are not Strangers to the airy Region; and there are ſome Birds, that are Inhabitants of the Water, whoſe Blood is cold as Fiſhes, and their Fleſh is ſo like in Taſte, that the ſcrupulous are allow'd them on Fiſh-days. There are Animals ſo near of kin both to Birds and Beaſts, that they are in the middle between both: Amphibious Animals link the Terreſtrial and Aquatick together; Seals live at Land and at Sea, and Porpoiſes have the warm Blood and Entrails of a Hog, not to mention what is confidently reported of Mermaids or Seamen. There are ſome Brutes, that ſeem to have as much Knowledg and Reaſon, as ſome that are call'd Men; and the Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms are ſo nearly join'd, that if you will take the loweſt of one, and the higheſt of the other, there will ſcarce be perceiv'd any great difference between them; and ſo on, till we come to the loweſt and the moſt inorganical Parts of Matter, we ſhall find every where, that the ſeveral *Species* are link'd together, and differ but in almoſt inſenſible degrees. And when we conſider the infinite Power and Wiſdom of the Maker, we have reaſon to think, that it is ſuitable to the magnificent Harmony of the Univerſe, and the great

Whereof there are probably numberleſs Species.

Deſign and infinite Goodneſs of the Architect, that the *Species* of Creatures ſhould alſo, by gentle degrees, aſcend upward from us toward his infinite Perfection, as we ſee they gradually deſcend from us downwards: Which if it be probable, we have reaſon then to be perſuaded, that there are far more *Species* of Creatures above us, then there are beneath; we being, in degrees of Perfection, much more remote from the infinite Being of GOD, than we are from the loweſt State of Being, and that which approaches neareſt to nothing. And yet of all thoſe diſtinct *Species*, for the Reaſons aboveſaid, we have no clear diſtinct *Ideas*.

The nominal Eſſence that of the Species, prov'd from Water and Ice.

§. 13. But to return to the *Species* of corporeal Subſtances. If I ſhould ask any one, whether *Ice* and *Water* were two diſtinct *Species* of Things, I doubt not but I ſhould be anſwer'd in the affirmative: And it cannot be deny'd, but he that ſays they are two diſtinct *Species*, is in the right. But if an *Engliſhman*, bred in *Jamaica*, who perhaps had never ſeen nor heard of *Ice*, coming into *England* in the Winter, find the Water, he puts in his Baſon at night, in a great part frozen in the morning, and not knowing any peculiar Name it had, ſhould call it harden'd Water; I ask, whether this would be a new *Species* to him different from Water? And, I think, it would be anſwer'd here, It would not be to him a new *Species*, no more than congeal'd Gelly, when it is cold, is a diſtinct *Species* from the ſame Gelly fluid and warm; or than liquid Gold, in the Furnace, is a diſtinct *Species* from hard Gold in the hands of a Workman. And if this be ſo, 'tis plain, that our *diſtinct Species are nothing but diſtinct complex* Ideas, *with diſtinct Names annex'd to them.* 'Tis true, every Subſtance that exiſts has its peculiar Conſtitution, whereon depend thoſe ſenſible Qualities and Powers we obſerve in it; but the ranking of Things into *Species*, which is nothing but ſorting them under ſeveral Titles, is done by us according to the *Ideas* that we have of them: Which tho ſufficient to diſtinguiſh them by Names, ſo that we may be able to diſcourſe of them, when we have them not preſent before us; yet if we ſuppoſe it to be done by their real internal Conſtitutions, and that Things exiſting are diſtinguiſh'd by Nature into Species, by real Eſſences, according as we diſtinguiſh them into *Species* by Names, we ſhall be liable to great Miſtakes.

Difficulties againſt a certain number of real Eſſences.

§. 14. To diſtinguiſh ſubſtantial Beings into *Species*, according to the uſual Suppoſition, that there are certain preciſe *Eſſences* or *Forms* of Things, whereby all the Individuals exiſting, are by Nature diſtinguiſh'd into *Species*, theſe things are neceſſary:

§. 15. *Firſt*, To be aſſur'd that Nature, in the Production of Things, always deſigns them to partake of certain regulated eſtabliſh'd *Eſſences*, which are to be the Models of all things to be produc'd. This, in that crude Senſe it is uſually propos'd, would need ſome better Explication before it can fully be aſſented to.

§. 16. *Secondly*, It would be neceſſary to know whether Nature always attains that *Eſſence* it deſigns in the production of things. The irregular and monſtrous Births, that in divers ſorts of Animals have been obſerv'd, will always give us reaſon to doubt of one or both of theſe.

§. 17. *Thirdly*, It ought to be determin'd whether thoſe we call *Monſters* be really a diſtinct *Species*, according to the ſcholaſtick Notion of the word *Species*; ſince it is certain, that every thing that exiſts has its particular Conſtitution: And yet we find that ſome of theſe monſtrous Productions have few or none of thoſe Qualities, which are ſuppos'd to reſult from, and accompany the *Eſſence* of that *Species*, from whence they derive their Originals, and to which, by their Deſcent, they ſeem to belong.

Our nominal Eſſences of Subſtances, not perfect Collections of Properties.

§. 18. *Fourthly*, The *real Eſſences* of thoſe things, which we diſtinguiſh into *Species*, and as ſo diſtinguiſh'd we name, ought to be known; *i. e.* we ought to have *Ideas* of them. But ſince we are ignorant in theſe four Points, *the ſuppos'd real Eſſences of Things ſtand us not in ſtead for the diſtinguiſhing Subſtances into Species.*

§. 19. *Fifthly*, The only imaginable Help in this Caſe would be, that having fram'd perfect complex *Ideas* of the *Properties* of things, flowing from their different real Eſſences, we ſhould thereby diſtinguiſh them into *Species*. But neither can this be done; for being ignorant of the real Eſſence it ſelf, it is impoſſible

poſſible to know all thoſe Properties that flow from it, and are ſo annex'd to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that that Eſſence is not there, and ſo the Thing is not of that *Species*. We can never know what are the preciſe number of Properties depending on the real Eſſence of *Gold*, any one of which failing, the real Eſſence of Gold, and conſequently Gold, would not be there, unleſs we knew the real Eſſence of Gold it ſelf, and by that determin'd that *Species*. By the word *Gold* here, I muſt be underſtood to deſign a particular piece of Matter; *v. g.* the laſt Guinea that was coin'd. For if it ſhould ſtand here in its ordinary Signification for that complex *Idea*, which I or any one elſe calls Gold; *i. e.* for the nominal Eſſence of Gold, it would be *Jargon*: ſo hard is it to ſhew the various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing elſe but words to do it by.

§. 20. By all which it is clear, That our *diſtinguiſhing Subſtances into Species* by Names, *is not* at all *founded on their real Eſſences*; nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into Species, according to the internal eſſential Differences.

But ſuch a Collection as our Name ſtands for.

§. 21. But ſince, as has been remark'd, we have need of general words, tho we know not the real Eſſences of Things; all we can do is to collect ſuch a number of ſimple *Ideas*, as by Examination we find to be united together in Things exiſting, and thereof to make one complex *Idea*. Which tho it be not the real Eſſence of any Subſtance that exiſts, is yet *the ſpecifick Eſſence*, to which our Name belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at leaſt try the Truth of theſe nominal Eſſences. For example, there be that ſay, that the Eſſence of *Body* is Extenſion: If it be ſo, we can never miſtake in putting the Eſſence of any thing for Thing it ſelf. Let us then in Diſcourſe put *Extenſion* for *Body*; and when we would ſay that Body moves, let us ſay that Extenſion moves, and ſee how it will look. He that ſhould ſay that one Extenſion by Impulſe moves another Extenſion, would by the bare Expreſſion, ſufficiently ſhew the Abſurdity of ſuch a Notion. The *Eſſence* of any thing, in reſpect of us, is the whole complex *Idea*, comprehended and mark'd by that Name; and in Subſtances, beſides the ſeveral diſtinct ſimple *Ideas* that make them up, the confus'd one of Subſtance, or of an unknown Support and Cauſe of their Union, is always a part: And therefore the Eſſence of Body is not bare Extenſion, but an extended ſolid thing: and ſo to ſay an extended ſolid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible as to ſay, *Body* moves or impels. Likewiſe to ſay, that a rational Animal is capable of Converſation, is all one as to ſay a *Man*. But no one will ſay, that Rationality is capable of Converſation, becauſe it makes not the whole Eſſence to which we give the name Man.

Our abſtract Ideas are to us the Meaſures of Species; inſtance in that of Man.

§. 22. There are Creatures in the World that have Shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want Language and Reaſon. There are Naturals amongſt us that have perfectly our Shape, but want Reaſon, and ſome of them Language too. There are Creatures, as 'tis ſaid (*ſit fides penes Authorem*, but there appears no Contradiction that there ſhould be ſuch) that with Language, and Reaſon, and a Shape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy Tails; others where the Males have no Beards, and others where the Females have. If it be ask'd, whether theſe be all *Men* or no, all of human *Species*; 'tis plain, the Queſtion refers only to the nominal Eſſence: For thoſe of them to whom the definition of the word *Man*, or the complex *Idea* ſignify'd by that Name, agrees, are *Men*, and the other not, But if the Inquiry be made concerning the ſuppos'd real Eſſence, and whether the internal Conſtitution and Frame of theſe ſeveral Creatures be ſpecifically different, it is wholy impoſſible for us to anſwer, no part of that going into our ſpecifick *Idea*; only we have reaſon to think, that where the Faculties or outward Frame ſo much differs, the internal Conſtitution is not exactly the ſame. But what difference in the internal real Conſtitution makes a ſpecifick difference, it is in vain to enquire; whilſt *our Meaſures of Species* be, as they *are*, *only our abſtract Ideas*, which we know; and not that internal Conſtitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of Hair only on the Skin, be a Mark of a different internal ſpecifick Conſtitution between a Changeling and a Drill, when they agree in Shape, and want of Reaſon and Speech? And ſhall not the want of Reaſon and Speech be a ſign to us of different

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real Conſtitutions and *Species* between a Changeling and a reaſonable Man? And ſo of the reſt, if we pretend that the diſtinction of *Species* or Sorts is fixedly eſtabliſh'd by the real Frame and ſecret Conſtitutions of things.

Species not diſtinguiſh'd by Generation.

§. 23. Nor let any one ſay, that the Power of Propagation in Animals by the mixture of Male and Female, and in Plants by Seeds, keeps the ſuppos'd real *Species* diſtinct and entire. For granting this to be true, it would help us in the diſtinction of the *Species* of things no farther than the Tribes of Animals and Vegetables. What muſt we do for the reſt? But in thoſe too it is not ſufficient: for if Hiſtory lye not, Woman have conceiv'd by Drills; and what real *Species*, by that Meaſure, ſuch a Production will be in Nature, will be a new Queſtion: and we have reaſon to think this is not impoſſible, ſince Mules and Jumarts, the one from the mixture of an Aſs and a Mare, the other from the mixture of a Bull and a Mare, are ſo frequent in the World. I once ſaw a Creature that was the iſſue of a Cat and a Rat, and had the plain Marks of both about it? wherein Nature appear'd to have follow'd the Pattern of neither ſort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which, he that ſhall add the monſtrous Productions that are ſo frequently to be met with in Nature, will find it hard, even in the Race of Animals, to determine by the Pedegree of what *Species* every Animal's Iſſue is; and be at a loſs about the real Eſſence, which he thinks certainly convey'd by Generation, and has alone a right to the ſpecifick Name. But farther, if the *Species* of Animals and Plants are to be diſtinguiſh'd only by Propagation, muſt I go to the *Indies* to ſee the Sire and Dam of the one, and the Plant from which the Seed was gather'd that produc'd the other, to know whether this be a Tyger or that Tea?

Not by ſubſtantial Forms.

§. 24. Upon the whole matter, 'tis evident, that 'tis their own Collections of ſenſible Qualities, that Men make the Eſſences of their ſeveral ſorts of Subſtances; and that their real internal Structures are not conſider'd by the greateſt part of Men, in the ſorting them. Much leſs were any *ſubſtantial Forms* ever thought on by any, but thoſe who have in this one part of the World learn'd the Language of the Schools: and yet thoſe ignorant Men, who pretend not any inſight into the real Eſſences, nor trouble themſelves about ſubſtantial Forms, but are content with knowing things one from another by their ſenſible Qualities, are often better acquainted with their Differences, can more nicely diſtinguiſh them from their Uſes, and better know what they may expect from each, than thoſe learned quick-ſighted Men, who look ſo deep into them, and talk ſo confidently of ſomething more hidden and eſſential.

The ſpecifick Eſſences are made by the Mind.

§. 25. But ſuppoſing that the *real Eſſences* of Subſtances were diſcoverable by thoſe that would ſeverely apply themſelves to that Enquiry, yet we could not reaſonably think, that the *ranking of things under general Names, was regulated by* thoſe internal real Conſtitutions, or any thing elſe but *their obvious Appearances:* ſince Languages, in all Countries, have been eſtabliſh'd long before Sciences. So that they have not been Philoſophers, or Logicians, or ſuch who have troubled themſelves about *Forms* and *Eſſences*, that have made the general Names that are in uſe amongſt the ſeveral Nations of Men: but thoſe more or leſs comprehenſive Terms have for the moſt part, in all Languages, receiv'd their birth and ſignification from ignorant and illiterate People, who ſorted and denominated things by thoſe ſenſible Qualities they found in them; thereby to ſignify them, when abſent, to others, whether they had an occaſion to mention a ſort or a particular thing.

Therefore very various and uncertain.

§. 26. Since then it is evident, that we ſort and name Subſtances by their *nominal*, and not by their real *Eſſences*; the next thing to be conſider'd is, how and by whom theſe *Eſſences* come to be made. As to the latter, 'tis evident they *are made by the Mind*, and not by Nature: For were they Nature's Workmanſhip, they could not be ſo various and different in ſeveral Men, as experience tells us they are. For if we will examin it, we ſhall not find the nominal Eſſence of any one *Species* of Subſtances in all Men the ſame; no not of that which of all others we are the moſt intimately acquainted with. It could not poſſibly be, that the abſtract *Idea* to which the name *Man* is given, ſhould be different in ſeveral Men, if it were of Nature's making; and that to one it ſhould be *Animal rationale*, and to another *Animal implume bipes latis unguibus*. He that annexes the Name *Man*, to a complex *Idea* made up of Senſe and ſpontaneous Motion, join'd to a Body of ſuch a Shape, has thereby one Eſſence of the

the *Species Man*; and he that, upon farther examination, adds Rationality, has another Essence of the *Species* he calls *Man*: by which means, the same Individual will be a true *Man* to the one, which is not so to the other. I think, there is scarce any one will allow this upright Figure, so well known, to be the essential difference of the *Species Man*; and yet how far Men determine of the sorts of Animals rather by their Shape than Descent, is very visible: since it has been more than once debated, whether several human *Fœtus's* should be preserv'd or receiv'd to Baptism or no, only because of the difference of their outward Configuration from the ordinary Make of Children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of Reason, as Infants cast in another Mold: Some whereof tho' of an approv'd Shape, are never capable of as much appearance of Reason, all their lives, as is to be found in an Ape, or an Elephant; and never give any signs of being acted by a rational Soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward Figure, which only was found wanting, and not the Faculty of Reason, which no body could know would be wanting in its due Season, was made essential to the human *Species*: The learned Divine and Lawyer, must, on such occasions, renounce his sacred Definition of *Animal Rationale*, and substitute some other Essence of the human *Species*. Monsieur *Menage* furnishes us with an Example worth the taking notice of on this occasion. *When the Abbot of* St. Martin, says he, *was born, he had so little of the Figure of a Man, that it bespoke him rather a Monster. 'Twas for some time under Deliberation, whether he should be baptiz'd or no. However, he was baptiz'd and declar'd a Man provisionally* [till time should shew what he would prove.] *Nature had molded him so untowardly, that he was call'd all his life the Abbot* Malotru, *i. e.* Ill-shaped. *He was of* Caen. Menagiana $\frac{278}{430}$. This Child, we see, was very near being excluded out of the *Species* of *Man* barely by his Shape. He escap'd very narrowly as he was, and 'tis certain a Figure a little more oddly turn'd had cast him, and he had been executed as a thing not to be allow'd to pass for a Man. And yet there can be no reason given, why if the Lineaments of his Face had been a little alter'd, a rational Soul could not have been lodg'd in him; why a Visage somewhat longer, or a Nose flatter, or a wider Mouth, could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his ill Figure, with such a Soul, such Parts, as made him, disfigur,d as he was, capable to be a Dignitary in the Church.

§. 27. Wherein then, would I gladly know, consists the precise and *unmovable Boundaries* of that *Species*? 'Tis plain, if we examine, there is *no* such thing *made by Nature*, establish'd by her amongst Men. The real Essence of that, or any other sort of Substances, 'tis evident we know not; and therefore are so undetermin'd in our nominal Essences, which we make our selves, that if several Men were to be ask'd concerning some oddly-shaped *Fœtus*, as soon as born, whether it were a *Man* or no, 'tis past doubt, one should meet with different Answers. Which could not happen, if the nominal Essences. whereby we limit and distinguish the *Species* of substances, were not made by Man, with some liberty; but were exactly copy'd from precise Boundaries set by Nature, whereby it distinguish'd all Substances into certain Species. Who would undertake to resolve, what Species that Monster was of, which is mention'd by *Licetus*, *lib.* 1. *c.* 3. with a Man's Head and Hogs Body? Or those other, which to the Bodies of Men had the Heads of Beasts, as Dogs, Horses, *&c.* if any of these Creatures had liv'd, and could have spoke, it would have increas'd the difficulty. Had the upper part, to the middle, been of human Shape, and all below Swine; had it been Murder to destroy it? Or must the Bishop have been consulted, whether it were Man enough to be admitted to the Font or no? as, I have been told, it happen'd in *France* some Years since, in somewhat a like case. So uncertain are the Boundaries of Species of Animals to us, who have no other Measures than the complex *Ideas* of our own collecting: And so far are we from certainly knowing what a *Man* is; tho', perhaps, it will be judg'd great Ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet I think, I may say, that the certain Boundaries of that Species are so far from being determin'd, and the precise number of simple *Ideas*, which make the nominal Essence, so far from being settled and perfectly known, that very material Doubts may still arise about it. And I imagine, none of the Definitions of the word *Man*, which we yet have, nor Descriptions of that sort of Animal, are so perfect and exact, as

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to satisfy a considerate inquisitive Person, much less to obtain a general Consent, and to be that which Men would every where stick by, in the Decision of Cases, and determining of Life and Death, Baptism or no Baptism, in Productions that might happen.

But not so arbitary as mix'd Modes.

§. 28. But tho' these *nominal Essences of Substances* are made by the Mind, they are *not* yet *made so arbitrarily as those of mix'd modes.* To the making of any nominal Essence, it is necessary, *First*, That the *Ideas* whereof it consists, have such an Union as to make but one *Idea*, how compounded soever. *Secondly*, That the particular *Ideas* so united be exactly the same, neither more nor less. For if two abstract complex *Ideas* differ either in Number or Sorts of their component parts, they make two different, and not one and the same Essence. In the first of these, the Mind, in making its complex *Ideas* of Substances, only follows Nature; and puts none together, which are not suppos'd to have an Union in Nature. No body joins the Voice of a Sheep, with the Shape of a Horse; nor the Colour of Lead, with the Weight and Fixedness of Gold, to be the complex *Ideas* of any real Substances: unless he has a Mind to fill his Head with *Chimera's*, and his Discourse with unintelligible Words. Men observing certain Qualities always join'd and existing together, therein copy'd Nature; and of *Ideas* so united, made their complex ones of Substances. For tho' Men may make what complex *Ideas* they please, and give what Names to them they will; yet if they will be understood, when they speak of things really existing, they must in some degree conform their *Ideas* to the things they would speak of: or else Mens Language will be like that of *Babel*; and every Man's Words being intelligible only to himself, would no longer serve to Conversation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life, if the *Ideas* they stand for be not some way answering the common Appearances and Agreement of Substances, as they really exist.

Tho' very imperfect.

§. 29. *Secondly*, Tho' the Mind of Man, *in making* its *complex Ideas of Substances*, never puts any together that do not really or are not suppos'd to co-exist; and so it truly borrows that Union from Nature: yet *the number* it combines, *depends upon the various Care, Industry, or Fancy of him that makes it.* Men generally content themselves with some few sensible obvious Qualities; and often, if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as those that they take. Of sensible Substances there are two sorts; one of organiz'd Bodies which are propagated by Seed; and in these, the Shape is that, which to us is the leading Quality and most characteristical Part that determines the Species. And therefore in Vegetables and Animals, an extended solid Substance of such a certain Figure usually serves the turn. For however some Men seem to prize their Definition of *Animal Rational*, yet should there a Creature be found, that had Language and Reason, but partook not of the usual shape of a Man, I believe it would hardly pass for a *Man*, how much soever it were *Animal Rational*. And if *Balaam's* Ass had, all his life, discours'd as rational as he did once with his Master, I doubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the Name *Man*, or allow'd him to be of the same Species with himself. As in Vegetables and Animals 'tis the Shape, so in most other Bodies, not propagated by Seed, 'tis the Colour we must fix on, and are most led by. Thus where we find the Colour of Gold, we are apt to imagine all the other Qualities, comprehended in our complex *Idea*, to be there also: and we commonly take these two obvious Qualities, *viz.* Shape and Colour, for so presumptive *Ideas* of several *Species*, that in a good Picture we readily say this is a Lion, and that a Rose; this is a Gold, and that a Silver Goblet, only by the different Figures and Colours represented to the Eye by the Pencil.

Which yet serve for common Converse.

§. 30. But tho' this serves well enough for gross and confus'd Conceptions, and unaccurate ways of Talking and Thinking; yet *Men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple* Ideas, *or* Qualities, *belonging to any sort of things, signify'd by its name.* Nor is it a wonder, since it requires much time, pains, and skill, strict enquiry, and long examination, to find out what and how many those simple *Ideas* are, which are constantly and inseparably united in Nature, and are always to be found together in the same Subject. Most Men wanting either Time, Inclination, or Industry enough for this, even to some tolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious and outward Appearances of things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common Affairs

of

of Life: And ſo, without farther examination, give them Names, or take up the names already in uſe. Which, tho' in common Converſation they paſs well enough for the ſigns of ſome few obvious Qualities co-exiſting, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a ſettled ſignification, a preciſe number of ſimple *Ideas*; much leſs all thoſe, which are united in Nature. He that ſhall conſider after ſo much ſtir about *Genus* and *Species*, and ſuch a deal of Talk of ſpecifick Differences, how few Words we have yet ſettled Definitions of, may with reaſon imagine that thoſe *Terms*, which there hath been ſo much noiſe made about, are only *Chimeras*, which give us no light into the ſpecifick Natures of things. And he that ſhall conſider, how far the Names of Subſtances are from having Significations, wherein all who uſe them do agree, will have reaſon to conclude, that tho' the nominal Eſſences of Subſtances are all ſuppos'd to be copy'd from Nature, yet they are all, or moſt of them, very imperfect. Since the Compoſition of thoſe complex *Ideas* are, in ſeveral Men, very different: and therefore that theſe Boundaries of *Species* are as Men, and not as Nature makes them, if at leaſt there are in Nature any ſuch prefix'd Bounds. 'Tis true, that many particular Subſtances are ſo made by Nature, that they have Agreement and Likeneſs one with another, and ſo afford a foundation of being rank'd into ſorts. But the ſorting of things by us, or the making of determinate *Species*, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms, I cannot ſee how it can be properly ſaid, that Nature ſets the Boundaries of the *Species* of things: or if it be ſo, our Boundaries of *Species* are not exactly conformable to thoſe in Nature. For we having need of general Names for preſent uſe, ſtay not for a perfect diſcovery of all thoſe Qualities which would beſt ſhew us their moſt material Differences and Agreements; but we our ſelves divide them, by certain obvious Appearances, into *Species*, that we may the eaſier under general names communicate our Thoughts about them. For having no other Knowledg of any Subſtance, but of the ſimple *Ideas* that are united in it; and obſerving ſeveral particular things to agree with others in ſeveral of thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, we make that Collection our ſpecifick *Idea*, and give it a general Name; that in recording our own Thoughts, and in our Diſcourſe with others, we may in one ſhort word deſign all the Individuals that agree in that complex *Idea*, without enumerating the ſimple *Ideas* that make it up; and ſo not waſte our Time and Breath in tedious Deſcriptions: which we ſee they are fain to do, who would diſcourſe of any new ſort of things, they have not yet a name for.

Eſſences of Species under the ſame name very different.

§. 31. But however theſe Species of Subſtances paſs well enough in ordinary Converſation, it is plain that this complex *Idea*, wherein they obſerve ſeveral Individuals to agree, is by different Men made very differently; by ſome more and others leſs accurately. in ſome, this complex *Idea* contains a greater, and in others a ſmaller number of Qualities; and ſo is apparently ſuch as the Mind makes it. The yellow ſhining Colour makes *Gold* to Children; others add Weight, Malleableneſs, and Fuſibility; and others yet other Qualities, which they find join'd with that yellow Colour, as conſtantly as its Weight and Fuſibility: For in all theſe and the like Qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex *Idea* of that Subſtance wherein they are all join'd, as another. And therefore *different Men* leaving out or putting in ſeveral ſimple *Ideas*, which others do not, according to their various Examination, Skill, or Obſervation of that Subject, *have different Eſſences of Gold*; which muſt therefore be of their own, and not of Nature's making.

The more general our Ideas are, the more incompleat and partial they are.

§. 32. If the number of ſimple *Ideas*, that make the nominal Eſſence of the loweſt Species, or firſt ſorting of Individuals, depends on the Mind of Man variouſly collecting them, it is much more evident that they do ſo, in the more comprehenſive *Claſſis*, which by the Maſters of Logick are call'd *Genera*. Theſe are complex *Ideas* deſignedly imperfect: And 'tis viſible at firſt ſight, that ſeveral of thoſe Qualities that are to be found in the things themſelves, are purpoſely left out of *generical Ideas*. For as the Mind, to make general *Ideas* comprehending ſeveral particulars, leaves out thoſe of Time, and Place, and ſuch other, that make them incommunicable to more than one Individual; ſo to make other yet more general *Ideas*, that may comprehend different ſorts, it leaves out thoſe Qualities that diſtinguiſh them, and puts into its new Collection only ſuch *Ideas* as are common to ſeveral ſorts. The ſame Convenience that

made Men expreſs ſeveral parcels of yellow Matter coming from *Guinea* and *Peru* under one name, ſets them alſo upon making of one Name that may comprehend both Gold and Silver, and ſome other Bodies of different ſorts. This is done by leaving out thoſe Qualities, which are peculiar to each ſort; and retaining a complex *Idea* made up of thoſe that are common to them all. To which the name *Metal* being annex'd, there is a *Genus* conſtituted; the Eſſence whereof being that abſtract *Idea*, containing only Malleableneſs and Fuſibility, with certain degrees of Weight and Fixedneſs, wherein ſome Bodies of ſeveral kinds agree, leaves out the Colour, and other Qualities peculiar to Gold and Silver, and the other ſorts comprehended under the name *Metal*. Whereby it is plain, that Men follow not exactly the Patterns ſet them by Nature, when they make their general *Ideas* of Subſtances; ſince there is no Body to be found, which has barely Malleableneſs and Fuſibility in it, without other Qualities as inſeparable as thoſe. But Men, in making their general *Ideas*, ſeeing more the Convenience of Language and quick Diſpatch, by ſhort and comprehenſive Signs, than the true and preciſe Nature of things as they exiſt, have, in the framing their abſtract *Ideas*, chiefly purſu'd that End which was to be furniſh'd with ſtore of general and variouſly comprehenſive Names. So that in this whole buſineſs of *Genera* and *Species* the *Genus*, or more comprehenſive, is but a partial Conception of what is in the *Species*, and the *Species* but a partial *Idea* of what is to be found in each Individual. If therefore any one will think, that a *Man*, and a *Horſe*, and an Animal, and a Plant, &c. are diſtinguiſh'd by real Eſſences, made by Nature, he muſt think Nature to be very liberal of theſe real Eſſences, making one for Body, another for an Animal, and another for a Horſe,; and all theſe Eſſences liberally beſtow'd upon *Bucephalus*. But if we would rightly conſider what is done, in all theſe *Genera* and *Species*, or Sorts, we ſhould find, that there is no new thing made, but only more or leſs comprehenſive Signs whereby we may be enabled to expreſs, in a few Syllables, great Numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or leſs general Conceptions, which we have fram'd to that purpoſe. In all which we may obſerve, that the more general term is always the Name of a leſs complex *Idea*; and that each *Genus* is but a partial Conception of the *Species* comprehended under it. So that if theſe abſtract general *Ideas* be thought to be compleat, it can only be in reſpect of a certain eſtabliſh'd Relation between them and certain Names, which are made uſe of to ſignify them; and not in reſpect of any thing exiſting, as made by Nature.

This all accommodated to the end of Speech.

§. 33. *This* is *adjuſted to the true end of Speech*, which is to be the eaſieſt and ſhorteſt way of communicating our Notions. For thus he, that would diſcourſe of things as they agreed in the complex *Idea* of Extenſion and Solidity, needed but uſe the word *Body* to denote all ſuch. He that to theſe would join others, ſignify'd by the words Life, Senſe, and ſpontaneous Motion, needed but uſe the word *Animal*, to ſignify all which partook of thoſe *Ideas*: and he that had made a comp ex *Idea* of a Body, with Life, Senſe, and Motion, with the Faculty of Reaſoning, and a certain Shape join'd to it, needed but uſe the ſhort monoſyllable *Man* to expreſs all Particulars that correſpond to that complex *Idea*. This is the proper buſineſs of *Genus* and *Species*: and this Men do, without any conſideration of *real Eſſences*, or *ſubſtantial Forms*, which come not within the reach of our Knowledg, when we think of thoſe things; nor within the Signification of our words, when we diſcourſe with others.

Inſtance in Contraries.

§. 34. Were I to talk with any one of a ſort of Birds I lately ſaw in St. *James*'s Park, about three or four Foot high, with a Covering of ſomething between Feathers and Hair, of a dark brown Colour without Wings, but in the place thereof two or three little Branches coming down like Sprigs of Spaniſh Broom, long great Legs, with Feet only of three Claws, and without a Tail; I muſt make this Deſcription of it, and ſo may make others underſtand me: But when I am told that the Name of it is *Caſſuaris*, I may then uſe that Word to ſtand in diſcourſe for all my complex *Idea* mention'd in that Diſcription; tho' by that word, which is now become a ſpecifick Name, I know no more of the real Eſſence or Conſtitution of that ſort of Animals than I did before; and knew probably as much of the Nature of that *Species* of Birds, before I learn'd the Name, as many *Engliſh-men* do of Swans, or Herons, which

which are specifick Names, very well known, of Sorts of Birds common in *England*.

§. 35. From what has been said, 'tis evident, that *Men make Sorts of things.* For it being different Essences alone that make different *Species*, 'tis plain that they who make those abstract *Ideas*, which are the nominal Essences, do thereby make the *Species*, or Sort. Should there be a Body found, having all the other Qualities of Gold, except malleableness, 'twould no doubt be made a question whether it were Gold or no, *i. e.* whether it were of that *Species*. This could be determin'd only by that abstract *Idea* to which every one annex'd the name *Gold*: so that it would be true Gold to him, and belong to that *Species*, who included not Malleableness in his nominal Essence, signify'd by the Sound *Gold*; and on the other side it would not be true Gold, or of that *Species* to him who included Malleableness in his specifick *Idea*. And who, I pray, is it that makes these diverse *Species* even under one and the same Name, but Men that make two different abstract *Ideas* consisting not exactly of the same Collection of Qualities? Nor is it a mere Supposition to imagine that a Body may exist, wherein the other obvious Qualities of Gold may be without Malleableness, since it is certain, that Gold it self will be sometimes so eager, (as Artists call it) that it will as little endure the Hammer as Glass it self. What we have said, of the putting in or leaving Malleableness out of the complex *Idea*, the name *Gold* is by any one annex'd to, may be said of its peculiar Weight, Fixedness, and several other the like Qualities: For whatsoever is left out, or put in, 'tis still the complex *Idea*, to which that Name is annex'd, that makes the *Species*: and as any particular Parcel of Matter answers that *Idea*, so the Name of the Sort belongs truly to it; and 'tis of that *Species*. And thus any thing is true *Gold*, perfect *Metal*. All which determination of the *Species*, 'tis plain, depends on the Understanding of Man, making this or that complex *Idea*. *Men determine the Sorts.*

§. 36. This then, in short, is the case: *Nature makes many particular things which do agree* one with another, in many sensible Qualities, and probably too in their internal Frame and Constitution: but 'tis not this real Essence that distinguishes them into *Species*; 'tis *Men*, who, taking occasion from the Qualities they find united in them, and wherein they observe often several Individuals to agree, *range them into Sorts, in order to their naming*, for the convenience of comprehensive Signs; under which Individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abstract *Idea*, come to be rank'd as under Ensigns; so that this is of the Blue, that the Red Regiment; this is a Man, that a Drill: And in this, I think, consists the whole business of *Genus* and *Species*. *Nature makes the Similitude.*

§. 37. I do not deny but Nature, in the constant Production of particular Beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kin one to another: But I think it nevertheless true, that *the Boundaries of the Species, whereby Men sort them, are made by Men*; since the Essences of the *Species*, distinguish'd by different Names, are, as has been prov'd, of Man's making, and seldom adequate to the internal Nature of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly say, such a manner of sorting of things is the Workmanship of Men.

§. 38. One thing I doubt not but will seem very strange in this Doctrine; which is, that from what has been said it will follow, that *each abstract* Idea, *with a name to it, makes a distinct Species.* But who can help it if Truth will have it so? For so it must remain till some body can shew us the *Species* of things limited and distinguish'd by something else; and let us see, that general Terms signify not our abstract *Ideas*, but something different from them. I would fain know why a Shock and a Hound are not as distinct *Species* as a Spaniel and an Elephant. We have no other *Idea* of the different Essence of an Elephant and a Spaniel, than we have of the different Essence of a Shock and a Hound; all the essential difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one from another, consisting only in the different Collection of simple *Ideas*, to which we have given those different Names. *Each abstract* Idea *is an Essence.*

§. 39. How much *the making of* Species *and* Genera *is in order to general Names*, and how much general Names are necessary, if not to the Being, yet at least to the compleating of a *Species*, and making it pass for such, will appear, besides what has been said above concerning Ice and Water, in a very familiar *Genera and Species are in order to naming.*

Example. A ſilent and a ſtriking *Watch* are but one *Species* to thoſe who have but one Name for them: but he that has the name *Watch* for one, and *Clock* for the other, and diſtinct complex *Ideas*, to which thoſe Names belong, to him they are different *Species*. It will be ſaid perhaps that the inward Contrivance and Conſtitution is different between theſe two, which the Watch-maker has a clear *Idea* of. And yet, 'tis plain, they are but one *Species* to him, when he has but one Name for them. For what is ſufficient in the inward Contrivance to make a new *Species?* There are ſome *Watches* that are made with four Wheels, others with five: Is this a ſpecifick difference to the Workman? Some have Strings and Phyſies, and others none; ſome have the Ballance looſe, and others regulated by a Spiral Spring, and others by Hogs-Briſtles: Are any or all of theſe enough to make a ſpecifick difference to the Workman, that knows each of theſe, and ſeveral other different Contrivances, in the internal Conſtitutions of *Watches?* 'Tis certain each of theſe hath a real difference from the reſt: But whether it be an eſſential, a ſpecifick difference or no, relates only to the complex *Idea* to which the name *Watch* is given: as long as they all agree in the *Idea* which that Name ſtands for, and that Name does not as a generical Name comprehend different *Species* under it, they are not eſſentially nor ſpecifically different. But if any one will make minuter Diviſions from Differences that he knows in the internal Frame of Watches, and to ſuch preciſe complex *Ideas*, give Names that ſhall prevail; they will then be new *Species* to them, who have thoſe *Ideas* with Names to them; and can, by thoſe differences, diſtinguiſh Watches into theſe ſeveral ſorts, and then *Watch* will be a generical Name. But yet they would be no diſtinct *Species* to Men ignorant of Clock-work and the inward Contrivances of Watches, who had no other *Idea* but the outward Shape and Bulk. with the marking of the Hours by the Hand. For to them all thoſe other Names would be but ſynonymous Terms for the ſame *Idea*, and ſignify no more, nor no other thing but a *Watch*. Juſt thus, I think, it is in natural things. No body will doubt that the Wheels or Springs (if I may ſo ſay) within, are different in a *rational Man* and a *Changeling*, no more than that there is a difference in the Frame between a *Drill* and a *Changeling*. But whether one, or both theſe Differences be eſſential or ſpecifical, is only to be known to us, by their agreement or diſagreement with the complex *Idea* that the name *Man* ſtands for: For by that alone can it be determin'd, whether one, or both, or neither of thoſe be a Man or no.

Species of artificial things leſs confus'd than natural.

§. 40. From what has been before ſaid, we may ſee the reaſon *why, in the Species of artifical things, there is generally leſs Confuſion and Uncertainty, than in natural.* Becauſe an *artifical* thing being a production of Man, which the Artificer deſign'd, and therefore well knows the *Idea* of, the Name of it is ſuppos'd to ſtand for no other *Idea*, nor to import any other Eſſence than what is certainly to be known, and eaſy enough to be apprehended. For the *Idea* or Eſſence of the ſeveral ſorts of *artifical* things conſiſting, for the moſt part, in nothing but the determinate Figure of ſenſible Parts; and ſometimes Motion depending thereon, which the Artificer faſhions in Matter, ſuch as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our Faculties to attain a certain *Idea* thereof, and ſo ſettle the Signification of the Names, whereby the Species of *artificial* things are diſtinguiſh'd with leſs Doubt, Obſcurity and Equivocation, than we can in things natural, whoſe Differences and Operations depend upon Contrivances beyond the reach of our Diſcoveries.

Artificial things of diſtinct Species.

§. 41. I muſt be excus'd here if I think *artificial things are of diſtinct Species*, as well as natural: ſince I find they are as plainly and orderly rank'd into Sorts, by different abſtract *Ideas*, with general Names annex'd to them, as diſtinct one from another as thoſe of natural Subſtances. For why ſhould we not think a Watch and Piſtol, as diſtinct Species one from another, as a Horſe and a Dog, they being expreſs'd in our Minds by diſtinct *Ideas*, and to others by diſtinct Appellations?

Subſtances alone have proper Names.

§. 42. This is farther to be obſerv'd concerning *Subſtances*, that they alone of all our ſeveral ſorts of *Ideas* have particular or proper Names, whereby one only particular thing is ſignify'd. Becauſe in ſimple *Ideas*, Modes, and Relations, it ſeldom happens that Men have occaſion to mention often this or that Particular when it is abſent. Beſides, the greateſt part of mix'd Modes, being

Actions

Actions which perish in their Birth, are not capable of a lasting Duration as Substances, which are the Actors; and wherein the simple *Ideas* that make up the complex *Ideas* design'd by the Name, have a lasting Union.

Difficulty to treat of Words.

§. 43. I must beg pardon of my Reader, for having dwelt so long upon this Subject, and perhaps with some Obscurity. But I desire it may be consider'd how *difficult* it is *to lead another by Words into the Thoughts of things, strip'd of those Specifick Differences* we give them: which things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into some sort or other, and suggest to the Mind the usual abstract *Idea* of that *Species*, and so cross my purpose. For to talk of a *Man*, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary Signification of the name Man, which is our complex *Idea* usually annex'd to it; and bid the Reader consider *Man* as he is in himself, and as he is really distinguish'd from others in his internal Constitution, or real Essence, that is, by something he knows, not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one must do who would speak of the suppos'd real Essences and *Species* of things, as thought to be made by Nature, if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signify'd by the general Names, which Substances are call'd by. But because it is difficult by known familiar Names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an Example to make the different Consideration the Mind has of specifick Names and *Ideas* a little more clear; and to shew how the complex *Ideas* of Modes are refer'd sometimes to Archetypes in the Minds of other intelligent Beings; or, which is the same, to the Signification annex'd by others to their receiv'd Names; and sometimes to no Archetypes at all. Give me leave also to shew how the Mind always refers its *Ideas* of Substances, either to the Substances themselves, or to the Signification of their Names as to the *Archetypes*; and also to make plain the Nature of *Species*, or sorting of things, as apprehended, and made use of by us; and of the Essences belonging to those *Species*, which is perhaps of more moment, to discover the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledg, than we at first imagine.

Instance of mix'd Modes in Kinneah *and* Nioupha.

§. 44. Let us suppose *Adam* in the State of a grown Man, with a good Understanding, but in a strange Country, with all things new and unknown about him; and no other Faculties, to attain the Knowledg of them, but what one of this Age has now. He observes *Lamech* more malancholy than usual, and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his Wife *Adah* (whom he most ardently lov'd) that she had too much kindness for another Man. *Adam* discourses these his Thoughts to *Eve* and desires her to take care that *Adah* commit not folly: And in these Discourses with *Eve* he makes use of these two new words, *Kinneah* and *Nioupha*. In time *Adam's* Mistake appears, for he finds *Lamech's* Trouble proceeded from having kill'd a Man: But yet the two Names, *Kinneah* and *Nioupha*; the one standing for Suspicion, in a Husband, of his Wife's Disloyalty to him, and the other for the Act of committing Disloyalty, lost not their distinct Significations. It is plain then that here were two distinct complex *Ideas* of mix'd Modes, with Names to them, two distinct Species of Actions essentially different; I ask wherein consisted the Essences of these two distinct Species of Action? And 'tis plain it consisted in a precise Combination of simple *Ideas*, different in one from the other. I ask, whether the complex *Idea* in *Adam's* Mind, which he call'd *Kinneah*, were adequate or no? And it is plain it was, for it being a Combination of simple *Ideas*, which he, without any regard to any Archetype, without respect to any thing as a Pattern, voluntarily put together, abstract and gave the name *Kinneah* to, to express in short to others, by that one Sound, all the simple *Ideas* contain'd and united in that complex one; it must necessarily follow, that it was an adequate *Idea*. His own Choice having made that Combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being refer'd to no other Archetype which it was suppos'd to represent.

§. 45. These words, *Kinneah* and *Nioupha*, by degrees grew into common use; and then the case was somewhat alter'd. *Adam's* Children had the same Faculties, and thereby the same Power that he had to make what complex *Ideas* of mix'd Modes they pleas'd in their own Minds; to abstract them, and make what Sounds they pleas'd the Signs of them: But the use of Names being to make our *Ideas* within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the same

ſame Signs ſtands for the ſame *Idea* in two who would communicate their Thoughts, and diſcourſe together. Thoſe therefore of *Adam*'s Children, that found theſe two words, *Kinneah* and *Nioaph*, in familiar uſe, could not take them for inſignificant Sounds; but muſt needs conclude, they ſtood for ſomething, for certain *Ideas*, abſtract *Ideas*, they being general Names, which abſtract *Ideas* were the Eſſences of the Species diſtinguiſh'd by thoſe Names. If therefore they would uſe theſe words, as Names of Species already eſtabliſh'd and agreed on, they were oblig'd to conform the *Ideas*, in their Minds, ſignify'd by theſe Names, to the *Ideas*, that they ſtood for in other mens Minds, as to their Patterns and *Archetypes*; and then indeed their *Ideas* of theſe complex Modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (eſpecially thoſe that conſiſted of Combinations of many ſimple *Ideas*) not to be exactly conformable to the *Ideas* in other mens minds, uſing the ſame Names; tho' for this there be uſually a Remedy at hand, which is to ask the meaning of any word we underſtand not, of him that uſes it: it being as impoſſible to know certainly what the words Jealouſy and Adultery (which I think anſwer קנאה and נאוף) ſtand for in another man's Mind, with whom I would diſcourſe about them; as it was impoſſible, in the beginning of Language, to know what *Kinneah* and *Nioaph* ſtood for in another man's Mind, without Explication, they being voluntary Signs in every one.

Inſtance of Subſtances in Zahab.

§. 46. Let us now alſo conſider, after the ſame manner, the Names of Subſtances in their firſt Application. One of *Adam*'s Children, roving in the Mountains, lights on a glittering Subſtance which pleaſes his Eye; home he carries it to *Adam*, who, upon conſideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow Colour, and an exceeding great Weight. Theſe, perhaps at firſt, are all the Qualities he takes notice of in it: and abſtracting this complex *Idea*, conſiſting of a Subſtance having that peculiar bright Yellowneſs, and a Weight very great in proportion to its Bulk, he gives it the name *Zahab*, to denominate and mark all Subſtances that have theſe ſenſible Qualities in them. 'Tis evident now that, in this caſe, *Adam* acts quite differently from what he did before in forming thoſe *Ideas* of mix'd Modes, to which he gave the name *Kinneah* and *Nioaph*. For there he puts *Ideas* together, only by his own imagination, not taken from the Exiſtence of any thing; and to them he gave Names to denominate all things that ſhould happen to agree to thoſe his abſtract *Ideas*, without conſidering whether any ſuch thing did exiſt or no: the Standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his *Idea* of this new Subſtance, he takes the quit contrary Courſe; here he has a Standard made by Nature; and therefore being to repreſent that to himſelf, by the *Idea* he has of it, even when it is abſent, he puts in no ſimple *Idea* into his complex one, but what he has the Preception of from the thing it ſelf. He takes care that his *Idea* be conformable to this *Archetype*, and intends the Name ſhould ſtand for an *Idea* ſo conformable.

§. 47. This piece of Matter, thus denominated *Zahab* by *Adam*, being quite different from any he had ſeen before, no body, I think, will deny to be a diſtinct Species, and to have its peculiar Eſſence; and that the name *Zahab* is the mark of the Species, and a Name belonging to all things partaking in that Eſſence. But here it is plain, the Eſſence, *Adam* made the name *Zahab* ſtand for, was nothing but a Body hard, ſhining, yellow, and very heavy. But the inquiſitive Mind of Man, not content with the Knowledg of theſe, as I may ſay ſuperficial Qualities, puts *Adam* on farther examination of this Matter. He therefore knocks and beats it with Flints, to ſee what was diſcoverable in the Inſide: He finds it yield to Blows, but not eaſily ſeperate into pieces: He finds it will bend with breaking. Is not now Ductility to be added to his former *Idea*, and made part of the Eſſence of the Species that name *Zahab* ſtands for? Farther Trials diſcover Fuſibility and Fixedneſs. Are not they alſo, by the ſame reaſon that any of the others were, to be put into the complex *Idea* ſignify'd by the name *Zahab*? If not, what reaſon will there be ſhewn more for the one than the other? If theſe muſt, then all the other Properties, which any farther Trials ſhall diſcover in this matter, ought by the ſame reaſon to make a part of the Ingredients of the complex *Idea*, which the name *Zahab* ſtands for, and ſo be the Eſſences of the Species mark'd by that Name. Which Properties,

perties, becauſe they are endleſs, it is plain, that the *Idea* made after this faſhion by this *Archetype*, will be always inadequate.

Their Ideas, imperfect, and therefore various.

§. 48. But this is not all, it would alſo follow, that the *Names of Subſtances* would not only have (as in truth they have) but would alſo be ſuppos'd to *have different Significations, as us'd by different Men*, which would very much cumber the uſe of Language. For if every diſtinct Quality, that were diſcover'd in any Matter by any one, were ſuppos'd to make a neceſſary part of the complex *Idea*, ſignify'd by the common Name given it, it muſt follow, that Men muſt ſuppoſe the ſame word to ſignify different Things in different Men; ſince they cannot doubt but different Men may have diſcover'd ſeveral Qualities in Subſtances of the ſame Denomination, which others know nothing of.

Therefore to fix their Species, a real Eſſence is ſuppos'd.

§. 49. To avoid this therefore, they have *ſuppos'd a real Eſſence belonging to every Species*, from which theſe Properties all flow, and would have their Name of the Species ſtand for that. But they not having any *Idea* of that real Eſſence in Subſtances, and their Words ſignifying nothing but the *Ideas* they have, that which is done by this Attempt, is only to put the Name or Sound in the place and ſtead of the thing having that real Eſſence, without knowing what the real Eſſence is; and this is that which Men do, when they ſpeak of Species of Things, as ſuppoſing them made by Nature, and diſtinguiſh'd by real Eſſences.

Which Suppoſition is of no uſe.

§. 50. For let us conſider, when we affirm, that all *Gold* is fix'd, either it means that Fixedneſs is a part of the Definition, part of the nominal Eſſence the word *Gold* ſtands for; and ſo this Affirmation, *all Gold is fix'd*, contains nothing but the ſignification of the Term *Gold*. Or elſe it means, that Fixedneſs not being a part of the Definition of the word *Gold*, is a Property of that Subſtance it ſelf: In which caſe, it is plain, that the word *Gold* ſtands in the place of a Subſtance, having the real Eſſence of a Species of Things made by Nature. In which way of Subſtitution it has ſo confus'd and uncertain a ſignification, that tho' this Propoſition, *Gold is fix'd*, be in that ſenſe an Affirmation of ſomething real, yet 'tis a Truth will always fail us in its particular Application, and ſo is of no real Uſe nor Certainty. For let it be ever ſo true that all *Gold i. e.* all that has the real Eſſence of *Gold*, is fix'd, what ſerves this for, whilſt we know not in this ſenſe what is or is not *Gold?* For if we know not the real Eſſence of Gold, 'tis impoſſible we ſhould know what parcel of Matter has that Eſſence, and ſo whether it be true *Gold* or no.

Concluſion.

§. 51. To conclude: What liberty *Adam* had at firſt to make any complex *Ideas* of mix'd modes, by no other Pattern but by his own Thoughts, the ſame have all Men ever ſince had. And the ſame neceſſity of conforming his *Ideas* of Subſtances to Things without him, as to *Archetypes* made by Nature, that *Adam* was under, if he would not wilfully impoſe upon himſelf, the ſame are all Men ever ſince under too. The ſame Liberty alſo that *Adam* had of affixing any new Name to any *Idea*, the ſame has any one ſtill (eſpecially the Beginners of Languages, if we can imagine any ſuch) but only with this difference, that in Places where Men in Society have already eſtabliſh'd a Language amongſt them, the ſignification of words are very warily and ſparingly to be alter'd: Becauſe Men being furniſh'd already with Names for their *Ideas*, and common Uſe having appropriated known Names to certain *Ideas*, an affected Miſapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. He that hath new Notions, will, perhaps, venture ſometimes on the coining new Terms to expreſs them: But Men think it a Boldneſs, and 'tis uncertain whether common Uſe will ever make them paſs for current. But in Communication with others, it is neceſſary, that we conform the *Ideas* we make the vulgar Words of any Language ſtand for, to their known proper Significations (which I have explain'd at large already) or elſe to make known that new Signification we apply them to.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together.

§. 1. BESIDES Words, which are Names of *Ideas* in the Mind, there are a great many others that are made use of, to signify the *Connection* that the Mind gives to *Ideas, or Propositions one with another.* The Mind, in communicating its Thought to others, does not only need Signs of the *Ideas* it has then before it, but others also, to shew or intimate some particular Action of its own, at that time, relating to those *Ideas.* This it does several ways; as *Is*, and *Is not*, are the general Marks of the Mind, affirming or denying. But besides Affirmation or Negation, without which there is in Words no Truth or Falshood, the Mind does, in declaring its Sentiments to others, connect not only the Parts of Propositions, but whole Sentences one to another, with their several Relations and Dependencies, to make a coherent Discourse.

In them consists the Art of Well-speaking.

§. 2. The Words, whereby it signifies what Connection it gives to the several Affirmations and Negations, that it unites in one continu'd Reasoning or Narration, are generally call'd *Particles*; and 'tis in the right use of these, that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good Stile. To think well, it is not enough that a Man has *Ideas* clear and distinct in his Thoughts, nor that he observes the Agreement or Disagreement of some of them; but he must think in train, and observe the dependence of his Thoughts and Reasonings one upon another. And to express well such methodical and rational Thoughts, he must have words to *shew* what *Connection, Restriction, Distinction, Opposition, Emphasis*, &c. he gives to each respective *Part of his Discourse.* To mistake in any of these, is to puzzle, instead of informing his Hearer; and therefore it is that those words, which are not truly by themselves the Names of any *Ideas*, are of such constant and indispensible use in Language, and do much contribute to Mens well expressing themselves.

They shew what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.

§. 3. This part of Grammar has been perhaps as much neglected, as some others over-diligently cultivated. 'Tis easy for Men to write, one after another, of *Cases* and *Genders*, *Moods* and *Tenses*, *Gerunds* and *Supines.* In these, and the like, there has been great Diligence us'd; and Particles themselves, in some Languages, have been, with great shew of Exactness, rank'd into their several Orders. But tho' *Prepositions* and *Conjunctions*, &c. are Names well known in Grammar, and the Particles contain'd under them carefully rank'd into their distinct Subdivisions; yet he who would shew the right use of Particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a little more Pains, enter into his own Thoughts, and observe nicely the several Postures of his Mind in discoursing.

They shew what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.

§. 4. Neither is it enough, for the explaining of these Words, to render them, as is usually in Dictionaries, by words of another Tongue which came nearest to their signification: For what is meant by them, is commonly as hard to be understood in one, as another Language. They are all *Marks of some Action, or Intimation of the Mind*; and therefore to understand them rightly, the several Views, Postures, Stands, Turns, Limitations and Exceptions, and several other Thoughts of the Mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient Names, are diligently to be study'd. Of these there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of Particles, that most Languages have to express them by; and therefore it is not to be wonder'd that most of these Particles have divers, and sometimes almost opposite significations. In the Hebrew Tongue there is a Particle consisting but of one single Letter, of which there are reckon'd up, as I remember, seventy, I am sure above fifty several significations.

Instance in But.

§. 5. *BUT* is a Particle, none more familiar in our Language; and he that says it is a discretive Conjunction, and that it answers *Sed* in *Latin*, or *Mais* in *French*, thinks he has sufficiently explain'd it. But it seems to me to intimate several Relations, the Mind gives to the several Propositions or Parts of them, which it joins by this Monosyllable.

First

Firſt, *BUT to ſay no more:* Here it intimates a ſtop of the Mind in the courſe it was going, before it came to the end of it.

Secondly, *I ſaw BUT two Plants:* Here it ſhews, that the Mind limits the ſenſe to what is expreſs'd, with a Negation of all other.

Thirdly, *You pray; BUT it is not that GOD would bring you to the true Religion.*

Fourthly, *BUT that he would confirm you in your own.* The firſt of theſe *BUTS* intimates a Suppoſition in the Mind of ſomething otherwiſe than it ſhould be; the latter ſhews, that the Mind makes a direct oppoſition between that, and what goes before it.

Fifthly, *All Animals have Senſe; BUT a Dog is an Animal:* Here it ſignifies little more, but that the latter Propoſition is join'd to the former, as the *Minor* of a Syllogiſm.

§. 6. To theſe, I doubt not, might be added a great many other Significations of this Particle, if it were my buſineſs to examine it in its full latitude, and conſider it in all the places it is to be found: which if one ſhould do, I doubt, whether in all thoſe manners it is made uſe of, it would deſerve the Title of *Diſcretive*, which Grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full Explication of this ſort of Signs. The Inſtances I have given in this one, may give occaſion to reflect upon their uſe and force in Language, and lead us into the contemplation of ſeveral Actions of our Minds in diſcourſing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by theſe Particles; ſome whereof conſtantly, and others in certain conſtructions, have the Senſe of a whole Sentence contain'd in them.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Abſtract and Concrete Terms.

§. 1. THE ordinary Words of Language, and our common Uſe of them, would have given us light into the nature of our *Ideas*, if they had been but conſider'd with Attention. The Mind, as has been ſhewn, has a power to abſtract its *Ideas*, and ſo they become *Eſſences*, general Eſſences, whereby the ſorts of things are diſtinguiſh'd. Now each abſtract *Idea* being diſtinct, ſo that of any two the one can never be the other, the Mind will, by its intuitive Knowledg, perceive their difference; and therefore in Propoſitions, no two whole *Ideas* can ever be affirm'd one of another. This we ſee in the common Uſe of Language, which permits *not any two abſtract Words, or Names of abſtract Ideas, to be affirm'd one of another.* For how near of kin ſoever they may ſeem to be, and how certain ſoever it is, that Man is an Animal, or Rational, or White, yet every one at firſt hearing perceives the Falſhood of theſe Propoſitions; *Humanity is Animality*, or *Rationality*, or *Whiteneſs:* And this is as evident, as any of the moſt allow'd Maxims. All our Affirmations then are only inconcrete, which is the affirming, not one abſtract *Idea* to be another, but one abſtract *Idea* to be join'd to another; which abſtract *Ideas*, in Subſtances, may be of any ſort; in all the reſt, are little elſe but of Relations; and in Subſtances, the moſt frequent are of Powers: *v. g. a Man is White*, ſignifies, that the thing that has the Eſſence of a Man, has alſo in it the Eſſence of Whiteneſs, which is nothing but a power to produce the *Idea* of Whiteneſs in one, whoſe Eyes can diſcover ordinary Objects; or *a Man is rational*, ſignifies that the ſame thing that hath the Eſſence of a Man, hath alſo in it the Eſſence of Rationality, *i. e.* a Power of Reaſoning.

Abſtract Terms not predicable one of another, and why.

§. 2. This Diſtinction of Names ſhews us alſo the difference of our *Ideas:* For if we obſerve them, we ſhall find that our *ſimple Ideas have all abſtract, as well as concrete Names*; the one whereof is (to ſpeak the Language of Grammarians) a Subſtantive, the other an Adjective; as Whiteneſs, White, Sweetneſs, Sweet. The like alſo holds in our *Ideas* of Modes and Relations; as Juſtice, Juſt; Equality, Equal; only with this difference, That ſome of the concrete Names of Relations, amongſt Men chiefly, are Subſtantives; as *Paternitas, Pater*; where-

They ſhew the difference of our Ideas.

of it were eaſy to render a reaſon. But as to our *Ideas* of *Subſtances*, we have very few or *no abſtract Names* at all. For tho' the Schools have introduc'd *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, *Corporietas*, and ſome others; yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of Names of Subſtances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abſtract ones: and thoſe few that the Schools forg'd, and put into the mouths of their Scholars, could never yet get admittance into common Uſe, or obtain the Licence of publick Approbation. Which ſeems to me at leaſt to intimate the Confeſſion of all Mankind, that they have no *Ideas* of the real Eſſences of Subſtances, ſince they have not Names for ſuch *Ideas*: which no doubt they would have had, had not their Conſciouſneſs to themſelves of their ignorance of them, kept them from ſo idle an Attempt. And therefore tho' they had *Ideas* enough to diſtinguiſh Gold from a Stone, and Metal from Wood; yet they but timorouſly ventur'd on ſuch terms, as *Aurietas* and *Saxietas*, *Metallietas* and *Lignietas*, or the like Names, which ſhould pretend to ſignify the real Eſſences of thoſe Subſtances, whereof they knew they had no *Ideas*. And indeed it was only the Doctrine of *Subſtantial Forms*, and the Confidence of miſtaken Pretenders to a Knowledge that they had not, which firſt coin'd, and then introduc'd *Animalitas*, and *Humanitas*, and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own Schools, and could never get to be current amongſt underſtanding Men. Indeed, *Humanitas* was a Word familiar amongſt the *Romans*, but in a far different ſenſe, and ſtood not for the abſtract Eſſence of any Subſtance; but was the abſtract Name of a Mode, and its concrete *Humanus*, not *Homo*.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

Words are uſed for recording and communicating our Thoughts.

§. 1. FROM what has been ſaid in the foregoing Chapters, it is eaſy to perceive what Imperfection there is in Language, and how the very Nature of Words makes it almoſt unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their ſignifications. To examine the Perfection or Imperfection of Words, it is neceſſary firſt to conſider their Uſe and End: For as they are more or leſs fitted to attain that, ſo are they more or leſs perfect. We have, in the former part of this *Diſcourſe*, often upon occaſion mention'd *a double Uſe of Words*.

Firſt, One for the recording of our own Thoughts.

Secondly, The other for the communicating of our Thoughts to others.

Any Words will ſerve for recording.

§. 2. As to the firſt of theſe, *for the recording our own Thoughts* for the help of our own Memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to our ſelves, any Words will ſerve the turn. For ſince Sounds are voluntary and indifferent ſigns of any *Ideas*, a Man may uſe what Words he pleaſes, to ſignify his own *Ideas* to himſelf: and there will be no imperfection in them, if he conſtantly uſe the ſame ſign for the ſame *Idea*; for then he cannot fail of having his meaning underſtood, wherein conſiſts the right Uſe and Perfection of Language.

Communication by Words, Civil or Philoſophical.

§. 3. *Secondly*, As to *Communication of Words*, that too *has a double Uſe*.

I. *Civil.*

II. *Philoſophical.*

Firſt, By their *civil Uſe*, I mean ſuch a Communication of Thoughts and *Ideas* by Words, as may ſerve for the upholding common Converſation and Commerce, about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniences of civil Life, in the Societies of Men one amongſt another.

Secondly, By the *Philoſophical Uſe* of Words, I mean ſuch an Uſe of them, as may ſerve to convey the preciſe Notions of things, and to expreſs, in general Propoſitions, certain and undoubted Truths, which the Mind may reſt upon and be ſatisfy'd with, in its ſearch after true Knowledge. Theſe two Uſes are very diſtinct; and a great deal leſs Exactneſs will ſerve in the one than in the other, as we ſhall ſee in what follows.

§. 4.

§. 4. The chief end of Language in Communication being to be underſtood, Words ſerve not well for that end, neither in Civil nor Philoſophical Diſcourſe, when any Word does not excite in the Hearer the ſame *Idea* which it ſtands for in the Mind of the Speaker. Now ſince Sounds have no natural Connection with our *Ideas*, but have all their ſignification from the arbitrary Impoſition of Men, the *Doubtfulneſs* and Uncertainty *of their Signification*, which is the *Imperfection* we here are ſpeaking of, has its cauſe more in the *Ideas* they ſtand for, than in any Incapacity there is in one Sound more than in another, to ſignify any *Idea*: for in that regard they are all equally perfect. *The Imperfection of Words is the Doubtfulneſs of their Signification.*

That then which makes Doubtfulneſs and Uncertainty in the Signification of ſome more than other Words, is the difference of *Ideas* they ſtand for.

§. 5. Words having naturally no Signification, the *Idea* which each ſtands for muſt be learn'd and retain'd by thoſe, who would exchange Thoughts, and hold intelligible Diſcourſe with others in any Language. But this is hardeſt to be done, where, *Cauſes of their Imperfection.*

Firſt, The *Ideas* they ſtand for are very complex, and made up of a great number of *Ideas* put together.

Secondly, Where the *Ideas* they ſtand for have no certain Connection in Nature; and ſo no ſettled Standard, any where in Nature exiſting, to rectify and adjuſt them by.

Thirdly, Where the Signification of the Word is refer'd to a Standard, which Standard is not eaſy to be known.

Fourthly, Where the Signification of the Word, and the real Eſſence of the Thing, are not exactly the ſame.

Theſe are Difficulties that attend the Signification of ſeveral Words that are intelligible. Thoſe which are not intelligible at all, ſuch as Names ſtanding for any ſimple *Ideas*, which another has not Organs or Faculties to attain; as the Names of Colours to a blind Man, or Sounds to a deaf Man; need not here be mention'd.

In all theſe caſes we ſhall find an Imperfection in Words, which I ſhall more at large explain, in their particular application to our ſeveral ſorts of *Ideas*: For if we examine them, we ſhall find that the *Names of mix'd Modes are moſt liable to Doubtfulneſs and Imperfection, for the two firſt Reaſons; and the Names of Subſtances chiefly for the two latter.*

§. 6. *Firſt*, The Names of *mix'd Modes* are many of them liable to great Uncertainty and Obſcurity in their Signification. *The Names of mix'd Modes doubtful. Firſt, Becauſe the Ideas they ſtand for, are ſo complex.*

I. Becauſe of that *great Compoſition* theſe complex *Ideas* are often made up of. To make Words ſerviceable to the end of Communication, it is neceſſary (as has been ſaid) that they excite in the Hearer exactly the ſame *Idea* they ſtand for in the Mind of the Speaker. Without this, Men fill one another's heads with Noiſe and Sounds; but convey not thereby their Thoughts, and lay not before one another their *Ideas*, which is the end of Diſcourſe and Language. But when a Word ſtands for a very complex *Idea* that is compounded and decompounded, it is not eaſy for Men to form and retain that *Idea* ſo exactly, as to make the Name in common uſe ſtand for the ſame preciſe *Idea* without any the leaſt variation. Hence it comes to paſs, that Mens Names of very compound *Ideas*, ſuch as for the moſt part are moral Words, have ſeldom, in two different Men, the ſame preciſe Signification; ſince one Man's complex *Idea* ſeldom agrees with another's, and often differs from his own, from that which he had yeſterday, or will have to morrow.

§. 7. II. *Becauſe the Names of mix'd Modes*, for the moſt part, *want Standards* in Nature, whereby Men may rectify and adjuſt their Significations; therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are Aſſemblages of *Ideas* put together at the pleaſure of the Mind, purſuing its own ends of Diſcourſe, and ſuited to its own Notions; whereby it deſigns not to copy any thing really exiſting, but to denominate and rank things, as they come to agree, with thoſe Archetypes or Forms it has made. He that firſt brought the word *Sham*, *Wheedle*, or *Banter* in uſe, put together, as he thought fit, thoſe *Ideas* he made it ſtand for: And as it is with any new Names of Modes, that are now brought into any Language; ſo it was with the old ones, when they were firſt made uſe of. Names therefore that ſtand for Collections of *Ideas* which the Mind makes at *Secondly, Becauſe they have no Standards.*

pleaſure, muſt needs be of doubtful ſignification, when ſuch Collections are no where to be found conſtantly united in Nature, nor any Patterns to be ſhewn whereby Men may adjuſt them. What the word *Murder*, or *Sacrilege*, &c. ſignifies, can never be known from things themſelves: There be many of the parts of thoſe complex *Ideas*, which are not viſible in the Action it ſelf; the Intention of the Mind, or the Relation of Holy Things, which make a part of *Murder* or *Sacrilege*, have no neceſſary Connection with the outward and viſible Action of him that commits either: and the pulling the Trigger of the Gun with which the Murder is committed, and is all the Action that perhaps is viſible, has no natural Connection with thoſe other *Ideas* that make up the complex one, nam'd *Murder*. They have their Union and Combination only from the Underſtanding, which unites them under one Name: but uniting them without any Rule or Pattern, it cannot be but that the ſignification of the Name that ſtands for ſuch voluntary Collections, ſhould be often various in the Minds of different Men, who have ſcarce any ſtanding Rule to regulate themſelves and their Notions by, in ſuch arbitrary *Ideas*.

Propriety not a ſufficient Remedy.

§. 8. 'Tis true, *Common Uſe* that is the Rule of Propriety, may be ſuppos'd here to afford ſome aid, to ſettle the Signification of Language; and it cannot be deny'd, but that in ſome meaſure it does. Common Uſe *regulates the meaning of Words* pretty well for common Converſation; but no Body having an Authority to eſtabliſh the preciſe Signification of Words, nor determine to what *Ideas* any one ſhall annex them, common uſe is not ſufficient to adjuſt them to philoſophical Diſcourſes; there being ſcarce any Name of any very complex *Idea* (to ſay nothing of others) which in common uſe has not a great latitude, and which, keeping within the bounds of Propriety, may not be made the ſign of far different *Ideas*. Beſides, the Rule and Meaſure of Propriety it ſelf being no where eſtabliſh'd, it is often matter of diſpute whether this or that way of uſing a word, be Propriety of Speech or no. From all which it is evident, that the Names of ſuch kind of very complex *Ideas* are naturally liable to this Imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain ſignification; and even in Men that have a mind to underſtand one another, do not always ſtand for the ſame *Idea* in Speaker and Hearer. Tho' the names *Glory* and *Gratitude* be the ſame in every Man's mouth thro' a whole Country, yet the complex collective *Idea*, which every one thinks on, or intends by that name, is apparently very different in Men uſing the ſame Language.

The way of learning theſe Names contributes alſo to their Doubtfulneſs.

§. 9. *The way* alſo *wherein the Names of mix'd Modes are ordinarily learn'd, does* not a little *contribute to the Doubtfulneſs of their Signification.* For if we will obſerve how Children learn Languages, we ſhall find that to make them underſtand what the Names of ſimple *Ideas*, or Subſtances, ſtand for, People ordinarily ſhew them the thing whereof they would have them have the *Idea*; and then repeat to them the Name that ſtands for it, as *White*, *Sweet*, *Milk*, *Sugar*, *Cat*, *Dog*. But as for mix'd Modes, eſpecially the moſt material of them, moral Words, the Sounds are uſually learn'd firſt; and then to know what complex *Ideas* they ſtand for, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (which happens for the moſt part) are left to their own Obſervation and Induſtry; which being little laid out in the ſearch of the true and preciſe meaning of Names, theſe moral Words are in moſt Mens mouths little more than bare Sounds; or when they have any, 'tis for the moſt part but a very looſe and undetermin'd, and conſequently obſcure and confus'd Signification. And even thoſe themſelves, who have with more attention ſettled their Notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience, to have them ſtand for complex *Ideas*, different from thoſe which other, even intelligent and ſtudious Men, make them the ſigns of. Where ſhall one find any, either *controverſial Debate*, or *familiar Diſcourſe*, concerning *Honour*, *Faith*, *Grace*, *Religion*, *Church*, &c. wherein it is not eaſy to obſerve the different Notions Men have of them? which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the Signification of thoſe Words, nor have in their Minds the ſame complex *Ideas* which they make them ſtand for: and ſo all the Conteſts that follow thereupon, are only about the meaning of a Sound. And hence we ſee, that in the Interpretation of Laws, whether Divine or Human, there is no end; Comments beget Comments, and Explications make new Matter for Explications: And of limiting, diſtinguiſhing, varying

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the Signification of these moral Words, there is no End. These *Ideas* of Mens making, are, by Men still having the same Power, multiply'd *in infinitum*. Many a Man, who was pretty well satisfy'd of the meaning of a Text of Scripture, or Clause in the Code at first reading, has by consulting Commentators quite lost the sense of it, and by those Elucidations given rise or increase to his Doubts, and drawn Obscurity upon the place. I say not this, that I think Commentaries needless; but to shew how uncertain the Names of mix'd Modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those who had both the Intention and the Faculty of Speaking as clearly as Language was capable to express their Thoughts.

Hence unavoidable Obscurity in ancient Authors.

§. 10. What Obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the Writings of Men, who have liv'd in remote Ages and different Countries, it will be needless to take notice; since the numerous Volumes of learned Men, employing their Thoughts that way, are proofs more than enough to shew what Attention, Study, Sagacity, and Reasoning are requir'd, to find out the true meaning of *antient Authors*. But there being no Writings we have any great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of, but those that contain either Truths we are requir'd to believe, or Laws we are to obey, and draw Inconveniences on us when we mistake or transgress, we may be less anxious about the Sense of other Authors; who writing but their own Opinions, we are under no greater necessity to know them, than they to know our's. Our Good or Evil depending not on their Decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their Notions: And therefore in the reading of them, if they do not use their Words with a due Clearness and Perspicuity, we may lay them aside, and without any injury done them resolve thus with our selves,

Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi.

§. 11. If the Signification of the Names of mix'd Modes are uncertain, because there be no real Standards existing in Nature, to which those *Ideas* are refer'd, and by which they may be adjusted, the *Names of Substances are of a doubtful Signification*, for a contrary reason, *viz.* Because the *Ideas* they stand for are suppos'd conformable to the Reality of things, and are *refer'd to the Standards* made by Nature. In our *Ideas* of Substances we have not the liberty, as in mix'd Modes, to frame what Combinations we think fit, to be the characteristical Notes to rank and denominate things by. In these we must follow Nature, suit our complex *Ideas* to real Existences, and regulate the Signification of their Names by the things themselves, if we will have our Names to be the signs of them, and stand for them. Here, 'tis true, we have Patterns to follow; but Patterns that will make the Signification of their Names very uncertain: For Names must be of a very unsteddy and various meaning, if the *Ideas* they stand for be refer'd to Standards without us, *that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.*

Names of Substances refer'd,

1. To real Essences that cannot be known.

§. 12. The *Names of Substances have*, as has been shew'd, a double *Reference* in their ordinary Use.

First, Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their Signification is suppos'd to agree to *the real Constitution of things*, from which all their Properties flow, and in which they all centre. But this real Constitution, or (as it is apt to be call'd) Essence, being utterly unknown to us, any Sound that is put to stand for it, must be very uncertain in its Application; and it will be impossible to know what things are, or ought to be call'd an *Horse*, or *Antimony*, when those words are put for real Essences, that we have no *Ideas* of at all. And therefore in this Supposition, the Names of Substances being refer'd to Standards that cannot be known, their Significations can never be adjusted and establish'd by those Standards.

2. To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.

§. 13. *Secondly*, The *simple Ideas* that are found to *co-exist in Substances* being that which their Names immediately signify, these, as united in the several Sorts of things, *are* the proper *Standards* to which their Names are refer'd, and by which their Significations may be best rectify'd. But neither will these *Archetypes* so well serve to this Purpose, as to leave these Names without very various and uncertain Significations. Because these simple *Ideas* that co-exist, and are united in the same Subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal right to go into the complex specifick *Ideas*, which the specifick Name is to stand for,

for, Men, tho' they propose to themselves the very same Subject to consider, yet frame very different *Ideas* about it; and so the Name they use for it unavoidably comes to have, in several Men, very different Significations. The simple Qualities which make up the complex *Ideas* being most of them Powers, in relation to Changes, which they are apt to make in, or receive from other Bodies, are almost infinite. He that shall but observe what a great variety of alterations any one of the baser Metals is apt to receive from the different application only of Fire; and how much a greater number of Changes any of them will receive in the hands of a Chymist, by the application of other Bodies, will not think it strange that I count the Properties of any sort of Bodies not easy to be collected, and completely known by the ways of Enquiry, which our Faculties are capable of. They being therefore at least so many, that no Man can know the precise and definite number, they are differently discover'd by different Men, according to their various Skill, Attention, and Ways of handling; who therefore cannot chuse but have different *Ideas* of the same Substance, and therefore make the Signification of its common Name very various and uncertain. For the complex *Ideas* of Substances being made up of such simple ones as are suppos'd to co-exist in Nature, every one has a right to put into his complex *Idea* those Qualities he has found to be united together. For tho' in the Substance *Gold*, one satisfies himself with Colour and Weight, yet another thinks Solubility in *Aq. Regia* as necessary to be join'd with that Colour in his *Idea* of Gold, as any one does its Fusibility; Solubility in *Aq. Regia* being a Quality as constantly join'd with its Colour and Weight, as Fusibility, or any other; others put in its Ductility or Fixedness, *&c.* as they have been taught by Tradition or Experience. Who of all these has establish'd the right Signification of the word *Gold?* or who shall be the Judg to determine? Each has his Standard in Nature, which he appeals to, and with reason thinks he has the same right to put into his complex *Idea* signify'd by the word *Gold*, those Qualities which upon trial he has found united; as another, who has not so well examin'd, has to leave them out; or a third, who has made other trials, has to put in others. For the Union in nature of these Qualities being the true Ground of their Union in one complex *Idea*, who can say, one of them has more reason to be put in, or left out, than another? From whence it will always unavoidably follow, that the complex *Ideas* of Substances, in Men using the same Name for them, will be very various; and so the Significations of those Names very uncertain.

3. To co-existing Qualities which are known but imperfectly.

§. 14. Besides, there is scarce any particular thing existing, which, in some of its simple *Ideas*, does not communicate with a greater, and in others a less Number of particular Beings: Who shall determine in this case which are those that are to make up the precise Collection that is to be signify'd by the specifick Name; or can with any just Authority prescribe, which obvious or common Qualities are to be left out; or which more secret, or more particular, are to be put into the Signification of the Name of any Substance? All *which* together seldom or never fail to *produce* that various and *doubtful Signification in the Names of Substances*, which causes such Uncertainty, Disputes, or Mistakes, when we come to a Philosophical Use of them.

With this Imperfection they may serve for Civil, but not well for Philosophical Use.

§. 15. 'Tis true, as *to civil and common Conversation*, the general *Names of Substances*, regulated in their ordinary Signification by some obvious Qualities (as by the Shape and Figure in things of known seminal Propagation, and in other Substances, for the most part by Colour, join'd with some other sensible Qualities) *do well enough* to design the things Men would be understood to speak of; And so they usually conceive well enough the Substances meant by the word *Gold*, or *Apple*, to distinguish the one from the other. *But in Philosophical Enquiries and Debates*, where general Truths are to be establish'd, and Consequences drawn from Positions laid down; there the precise Signification of the Names of Substances will be found, not only *not* to be *well establish'd*, but also very hard to be so. For example, he that shall make Malleableness, or a certain degree of Fixedness, a part of his complex *Idea* of *Gold*, may make Propositions concerning Gold, and draw Consequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from *Gold* taken in such a Signification: But yet such as another Man can never be forc'd to admit, nor be convinc'd of their Truth, who

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makes not Malleableneſs, or the ſame degree of Fixedneſs, part of that complex *Idea*, that the name *Gold*, in his uſe of it, ſtands for.

§. 16. This is a natural, and almoſt unavoidable Imperfection in almoſt all the Names of Subſtances, in all Languages whatſoever, which Men will eaſily find, when once paſſing from confus'd or looſe Notions, they come to more ſtrict and cloſe Enquiries. For then they will be convinc'd how doubtful and obſcure thoſe words are in their Signification, which in ordinary uſe appear'd very clear and determin'd. I was once in a Meeting of very Learned and Ingenious Phyſicians, where by chance there aroſe a Queſtion, whether any Liquor paſs'd thro' the Filaments of the Nerves. The Debate having been manag'd a good while by variety of Arguments on both ſides, I (who had been uſed to ſuſpect, that the greateſt part of Diſputes were more about the Signification of words, than a real difference in the Conception of things) deſir'd, That before they went any farther on in this Diſpute, they would firſt examine, and eſtabliſh amongſt them, what the word *Liquor* ſignify'd. They at firſt were a little ſurpriz'd at the Propoſal; and had they been Perſons leſs ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one: ſince there was no one there that thought not himſelf to underſtand very perfectly what the word Liquor ſtood for; which I think too none of the moſt perplex'd Names of Subſtances. However, they were pleas'd to comply with my Motion, and upon Examination found, that the Signification of that word was not ſo ſettled and certain as they had all imagin'd; but that each of them made it a ſign of a different complex *Idea*. This made them perceive that the main of their Diſpute was about the Signification of that Term; and that they differ'd very little in their Opinions, concerning ſome fluid and ſubtile Matter, paſſing thro' the Conduits of the Nerves; tho' it was not ſo eaſy to agree whether it was to be call'd *Liquor* or no, a thing which when conſider'd, they thought it not worth the contending about. *Inſtance, Liquor.*

§. 17. How much this is the caſe, in the greateſt part of Diſputes that Men are engag'd ſo hotly in, I ſhall perhaps have an occaſion in another place to take notice. Let us only here conſider a little more exactly the fore-mention'd Inſtance of the word *Gold*, and we ſhall ſee how hard it is preciſely to determine its Signification. I think all agree to make it ſtand for a Body of a certain yellow ſhining Colour; which being the *Idea* to which Children have annex'd that Name, the ſhining yellow part of a Peacock's Tail is properly to them Gold. Others, finding Fuſibility join'd with that yellow Colour in certain Parcels of Matter, made of that Combination a complex *Idea*, to which they give the name *Gold* to denote a ſort of Subſtance; and ſo exclude from being *Gold* all ſuch yellow ſhining Bodies, as by Fire will be reduc'd to Aſhes; and admit to be of that Species, or to be comprehended under that name *Gold*, only ſuch Subſtances as having that ſhining yellow Colour will by Fire be reduc'd to Fuſion, and not to Aſhes. Another, by the ſame Reaſon, adds the Weight, which, being a Quality as ſtraitly join'd with that Colour as its Fuſibility, he thinks has the ſame reaſon to be join'd in its *Idea*, and to be ſignify'd by its Name: and therefore the other made up of Body, of ſuch a Colour and Fuſibility, to be imperfect; and ſo on of all the reſt: wherein no one can ſhew a Reaſon why ſome of the inſeparable Qualities, that are always united in Nature, ſhould be put into the nominal Eſſence, and others left out: or why the word *Gold*, ſignifying that ſort of Body the Ring on his Finger is made of, ſhould determine that ſort rather by its Colour, Weight, and Fuſibility, than by its Colour, Weight, and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*: ſince the diſſolving it by that Liquor is as inſeparable from it as the Fuſion by Fire; and they are both of them nothing, but the relation which that Subſtance has to two other Bodies, which have a Power to operate differently upon it. For by what right is it that Fuſibility comes to be a part of the Eſſence ſignify'd by the word *Gold*, and Solubility but a Property of it? or why is its Colour part of the Eſſence, and its Malleableneſs but a Property? That which I mean is this, That theſe being all but Properties depending on its real Conſtitution, and nothing but Powers, either active or paſſive, in reference to other Bodies; no one has Authority to determine the ſignification of the word *Gold* (as refer'd to ſuch a Body exiſting in Nature) more to one Collection of *Ideas* to be found *Inſtance, Gold.*

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in that Body than to another: whereby the Signification of that Name must unavoidably be very uncertain; since, as has been said, several People observe several Properties in the same Substance; and, I think, I may say no body all. And therefore we have but very imperfect Descriptions of things, and Words have very uncertain Significations.

The Names of simple Ideas *the leaſt doubtful.*

§. 18. From what has been said, it is easy to observe what has been before remark'd, *viz.* That the *Names of simple* Ideas *are*, of all others, the *least liable to Mistakes*, and that for these Reasons. *First*, Because the *Ideas* they stand for, being each but one single Perception, are much easier got, and more clearly retain'd, than the more complex ones, and therefore are not liable to the Uncertainty which usually attends those compounded ones of *Substances and mix'd Modes*, in which the precise number of simple *Ideas*, that make them up, are not easily agreed, and so readily kept in the Mind. And *Secondly*, Because they are never refer'd to any other Essence, but barely that Perception they immediately signify: which Reference is that which renders the Signification of the Names of Substances naturally so perplex'd, and gives occasion to so many Disputes. Men, that do not perversly use their Words, or on purpose set themselves to cavil, seldom mistake in any Language which they are acquainted with, the Use and Signification of the Names of simple *Ideas*: *White* and *Sweet*, *Yellow* and *Bitter*, carry a very obvious meaning with them, which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he is ignorant of, and seeks to be inform'd. But what precise Collection of simple *Ideas*, *Modesty* or *Frugality* stand for in another's Use, is not so certainly known. And however we are apt to think, we well enough know what is meant by *Gold* or *Iron*; yet the precise complex *Idea*, others make them the Signs of, is not so certain: And I believe it is very seldom that in Speaker and Hearer they stand for exactly the same Collection. Which must needs produce Mistakes and Disputes, when they are made use of in Discourses, wherein Men have to do with universal Propositions, and would settle in their Minds universal Truths, and consider the Consequences that follow from them.

And next to them simple Modes.

§. 19. By the same Rule, the *Names of simple Modes are, next to those of simple* Ideas, *least liable to Doubt and Uncertainty*, especially those of Figure and Number, of which Men have so clear and distinct *Ideas*. Who ever, that had a mind to understand them, mistook the ordinary meaning of *Seven*, or a *Triangle*? And in general the least compounded *Ideas* in every kind have the least dubious Names.

The most doubtful are the Names of very compounded mixed Modes and Substances.

§. 20. Mix'd Modes therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious simple *Ideas*, have usually Names of no very uncertain Signification. But the Names of mix'd Modes, which comprehend a great number of simple *Ideas*, are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermin'd Meaning, as has been shewn. The Names of Substances, being annex'd to *Ideas* that are neither the real Essences nor exact Representations of the Patterns they are refer'd to, are liable yet to greater Imperfection and Uncertainty, especially when we come to a philosophical Use of them.

Why this imperfection charg'd upon Words.

§. 21. The great Disorder that happens in our Names of Substances, proceeding for the most part from our want of Knowledg, and Inability to penetrate into their real Constitutions, it may probably be wonder'd, *Why I charge this as an imperfection* rather *upon our Words* than Understandings. This Exception has so much appearance of Justice, that I think my self oblig'd to give a reason why I have follow'd this Method. I must confess then, that when I first began this Discourse of the Understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought that any Consideration of Words was at all necessary to it. But when, having pass'd over the Original and Composition of our *Ideas*, I began to examine the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledg, I found it had so near a Connection with Words, that unless their force and manner of Signification were first well observ'd, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning Knowledg: which being conversant about Truth, had constantly to do with Propositions. And tho' it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of Words, that they seem'd scarce separable from our general Knowledg. At least they interpose themselves so much between our Understandings and the Truth, which it would contem-

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plate and apprehend that like the *Medium* thro' which viſible Objects paſs, their Obſcurity and Diſorder does not ſeldom caſt a miſt before our Eyes, and impoſe upon our Underſtandings. If we conſider, in the Fallacies Men put upon themſelves as well as others, and the Miſtakes in Mens Diſputes and Notions, how great a part is owing to Words, and their uncertain or miſtaken Significations, we ſhall have reaſon to think this no ſmall obſtacle in the way to Knowledg; which, I conclude, we are the more carefully to be warn'd of, becauſe it has been ſo far from being taken notice of as an Inconvenience, that the Arts of improving it have been made the buſineſs of Mens ſtudy; and obtain'd the Reputation of Learning and Subtilty, as we ſhall ſee in the following Chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that were the imperfections of Language, as the Inſtrument of Knowledg, more thorowly weigh'd, a great many of the Controverſies that make ſuch a noiſe in the world, would of themſelves ceaſe; and the way to Knowledg, and perhaps Peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does.

§. 22. Sure I am, that the Signification of Words in all Languages, depending very much on the Thoughts, Notions, and *Ideas* of him that uſes them, muſt unavoidably be of great uncertainty to Men of the ſame Language and Country. This is ſo evident in the *Greek* Authors, that he that ſhall peruſe their Writings will find in almoſt every one of them a diſtinct Language, tho' the ſame Words. But when to this natural difficulty in every Country, there ſhall be added different Countries and remote Ages, wherein the Speakers and Writers had very different Notions, Tempers, Cuſtoms, Ornaments, and Figures of Speech, *&c.* every one of which influenc'd the Signification of their Words then, tho' to us now they are loſt and unknown; *it would become us to be charitable one to another in our Interpretations or Miſunderſtanding of* thoſe *antient Writings*: which tho' of great concernment to be underſtood, are liable to the unavoidable Difficulties of Speech, which (if we except the Names of ſimple *Ideas*, and ſome very obvious things) is not capable, without a conſtant defining the Terms of conveying the Senſe and Intention of the Speaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty, to the Hearer. And in Diſcourſes of Religion, Law, and Morality, as they are matters of the higheſt concernment, ſo there will be the greateſt difficulty.

This ſhould teach us Moderation, in impoſing our own Senſe of old Authors.

§. 23. The Volumes of Interpreters and Commentators on the Old and New Teſtament, are but too manifeſt proofs of this. Tho' every thing ſaid in the Text be infallibly true, yet the Reader may be, nay cannot chuſe but be very fallible in the underſtanding of it. Nor is it to be wonder'd, that the Will of GOD, when clothed in Words, ſhould be liable to that doubt and uncertainty, which unavoidably attends that ſort of Conveyance; when even his Son, whilſt clothed in Fleſh, was ſubject to all the Frailties and Inconveniences of human Nature, Sin excepted. And we ought to magnify his Goodneſs, that he hath ſpread before all the World ſuch legible Characters of his Works and Providence, and given all Mankind ſo ſufficient a Light of Reaſon, that they to whom this written Word never came, could not (whenever they ſet themſelves to ſearch) either doubt of the Being of a GOD, or of the Obedience due to him. Since then the Precepts of natural Religion are plain, and very intelligible to all Mankind, and ſeldom come to be controverted; and other reveal'd Truths, which are convey'd to us by Books and Languages, are liable to the common and natural Obſcurities and Difficulties incident to Words; methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in obſerving the former, and leſs magiſterial, poſitive, and imperious, in impoſing our own Senſe and Interpretations of the latter.

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuſe of Words.

Abuſe of Words.

§. 1. BESIDES the Imperfection that is naturally in Language, and the Obſcurity and Confuſion that is ſo hard to be avoided in the Uſe of Words, there are ſeveral *wilful Faults and Neglects* which Men are guilty of in this way of Communication, whereby they render theſe ſigns leſs clear and diſtinct in their Signification, than naturally they need to be.

Firſt, Words without any, or without clear Ideas.

§. 2. *Firſt*, In this kind, the firſt and moſt palpable Abuſe is, the uſing of Words without clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; or, which is worſe, ſigns without any thing ſignify'd. Of theſe there are two ſorts:

I. One may obſerve, in all Languages, certain Words, that if they be examin'd, will be found, in their firſt Original and their appropriated Uſe, not to ſtand for any clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. Theſe, for the moſt part, the ſeveral *Sects* of Philoſophy and Religion have Introduc'd. For their Authors, or promoters, either affecting ſomething ſingular and out of the way of common Apprehenſions, or to ſupport ſome ſtrange Opinions, or cover ſome Weakneſs of their Hypotheſis, ſeldom fail to *coin* new Words, and ſuch as when they come to be examin'd may juſtly be call'd *inſignificant Terms*. For having either had no determinate Collection of *Ideas* annex'd to them, when they were firſt invented; or at leaſt ſuch as, if well examin'd will be found inconſiſtent; 'tis no wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar uſe of the ſame party, they remain empty Sounds, with little or no ſignification, amongſt thoſe who think it enough to have them often in their mouths as the diſtinguiſhing Characters of their Church, or School, without much troubling their heads to examine what are the preciſe *Ideas* they ſtand for. I ſhall not need here to heap up Inſtances; every one's Reading and Converſation will ſufficiently furniſh him: or if he wants to be better ſtored, the great Mint-maſters of theſe kind of Terms, I mean the School-men and Metaphyſicians (under which, I think, the diſputing Natural and Moral Philoſophers of theſe latter Ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him.

§. 3. II. Others there be, who extend this Abuſe yet farther, who take ſo little care to lay by Words, which in their primary Notation have ſcarce any clear and diſtinct *Ideas* which they are annex'd to, that by an unpardonable Negligence they familiarly *uſe Words*, which the Propriety of Language has affix'd to very important *Ideas*, *without any diſtinct meaning* at all. *Wiſdom*, *Glory*, *Grace*, &c. are Words frequent enough in every man's mouth; but if a great many of thoſe who uſe them, ſhould be ask'd what they mean by them, they would be at a ſtand, and not know what to anſwer: A plain proof, that tho' they have learn'd thoſe Sounds, and have them ready at their tongue's end, yet there are no determin'd *Ideas* laid up in their Minds, which are to be expreſs'd to others by them.

Occaſion'd by learning Names before the Ideas they belong to.

§. 4. Men having been *accuſtom'd* from their Cradles *to learn Words*, which are eaſily got and retain'd, *before they knew*, or had framed *the complex Ideas* to which they were annex'd, or which were to be found in the things *they* were thought to *ſtand* for, they *uſually continue to do ſo* all their Lives; and without taking the pains neceſſary to ſettle in their Minds determin'd *Ideas*, they uſe their words for ſuch unſteddy and confus'd Notions as they have, contenting themſelves with the ſame Words other People uſe: as if their very Sound neceſſarily carry'd with it conſtantly the ſame meaning. This, tho' Men make a ſhift with, in the ordinary Occurrences of Life, where they find it neceſſary to be underſtood, and therefore they make ſigns till they are ſo; yet this Inſignificancy in their Words, when they come to reaſon concerning either their Tenets or Intereſt, manifeſtly fills their Diſcourſe with abundance of empty unintelligible Noiſe and Jargon, eſpecially in moral Matters, where the Words for the moſt part ſtanding for arbitrary and numerous Collections of *Ideas*, not regularly and permanently united in Nature, their bare Sounds are often only thought on, or

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at leaſt very obſcure and uncertain Notions annex'd to them. Men take the Words they find in uſe amongſt their Neighbours; and that they may not ſeem ignorant what they ſtand for, uſe them confidently, without much troubling their Heads about a certain fix'd meaning: whereby, beſides the eaſe of it, they obtain this advantage, That as in ſuch Diſcourſes they ſeldom are in the right, ſo they are as ſeldom to be convinc'd that they are in the wrong; it being all one to go about to draw thoſe Men out of their miſtakes, who have no ſettled Notions, as to diſpoſſeſs a Vagrant of his Habitation, who has no ſettled abode. This I gueſs to be ſo; and every one may obſerve in himſelf and others, whether it be or no.

2 *Unſteddy Application of them.*

§. 5. *Secondly*, Another great Abuſe of Words, is, *Inconſtancy* in the uſe of them. It is hard to find a Diſcourſe written of any Subject, eſpecially of Controverſy, wherein one ſhall not obſerve, if he read with attention, the ſame Words (and thoſe commonly the moſt material in the Diſcourſe, and upon which the Argument turns) uſed ſometimes for one Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, and ſometimes for another; which is a perfect Abuſe of Language. Words being intended for ſigns of my *Ideas*, to make them known to others, not by any natural Signification, but by a voluntary Impoſition, 'tis plain Cheat and Abuſe, when I make them ſtand ſometimes for one thing, and ſometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great Folly, or greater Diſhoneſty. And a Man, in his Accompts with another, may, with as much fairneſs, make the Characters of Numbers ſtand ſometimes for one, and ſometimes for another Collection of Units (*v. g.* this Character 3 ſtand ſometimes for three, ſometimes for four, and ſometimes for eight) as in his Diſcourſe, or Reaſoning, make the ſame Words ſtand for different Collections of ſimple *Ideas*. If Men ſhould do ſo in their Reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would ſpeak thus, in the Affairs and Buſineſs of the World, and call 8 ſometimes ſeven, and ſometimes nine, as beſt ſerv'd his advantage, would preſently have clap'd upon him one of the two Names Men are conſtantly diſguſted with. And yet in Arguings and learned Conteſts, the ſame ſort of proceeding paſſes commonly for Wit and Learning: but to me it appears a greater diſhoneſty, than the miſplacing of Counters in the caſting up a Debt; and the Cheat the greater, by how much Truth is of greater concernment and value than Money.

3. *Affected Obſcurity by wrong Application.*

§. 6. *Thirdly*, Another Abuſe of Language is, an *affected Obſcurity*, by either applying old Words to new and unuſual Significations, or introducing new and ambiguous Terms, without defining either; or elſe putting them ſo together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Tho' the Peripatetick Philoſophy has been moſt eminent in this way, yet other Sects have not been wholly clear of it. There is ſcarce any of them that are not cumber'd with ſome Difficulties (ſuch is the Imperfection of human Knowledg) which they have been fain to cover with Obſcurity of Terms, and to confound the Signification of Words, which, like a Miſt before Peoples Eyes, might hinder their weak Parts from being diſcover'd. That *Body* and *Extenſion*, in common uſe, ſtand for two diſtinct *Ideas*, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For were their Signification preciſely the ſame, it would be proper, and as intelligible to ſay, the *Body of an Extenſion*, as *the Extenſion of a Body*; and yet there are thoſe who find it neceſſary to confound their Signification. To this Abuſe, and the Miſchiefs of confounding the Signification of Words, Logick and the liberal Sciences, as they have been handled in the Schools, have given reputation; and the admir'd Art of Diſputing hath added much to the natural Imperfection of Languages, whilſt it has been made uſe of and fitted to perplex the Signification of Words, more than to diſcover the Knowledg and Truth of Things: And he that will look into that ſort of learned Writings, will find the Words there much more obſcure, uncertain, and undetermin'd in their Meaning, than they are in ordinary Converſation.

Logick and Diſpute has much contributed to this.

§. 7. This is unavoidably to be ſo, where Mens Parts and Learning are eſtimated by their Skill in *Diſputing*. And if Reputation and Reward ſhall attend theſe Conqueſts, which depend moſtly on the Fineneſſe and Niceties of Words; 'tis no wonder if the Wit of Man ſo employ'd, ſhould perplex, involve, and ſubtilize the Signification of Sounds, ſo as never to want ſomething to ſay, in oppoſing

oppoſing or defending any Queſtion; the Victory being adjudg'd not to him who had Truth on his ſide, but the laſt Word in the Diſpute.

Calling it Subtility.

§. 8. This, tho' a very uſeleſs Skill, and that which I think the direct oppoſite to the ways of Knowledg, hath yet paſs'd hitherto under the laudable and eſteem'd Names of *Subtilty* and *Acuteneſs*; and has had the Applauſe of the Schools, and Encouragement of one part of the learned Men of the World. And no wonder, ſince the Philoſophers of old (the diſputing and wrangling Philoſophers I mean, ſuch as *Lucian* wittily and with reaſon taxes) and the Schoolmen ſince, aiming at Glory and Eſteem for their great and univerſal Knowledg, eaſier a great deal to be pretended to, than really acquir'd, found this a good Expedient to cover their Ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable Web of perplex'd Words, and procure to themſelves the Admiration of others by unintelligible Terms, the apter to produce wonder, becauſe they could not be underſtood: whilſt it appears in all Hiſtory, that theſe profound Doctors were no wiſer, nor more uſeful than their Neighbours; and brought but ſmall advantage to human Life, or the Societies wherein they liv'd: unleſs the coining of new Words, where they produc'd no new things to apply them to, or the perplexing or obſcuring the Signification of old ones, and ſo bringing all Things into queſtion and diſpute, were a thing profitable to the Life of Man, or worthy Commendation and Reward.

This Learning very little benefits Society.

§. 9. For notwithſtanding theſe learned Diſputants, theſe all-knowing Doctors, it was to the unſcholaſtick Stateſman, that the Governments of the World ow'd their Peace, Defence, and Liberties; and from the illiterate and contemn'd Mechanick (a Name of Diſgrace) that they receiv'd the Improvements of uſeful Arts. Nevertheleſs, this artificial Ignorance, and *learned Gibberiſh*, prevail'd mightily in theſe laſt Ages, by the Intereſt and Artifice of thoſe, who found no eaſier way to that pitch of Authority and Dominion they have attain'd, than by amuſing the Men of Buſineſs and Ignorant with hard words, or employing the Ingenious and Idle in intricate Diſputes about unintelligible Terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endleſs Labyrinth: Beſides, there is no ſuch way to gain admittance, or give defence to ſtrange and abſurd Doctrines, as to guard them round about with Legions of obſcure, doubtful, and undefined Words: which yet make theſe Retreats more like the Dens of Robbers, or Holes of Foxes, than the Fortreſſes of fair Warriours; which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the Strength that is in them, but the Briars and Thorns, and the Obſcurity of the Thickets they are beſet with. For Untruth being unacceptable to the Mind of Man, there is no other Defence left for Abſurdity, but Obſcurity.

But deſtroys the Inſtruments of Knowledg and Communication.

§. 10. Thus learned Ignorance, and this Art of keeping, even inquiſitive Men, from true Knowledg, hath been propagated in the World, and hath much perplex'd, whilſt it pretended to inform the underſtanding. For we ſee that other well-meaning and wiſe Men, whoſe Education and Parts had not acquir'd that *Acuteneſs*, could intelligibly expreſs themſelves to one another; and in its plain uſe make a benefit of Language. But tho' unlearned Men well enough underſtood the words *White* and *Black*, &c. and had conſtant Notions of the *Ideas* ſignify'd by thoſe words; yet there were Philoſophers found, who had Learning and *Subtilty* enough to prove, that *Snow was Black*; i. e. to prove, that *White* was *Black*. Whereby they had the Advantage to deſtroy the Inſtruments and Means of Diſcourſe, Converſation, Inſtruction and Society; whilſt with great Art and *Subtilty* they did no more but perplex and confound the ſignification of words, and thereby render Language leſs uſeful, than the real Defects of it had made it; a Gift, which the Illiterate had not attain'd to.

As uſeful as to confound the Sound of the Letters.

§. 11. Theſe learned Men did equally inſtruct Mens Underſtandings, and profit their Lives, as he who ſhould alter the ſignification of known Characters, and, by a ſubtile Device of Learning, far ſurpaſſing the Capacity of the Illiterate, Dull and Vulgar, ſhould, in his Writing, ſhew that he could put *A* for *B*, and *D* for *E*, *&c.* to the no ſmall Admiration and Benefit of his Reader. It being as ſenſleſs to put *Black*, which is a word agreed on to ſtand for one ſenſible *Idea*, to put it, I ſay, for another, or the contrary *Idea*, *i. e.* to call *Snow Black*, as to put this mark *A*, which is a Character agreed on to ſtand for one Modification of Sound, made by a certain Motion of the Organs of Speech, for

for *B*; which is agreed on to ſtand for another Modification of Sound, made by another certain Motion of the Organs of Speech.

§. 12. Nor hath this Miſchief ſtop'd in logical Niceities, or curious empty Speculations, it hath invaded the great Concernments of human Life and Society, obſcur'd and perplex'd the material Truths of Law and Divinity, brought Confuſion, Diſorder and Uncertainty into the Affairs of Mankind; and if not deſtroy'd, yet in great meaſure render'd uſeleſs, thoſe two great Rules, Religion and Juſtice. What have the greateſt part of the Comments and Diſputes upon the Laws of GOD and Man ſerv'd for, but to make the Meaning more doubtful, and perplex the Senſe? What have been the Effect of thoſe multiply'd curious Diſtinctions and acute Niceties, but Obſcurity and Uncertainty, leaving the Words more unintelligible, and the Reader more at a loſs? How elſe comes it to paſs that Princes, ſpeaking or writing to their Servants, in their ordinary Commands, are eaſily underſtood; ſpeaking to their People, in their Laws, are not ſo? And, as I remark'd before, doth it not often happen, that a Man of an ordinary Capacity very well underſtands a Text or a Law that he reads, till he conſults an Expoſitor, or goes to Council; who by that time he hath done explaining them, makes the words ſignify either nothing at all, or what he pleaſes. *This Art has perplex'd Religion and Juſtice.*

§. 13. Whether any By-Intereſts of theſe Profeſſions have occaſioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be conſider'd, whether it would not be well for Mankind, whoſe Concernment it is to know things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not to ſpend their Lives in talking about them, or toſſing words to and fro; whether it would not be well, I ſay, that the uſe of Words were made plain and direct, and that Language, which was given us for the improvement of Knowledg and bond of Society, ſhould not be employ'd to darken Truth, and unſettle Peoples Rights; to raiſe Miſts, and render unintelligible both Morality and Religion? Or that at leaſt, if this will happen, it ſhould not be thought Learning or Knowledg to do ſo? *And ought not to paſs for Learning.*

§. 14. *Fourthly*, Another great *Abuſe of Words is, the taking them for Things.* This tho' it in ſome degree concerns all Names in general, yet more particularly affects thoſe of Subſtances. To this Abuſe thoſe Men are moſt ſubject, who confine their Thoughts to any one Syſtem, and give themſelves up into a firm Belief of the Perfection of any receiv'd Hypotheſis; whereby they come to be perſuaded, that the Terms of that Sect are ſo ſuited to the nature of Things, that they perfectly correſpond with their real Exiſtence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the Peripatetick Philoſophy, who does not think the ten Names, under which are rank'd the ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the nature of Things? Who is there of that School, that is not perſuaded, that *ſubſtantial Forms*, *vegetative Souls*, *abhorrence of a Vacuum*, *intentional Species*, &c. are ſomething real? Theſe words Men have learn'd from their very Entrance upon Knowledg, and have found their Maſters and Syſtems lay great ſtreſs upon them; and therefore they cannot quit the Opinion, that they are conformable to Nature, and are the Repreſentations of ſomething that really exiſts. The *Platoniſt* have their *Soul of the World*, and the *Epicureans their Endeavour towards Motion* in their Atoms, when at reſt. There is ſcarce any Sect in Philoſophy has not a diſtinct Set of Terms, that others underſtand not; but yet this Gibberiſh, which, in the Weakneſs of Human Underſtanding, ſerves ſo well to palliate Mens Ignorance, and cover their Errors, comes by familiar uſe among thoſe of the ſame Tribe, to ſeem the moſt important part of Language, and of all other the Terms the moſt ſignificant. And ſhould *Aerial* and *Ætherial Vehicles* come once, by the Prevalency of that Doctrine, to be generally receiv'd any where, no doubt thoſe Terms would make Impreſſions on Mens Minds, ſo as to eſtabliſh them in the perſuaſion of the reality of ſuch things, as much as *Peripatetick Forms* and *intentional Species* have heretofore done. *4. Taking them for Things.*

§ 15. How much *Names taken for Things* are apt to *miſlead the Underſtanding*, the attentive reading of philoſophical Writers would abundantly diſcover; and that, perhaps, in words little ſuſpected of any ſuch Miſuſe. I ſhall inſtance in one only, and that a very familiar one: How many intricate Diſputes have there been about *Matter*, as if there were ſome ſuch thing really in Nature, diſtinct from *Body*; as 'tis evident the word *Matter* ſtands for an *Idea* diſtinct *Inſtance, in Matter.*

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from the *Idea* of Body? For if the *Idea* theſe two Terms ſtood for, were preciſely the ſame, they might indifferently in all places be put one for another. But we ſee, that tho' it be proper to ſay, there is *one Matter of all Bodies*, one cannot ſay, there is *one Body of all Matters*: We familiarly ſay, one *Body* is bigger than another; but it ſounds harſh (and I think is never us'd) to ſay, one *Matter* is bigger than another. Whence comes this then? *viz.* from hence, that tho' *Matter* and *Body* be not really diſtinct, but wherever there is the one, there is the other; yet *Matter* and *Body* ſtands for two different Conceptions, whereof the one is incompleat, and but a part of the other. For *Body* ſtands for a ſolid extended figur'd Subſtance, whereof *Matter* is but a partial and more confus'd Conception, it ſeeming to me to be us'd for the Subſtance and Solidity of Body, without taking in its Extenſion and Figure: And therefore it is that ſpeaking of *Matter*, we ſpeak of it always as one, becauſe in truth it expreſly contains nothing but the *Idea* of a ſolid Subſtance, which is every where the ſame, every where uniform. This being our *Idea* of *Matter*, we no more conceive or ſpeak of different *Matters* in the World, than we do of different Solidities; tho' we both conceive and ſpeak of different Bodies, becauſe Extenſion and Figure are capable of Variation. But ſince Solidity cannot exiſt without Extenſion and Figure, the taking *Matter* to be the Name of ſomething really exiſting under that Preciſion, has no doubt produc'd thoſe obſcure and unintelligible Diſcourſes and Diſputes, which have fill'd the Heads and Books of Philoſophers concerning *Materia Prima*; which Imperfection or Abuſe, how far it may concern a great many other general Terms, I leave to be conſider'd. This I think, I may at leaſt ſay, that we ſhould have a great many fewer Diſputes in the World, if Words were taken for what they are, the Signs of our *Ideas* only, and not for Things themſelves. For when we argue about *Matter*, or any the like Term, we truly argue only about the *Idea* we expreſs by that Sound, whether that preciſe *Idea* agree to any Thing really exiſting in Nature or no. And if Men would tell what *Ideas* they make their Words ſtand for, there could not be half that Obſcurity or Wrangling, in the ſearch or ſupport of Truth, that there is.

This makes Errors laſting.

§. 16. But whatever Inconvenience follows from this Miſtake of Words, this I am ſure, that by conſtant and familiar uſe, they charm Men into Notions far remote from the Truth of Things. 'Twould be a hard matter to perſuade any one, that the words which his Father or Schoolmaſter, the Parſon of the Pariſh, or ſuch a Reverend Doctor us'd, ſignify'd nothing that really exiſted in Nature: Which, perhaps, *is none of the leaſt Cauſes, that Men are ſo hardly drawn to quit their Miſtakes*, even in Opinions purely philoſophical, and where they have no other Intereſt but Truth. For the words they have a long Time been us'd to, remaining firm in their Minds, 'tis no wonder that the wrong Notions annex'd to them ſhould not be remov'd.

5. Setting them for what they cannot ſignify.

§. 17. *Fifthly*, Another *Abuſe of Words, is the ſetting them in the place of things which they do or can by no means ſignify.* We may obſerve, that in the general Names of Subſtances, whereof the nominal Eſſences are only known to us, when we put them into Propoſitions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do moſt commonly tacitly ſuppoſe, or intend they ſhould ſtand for the real Eſſence of a certain ſort of Subſtances. For when a Man ſays *Gold is malleable*, he means and would inſinuate ſomething more than this, that *what I call Gold is malleable*, (tho' truly it amounts to no more) but would have this underſtood, *viz.* that *Gold*, i. e. *what has the real Eſſence of Gold, is malleable*; which amounts to thus much, that *Malleableneſs depends on, and is inſeparable from the real Eſſence of Gold.* But a Man, not knowing wherein that real Eſſence conſiſts, the Connection in his Mind of Malleableneſs, is not truly with an Eſſence he knows not, but only with the Sound Gold he puts for it. Thus when we ſay, that *Animal rationale* is, and *Animal implume bipes latis unguibus* is not, a good Definition of a Man; 'tis plain, we ſuppoſe the name *Man* in this caſe to ſtand for the real Eſſence of a Species, and would ſignify, that a *rational Animal* better deſcrib'd that real Eſſence, than *a two-leg'd Animal with broad Nails, and without Feathers.* For elſe, why might not *Plato* as properly make the word ἄνθρωπος or *Man* ſtand for his complex *Idea*, made up of the *Ideas* of a Body, diſtinguiſh'd from others by a certain Shape and other outward Appearances, as *Ariſtotle*

riſtotle, make the complex *Idea*, to which he gave the name ἄνθρωπος or *Man*, of Body and the Faculty of Reaſoning join'd together; unleſs the name ἄνθρωπος or *Man* were ſuppos'd to ſtand for ſomething elſe than what it ſignifies; and to be put in the place of ſome other thing than the *Idea* a Man profeſſes he would expreſs by it?

§. 18. 'Tis true, the Names of Subſtances would be much more uſeful, and Propoſitions made in them much more certain, were the real Eſſences of Subſtances the *Ideas* in our Minds which thoſe words ſignify'd. And 'tis for want of thoſe real Eſſences that our Words convey ſo little Knowledg or Certainty in our Diſcourſes about them: And therefore the Mind, to remove that Imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a ſecret Suppoſition, to ſtand for a thing having that real Eſſence, as if thereby it made ſome nearer Approaches to it. For tho' the word *Man* or *Gold* ſignify nothing truly but a complex *Idea* of Properties united together in one ſort of Subſtances: Yet there is ſcarce any body in the uſe of theſe words, but often ſuppoſes each of thoſe Names to ſtand for a thing having the real Eſſence on which thoſe Properties depend. Which is ſo far from diminiſhing the Imperfection of our Words, that by a plain Abuſe it adds to it when we would make them ſtand for ſomething which not being in our complex *Idea*, the Name we uſe can no ways be the ſign of. *v. g. Puttin them for the real Eſſences of Subſtances.*

§. 19. This ſhews us the reaſon why in *mix'd Modes* any of the *Ideas* that make the Compoſition of the complex one, being left out or chang'd, it is allow'd to be another thing, *i. e.* to be of another Species, as is plain in *Chance-medly*, *Man-ſlaughter*, *Murder*, *Parricide*, &c. The reaſon whereof is, becauſe the complex *Idea* ſignify'd by that Name is the real as well as nominal Eſſence; and there is no ſecret Reference of that Name to any other Eſſence but that. But in *Subſtances* it is not ſo. For tho' in that call'd *Gold* one puts into his complex *Idea* what another leaves out, and *vice verſa*; yet Men do not uſually think that therefore the Species is chang'd: becauſe they ſecretly in their Minds refer that Name, and ſuppoſe it annex'd to a real immutable Eſſence of a thing exiſting, on which thoſe Properties depend. He that adds to his complex *Idea* of *Gold* that of Fixedneſs and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have chang'd the Species; but only to have a more perfect *Idea*, by adding another ſimple *Idea*, which is always in fact join'd with thoſe other, of which his former complex *Idea* conſiſted. But this reference of the Name to a thing, whereof we have not the *Idea*, is ſo far from helping at all, that it only ſerves the more to involve us in Difficulties. For by this tacit Reference to the real Eſſence of that Species of Bodies, the word *Gold* (which by ſtanding for a more or leſs perfect Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, ſerves to deſign that ſort of Body well enough in civil Diſcourſe) comes to have no Signification at all, being put for ſomewhat whereof we have no *Idea* at all, and ſo can ſignify nothing at all, when the Body it ſelf is away. For however it may be thought all one; yet, if well conſider'd, it will be found a quite different thing to argue about *Gold* in Name, and about a parcel of the Body it ſelf, *v. g.* a piece of *Leaf Gold* laid before us; tho' in Diſcourſe we are fain to ſubſtitute the Name for the thing. *Hence we think every change of our* Idea *in Subſtances, not to change the Species.*

§. 20. That which I think very much diſpoſes Men to ſubſtitute their Names for the real Eſſences of *Species*, is the Suppoſition before-mention'd, that Nature works regularly in the Production of things, and ſets the Boundaries to each of thoſe *Species*, by giving exactly the ſame real internal Conſtitution to each Individual, which we rank under one general Name. Whereas any one who obſerves their different Qualities, can hardly doubt, that many of the Individuals, call'd by the ſame Name, are, in their internal Conſtitution, as different one from another as ſeveral of thoſe which are rank'd under different Specifick Names. *This Suppoſition* however, *that the ſame preciſe internal Conſtitution goes always with the ſame ſpecifick Name, makes Men forward to take* thoſe *Names for the Repreſentatives* of thoſe real *Eſſences*, tho' indeed they ſignify nothing but the complex *Ideas* they have in their Minds when they uſe them. So that, if I may ſo ſay, ſignifying one thing, and being ſuppos'd for, or put in the place of another, they cannot but in ſuch a kind of uſe cauſe a great deal of Uncertainty in mens Diſcourſes; eſpecially in thoſe who have thorowly imbib'd the Doctrine *The Cauſe of the Abuſe, a Suppoſition of Nature's working always regularly.*

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of *ſubſtantial Forms*, whereby they firmly imagine the ſeveral Species of things to be determin'd and diſtinguiſh'd.

This Abuſe contains two falſe ſuppoſitions.

§. 21. But however prepoſterous and abſurd it be to make our Names ſtand for *Ideas* we have not, or (which is all one) Eſſences that we know not, it being in effect to make our Words the Signs of nothing; yet 'tis evident to any one, who reflects ever ſo little on the uſe Men make of their Words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a Man asks whether this or that thing he ſees, let it be a Drill, or a monſtrous *Fœtus*, be a *Man* or no; 'tis evident, the Queſtion is not, whether that particular thing agree to his complex *Idea* expreſs'd by the name *Man*: but whether it has in it the real Eſſence of a Species of things, which he ſuppoſes his name *Man* to ſtand for. In which way of uſing the Names of Subſtances, there are theſe falſe Suppoſitions contain'd.

Firſt, That there are certain preciſe Eſſences, according to which Nature makes all particular things, and by which they are diſtinguiſh'd into *Species*. That every thing has a real Conſtitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which its ſenſible Qualities depend, is paſt doubt: But I think it has been prov'd that this makes not the diſtinction of *Species*, as we rank them; nor the Boundaries of their Names.

Secondly, This tacitly alſo inſinuates, as if we had *Ideas* of theſe propos'd Eſſences. For to what purpoſe elſe is it to enquire whether this or that thing have the real Eſſence of the Species *Man*, if we did not ſuppoſe that there were ſuch a ſpecifick Eſſence known? which yet is utterly falſe: And therefore ſuch Application of Names, as would make them ſtand for *Ideas* which we have not, muſt needs cauſe great Diſorder in Diſcourſes and Reaſonings about them, and be a great Inconvenience in our Communication by words.

6. A Suppoſition that Words have a certain and evident Signification.

§. 22. *Sixthly*, There remains yet another more general, tho' perhaps leſs obſerv'd *Abuſe of Words*; and that is, that Men having by a long and familiar uſe annex'd to them certain *Ideas*, they are apt *to imagine ſo near and neceſſary a Connection between the Names and the Signification* they uſe them in, that they forwardly ſuppoſe one cannot but underſtand what their meaning is; and therefore one ought to acquieſce in the Words deliver'd, as if it were paſt doubt, that in the uſe of thoſe common receiv'd Sounds, the Speaker and Hearer had neceſſarily the ſame preciſe *Ideas*: Whence preſuming, that when they have in Diſcourſe us'd any Term, they have thereby as it were ſet before others, the very thing they talk of. And ſo likewiſe taking the words of others, as naturally ſtanding for juſt what they themſelves have been accuſtom'd to apply them to, they never trouble themſelves to explain their own, or underſtand clearly others meaning. From whence commonly proceeds Noiſe and Wrangling without Improvement or Information; whilſt Men take Words to be the conſtant regular Marks of agreed Notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unſteddy Signs of their own *Ideas*. And yet Men think it ſtrange, if in Diſcourſe, or (where it is often abſolutely neceſſary) in Diſpute, one ſometimes asks the meaning of their Terms: tho' the Arguings one may every day obſerve in Converſation, make it evident, that there are few Names of complex *Ideas* which any two Men uſe for the ſame juſt preciſe Collection. 'Tis hard to name a Word which will not be a clear Inſtance of this. *Life* is a Term none more familiar. Any one almoſt would take it for an Affront to be ask'd what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in queſtion, whether a Plant, that lies ready form'd in the Seed, have Life; whether the Embrio in an Egg before Incubation, or a Man in a Swoon without Senſe or Motion, be alive or no; it is eaſy to perceive that a clear diſtinct ſettled *Idea* does not always accompany the uſe of ſo known a word as that of *Life* is. Some groſs and confus'd Conceptions Men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common Words of their Language; and ſuch a looſe uſe of their Words ſerves them well enough in their ordinary Diſcourſes or Affairs. But this is not ſufficient for Philoſophical Enquiries. Knowledg and Reaſoning require preciſe determinate *Ideas*. And tho' Men will not be ſo importunately dull, as not to underſtand what others ſay, without demanding an Explication of their Terms; nor ſo troubleſomely critical, as to correct others in the uſe of the Words they receive from them: yet where Truth and Knowledg are concern'd in the caſe, I know not what fault it can be to deſire the Explication of Words, whoſe

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Senſe ſeems dubious; or why a Man ſhould be aſham'd to own his Ignorance, in what ſenſe another Man uſes his Words, ſince he has no other way of certainly knowing it, but by being inform'd. This Abuſe of taking Words upon truſt, has no where ſpread ſo far, nor with ſo ill effects, as amongſt Men of Letters. The multiplication and obſtinacy of Diſputes, which has ſo laid waſte the intellectual World, is owing to nothing more, than to this ill Uſe of Words. For tho' it be generally believ'd that there is great diverſity of Opinions in the Volumes and Variety of Controverſies the World is diſtracted with; yet the moſt I can find that the contending learned Men of different Parties do, in their Arguings one with another, is, that they ſpeak different Languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them quitting Terms, think upon Things, and know what they think, they think all the ſame; tho' perhaps what they would have, be different.

§. 23. To conclude this Conſideration of the Imperfection and Abuſe of Language; the *Ends of Language in our Diſcourſe with others*, being chiefly theſe three: *Firſt*, *To make known* one Man's Thoughts or *Ideas* to another: *Secondly*, To do it *with* as much eaſe and *quickneſs* as is poſſible: and, *Thirdly*, Thereby to *convey* the *Knowledg* of things: Language is either abus'd or deficient, when it fails of any of theſe three. *The Ends of Language:* 1. *To convey our* Ideas.

Firſt, Words fail in the firſt of theſe Ends, and lay not open one Man's *Ideas* to another's view: 1. When Men have Names in their mouths without any determin'd *Ideas* in their Minds, whereof they are the ſigns: or, 2. When they apply the common receiv'd Names of any Language to *Ideas*, to which the common Uſe of that Language does not apply them: or, 3. When they apply them very unſteddily, making them ſtand now for one, and by and by for another *Idea*.

§. 24. *Secondly*, Men fail of conveying their Thoughts with all the quickneſs and eaſe that may be, when they have complex *Ideas* without having diſtinct Names for them. This is ſometimes the fault of the Language it ſelf, which has not in it a Sound yet apply'd to ſuch a Signification; and ſometimes the fault of the Man, who has not yet learn'd the Name for that *Idea* he would ſhew another. 2. *To do it with quickneſs.*

§. 25. *Thirdly*, There is no Knowledge of things convey'd by Mens Words, when their *Ideas* agree not to the Reality of things. Tho' it be a Defect, that has its Original in our *Ideas*, which are not ſo conformable to the Nature of things, as Attention, Study, and Application might make them; yet it fails not to extend it ſelf to our Words too, when we uſe them as Signs of real Beings, which yet never had any Reality or Exiſtence. 3. *Therewith to convey the Knowledg of things.*

§. 26. *Firſt*, He that hath Words of any Language, without diſtinct *Ideas* in his Mind to which he applies them, does, ſo far as he uſes them in Diſcourſe, only make a noiſe without any Senſe or Signification; and how learned ſoever he may ſeem by the uſe of hard Words or learned Terms, is not much more advanc'd thereby in Knowledg, than he would be in Learning, who had nothing in his Study but the bare Titles of Books, without poſſeſſing the Contents of them. For all ſuch Words, however put into Diſcourſe, according to the right Conſtruction of Grammatical Rules, or the Harmony of well-turn'd Periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare Sounds, and nothing elſe. *How Mens Words fail in all theſe.*

§. 27. *Secondly*, He that has complex *Ideas*, without particular Names for them, would be in no better a Caſe than a Bookſeller, who had in his Warehouſe Volumes that lay there unbound, and without Titles; which he could therefore make known to others, only by ſhewing the looſe Sheets, and communicate them only by Tale. This Man is hinder'd in his Diſcourſe, for want of Words to communicate his complex *Ideas*, which he is therefore forc'd to make known by an enumeration of the ſimple ones that compoſe them; and ſo is fain often to uſe twenty Words, to expreſs what another Man ſignifies in one.

§. 28. *Thirdly*, He that puts not conſtantly the ſame Sign for the ſame *Idea*, but uſes the ſame Words ſometimes in one, and ſometimes in another Signification, ought to paſs in the Schools and Converſation for as fair a Man, as he does in the Market and Exchange, who ſells ſeveral things under the ſame Name.

§. 29. *Fourthly*, He that applies the Words of any Language to *Ideas* different from thoſe to which the common Uſe of that Country applies them, however his

his own Underſtanding may be fill'd with Truth and Light, will not by ſuch Words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his Terms. For however the Sounds are ſuch as are familiarly known, and eaſily enter the ears of thoſe who are accuſtom'd to them; yet ſtanding for other *Ideas* than thoſe they uſually are annex'd to, and are wont to excite in the Mind of the Hearers, they cannot make known the Thoughts of him who thus uſes them.

§. 30. *Fifthly*, he that hath imagin'd to himſelf Subſtances ſuch as never have been, and fill'd his Head with *Ideas* which have not any correſpondence with the real Nature of things, to which yet he gives ſettled and defin'd Names, may fill his Diſcourſe, and perhaps another Man's Head, with the fantaſtical Imaginations of his own Brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true Knowledg.

§. 31. He that hath Names without *Ideas*, wants Meaning in his Words, and ſpeaks only empty Sounds. He that hath complex *Ideas*, without Names for them, wants Liberty and Diſpatch in his Expreſſions, and is neceſſitated to uſe Periphraſes. He that uſes his Words looſely and unſteddily, will either be not minded, or not underſtood. He that applies his Names to *Ideas* different from their common Uſe, wants Propriety in his Language, and ſpeaks Gibberiſh. And he that hath *Ideas* of Subſtances diſagreeing with the real Exiſtence of things, ſo far wants the Materials of true Knowledge in his Underſtanding, and hath inſtead thereof *Chimera*'s.

How in Subſtances.

§. 32. In our Notions concerning Subſtances, we are liable to all the former Inconveniences: *v. g.* He that uſes the word *Tarantula*, without having any Imagination or *Idea* of what it ſtands for, pronounces a good Word; but ſo long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that in a new-diſcover'd Country ſhall ſee ſeveral ſorts of Animals and Vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true *Ideas* of them, as of a Horſe or a Stag; but can ſpeak of them only by a deſcription, till he ſhall either take the Names the Natives call them by, or give them Names himſelf. 3. He that uſes the word *Body* ſometimes for pure Extenſion, and ſometimes for Extenſion and Solidity together, will talk very fallaciouſly. 4. He that gives the name *Horſe* to that *Idea* which common Uſage calls *Mule*, talks improperly, and will not be underſtood. 5. He that thinks the name *Centaur* ſtands for ſome real Being, impoſes on himſelf, and miſtakes Words for Things.

How in Modes and Relations.

§. 33. In Modes and Relations generally we are liable only to the four firſt of theſe Inconveniences; *viz.* 1. I may have in my Memory the Names of Modes, as *Gratitude*, or *Charity*, and yet not have any preciſe *Ideas* annex'd in my Thoughts to thoſe Names. 2. I may have *Ideas*, and not know the Names that belong to them; *v. g.* I may have the *Idea* of a Man's drinking, till his Colour and Humour be alter'd, till his Tongue trips, and his Eyes look red, and his Feet fail him; and yet not know, that it is to be call'd *Drunkenneſs*. 3. I may have the *Ideas* of Vertues or Vices, and Names alſo, but apply them amiſs: *v. g.* when I apply the name *Frugality* to that *Idea* which others call and ſignify by this Sound, *Covetouſneſs*. 4. I may uſe any of thoſe Names with inconſtancy. 5. But in Modes and Relations, I cannot have *Ideas* diſagreeing to the Exiſtence of things: for Modes being complex *Ideas*, made by the Mind at pleaſure; and Relation being but my way of conſidering or comparing two things together, and ſo alſo an *Idea* of my own making; theſe *Ideas* can ſcarce be found to diſagree with any thing exiſting, ſince they are not in the Mind as the Copies of things regularly made by Nature, nor as Properties inſeparably flowing from the internal Conſtitution or Eſſence of any Subſtance; but as it were Patterns lodg'd in my Memory, with Names annex'd to them, to denominate Actions and Relations by, as they come to exiſt. But the miſtake is commonly in my giving a wrong Name to my Conceptions; and ſo uſing Words in a different ſenſe from other People, I am not underſtood, but am thought to have wrong *Ideas* of them, when I give wrong Names to them. Only if I put in my *Ideas* of mix'd Modes or Relations, any inconſiſtent *Ideas* together, I fill my head alſo with *Chimera*'s; ſince ſuch *Ideas*, if well examin'd, cannot ſo much as exiſt in the Mind, much leſs any real Being be ever denominated from them.

7. Figurative Speech alſo an Abuſe of Language.

§. 34. Since Wit and Fancy finds eaſier entertainment in the World, than dry Truth and real Knowledg, *figurative Speeches* and Alluſion in Language will hard-

ly be admitted, as an Imperfection or *Abuſe* of it. I confeſs, in Diſcourſes where we ſeek rather Pleaſure and Delight than Information and Improvement, ſuch Ornaments as are borrow'd from them can ſcarce paſs for Faults. But yet if we would ſpeak of things as they are, we muſt allow that all the Art of Rhetorick, beſides Order and Clearneſs, all the artificial and figurative Application of words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing elſe but to inſinuate wrong *Ideas*, move the Paſſions, and thereby miſlead the Judgment, and ſo indeed are perfect cheat: And therefore however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Addreſſes, they are certainly in all Diſcourſes that pretend to inform or inſtruct, wholly to be avoided; and where Truth and Knowledg are concern'd, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the Language or Perſon that makes uſe of them. What and how various they are, will be ſuperfluous here to take notice; the Books of Rhetorick which abound in the World, will inſtruct thoſe who want to be inform'd: only I cannot but obſerve, how little the Preſervation and Improvement of Truth and Knowledg, is the Care and Concern of Mankind; ſince the Arts of Fallacy are endow'd and prefer'd. 'Tis evident how much Men love to deceive and be deceiv'd, ſince Rhetorick, that powerful Inſtrument of Error and Deceit, has its eſtabliſh'd Profeſſors, is publickly taught, and has always been had in great Reputation: And, I doubt not, but it will be thought great Boldneſs, if not Brutality in me, to have ſaid thus much againſt it. *Eloquence*, like the Fair Sex, has too prevailing Beauties in it, to ſuffer it ſelf ever to be ſpoken againſt. And 'tis in vain to find fault with thoſe Arts of Deceiving, wherein Men find pleaſure to be deceiv'd.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuſes.

§. 1. THE natural and improv'd Imperfections of Languages, we have ſeen above at large; and Speech being the great Bond that holds Society together, and the common Conduit whereby the Improvements of Knowledg are convey'd from one Man, and one Generation to another, it would well deſerve our moſt ſerious Thoughts, to conſider what *Remedies* are to be found *for theſe Inconveniences* above-mention'd. *They are worth ſeeking.*

§. 2. I am not ſo vain to think, that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect *Reforming* the *Languages* of the World, no not ſo much as of his own Country, without rendering himſelf ridiculous. To require that Men ſhould uſe their Words conſtantly in the ſame ſenſe, and for none but determin'd and uniform *Ideas*, would be to think that all Men ſhould have the ſame Notions, and ſhould talk of nothing but what they have clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of: which is not to be expected by any one, who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with Men to be very knowing or very ſilent. And he muſt be very little ſkill'd in the World, who thinks that a voluble Tongue ſhall accompany only a good Underſtanding; or that Mens talking much or little, ſhall hold proportion only to their Knowledg. *Are not eaſy.*

§. 3. But tho' the Market and Exchange muſt be left to their own ways of Talking, and Goſſippings not to be robb'd of their antient Privilege; tho' the Schools and Men of Argument would perhaps take it amiſs to have any thing offer'd to abate the length, or leſſen the number of their Diſputes: yet methinks thoſe who pretend *ſeriouſly* to *ſearch after* or maintain *Truth*, ſhould think themſelves oblig'd to ſtudy how they might deliver themſelves without Obſcurity, Doubtfulneſs, or Equivocation, to which Mens Words are naturally liable, if care be not taken. *But yet neceſſary to Philoſophy.*

§. 4. For he that ſhall well conſider the *Errors* and Obſcurity, the Miſtakes and Confuſion, that are *ſpread in the World by an ill uſe of Words*, will find ſome reaſon to doubt whether Language, as it has been employ'd, has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of Knowledg amongſt Mankind. How many are there, that when they would think on things, fix their Thoughts only *Miſuſe of Words the cauſe of great Errors.*

on Words, eſpecially when they would apply their Minds to moral matters? And who then can wonder, if the Reſult of ſuch Contemplations, and Reaſonings about little more than Sounds, whilſt the *Ideas* they annex'd to them are very confus'd or very unſteddy, or perhaps none at all; who can wonder, I ſay, that ſuch Thoughts and Reaſonings end in nothing but Obſcurity and Miſtake, without any clear Judgment or Knowledge?

Obſtinacy. §. 5. This Inconvenience, in an ill uſe of Words, Men ſuffer in their own private Meditations: but much more manifeſt are the Diſorders which follow from it, in Converſation, Diſcourſe, and Arguings with others. For Language being the great Conduit, whereby Men convey their Diſcoveries, Reaſonings, and Knowledg, from one to another, he that makes an ill uſe of it, tho' he does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledg, which are in things themſelves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or ſtop the Pipes, whereby it is diſtributed to the publick uſe and advantage of Mankind. He that uſes Words without any clear and ſteddy meaning, what does he but lead himſelf and others into Errors? And he that deſignedly does it, ought to be look'd on as an Enemy to Truth and Knowledg. And yet who can wonder, that all the Sciences and Parts of Knowledg have been ſo over-charg'd with obſcure and equivocal Terms, and inſignificant and doubtful Expreſſions, capable to make the moſt Attentive or Quick-ſighted, very little or not at all the more knowing or orthodox; ſince Subtility, in thoſe who make profeſſion to teach or defend Truth, hath paſs'd ſo much for a Vertue: A Vertue, indeed, which conſiſting for the moſt part in nothing but the fallacious and illuſory uſe of *obſcure* or *deceitful Terms*, is only fit to *make Men* more *conceited* in their Ignorance, and *obſtinate* in their Errors.

And Wrangling. §. 6. Let us look into the Books of Controverſy of any kind; there we ſhall ſee, that the Effect of obſcure, unſteddy or equivocal Terms, is nothing but Noiſe and Wrangling about Sounds, without convincing or bettering a Man's Underſtanding. For if the *Idea* be not agreed on betwixt the Speaker and Hearer, for which the words ſtand, the Argument is not about Things, but Names. As often as ſuch a word, whoſe ſignification is not aſcertain'd betwixt them, comes in uſe, their Underſtandings have no other Object wherein they agree, but barely the Sound; the Things that they think on at that time, as expreſs'd by that word, being quite different.

Inſtance, Bat and Bird. §. 7. Whether a *Bat* be a *Bird* or no, is not a Queſtion; whether a *Bat* be another thing than indeed it is, or have other Qualities than indeed it has, for that would be extremely abſurd to doubt of: But the Queſtion is, 1. Either between thoſe that acknowledg'd themſelves to have but imperfect *Ideas* of one or both of thoſe ſorts of things, for which theſe Names are ſuppos'd to ſtand; and then it is a real Inquiry concerning the nature of a *Bird* or a *Bat*, to make their yet imperfect *Ideas* of it more compleat, by examining, whether all the ſimple *Ideas*, to which, combin'd together, they both give the name *Bird*, be all to be found in a *Bat*: But this is a Queſtion only of Enquirers (not Diſputers) who neither affirm, nor deny, but examine. Or, 2. It is a Queſtion between Diſputants, whereof the one affirms, and the other denies, that a *Bat* is a *Bird*. And then the Queſtion is barely about the ſignification of one or both theſe words; in that they not having both the ſame complex *Ideas*, to which they give theſe two Names, one holds, and t'other denies, that theſe two Names may be affirm'd one of another. Were they agreed in the ſignification of theſe two Names, it were impoſſible they ſhould diſpute about them: For they would preſently and clearly ſee (were that adjuſted between them) whether all the ſimple *Ideas*, of the more general name *Bird*, were found in the complex *Idea* of a *Bat*, or no; and ſo there could be no doubt, whether a *Bat* were a *Bird* or no. And here I deſire it may be conſider'd and carefully examin'd, whether the greateſt part of the Diſputes in the World are not merely verbal, and about the ſignification of Words; and whether, if the Terms they are made in were defin'd, and reduc'd in their ſignification (as they muſt be where they ſignify any thing) to determin'd Collections of the ſimple *Ideas* they do or ſhould ſtand for, thoſe Diſputes would not end of themſelves, and immediately vaniſh. I leave it then to be conſider'd, what the Learning of Diſputation is, and how well they are imploy'd for the Advantage of themſelves or others, whoſe Buſineſs is only the vain Oſtentation of Sounds; *i. e.* thoſe who ſpend their

their Lives in Diſputes and Controverſies. When I ſhall ſee any of thoſe Combatants ſtrip all his Terms of Ambiguity and Obſcurity (which every one may do in the words he uſes himſelf) I ſhall think him a Champion for Knowledg, Truth and Peace, and not the Slave of Vain-Glory, Ambition, or a Party.

§. 8. *To remedy the Defects of Speech* before-mention'd to ſome degree, and to prevent the Inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the Obſervation of theſe following Rules may be of uſe, till ſome body better able ſhall judg it worth his while, to think more maturely on this Matter, and oblige the World with his Thoughts on it. 1. *Remedy, to uſe no Word without an* Idea.

Firſt, A Man ſhould take care *to uſe no Word without a Signification*, no Name without an *Idea* for which he makes it ſtand. This Rule will not ſeem altogether needleſs, to any one who ſhall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with ſuch Words, as *Inſtinct*, *Sympathy*, and *Antipathy*, &c. in the Diſcourſe of others, ſo made uſe of, as he might eaſily conclude, that thoſe that us'd them had no *Ideas* in their Minds to which they apply'd them; but ſpoke them only as Sounds, which uſually ſerv'd inſtead of Reaſons on the like occaſions. Not but that theſe Words, and the like, have very proper Significations in which they may be us'd; but there being no natural Connection between any Words and any *Ideas*, theſe, and any other, may be learn'd by rote, and pronounc'd or writ by Men, who have no *Ideas* in their Minds, to which they have annex'd them, and for which they make them ſtand; which is neceſſary they ſhould, if Men would ſpeak intelligibly even to themſelves alone.

§. 9. *Secondly*, 'Tis not enough a Man *uſes* his *Words as Signs of* ſome *Ideas*: thoſe *Ideas* he annexes them to, if they be *ſimple*, muſt be clear and diſtinct; if *complex*, muſt be *determinate*, *i. e.* the preciſe Collection of ſimple *Ideas* ſettled in the Mind, with that Sound annex'd to it, as the ſign of that preciſe determin'd Collection, and no other. This is very neceſſary in Names of Modes, and eſpecially moral words; which having no ſettled Objects in Nature, from whence their *Ideas* are taken, as from their Original, are apt to be very confus'd. *Juſtice* is a word in every Man's Mouth, but moſt commonly with a very undetermin'd looſe ſignification: Which will always be ſo, unleſs a Man has in his Mind a diſtinct comprehenſion of the component Parts that complex *Idea* conſiſts of; and if it be decompounded, muſt be able to reſolve it ſtill on, till he at laſt comes to the ſimple *Ideas* that make it up: And unleſs this be done, a Man makes an ill uſe of the Word, let it be *Juſtice*, for Example, or any other: I do not ſay, a Man needs ſtand to recollect and make this Analyſis at large, every time the word *Juſtice* comes in his way: But this at leaſt is neceſſary, that he have ſo examin'd the ſignification of that Name, and ſettled the *Idea* of all its Parts in his Mind, that he can do it when he pleaſes. If one, who makes his complex *Idea* of *Juſtice*, to be ſuch a Treatment of the Perſon or Goods of another, as is according to Law, hath not a clear and diſtinct *Idea* what *Law* is, which makes a part of his complex *Idea* of Juſtice, 'tis plain his *Idea* of Juſtice it ſelf will be confus'd and imperfect. This Exactneſs will perhaps, be judg'd very troubleſome; and therefore moſt Men will think they may be excus'd from ſettling the complex *Ideas* of mix'd Modes ſo preciſely in their Minds. But yet I muſt ſay, till this be done, it muſt not be wonder'd that they have a great deal of Obſcurity and Confuſion in their own Minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their Diſcourſes with others. 2. *To have diſtinct* Ideas *annex'd to them in Modes.*

§. 10. In the Names of *Subſtances*, for a right uſe of them, ſomething more is requir'd than barely *determin'd Ideas*. In theſe *the Names muſt alſo be conformable to Things*, as they exiſt; but of this I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large by and by. This Exactneſs is abſolutely neceſſary in Inquiries after Philoſophical Knowledg, and in Controverſies about Truth. And tho' it would be well too, if it extended it ſelf to common Converſation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life; yet I think that is ſcarce to be expected. Vulgar Notions ſuit vulgar Diſcourſes; and both, tho' confus'd enough, yet ſerve pretty well the Market and the Wake. Merchants and Lovers, Cooks and Taylors, have words wherewithal to diſpatch their ordinary Affairs; and ſo, I think, might Philoſophers and Diſputants too, if they had a mind to underſtand, and to be clearly underſtood. *And conformable in Subſtances.*

§. 11.

3. *Propriety.* §. 11. *Thirdly,* 'Tis not enough that Men have *Ideas*, determin'd *Ideas*, for which they make theſe Signs ſtand; but they *muſt* alſo take care to *apply their Words*, as near as may be, *to ſuch* Ideas *as common Uſe has annex'd them to.* For Words, eſpecially of Languages already fram'd, being no Man's private poſſeſſion, but the common meaſure of Commerce and Communication, 'tis not for any one, at pleaſure, to change the Stamp they are current in, nor alter the *Ideas* they are affix'd to; or at leaſt, when there is a neceſſity to do ſo, he is bound to give notice of it. Mens Intentions in ſpeaking are, or at leaſt ſhould be, to be underſtood; which cannot be without frequent Explanations, Demands, and other the like incommodious Interruptions, where Men do not follow common uſe. Propriety of Speech is that which gives our Thoughts entrance into other Mens Minds with the greateſt Eaſe and Advantage; and therefore deſerves ſome part of our Care and Study, eſpecially in the Names of moral Words. The proper ſignification and the uſe of Terms is beſt to be learned from thoſe, who in their Writings and Diſcourſes appear to have had the cleareſt Notions, and apply'd to them their Terms with the exacteſt Choice and Fitneſs. This way of uſing a Man's Words according to the Propriety of the Language, tho' it have not always the good Fortune to be underſtood; yet moſt commonly leaves the blame of it on him, who is ſo unskilful in the Language he ſpeaks, as not to underſtand it, when made uſe of as it ought to be.

4. *To make known their meaning.* §. 12. *Fourthly,* But becauſe common Uſe has not ſo viſibly annex'd any ſignification to Words, as to make Men know always certainly what they preciſely ſtand for: And becauſe Men, in the improvement of their Knowledg, come to have *Ideas* different from the vulgar and ordinary receiv'd ones, for which they muſt either make new Words (which Men ſeldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of Affectation or Novelty) or elſe muſt uſe old ones in a new Signification: Therefore after the Obſervation of the foregoing Rules, it is ſometimes neceſſary, for the aſcertaining the ſignification of Words, to *declare their Meaning*, where either common Uſe has left it uncertain and looſe (as it has in moſt Names of very complex *Ideas*) or where the Term, being very material in the Diſcourſe, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any Doubtfulneſs or Miſtake.

And that three ways. §. 13. As the *Ideas*, Mens Words ſtand for, are of different ſorts; ſo the way of making known the *Ideas*, they ſtand for, when there is occaſion, is alſo different. For tho' defining be thought the proper *way to make known the proper ſignification of Words*; yet there are ſome Words that will not be defin'd, as there are others, whoſe preciſe Meaning cannot be made known but by Definition; and perhaps a third, which partake ſomewhat of both the other, as we ſhall ſee in the names of ſimple *Ideas*, Modes and Subſtances.

1. *In ſimple* Ideas, *by ſynonymous Terms or ſhewing.* §. 14. *Firſt,* When a Man makes uſe of the *Name* of *any ſimple Idea*, which he perceives is not underſtood, or is in danger to be miſtaken, he is oblig'd by the Laws of Ingenuity, and the end of Speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what *Idea* he makes it ſtand for. This, as has been ſhewn, cannot be done by Definition; and therefore, when a ſynonymous Word fails to do it, there is but one of theſe ways left. *Firſt,* Sometimes the *naming the Subject, wherein that ſimple* Idea *is* to be found, will make its Name be underſtood by thoſe who are acquainted with that Subject, and know it by that Name. So, to make a Countryman underſtand what *Fueillemorte* Colour ſignifies, it may ſuffice to tell him, 'tis the Colour of wither'd Leaves falling in *Autumn*. *Secondly,* But the only ſure way of making known the ſignification of the Name of any ſimple *Idea*, is *by preſenting to his Senſes that Subject which may produce it in his Mind*, and make him actually have the *Idea* that word ſtands for.

2. *In mix'd Modes, by definition.* §. 15. *Secondly, Mix'd Modes,* eſpecially thoſe belonging to Morality, being moſt of them ſuch Combinations of *Ideas*, as the mind puts together of its own choice, and whereof there are not always ſtanding Patterns to be found exiſting; the ſignification of their Names cannot be made known, as thoſe of ſimple *Ideas*, by any ſhewing; but in recompence thereof, may be perfectly and exactly *defin'd*. For they being Combinations of ſeveral *Ideas*, that the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any Archetypes, Men may, if they pleaſe, exactly know the *Ideas* that go to each Compoſition, and ſo both uſe theſe words in a certain and undoubted Signification, and perfectly declare,

clare, when there is occaſion, what they ſtand for. This, if well conſider'd, would lay great blame on thoſe, who make not their Diſcourſes about moral things very clear and diſtinct. For ſince the preciſe ſignification of the Names of mix'd Modes, or, which is all one, the real Eſſence of each Species is to be known, they being not of Nature's but Man's making, it is a great Negligence and Perverſeneſs to Diſcourſe of moral Things with Uncertainty and Obſcurity; which is more pardonable in treating of natural Subſtances, where doubtful Terms are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary Reaſon, as we ſhall ſee by and by.

Morality capable of Demonſtration.

§. 16. Upon this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that *Morality is capable of Demonſtration*, as well as Mathematicks: ſince the preciſe real Eſſence of the Things moral Words ſtand for, may be perfectly known; and ſo the Congruity or Incongruity of the Things themſelves be certainly diſcover'd, in which conſiſts perfect Knowledg. Nor let any one object, that the Names of Subſtances are often to be made uſe of in Morality, as well as thoſe of Modes, from which will ariſe Obſcurity. For as to Subſtances, when concern'd in moral Diſcourſes, their divers Natures are not ſo much enquir'd into, as ſuppos'd; *v. g.* when we ſay, that *Man is Subject to Law*, we mean nothing by *Man*, but a corporeal rational Creature: What the real Eſſence or other Qualities of that Creature are, in this Caſe, is no way conſider'd. And therefore, whether a Child or Changling be a *Man* in a phyſical Senſe, may among the Naturaliſts be as diſputable as it will, it concerns not at all the *moral Man*, as I may call him, which is this immoveable unchangeable *Idea*, *a corporeal rational Being*. For were there a Monkey, or any other Creature to be found, that had the uſe of Reaſon to ſuch a degree as to be able to underſtand general Signs, and to deduce Conſequences about general *Ideas*, he would no doubt be ſubject to Law; and in that Senſe be a *Man*, how much ſoever he differ'd in Shape from others of that Name. The Names of Subſtances, if they be us'd in them as they ſhould, can no more diſturb Moral than they do Mathematical Diſcourſes: where, if the Mathematician ſpeaks of a *Cube* or *Globe* of *Gold*, or any other Body, he has his clear ſettled *Idea* which varies not, tho' it may by miſtake be apply'd to a particular Body to which it belongs not.

Definition can make moral Diſcourſes clear.

§. 17. This I have here mention'd by the bye, to ſhew of what Conſequence it is for Men, in their Names of mix'd Modes, and conſequently in all their moral Diſcourſes, to define their Words when there is occaſion: ſince thereby moral Knowledg may be brought to ſo great Clearneſs and Certainty. And it muſt be great want of Ingenuity (to ſay no worſe of it) to refuſe to do it: ſince a *Definition is the only way whereby the preciſe Meaning of moral Words can be known*; and yet a way whereby their Meaning may be known *certainly*, and without leaving room for any conteſt about it. And therefore the Negligence or Perverſeneſs of Mankind cannot be excus'd, if their Diſcourſes in Morality be not much more clear than thoſe in Natural Philoſophy: ſince they are about *Ideas* in the Mind, which are none of them falſe or diſproportionate; they having no external Beings for the *Archetypes* which they are refer'd to, and muſt correſpond with. It is far eaſier for Men to frame in their Minds an *Idea* which ſhall be the Standard to which they will give the Name *Juſtice*, with which Pattern ſo made all Actions that agree ſhall paſs under that Denomination, than, having ſeen *Ariſtides*, to frame an *Idea* that ſhall in all Things be exactly like him, who is as he is, let men make what *Idea* they pleaſe of him. For the one, they need but know the Combination of *Ideas* that are put together in their own Minds; for the other, they muſt enquire into the whole Nature, and abſtruſe hidden Conſtitution, and various Qualities of a thing exiſting without them.

And is the only way.

§. 18. Another Reaſon that makes the *defining of mix'd Modes* ſo neceſſary, *eſpecially of moral Words*, is what I mention'd a little before, *viz.* That it is *the only way whereby the Signification of the moſt of* them can be known with Certainty. For the *Ideas* they ſtand for, being for the moſt part ſuch whoſe componeut Parts no where exiſt together, but ſcatter'd and mingled with others, it is the Mind alone that collects them, and gives them the Union of one *Idea*: and it is only by Words, enumerating the ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* which the Mind has united, that we can make known to others what their Names ſtand for; the

Aſſiſtance

Assistance of the Senses in this case not helping us, by the proposal of sensible Objects, to shew the *Ideas* which our Names of this kind stand for, as it does often in the Names of sensible simple *Ideas*, and also to some degree in those of Substances.

3. In Substances, by shewing and defining.

§. 19. *Thirdly, For the explaining* the Signification of *the Names of Substances*, as they stand for the *Ideas* we have of their distinct Species, both the fore mention'd ways, *viz.* of *shewing and defining, are requisite* in many cases to be made use of. For there being ordinarily in each Sort some leading Qualities, to which we suppose the other *Ideas*, which make up our complex *Idea* of that Species, annex'd; we forwardly give the specifick Name to that thing, wherein that characteristical Mark is found, which we take to be the most distinguishing *Idea* of that Species. These leading or characteristical (as I may so call them) *Ideas*, in the sorts of Animals and Vegetables, is (as has been before remark'd, Ch. VI. §. 29. and Ch. IX. §. 15.) mostly Figure, and inanimate Bodies Colour, and in some both together. Now,

Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances are best got by shewing.

§. 20. These *leading sensible Qualities* are those which make *the chief Ingredients of our specifick* Ideas, and consequently the most observable and unvariable part in the Definitions of our specifick Names, as attributed to Sorts of *Substances* coming under our Knowledg. For tho' the Sound *Man*, in its own Nature, be as apt to signify a complex *Idea* made up of Animality and Rationality, united in the same Subject, as to signify any other Combination; yet us'd as a Mark to stand for a sort of Creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward Shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex *Idea*, signify'd by the word *Man*, as any other we find in it: and therefore why *Plato*'s *Animal implume bipes latis unguibus* should not be as good a Definition of the name *Man*, standing for that sort of Creatures, will not be easy to shew: for 'tis the Shape, as the leading Quality, that seems more to determine that Species, than a Faculty of Reasoning, which appears not at first, and in some never. And if this be not allow'd to be so, I do not know how they can be excus'd from Murder, who kill monstrous Births, (as we call them) because of an unordinary Shape, without knowing whether they have a rational Soul or no; which can be no more discern'd in a well-form'd, than ill-shap'd Infant, as soon as born. And who is it has inform'd us, that a rational Soul can inhabit no Tenement, unless it has just such a sort of Frontispiece, or can join it self to, and inform no sort of Body but one that is just of such an outward Structure?

Ideas *of the leading Qualities of Substances are best got by shewing.*

§. 21. Now *these leading Qualities are best made known by shewing*, and can hardly be made known otherwise. For the Shape of an *Horse*, or *Cassuary*, will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the Mind by Words, the Sight of the Animals doth it a thousand times better: And the *Idea* of the particular Colour of *Gold* is not to be got by any Description of it, but only by the frequent Exercise of the Eyes about it, as is evident in those who are us'd to this Metal, who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the Sight; where others (who have as good Eyes, but yet by use have not got the precise nice *Idea* of that peculiar Yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like may be said of those other simple *Ideas*, peculiar in their kind to any Substance; for which precise *Ideas* there are no peculiar Names. The particular ringing Sound there is in *Gold*, distinct from the Sound of other Bodies, has no particular Name annex'd to it, no more than the particular Yellow that belongs to that Metal.

The Ideas *of their Powers best by Definition.*

§. 22. But because many of the simple *Ideas* that make up our specifick *Ideas* of Substances, are Powers which lie not obvious to our Senses in the things as they ordinarily appear; therefore in the Signification of our *Names of Substances, some part of the Signification will be better made known by enumerating those simple* Ideas, *than in shewing the Substance it self.* For he that, to the yellow shining Colour of *Gold* got by Sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have the *Ideas* of great Ductility, Fusibility, Fixedness, and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, will have a perfecter *Idea* of *Gold* than he can have by seeing a piece of *Gold*, and thereby imprinting in his Mind only its obvious Qualities. But if the formal Constitution of this shining heavy, ductil thing (from whence all these its Properties flow) lay open to our Senses, as the formal Constitution, or Essence of a Triangle does, the Signification of the word *Gold* might as easily be ascertain'd as that of *Triangle*.

§. 23.

§. 23. Hence we may take notice how much the Foundation of all *our Knowledg of corporeal things lies in our Senſes.* For how Spirits, ſeparate from Bodies (whoſe Knowledg and *Ideas* of theſe things are certainly much more perfect than our's) know them, we have no Notion, no *Idea* at all. The whole Extent of our Knowledg or Imagination reaches not beyond our own *Ideas* limited to our ways of Perception. Tho' yet it be not to be doubted that Spirits of a higher rank than thoſe immers'd in Fleſh, may have as clear *Ideas* of the radical Conſtitution of Subſtances, as we have of a Triangle, and ſo perceive how all their Properties and Operations flow from thence: but the manner how they come by that Knowledg exceeds our Conceptions. *A Reflection on the Knowledg of Spirits.*

§. 24. But tho' Definitions will ſerve to explain the Names of Subſtances as they ſtand for our *Ideas*; yet they leave them not without great Imperfection as they ſtand for things. For our Names of Subſtances being not put barely for our *Ideas*, but being made uſe of ultimately to repreſent things, and ſo are put in their place, their Signification muſt agree with the Truth of things as well as with Mens *Ideas*. And therefore in Subſtances we are not always to reſt in the ordinary complex *Idea*, commonly receiv'd as the Signification of that Word, but muſt go a little farther, and enquire into the Nature and Properties of the things themſelves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our *Ideas* of their diſtinct Species; or elſe learn them from ſuch as are us'd to that ſort of things, and are experienc'd in them. For ſince 'tis intended their Names ſhould ſtand for ſuch Collections of ſimple *Ideas* as do really exiſt in things themſelves, as well as for the complex *Idea* in other mens minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they ſtand for: therefore *to define their Names right, natural Hiſtory is to be enquir'd into*; and their Properties are, with Care and Examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding Inconveniences in Diſcourſes and Arguings about natural Bodies and ſubſtantial Things, to have learn'd, from the Propriety of the Language, the common but confus'd or very imperfect *Idea* to which each Word is apply'd, and to keep them to that *Idea* in our uſe of them: but we muſt, by acquainting our ſelves with the Hiſtory of that ſort of things, rectify and ſettle our complex *Idea* belonging to each ſpecifick Name; and in diſcourſe with others (if we find them miſtake us) we ought to tell what the complex *Idea* is, that we make ſuch a Name ſtand for. This is the more neceſſary to be done by all thoſe who ſearch after Knowledg and philoſophical Verity, in that Children being taught Words whilſt they have but imperfect Notions of things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and ſeldom frame determin'd *Ideas* to be ſignify'd by them. Which Cuſtom (it being eaſy, and ſerving well enough for the ordinary Affairs of Life and Converſation) they are apt to continue when they are Men: and ſo begin at the wrong end, learning Words firſt and perfectly, but make the Notions to which they apply thoſe Words afterwards very overtly. By this means it comes to paſs, that Men ſpeaking the proper Language of their Country, *i. e.* according to Grammar-Rules of that Language, do yet ſpeak very improperly of things themſelves; and by their arguing one with another, make but ſmall Progreſs in the Diſcoveries of uſeful Truths, and the Knowledg of things, as they are to be found in themſelves, and not in our Imaginations; and it matters not much, for the improvement of our Knowledge, how they are call'd. *Ideas alſo of Subſtances muſt be conformable to things.*

§. 25. It were therefore to be wiſh'd, That Men, vers'd in phyſical Enquiries, and acquainted with the ſeveral ſorts of natural Bodies, would ſet down thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, wherein they obſerve the Individuals of each ſort conſtantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that Confuſion which comes from ſeveral Perſons applying the ſame Name to a Collection of a ſmaller or greater number of ſenſible Qualities, proportionably as they have been more or leſs acquainted with, or accurate in examining the Qualities of any ſort of things which come under one Denomination. But a Dictionary of this ſort containing, as it were, a natural Hiſtory, requires too many Hands, as well as too much Time, Coſt, Pains, and Sagacity, ever to be hop'd for; and till that be done, we muſt content our ſelves with ſuch Definitions of the Names of Subſtances, as explain the ſenſe Men uſe them in. And it would be well, where there is occaſion, if they would afford us ſo much. This yet is not *Not eaſy to be made ſo.*

uſually done; but Men talk to one another, and diſpute in Words, whoſe meaning is not agreed between them, out of a miſtake, that the Signification of common Words are certainly eſtabliſh'd, and the preciſe *Ideas* they ſtand for perfectly known; and that it is a ſhame to be ignorant of them. Both which Suppoſitions are falſe: no Names of complex *Ideas* having ſo ſettled determin'd Significations, that they are conſtantly us'd for the ſame preciſe *Ideas*. Nor is it a ſhame for a Man not to have a certain Knowledg of any thing, but by the neceſſary ways of attaining it; and ſo it is no diſcredit not to know what preciſe *Idea* any Sound ſtands for in another man's Mind, without he declare it to me by ſome other way than barely uſing that Sound, there being no other way, without ſuch a Declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the neceſſity of Communication by Language brings Men to an Agreement in the Signification of common Words, within ſome tolerable Latitude, that may ſerve for ordinary Converſation: and ſo a Man cannot be ſuppos'd wholly ignorant of the *Ideas* which are annex'd to words by common Uſe, in a Language familiar to him. But common Uſe, being but a very uncertain Rule, which reduces it ſelf at laſt to the *Ideas* of particular Men, proves often but a very variable Standard. But tho' ſuch a Dictionary, as I have above-mention'd, will require too much Time, Coſt and Pains to be hop'd for in this Age; yet methinks it is not unreaſonable to propoſe, that Words ſtanding for things, which are known and diſtinguiſh'd by their outward Shapes, ſhould be expreſs'd by little Draughts and Prints made of them. A Vocabulary made after this faſhion would perhaps with more eaſe, and in leſs time, teach the true Signification of many Terms, eſpecially in Languages of remote Countries or Ages, and ſettle truer *Ideas* in mens Minds of ſeveral things, whereof we read the Names in antient Authors, than all the large and laborious Comments of learned Criticks. Naturaliſts, that treat of Plants and Animals, have found the Benefit of this way: And he that has had occaſion to conſult them, will have reaſon to confeſs, that he has a clearer *Idea* of *Apium*, or *Ibex*, from a little Print of that Herb or Beaſt, than he could have from a long Definition of the Names of either of them. And ſo no doubt he would have of *Strigil* and *Siſtrum*, if inſtead of a *Curry-Comb* and *Cymbal*, which are the *Engliſh* Names Dictionaries render them by, he could ſee ſtamp'd in the Margin, ſmall Pictures of theſe Inſtruments, as they were in uſe amongſt the Ancients. *Toga*, *Tunica*, *Pallium*, are Words eaſily tranſlated by *Gown*, *Coat*, and *Cloak*; but we have thereby no more true *Ideas* of the Faſhion of thoſe Habits amongſt the *Romans*, than we have of the Faces of the Taylors who made them. Such things as theſe, which the Eye diſtinguiſhes by their Shapes, would be beſt let into the Mind by Draughts made of them, and more determine the Signification of ſuch Words than any other Words ſet for them, or made uſe of to define them. But this only by the bye.

5. By Conſtancy in their Signification.

§. 26. *Fifthly*, If Men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their Words, and Definitions of their Terms are not to be had; yet this is the leaſt that can be expected, that in all Diſcourſes, wherein one Man pretends to inſtruct or convince another, he ſhould *uſe the ſame Word conſtantly in the ſame Senſe*: If this were done (which no body can refuſe without great diſingenuity) many of the Books extant might be ſpar'd, many of the Controverſies in Diſpute would be at an End; ſeveral of thoſe great Volumes, ſwoln with ambiguous Words, now us'd in one ſenſe, and by and by in another, would ſhrink into a very narrow compaſs; and many of the Philoſophers (to mention no other) as well as Poets Works, might be contain'd in a Nutſhel.

When the Variation is to be explain'd.

§. 27. But after all, the Proviſion of Words is ſo ſcanty in reſpect of that infinite Variety of Thoughts, that Men, wanting Terms to ſuit their preciſe Notions, will, notwithſtanding their utmoſt Caution, be forc'd often to uſe the ſame Word in ſomewhat different Senſes. And tho' in the continuation of a Diſcourſe, or the purſuit of an Argument, there be hardly room to digreſs into a particular Definition, as often as a Man varies the Signification of any Term; yet the import of the Diſcourſe will, for the moſt part, if there be no deſign'd Fallacy, ſufficiently lead candid and intelligent Readers into the true meaning of it: but where that is not ſufficient to guide the Reader, there it concerns the Writer to explain his meaning, and ſhew in what ſenſe he there uſes that Term.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledg in general.

§. 1. SINCE the *Mind*, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own *Ideas*, which it alone does or can contemplate; it is evident, that our Knowledg is only conversant about them. *Our Knowledg conversant about our Ideas.*

§. 2. *Knowledg* then seems to me to be nothing but *the Perception of the Connection and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas.* In this alone it consists. Where this Perception is, there is Knowledg; and where it is not, there, tho' we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of Knowledg. For when we know that *White is not Black*, what do we else but perceive that these two *Ideas* do not agree? When we possess our selves with the utmost Security of the Demonstration, that *the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones*, what do we more but perceive, that Equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three Angles of a Triangle? *Knowledg is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas.*

§. 3. But to understand a little more distinctly, wherein this Agreement or Disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts: *This Agreement fourfold.*

1. *Identity*, or *Diversity*.
2. *Relation*.
3. *Co-existence*, or *necessary Connection*.
4. *Real Existence*.

§. 4. *First*, As to the first sort of Agreement or Disagreement, *viz. Identity* or *Diversity*. 'Tis the first Act of the Mind, when it has any Sentiments or *Ideas* at all, to perceive its *Ideas*; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no Knowledg, no Reasoning, no Imagination, no distinct Thoughts at all. By this the Mind clearly and infallibly perceives each *Idea* to agree with it self, and to be what it is; and all distinct *Ideas* to disagree, *i. e.* the one not to be the other: and this it does without Pains, Labour or Deduction; but at first view, by its natural Power of Perception and Distinction. And tho' Men of Art have reduc'd this into those general Rules, *What is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*; for ready Application in all Cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflect on it; yet it is certain, that the first Exercise of this Faculty is about particular *Ideas*. A Man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his Mind, that the *Ideas* he calls *White* and *Round*, are the very *Ideas* they are, and that they are not other *Ideas* which he calls *Red* or *Square*. Nor can any Maxim or Proposition in the world make him know it clearer or surer than he did before, and without any such general Rule. This then is the first Agreement or Disagreement, which the Mind perceives in its *Ideas*; which it always perceives at first sight: And if there ever happen any doubt about it, 'twill always be found to be about the Names, and not the *Ideas* themselves, whose Identity and Diversity will always be perceiv'd, as soon and as clearly as the *Ideas* themselves are, nor can it possibly be otherwise. 1. *Of Identity or Diversity.*

2. *Relative.* §. 5. *Secondly*, The next ſort of Agreement, or Diſagreement, the Mind perceives in any of its *Ideas*, may, I think, be call'd *Relative*, and is nothing but *the Perception of the Relation between any two Ideas*, of what kind ſoever, whether Subſtances, Modes, or any other. For ſince all diſtinct *Ideas* muſt eternally be known not to be the ſame, and ſo be univerſally and conſtantly deny'd one of another, there could be no room for any poſitive Knowledg at all, if we could not perceive any Relation between our *Ideas*, and find out the Agreement or Diſagreement they have one with another, in ſeveral ways the Mind takes of comparing them.

3. *Of Co-exiſtence.* §. 6. *Thirdly*, The third ſort of Agreement, or Diſagreement, to be found in our *Ideas*, which the Perception of the Mind is employ'd about, is *Co-exiſtence*, or *Non-Co-exiſtence* in the ſame Subject; and this belongs particularly to Subſtances. Thus, when we pronounce concerning *Gold* that it is fix'd, our Knowledg of this Truth amounts to no more but this, that Fixedneſs, or a Power to remain in the Fire unconſum'd, is an *Idea* that always accompanies and is join'd with that particular ſort of Yellowneſs, Weight, Fuſibility, Malleableneſs, and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, which make our complex *Idea*, ſignify'd by the word *Gold*.

4. *Of real Exiſtence.* §. 7. *Fourthly*, The fourth and laſt ſort is, that of *actual real Exiſtence* agreeing to any *Idea*. Within theſe four ſorts of Agreement or Diſagreement, is, I ſuppoſe, contain'd all the Knowledg we have, or are capable of: For all the Enquiries that we can make concerning any of our *Ideas*, all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them, is, That it is, or is not, the ſame with ſome other; that it does, or does not, always co-exiſt with ſome other *Idea* in the ſame Subject; that it has this or that Relation to ſome other *Idea*; or that it has a real Exiſtence without the Mind. Thus *Blue is not Yellow*, is of Identity: *Two Triangles upon equal Baſes between two Parallels are equal*, is of Relation: *Iron is ſuſceptible of magnetical Impreſſion*, is of Co-exiſtence: *GOD is*, is of real Exiſtence. Tho' Identity and Co-exiſtence are truly nothing but Relations, yet they are ſo peculiar ways of Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Ideas*, that they deſerve well to be conſider'd as diſtinct Heads, and not under Relation in general; ſince they are ſo different Grounds of Affirmation and Negation, as will eaſily appear to any one, who will but reflect on what is ſaid in ſeveral places of this Eſſay. I ſhould now proceed to examine the ſeveral degrees of our Knowledg, but that it is neceſſary firſt to conſider the different Acceptations of the word *Knowledg*.

Knowledg actual or habitual. §. 8. There are ſeveral ways wherein the Mind is poſſeſs'd of Truth, each of which is call'd *Knowledg*.

1. There is *actual Knowledg*, which is the preſent View the Mind has of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of its *Ideas*, or of the Relation they have one to another.

2. A Man is ſaid to know any Propoſition, which having been once laid before his Thoughts, he evidently perceiv'd the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* whereof it conſiſts; and ſo lodg'd it in his Memory, that whenever that Propoſition comes again to be reflected on, he, without doubt or heſitation, embraces the right ſide, aſſents to, and is certain of the Truth of it. This, I think, one may call *habitual Knowledg*: And thus a Man may be ſaid to know all thoſe Truths which are lodg'd in his Memory, by a foregoing clear and full Perception, whereof the Mind is aſſur'd paſt doubt, as often as it has occaſion to reflect on them. For our finite Underſtandings being able to think clearly and diſtinctly but on one thing at once, if Men had no knowledg of any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant; and he that knew moſt, would know but one Truth, that being all he was able to think on at one time.

Habitual Knowledg twofold. §. 9. Of habitual Knowledg, there are alſo, vulgarly ſpeaking, two degrees:

Firſt, The one is of *ſuch Truths laid up in the Memory, as whenever they occur to the Mind, it actually perceives the Relation is between thoſe* Ideas. And this is in all thoſe Truths, whereof we have an *intuitive Knowledg*; where the *Ideas* themſelves, by an immediate View, diſcover their Agreement or Diſagreement one with another.

Secondly,

Secondly, The other is of *ſuch Truths, whereof the Mind having been convinc'd, it retains the Memory of the Conviction, without the Proofs.* Thus a Man that remembers certainly that he once perceiv'd the Demonſtration, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it, becauſe he cannot doubt of the Truth of it. In his adherence to a Truth, where the Demonſtration by which it was at firſt known is forgot, tho' a Man may be thought rather to believe his Memory than really to know, and this way of entertaining a Truth ſeem'd formerly to me like ſomething between Opinion and Knowledg; a ſort of Aſſurance which exceeds bare Belief, for that relies on the Teſtimony of another: yet upon a due examination I find it comes not ſhort of perfect Certainty, and is in effect true Knowledg. That which is apt to miſlead our firſt Thoughts into a miſtake in this matter, is, that the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* in this caſe is not perceiv'd, as it was at firſt, by an actual View of all the intermediate *Ideas*, whereby the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe in the Propoſition was at firſt perceiv'd; but by other intermediate *Ideas*, that ſhew the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* contain'd in the Propoſition whoſe Certainty we remember. For Example, in this Propoſition, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, one who has ſeen and clearly perceiv'd the Demonſtration of this Truth, knows it to be true, when that Demonſtration is gone out of his Mind; ſo that at preſent it is not actually in view, and poſſibly cannot be recollected: but he knows it in a different way from what he did before. The Agreement of the two *Ideas* join'd in that Propoſition is perceiv'd, but it is by the intervention of other *Ideas* than thoſe which at firſt produc'd that Perception. He remembers, *i. e.* he knows (for Remembrance is but the reviving of ſome paſt Knowledg) that he was once certain of the Truth of this Propoſition, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones. The Immutability of the ſame Relations between the ſame immutable Things, is now the *Idea* that ſhews him, that if the three angles of a Triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true in the caſe, is always true; what *Idea* once agreed, will always agree; and conſequently what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it. Upon this ground it is, that particular Demonſtrations in Mathematicks afford general Knowledg. If then the Perception that the ſame *Ideas* will eternally have the ſame Habitudes and Relations, be not a ſufficient ground of Knowledg, there could be no Knowledg of general Propoſitions in Mathematicks; for no Mathematical Demonſtration would be any other than particular: and when a Man had demonſtrated any Propoſition concerning one Triangle or Circle, his Knowledg would not reach beyond that particular Diagram. If he would extend it farther, he muſt renew his Demonſtrations in another Inſtance, before he could know it to be true in another like Triangle, and ſo on: by which means one could never come to the Knowledg of any general Propoſitions. No Body, I think, can deny that Mr. *Newton* certainly knows any Propoſition, that he now at any time reads in his Book, to be true; tho' he has not in actual view that admirable Chain of intermediate *Ideas*, whereby he at firſt diſcover'd it to be true. Such a Memory as that, able to retain ſuch a Train of Particulars, may be well thought beyond the reach of human Faculties; when the very Diſcovery, Perception, and laying together that wonderful Connection of *Ideas*, is found to ſurpaſs moſt Readers Comprehenſion. But yet 'tis evident, the Author himſelf knows the Propoſition to be true, remembring he once ſaw the Connection of thoſe *Ideas*, as certainly as he knows ſuch a Man wounded another, remembring that he ſaw him run him thro'. But becauſe the Memory is not always ſo clear as actual Perception, and does in all Men more or leſs decay in length of time, this amongſt other Differences is one, which ſhews that *demonſtrative Knowledg* is much more imperfect than *intuitive*, as we ſhall ſee in the following Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledg.

Intuitive. §. 1. ALL our Knowledg conſiſting, as I have ſaid, in the view the Mind has of its own *Ideas*, which is the utmoſt Light and greateſt Certainty we, with our Faculties, and in our way of Knowledg, are capable of; it may not be amiſs, to conſider a little the degrees of its Evidence. The different Clearneſs of our Knowledg ſeems to me to lie in the different way of Perception the Mind has of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of its *Ideas*. For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we ſhall find that ſometimes the Mind perceives the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas* immediately by themſelves, without the intervention of any other: and this, I think, we may call *intuitive Knowledg*. For in this, the Mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth Light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the Mind perceives, That *White* is not *Black*, That a *Circle* is not a *Triangle*, That *Three* are more than *Two*, and equal to *One* and *Two*. Such kind of Truths the Mind perceives at the firſt ſight of the *Ideas* together, by bare *Intuition*, without the intervention of any other *Idea*; and this kind of Knowledg is the cleareſt and moſt certain, that human Frailty is capable of. This part of Knowledg is irreſiſtible, and like bright Sun-ſhine forces it ſelf immediately to be perceiv'd, as ſoon as ever the Mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for Heſitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind is preſently fill'd with the clear Light of it. 'Tis on this *Intuition* that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of all our Knowledg; which Certainty every one finds to be ſo great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater: For a Man cannot conceive himſelf capable of a greater Certainty, than to know that any *Idea* in his Mind is ſuch as he perceives it to be; and that two *Ideas*, wherein he perceives a difference, are different, and not preciſely the ſame. He that demands a greater Certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and ſhews only that he has a mind to be a Sceptick, without being able to be ſo. Certainty depends ſo wholly on this Intuition, that in the next degree of *Knowledg*, which I call *Demonſtrative*, this Intuition is neceſſary in all the Connections of the intermediate *Ideas*, without which we cannot attain Knowledg and Certainty.

Demonſtrative. §. 2. The next degree of Knowledg is, where the Mind perceives the Agreement or Diſagreement of any *Ideas*, but not immediately. Tho' wherever the Mind perceives the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of its *Ideas*, there be certain Knowledg; yet it does not always happen, that the Mind ſees that Agreement or Diſagreement which there is between them, even where it is diſcoverable: and in that caſe remains in Ignorance, and at moſt gets no farther than a probable Conjecture. The Reaſon why the Mind cannot always perceive preſently the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas*, is, becauſe thoſe *Ideas*, concerning whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement the Enquiry is made, cannot by the Mind be ſo put together as to ſhew it. In this caſe then, when the Mind cannot ſo bring its *Ideas* together, as by their immediate Compariſon, and as it were Juxta-poſition or Application one to another, to perceive their Agreement or Diſagreement, it is fain, by the intervention of other *Ideas* (one or more, as it happens) to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement which it ſearches; and this is that which we call *Reaſoning*. Thus the Mind being willing to know the Agreement or Diſagreement in bigneſs, between the three Angles of a Triangle and two right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing them do it: becauſe the three Angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compar'd with any one or two Angles; and ſo of this the Mind has no immediate, no intuitive Knowledg. In this caſe the Mind is fain to find out ſome other Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have an Equality; and finding thoſe equal to two right ones, comes to know their Equality to two right ones.

§. 3.

§. 3. Thoſe intervening *Ideas* which ſerve to ſhew the Agreement of any two others, are call'd *Proofs*; and where the Agreement or Diſagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceiv'd, it is call'd *Demonſtration*, it being *ſhewn* to the Underſtanding, and the Mind made ſee that it is ſo. A quickneſs in the Mind to find out theſe intermediate *Ideas* (that ſhall diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement of any other) and to apply them right, is, I ſuppoſe, that which is call'd *Sagacity*. *Depends on Proofs.*

§. 4. *This Knowledg by intervening Proofs*, tho' it be certain, yet the Evidence of it is *not* altogether *ſo clear* and bright, nor the Aſſent ſo ready, as in *intuitive* Knowledg. For tho' in *Demonſtration*, the Mind does at laſt perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* it conſiders; yet 'tis not without pains and attention: There muſt be more than one tranſient View to find it. A ſteddy Application and Purſuit is requir'd to this Diſcovery: and there muſt be a Progreſſion by ſteps and degrees, before the Mind can in this way arrive at Certainty, and come to perceive the Agreement or Repugnancy between two *Ideas* that need Proofs and the Uſe of Reaſon to ſhew it. *But not ſo eaſy.*

§. 5. *Another difference between intuitive and demonſtrative Knowledg*, is, that tho' in the latter all doubt be remov'd, when by the intervention of the intermediate *Ideas* the Agreement or Diſagreement is perceiv'd; yet before the Demonſtration there was a doubt, which in intuitive Knowledg cannot happen to the Mind, that has its Faculty of Perception left to a Degree capable of diſtinct *Ideas*, no more than it can be a doubt to the Eye (that can diſtinctly ſee White and Black) whether this Ink and this Paper be all of a Colour. If there be Sight in the Eyes, it will at firſt glimpſe, without heſitation perceive the Words printed on this Paper different from the Colour of the Paper: And ſo if the Mind have the Faculty of diſtinct Perception, it will perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe *Ideas* that produce intuitive Knowledg. If the Eyes have loſt the Faculty of ſeeing, or the Mind of perceiving, we in vain enquire after the Quickneſs of Sight in one, or Clearneſs of Perception in the other. *Not without precedent Doubts.*

§. 6. 'Tis true, the Perception produc'd by *Demonſtration* is alſo very clear, yet it is often with a great Abatement of that evident Luſtre and full Aſſurance, that always accompany that which I call *intuitive*; like a Face reflected by ſeveral Mirrors one to another, where as long as it retains the Similitude and Agreement with the Object, it produces a Knowledg: but 'tis ſtill in every ſucceſſive Reflection with a leſſening of that perfect Clearneſs and Diſtinctneſs, which is in the firſt, till at laſt, after many removes, it has a great mixture of Dimneſs, and is not at firſt ſight ſo knowable, eſpecially to weak Eyes. Thus it is with Knowledg, made out by a long Train of Proofs. *Not ſo clear.*

§. 7. Now, *in every ſtep Reaſon makes in demonſtrative Knowledg, there is an intuitive Knowledg* of that Agreement or Diſagreement, it ſeeks with the next intermediate *Idea*, which it uſes as a Proof: for if it were not ſo, that yet would need a Proof; ſince without the Perception of ſuch Agreement or Diſagreement, there is no Knowledg produc'd. If it be perceiv'd by it ſelf, it is intuitive Knowledg: If it cannot be perceiv'd by it ſelf, there is need of ſome intervening *Idea*, as a common meaſure to ſhew their Agreement or Diſagreement. By which it is plain, that every ſtep in Reaſoning that produces Knowledg, has intuitive Certainty; which when the Mind perceives, there is no more requir'd, but to remember it to make the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas*, concerning which we enquire, viſible and certain. So that to make any thing a *Demonſtration*, it is neceſſary to perceive the immediate Agreement of the intervening *Ideas*, whereby the Agreement or Diſagreement of the two *Ideas* under Examination (whereof the one is always the firſt, and the other the laſt in their account) is found. This intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the intermediate *Ideas*, in each ſtep and progreſſion of the *Demonſtration*, muſt alſo be carry'd exactly in the Mind, and a Man muſt be ſure that no part is left out: which, becauſe in long Deductions, and the uſe of many Proofs, the Memory does not always ſo readily and exactly retain; therefore it comes to paſs, that this is more imperfect than intuitive Knowledg, and Men embrace often Falſhood for Demonſtrations. *Each ſtep muſt have intuitive Evidence.*

§. 8. The neceſſity of this intuitive Knowledg, in each ſtep of ſcientifical or demonſtrative Reaſoning, gave occaſion, I imagine, to that *miſtaken Axiom*, *Hence the miſtake, ex præcognitis & præconceſſis.*

that

that all Reasoning was ex præcognitis & præconcessis; which how far it is mistaken, I shall have occasion to shew more at large, when I come to consider Propositions, and particularly those Propositions which are call'd Maxims; and to shew that 'tis by a Mistake, that they are suppos'd to be the Foundations of all our Knowledg and Reasonings.

Demonstration not limited to Quantity.

§. 9. It has been generally taken for granted, that Mathematicks alone are capable of Demonstrative Certainty: But to have such an Agreement or Disagreement, as may intuitively be perceiv'd, being, as I imagine, not the Privilege of the *Ideas* of *Number*, *Extension* and *Figure* alone; it may possibly be the want of due Method and Application in us, and not of sufficient Evidence in things, that Demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other Parts of Knowledg, and been scarce so much as aim'd at by any but Mathematicians. For whatever *Ideas* we have, wherein the Mind can perceive the immediate Agreement or Disagreement that is between them, there the Mind is capable of intuitive Knowledg; and where it can perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, by an intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement they have with any intermediate *Ideas*, there the Mind is capable of Demonstration, which is not limited to *Ideas* of Extension, Figure, Number, and their Modes.

Why it has been so thought.

§. 10. The Reason why it has been generally sought for, and suppos'd to be only in those, I imagine has been not only the general Usefulness of those Sciences; but because, in comparing their Equality or Excess, the Modes of Numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable: and tho' in Extension, every the least Excess is not so perceptible, yet the Mind has found out ways, to examine and discover demonstratively the just Equality of two Angles, or Extensions, or Figures: and both these, *i. e.* Numbers and Figures, can be set down by visible and lasting Marks, wherein the *Ideas* under consideration are perfectly determin'd; which for the most part they are not, where they are mark'd only by Names and Words.

§. 11. But in other simple *Ideas*, whose Modes and Differences are made and counted by Degrees, and not Quantity, we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their Differences, as to perceive or find ways to measure their just Equality, or the least Differences. For those other simple *Ideas*, being Appearances or Sensations, produc'd in us by the Size, Figure, Number and Motion of minute Corpuscles singly insensible, their different degrees also depend upon the Variation of some, or all of those Causes; which since it cannot be observ'd by us in particles of Matter, whereof each is too subtle to be perceiv'd, it is impossible for us to have any exact Measures of the different degrees of these simple *Ideas*. For supposing the Sensation or *Idea* we name *Whiteness*, be produc'd in us by a certain Number of Globules, which having a Verticity about their own Centers, strike upon the *Retina* of the Eye, with a certain degree of Rotation, as well as progressive Swiftness; it will hence easily follow, that the more the superficial Parts of any Body are so order'd, as to reflect the greater number of Globules of Light, and to give them that proper Rotation, which is fit to produce this Sensation of White in us, the more white will that Body appear, that from an equal Space sends to the *Retina* the greater number of such Corpuscles, with that peculiar sort of Motion. I do not say, that the Nature of Light consists in very small round Globules, nor of Whiteness in such a Texture of Parts, as gives a certain Rotation to these Globules, when it reflects them; for I am not now treating physically of Light or Colours. But this, I think, I may say, that I cannot (and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did) conceive how Bodies without us can any ways affect our Senses, but by the immediate Contact of the sensible Bodies themselves, as in Tasting and Feeling, or the impulse of some insensible Particles coming from them, as in Seeing, Hearing and Smelling; by the different Impulse of which Parts, caus'd by their different Size, Figure and Motion, the variety of Sensations is produc'd in us.

§. 12. Whether then they be Globules, or no; or whether they have a Verticity about their own Centers, that produce the *Idea* of *Whiteness* in us, this is certain, that the more Particles of Light are reflected from a Body, fitted to give them that peculiar Motion which produces the Sensation of Whiteness in

us; and poſſibly too, the quicker that peculiar Motion is, the whiter does the Body appear, from which the greater number are reflected, as is evident in the ſame piece of Paper put in the Sun-beams, in the Shade, and in a dark Hole; in each of which it will produce in us the *Idea* of Whiteneſs in far different degrees.

Why it has been ſo thought.

§. 13. Not knowing therefore what number of Particles, nor what Motion of them is fit to produce any preciſe degree of *Whiteneſs*, we cannot demonſtrate the certain Equality of any two degrees of *Whiteneſs*, becauſe we have no certain Standard to meaſure them by, nor Means to diſtinguiſh every the leaſt real Difference, the only Help we have being from our Senſes, which in this point fail us. But where the Difference is ſo great, as to produce in the Mind clearly diſtinct *Ideas*, whoſe Differences can be perfectly retain'd, there theſe *Ideas* of Colours, as we ſee in different kinds, as Blue and Red, are as capable of Demonſtration, as *Ideas* of Number and Extenſion. What I have here ſaid of *Whiteneſs* and Colours, I think, holds true in all ſecondary Qualities, and their Modes.

Senſitive Knowledge of particular Exiſtence.

§. 14. Theſe two, *viz.* Intuition and Demonſtration, are the degrees of our Knowledg; whatever comes ſhort of one of theſe, with what Aſſurance ſoever embrac'd, is but Faith, or Opinion, but not Knowledg, at leaſt in all general Truths. There is, indeed, another *Perception* of the Mind, imploy'd about *the particular Exiſtence of finite Beings* without us; which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of Certainty, paſſes under the name of Knowledg. There can be nothing more certain, than that the *Idea* we receive from an external Object is in our Minds; this is intuitive Knowledge. But whether there be any thing more than barely that *Idea* in our Minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the Exiſtence of any thing without us, which correſponds to that *Idea*, is that, whereof ſome Men think there may be a Queſtion made; becauſe Men may have ſuch *Ideas* in their Minds, when no ſuch Thing exiſts, no ſuch Object affects their Senſes. But yet here, I think, we are provided with an Evidence, that puts us paſt doubting: For I ask any one, Whether he be not invincibly conſcious to himſelf of a different Perception, when he looks on the Sun by Day, and thinks on it by Night; when he actually taſtes Wormwood, or ſmells a Roſe, or only thinks on that Savour or Odour? We as plainly find the Difference there is between any *Idea* reviv'd in our Minds by our own Memory, and actually coming into our Minds by our Senſes, as we do between any two diſtinct *Ideas*. If any one ſay, a Dream may do the ſame thing, and all theſe *Ideas* may be produc'd in us without any external Objects, he may pleaſe to dream that I make him this Anſwer; 1. That 'tis no great matter, whether I remove his Scruple, or no: Where all is but Dream, Reaſoning and Arguments are of no uſe, Truth and Knowledg nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifeſt difference between dreaming of being in the Fire, and being actually in it. But yet if he be reſolv'd to appear ſo ſceptical, as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the Fire is nothing but a Dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any ſuch thing as Fire actually exiſts without us: I anſwer, That we certainly finding that Pleaſure or Pain follows upon the application of certain Objects to us, whoſe Exiſtence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our Senſes; this certainly is as great as our Happineſs or Miſery, beyond which we have no Concernment to know, or to be. So that, I think, we may add to the two former ſorts of *Knowledg* this alſo, of the Exiſtence of particular external Objects, by that Perception and Conſciouſneſs we have of actual Entrance of *Ideas* from them, and allow theſe *three degrees of Knowledg*, viz. *Intuitive, Demonſtrative and Senſitive:* in each of which there are different degrees and ways of Evidence and Certainty.

Knowledg not always clear, where the Ideas are ſo.

§. 15. But ſince our Knowledg is founded on, and imploy'd about our *Ideas* only, will it not follow from thence, that it is conformable to our *Ideas*; and that where our *Ideas* are clear and diſtinct, or obſcure and confus'd, our Knowledg will be ſo too? To which I anſwer, No: For our Knowledg conſiſting in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas*, its Clearneſs or Obſcurity conſiſts in the Clearneſs or Obſcurity of that Perception, and not in the Clearneſs or Obſcurity of the *Ideas* themſelves; *v. g.* a Man that has

has as clear *Ideas* of the Angles of a Triangle, and of Equality to two right ones, as any Mathematician in the World, may yet have but a very obſcure Perception of their Agreement, and ſo have but a very obſcure Knowledg of it. But *Ideas*, which by reaſon of their Obſcurity or otherwiſe, are confus'd, cannot produce any clear or diſtinct Knowledg; becauſe as far as any *Ideas* are confus'd, ſo far the Mind cannot perceive clearly, whether they agree or diſagree. Or to expreſs the ſame thing in a way leſs apt to be miſunderſtood: He that hath not determin'd *Ideas* to the Words he uſes, cannot make Propoſitions of them, of whoſe Truth he can be certain.

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Human Knowledg.

§. 1. KNOWLEDG, as has been ſaid, lying in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of our *Ideas*, it follows from hence, That,

1. *No farther than we have* Ideas.

Firſt, We can have *Knowledg* no farther than we have *Ideas*.

2. *No farther than we can perceive their Agreement or Diſagreement.*

§. 2. *Secondly*, That we can have no *Knowledg* farther than we can have Perception of that Agreement or Diſagreement. Which Perception being, 1. Either by *Intuition*, or the immediate comparing any two *Ideas*; or, 2. By *Reaſon*, examining the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas*, by the Intervention of ſome others: Or, 3. By *Senſation*, perceiving the Exiſtence of particular Things: Hence it alſo follows,

3. *Intuitive Knowledg extends it ſelf not to all the Relations of all our* Ideas.

§. 3. *Thirdly*, That we cannot have an *intuitive Knowledg*, that ſhall extend it ſelf to all our *Ideas*, and all that we would know about them; becauſe we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations they have one to another by Juxta-Poſition, or an immediate Compariſon one with another. Thus having the *Ideas* of an obtuſe, and an acute-angled Triangle, both drawn from equal Baſes, and between Parallels, I can, by intuitive Knowledg, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that way know whether they be equal or no; becauſe their Agreement or Diſagreement in Equality can never be perceiv'd by an immediate comparing them: The difference of Figure makes their Parts uncapable of an exact immediate Application; and therefore there is need of ſome intervening Quantities to meaſure them by, which is Demonſtration, or rational Knowledg.

4. *Nor demonſtrative Knowledg.*

§. 4. *Fourthly*, it follows alſo, from what is above obſerv'd, that our *rational Knowledg* cannot reach to the whole Extent of our *Ideas*: Becauſe between two different *Ideas* we would examine, we cannot always find ſuch *Mediums*, as we can connect one to another with an intuitive Knowledg, in all the Parts of the Deduction; and wherever that fails, we come ſhort of Knowledg and Demonſtration.

5. *Senſitive Knowledg narrower than either.*

§. 5. *Fifthly*, *Senſitive Knowledge*, reaching no farther than the Exiſtence of Things actually preſent to our Senſes, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

6. *Our Knowledg therefore narrower than our* Ideas.

§. 6. From all which it is evident, that *the Extent of our Knowledg* comes not only ſhort of the Reality of Things, but even of the Extent of our own *Ideas*. Tho' our Knowledg be limited to our *Ideas*, and cannot exceed them either in Extent or Perfection; and tho' theſe be very narrow Bounds, in reſpect of the Extent of All-Being, and far ſhort of what we may juſtly imagine to be in ſome even created Underſtandings, not ty'd down to the dull and narrow Information is to be receiv'd from ſome few, and not very acute ways of Perception, ſuch as are our Senſes; yet it would be well with us if our Knowledg were but as large as our *Ideas*, and there were not many Doubts and Inquiries concerning the *Ideas* we have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever ſhall be in this World reſolv'd. Nevertheleſs I do not queſtion but that human Knowledg, under the preſent Circumſtances of our Beings and Conſtitutions, may be carry'd much farther than it hitherto has been, if Men would ſincerely, and with freedom of Mind, imploy all that Induſtry and Labour of Thought, in improving

improving the means of diſcovering Truth, which they do for the colouring or ſupport of Falſhood, to maintain a Syſtem, Intereſt or Party they are once ingag'd in. But yet after all, I think I may, without Injury to human Perfection, be confident, that our Knowledg would never reach to all we might deſire to know concerning thoſe *Ideas* we have; nor be able to ſurmount all the Difficulties, and reſolve all the Queſtions might ariſe concerning any of them. We have the *Ideas* of a *Square*, a *Circle*, and *Equality*; and yet, perhaps, ſhall never be able to find a Circle equal to a Square, and certainly know that it is ſo. We have the *Ideas* of *Matter* and *Thinking*, but poſſibly ſhall never be able to know, whether any mere material Being thinks, or no; it being impoſſible for us, by the Contemplation of our own *Ideas*, without Revelation, to diſcover, whether Omnipotency has not given to ſome Syſtems of Matter fitly diſpos'd, a Power to perceive and think, or elſe join'd and fix'd to Matter ſo diſpos'd, a thinking immaterial Subſtance: it being, in reſpect of our Notions, not much more remote from our Comprehenſion to conceive, that GOD can if he pleaſes, ſuperadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he ſhould ſuperadd to it another Subſtance, with a Faculty of Thinking; ſince we know not wherein Thinking conſiſts, nor to what ſort of Subſtances the Almighty has been pleas'd to give that Power, which cannot be in any created Being but merely by the good Pleaſure and Bounty of the Creator. For I ſee no Contradiction in it, that the firſt eternal thinking Being ſhould, if he pleas'd, give to certain Syſtems of created ſenſleſs Matter, put together, as he thinks fit, ſome degrees of Senſe, Perception and Thought: Tho', as I think, I have prov'd, *lib.* 4. *ch.* 10. it is no leſs than a Contradiction to ſuppoſe Matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of Senſe and Thought) ſhould be that eternal firſt thinking Being. What Certainty of Knowledg can any one have that ſome Perceptions, ſuch as *v. g.* Pleaſure and Pain, ſhould not be in ſome Bodies themſelves, after a certain manner modify'd and mov'd, as well as that they ſhould be in an immaterial Subſtance, upon the Motion of the Parts of Body? Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to ſtrike and affect Body; and Motion, according to the utmoſt reach of our *Ideas*, being able to produce nothing but Motion: ſo that when we allow it to produce Pleaſure or Pain, or the *Idea* of a Colour or Sound, we are fain to quit our Reaſon, go beyond our *Ideas*, and attribute it wholly to the good Pleaſure of our Maker. For ſince we muſt allow he has annex'd Effects to Motion, which we can no way conceive Motion able to produce, what reaſon have we to conclude, that he could not order them as well to be produc'd in a Subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a Subject we cannot conceive the Motion of Matter can any way operate upon? I ſay not this, that I would any way leſſen the Belief of the Soul's Immateriality: I am not here ſpeaking of Probability, but Knowledg; and I think not only, that it becomes the Modeſty of Philoſophy not to pronounce magiſterially, where we want that Evidence that can produce Knowledg; but alſo, that it is of uſe to us to diſcern how far our Knowledg does reach: for the ſtate we are at preſent in, not being that of Viſion, we muſt, in many things, content our ſelves with Faith and Probability; and in the preſent Queſtion, about the Immateriality of the Soul, if our Faculties cannot arrive at demonſtrative Certainty, we need not think it ſtrange. All the great Ends of Morality and Religion are well enough ſecur'd, without Philoſophical Proofs of the Soul's Immateriality; ſince it is evident, that he who made us at firſt begin to ſubſiſt here, ſenſible intelligent Beings, and for ſeveral years continu'd us in ſuch a State, can and will reſtore us to the like State of Senſibility in another World, and make us capable there to receive the Retribution he has deſign'd to Men, according to their Doings in this Life. And therefore 'tis not of ſuch mighty neceſſity to determine one way or t'other, as ſome over-zealous for or againſt the Immateriality of the Soul, have been forward to make the World believe. Who, either on the one ſide, indulging too much their Thoughts immers'd altogether in Matter, can allow no Exiſtence to what is not material: Or who, on the other ſide, finding not *Cogitation* within the natural Powers of Matter, examin'd over and over again by the utmoſt Intention of Mind, have the confidence to conclude, that Omnipotency it ſelf cannot give Perception and Thought to a Subſtance which has the Modification of Solidity. He that conſiders how hard-

ly Senſation is, in our Thoughts, reconcileable to extended Matter; or Exiſtence to any thing that hath no Extenſion at all, will confeſs, that he is very far from certainly knowing what his Soul is. 'Tis a Point which ſeems to me to be put out of the reach of our Knowledg: And he who will give himſelf leave to conſider freely, and look into the dark and intricate part of each Hypotheſis, will ſcarce find his Reaſon able to determine him fixedly for or againſt the Soul's Materiality. Since on which ſide ſoever he views it, either as an unextended Subſtance, or as a thinking extended Matter; the Difficulty to conceive either, will, whilſt either alone is in his Thoughts, ſtill drive him to the contrary ſide. An unfair way which ſome Men take with themſelves: who, becauſe of the unconceivableneſs of ſomething they find in one, throw themſelves violently into the contrary Hypotheſis, tho' altogether as unintelligible to an unbyaſs'd Underſtanding. This ſerves not only to ſhew the Weakneſs and the Scantineſs of our Knowledge, but the inſignificant Triumph of ſuch ſort of Arguments, which, drawn from our own Views, may ſatisfy us that we can find no certainty on one ſide of the Queſtion; but do not at all thereby help us to Truth by running into the oppoſite Opinion, which, on examination, will be found clog'd with equal difficulties. For what Safety, what Advantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the ſeeming Abſurdities, and to him unſurmountable Rubs he meets with in one Opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built on ſomething altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his Comprehenſion? 'Tis paſt controverſy, that we have in us ſomething that thinks; our very Doubts about what it is, confirm the Certainty of its being, tho' we muſt content our ſelves in the Ignorance of what kind of *Being* it is: and 'tis in vain to go about to be ſceptical in this, as it is unreaſonable in moſt other caſes to be poſitive againſt the being of any thing, becauſe we cannot comprehend its Nature. For I would fain know what Subſtance exiſts, that has not ſomething in it which manifeſtly baffles our Underſtandings? Other Spirits, who ſee and know the Nature and inward Conſtitution of things, how much they exceed us in Knowledg: To which if we add larger Comprehenſion, which enables them at one glance to ſee the Connection and Agreement of very many *Ideas*, and readily ſupplies to them the intermediate Proofs, which we by ſingle and ſlow ſteps, and long poring in the dark, hardly at laſt find out, and are often ready to forget one before we have hunted out another; we may gueſs at ſome part of the Happineſs of ſuperior Ranks of Spirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating Sight, as well as a larger Field of Knowledg. But to return to the Argument in hand; our *Knowledg*, I ſay, is not only limited to the Paucity and Imperfections of the *Ideas* we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes ſhort of that too. But how far it reaches, let us now enquire.

How far our Knowledg reaches.

§. 7. The Affirmations or Negations we make concerning the *Ideas* we have, may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduc'd to theſe four ſorts, *viz.* Identity, Co-exiſtence, Relation, and real Exiſtence. I ſhall examine how far our Knowledg extends in each of theſe.

1. Our Knowledg of Identity and Diverſity as far as our Ideas.

§. 8. *Firſt, As to Identity and Diverſity*, in this way of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Ideas, our intuitive Knowledg is as far extended as our* Ideas themſelves: and there can be no *Idea* in the Mind, which it does not preſently, by an intuitive Knowledg, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

2. Of Co-exiſtence a very little way.

§. 9. *Secondly, As to* the ſecond ſort, which is the *Agreement* or *Diſagreement* of our *Ideas in Co-exiſtence*; in this, our Knowledg is very ſhort, tho' in this conſiſts the greateſt and moſt material part of our Knowledg concerning Subſtances. For our *Ideas* of the Species of Subſtances being, as I have ſhew'd, nothing but certain Collections of ſimple *Ideas* united in one Subject, and ſo co-exiſting together; *v. g.* Our *Idea* of *Flame* is a Body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of *Gold*, a Body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fuſible: Theſe, or ſome ſuch complex *Ideas* as theſe in mens Minds, do theſe two Names of the different Subſtances, *Flame*, and *Gold*, ſtand for. When we would know any thing farther concerning theſe, or any other ſort of Subſtances, what do we enquire, but what other Qualities or Powers theſe Subſtances have

or

or have not? which is nothing elſe but to know what other ſimple *Ideas* do or do not co-exiſt with thoſe that make up that complex *Idea?*

§. 10. This, how weighty and conſiderable a part ſoever of human Science, is yet very narrow, and ſcarce any at all. The Reaſon whereof is, that the ſimple *Ideas*, whereof our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances are made up, are, for the moſt part, ſuch as carry with them, in their own Nature, no viſible neceſſary Connection or Inconſiſtency with any other ſimple *Ideas*, whoſe *Co-exiſtence* with them we would inform our ſelves about. *Becauſe the Connection between moſt ſimple Ideas is unknown.*

§. 11. The *Ideas* that our complex ones of Subſtances are made up of, and about which our Knowledg concerning Subſtances is moſt employ'd, are thoſe of their *Secondary Qualities:* which depending all (as has been ſhewn) upon the primary Qualities of their minute and inſenſible Parts; or if not upon them, upon ſomething yet more remote from our Comprehenſion; 'tis impoſſible we ſhould know which have a neceſſary Union or Inconſiſtency one with another: For not knowing the Root they ſpring from, not knowing what Size, Figure, and Texture of Parts they are, on which depend, and from which reſult thoſe Qualities which make our complex *Idea* of Gold, 'tis impoſſible we ſhould know what other Qualities reſult from, or are incompatible with the ſame Conſtitution of the inſenſible parts of *Gold*; and ſo conſequently muſt always *co-exiſt* with that complex *Idea* we have of it, or elſe are *inconſiſtent* with it. *Eſpecially of ſecondary Qualities.*

§. 12. Beſides this Ignorance of the primary Qualities of the inſenſible Parts of Bodies, on which depend all their ſecondary Qualities, there is yet another and more incurable part of Ignorance, which ſets us more remote from a certain Knowledg of the *Co-exiſtence* or *In-co-exiſtence* (if I may ſo ſay) of different *Ideas* in the ſame Subject; and that is, that there is no diſcoverable Connection between any *ſecondary Quality, and thoſe primary Qualities* which it depends on. *Becauſe all Connection between any ſecondary and primary Qualities is undiſcoverable.*

§. 13. That the Size, Figure and Motion of one Body ſhould cauſe a Change in the Size, Figure and Motion of another Body, is not beyond our Conception: the Separation of the Parts of one Body upon the Intruſion of another; and the Change from Reſt to Motion upon impulſe; theſe and the like ſeem to us to have ſome *Connection* one with another. And if we knew theſe primary Qualities of Bodies, we might have reaſon to hope we might be able to know a great deal more of theſe Operations of them one upon another: But our Minds not being able to diſcover any *Connection* betwixt theſe primary Qualities of Bodies, and the Senſations that are produc'd in us by them, we can never be able to eſtabliſh certain and undoubted Rules of the Conſequences or *Co-exiſtence* of any ſecondary Qualities, tho' we could diſcover the Size, Figure or Motion of thoſe inviſible Parts which immediately produce them. We are ſo far from knowing what Figure, Size or Motion of Parts produce a yellow Colour, a ſweet Taſte, or a ſharp Sound, that we can by no means conceive how any *Size, Figure* or *Motion* of any Particles, can poſſibly produce in us the *Idea* of any *Colour, Taſte* or *Sound* whatſoever; there is no conceivable *Connection* betwixt the one and the other.

§. 14. In vain therefore ſhall we endeavour to diſcover by our *Ideas* (the only true way of certain and univerſal Knowledg) what other *Ideas* are to be found conſtantly join'd with that of our complex *Idea* of any Subſtance: ſince we neither know the real Conſtitution of the minute Parts on which their Qualities do depend; nor, did we know them, could we diſcover any neceſſary *Connection* between them, and any of the *ſecondary Qualities:* which is neceſſary to be done before we can certainly know their *neceſſary Co-exiſtence.* So that let our complex *Idea* of any Species of Subſtances be what it will, we can hardly, from the ſimple *Ideas* contain'd in it, certainly determine the *neceſſary Co-exiſtence* of any other Quality whatſoever. Our Knowledg in all theſe Enquiries reaches very little farther than our Experience. Indeed, ſome few of the primary Qualities have a neceſſary Dependance and viſible Connection one with another, as Figure neceſſarily ſuppoſes Extenſion; receiving or communicating Motion by impulſe, ſuppoſes Solidity. But tho' theſe and perhaps ſome other of our *Ideas* have, yet there are ſo *few* of them, that have a *viſible Connection* one with another, that we can by Intuition or Demonſtration diſcover the Co-exiſtence of very few of the Qualities are to be found united in Subſtances: and we are left only

only to the Assistance of our Senses, to make known to us what Qualities they contain. For of all the Qualities that are *co-existent* in any Subject, without this Dependance and evident Connection of their *Ideas* one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to *co-exist* any farther than Experience, by our Senses, informs us. Thus, tho' we see the yellow Colour, and upon trial find the Weight, Malleableness, Fusibility, and Fixedness, that are united in a piece of Gold; yet because no one of these *Ideas* has any evident *Dependance*, or necessary Connection with the other, we cannot certainly know, that where any four of these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable soever it may be: because the highest Probability amounts not to Certainty, without which there can be no true Knowledg. For this *Co-existence* can be no farther known than it is perceiv'd; and it cannot be perceiv'd, but either in particular Subjects, by the Observation of our Senses, or in general, by the necessary *Connection* of the *Ideas* themselves.

Of Repugnancy to co-existence larger.

§. 15. *As to Incompatibility or Repugnancy to Co-existence*, we may know, that any Subject can have of each sort of primary Qualities, but one particular at once; *v. g.* each particular Extension, Figure, Number of Parts, Motion, excludes all other of each kind. The like also is certain of all sensible *Ideas* peculiar to each Sense; for whatever of each kind is present in any Subject excludes all other of that sort; *v. g.* no one Subject can have two Smells or two Colours at the same time. To this perhaps will be said, has not an *Opal*, or the infusion of *Lignum Nephriticum*, two Colours at the same time? To which I answer, that these Bodies, to Eyes differently plac'd, may at the same time afford different Colours: But I take liberty also to say, that to Eyes differently plac'd, 'tis different parts of the Object that reflect the Particles of Light: And therefore 'tis not the same Part of the Object, and so not the very same Subject, which at the same time appears both yellow and azure. For 'tis as impossible that the very same Particle of any Body should at the same time differently modify or reflect the Rays of Light, as that it should have two different Figures and Textures at the same time.

Of the Co-existence of Powers a very little way.

§. 16. But *as to the Powers of Substances* to change the sensible Qualities of other Bodies, which make a great part of our Enquiries about them, and is no considerable Branch of our Knowledg; I doubt, as to these, wherein *our Knowledg reaches* much farther than our Experience; or whether we can come to the discovery of most of these Powers, and be certain that they are in any Subject, by the Connection with any of those *Ideas* which to us make its Essence. Because the active and Passive Powers of Bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a Texture and motion of Parts, which we cannot by any means come to discover; 'tis but in very few cases, we can be able to perceive their Dependance on, or Repugnance to any of those *Ideas* which make our complex one of that sort of things. I have here instanc'd in the Corpuscularian Hypothesis, as that which is thought to go farthest in an intelligible Explication of the Qualities of Bodies; and I fear the Weakness of human Understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer Discovery of the necessary Connection and *Co-existence* of the Powers which are to be observ'd united in several sorts of them. This at least is certain, that which ever Hypothesis be clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine) our Knowledg concerning corporeal Substances will be very little advanc'd by any of them, till we are made see what Qualities and Powers of Bodies have a *necessary Connection or Repugnancy* one with another; which in the present State of Philosophy, I think, we know but to a very small degree: And I doubt whether, with those Faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general Knowledg (I say not particular Experience) in this part much farther. Experience is that which in this Part we must depend on. And it were to be wish'd that it were more improv'd. We find the Advantages some Mens generous Pains have this way brought to the Stock of natural Knowledg. And if others, especially the Philosophers by Fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary in their Observations, and sincere in their Reports, as those who call themselves Philosophers ought to have been; our Acquaintance with the Bodies here about us, and our Insight into their Powers and Operations, had been yet much greater.

§. 17.

§. 17. If we are at a loſs in reſpect of the Powers and Operations of Bodies, I think it is eaſy to conclude, *we are much more in the dark in reference to Spirits*; whereof we naturally have no *Ideas*, but what we draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the Operations of our own Souls within us, as far as they can come within our Obſervation. But how inconſiderable a rank the Spirits that inhabit our Bodies hold amongſt thoſe various and poſſibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings; and how far ſhort they come of the Endowments and Perfections of Cherubims and Seraphims, and infinite ſorts of Spirits above us; is what by a tranſient hint, in another place, I have offer'd to my Reader's Conſideration. *Of Spirits yet narrower.*

§. 18. As to the third ſort of our Knowledg, *viz.* the *Agreement or Diſagreement of any of our* Ideas *in any other Relation*: This, as it is the largeſt Field of our Knowledg, ſo it is hard to determine how far it may extend; becauſe the Advances that are made in this part of Knowledg, depending on our Sagacity in finding intermediate *Ideas*, that may ſhew the *Relations* and *Habitudes* of *Ideas*, whoſe Co-exiſtence is not conſider'd, 'tis a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of ſuch Diſcoveries; and when Reaſon has all the helps it is capable of, for the finding of Proofs, or examining the Agreement or Diſagreement of remote *Ideas*. They that are ignorant of *Algebra* cannot imagine the Wonders in this kind are to be done by it: and what farther Improvements and Helps, advantageous to other parts of Knowledg, the ſagacious Mind of Man may yet find out, 'tis not eaſy to determine. This at leaſt I believe, that the *Ideas* of Quantity are not thoſe alone that are capable of Demonſtration and Knowledg; and that other, and perhaps more uſeful parts of Contemplation, would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Paſſions, and domineering Intereſt did not oppoſe or menace ſuch Endeavours. 3. *Of other Relations it is not eaſy to ſay how far.*

The *Idea* of a Supreme Being, infinite in Power, Goodneſs and Wiſdom, whoſe Workmanſhip we are, and on whom we depend; and the *Idea* of our ſelves, as underſtanding rational Beings, being ſuch as are clear in us, would, I ſuppoſe, if duly conſider'd and purſu'd, afford ſuch Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might place *Morality amongſt the Sciences capable of demonſtration*: wherein I doubt not but from ſelf-evident Propoſitions, by neceſſary Conſequences, as inconteſtable as thoſe in Mathematicks, the meaſures of Right and Wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himſelf with the ſame Indifferency and Attention to the one, as he does to the other of theſe Sciences. The *Relation* of other *Modes* may certainly be perceiv'd, as well as thoſe of Number and Extenſion: and I cannot ſee why they ſhould not alſo be capable of Demonſtration, if due Methods were thought on to examine or purſue their Agreement or Diſagreement. *Where there is no Property, there is no Injuſtice*, is a Propoſition as certain as any Demonſtration in *Euclid*: For the *Idea* of *Property* being a Right to any thing; and the *Idea* to which the name *Injuſtice* is given, being the Invaſion or Violation of that Right; it is evident, that theſe *Ideas* being thus eſtabliſh'd, and theſe Names annex'd to them, I can as certainly know this Propoſition to be true, as that a Triangle has three Angles equal to two right ones. Again, *No Government allows abſolute Liberty*: The *Idea* of Government being the Eſtabliſhment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws which require Conformity to them; and the *Idea* of abſolute Liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleaſes; I as am capable of being certain of the Truth of this Propoſition, as of any in Mathematicks. *Morality capable of Demonſtration.*

§. 19. That which in this reſpect has given the advantage to the *Ideas* of Quantity, and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonſtration, is, *Two things have made moral* Ideas *thought incapable of Demonſtration. Their Complexedneſs, and want of ſenſible Repreſentations.*

Firſt, That they can be ſet down and repreſented by ſenſible Marks, which have a greater and nearer Correſpondence with them than any Words or Sounds whatſoever. Diagrams drawn on Paper are Copies of the *Ideas* in the Mind, and not liable to the Uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification. An Angle, Circle or Square, drawn in Lines, lies open to the View, and cannot be miſtaken: it remains unchangeable, and may at leiſure be conſider'd and exami'n'd, and the Demonſtration be revis'd, and all the parts of it may be gone over more than once without any danger of the leaſt change in the *Ideas*. This cannot be thus done in *moral Ideas*, we have no ſenſible Marks that reſemble them,

them, whereby we can ſet them down; we have nothing but Words to expreſs them by: which tho', when written, they remain the ſame, yet the *Ideas* they ſtand for may change in the ſame Man; and 'tis very ſeldom that they are not different in different Perſons.

Secondly, Another thing that makes the greater difficulty in *Ethicks*, is, That *moral Ideas* are commonly more complex than thoſe of the Figures ordinarily conſider'd in Mathematicks. From whence theſe two Inconveniences follow: *Firſt*, That their Names are of more uncertain Signification, the preciſe Collection of ſimple *Ideas* they ſtand for not being ſo eaſily agreed on, and ſo the Sign that is us'd for them in Communication always, and in thinking often, does not ſteddily carry with it the ſame *Idea*. Upon which the ſame Diſorder, Confuſion and Error follows, as would if a Man, going to demonſtrate ſomething of an *Heptagon*, ſhould in the Diagram he took to do it, leave out one of the Angles, or by over-ſight make the Figure with one Angle more than the Name ordinarily imported, or he intended it ſhould, when at firſt he thought of his Demonſtration. This often happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex moral *Ideas*, where the ſame Name being retain'd, one Angle, *i. e.* one ſimple *Idea* is left out or put in, in the complex one (ſtill call'd by the ſame name) more at one time than another. *Secondly*, From the Complexedneſs of theſe moral *Ideas*, there follows another Inconvenience, *viz.* that the Mind cannot eaſily retain thoſe preciſe Combinations, ſo exactly and perfectly as is neceſſary in the Examination of the Habitudes and Correſpondencies, Agreements or Diſagreements, of ſeveral of them one with another; eſpecially where it is to be judg'd of by long Deductions, and the Intervention of ſeveral other complex *Ideas*, to ſhew the Agreement or Diſagreement of two remote ones.

The great help againſt this which Mathematicians find in Diagrams and Figures, which remain unalterable in their Draughts, is very apparent, and the Memory would often have great difficulty otherwiſe to retain them ſo exactly whilſt the Mind went over the Parts of them ſtep by ſtep, to examine their ſeveral Correſpondencies. And tho' in caſting up a long Sum, either in *Addition*, *Multiplication*, or *Diviſion*, every part be only a Progreſſion of the Mind, taking a view of its own *Ideas*, and conſidering their Agreement or Diſagreement; and the Reſolution of the Queſtion be nothing but the Reſult of the whole, made up of ſuch particulars, whereof the Mind has a clear Perception: yet without ſetting down the ſeveral parts by Marks, whoſe preciſe Significations are known, and by Marks that laſt and remain in view when the Memory had let them go, it would be almoſt impoſſible to carry ſo many different *Ideas* in mind, without confounding or letting ſlip ſome parts of the Reckoning, and thereby making all our Reaſonings about it uſeleſs. In which caſe, the Cyphers or Marks help not the Mind at all to perceive the Agreement of any two or more Numbers, their Equalities or Proportions: That, the Mind has only by intuition of its own *Ideas* of the Numbers themſelves. But the numerical Characters are helps to the Memory, to record and retain the ſeveral *Ideas* about which the Demonſtration is made, whereby a Man may know how far his intuitive Knowledg, in ſurveying ſeveral of the particulars, has proceeded; that ſo he may without confuſion go on to what is yet unknown, and at laſt have in one view before him the Reſult of all his Perceptions and Reaſonings.

Remedies of thoſe Difficulties.

§. 20. One part of *theſe Advantages* in moral *Ideas*, which has made them be thought not capable of Demonſtration, may in a good meaſure be *remedy'd* by Definitions, ſetting down that Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, which every Term ſhall ſtand for, and then uſing the Terms ſteddily and conſtantly for that preciſe Collection. And what Methods *Algebra*, or ſomething of that kind, may hereafter Suggeſt, to remove the other Difficulties, is not eaſy to foretel. Confident I am, that if Men would in the ſame method, and with the ſame indifferency, ſearch after Moral, as they do Mathematical Truths, they would find them to have a ſtronger Connection one with another, and a more neceſſary Conſequence from our clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, and to come nearer perfect Demonſtration than is commonly imagin'd. But much of this is not to be expected, whilſt the Deſire of Eſteem, Riches, or Power, makes Men eſpouſe the well-endow'd Opinions in faſhion, and then ſeek Arguments either to make good their Beauty, or varniſh over and cover their Deformity: Nothing being ſo beautiful

beautiful to the Eye, as Truth is to the Mind; nothing ſo deform'd and irreconcilable to the Underſtanding, as a Lye. For tho' many a Man can with ſatisfaction enough own a no very handſom Wife in his Boſom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow, that he has eſpous'd a Falſhood, and receiv'd into his Breaſt ſo ugly a thing as a Lye? Whilſt the Parties of Men cram their Tenets down all Mens throats, whom they can get into their power, without permitting them to examine their Truth or Falſhood, and will not let Truth have fair play in the World, nor Men the liberty to ſearch after it; what Improvements can be expected of this kind? What greater Light can be hoped for in the moral Sciences? The ſubject part of Mankind in moſt places might, inſtead thereof, with *Egyptian* Bondage expect *Egyptian* Darkneſs, were not the Candle of the Lord ſet up by himſelf in Mens Minds, which it is impoſſible for the Breath or Power of Man wholly to extinguiſh.

§. 21. As to the fourth ſort of our Knowledg, *viz.* of the *real actual Exiſtence* of things, we have an intuitive Knowledg of our own *Exiſtence*; a demonſtrative Knowledg of the *Exiſtence* of a God; of the *Exiſtence* of any thing elſe, we have no other but a ſenſitive Knowledg, which extends not beyond the Objects preſent to our Senſes.

4. Of real Exiſtence: we have an intuitive Knowledg of our own; demonſtrative, of God's; ſenſitive, of ſome few other things.

§. 22. Our Knowledg being ſo narrow, as I have ſhew'd, it will perhaps give us ſome light into the preſent State of our Minds, if we look a little into the dark ſide, and take a view of *our Ignorance*: which being infinitely larger than our Knowledg, may ſerve much to the quieting of Diſputes, and Improvement of uſeful Knowledge; if diſcovering how far we have clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, we confine our Thoughts within the Contemplation of thoſe things that are within the reach of our Underſtandings, and launch not out into that Abyſs of Darkneſs (where we have not Eyes to ſee, nor Faculties to perceive any thing) out of a Preſumption, that nothing is beyond our Comprehenſion. But to be ſatisfy'd of the Folly of ſuch a Conceit, we need not go far. He that knows any thing, knows this in the firſt place, that he needs not ſeek long for Inſtances of his Ignorance. The meaneſt and moſt obvious things that come in our way, have dark ſides, that the quickeſt Sight cannot penetrate into. The cleareſt and moſt enlarg'd Underſtandings of thinking Men find themſelves puzzled, and at a loſs, in every particle of Matter. We ſhall the leſs wonder to find it ſo, when we conſider the *Cauſes of our Ignorance*; which, from what has been ſaid, I ſuppoſe, will be found to be chiefly theſe three:

Our Ignorance great.

Firſt, Want of *Ideas*.

Secondly, Want of a diſcoverable Connection between the *Ideas* we have.

Thirdly, Want of tracing and examining our *Ideas*.

§. 23. *Firſt*, There are ſome things, and thoſe not a few, that we are ignorant of for *want of Ideas*.

Firſt, *One cauſe of it want of* Ideas, *either ſuch as we have no Conception of, or ſuch as particularly we have not.*

Firſt, All the ſimple *Ideas* we have, are confin'd (as I have ſhewn) to thoſe we receive from corporeal Objects by *Senſation*, and from the Operations of our own Minds as the Objects of *Reflection*. But how much theſe few and narrow Inlets are diſproportionate to the vaſt whole Extent of all Beings, will not be hard to perſuade thoſe who are not ſo fooliſh as to think their Span the meaſure of all things. What other ſimple *Ideas* 'tis poſſible the Creatures in other parts of the Univerſe may have, by the aſſiſtance of Senſes and Faculties more or perfecter than we have, or different from our's, 'tis not for us to determine. But to ſay, or think there are no ſuch, becauſe we conceive nothing of them, is no better an Argument, than if a blind Man ſhould be poſitive in it, that there was no ſuch thing as Sight and Colours, becauſe he had no manner of *Idea* of any ſuch thing, nor could by any means frame to himſelf any Notion about Seeing. The Ignorance and Darkneſs that is in us, no more hinders nor confines the Knowledg that is in others, than the Blindneſs of a Mole is an argument againſt the Quick-ſightedneſs of an Eagle. He that will conſider the infinite Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs of the Creator of all things, will find reaſon to think, it was not all laid out upon ſo inconſiderable, mean, and impotent a Creature, as he will find Man to be; who, in all probability, is one of the loweſt of all intellectual Beings. What Faculties therefore other Species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature and inmoſt Conſtitutions of things, what *Ideas* they may receive of them, far different from our's, we know not.

not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want ſeveral other views of them, beſides thoſe we have, to make Diſcoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinc'd that the *Ideas* we can attain to by our Faculties, are very diſproportionate to things themſelves, when a poſitive clear diſtinct one of Subſtance it ſelf, which is the Foundation of all the reſt, is conceal'd from us. But want of *Ideas* of this kind being a Part as well as Cauſe of our Ignorance, cannot be deſcrib'd. Only this, I think, I may confidently ſay of it, that the intellectual and ſenſible World, are in this perfectly alike; That that part, which we ſee of either of them, holds no proportion with what we ſee not; and whatſoever we can reach with our Eyes, or our Thoughts, of either of them, is but a point, almoſt nothing in compariſon of the reſt.

Becauſe of their Remoteneſs; or,

§. 24. *Secondly*, Another great Cauſe of Ignorance, is the *want of* Ideas *we are capable of*. As the want of *Ideas*, which our Faculties are not able to give us, ſhuts us wholly from thoſe views of things, which 'tis reaſonable to think other Beings, perfecter than we, have, of which we know nothing; ſo the want of *Ideas* I now ſpeak of, keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known to us. *Bulk*, *Figure*, and *Motion*, we have *Ideas* of. But tho' we are not without *Ideas* of theſe primary Qualities of Bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular *Bulk*, *Figure*, and *Motion*, of the greateſt part of the Bodies of the Univerſe, we are ignorant of the ſeveral Powers, Efficacies, and Ways of Operations, whereby the Effects, which we daily ſee, are produc'd. Theſe are hid from us in ſome things, by being *too remote*; and in others, by being *too minute*. When we conſider the vaſt diſtance of the known and viſible parts of the World, and the Reaſons we have to think, that what lies within our ken, is but a ſmall part of the immenſe Univerſe, we ſhall then diſcover an huge Abyſs of Ignorance. What are the particular Fabricks of the great Maſſes of Matter, which make up the whole ſtupendous Frame of corporeal Beings, how far they are extended, what is their Motion, and how continu'd or communicated, and what influence they have one upon another, are Contemplations that at firſt glimpſe our Thoughts loſe themſelves in. If we narrow our Contemplation, and confine our Thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this Syſtem of our Sun, and the groſſer Maſſes of Matter, that viſibly move above it; what ſeveral ſorts of Vegetables, Animals, and intellectual corporeal Beings, infinitely different from thoſe of our little ſpot of Earth, may there probably be in the other Planets, to the knowledg of which, even of their outward Figures and Parts, we can no way attain, whilſt we are confin'd to this Earth; there being no natural Means, either by Senſation or Reflection, to convey their certain *Ideas* into our Minds? They are out of the reach of thoſe Inlets of all our Knowledg: and what ſorts of Furniture and Inhabitants thoſe Manſions contain in them, we cannot ſo much as gueſs, much leſs have clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of them.

Becauſe of their Minuteneſs.

§ 25. If a great, nay, far the greateſt part of the ſeveral Ranks of *Bodies* in the Univerſe, ſcape our notice by their Remoteneſs, there are others that are no leſs conceal'd from us by their *Minuteneſs*. Theſe inſenſible Corpuſcles being the active Parts of Matter, and the great Inſtruments of Nature, on which depend not only all their ſecondary Qualities, but alſo moſt of their natural Operations; our want of preciſe diſtinct *Ideas* of their primary Qualities, keeps us in an incurable Ignorance of what we deſire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could diſcover the Figure, Size, Texture, and Motion of the minute conſtituent parts of any two Bodies, we ſhould know without trial ſeveral of their Operations one upon another, as we do now the Properties of a Square or a Triangle. Did we know the mechanical Affection of the Particles of *Rhubarb*, *Hemlock*, *Opium*, as a *Man*, as a Watch-maker, does thoſe of a Watch, whereby it performs its Operations, and of a File which by rubbing on them will alter the Figure of any of the Wheels; we ſhould be able to tell beforehand, that *Rhubarb* will purge, *Hemlock* kill, and *Opium* make a Man ſleep, as well as a Watch-maker can, that a little piece of Paper laid on the Ballance will keep the Watch from going, till it be remov'd; or that ſome ſmall part of it being rub'd by a File, the Machine would quite loſe its Motion, and the Watch go no more. The diſſolving of Silver in *Aqua Fortis*, and Gold in *Aqua Regia*, and not *vice verſa*, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know, than

it

it is to a Smith to underſtand why the turning of one Key will open a Lock, and not the turning of another. But whilſt we are deſtitute of Senſes acute enough to diſcover the minute Particles of Bodies, and to give us *Ideas* of their mechanical Affections, we muſt be content to be ignorant of their Properties and ways of Operation; nor can we be aſſur'd about them any farther, than ſome few trials we make, are able to reach. But whether they will ſucceed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain Knowledg of univerſal Truths concerning natural Bodies: and our Reaſon carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact.

Hence no Science of Bodies.

§. 26. And therefore I am apt to doubt, that how far ſoever human Induſtry may advance uſeful and *experimental* Philoſophy *in phyſical things*, *ſcientifical* will ſtill be out of our reach; becauſe we want perfect and adequate *Ideas* of thoſe very Bodies which are neareſt to us, and moſt under our command. Thoſe which we have rank'd into Claſſes under names, and we think our ſelves beſt acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and incompleat *Ideas* of. Diſtinct *Ideas* of the ſeveral ſorts of Bodies that fall under the examination of our Senſes, perhaps we may have: but adequate *Ideas*, I ſuſpect, we have not of any one amongſt them. And tho' the former of theſe will ſerve us for common Uſe and Diſcourſe, yet whilſt we want the latter, we are not capable of *ſcientifical Knowledg*; nor ſhall ever be able to diſcover general, inſtructive, unqueſtionable Truths concerning them. *Certainty* and *Demonſtration* are things we muſt not, in theſe matters, pretend to. By the Colour, Figure, Taſte, and Smell, and other ſenſible Qualities, we have as clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of Sage and Hemlock, as we have of a Circle and a Triangle: But having no *Ideas* of the particular primary Qualities of the minute Parts of either of theſe Plants, nor of other Bodies which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will produce; nor when we ſee thoſe effects, can we ſo much as gueſs, much leſs know, their manner of production. Thus having no *Ideas* of the particular mechanical Affections of the minute Parts of Bodies that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their Conſtitutions, Powers, and Operations: and of Bodies more remote, we are yet more ignorant, not knowing ſo much as their very outward Shapes, or the ſenſible and groſſer parts of their Conſtitutions.

Much leſs of Spirits.

§. 27. This, at firſt ſight, will ſhew us how diſproportionate our Knowledg is to the whole extent even of material Beings; to which if we add the Conſideration of that infinite number of *Spirits* that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our Knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance, nor can frame to our ſelves any diſtinct *Ideas* of their ſeveral Ranks and Sorts, we ſhall find this cauſe of Ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable obſcurity, almoſt the whole Intellectual World; a greater certainly, and more beautiful World than the material. For bating ſome very few, and thoſe, if I may ſo call them, ſuperficial *Ideas* of Spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence the beſt we can collect of the Father of all Spirits, the eternal independent Author of them and us and all things; we have no certain Information, ſo much as of the Exiſtence of other Spirits, but by Revelation. Angels of all ſorts are naturally beyond our diſcovery: And all thoſe Intelligences, whereof 'tis likely there are more Orders than of corporeal Subſtances, are things whereof our natural Faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are Minds and thinking Beings in other Men as well as himſelf, every Man has a Reaſon, from their Words and Actions, to be ſatisfy'd: And the Knowledg of his own Mind cannot ſuffer a Man, that conſiders, to be ignorant, that there is a GOD. But that there are degrees of Spiritual Beings between us and the great GOD, who is there that by his own Search and Ability can come to know? Much leſs have we diſtinct *Ideas* of their different Natures, Conditions, States, Powers and ſeveral Conſtitutions, wherein they agree or differ from one another, and from us. And therefore in what concerns their different Species and Properties, we are under an abſolute ignorance.

Secondly, Want of a diſcoverable Connection between Ideas we have.

§. 28. *Secondly*, What a ſmall part of the ſubſtantial Beings that are in the Univerſe, the want of *Ideas* leave open to our Knowledg, we have ſeen. In the next place, another cauſe of Ignorance, of no leſs moment, is a want of a *diſcoverable Connection* between thoſe *Ideas* we have: For wherever we want that,

we are utterly uncapable of univerſal and certain Knowledg; and are, as in the former caſe, left only to Obſervation and Experiment: which, how narrow and confin'd it is, how far from general Knowledg, we need not be told. I ſhall give ſome few Inſtances of this cauſe of our Ignorance, and ſo leave it. 'Tis evident that the Bulk, Figure, and Motion of ſeveral Bodies about us, produce in us ſeveral Senſations, as of Colours, Sounds, Taſtes, Smells, Pleaſure and Pain, *&c.* Theſe mechanical Affections of Bodies having no affinity at all with thoſe *Ideas* they produce in us (there being no conceivable Connection between any Impulſe of any ſort of Body, and any Perception of a Colour, or Smell, which we find in our Minds) we can have no diſtinct Knowledg of ſuch Operations beyond our Experience; and can reaſon no otherwiſe about them, than as effects produc'd by the Appointment of an infinitely wiſe Agent, which perfectly ſurpaſs our Comprehenſions. As the *Ideas* of ſenſible ſecondary Qualities which we have in our Minds, can by us be no way deduc'd from bodily Cauſes, nor any Correſpondence or Connection be found between them and thoſe primary Qualities which (Experience ſhews us) produce them in us; ſo on the other ſide, the Operation of our Minds upon our Bodies is as unconceivable. How any Thought ſhould produce a Motion in Body, is as remote from the Nature of our *Ideas*, as how any Body ſhould produce any Thought in the Mind. That it is ſo, if Experience did not convince us, the Conſideration of the things themſelves would never be able in the leaſt to diſcover to us. Theſe, and the like, tho' they have a conſtant and regular Connection, in the ordinary courſe of things; yet that Connection being not diſcoverable in the *Ideas* themſelves, which appearing to have no neceſſary dependance one on another, we can attribute their Connection to nothing elſe but the arbitrary Determination of that All-wiſe Agent, who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak Underſtandings to conceive.

Inſtances. §. 29. In ſome of our *Ideas* there are certain Relations, Habitudes, and Connections, ſo viſibly included in the Nature of the *Ideas* themſelves, that we cannot conceive them ſeparable from them by any Power whatſoever. And in theſe only we are capable of certain and univerſal Knowledg. Thus the *Idea* of a right-lin'd Triangle neceſſarily carries within it an Equality of its Angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this Relation, this Connection of theſe two *Ideas*, to be poſſibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary Power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwiſe. But the Coherence and Continuity of the Parts of Matter; the Production of Senſation in us of Colours and Sounds, *&c.* by Impulſe and Motion; nay, the original Rules and Communication of Motion being ſuch, wherein we can diſcover no natural Connection with any *Ideas* we have, we cannot but aſcribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleaſure of the wiſe Architect. I need not, I think, here mention the Reſurrection of the Dead, the future State of this Globe of Earth, and ſuch other things, which are by every one acknowledg'd to depend wholly on the Determination of a free Agent. The things that, as far as our Obſervation reaches, we conſtantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a Law ſet them; but yet by a Law that we know not: whereby, tho' Cauſes work ſteddily, and Effects conſtantly flow from them, yet their *Connections* and *Dependencies* being not diſcoverable in our *Ideas*, we can have but an experimental Knowledg of them. From all which 'tis eaſy to perceive what a darkneſs we are involv'd in, how little 'tis of Being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And therefore we ſhall do no Injury to our Knowledg, when we modeſtly think with our ſelves, that we are ſo far from being able to comprehend the whole Nature of the Univerſe, and all the things contain'd in it, that we are not capable of a philoſophical *Knowledg* of the Bodies that are about us, and make a part of us: concerning their ſecondary Qualities, Powers, and Operations, we can have no univerſal Certainty. Several Effects come every day within the Notice of our Senſes, of which we have ſo far *ſenſitive Knowledg*; but the Cauſes, Manner, and Certainty of their Production, for the two foregoing Reaſons, we muſt be content to be ignorant of. In theſe we can go no farther than particular Experience informs us of matter of fact, and by Analogy to gueſs what Effects the like Bodies are, upon other trials, like to produce. But as to a perfect *Science* of natural Bodies (not to mention ſpi-

ritual

ritual Beings) we are, I think, ſo far from being capable of any ſuch thing, that I conclude it loſt labour to ſeek after it.

§. 30. *Thirdly*, Where we have adequate *Ideas*, and where there is a certain and diſcoverable Connection between them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of *tracing* thoſe *Ideas* which we have, or may have; and for want of finding out thoſe intermediate *Ideas*, which may ſhew us what Habitude of Agreement or Diſagreement they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical Truths, not out of any Imperfection of their Faculties, or Uncertainty in the things themſelves; but for want of Application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing thoſe *Ideas*. That which has moſt contributed to hinder the due *tracing* of our *Ideas*, and finding out their Relations, and Agreements or Diſagreements one with another, has been, I ſuppoſe, the ill uſe of *Words*. It is impoſſible that Men ſhould ever truly ſeek or certainly diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas* themſelves, whilſt their Thoughts flutter about, or ſtick only in Sounds of doubtful and uncertain Significations. Mathematicians abſtracting their Thoughts from Names, and accuſtoming themſelves to ſet before their Minds the *Ideas* themſelves that they would conſider, and not Sounds inſtead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that Perplexity, Puddering, and Confuſion, which has ſo much hinder'd Mens progreſs in other parts of Knowledg. For whilſt they ſtick in Words of undetermin'd and uncertain Signification, they are unable to diſtinguiſh True from Falſe, Certain from Probable, Conſiſtent from Inconſiſtent, in their own Opinions. This having been the Fate or Misfortune of a great part of the Men of Letters, the Increaſe brought into the Stock of real Knowledg, has been very little, in proportion to the Schools, Diſputes, and Writings, the World has been fill'd with; whilſt Students, being loſt in the great Wood of Words, knew not whereabout they were, how far their Diſcoveries were advanc'd, or what was wanting in their own or the general Stock of Knowledg. Had Men in the Diſcoveries of the material, done as they have in thoſe of the intellectual World, involv'd all in the obſcurity of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking, Volumes writ of Navigation and Voyages, Theories and Stories of Zones and Tydes, multiply'd and diſputed; nay, Ships built, and Fleets ſet out, would never have taught us the way beyond the Line; and the Antipodes would be ſtill as much unknown, as when it was declar'd Hereſy to hold there were any. But having ſpoken ſufficiently of Words, and the ill or careleſs uſe that is commonly made of them, I ſhall not ſay any thing more of it here.

Thirdly, Want of tracing our Ideas.

§. 31. Hitherto we have examined the *Extent* of our Knowledg, in reſpect of the ſeveral ſorts of Beings that are. There is another *Extent* of it, *in reſpect of Univerſality*, which will alſo deſerve to be conſider'd; and in this regard, our Knowledg follows the Nature of our *Ideas*. If the *Ideas* are abſtracted, whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement we perceive, our Knowledg is univerſal. For what is known of ſuch general *Ideas*, will be true of every particular thing, in whom that Eſſence, *i. e.* that abſtract *Idea* is to be found; and what is once known of ſuch *Ideas*, will be perpetually and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledg, we muſt ſearch and find it only in our own Minds, and 'tis only the examining of our own *Ideas*, that furniſheth us with that. Truths belonging to Eſſences of things (that is, to abſtract *Ideas*) are eternal, and are to be found out by the Contemplation only of thoſe Eſſences: as the Exiſtence of things is to be known only from Experience. But having more to ſay of this in the Chapters where I ſhall ſpeak of general and real Knowledg, this may here ſuffice as to the Univerſality of our Knowledg in general.

Extent in reſpect of Univerſality.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Reality of Knowledg.

§. 1. I Doubt not but my Reader by this Time may be apt to think, that I have been all this while only building a Caſtle in the Air; and be ready to ſay to me, To what purpoſe all this ſtir? Knowledg, ſay you, is only the Perception

Obj. Knowledg placed in Ideas may be all bare Viſions.

tion of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our own *Ideas*: but who knows what thoſe *Ideas* may be? Is there any thing ſo extravagant, as the Imaginations of Mens Brains? Where is the Head that has no *Chimera's* in it? Or if there be a ſober and a wiſe Man, what difference will there be, by your Rules, between his Knowledg and that of the moſt extravagant Fancy in the World? They both have their *Ideas*, and perceive their Agreement and Diſagreement one with another. If there be any difference between them, the advantage will be on the warm-headed Man's ſide, as having the more *Ideas*, and the more lively: And ſo, by your Rules, he will be the more knowing. If it be true, that all Knowledg lies only in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our own *Ideas*, the Viſions of an Enthuſiaſt, and the Reaſonings of a ſober Man, will be equally certain. 'Tis no Matter how things are; ſo a Man obſerve but the Agreement of his own Imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all Truth, all Certainty. Such Caſtles in the Air, will be as ſtrong Holds of Truth, as the Demonſtrations of *Euclid*. That an Harpy is not a Centaur, is by this way as certain Knowledg, and as much a Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle.

But *of what uſe is all this* fine *Knowledg of Mens own Imaginations*, to a Man that enquires after the reality of things? It matters not what Mens Fancies are, 'tis the Knowledg of Things that is only to be priz'd; 'tis this alone gives a Value to our Reaſonings, and Preference to one Man's Knowledg over another's, that it is of Things as they really are, and not of Dreams and Fancies.

Anſw. *Not ſo, where* Ideas *agree with Things.*

§. 2. To which I anſwer, That if our Knowledg of our *Ideas* terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is ſomething farther intended, our moſt ſerious Thoughts will be of little more uſe, than the Reveries of a crazy Brain; and the Truths built thereon of no more weight, than the Diſcourſes of a Man who ſees things clearly in a Dream, and with great aſſurance utters them. But, I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of Certainty, by the Knowledg of our own *Ideas*, goes a little farther than bare Imagination: and, I believe it will appear, that all the Certainty of general Truths a Man has, lies in nothing elſe.

Anſw. *Not ſo, where* Ideas *agree with Things.*

§. 3. 'Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but only by the intervention of the *Ideas* it has of them. *Our Knowledg* therefore is *real*, only ſo far as there is a Conformity between our *Ideas* and the Reality of Things. But what ſhall be here the Criterion? How ſhall the Mind, when it perceives nothing but its own *Ideas*, know that they agree with Things themſelves? This, tho' it ſeems not to want difficulty, yet, I think, there be two ſorts of *Ideas*, that, we may be aſſur'd, agree with Things.

1. *All ſimple* Ideas *do.*

§. 4. *Firſt*, The firſt are ſimple *Ideas*, which ſince the Mind, as has been ſhew'd, can by no means make it to ſelf, muſt neceſſarily be the Product of Things operating on the Mind in a natural way, and producing therein thoſe Perceptions which by the Wiſdom and Will of our Maker they are ordain'd and adapted to. From whence it follows, that *ſimple* Ideas *are not Fictions* of our Fancies, but the natural and regular Productions of Things without us, really operating upon us, and ſo carry with them all the Conformity which is intended, or which our State requires: For they repreſent to us Things under thoſe Appearances which they are fitted to produce in us, whereby we are enabled to diſtinguiſh the ſorts of particular Subſtances, to diſcern the ſtates they are in, and ſo to take them for our Neceſſities, and apply them to our Uſes. Thus the *Idea of* Whiteneſs, or Bitterneſs, as it is in the Mind, exactly anſwering that Power which is in any Body to produce it there, has all the real Conformity it can, or ought to have, with things without us. And this Conformity between our ſimple *Ideas*, and the Exiſtence of Things, is ſufficient for real Knowledg.

2. *All complex* Ideas, *except of Subſtances.*

§. 5. *Secondly, All our complex* Ideas, *except thoſe of Subſtances*, being *Archetypes* of the Mind's own making, not intended to be the Copies of any thing, nor refer'd to the Exiſtence of any thing, as to their Originals, *cannot want any Conformity neceſſary to real Knowledg*. For that which is not deſign'd to repreſent any thing but it ſelf, can never be capable of a wrong Repreſentation, nor miſlead us from the true Apprehenſion of any thing, by its Diſlikeneſs to it; and ſuch, excepting thoſe of Subſtances, are all our complex *Ideas*: Which, as I have ſhew'd in another place, are Combinations of *Ideas*, which the Mind, by its

its free Choice, puts together, without considering any Connection they have in nature. And hence it is, that in all these sorts the *Ideas* themselves are consider'd as the *Archetypes*, and things no otherwise regarded, but as they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the Knowledg we attain concerning these *Ideas*, is real, and reaches Things themselves; because in all our Thoughts, Reasonings and Discourses of this kind, we intend things no farther than as they are conformable to our *Ideas*. So that in these we cannot miss of a certain undoubted reality.

Hence the Reality of Mathematical Knowledg.

§. 6. I doubt not but it will be easily granted, that the *Knowledg* we have *of Mathematical Truths, is* not only certain, but *real Knowledg*; and not the bare empty Vision of vain insignificant *Chimeras* of the Brain: And yet, if we will consider, we shall find that it is only of our own *Ideas*. The Mathematician considers the Truth and Properties belonging to a Rectangle, or Circle, only as they are in *Idea* in his own Mind. For 'tis possible he never found either of them existing mathematically, *i. e.* precisely true, in his Life. But yet the Knowledg he has of any Truths or Properties belonging to a Circle, or any other mathematical Figure, are nevertheless true and certain, even of real things existing; because real things are no farther concern'd, nor intended to be meant by any such Propositions, than as things really agree to those *Archetypes* in his Mind. Is it true of the *Idea* of a *Triangle*, that its three Angles are equal to two right ones? It is true also of a *Triangle*, wherever it really exists. Whatever other Figure exists, that is not exactly answerable to that *Idea* of a *Triangle* in his Mind, is not at all concern'd in that Proposition: And therefore he is certain all his Knowledg concerning such *Ideas*, is real Knowledg; because intending things no farther than they agree with those his *Ideas*, he is sure what he knows concerning those Figures, when they have barely *an Ideal existence* in his Mind, will hold true of them also, when they have a real Existence in Matter; his Consideration being barely of those Figures, which are the same, wherever or however they exist.

And of Moral,

§. 7. And hence it follows, that *moral Knowledg* is as *capable of real Certainty*, as Mathematicks. For Certainty being but the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas*; and Demonstration nothing but the Perception of such Agreement, by the Intervention of other *Ideas*, or Mediums; our *moral Ideas*, as well as mathematical, being *Archetypes* themselves, and so adequate and compleat *Ideas*; all the Agreement or Disagreement, which we shall find in them, will produce real Knowledg, as well as in mathematical Figures.

Existence not required to make it real.

§. 8. For the attaining of *Knowledg* and Certainty, it is requisite that we have determin'd *Ideas*; and to make our Knowledge *real*, it is requisite that the *Ideas* answer their *Archetypes*. Nor let it be wonder'd, that I place the Certainty of our Knowledg in the Consideration of our *Ideas*, with so little Care and Regard (as it may seem) to the real Existence of Things: Since most of those Discourses, which take up the Thoughts, and engage the Disputes of those who pretend to make it their Business to enquire after Truth and Certainty, will, I presume, upon examination, be found to be *general Propositions*, and Notions in which Existence is not at all concern'd. All the Discourses of the Mathematicians about the squaring of a Circle, Conick Sections, or any other part of Mathematicks, *concern not* the *Existence* of any of those Figures; but their Demonstrations, which depend on their *Ideas*, are the same, whether there be any Square or Circle existing in the World, or no. In the same manner, the Truth and Certainty of *moral* Discourses abstracts from the Lives of Men, and the Existence of those Vertues in the World whereof they treat. Nor are *Tully's* Offices less true, because there is no Body in the World that exactly practises his Rules, and lives up to that Pattern of a vertuous Man which he has given us, and which existed no where, when he writ, but in *Idea*. If it be true in Speculation, *i. e.* in *Idea*, that *Murder deserves Death*, it will also be true in reality of any Action that exists conformable to that *Idea* of *Murder*. As for other Actions, the Truth of that Proposition concerns them not. And thus it is of all other Species of Things, which have no other Essence but those *Ideas* which are in the Minds of Men.

§. 9. But it will here be said, that if *moral Knowledg* be plac'd in the Contemplation of our own *moral Ideas*, and those, as other Modes, be of our own making,

Nor will it be less true or certain, because moral Ideas are of our own making and naming.

making, what ſtrange Notions will there be of *Juſtice* and *Temperance*? What Confuſion of Vertues and Vices, if every one may make what *Idea* of them he pleaſes? No Confuſion nor Diſorder in the things themſelves, nor the Reaſonings about them; no more than (in Mathematicks) there would be a Diſturbance in the Demonſtration, or a Change in the Properties of Figures, and their Relations one to another, if a Man ſhould make a Triangle with four Corners, or a *Trapezium* with four right Angles; that is, in plain *Engliſh*, change the Names of the Figures, and call that by one Name, which Mathematicians call ordinarily by another. For let a Man make to himſelf the *Idea* of a Figure with three Angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he pleaſe, *Equilaterum* or *Trapezium*, or any thing elſe, the Properties of, and Demonſtrations about that *Idea* will be the ſame, as if he call'd it a *Rectangular Triangle*. I confeſs the change of the Name, by the impropriety of Speech, will at firſt diſturb him, who knows not what *Idea* it ſtands for; but as ſoon as the Figure is drawn, the Conſequences and Demonſtration are plain and clear. Juſt the ſame is it in *moral* Knowledg, let a Man have the *Idea* of taking from others, without their Conſent, what their honeſt Induſtry has poſſeſs'd them of, and call this *Juſtice*, if he pleaſe. He that takes the Name here without the *Idea* put to it, will be miſtaken, by joining another *Idea* of his own to that Name: But ſtrip the *Idea* of that Name, or take it ſuch as it is in the Speaker's Mind, and the ſame Things will agree to it, as if you call'd it *Injuſtice*. Indeed wrong Names in moral Diſcourſes breed uſually more Diſorder, becauſe they are not ſo eaſily rectify'd as in Mathematicks, where the Figure once drawn and ſeen, makes the Name uſeleſs and of no Force. For what need of a Sign, when the thing ſignify'd is preſent and in view? But in moral Names that cannot be ſo eaſily and ſhortly done, becauſe of the many Decompoſitions that go to the making up the complex *Ideas* of thoſe Modes. But yet for all this, *miſcalling of* any of thoſe *Ideas*, contrary to the uſual ſignification of the words of that Language, hinders not, but that we may have certain and demonſtrative Knowledg of their ſeveral Agreements or Diſagreements, if we will carefully, as in Mathematicks, keep to the ſame preciſe *Ideas*, and trace them in their ſeveral Relations one to another, without being led away by their Names. If we but ſeparate the *Idea* under conſideration from the Sign that ſtands for it, our Knowledg goes equally on in the Diſcovery of real Truth and Certainty, whatever Sounds we make uſe of.

Miſnaming diſturbs not the Certainty of the Knowledg.

§. 10. One thing more we are to take notice of, That where GOD, or any other Law-maker, hath defin'd any moral Names, there they have made the Eſſence of that Species to which that Name belongs; and there it is not ſafe to apply or uſe them otherwiſe: But in other Caſes, 'tis bare Impropriety of Speech to apply them contrary to the common Uſage of the Country. But yet even this too diſturbs not the Certainty of that Knowledg, which is ſtill to be had by a due Contemplation, and comparing of thoſe even nick-nam'd *Ideas*.

Ideas *of Subſtances have their Archetypes without us.*

§. 11. *Thirdly*, There is another ſort of *complex Ideas*, which being refer'd to *Archetypes* without us, may differ from them, and ſo our Knowledg about them may come ſhort of being real. Such are our *Ideas* of Subſtances, which conſiſting of a Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, ſuppos'd taken from the Works of Nature, may yet vary from them, by having more or different *Ideas* united in them, than are to be found united in the things themſelves. From whence it comes to paſs, that they may, and often do fail of being exactly conformable to things themſelves.

So far as they agree with thoſe, ſo far our Knowledg concerning them is real.

§. 12. I ſay then, that to have *Ideas* of *Subſtances*, which, by being conformable to things, may afford us *real* Knowledg, it is not enough, as in Modes, to put together ſuch *Ideas* as have no Inconſiſtence, tho' they did never before ſo exiſt: *v. g.* the *Ideas* of *Sacriledge* or *Perjury*, &c. were as real and true *Ideas* before, as after the Exiſtence of any ſuch Fact. But *our Ideas of Subſtances* being ſuppos'd Copies, and refer'd to *Archetypes* without us, muſt ſtill be taken from ſomething that does or has exiſted; they muſt not conſiſt of *Ideas* put together at the pleaſure of our thoughts, without any real Pattern they were taken from, tho' we can perceive no Inconſiſtence in ſuch a Combination. The reaſon whereof is, becauſe we knowing not what real Conſtitution it is of Subſtances, whereon our ſimple *Ideas* depend, and which really is the Cauſe of the

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ſtrict Union of ſome of them one with another, and the Excluſion of others: there are very few of them, that we can be ſure are, or are not inconſiſtent in Nature, any farther than Experience and ſenſible Obſervation reach. Herein therefore is founded the *Reality* of our Knowledg concerning *Subſtances*, that all our complex *Ideas* of them muſt be ſuch, and ſuch only, as are made up of ſuch ſimple ones, as have been diſcover'd to co-exiſt in Nature. And our *Ideas* being thus true, tho' not perhaps, very exact Copies, are yet the Subjects of *real* (as far as we have any) *Knowledg* of them. Which (as has been already ſhewn) will not be found to reach very far: But ſo far as it does, it will ſtill be *real Knowledg*. Whatever *Ideas* we have, the Agreement we find they have with others, will ſtill be Knowledg. If thoſe *Ideas* be abſtract, it will be general Knowledg. But to make it *real* concerning Subſtances, the *Ideas* muſt be taken from the real Exiſtence of things. Whatever ſimple *Ideas* have been found to co-exiſt in any Subſtance, theſe we may with confidence join together again, and ſo make abſtract *Ideas* of Subſtances. For whatever have once had an union in Nature, may be united again.

In our Enquiries about Subſtances, we muſt conſider Ideas, and not confine our Thoughts to Names or Species ſuppos'd ſet out by Names.

§. 13. This, if we rightly conſider, and *confine not our Thoughts* and abſtract *Ideas* to Names, as if there were, or could be no other *Sorts* of things than what known Names had already determin'd, and as it were ſet out, we ſhould think of things with greater Freedom and leſs Confuſion than perhaps we do. It would poſſibly be thought a bold Paradox, if not a very dangerous Falſhood, if I ſhould ſay, that ſome *Changelings*, who have liv'd forty Years together without any appearance of Reaſon, are ſomething between a Man and a Beaſt: Which Prejudices is founded upon nothing elſe but a falſe Suppoſition, that theſe two Names, *Man* and *Beaſt*, ſtand for diſtinct Species ſo ſet out by real Eſſences, that there can come no other Species between them. Whereas if we will abſtract from thoſe Names, and the Suppoſition of ſuch ſpecifick Eſſences made by Nature, wherein all things of the ſame Denominations did exactly and equally partake; if we would not fanſy that there were a certain number of theſe Eſſences, wherein all things, as in Molds, were caſt and form'd, we ſhould find that the *Idea* of the Shape, Motion, and Life of a Man without Reaſon, is as much a diſtinct *Idea*, and makes as much a diſtinct *ſort* of things from Man and Beaſt, as the *Idea* of the Shape of an *Aſs* with Reaſon, would be different from either that of Man or Beaſt, and be a Species of an Animal between, or diſtinct from both.

Objection againſt a Changeling, being ſomething between a Man and Beaſt, anſwer'd.

§. 14. Here every body will be ready to ask, If *Changelings* may be ſuppos'd ſomething between Man and Beaſt, pray what are they? I anſwer, *Changelings*, which is as good a Word to ſignify ſomething different from the Signification of *MAN* or *BEAST*, as the Names Man and Beaſt are to have Significations different one from the other. This, well conſider'd, would reſolve this matter, and ſhew my meaning without any more ado. But I am not ſo unacquainted with the Zeal of ſome Men, which enables them to ſpin Conſequences, and to ſee Religion threaten'd whenever any one ventures to quit their Forms of Speaking, as not to foreſee what Names ſuch a Propoſition as this is like to be charg'd with: And without doubt it will be ask'd, If *Changelings* are ſomething between Man and Beaſt, what will become of them in the other World? To which I anſwer, 1. It concerns me not to know or enquire. To their own Maſter they ſtand or fall. It will make their ſtate neither better nor worſe, whether we determine any thing of it or no. They are in the hands of a faithful Creator and a bountiful Father, who diſpoſes not of his Creatures according to our narrow Thoughts or Opinions, nor diſtinguiſhes them according to Names and Species of our Contrivance. And we that know ſo little of this preſent World we are in, may, I think, content our ſelves without being peremptory in defining the different ſtates, which Creatures ſhall come into when they go off this Stage. It may ſuffice us, that he hath made known to all thoſe, who are capable of Inſtruction, Diſcourſe and Reaſoning, that they ſhall come to an Account, and receive according to what they have done in this Body.

§. 15. But, *Secondly*, I anſwer, The Force of theſe mens Queſtion (*viz.* Will you deprive *Changelings* of a future State?) is founded on one of theſe two Suppoſitions, which are both falſe. The firſt is, That all things that have the out-

ward Shape and Appearance of a Man muſt neceſſarily be deſign'd to an immortal future Being after this Life: Or, ſecondly, that whatever is of human Birth muſt be ſo. Take away theſe Imaginations, and ſuch Queſtions will be groundleſs and ridiculous. I deſire then thoſe who think there is no more but an accidental difference between themſelves and *Changelings*, the Eſſence in both being exactly the ſame, to conſider whether they can imagine Immortality annex'd to any outward Shape of the Body; the very propoſing it, is, I ſuppoſe, enough to make them diſown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much ſoever immers'd in Matter, allow'd that Excellency to any Figure of the groſs ſenſible outward Parts, as to affirm eternal Life due to it, or a neceſſary Conſequence of it; or that any Maſs of Matter ſhould, after its Diſſolution here, be again reſtor'd hereafter to an everlaſting State of Senſe, Perception, and Knowledg, only becauſe it was molded into this or that Figure, and had ſuch a particular frame of its viſible Parts. Such an Opinion as this, placing Immortality in a certain ſuperficial Figure, turns out of doors all conſideration of Soul or Spirit, upon whoſe account alone ſome corporeal Beings have hitherto been concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more to the outſide than inſide of things; to place the Excellency of a Man more in the external Shape of his Body, than internal Perfections of his Soul: which is but little better than to annex the great and ineſtimable Advantage of Immortality and Life everlaſting, which he has above other material Beings; to annex it, I ſay to cut off his Beard, or the Faſhion of his Coat. For this or that outward Make of our Bodies no more carries with it the Hopes of an eternal Duration, than the Faſhion of a Man's Suit gives him reaſonable grounds to imagine it will never wear out, or that it will make him immortal. 'Twill perhaps be ſaid, that no body thinks that the Shape makes any thing immortal, but 'tis the Shape is the Sign of a rational Soul within, which is immortal. I wonder who made it the Sign of any ſuch thing: for barely ſaying it, will not make it ſo. It would require ſome Proofs to perſuade one of it. No Figure that I know ſpeaks any ſuch Language. For it may as rationally be concluded, that the dead Body of a Man, wherein there is to be found no more Appearance or Action of Life than there is in a Statue, has yet nevertheleſs a living Soul in it becauſe of its Shape; as that there is a rational Soul in a *Changeling*, becauſe he has the Outſide of a rational Creature, when his Actions carry far leſs Marks of Reaſon with them, in the whole Courſe of his Life, than what are to be found in many a Beaſt.

Monſters. §. 16. But 'tis the Iſſue of rational Parents, and muſt therefore be concluded to have a rational Soul. I know not by what Logick you muſt ſo conclude. I am ſure this is a Concluſion, that Men no where allow of. For if they did, they would not make bold, as every where they do, to deſtroy ill-form'd and miſ-ſhap'd Productions. Ay, but theſe are *Monſters*. Let them be ſo; What will your driveling, unintelligent, intractable *Changeling* be? Shall a Defect in the Body make a *Monſter*: a Defect in the Mind (the far more Noble, and in the common Phraſe, the far more Eſſential Part) not? Shall the want of a Noſe or a Neck make a *Monſter*, and put ſuch Iſſue out of the rank of Men; the want of Reaſon and Underſtanding, not? This is to bring all back again to what was exploded juſt now: This is to place all in the Shape, and to take the Meaſure of a Man only by his Outſide. To ſhew that, according to the ordinary way of Reaſoning in this matter, People do lay the whole ſtreſs on the Figure, and reſolve the whole Eſſence of the Species of Man (as they make it) into the outward Shape, how unreaſonable ſoever it be, and how much ſoever they diſown it; we need but trace their Thoughts and Practice a little farther, and then it will plainly appear. The well-ſhap'd *Changeling* is a Man, has a rational Soul, tho' it appear not; this is paſt doubt, ſay you. Make the Ears a little longer, and more pointed, and the Noſe a little flatter than ordinary, and then you begin to boggle: Make the Face yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and then you are at a ſtand: Add ſtill more and more of the Likeneſs of a Brute to it, and let the Head be perfectly that of ſome other Animal, then preſently 'tis a *Monſter*; and 'tis Demonſtration with you that it hath no rational Soul, and muſt be deſtroy'd. Where now (I ask) ſhall be the juſt meaſure of the utmoſt Bounds of that Shape, that carries with

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it a rational Soul? For ſince there have been human *Fœtus*'s produc'd, half Beaſt, and half Man; and others three parts one, and one part t'other; and ſo it is poſſible they may be in all the variety of Approaches to the one or the other Shape, and may have ſeveral degrees of Mixture of the Likeneſs of a Man or a Brute; I would gladly know what are thoſe preciſe Lineaments, which according to this Hypotheſis, are, or are not capable of a rational Soul to be join'd to them? What ſort of Outſide is the certain Sign that there is, or is not ſuch an Inhabitant within? For till that be done, we talk at random of *Man*: and ſhall always, I fear, do ſo, as long as we give our ſelves up to certain Sounds, and the Imaginations of ſettled and fix'd Species in Nature, we know not what. But after all, I deſire it may be conſider'd, that thoſe who think they have anſwer'd the Difficulty, by telling us, that a miſ-ſhap'd *Fœtus* is a *Monſter*, run into the ſame Fault they are arguing againſt, by conſtituting a Species between Man and Beaſt. For what elſe, I pray, is their Monſter in the caſe (if the word *Monſter* ſignifies any thing at all) but ſomething neither Man nor Beaſt, but partaking ſomewhat of either? And juſt ſo is the *Changeling* before mention'd. So neceſſary is it to quit the common Notion of Species and Eſſences, if we will truly look into the Nature of things, and examine them, by what our Faculties can diſcover in them as they exiſt, and not by groundleſs Fancies, that have been taken up about them.

§. 17. I have mention'd this here, becauſe I think we cannot be too cautious that *Words* and *Species*, in the ordinary Notions which we have been us'd to of them, impoſe not on us. For I am apt to think, therein lies one great obſtacle to our clear and diſtinct Knowledg, eſpecially in reference to Subſtances; and from thence has roſe a great part of the Difficulties about Truth and Certainty. Would we accuſtom our ſelves to ſeparate our Contemplations and Reaſonings from Words, we might, in a great meaſure, remedy this Inconvenience within our own Thoughts: But yet it would ſtill diſturb us in our Diſcourſe with others, as long as we retain'd the Opinion, that *Species* and their Eſſences were any thing elſe but our abſtract *Ideas* (ſuch as they are) with Names annex'd to them, to be the ſigns of them. *Words and Species.*

§. 18. Wherever we perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of our *Ideas*, there is certain Knowledg: and wherever we are ſure thoſe *Ideas* agree with the reality of things, there is certain real Knowledg. Of which Agreement of our *Ideas* with the reality of things, having here given the Marks, I think I have ſhewn wherein it is, that *Certainty*, *real Certainty*, conſiſts: Which, whatever it was to others, was, I confeſs, to me heretofore, one of thoſe *Deſiderata* which I found great want of. *Recapitulation.*

CHAP. V.

Of Truth in general.

§. 1. WHAT is *Truth*, was an Enquiry many Ages ſince; and it being that which all Mankind either do, or pretend to ſearch after, it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it conſiſts, and ſo acquaint our ſelves with the Nature of it, as to obſerve how the Mind diſtinguiſhes it from Falſhood. *What Truth is.*

§. 2. *Truth* then ſeems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to ſignify nothing but *the joining or ſeparating of Signs, as the things ſignify'd by them, do agree or diſagree one with another.* The *joining* or *ſeparating* of Signs here meant, is what by another name we call Propoſition. So that Truth properly belongs only to Propoſitions: whereof there are two ſorts, *viz.* Mental and Verbal; as there are two ſorts of Signs commonly made uſe of, *viz.* *Ideas* and Words. *A right joining or ſeparating of Signs; i. e.* Ideas *or Words.*

§. 3. To form a clear Notion of *Truth*, it is very neceſſary to conſider *Truth* of Thought, and *Truth* of Words, diſtinctly one from another: but yet it is very difficult to treat of them aſunder. Becauſe it is unavoidable, in treating of mental Propoſitions, to make uſe of Words: and then the Inſtances given *Which make mental or verbal Propoſitions.*

of *mental Propoſitions* ceaſe immediately to be barely Mental, and become *Verbal*. For a *mental Propoſition* being nothing but a bare Conſideration of the *Ideas*, as they are in our Minds ſtrip'd of Names, they loſe the Nature of purely *mental Propoſitions*, as ſoon as they are put into Words.

Mental Propoſitions are very hard to be treated of.

§. 4. And that which makes it yet *harder to treat of mental* and verbal *Propoſitions ſeparately*, is, That moſt Men, if not all, in their Thinking and Reaſonings within themſelves, make uſe of Words inſtead of *Ideas*; at leaſt when the Subject of their Meditation contains in it complex *Ideas*. Which is a great Evidence of the Imperfection and Uncertainty of our *Ideas* of that kind, and may, if attentively made uſe of, ſerve for a Mark to ſhew us, what are thoſe things we have clear and perfect eſtabliſh'd *Ideas* of, and what not. For if we will curiouſly obſerve the way our Mind takes in Thinking and Reaſoning, we ſhall find, I ſuppoſe, that when we make any Propoſitions within our own Thoughts about *White* or *Black*, *Sweet* or *Bitter*, a *Triangle* or a *Circle*, we can and often do frame in our Minds the *Ideas* themſelves, without reflecting on the Names. But when we would conſider, or make Propoſitions about the more complex *Ideas*, as of a *Man*, *Vitriol*, *Fortitude*, *Glory*, we uſually put the Name for the *Idea*: Becauſe the *Ideas* theſe Names ſtand for, being for the moſt part imperfect, confus'd, and undetermin'd, we reflect on the *Names* themſelves, becauſe they are more clear, certain and diſtinct, and readier occur to our Thoughts than the pure *Ideas*: and ſo we make uſe of theſe Words inſtead of the *Ideas* themſelves, even when we would meditate and reaſon within our ſelves, and make tacit mental Propoſitions. In *Subſtances*, as has been already noted, this is occaſion'd by the Imperfection of our *Ideas*: we making the Name ſtand for the real Eſſence, of which we have no *Idea* at all. In *Modes*, it is occaſion'd by the great Number of ſimple *Ideas*, that go to the making them up. For many of them being compounded, the *Name* occurs much eaſier than the complex *Idea* it ſelf, which requires Time and Attention to be recollected, and exactly repreſented to the Mind, even in thoſe Men who have formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impoſſible to be done by thoſe, who, tho' they have ready in their Memory the greateſt part of the common Words of their Language, yet perhaps never troubled themſelves in all their Lives to conſider what preciſe *Ideas* the moſt of them ſtood for. Some confus'd or obſcure Notions have ſerv'd their turns; and many who talk very much of *Religion* and *Conſcience*, of *Church* and *Faith*, of *Power* and *Right*, of *Obſtructions* and *Humours*, *Melancholy*, and *Choler*, would perhaps have little left in their Thoughts and Meditations, if one ſhould deſire them to think only of the things themſelves, and lay by thoſe Words, with which they ſo often confound others, and not ſeldom themſelves alſo.

Being nothing but the joining or ſeparating Ideas *without Words.*

§. 5. But to return to the Conſideration of Truth: We muſt, I ſay, obſerve two ſorts of Propoſitions that we are capable of making.

Firſt, Mental, wherein the *Ideas* in our Underſtandings are without the uſe of Words *put together, or ſeparated* by the Mind, perceiving or judging of their Agreement or Diſagreement.

Secondly, Verbal Propoſitions, which *are Words*, the Signs of our *Ideas*, *put together or ſeparated in Affirmative or Negative Sentences*. By which way of affirming or denying, theſe Signs, made by Sounds, are as it were put together or ſeparated one from another. So that Propoſition conſiſts in joining or ſeparating Signs, and Truth conſiſts in the putting together or ſeparating thoſe Signs, according as the things, which they ſtand for, agree or diſagree.

When mental Propoſitions contain real Truth, and when verbal.

§. 6. Every one's Experience will ſatisfy him, that the Mind, either by perceiving or ſuppoſing the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of its *Ideas*, does tacitly within it ſelf put them into a kind of Propoſition affirmative or negative, which I have endeavour'd to expreſs by the Terms, *Putting together* and *Separating*. But this Action of the Mind, which is ſo familiar to every thinking and reaſoning Man, is eaſier to be conceiv'd by reflecting on what paſſes in us when we affirm or deny, than to be explain'd by Words. When a Man has in his Mind the *Idea* of two Lines, *viz.* the *Side* and *Diagonal* of a Square, whereof the Diagonal is an inch long, he may have the *Idea* alſo of the Diviſion of that Line, into a certain Number of equal Parts; *v. g.* into Five, Ten, an Hundred, a Thouſand, or any other Number, and may have the *Idea* of that

inch

inch Line being diviſible or not diviſible, into ſuch equal parts, as a certain number of them will be equal to the Side-line. Now whenever he perceives, believes, or ſuppoſes ſuch a kind of Diviſibility to agree or diſagree to his *Idea* of that Line, he, as it were, *joins* or *ſeparates* thoſe two *Ideas*, *viz.* the *Idea* of that Line, and the *Idea* of that kind of Diviſibility; and ſo makes a mental Propoſition, which is true or falſe, according to ſuch a kind of Diviſibility, a Diviſibility into ſuch *aliquot* parts, does really agree to that Line or no. When *Ideas* are ſo put together, or ſeparated in the Mind, as they, or the things they ſtand for do agree or not, that is, as I may call it, *mental Truth*. But *Truth of Words* is ſomething more; and that is, the affirming or denying of Words one of another, as the *Ideas* they ſtand for agree or diſagree: And this again is two-fold; either *purely verbal* and trifling, which I ſhall ſpeak of, *Chap.* 10. or *real* and inſtructive; which is the Object of that real Knowledg, which we have ſpoken of already.

§. 7. But here again will be apt to occur the ſame Doubt about Truth, that did about Knowledg: And it will be objected, That if Truth be nothing but the joining or ſeparating of Words in Propoſitions, as the *Ideas* they ſtand for agree or diſagree in Mens Minds, the Knowledg of *Truth is not ſo valuable a Thing*, as it is taken to be, nor worth the Pains and Time Men employ to the ſearch of it; ſince *by this account* it amounts to no more than the Conformity of Words to the *Chimeras* of Mens Brains. Who knows not what odd Notions many Mens Heads are fill'd with, and what ſtrange *Ideas* all Mens Brains are capable of? But if we reſt here, we know the Truth of nothing by this Rule, but of the viſionary World in our own Imaginations; nor have other Truth, but what as much concerns *Harpies* and *Centaurs*, as Men and Horſes. For thoſe, and the like, may be *Ideas* in our Heads, and have their Agreement and Diſagreement there, as well as the *Ideas* of real Beings, and ſo have as true Propoſitions made about them. And 'twill be altogether as true a Propoſition, to ſay all *Centaurs are Animals*, as that *all Men are Animals*; and the Certainty of one, as great as the other. For in both the Propoſitions, the Words are put together, according to the Agreement of the *Ideas* in our Minds: And the Agreement of the *Idea* of *Animal* with that of *Centaur*, is as clear and viſible to the Mind, as the Agreement of the *Idea* of *Animal* with that of *Man*; and ſo theſe two Propoſitions are equally true, equally certain. But of what uſe is all ſuch Truth to us?

Objection againſt verbal Truth, that thus it may all be chimerical.

§. 8. Tho' what has been ſaid in the foregoing Chapter, to diſtinguiſh real from imaginary Knowledg, might ſuffice here, in anſwer to this Doubt, to diſtinguiſh *real Truth* from *Chimerical*, or (if you pleaſe) *barely nominal*, they depending both on the ſame foundation; yet it may not be amiſs here again to conſider, that tho' our Words ſignify nothing but our *Ideas*, yet being deſign'd by them to ſignify things, the *Truth* they contain, when put into Propoſitions, will be only *verbal*, when they ſtand for *Ideas* in the Mind, that have not an Agreement with the Reality of things. And therefore Truth, as well as Knowledg, may well come under the diſtinction of *Verbal* and *Real*; that being only *verbal Truth*, wherein Terms are join'd according to the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* they ſtand for, without regarding whether our *Ideas* are ſuch as really have, or are capable of having an Exiſtence in Nature. But then it is they contain *real Truth*, when theſe Signs are join'd, as our *Ideas* agree; and when our *Ideas* are ſuch, as we know are capable of having an Exiſtence in Nature: which in Subſtances we cannot know, but by knowing that ſuch have exiſted.

Anſwer'd, Real Truth is about Ideas agreeing as Things.

§. 9. *Truth* is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas* as it is. *Falſhood* is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas* otherwiſe than it is. And ſo far as theſe *Ideas*, thus mark'd by Sounds, agree to their Archetypes, ſo far only is the *Truth real*. The Knowledg of this Truth conſiſts in knowing what *Ideas* the Words ſtand for, and the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe *Ideas*, according as it is mark'd by thoſe Words.

Falſhood is the joining of Names otherwiſe than their Ideas agree.

§. 10. But becauſe Words are look'd on as the great Conduits of Truth and Knowledg, and that in conveying and receiving of Truth, and commonly in reaſoning about it, we make uſe of Words and Propoſitions, I ſhall more at large

General Propoſitions to be treated of more at large.

large enquire, wherein the Certainty of real Truths, contain'd in Propositions, consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to shew in what sort of universal Propositions we are capable of being *certain* of their real Truth or Falshood.

I shall begin with general Propositions, as those which most employ our Thoughts, and exercise our Contemplation. *General Truths* are most look'd after by the Mind, as those that most enlarge our Knowledg; and by their Comprehensiveness, satisfying us at once of many Particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to Knowledg.

Moral and metaphysical Truth.

§. 11. Besides Truth taken in the strict sense before-mention'd, there are other sorts of Truths; as, 1. *Moral Truth*, which is speaking of things according to the Persuasion of our own Minds, tho' the Proposition we speak agree not to the Reality of things. 2. *Metaphysical Truth*, which is nothing but the real Existence of things, conformable to the *Ideas* to which we have annex'd their Names. This, tho' it seems to consist in the very Beings of things, yet when consider'd a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit Proposition, whereby the Mind joins that particular thing to the *Idea* it had before settled with a Name to it. But these Considerations of Truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present Purpose, it may suffice here only to have mention'd them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

Treating of Words necessary to Knowledg.

§. 1. THO' the examining and judging of *Ideas* by themselves, their Names being quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct Knowledg; yet thro' the prevailing Custom of using Sounds for *Ideas*, I think it is very seldom practis'd. Every one may observe how common it is for Names to be made use of, instead of the *Ideas* themselves, even when Men think and reason within their own Breasts; especially if the *Ideas* be very complex, and made up of a great Collection of simple ones. This makes *the Consideration of Words and Propositions so necessary a part of the Treatise of Knowledg*, that 'tis very hard to speak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other.

General Truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal propositions.

§. 2. All the Knowledg we have, being only of particular or *general Truths*, 'tis evident that whatever may be done in the former of these, the latter, which is that which with reason is most sought after, can never be well made known, and is very *seldom apprehended, but as conceiv'd and expres'd in Words.* It is not therefore out of our way, in the Examination of our Knowledg, to enquire into the Truth and Certainty of universal Propositions.

Certainty two-fold, of Truth and of Knowledg.

§. 3. But that we may not be misled in this case, by that which is the danger every where, I mean by the Doubtfulness of Terms, 'tis fit to observe, that Certainty is two-fold; *Certainty of Truth*, and *Certainty of Knowledg*. *Certainty of Truth* is, when Words are so put together in Propositions, as exactly to express the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* they stand for, as really it is. *Certainty of Knowledg* is, to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, as express'd in any Proposition. This we usually call knowing, or being certain of the Truth of any Proposition.

No Proposition can be known to be true, where the Essence of each Species mention'd is not known.

§. 4. Now because *we cannot be certain of the Truth of any general Proposition, unless we know the precise Bounds and extent of the Species its Terms stand for*, it is necessary we should know the Essence of each *Species*, which is that which constitutes and bounds it. This, in all simple *Ideas* and Modes, is not hard to do. For in these, the real and nominal Essence being the same; or, which is all one, the abstract *Idea* which the general Term stands for, being the sole Essence and Boundary that is or can be suppos'd of the *Species*, there can be no doubt, how far the *Species* extends, or what things are comprehended under each Term: which, 'tis evident, are all that have an exact Conformity with the *Idea* it stands for, and no other. But in Substances wherein a real Essence distinct from the nominal is suppos'd to constitute, determine, and bound the Species, the

Extent

Extent of the general Word is very uncertain: becauſe not knowing this real Eſſence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that *Species*; and conſequently what may, or may not with certainty be affirm'd of it. And thus ſpeaking of a *Man*, or *Gold*, or any other *Species* of natural Subſtances, as ſuppos'd conſtituted by a preciſe real Eſſence, which Nature regularly imparts to every individual of that Kind, whereby it is made to be of that *Species*, we cannot be certain of the Truth of any Affirmation or Negation made of it. For *Man*, or *Gold*, taken in this ſenſe, and uſed for *Species* of things conſtituted by real Eſſences different from the complex *Idea* in the Mind of the Speaker, ſtand for we know not what: and the Extent of theſe Species, with ſuch Boundaries, are ſo unknown and undetermin'd, that 'tis impoſſible with any certainty to affirm, that all Men are rational, or that all Gold is yellow. But where the nominal Eſſence is kept to, as the Boundary of each Species, and Men extend the Application of any general Term no farther than to the particular things, in which the complex *Idea* it ſtands for is to be found, there they are in no danger to miſtake the bounds of each *Species*, nor can be in doubt, on this account, whether any Propoſitions be true or no. I have choſe to explain this Uncertainty of Propoſitions in this ſcholaſtick way, and have made uſe of the Terms of *Eſſences* and *Species*, on purpoſe to ſhew the Abſurdity and Inconvenience there is to think of them, as of any other ſort of Realities, than barely abſtract *Ideas* with Names to them. To ſuppoſe that the *Species* of things are any thing but the ſorting of them under general Names, according as they agree to ſeveral abſtract *Ideas*, of which we make thoſe Names the Signs, is to confound Truth, and introduce Uncertainty into all general Propoſitions that can be made about them. Tho' therefore theſe things might, to People not poſſeſs'd with ſcholaſtick Learning, be perhaps treated of in a better and clearer way; yet thoſe wrong Notions of *Eſſences* or *Species* having got root in moſt Peoples Minds, who have receiv'd any Tincture from the Learning which has prevail'd in this part of the World, are to be diſcover'd and remov'd, to make way for that uſe of Words which ſhould convey Certainty with it.

§. 5. *The Names of Subſtances* then, *whenever made to ſtand for Species, which are ſuppos'd to be conſtituted by real Eſſences*, which we know not, *are not capable to convey Certainty to the Underſtanding*: of the Truth of general Propoſitions made up of ſuch Terms, we cannot be ſure. The reaſon whereof is plain: For how can we be ſure that this or that Quality is in *Gold*, when we know not what is or is not *Gold*? Since in this way of ſpeaking, nothing is *Gold*, but what partakes of an Eſſence, which we not knowing, cannot know where it is or is not, and ſo cannot be ſure that any parcel of Matter in the World is or is not in this ſenſe *Gold*; being incurably ignorant, whether it has or has not that which makes any thing to be call'd *Gold*, *i. e.* that real Eſſence of *Gold* whereof we have no *Idea* at all: this being as impoſſible for us to know, as it is for a blind Man to tell in what Flower the Colour of a *Panſie* is, or is not to be found, whilſt he has no *Idea* of the Colour of a *Panſie* at all. Or if we could (which is impoſſible) certainly know where a real Eſſence, which we know not, is; *v. g.* in what parcels of Matter the real Eſſence of *Gold* is; yet could we not be ſure, that this or that Quality could with Truth be affirm'd of *Gold*: ſince it is impoſſible for us to know, that this or that Quality or *Idea* has a neceſſary Connection with a real Eſſence, of which we have no *Idea* at all, whatever Species that ſuppos'd real Eſſence may be imagin'd to conſtitute.

This more particularly concerns Subſtances.

§. 6. On the other ſide, the *Names of Subſtances*, when made uſe of, as they ſhould be, for the *Ideas* Men have in their Minds, tho' they carry a clear and determinate Signification with them, *will not* yet *ſerve us to make any univerſal Propoſitions, of whoſe Truth we can be certain.* Not becauſe in this uſe of them we are uncertain what things are ſignify'd by them, but becauſe the complex *Ideas* they ſtand for, are ſuch Combinations of ſimple ones, as carry not with them any diſcoverable Connection or Repugnancy, but with a very few other *Ideas*.

The Truth of few univerſal Propoſitions concerning Subſtances, is to be known.

§. 7. The complex *Ideas*, that our Names of the Species of Subſtances properly ſtand for, are Collections of ſuch Qualities as have been obſerv'd to co-exiſt in an unknown *Subſtratum*, which we call *Subſtance*: but what other Qualities neceſſarily co-exiſt with ſuch Combinations, we cannot certainly know,

Becauſe Co-exiſtence of Ideas in few caſes is to be known.

unleſs

unleſs we can diſcover their natural Dependance; which in their primary Qualities, we can go but a very little way in; and in all their ſecondary Qualities, we can diſcover no Connection at all, for the Reaſons mention'd, Chap. 3. *Viz.* 1. Becauſe we know not the real Conſtitutions of Subſtances, on which each *ſecondary Quality* particularly depends. 2. Did we know that, it would ſerve us only for experimental (not univerſal) Knowledg; and reach with Certainty no farther, than that bare Inſtance: becauſe our Underſtandings can diſcover no conceivable Connection between any *ſecondary Quality*, and any Modification whatſoever of any of the *primary* ones. And therefore there are very few general Propoſitions to be made concerning Subſtances, which can carry with them *undoubted Certainty*.

Inſtances in Gold.

§. 8. *All Gold is fix'd*, is a Propoſition whoſe Truth we cannot be certain of, how univerſally ſoever it be believ'd. For if, according to the uſeleſs Imagination of the Schools, any one ſuppoſes the Term *Gold* to ſtand for a Species of things ſet out by Nature, by a real Eſſence belonging to it, 'tis evident he knows not what particular Subſtances are of that Species; and ſo cannot, with certainty affirm any thing univerſally of *Gold*. But if he makes *Gold* ſtand for a Species determin'd by its nominal Eſſence, let the nominal Eſſence, for Example, be the complex *Idea* of a *Body* of a certain *yellow* Colour, *malleable*, *fuſible*, and *heavier* than any other known; in this proper uſe of the Word *Gold*, there is no Difficulty to know what is or is not *Gold*. But yet no other Quality can with certainty be univerſally affirm'd or deny'd of *Gold*, but what hath a diſcoverable Connection or Conſiſtency with that nominal Eſſence. *Fixedneſs*, for example, having no neceſſary Connection, that we can diſcover, with the Colour, Weight, or any other ſimple *Idea* of our complex one, or with the whole Combination together; it is impoſſible that we ſhould certainly know the Truth of this Propoſition, That *all Gold is fix'd*.

§. 9. As there is no diſcoverable Connection between *Fixedneſs*, and the Colour, Weight, and other ſimple *Ideas* of that nominal Eſſence of *Gold*; ſo if we make our complex *Idea* of *Gold*, a *Body yellow*, *fuſible*, *ductile*, *weighty*, and *fix'd*, we ſhall be at the ſame uncertainty concerning *Solubility* in *Aq. Regia*, and for the ſame reaſon: Since we can never, from conſideration of the *Ideas* themſelves, with certainty affirm or deny of a Body, whoſe complex *Idea* is made up of yellow, very weighty, ductile, fuſible, and fix'd, that it is ſoluble in *Aq. Regia*; and ſo on, of the reſt of its Qualities. I would gladly meet with one general Affirmation concerning any Quality of *Gold*, that any one can certainly know is true. It will, no doubt, be preſently objected, Is not this an univerſal certain Propoſition, *All Gold is malleable?* To which I anſwer, It is a very certain Propoſition, if *Malleableneſs* be a part of the complex *Idea* the word *Gold* ſtands for. But then here is nothing affirm'd of *Gold*, but that that Sound ſtands for an *Idea* in which *Malleableneſs* is contain'd: And ſuch a ſort of Truth and Certainty as this, it is to ſay, *a Centaur is four-footed*. But if *Malleableneſs* makes not a part of the ſpecifick Eſſence the Name *Gold* ſtands for, 'tis plain, *All Gold is malleable*, is not a certain Propoſition. Becauſe, let the complex *Idea* of *Gold* be made up of which ſoever of its other Qualities you pleaſe, *Malleableneſs* will not appear to depend on that complex *Idea*, nor follow from any ſimple one contain'd in it: The Connection that *Malleableneſs* has (if it has any) with thoſe other Qualities, being only by the intervention of the real Conſtitution of its ſenſible Parts; which, ſince we know not, 'tis impoſſible we ſhould perceive that Connection, unleſs we could diſcover that which ties them together.

As far as any ſuch Co-exiſtence can be known, ſo far univerſal Propoſitions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, becauſe,

§. 10. The more, indeed, of theſe co-exiſting Qualities we unite into one complex *Idea*, under one Name, the more preciſe and determinate we make the Signification of that Word; but yet never make it thereby more capable of *univerſal Certainty*, in reſpect of other Qualities not contain'd in our complex *Idea*; ſince we perceive not their Connection or Dependance one on another, being ignorant both of that real Conſtitution in which they are all founded, and alſo how they flow from it. For the chief part of our Knowledg concerning Subſtances, is not, as in other things, barely of the Relation of two *Ideas* that may exiſt ſeparately; but is of the neceſſary Connection and Co-exiſtence of ſeveral diſtinct *Ideas* in the ſame Subject, or of their Repugnancy ſo to co-exiſt.

Could

Could we begin at the other End, and discover what it was, wherein that Colour consisted, what made a Body lighter or heavier, what Texture of Parts made it malleable, fusible, and fix'd, and fit to be dissolv'd in this sort of Liquor, and not in another; if (I say) we had such an *Idea* as this of Bodies, and could perceive wherein all sensible Qualities originally consist, and how they are produc'd; we might frame such abstract *Ideas* of them, as would furnish us with Matter of more general Knowledg, and enable us to make universal Propositions, that should carry *general Truth* and *Certainty* with them. But whilst our complex *Ideas* of the sorts of Substances are so remote from that internal real Constitution, on which their sensible Qualities depend, and are made up of nothing but an imperfect Collection of those apparent Qualities our Senses can discover; there can be very few general Propositions concerning Substances, of whose real Truth we can be *certainly* assur'd: since there are but few simple *Ideas*, of whose Connection and necessary Co-existence we can have certain and undoubted Knowledg. I imagine, amongst all the *secondary Qualities* of Substances, and the Powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whose necessary Co-existence, or Repugnance to co-exist, can certainly be known, unless in those of the same sense, which necessarily exclude one another, as I have elsewhere shew'd. No one, I think, by the Colour that is in any Body, can certainly know what Smell, Taste, Sound, or tangible Qualities it has, nor what Alterations it is capable to make or receive, on or from other Bodies. The same may be said of the Sound or Taste, *&c.* Our specifick Names of Substances standing for any Collections of such *Ideas*, 'tis not to be wonder'd, that we can with them make very few general Propositions of *undoubted real Certainty*. But yet so far as any complex *Idea*, of any sort of Substances, contains in it any simple *Idea*, whose necessary Co-existence with any other may be discover'd, so far *universal Propositions* may *with certainty* be made concerning it: *v. g.* Could any one discover a necessary Connection between *Malleableness*, and the *Colour* or *Weight* of *Gold*, or any other part of the complex *Idea* signify'd by that Name, he might make a *certain* universal Proposition concerning *Gold* in this respect; and the real Truth of this Proposition, That *all Gold is malleable*, would be as *certain* as of this, *The three Angles of all right-lin'd Triangles are equal to two right ones.*

§. 11. Had we such *Ideas* of Substances, as to know what real Constitutions produce those sensible Qualities we find in them, and how those Qualities flow'd from thence, we could by the specifick *Ideas* of their real Essences in our own Minds, more certainly find out their Properties, and discover what Qualities they had or had not, than we can now by our Senses: and to know the Properties of *Gold*, it would be no more necessary that *Gold* should exist, and that we should make experiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the Properties of a Triangle, that a Triangle should exist in any Matter; the *Idea* in our Minds would serve for the one as well as the other. But we are so far from being admitted into the Secrets of Nature, that we scarce so much as ever approach the first Entrance towards them. For we are wont to consider the Substances we meet with, each of them as an entire thing by it self, having all its Qualities in it self, and independent of other things; overlooking, for the most part, the Operations of those invisible Fluids they are encompass'd with, and upon whose Motions and Operations depend the greatest part of those Qualities which are taken notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent Marks of Distinction whereby we know and denominate them. Put a Piece of *Gold* any where by it self, separate from the reach and influence of all other Bodies, it will immediately lose all its Colour and Weight, and perhaps Malleableness too; which, for ought I know, would be chang'd into a perfect Friability. *Water*, in which to us *Fluidity* is an essential Quality, left to it self, would cease to be fluid. But if inanimate Bodies owe so much of their present state to other Bodies without them, that they would not be what they appear to us, were those Bodies that environ them remov'd, it is yet more so in *Vegetables*, which are nourish'd, grow, and produce Leaves, Flowers, and Seeds, in a constant Succession. And if we look a little nearer into the state of *Animals*, we shall find that their Dependance, as to Life, Motion, and the most considerable Qualities to be observ'd in them, is so wholly on extrinsecal Causes and Qualities of other Bodies that make no part of them, that they cannot subsist a moment

The Qualities which make our complex Ideas of Substances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived Causes.

without them: tho' yet those Bodies on which they depend, are little taken notice of, and make no part of the complex *Ideas* we frame of those Animals. Take the Air but a minute from the greatest part of living Creatures, and they presently lose Sense, Life, and Motion. This the Necessity of Breathing has forc'd into our Knowledg. But how many other extrinsecal, and possibly very remote Bodies, do the Springs of those admirable Machines depend on, which are not vulgarly observ'd, or so much as thought on; and how many are there, which the severest Enquiry can never discover? The Inhabitants of this Spot of the Universe, tho' remov'd so many Millions of Miles from the Sun, yet depend so much on the duly temper'd Motion of Particles coming from, or agitated by it, that were this Earth remov'd but a small part of that distance out of its present Situation, and placed a little farther or nearer that Source of Heat, 'tis more than probable that the greatest part of the Animals in it would immediately perish: since we find them so often destroy'd by an Excess or Defect of the Sun's Warmth, which an accidental Position, in some Parts of this our little Globe, exposes them to. The Qualities observ'd in a *Loadstone* must needs have their Source far beyond the Confines of that Body; and the Ravage made often on several sorts of Animals by invisible Causes, the certain Death (as we are told) of some of them, by barely passing the Line, or, as 'tis certain of others, by being remov'd into a neighbouring Country, evidently shew that the Concurrence and Operation of several Bodies, with which they are seldom thought to have any thing to do, is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us, and to preserve those Qualities by which we know and distinguish them. We are then quite out of the way, when we think that things contain within themselves the Qualities that appear to us in them: And we in vain search for that Constitution within the Body of a Fly, or an Elephant, upon which depend those Qualities and Powers we observe in them. For which perhaps, to understand them aright, we ought to look not only beyond this our Earth and Atmosphere, but even beyond the Sun, or remotest Star our Eyes have yet discover'd. For how much the Being and Operation of particular Substances in this our Globe depend on Causes utterly beyond our view, is impossible for us to determine. We see and perceive some of the Motions and grosser Operations of things here about us; but whence the Streams come that keep all these curious Machines in motion and repair, how convey'd and modify'd, is beyond our Notice and Apprehension: and the great Parts and Wheels, as I may so say, of this stupendous Structure of the Universe, may, for ought we know, have such a Connection and Dependance in their Influences and Operations one upon another, that perhaps things in this our Mansion would put on quite another face, and cease to be what they are, if some one of the Stars or great Bodies incomprehensibly remote from us, should cease to be or move as it does. This is certain, Things however absolute and intire they seem in themselves, are but Retainers to other parts of Nature, for that which they are most taken notice of by us. Their observable Qualities, Actions, and Powers, are owing to something without them; and there is not so compleat and perfect a part that we know of Nature, which does not owe the Being it has, and the Excellencies of it, to its Neighbours; and we must not confine our Thoughts within the Surface of any Body, but look a great deal farther, to comprehend perfectly those Qualities that are in it.

§. 12. If this be so, it is not to be wonder'd, that *we have very imperfect* Ideas *of Substances*; and that the real Essences, on which depend their Properties and Operations, are unknown to us. We cannot discover so much as that *Size*, *Figure*, and *Texture* of their minute and active Parts, which is really in them; much less the different Motions and Impulses made in and upon them by Bodies from without, upon which depends, and by which is form'd, the greatest and most remarkable part of those Qualities we observe in them, and of which our complex *Ideas* of them are made up. This Consideration alone is enough to put an end to all our Hopes of ever having the *Ideas* of their real Essences; which, whilst we want the nominal Essences we make use of instead of them, will be able to furnish us but very sparingly with any *general Knowledg*, or universal Propositions capable of real *Certainty*.

§. 13.

§. 13. We are not therefore to wonder, if *Certainty* be to be found in very few general Propoſitions made concerning Subſtances: Our Knowledg of their Qualities and Properties go very ſeldom farther than our Senſes reach and inform us. Poſſibly inquiſitive and obſerving Men may, by ſtrength of *Judgment* penetrate farther, and on Probabilities taken from wary Obſervation, and Hints well laid together, often gueſs right at what Experience has not yet diſcover'd to them. But this is but gueſſing ſtill; it amounts only to Opinion, and has not that *Certainty* which is requiſite to Knowledg. For all *general Knowledg* lies only in our own Thoughts, and conſiſts barely in the Contemplation of our own abſtract *Ideas*. Wherever we perceive any Agreement or Diſagreement amongſt them, there we have *general Knowledge*; and by putting the Names of thoſe *Ideas* together accordingly in Propoſitions, can with certainty pronounce *general Truths*. But becauſe the abſtract *Ideas* of Subſtances, for which their ſpecifick Names ſtand, whenever they have any diſtinct and determinate Signification, have a diſcoverable Connection or Inconſiſtency with but a very few other *Ideas*; the *Certainty of univerſal Propoſitions concerning Subſtances* is very narrow and ſcanty in that part, which is our principal Enquiry concerning them: and there are ſcarce any of the Names of Subſtances, let the *Idea* it is apply'd to be what it will, of which we can generally and with certainty pronounce, that it has or has not this or that other Quality belonging to it, and conſtantly co-exiſting or inconſiſtent with that *Idea*, wherever it is to be found.

Judgment may reach farther, but that is not Knowledg.

§. 14. Before we can have any tolerable Knowledg of this kind, we muſt firſt know what Changes the *primary Qualities* of one Body do regularly produce in the *primary Qualities* of another, and how. Secondly, We muſt know what *primary Qualities* of any Body produce certain Senſations or *Ideas* in us. This is in truth no leſs than to know all the Effects of Matter, under its divers Modifications of Bulk, Figure, Coheſion of Parts, Motion and Reſt. Which I think, every body will allow, is utterly impoſſible to be known by us without Revelation. Nor if it were reveal'd to us, what ſort of Figure, Bulk and Motion of Corpuſcles, would produce in us the Senſation of a *yellow* Colour, and what ſort of Figure, Bulk and Texture of Parts, in the Superficies of any Body, were fit to give ſuch Corpuſcles their due Motion to produce that Colour; would that be enough to make *univerſal* Propoſitions with *Certainty*, concerning the ſeveral ſorts of them, unleſs we had Faculties acute enough to perceive the preciſe Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of Bodies in thoſe minute Parts, by which they operate on our Senſes, that ſo we might by thoſe frame our abſtract *Ideas* of them. I have mention'd here only *corporeal* Subſtances, whoſe Operations ſeem to lie more level to our Underſtandings: For as to the *Operations of Spirits*, both their thinking and moving of Bodies, we at firſt Sight find our ſelves at a loſs; tho' perhaps, when we have apply'd our Thoughts a little nearer to the Conſideration of Bodies, and their Operations, and examin'd how far our Notions, even in theſe, reach, with any Clearneſs, beyond ſenſible Matter of Fact, we ſhall be bound to confeſs, that even in theſe too our Diſcoveries amount to very little beyond perfect Ignorance and Incapacity.

What is requiſite for our Knowledg of Subſtances.

§. 15. This is evident, *the abſtract complex* Ideas *of Subſtances*, for which their general Names ſtand, not comprehending their real Conſtitutions, *can afford us but very little univerſal Certainty*. Becauſe our *Ideas* of them are not made up of that, on which thoſe Qualities we obſerve in them, and would inform our ſelves about, do depend, or with which they have any certain Connection: *v. g.* Let the *Idea* to which we give the name *Man*, be, as it commonly is, a Body of the ordinary Shape, with Senſe, voluntary Motion, and Reaſon join'd to it: This being the abſtract *Idea*, and conſequently the Eſſence of our Species *Man*, we can make but very few general certain Propoſitions concerning *Man*, ſtanding for ſuch an *Idea*. Becauſe not knowing the real Conſtitution on which Senſation, Power of Motion, and Reaſoning, with that peculiar Shape, depend, and whereby they are united together in the ſame Subject, there are very few other Qualities, with which we can perceive them to have a neceſſary Connection: and therefore we cannot with Certainty affirm, That *all Men ſleep by Intervals*; That *no Man can be nouriſh'd by Wood or Stones*; That *all Men will be poiſon'd by Hemlock*: becauſe theſe *Ideas* have no Connection nor Repugnancy with this our nominal Eſſence of *Man*, with this abſtract *Idea* that Name ſtands for. We muſt

Whilſt our Ideas of Subſtances contain not their real Conſtitutions, we can make but few general certain Propoſitions concerning them.

muſt in theſe and the like appeal to Trial in particular Subjects, which can reach but a little way. We muſt content our ſelves with probability in the reſt; but can have no general Certainty, whilſt our ſpecifick *Idea* of *Man* contains not that real Conſtitution, which is the Root, wherein all his inſeparable Qualities are united, and from whence they flow. Whilſt our *Idea*, the word *Man* ſtands for, is only an imperfect Collection of ſome ſenſible Qualities and Powers in him, there is no diſcernible Connection or Repugnance between our ſpecifick *Idea*, and the Operation of either the Parts of Hemlock or Stones, upon his Conſtitution. There are Animals that ſafely eat Hemlock, and others that are nouriſh'd by Wood and Stones: But as long as we want *Ideas* of thoſe real Conſtitutions of different ſorts of Animals, whereon theſe and the like Qualities and Powers depend, we muſt not hope to reach *Certainty* in univerſal Propoſitions concerning them. Thoſe few *Ideas* only, which have a diſcernible Connection with our nominal Eſſence, or any part of it, can afford us ſuch Propoſitions. But theſe are ſo few, and of ſo little moment, that we may juſtly look on our certain *general Knowledge of Subſtances*, as almoſt none at all.

Wherein lies the general Certainty of Propoſitions.

§. 16. To conclude, *General Propoſitions*, of what kind ſoever, are then only capable of *Certainty*, when the Terms us'd in them ſtand for ſuch *Ideas*, whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement, as there expreſs'd, is capable to be diſcover'd by us. And we are then certain of their Truth or Falſhood, when we perceive the *Ideas* the Terms ſtand for, to agree or not agree, according as they are affirm'd or deny'd one of another. Whence we may take notice, that *general Certainty* is never to be found but in our *Ideas*. Whenever we go to ſeek it elſewhere in Experiment, or Obſervations without us, our Knowledg goes not beyond Particulars. 'Tis the Contemplation of our own abſtract *Ideas*, that alone is able to afford us *general Knowledg*.

CHAP. VI.

Of Maxims.

They are ſelf-evident.

§. 1. THERE are a ſort of Propoſitions, which under the name of *Maxims* and *Axioms* have paſs'd for Principles of Science; and becauſe they are *ſelf-evident*, have been ſuppos'd innate, altho' no Body (that I know) ever went about to ſhew the Reaſon and Foundation of their Clearneſs or Cogency. It may however be worth while to enquire into the Reaſon of their Evidence, and ſee whether it be peculiar to them alone, and alſo examine how far they influence and govern our other Knowledg.

Wherein that Self-evidence conſiſts.

§. 2. *Knowledg*, as has been ſhewn, conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*: Now where that Agreement or Diſagreement is perceiv'd immediately by it ſelf, without the Intervention or Help of any other, there our *Knowledg is ſelf-evident*. This will appear to be ſo to any one, who will but conſider any of thoſe Propoſitions, which, without any proof, he aſſents to at firſt ſight: for in all of them he will find, that the Reaſon of his Aſſent is from that Agreement or Diſagreement, which the Mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in thoſe *Ideas* anſwering the Affirmation or Negation in the Propoſition.

Self-evidence not peculiar to receiv'd Axioms.

§. 3. This being ſo, in the next place let us conſider, whether this *Self-evidence* be peculiar only to thoſe Propoſitions, which commonly paſs under the name of Maxims, and have the Dignity of Axioms allow'd them. And here 'tis plain, that ſeveral other Truths, not allow'd to be Axioms, partake equally with them in this *Self-evidence*. This we ſhall ſee, if we go over theſe ſeveral ſorts of Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, which I have abovemention'd, *viz.* Identity, Relation, Co-exiſtence, and real Exiſtence; which will diſcover to us, that not only thoſe few Propoſitions, which have had the credit of *Maxims*, are ſelf-evident, but a great many, even almoſt an infinite number of *other Propoſitions* are ſuch.

§. 4. For, *Firſt*, the immediate Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Identity*, being founded in the Mind's having diſtinct *Ideas*, this affords

fords us as many *ſelf-evident* Propoſitions, as we have diſtinct *Ideas*. Every one that has any Knowledg at all, has, as the Foundation of it, various and diſtinct *Ideas*: And it is the firſt Act of the Mind (without which it can never be capable of any Knowledg) to know every one of its *Ideas* by it ſelf, and diſtinguiſh it from others. Every one finds in himſelf, that he knows the *Ideas* he has; that he knows alſo, when any one is in his Underſtanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them diſtinctly and unconfuſedly one from another. Which always being ſo (it being impoſſible but that he ſhould perceive what he perceives) he can never be in doubt when any *Idea* is in his Mind, that it is there, and is that *Idea* it is; and that two diſtinct *Ideas*, when they are in his Mind, are there, and are not one and the ſame *Idea*. So that all ſuch Affirmations and Negations are made without any poſſibility of Doubt, Uncertainty or Heſitation, and muſt neceſſarily be aſſented to as ſoon as underſtood; that is, as ſoon as we have in our Minds determin'd *Ideas*, which the Terms in the Propoſition ſtand for. And therefore wherever the Mind with Attention conſiders any Propoſition, ſo as to perceive the two *Ideas* ſignify'd by the Terms, and affirm'd or deny'd one of the other, to be the ſame or different; it is preſently and infallibly certain of the Truth of ſuch a Propoſition, and this equally, whether theſe Propoſitions be in Terms ſtanding for more general *Ideas*, or ſuch as are leſs ſo, *v. g.* whether the general *Idea* of *Being* be affirm'd of it ſelf, as in this Propoſition, *whatſoever is, is*; or a more particular *Idea* be affirm'd of it ſelf, as *a Man is a Man*, or *whatſoever is White is White*; or whether the *Idea* of *Being* in general be deny'd of *not Being*, which is the only (if I may ſo call it) *Idea* different from it, as in this other Propoſition, *It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*; or any *Idea* of any particular Being be deny'd of another different from it, as *a Man is not a Horſe, Red is not Blue*. The Difference of the *Ideas*, as ſoon as the Terms are underſtood, makes the Truth of the Propoſition preſently viſible, and that with an equal Certainty and Eaſineſs in the leſs, as well as the more general Propoſitions, and all for the ſame reaſon, *viz.* Becauſe the Mind perceives in any *Ideas*, that it has the ſame *Idea* to the ſame with it ſelf; and two different *Ideas* to be different and not the ſame. And this it is equally certain of, whether theſe *Ideas* be more or leſs general, abſtract and comprehenſive. It is not therefore alone to theſe two general Propoſitions, *Whatſoever is, is*; and, *It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*; that this Self-evidence belongs by any peculiar Right. The Perception of being, or not being, belongs no more to theſe vague *Ideas*, ſignify'd by the Terms *Whatſoever* and *Thing*, than it does to any other *Ideas*. Theſe two general Maxims amounting to no more in ſhort but this, that *the ſame is the ſame*, and *ſame is not different*, are Truths known in more particular Inſtances, as well as in theſe general Maxims, and known alſo in particular Inſtances, before theſe general Maxims are ever thought on, and draw all their Force from the Diſcernment of the Mind imploy'd about particular *Ideas*. There is nothing more viſible than that the Mind, without the help of any Proof, or Reflection on either of theſe general Propoſitions, perceives ſo clearly, and knows ſo certainly, that the *Idea* of *White* is the *Idea* of White, and not the *Idea* of Blue; and that the *Idea* of White, when it is in the Mind, is there, and is not abſent; that the Conſideration of theſe Axioms can add nothing to the Evidence or Certainty of its Knowledg. Juſt ſo it is (as every one may experiment in himſelf) in all the *Ideas* a Man has in his Mind: He knows each to be it ſelf, and not to be another; and to be in his Mind, and not away when it is there, with a Certainty that cannot be greater; and therefore the Truth of no general Propoſition can be known with a greater Certainty, nor add any thing to this. So that in reſpect of Identity, our intuitive Knowledg reaches as far as our *Ideas*. And we are capable of making as many ſelf-evident Propoſitions, as we have Names for diſtinct *Ideas*. And I appeal to every one's own Mind, whether this Propoſition, *A Circle is a Circle*, be not as ſelf-evident a Propoſition, as that conſiſting of more general Terms, *Whatſoever is, is*: And again, whether this Propoſition, *Blue is not Red*, be not a Propoſition that the Mind can no more doubt of, as ſoon as it underſtands the Words, than it does of that Axiom, *It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*; and ſo of all the like.

1. *As to Identity and Diverſity all Propoſitions are equally ſelf-evident.*

§. 5.

2. *In Co-existence we have few self-evident Propositions.*

§. 5. *Secondly*, As to *Co-existence*, or such necessary Connection between two *Ideas*, that in the Subject where one of them is suppos'd, there the other must necessarily be also: Of such Agreement or Disagreement as this, the Mind has an immediate Perception but in very few of them. And therefore in this sort we have but very little intuitive Knowledg; nor are there to be found very many Propositions that are self-evident, tho' some there are; *v. g.* the *Idea* of filling a Place equal to the Contents of its Superficies, being annex'd to our *Idea* of Body, I think it is a self-evident Proposition, *That two Bodies cannot be in the same Place.*

3. *In other Relations we may have.*

§. 6. *Thirdly*, As to the *Relations* of Modes, Mathematicians have fram'd many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality. As *Equals taken from Equals, the Remainder will be Equals*; which, with the rest of that kind, however they are receiv'd for Maxims by the Mathematicians, and are unquestionable Truths; yet, I think, that any one who considers them, will not find that they have a clearer Self-evidence than these, that *one and one are equal to two*; that *if you take from the five Fingers of one Hand two, and from the five Fingers of the other Hand two, the remaining Number will be equal.* These and a thousand other such Propositions may be found in Numbers, which, at the very first hearing, force the Assent, and carry with them an equal, if not greater Clearness, than those Mathematical Axioms.

4. *Concerning real Existence we have none.*

§. 7. *Fourthly*, As to *real Existence*, since that has no Connection with any other of our *Ideas*, but that of our selves, and of a first Being, we have in that, concerning the real Existence of all other Beings, not so much as demonstrative, much less a self-evident Knowledg; and therefore concerning those there are no Maxims.

These Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledg.

§. 8. In the next place let us consider, what *Influence* these receiv'd *Maxims* have upon the other Parts of our Knowledg. The Rules establish'd in the Schools, that all Reasonings are *ex præcognitis & præconcessis*, seems to lay the Foundation of all other Knowledg in these Maxims, and to suppose them to be *præcognita*; whereby, I think, are meant these two things: First, That these Axioms are those Truths that are first known to the Mind. And, Secondly, That upon them the other Parts of our Knowledg depend.

Because they are not the Truths we first knew.

§. 9. *First*, That they are not the *Truths first known* to the Mind, is evident to Experience, as we have shewn in another place, *Book* I. *chap.* 2. Who perceives not that a Child certainly knows that a Stranger is not its Mother; that its Sucking-Bottle is not the Rod, long before he knows that *'tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be?* And how many Truths are there about Numbers, which it is obvious to observe that the Mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinc'd of, before it ever thought on these general Maxims, to which Mathematicians, in their Arguings, do sometimes refer them? Whereof the Reason is very plain: For that which makes the Mind assent to such Propositions, being nothing else but the Perception it has of the Agreement or Disagreement of its *Ideas*, according as it finds them affirm'd or deny'd one of another in words it understands, and every *Idea* being known to be what it is, and every two distinct *Ideas* being known not be to the same; it must necessarily follow, that such self-evident Truths must be *first* known, which consist of *Ideas* that are *first* in the Mind: and the *Ideas first* in the Mind, 'tis evident, are those of particular things, from whence, by slow degrees, the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones; which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense, are settled in the Mind, with general Names to them. Thus particular *Ideas* are *first* receiv'd and distinguish'd, and so Knowledg got about them; and next to them, the less general or specifick, which are next to particular: For abstract *Ideas* are not so obvious or easy to Children, or the yet unexercis'd Mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to grown Men, 'tis only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find, that general *Ideas* are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For example, Does it not require some Pains and Skill to form the *general Idea* of a *Triangle* (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult) for it must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon; but all and

none

none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an *Idea* wherein some Parts of several different and inconsistent *Ideas* are put together. 'Tis true, the Mind, in this imperfect State, has need of such *Ideas*, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of Communication, and Inlargement of Knowledg; to both which it is naturally very much inclin'd. But yet one has reason to suspect such *Ideas* are Marks of our Imperfection; at least this is enough to shew, that the most abstract and general *Ideas* are not those that the Mind is *first* and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest Knowledg is conversant about.

§. 10. *Secondly*, From what has been said it plainly follows, that these magnify'd *Maxims* are not the Principles and *Foundations* of all our other *Knowledg*. For if there be a great many other Truths, which have as much self-evidence as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impossible they should be the *Principles*, from which we deduce all other Truths. Is it impossible to know that *One* and *Two* are equal to *Three*, but by virtue of this, or some such Axiom, *viz. the Whole is equal to all its Parts taken together?* Many a one knows that *One* and *Two* are equal to *Three*, without having heard, or thought on that, or any other Axiom, by which it might be prov'd; and knows it as certainly, as any other Man knows, that the *Whole is equal to all its Parts*, or any other Maxim, and all from the same Reason of Self-evidence; the Equality of those *Ideas* being as visible and certain to him without that, or any other Axiom, as with it, it needing no Proof to make it perceiv'd. Nor after the Knowledg, *That the Whole is equal to all its Parts*, does he know that *One and Two are equal to Three*, better or more certainly than he did before. For if there be any odds in those *Ideas*, the *Whole* and *Parts* are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be settled in the Mind, than those of *One*, *Two* and *Three*. And indeed, I think, I may ask these Men, who will needs have all Knowledg besides those general Principles themselves, to *depend* on general, innate and self-evident Principles, what Principle is requisite to prove, that *One* and *One* are *Two*, that *Two* and *Two* are *Four*, that *Three* times *Two* are *Six?* Which being known without any proof, do evince, that either all Knowledg does not *depend* on certain *Præcognita* or general Maxims, call'd Principles, or else that these are Principles; and if these are to be counted Principles, a great part of Numeration will be so. To which if we add all the self-evident Propositions, which may be made about all our distinct *Ideas*, Principles will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which Men arrive to the Knowledg of, at different Ages; and a great many of these innate Principles, they never come to know all their Lives. But whether they come in view of the Mind, earlier or later, this is true of them, that they are all known by their native Evidence, are wholly independent, receive no Light, nor are capable of any Proof one from another; much less the more particular, from the more general; or the more simple, from the more compounded: the more simple, and less abstract, being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended. But which-ever be the clearest *Idea*, the Evidence and *Certainty* of all such Propositions is in this, That a Man sees the same *Idea* to be the same *Idea*, and infallibly perceives two different *Ideas* to be different *Ideas*. For when a Man has in his Understanding the *Ideas* of *One* and of *Two*, the *Idea* of *Yellow*, and the *Idea* of *Blue*, he cannot but certainly know, that the *Idea* of One is the *Idea* of One, and not the *Idea* of Two; and that the *Idea* of Yellow is the *Idea* of Yellow, and not the *Idea* of Blue. For a Man cannot confound the *Idea* of his Mind, which he has distinct: That would be to have them confus'd and distinct at the same time, which is a Contradiction: And to have none distinct, is to have no use of our Faculties, to have no Knowledg at all. And therefore what *Idea* soever is affirm'd of it self, or whatsoever two entire distinct *Ideas* are deny'd one of another, the Mind cannot but assent to such a Proposition as infallibly true, as soon as it understands the Terms without Hesitation or need of Proof, or regarding those made in more general Terms, and call'd Maxims.

Because on them the other Parts of our Knowledg do not depend.

§. 11. What shall we then say? Are these *general Maxims* of no use? By no means; tho' perhaps their Use is not that, which it is commonly taken to be. But since doubting in the least of what hath been by some Men ascrib'd to these *Maxims* may be apt to be cry'd out against, as overturning the Foundations of all

What Use these general Maxims have.

all the Sciences; it may be worth while to consider them, with respect to other parts of our Knowledg, and examine more particularly to what Purposes they serve, and to what not.

1. It is evident from what has been already said, that they are of no use to prove or confirm less general self-evident Propositions.

2. 'Tis as plain that they are not, nor have been the Foundations whereon any Science hath been built. There is, I know, a great deal of Talk, propagated from Scholastick Men, of Sciences and the *Maxims* on which they are built: But it has been my ill luck never to meet with any such Sciences; much less any one built upon these two *Maxims*, *What is, is*; and *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.* And I would be glad to be shewn where any such Science, erected upon these, or any other general *Axioms*, is to be found: and should be oblig'd to any one who would lay before me the Frame and System of any Science so built on these or any such like *Maxims*, that could not be shewn to stand as firm without any consideration of them. I ask, Whether these general *Maxims* have not the same use in the Study of Divinity, and in Theological Questions, that they have in the other Sciences? They serve here too to silence Wranglers, and put an end to Dispute. But I think that no body will therefore say, that the *Christian* Religion is built on these *Maxims*, or that the Knowledg we have of it is deriv'd from these *Principles*. 'Tis from Revelation we have receiv'd it, and without Revelation these *Maxims* had never been able to help us to it. When we find out an *Idea*, by whose Intervention we discover the Connection of two others, this is a Revelation from God to us, by the Voice of Reason. For we then come to know a Truth that we did not know before. When God declares any Truth to us, this is a Revelation to us by the Voice of his Spirit, and we are advanc'd in our Knowledg. But in neither of these do we receive our Light or Knowledg from *Maxims*. But in the one, the things themselves afford it, and we see the Truth in them by perceiving their Agreement or Disagreement. In the other, God himself affords it immediately to us, and we see the Truth of what he says in his unerring Veracity.

3. They are not of use to help Men forwards in the Advancement of Sciences, or new Discoveries of yet unknown Truths. Mr. *Newton*, in his never enough to be admir'd Book, has demonstrated several Propositions, which are so many new Truths, before unknown to the World, and are farther Advances in Mathematical Knowledg: But for the Discovery of these, it was not the general *Maxims*, *What is, is*; or, *The Whole is bigger than a Part*, or the like, that help'd him. These were not the Clues that led him into the Discovery of the Truth and Certainty of those Propositions. Nor was it by them that he got the Knowledg of those Demonstrations; but by finding out intermediate *Ideas*, that shew'd the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas*, as express'd in the Propositions he demonstrated. This is the great Exercise and Improvement of human Understanding in the enlarging of Knowledg, and advancing the Sciences; wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the Contemplation of these, or the like magnify'd *Maxims*. Would those who have this traditional Admiration of these Propositions, that they think no step can be made in Knowledg without the support of an *Axiom*, no Stone laid in the building of the Sciences without a general *Maxim*, but distinguish between the Method of acquiring Knowledg, and of communicating; between the Method of raising any Science, and that of teaching it to others as far as it is advanc'd; they would see that those general *Maxims* were not the Foundations on which the first Discoverers rais'd their admirable Structures, nor the Keys that unlock'd and open'd those Secrets of Knowledg. Tho' afterwards, when Schools were erected, and Sciences had their Professors to teach what others had found out, they often made use of *Maxims*, *i. e.* laid down certain Propositions which were self-evident, or to be receiv'd for true; which being settled in the Minds of their Scholars, as unquestionable Verities, they on occasion made use of, to convince them of Truths in particular Instances that were not so familiar to their Minds, as those general *Axioms* which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully settled in their Minds. Tho' these particular Instances, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the Understanding

ing than the general *Maxims* brought to confirm them: And it was in thoſe particular Inſtances that the firſt Diſcoverer found the Truth, without the help of the general *Maxims*: And ſo may any one elſe do, who with Attention conſiders them.

To come therefore to the Uſe that is made of *Maxims*.

1. They are of uſe, as has been obſerv'd, in the ordinary Methods of teaching Sciences as far as they are advanc'd; but of little or none in advancing them farther.

2. They are of uſe in Diſputes, for the ſilencing of obſtinate Wranglers, and bringing thoſe Conteſts to ſome Concluſion. Whether a need of them to that end came not in, in the manner following, I crave leave to enquire. The Schools having made Diſputation the Touchſtone of Mens Abilities, and the *Criterion* of Knowledg, adjudg'd Victory to him that kept the Field: and he that had the laſt Word, was concluded to have the better of the Argument, if not of the Cauſe. But becauſe by this means there was like to be no Deciſion between skilful Combatants, whilſt one never fail'd of a *medius terminus* to prove any Propoſition; and the other could as conſtantly, without, or with a Diſtinction, deny the *Major* or *Minor*; to prevent, as much as could be, the running out of Diſputes into an endleſs Train of Syllogiſms, certain general Propoſitions, moſt of them indeed ſelf-evident, were introduc'd into the Schools; which being ſuch as all Men allow'd and agreed in, were look'd on as general Meaſures of Truth, and ſerv'd inſtead of Principles (where the Diſputants had not laid down any other between them) beyond which there was no going, and which muſt not be receded from by either ſide. And thus theſe *Maxims* getting the Name of *Principles*, beyond which Men in Diſpute could not retreat, were by miſtake taken to be the Originals and Sources, from whence all Knowledg began, and the Foundations whereon the Sciences were built. Becauſe, when in their Diſputes they came to any of theſe, they ſtop'd there, and went no farther, the Matter was determin'd. But how much this is a Miſtake, hath been already ſhewn.

This Method of the Schools, which have been thought the Fountains of Knowledg, introduc'd, as I ſuppoſe, the like uſe of theſe Maxims, into a great part of Converſation out of the Schools, to ſtop the Mouth of Cavillers, whom any one is excus'd from arguing any longer with, when they deny theſe general ſelf-evident Principles receiv'd by all reaſonable Men, who have once thought of them: But yet their uſe herein is but to put an end to Wrangling. They in truth, when urg'd in ſuch caſes, teach nothing: That is already done by the intermediate *Ideas* made uſe of in the Debate, whoſe Connection may be ſeen without the help of thoſe Maxims, and ſo the Truth known before the Maxim is produc'd, and the Argument brought to a firſt Principle. Men would give off a wrong Argument before it came to that, if in their Diſputes they propos'd to themſelves the finding and embracing of Truth, and not a Conteſt for Victory. And thus Maxims have their uſe to put a ſtop to their Perverſeneſs, whoſe Ingenuity ſhould have yielded ſooner. But the Method of the Schools having allow'd and encourag'd Men to oppoſe and reſiſt evident Truth till they are baffled, *i. e.* till they are reduc'd to contradict themſelves or ſome eſtabliſh'd Principle; 'tis no wonder that they ſhould not in civil Converſation be aſham'd of that, which in the Schools is counted a Vertue and a Glory; obſtinately to maintain that ſide of the Queſtion they have choſen, whether true or falſe, to the laſt Extremity; even after Conviction. A ſtrange way to attain Truth and Knowledg: And that which I think the rational part of Mankind, not corrupted by Education, could ſcarce believe ſhould ever be admitted amongſt the Lovers of Truth, and Students of Religion or Nature; or introduc'd into the Seminaries of thoſe who are to propagate the Truths of Religion or Philoſophy amongſt the Ignorant and Unconvinc'd. How much ſuch a way of Learning is likely to turn young Mens Minds from the ſincere Search and Love of Truth; nay, and to make them doubt whether there is any ſuch thing, or at leaſt worth the adhering to, I ſhall not now enquire. This I think, that bating thoſe Places, which brought the *Peripatetick* Philoſophy into their Schools, where it continu'd many Ages, without teaching the World any thing but the Art of Wrangling; theſe Maxims were no where thought the

Foundations on which the Sciences were built, nor the great Helps to the Advancement of Knowledg.

What uſe theſe general Maxims have.

As to theſe *General Maxims* therefore, they are, as I have ſaid, of great *Uſe* in Diſputes, *to ſtop the Mouths of Wranglers*; but not of much *Uſe* to the Diſcovery of unknown Truths, or to help the Mind forwards in its Search after Knowledg. For who ever began to build his Knowledg on this general Propoſition, *What is, is*; or, *It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be*: and from either of theſe, as from a Principle of Science, deduc'd a *Syſtem* of uſeful Knowledg? Wrong Opinions often involving Contradictions, one of theſe Maxims, as a Touch ſtone, may *ſerve* well to ſhew whither they lead. But yet, however fit to lay open the Abſurdity or Miſtake of a Man's Reaſoning or Opinion, they are of very little *Uſe* for enlightning the Underſtanding: And it will not be found, that the Mind receives much help from them in its Progreſs in Knowledg; which would be neither leſs, nor leſs certain, were theſe two *General Propoſitions* never thought on. 'Tis true, as I have ſaid, they ſometimes *ſerve* in Argumentation to ſtop a Wrangler's Mouth, by ſhewing the Abſurdity of what he ſaith, and by expoſing him to the Shame of contradicting what all the World knows, and he himſelf cannot but own to be true. But it is one thing to ſhew a Man he is in an Error; and another to put him in poſſeſſion of Truth: and I would fain know what Truths theſe two Propoſitions are able to teach, and by their Influence make us know, which we did not know before, or could not know without them. Let us reaſon from them as well as we can, they are only about identical Predications, and influence, if any at all, none but ſuch. Each particular Propoſition concerning Identity or Diverſity, is as clearly and certainly known in it ſelf, if attended to, as either of theſe general ones: only theſe general ones, as ſerving in all caſes, are therefore more inculcated and inſiſted on. As to other leſs general Maxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal Propoſitions, and teach us nothing but the reſpect and import of Names one to another. *The whole is equal to all its Parts*; What real Truth, I beſeech you, does it teach? What more is contain'd in that Maxim than what the Signification of the word *Totum*, or the *Whole*, does of it ſelf import? And he that knows that the word *Whole* ſtands for what is made up of all its Parts, knows very little leſs, than that the *Whole* is equal to all its *Parts*. And upon the ſame ground, I think that this Propoſition, *A Hill is higher than a Valley*, and ſeveral the like, may alſo paſs for Maxims. But yet Maſters of *Mathematicks*, when they would, as Teachers of what they know, initiate others in that Science, do not without reaſon place this, and ſome other ſuch Maxims, at the entrance of their *Syſtems*; that their Scholars, having in the Beginning perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with theſe Propoſitions made in ſuch general Terms, may be us'd to make ſuch Reflections, and have theſe more general Propoſitions, as form'd Rules and Sayings, ready to apply to all particular Caſes. Not that if they be equally weigh'd, they are more clear and evident than the particular Inſtances they are brought to confirm; but that being more familiar to the Mind, the very naming them is enough to ſatisfy the Underſtanding. But this, I ſay, is more from our Cuſtom of uſing them, and the Eſtabliſhment they have got in our Minds by our often thinking of them, than from the different Evidence of the things. But before Cuſtom has ſettled Methods of Thinking and Reaſoning in our Minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwiſe; and that the Child, when a part of his Apple is taken away, knows it better in that particular Inſtance, than by this general Propoſition, *The Whole is equal to all its Parts*; and that if one of theſe have need to be confirm'd to him by the other, the General has more need to be let into his Mind by the Particular, than the Particular by the General. For in Particulars our Knowledg begins, and ſo ſpreads it ſelf by degrees to Generals. Tho' afterwards the Mind takes the quite contrary Courſe, and having drawn his Knowledg into as general Propoſitions as it can, makes thoſe familiar to its Thoughts, and accuſtoms it ſelf to have recourſe to them, as to the Standards of Truth and Falſhood. By which familiar *Uſe of them*, as Rules to meaſure the Truth of other Propoſitions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particular Propoſitions have their Truth and Evidence from their Conformity to theſe more general ones, which in Diſcourſe and Argumentation,

Argumentation, are ſo frequently urg'd, and conſtantly admitted. And this I think to be the reaſon why amongſt ſo many ſelf-evident Propoſitions, the moſt general only have had the Title of Maxims.

Maxims, if care be not taken in the Uſe of Words, may prove Contradictions.

§. 12. One thing farther, I think, it may not be amiſs to obſerve concerning theſe general Maxims, That they are ſo far from improving or eſtabliſhing our Minds in true Knowledg, that if our Notions be wrong, looſe or unſteddy, and we reſign up our Thoughts to the Sound of Words, rather than fix them on ſettled determin'd *Ideas* of things: I ſay, theſe *general Maxims* will *ſerve* to confirm us in Miſtakes; and in ſuch a way of uſe of Words, which is moſt common, will *ſerve* to prove Contradictions: *v. g.* He that, with *Des Cartes*, ſhall frame in his Mind an *Idea* of what he calls *Body*, to be nothing but Extenſion, may eaſily demonſtrate, that there is no *Vacuum*, i. e. no Space void of Body, by this *Maxim*, *What is, is.* For the *Idea* to which he annexes the name *Body*, being bare Extenſion, his Knowledg, that Space cannot be without Body, is certain. For he knows his own *Idea* of Extenſion clearly and diſtinctly, and knows that it is *what it is*, and not another *Idea*, tho' it be call'd by theſe three names, *Extenſion*, *Body*, *Space*. Which three Words, ſtanding for one and the ſame *Idea*, may no doubt, with the ſame Evidence and Certainty, be affirm'd one of another, as each of it ſelf: And it is as certain, that whilſt I uſe them all to ſtand for one and the ſame *Idea*, this Predication is as true and identical in its Signification, *That Space is Body*, as this Predication is true and identical, *That Body is Body*, both in Signification and Sound.

Inſtance in Vacuum.

§. 13. But if another ſhall come, and make to himſelf another *Idea*, different from *Des Cartes's*, of the thing, which yet, with *Des Cartes*, he calls by the ſame name *Body*; and make his *Idea*, which he expreſſes by the word *Body* to be of a thing that hath both *Extenſion* and *Solidity* together; he will as eaſily demonſtrate, that there may be a *Vacuum*, or Space without a Body, as *Des Cartes* demonſtrated the contrary. Becauſe the *Idea*, to which he gives the name *Space*, being barely the ſimple one of *Extenſion*; and the *Idea*, to which he gives the name *Body*, being the complex *Idea* of *Extenſion* and *Reſiſtibility*, or *Solidity*, together in the ſame Subject, theſe two *Ideas* are not exactly one and the ſame, but in the Underſtanding as diſtinct as the *Ideas* of One and Two, White and Black, or as of *Corporeity* and *Humanity*, if I may uſe thoſe barbarous Terms: And therefore the Predication of them in our Minds, or in Words ſtanding for them, is not identical, but the Negation of them one of another; *viz.* this Propoſition, Extenſion or *Space is not Body*, is as true and evidently certain, as this Maxim, *It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*, can make any Propoſition.

They prove not the Exiſtence of things without us.

§. 14. But yet tho' both theſe Propoſitions (as you ſee) may be equally demonſtrated, *viz.* That there may be a *Vacuum*, and that there cannot be a *Vacuum*, by theſe two certain Principles, (*viz.*) *What is, is*; and *The ſame thing can not be, and be*: yet neither of theſe Principles will ſerve to prove to us, that any, or what Bodies do exiſt: For that we are left to our Senſes, to diſcover to us as far as they can. Thoſe Univerſal and Self-evident Principles, being only our conſtant, clear, and diſtinct Knowledg of our own *Ideas*, more general or comprehenſive, can aſſure us of nothing that paſſes without the Mind, their Certainty is founded only upon the Knowledg we have of each *Idea* by it ſelf, and of its Diſtinction from others; about which we cannot be miſtaken whilſt they are in our Minds, tho' we may, and often are miſtaken, when we retain the Names without the *Ideas*; or uſe them confuſedly ſometimes for one, and ſometimes for another *Idea*. In which caſes the Force of theſe *Axioms*, reaching only to the Sound, and not the Signification of the Words, *ſerves* only to lead us into Confuſion, Miſtake, and Error. 'Tis to ſhew Men, that theſe Maxims, however cry'd up for the great Guards of Truth, will not ſecure them from Error in a careleſs looſe uſe of their Words, that I have made this Remark. In all that is here ſuggeſted concerning their little uſe for the Improvement of Knowledg, or dangerous uſe in undetermin'd *Ideas*, I have been far enough from ſaying or intending they ſhould be *laid aſide*, as ſome have been too forward to charge me. I affirm them to be Truths, ſelf-evident Truths; and ſo cannot be *laid aſide*. As far as their Influence will reach, 'tis in vain to endeavour, nor would I attempt to abridg it. But yet without any

injury to Truth or Knowledg, I may have reaſon to think their uſe is not anſwerable to the great ſtreſs which ſeems to be laid on them; and I may warn Men not to make an ill uſe of them, for the confirming themſelves in Errors.

Their Application dangerous about complex Ideas.

§. 15. But let them be of what uſe they will in verbal Propoſitions, they cannot diſcover or prove to us the leaſt Knowledg of the Nature of Subſtances, as they are found and exiſt without us, any farther than grounded on Experience. And tho' the Conſequence of theſe two Propoſitions, call'd Principles, be very clear, and their *Uſe* not dangerous or hurtful, in the Probation of ſuch things, wherein there is no need at all of them for Proof, but ſuch as are clear by themſelves without them, *viz.* where our *Ideas* are determin'd, and known by the Names that ſtand for them: yet when theſe Principles, *viz. What is, is*; and, *It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*; are made uſe of in the Probation of Propoſitions, wherein are Words ſtanding for complex *Ideas*, v. g. *Man*, *Horſe*, *Gold*, *Vertue*; there they are of infinite danger, and moſt commonly make Men receive and retain Falſhood for manifeſt Truth, and Uncertainty for Demonſtration: upon which follows Error, Obſtinacy, and all the Miſchiefs that can happen, for wrong Reaſoning. The reaſon whereof is not, that theſe Principles are leſs true, or of leſs force in proving Propoſitions made of Terms ſtanding for complex *Ideas*, than where the Propoſitions are about ſimple *Ideas*: But becauſe Men miſtake generally, thinking that where the ſame Terms are preſerv'd, the Propoſitions are about the ſame things, tho' the *Ideas* they ſtand for are in truth different; therefore theſe Maxims are made uſe of to ſupport thoſe, which in Sound and Appearance are contradictory Propoſitions; as is clear in the Demonſtrations above-mention'd about a *Vacuum*. So that whilſt Men take Words for Things, as uſually they do, theſe Maxims may and do commonly ſerve to prove contradictory Propoſitions: as ſhall yet be farther made manifeſt.

Inſtance in Man.

§. 16. For inſtance; Let *Man* be that concerning which you would by theſe firſt Principles demonſtrate any thing, and we ſhall ſee, that ſo far as Demonſtration is by theſe Principles, it is only verbal, and gives us no certain univerſal true Propoſition, or Knowledg of any Being exiſting without us. Firſt, a Child having fram'd the *Idea* of a *Man*, it is probable that his *Idea* is juſt like that Picture, which the Painter makes of the viſible Appearances join'd together; and ſuch a Complication of *Ideas* together in his Underſtanding, makes up the ſingle complex *Idea* which he calls *Man*, whereof White or Fleſh-colour in *England* being one, the Child can demonſtrate to you that *a Negro is not a Man*, becauſe White Colour was one of the conſtant ſimple *Ideas* of the complex *Idea* he calls *Man*: And therefore he can demonſtrate by the Principle, *It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*, that a *Negro is not a Man*; the Foundation of his Certainty being not that univerſal Propoſition, which perhaps he never heard nor thought of, but the clear diſtinct Perception he hath of his own ſimple *Ideas* of Black and White, which he cannot be perſuaded to take, nor can ever miſtake one for another, whether he knows that Maxim or no: And to this Child, or any one who hath ſuch an *Idea*, which he calls *Man*, can you never demonſtrate that a *Man* hath a Soul, becauſe his *Idea* of Man includes no ſuch Notion or *Idea* in it. And therefore to him, the Principle of *What is, is*, proves not this matter; but it depends upon Collection and Obſervation, by which he is to make his complex *Idea* call'd *Man*.

§. 17. *Secondly*, Another that hath gone farther in framing and collecting the *Idea* he calls *Man*, and to the outward Shape adds *Laughter* and *Rational Diſcourſe*, may demonſtrate that Infants and Changelings are no Men, by this Maxim, *It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*: And I have diſcours'd with very rational Men, who have actually deny'd that they are *Men*.

§. 18. *Thirdly*, Perhaps another makes up the complex *Idea* which he calls *Man*, only out of the *Ideas* of Body in general, and the Powers of Language and Reaſon, and leaves out the Shape wholly: This Man is able to demonſtrate, that a Man may have no Hands, but be *Quadrupes*, neither of thoſe being included in his *Idea* of *Man*; and in whatever Body or Shape he found *Speech* and *Reaſon* join'd; that was a *Man*: becauſe having a clear Knowledg of ſuch a complex *Idea*, it is certain that *What is, is*.

§. 19.

§. 19. So that, if rightly conſider'd, I think we may ſay, That where our *Ideas* are determin'd in our Minds, and have annex'd to them by us known and ſteddy Names under thoſe ſettled Determinations, there is *little need* or *no uſe* at all of theſe *Maxims*, to prove the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of them. He that cannot diſcern the Truth or Falſhood of ſuch Propoſitions, without the help of theſe and the like Maxims, will not be *help'd* by theſe Maxims to do it: ſince he cannot be ſuppos'd to know the Truth of theſe Maxims themſelves without proof, if he cannot know the Truth of others without proof, which are as ſelf-evident as theſe. Upon this Ground it is, that intuitive Knowledg neither requires nor admits any proof, one part of it more than another. He that will ſuppoſe it does, takes away the Foundation of all Knowledg and Certainty: And he that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his Aſſent to this Propoſition, That *Two are equal to Two*, will alſo have need of a proof to make him admit, that *What is, is.* He that needs a Probation to convince him, That *Two are not Three*, That *White is not Black*, That *a Triangle is not a Circle*, &c. or any other two determin'd diſtinct *Ideas* are not one and the ſame, will need alſo a Demonſtration to convince him, That it is impoſſible *for the ſame thing to be and not to be.* *Little uſe of theſe Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and diſtinct Ideas.*

§. 20. And as theſe Maxims are of *little uſe*, where we have determin'd *Ideas*, ſo they are, as I have ſhew'd, of *dangerous uſe*, where our *Ideas* are not determin'd; and where we uſe Words that are not annex'd to determin'd *Ideas*, but ſuch as are of a looſe and wandring Signification, ſometimes ſtanding for one, and ſometimes for another *Idea*: from which follows Miſtake and Error, which theſe Maxims (brought as Proofs to eſtabliſh Propoſitions, wherein the Terms ſtand for undetermin'd *Ideas*) do by their Authority confirm and rivet. *Their Uſe dangerous where our Ideas are confus'd.*

CHAP. VIII.

Of Trifling Propoſitions.

§. 1. WHETHER the Maxims treated of in the foregoing Chapter, be of that uſe to real Knowledg, as is generally ſuppos'd, I leave to be conſider'd. This, I think, may confidently be affirm'd, That there are univerſal Propoſitions; which tho' they be certainly true, yet they add no Light to our Underſtandings, bring no increaſe to our Knowledg. Such are, *Some Propoſitions bring no Increaſe to our Knowledg.*

§. 2. *Firſt, All purely indentical Propoſitions.* Theſe obviouſly, and at firſt bluſh, appear to contain no Inſtructions in them. For when we affirm the ſaid Term of it ſelf, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real *Idea*, it ſhews us nothing but what we muſt certainly know before, whether ſuch a Propoſition be either made by or propos'd to us. Indeed that moſt general one, *What is, is*, may ſerve ſometimes to ſhew a Man the Abſurdity he is guilty of, when by Circumlocution, or equivocal Terms, he would, in particular Inſtances, deny the ſame thing of it ſelf; becauſe no Body will ſo openly bid defiance to common Senſe, as to affirm viſible and direct Contradictions in plain words; or if he does, a Man is excus'd if he breaks off any farther Diſcourſe with him. But yet, I think I may ſay, that neither that receiv'd Maxim, nor any other identical Propoſition teaches us any thing: And tho' in ſuch kind of Propoſitions, this great and magnify'd Maxim, boaſted to be the Foundation of Demonſtration, may be and often is made uſe of to confirm them; yet all it proves, amounts to no more than this, That the ſame Word may with great certainty be affirm'd of it ſelf, without any doubt of the Truth of any ſuch Propoſition, and let me add alſo, without any real Knowledg. *At Firſt, Identical Propoſitions.*

§. 3. For at this rate, any very ignorant Perſon, who can but make a Propoſition, and knows what he means when he ſays, *Ay* or *No*, may make a million of Propoſitions, of whoſe Truths he may be infallibly certain, and yet not know one thing in the World thereby; *v. g.* what is a Soul, is a Soul; or *a Soul is a Soul*; *a Spirit is a Spirit*; *a Fetiche is a Fetiche*, &c. Theſe all being equivalent to this Propoſition, *viz. What is, is*, i. e. *what hath Exiſtence, hath Exiſtence*; or, *who hath a Soul, hath a Soul.* What is this more than trifling with Words?

Words? It is but like a Monkey ſhifting his Oyſter from one hand to the other; and had he had but Words, might, no doubt, have ſaid, Oyſter in right hand is *Subject*, and Oyſter in left hand is *Predicate*: and ſo might have made a ſelf-evident Propoſition of Oyſter, *i. e. Oyſter is Oyſter*; and yet, with all this, not have been one whit the wiſer or more knowing: and that way of handling the Matter, would much at one have ſatisfy'd the Monkey's Hunger, or a Man's Underſtanding; and they would have improv'd in Knowledg and Bulk together.

I know there are ſome, who becauſe *Identical Propoſitions* are ſelf-evident, ſhew a great concern for them, and think they do great ſervice to Philoſophy by crying them up, as if in them was contain'd all Knowledg, and the Underſtanding were led into all Truth by them only. I grant as forwardly as any one, that they are all true and ſelf-evident. I grant farther, that the Foundation of all our Knowledg lies in the Faculty we have of perceiving the ſame *Idea* to be the ſame, and of diſcerning it from thoſe that are different, as I have ſhewn in the foregoing Chapter. But how that vindicates the making uſe of *Identical Propoſitions*, for the Improvement of Knowledg, from the Imputation of Trifling, I do not ſee. Let any one repeat, as often as he pleaſes, that *the Will is the Will*, or lay what ſtreſs on it he thinks fit; of what uſe is this, and an infinite the like Propoſitions, for the enlarging our Knowledg? Let a Man abound as much as the Plenty of Words, which he has, will permit him in ſuch Propoſitions as theſe; *A Law is a Law*, and *Obligation is Obligation*; *Right is Right*, and *Wrong is Wrong*: will theſe and the like ever help him to an acquaintance with *Ethicks*? or inſtruct him or others in the Knowledg of *Morality*? Thoſe who know not, nor perhaps ever will know, what is *Right* and what is *Wrong*, nor the Meaſures of them; can with as much aſſurance make, and infallibly know the truth of theſe and all ſuch Propoſitions, as he that is beſt inſtructed in *Morality* can do. But what advance do ſuch Propoſitions give in the Knowledg of any thing neceſſary or uſeful for their Conduct?

He would be thought to do little leſs than trifle, who, for the enlightning the Underſtanding in any part of Knowledg, ſhould be buſy with *Identical Propoſitions*, and inſiſt on ſuch Maxims as theſe: *Subſtance is Subſtance*, and *Body is Body*; a *Vacuum is a Vacuum*, and *a Vortex is a Vortex*; a *Centaur is a Centaur*, and *a Chimera is a Chimera*, &c. For theſe and all ſuch are equally true, equally certain, and equally ſelf-evident. But yet they cannot but be counted trifling, when made uſe of as Principles of Inſtruction, and ſtreſs laid on them, as Helps to Knowledg: ſince they teach nothing but what every one, who is capable of Diſcourſe, knows without being told? *viz.* That the ſame Term is the ſame Term, and the ſame Idea the ſame Idea. And upon this account it was that I formerly did, and do ſtill think, the offering and inculcating ſuch Propoſitions, in order to give the Underſtanding any new Light or Inlet into the Knowledg of things, no better than trifling.

Inſtruction lies in ſomething very different; and he that would inlarge his own, or another's Mind, to Truths he does not yet know, muſt find out intermediate *Ideas*, and then lay them in ſuch order one by another, that the Underſtanding may ſee the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe in Queſtion. Propoſitions that do this, are inſtructive; but they are far from ſuch as affirm the ſame Term of it ſelf: which is no way to advance one's ſelf or others, in any ſort of Knowledg. It no more helps to that, than it would help any one in his learning to read, to have ſuch Propoſitions as theſe inculcated to him, *An* A *is an* A, and *a* B *is a* B; which a Man may know as well as any Schoolmaſter, and yet never be able to read a word as long as he lives. Nor do theſe, or any ſuch Identical Propoſitions help him one jot forward in the Skill of Reading, let him make what uſe of them he can.

If thoſe who blame my calling them *Trifling Propoſitions*, had but read, and been at the pains to underſtand what I had above writ in very plain *Engliſh*, they could not but have ſeen that by *Identical Propoſitions*, I mean only ſuch, wherein the ſame Term importing the ſame *Idea*, is affirm'd of it ſelf: which I take to be the proper Signification of *Identical Propoſitions*; and concerning all ſuch, I think I may continue ſafely to ſay, That to propoſe them as inſtructive, is no better than trifling. For no one who has the Uſe of Reaſon can miſs them,

them, where it is neceſſary they ſhould be taken notice of; nor doubt of their Truth, when he does take notice of them.

But if Men will call Propoſitions *Identical*, wherein the ſame Term is not affirm'd of it ſelf, whether they ſpeak more properly than I, others muſt judg: This is certain, all that they ſay of Propoſitions that are not *Identical* in my ſenſe, concerns not me, nor what I have ſaid; all that I have ſaid relating to thoſe Propoſitions wherein the ſame Term is affirm'd of it ſelf. And I would fain ſee an Inſtance, wherein any ſuch can be made uſe of, to the Advantage and Improvement of any one's Knowledg. Inſtances of other kinds, whatever, uſe may be made of them, concern not me, as not being ſuch as I call *Identical*.

Secondly, When a part of any complex Idea is predicated of the whole.

§. 4. *Secondly*, Another ſort of trifling Propoſitions is, *when a Part of the complex* Idea *is predicated of the Name of the Whole*; a part of the Definition of the Word defin'd. Such are all Propoſitions wherein the *Genus* is predicated of the *Species*, or more comprehenſive of leſs comprehenſive Terms: For what Information, what Knowledg carries this Propoſition in it, *viz. Lead is a Metal*, to a Man who knows the complex *Idea* the name *Lead* ſtands for? all the ſimple *Ideas* that go to the complex one ſignify'd by the Term *Metal*, being nothing but what he before comprehended, and ſignify'd by the Name *Lead*. Indeed, to a Man that knows the Signification of the word *Metal*, and not of the word *Lead*, it is a ſhorter way to explain the Signification of the word *Lead*, by ſaying it is a *Metal*, which at once expreſſes ſeveral of its ſimple *Ideas*, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a Body very *heavy, fuſible, and malleable*.

As part of the Definition of the Term defin'd.

§. 5. A like trifling it is, *to predicate any other part of the Definition of the Term defin'd*, or to affirm any one of the ſimple *Ideas* of a complex one, of the Name of the whole complex *Idea*; as *All Gold is fuſible*. For *Fuſibility* being one of the ſimple *Ideas* that goes to the making up the complex one the Sound *Gold* ſtands for, what can it be but playing with Sounds, to affirm that of the Name *Gold*, which is comprehended in its receiv'd Signification? 'Twould be thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely as a Truth of moment, That *Gold is yellow*; and I ſee not how it is any jot more material to ſay, *It is fuſible*, unleſs that Quality be left out of the complex *Idea*, of which the Sound *Gold* is the Mark in ordinary Speech. What Inſtruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is ſuppos'd to know before? For I am ſuppos'd to know the Signification of the Word another uſes to me, or elſe he is to tell me. And if I know that the Name of *Gold* ſtands for this complex *Idea* of *Body, Yellow, Heavy, Fuſible, Malleable*, 'twill not much inſtruct me to put it ſolemnly afterwards in a Propoſition, and gravely ſay, *All Gold is fuſible*. Such Propoſitions can only ſerve to ſhew the Diſingenuity of one, who will go from the Definition of his own Terms, by reminding him ſometimes of it; but carry no Knowledg with them, but of the Signification of Words, however certain they be.

Inſtance, Man and Palfry.

§. 6. *Every* Man *is an Animal*, or living Body, is as certain a Propoſition as can be; but no more conducing to the Knowledg of things, than to ſay, *A Palfry is an Ambling Horſe*, or a neighing ambling *Animal*, both being only about the Signification of Words, and make me know but this; That *Body, Senſe*, and *Motion*, or Power of Senſation and Moving, are three of thoſe *Ideas* that I always comprehend and ſignify by the word *Man*; and where they are not to be found together, the Name *Man* belongs not to that thing: And ſo of the other, that *Body, Senſe*, and *a certain way of going*, with *a certain kind of Voice*, are ſome of thoſe *Ideas* which I always comprehend, and ſignify by the word *Palfry*; and when they are not to be found together, the Name *Palfry* belongs not to that thing. 'Tis juſt the ſame, and to the ſame purpoſe, when any Term ſtanding for any one or more of the ſimple *Ideas*, that altogether make up that complex *Idea* which is call'd a *Man*, is affirm'd of the Term *Man*: *v. g.* ſuppoſe a *Roman* ſignified by the Word *Homo*, all theſe diſtinct *Ideas* united in one Subject, *Corporeitas, Senſibilitas, Potentia ſe movendi, Rationalitas, Riſibilitas*; he might, no doubt, with great certainty, univerſally affirm one, more, or all of theſe together of the word *Homo*, but did no more than ſay that the word *Homo*, in his Country, comprehended in its Signification all theſe *Ideas*. Much like a Romance Knight, who by the word *Palfry* ſignify'd theſe *Ideas*; *Body of a certain*

tain Figure, four-legg'd, with Senſe, Motion, Ambling, Neighing, White, uſed to have a Woman on his Back; might with the ſame Certainty univerſally affirm alſo any or all of theſe of the word *Palfry*: but did thereby teach no more, but that the word *Palfry*, in his or Romance Language, ſtood for all theſe, and was not to be apply'd to any thing, where any of theſe was wanting. But he that ſhall tell me, that in whatever thing *Senſe*, *Motion*, *Reaſon*, and *Laughter*, were united, that thing had actually a Notion of GOD, or would be caſt into a Sleep by *Opium*, made indeed an inſtructive Propoſition: becauſe neither *having the Notion of GOD*, nor *being caſt into Sleep by Opium*, being contain'd in the *Idea* ſignify'd by the word *Man*, we are by ſuch Propoſitions taught ſomething more than barely what the word *Man* ſtands for; and therefore the Knowledg contain'd in it, is more than *Verbal*.

For this teaches but the Signification of Words.

§. 7. Before a Man makes any Propoſition, he is ſuppos'd to underſtand the Terms he uſes in it, or elſe he talks like a Parrot, only making a noiſe by Imitation, and framing certain Sounds, which he has learnt of others; but not, as a Rational Creature, uſing them for Signs of *Ideas* which he has in his Mind. The Hearer alſo is ſuppos'd to underſtand the Terms as the Speaker uſes them, or elſe he talks jargon, and makes an unintelligible noiſe. And therefore he trifles with words, who makes ſuch a Propoſition, which when it is made, contains no more than one of the Terms does, and which a Man was ſuppos'd to know before; *v. g. A Triangle hath three Sides*, or *Saffron is yellow*. And this is no farther tollerable, than where a Man goes to explain his Terms, to one who is ſuppos'd or declares himſelf not to underſtand him: and then *it teaches only the Signification of that Word*, and the Uſe of that Sign.

But no real Knowledg.

§. 8. We can know then the Truth of two ſorts of Propoſitions with perfect *Certainty*; the one is, of thoſe trifling Propoſitions which have a Certainty in them, but 'tis only a *verbal Certainty*, but not inſtructive. And, ſecondly, we can know the Truth, and ſo may be *certain* in Propoſitions which affirm ſomething of another, which is a neceſſary Conſequence of its preciſe complex *Idea*, but not contain'd in it: As that *the external Angle of all Triangles is bigger than either of the oppoſite internal Angles*; which Relation of the outward Angle to either of the oppoſite internal Angles, making no Part of the complex *Idea* ſignify'd by the name Triangle, this is a real Truth, and conveys with it inſtructive *real Knowledg*.

General Propoſitions concerning Subſtances are often trifling.

§. 9. We have little or no Knowledg of what Combinations there be of ſimple *Ideas* exiſting together in Subſtances, but by our Senſes, we cannot make any univerſal *certain* Propoſitions concerning them, any farther than our nominal Eſſences lead us: which being to a very few and inconſiderable Truths, in reſpect of thoſe which depend on their real Conſtitutions, the general *Propoſitions* that are made *about Subſtance, if they are certain, are for the moſt part but trifling*; and if they are inſtructive, are uncertain, and ſuch as we can have no Knowledg of their real Truth, how much ſoever conſtant Obſervation and Analogy may aſſiſt our Judgments in gueſſing. Hence it comes to paſs, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent Diſcourſes, that amount yet to nothing. For 'tis plain, that Names of ſubſtantial Beings, as well as others, as far as they have relative Significations affix'd to them, may, with great truth be join'd negatively and affirmatively in Propoſitions as their relative Definitions make them fit to be ſo join'd; and Propoſitions conſiſting of ſuch Terms, may, with the ſame clearneſs, be deduc'd one from another, as thoſe that convey the moſt real Truths: and all this, without any Knowledg of the Nature or Reality of things exiſting without us. By this method one may make Demonſtrations and undoubted Propoſitions in Words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the Knowledg of the Truth of things; *v. g.* he that having learnt theſe following Words, with their ordinary mutually relative Acceptations annex'd to them; *v. g. Subſtance*, *Man*, *Animal*, *Form*, *Soul*, *Vegetative*, *Senſitive*, *Rational*, may make ſeveral undoubted Propoſitions about the Soul, without knowing at all what the Soul really is: and of this ſort, a Man may find an infinite number of Propoſitions, Reaſonings, and Concluſions, in Books of Metaphyſicks, School-Divinity, and ſome ſort of Natural Philoſophy; and after all, know as little of GOD, *Spirits*, or *Bodies*, as he did before he ſet out.

§. 10.

§. 10. He that hath liberty to define, *i. e.* determine the Signification of his Names of Subſtances (as certainly every one does in effect, who makes them ſtand for his own *Ideas*) and makes their Significations at a venture, taking them from his own or other Mens Fancies, and not from an Examination or Enquiry into the Nature of things themſelves; may, with little trouble, demonſtrate them one of another, according to thoſe ſeveral Reſpects and mutual Relations he has given them one to another; wherein, however things agree or diſagree in their own nature, he needs mind nothing but his own Notions, with the Names he hath beſtow'd upon them: but thereby no more increaſes his own Knowledg, than he does his Riches, who taking a Bag of Counters, calls one in a certain place a *Pound*, another in another place a *Shilling*, and a third in a third place a *Penny*; and ſo proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and caſt up a great Sum, according to his Counters ſo placed, and ſtanding for more or leſs as he pleaſes, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a Pound, Shilling, or Penny is, but only that one is contain'd in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve: which a Man may alſo do in the Signification of Words, by making them in reſpect of one another, more or leſs, or equally comprehenſive. *And ſly.*

§. 11. Tho' yet concerning moſt Words uſed in Diſcourſes, eſpecially argumentative and controverſial, there is this more to be complain'd of, which is the worſt ſort of *Trifling*, and which ſets us yet farther from the Certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them, *viz.* that moſt Writers are ſo far from inſtructing us in the Nature and Knowledg of things, that they *uſe their Words looſly* and uncertainly, and do not, by uſing them conſtantly and ſteddily in the ſame Significations, make plain and clear Deductions of Words one from another, and make their Diſcourſes coherent and clear (how little ſoever it were inſtructive) which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to ſhelter their Ignorance or Obſtinacy, under the Obſcurity and Perplexedneſs of their Terms: to which, perhaps, Inadvertency and ill Cuſtom do in many Men much contribute. *Thirdly, Uſing Words variouſly is trifling with them.*

§. 12. To conclude; *Barely verbal Propoſitions* may be known by theſe following *Marks:* *Marks of verbal Propoſitions:*

First, All Propoſitions, wherein two abſtract Terms are affirm'd one of another, are barely about the Signification of ſounds. For ſince no abſtract *Idea* can be the ſame with any other but it ſelf, when its abſtract Name is affirm'd of any other Term, it can ſignify no more but this, that it may or ought to be call'd by that Name, or that theſe two Names ſignify the ſame *Idea*. Thus, ſhould any one ſay, that *Parſimony is Frugality*, that *Gratitude is Juſtice*, that this or that Action is or is not *Temperance*; however ſpecious theſe and the like Propoſitions may at firſt ſight ſeem, yet when we come to preſs them, and examine nicely what they contain, we ſhall find that it all amounts to nothing but the Signification of thoſe Terms. *1. Predication in abſtract.*

§. 13. *Secondly*, All *Propoſitions wherein a part of the complex* Idea, which any Term ſtands for, *is predicated of that Term, are only* verbal; *v. g.* to ſay that *Gold is a Metal* or *heavy*. And thus all Propoſitions, wherein more comprehenſive Words, call'd *Genera*, are *affirm'd* of ſubordinate or leſs comprehenſive, call'd *Species*, or *Individuals*, are barely verbal. *2. A part of the Definition predicated of any Term.*

When by theſe two Rules we have examin'd the Propoſitions that make up the Diſcourſes we ordinarily meet with both in and out of Books, we ſhall, perhaps, find that a greater part of them, than is uſually ſuſpected, are purely about the Signification of Words, and contain nothing in them, but the Uſe and Application of theſe Signs.

This, I think, I may lay down for an infallible Rule, That wherever the diſtinct *Idea* any Word ſtands for, is not known and conſider'd, and ſomething not contain'd in the *Idea* is not affirm'd or deny'd of it; there our Thoughts ſtick wholly in Sounds, and are able to attain no real Truth or Falſhood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might ſave us a great deal of uſeleſs Amuſement and Diſpute, and very much ſhorten our trouble and wandring, in the ſearch of real and true Knowledg.

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledg of Exiſtence.

General certain Propoſitions concern not Exiſtence.

§. 1. HITHERTO we have only conſider'd the Eſſences of Things, which being only abſtract *Ideas*, and thereby remov'd in our Thoughts from particular Exiſtence (that being the proper Operation of the Mind, in Abſtraction, to conſider an *Idea* under no other Exiſtence, but what it has in the Underſtanding) gives us no Knowledg of real Exiſtence at all. Where, by the way we may take notice, that *univerſal Propoſitions*, of whoſe Truth or Falſhood we can have certain Knowledg, concern not *Exiſtence*; and farther, that all *particular Affirmations or Negations*, that would not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning *Exiſtence*; they declaring only the accidental Union or Separation of *Ideas* in Things exiſting, which, in their abſtract Natures, have no known neceſſary Union or Repugnancy.

A threefold Knowledg of Exiſtence.

§. 2. But leaving the nature of Propoſitions, and different ways of Predication to be conſider'd more at large in another place, let us proceed now to enquire concerning our Knowledg of the *Exiſtence* of Things, and how we come by it. I ſay then, that we have the Knowledg of *our own Exiſtence* by Intuition; of the *Exiſtence of* GOD by Demonſtration; and of other Things by Senſation.

Our Knowledg of our own Exiſtence is intuitive.

§. 3. As for *our own Exiſtence*, we perceive it ſo plainly, and ſo certainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any Proof. For nothing can be more evident to us, than our own Exiſtence; *I think, I reaſon, I feel Pleaſure and Pain*; Can any of theſe be more evident to me, than my own Exiſtence? If I doubt of all other things, that very Doubt makes me perceive my own *Exiſtence*, and will not ſuffer me to doubt of that. For if I know *I feel Pain*, it is evident I have as certain Perception of my own Exiſtence, as of the Exiſtence of the Pain I feel: Or if I know *I doubt*, I have as certain Perception of the Exiſtence of the thing doubting, as of that Thought which I call *Doubt*. Experience then convinces us, that *we have an intuitive Knowledg of our own Exiſtence*, and an internal infallible Perception that we are. In every Act of Senſation, Reaſoning or Thinking, we are conſcious to our ſelves of our own Being; and, in this matter, come not ſhort of the higheſt degree of *Certainty*.

CHAP. X.

Of our Knowledg of the Exiſtence of a GOD.

We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a GOD.

§. 1. THO' GOD has given us no innate *Ideas* of himſelf; tho' he has ſtampt no original Characters on our Minds, wherein we may read his Being; yet having furniſh'd us with thoſe Faculties our Minds are endow'd with, he hath not left himſelf without Witneſs: ſince we have Senſe, Perception and Reaſon, and cannot want a clear Proof of him, as long as we carry our ſelves about us. Nor can we juſtly complain of our Ignorance in this great Point, ſince he has ſo plentifully provided us with the means to diſcover, and know him, ſo far as is neceſſary to the end of our Being, and the great Concernment of our Happineſs. But tho' this be the moſt obvious Truth that Reaſon diſcovers; and tho' its Evidence be (if I miſtake not) equal to mathematical Certainty: yet it requires Thought and Attention, and the Mind muſt apply it ſelf to a regular Deduction of it from ſome part of our intuitive Knowledg, or elſe we ſhall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other Propoſitions, which are in themſelves capable of clear Demonſtration. To ſhew therefore that we are capable of *knowing*, i. e. *being certain that there is a GOD*, and how we may come by this Certainty, I think we need go no farther than our ſelves, and that undoubted Knowledg we have of our own Exiſtence.

§. 2.

§. 2. I think it is beyond queſtion, that *Man has a clear Perception of his own Being*; he knows certainly that he exiſts, and that he is ſomething. He that can doubt, whether he be any thing or no, I ſpeak not to, no more than I would argue with pure Nothing, or endeavour to convince Non-entity, that it were Something. If any one pretends to be ſo ſceptical, as to deny his own Exiſtence (for really to doubt of it is manifeſtly impoſſible) let him for me enjoy his beloved Happineſs of being Nothing, until Hunger, or ſome other Pain convince him of the contrary. This then, I think, I may take for a Truth, which everyone's certain Knowledg aſſures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, *viz.* That he is ſomething that actually exiſts. *Man knows that he himſelf is.*

§. 3. In the next place, Man knows by an intuitive Certainty, that bare *Nothing can no more produce any real Being, than it can be equal to two right Angles.* If a Man knows that Non-entity, or the Abſence of all Being cannot be equal to two right Angles, it is impoſſible he ſhould know any Demonſtration in *Euclid.* If therefore we know there is ſome real Being, and that Non-entity cannot produce any real Being, it is an evident Demonſtration, that from Eternity there has been Something; ſince what was not from Eternity, had a Beginning; and what had a beginning, muſt be produc'd by ſomething elſe. *He knows alſo that Nothing cannot produce a Being, therefore ſomething eternal.*

§. 4. Next it is evident, that what had its Being and Beginning from another, muſt alſo have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being from another too. All the Powers it has muſt be owing to, and receiv'd from the ſame Source. This eternal Source then of all Being muſt alſo be the Source and Original of all Power; and ſo *this eternal Being muſt be alſo the moſt powerful.* *That eternal Being muſt be moſt powerful.*

§. 5. Again, a Man finds in himſelf *Perception* and *Knowledg.* We have then got one ſtep farther; and we are certain now, that there is not only ſome Being, but ſome knowing intelligent Being in the World. *And moſt knowing.*

There was a time then, when there was no knowing Being, and when Knowledg began to be; or elſe, there has been alſo *a knowing Being from Eternity.* If it be ſaid, there was a time when no Being had any Knowledg, when that eternal Being was void of all Underſtanding: I reply, that then it was impoſſible there ſhould ever have been any Knowledg: It being as impoſſible that Things wholly void of Knowledg, and operating blindly, and without any Perception, ſhould produce a knowing Being, as it is impoſſible that a Triangle ſhould make it ſelf three Angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the *Idea* of ſenſleſs Matter, that it ſhould put into it ſelf Senſe, Perception and Knowledg, as it is repugnant to the *Idea* of a Triangle, that it ſhould put into it ſelf greater Angles than two right ones.

§. 6. Thus from the Conſideration of our ſelves, and what we infallibly find in our own Conſtitutions, our Reaſon leads us to the Knowledg of this certain and evident Truth, That *there is an eternal, moſt powerful, and moſt knowing Being*; which whether any one will pleaſe to call *God*, it matters not. The Thing is evident, and from this *Idea* duly conſider'd, will eaſily be deduc'd all thoſe other Attributes, which we ought to aſcribe to this eternal Being. If nevertheleſs any one ſhould be found ſo ſenſleſly arrogant, as to ſuppoſe Man alone knowing and wiſe, but yet the Product of mere Ignorance and Chance; and that all the reſt of the Univerſe acted only by that blind hap-hazard: I ſhall leave with him that very rational and emphatical Rebuke of *Tully*, *l.* 2. *de leg.* to be conſider'd at his Leiſure. "What can be more ſillily arrogant and miſ-"becoming, than for a Man to think that he has a Mind and Underſtanding in "him, but yet in all the Univerſe beſide there is no ſuch thing? Or that thoſe "things, which with the utmoſt ſtretch of his Reaſon he can ſcarce compre-"hend, ſhould be mov'd and manag'd without any Reaſon at all?" *Quid eſt enim verius, quam neminem eſſe oportere tam ſtulte arrogantem, ut in ſe mentem & rationem putet ineſſe, in cœlo mundoque; non putet? Aut ea quæ vix ſumma ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet?* *And therefore GOD.*

From what has been ſaid, it is plain to me, we have a more certain Knowledg of the Exiſtence of a GOD, than of any thing our Senſes have not immediately diſcover'd to us. Nay, I preſume I may ſay, that we more certainly know that there is a GOD, than that there is any thing elſe without us. When I ſay we *know*, I mean there is ſuch a Knowledg within our reach which we can-

not miſs, if we will but apply our Minds to that, as we do to ſeveral other Inquiries.

Our Idea *of a moſt perfect Being not the ſole Proof of a* GOD.

§. 7. *How far the* Idea *of a moſt perfect Being*, which a Man may frame in his Mind, does or does not prove the *Exiſtence of a* GOD, I will not here examine. For, in the different Make of Mens Tempers and Application of their Thoughts, ſome Arguments prevail more on one, and ſome on another, for the Confirmation of the ſame Truth. But yet, I think, this I may ſay, that it is an ill way of eſtabliſhing this Truth, and ſilencing Atheiſts, to lay the whole ſtreſs of ſo important a Point as this upon that ſole Foundation; and take ſome Mens having that *Idea* of GOD in their Minds (for 'tis evident ſome Men have none, and ſome worſe than none, and the moſt very different) for the only Proof of a Deity; and out of an Over-fondneſs of that darling Invention, caſhier, or at leaſt endeavour to invalidate all other Arguments, and forbid us to hearken to thoſe Proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own Exiſtence, and the ſenſible Parts of the Univerſe offer ſo clearly and cogently to our Thoughts, that I deem it impoſſible for a conſidering Man to withſtand them. For I judg it is as certain and clear a Truth, as can any where be deliver'd, That *the inviſible Things of* GOD *are clearly ſeen from the Creation of the World, being underſtood by the Things that are made, even his Eternal Power and Godhead.* Tho' our own Being furniſhes us, as I have ſhewn, with an evident and inconteſtable Proof of a Deity; and I believe no body can avoid the Cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it, as to any other Demonſtration of ſo many Parts: yet this being ſo fundamental a Truth, and of that Conſequence, that all Religion and genuine Morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I ſhall be forgiven by my Reader, if I go over ſome parts of this Argument again, and inlarge a little more upon them.

Something from Eternity.

§. 8. There is no Truth more evident, than that *Something* muſt be *from Eternity*. I never yet had heard of any one ſo unreaſonable, or that could ſuppoſe ſo manifeſt a Contradiction, as a Time wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all Abſurdities the greateſt, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect Negation and Abſence of all Beings, ſhould ever produce any real Exiſtence.

It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures to conclude, that ſomething has exiſted from Eternity; let us next ſee what kind of thing that muſt be.

Two ſorts of Beings, cogitative and incogitative.

§. 9. There are but two ſorts of Beings in the World, that Man knows or conceives.

Firſt, Such as are purely material, without Senſe, Perception or Thought, as the clippings of our Beards, and parings of our Nails.

Secondly, Senſible, thinking, perceiving Beings, ſuch as we find our ſelves to be, which, if you pleaſe, we will hereafter call *cogitative and incogitative* Beings; which to our preſent purpoſe, if for nothing elſe, are, perhaps, better Terms than material and immaterial.

Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative.

§. 10. If then there muſt be ſomething eternal, let us ſee what ſort of Being it muſt be. And to that, it is very obvious to Reaſon, that it muſt neceſſarily be a *cogitative* Being. For it is as impoſſible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative Matter ſhould prodnce a thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing ſhould of it ſelf produce Matter. Let us ſuppoſe any parcel of Matter eternal, great or ſmall, we ſhall find it, in it ſelf, able to produce nothing. For example; let us ſuppoſe the Matter of the next Pebble we meet with, eternal, cloſely united, and the Parts at firmly at reſt together, if there were no other Being in the World, muſt it not eternally remain ſo, a dead inactive Lump? Is it poſſible to conceive it can add Motion to it ſelf, being purely Matter, or produce any thing? Matter then, by its own Strength, cannot produce in it ſelf ſo much as Motion: the Motion it has muſt alſo be from Eternity, or elſe be produc'd, and added to Matter by ſome other Being more powerful than Matter; Matter, as is evident, having not power to produce Motion in it ſelf. But let us ſuppoſe Motion eternal too; yet Matter, *incogitative Matter* and Motion, whatever changes it might produce of Figure and Bulk, *could never produce Thought:* Knowledg will ſtill be as far beyond the Power of Motion and Matter to produce, as Matter is beyond the Power of *Nothing*, or *Non-entity* to produce. And I appeal to every one's own Thoughts, whether he cannot as eaſily conceive Matter produc'd by *nothing*, as Thought to be produc'd by pure Matter, when before there

was

was no ſuch thing as Thought, or an intelligent Being exiſting. Divide Matter into as minute Parts as you will (which we are apt to imagine a ſort of ſpiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it) vary the Figure and Motion of it as much as you pleaſe, a Globe, Cube, Cone, Priſm, Cylinder, &c. whole Diameters are but 1000000th part of a *Gry* (*a*), will operate no otherwiſe upon other Bodies of proportionable Bulk, than thoſe of an Inch or Foot Diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce Senſe, Thought and Knowledg, by putting together, in a certain Figure and Motion, groſs Particles of Matter, as by thoſe that are the very minuteſt, that do any where exiſt. They knock, impel and reſiſt one another, juſt as the greater do, and that is all they can do. So that if we will ſuppoſe nothing firſt, or eternal; *Matter* can never begin to be: If we ſuppoſe bare Matter, without Motion, eternal; *Motion* can never begin to be: If we ſuppoſe only Matter and Motion firſt, or eternal; *Thought* can never begin to be. For it is impoſſible to conceive that Matter either with or without Motion could have originally in and from it ſelf Senſe, Perception and Knowledg, as is evident from hence, that then Senſe, Perception and Knowledg muſt be a Property eternally inſeparable from Matter and every Particle of it. Not to add, that tho' our general or ſpecifick Conception of Matter makes us ſpeak of it as one thing, yet really all Matter is not one individual thing, neither is there any ſuch thing exiſting as one material Being, or one ſingle Body that we know or can conceive. And therefore if Matter were the eternal firſt cogitative Being, there would not be one eternal infinite cogitative Being, but an infinite number of eternal finite cogitative Beings, independent one of another, of limited Force and diſtinct Thoughts, which could never produce that Order, Harmony and Beauty which is to be found in Nature. Since therefore whatſoever is the firſt eternal *Being* muſt neceſſarily be cogitative; and whatſoever is firſt of all things, muſt neceſſarily contain in it, and actually have, at leaſt, all the Perfections that can ever after exiſt; nor can it ever give to another any Perfections that it hath not, either actually in it ſelf, or at leaſt in a higher degree; it neceſſarily follows, that the firſt eternal Being cannot be Matter.

(*a*) *A Gry is* $\frac{1}{10}$ *of a Line, a Line* $\frac{1}{10}$ *of an Inch, an Inch* $\frac{1}{10}$ *of a philoſophical Foot, a philoſophical Foot* $\frac{1}{3}$ *a Pendulum, whoſe Diadroms, in the Latitude of 45 Degrees, are each equal to one Second of Time, or* $\frac{1}{60}$ *of a Minute. I have affectedly made uſe of this meaſure here, and the parts of it, under a decimal Diviſion, with Names to them; becauſe, I think, it would be of general Convenience, that this ſhould be the common meaſure in the Commonwealth of Letters.*

§. 11. *If* therefore it be evident, that *Something* neceſſarily muſt *exiſt from Eternity*, 'tis alſo as evident, that *that Something muſt* neceſſarily *be a cogitative Being*: For it is as impoſſible that incogitative Matter ſhould produce a cogitative Being, as that Nothing, or the Negation of all Being, ſhould produce a poſitive Being or Matter. *Therefore there has been an eternal Wiſdom.*

§. 12. Tho' this Diſcovery of the *neceſſary Exiſtence of an eternal Mind*, does ſufficiently lead us into the Knowledg of GOD; ſince it will hence follow, that all other knowing Beings that have a Beginning muſt depend on him, and have no other ways of Knowledg, or extent of Power, than what he gives them; and therefore if he made thoſe, he made alſo the leſs-excellent Pieces of this Univerſe, all inanimate Beings, whereby his *Omniſcience*, *Power* and *Providence* will be eſtabliſh'd, and all his other Attributes neceſſarily follow: Yet to clear up this a little farther, we will ſee what Doubts can be rais'd againſt it. *Therefore there has been an eternal Wiſdom.*

§. 13. *Firſt*, Perhaps it will be ſaid, that tho' it be as clear as Demonſtration can make it, that there muſt be an eternal Being, and that Being muſt alſo be knowing; yet it does not follow, but that thinking Being may alſo be material. Let it be ſo; it equally ſtill follows, that there is a GOD. For if there be an Eternal, Omniſcient, Omnipotent Being, it is certain that there is a GOD, whether you imagine that Being to be material or no. But herein, I ſuppoſe, lies the Danger and Deceit of that Suppoſition: There being no way to avoid the Demonſtration, that there is an eternal knowing Being, Men, devoted to Matter, would willing have it granted, that this knowing Being is material; and then letting ſlide out of their Minds, or the Diſcourſe, the Demonſtration whereby an eternal knowing Being was prov'd neceſſarily to exiſt, would argue all to be Matter, and ſo deny a GOD, that is, an eternal cogitative Being: whereby they are ſo far from eſtabliſhing, that they deſtroy their own Hypotheſis. For, if there can be, in their Opinion, eternal Matter, without any *Whether material or no.*

any eternal cogitative Being, they manifeſtly ſeparate Matter and Thinking, and ſuppoſe no neceſſary Connection of the one with the other, and ſo eſtabliſh the Neceſſity of an eternal Spirit, but not of Matter; ſince it has been prov'd already, that an eternal cogitative Being is unavoidably to be granted. Now if Thinking Matter may be ſeparated, *the eternal Exiſtence of Matter will not follow from the eternal Exiſtence of a cogitative Being*, and they ſuppoſe it to no purpoſe.

Not material, 1. Becauſe every Particle of Matter is not cogitative.

§. 14. But now let us ſee how they can ſatisfy themſelves or others, that this *eternal thinking Being is material.*

Firſt, I would ask them, whether they imagine, that all Matter, *every Particle of Matter, thinks?* This, I ſuppoſe, they will ſcarce ſay; ſince then there would be as many eternal thinking Beings as there are Particles of Matter, and ſo an Infinity of Gods. And yet if they will not allow Matter as Matter, that is, every Particle of Matter to be as well cogitative as extended, they will have as hard a Task to make out to their own Reaſons, a cogitative Being out of incogitative Particles, as an extended Being out of unextended Parts, if I may ſo ſpeak.

2. One Particle alone of Matter cannot be cogitative.

§. 15. *Secondly*, If all Matter does not think, I next ask, whether it be *only one Atom that does ſo?* This has as many Abſurdities as the other; for then this Atom of Matter muſt be alone eternal or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by its powerful Thought or Will, made all the reſt of Matter. And ſo we have the Creation of Matter by a powerful Thought, which is that the Materialiſts ſtick at. For if they ſuppoſe one ſingle thinking Atom to have produc'd all the reſt of Matter, they cannot aſcribe that Pre-eminency to it upon any other account than that of its Thinking, the only ſuppos'd Difference. But allow it to be by ſome other way, which is above our Conception, it muſt be ſtill Creation, and theſe Men muſt give up their great Maxim, *Ex nihilo nil fit*. If it be ſaid, that all the reſt of Matter is equally eternal, as that thinking Atom, it will be to ſay any thing at pleaſure, tho' ever ſo abſurd: For to ſuppoſe all Matter eternal, and yet one ſmall Particle in Knowledg and Power infinitely above all the reſt, is without any the leaſt Appearance of Reaſon to frame any Hypotheſis. Every Particle of Matter, as Matter, is capable of all the ſame Figures and Motions of any other; and I challenge any one in his Thoughts, to add any thing elſe to one above another.

3. A Syſtem of incogitative Matter cannot be cogitative.

§. 16. If then neither one peculiar Atom alone can be this eternal thinking Being; nor all Matter as Matter, *i. e.* every Particle of Matter, can be it; it only remains, that it is *ſome certain Syſtem of Matter* duly put together, that is this *thinking eternal Being*. This is that, which, I imagine, is that Notion which Men are apteſt to have of GOD; who would have him a material Being, as moſt readily ſuggeſted to them, by the ordinary Conceit they have of themſelves, and other Men, which they take to be material thinking Beings. But this Imagination, however more natural, is no leſs abſurd than the other: For to ſuppoſe the eternal thinking Being to be nothing elſe but a a Compoſition of Particles of Matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to aſcribe all the Wiſdom and Knowledg of that eternal Being only to the *juxta*-poſition of Parts; than which nothing can be more abſurd. For unthinking Particles of Matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new Relation of Poſition, which 'tis impoſſible ſhould give Thought and Knowledg to them.

Whether in motion or at reſt.

§. 17. But farther, this *corporeal Syſtem* either has all its Parts at reſt, or it is a certain Motion of the Parts wherein its Thinking conſiſts. If it be perfectly at reſt, it is but one Lump, and ſo can have no Privileges above one Atom.

If it be the Motion of its Parts, on which its Thinking depends, all the Thoughts there muſt be unavoidably accidental and limited; ſince all the Particles that by Motion cauſe Thought, being each of them in it ſelf without any Thought, cannot regulate its own Motions, much leſs be regulated by the Thought of the whole; ſince that Thought is not the cauſe of Motion (for then it muſt be antecedent to it, and ſo without it) but the Conſequence of it, whereby Freedom, Power, Choice, and all rational and wiſe Thinking or Acting, will be quite taken away: So that ſuch a thinking Being will be no better

 nor

nor wiſer than pure blind Matter; ſince to reſolve all into the accidental unguided Motions of blind Matter, or into Thought depending on unguided Motions of blind Matter, is the ſame thing; not to mention the Narrowneſs of ſuch Thoughts and Knowledg that muſt depend on the motion of ſuch Parts. But there needs no Enumeration of any more Abſurdities and Impoſſibilities in this Hypotheſis (however full of them it be) than that before-mention'd; ſince let this thinking Syſtem be all, or a part of the Matter of the Univerſe, it is impoſſible that any one Particle ſhould either know its own, or the Motion of any other Particle, or the Whole know the Motion of every Particular; and ſo regulate its own Thoughts or Motions, or indeed have any Thought reſulting from ſuch Motion.

§. 18. Others would have *Matter* to be *eternal*, notwithſtanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This, tho' it take not away the Being of a GOD, yet ſince it denies one and the firſt great Piece of his Workmanſhip, the Creation, let us conſider it a little. *Matter* muſt be allow'd eternal; Why? Becauſe you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing; why do you not alſo think your ſelf eternal? You will anſwer perhaps, Becauſe about twenty or forty Years ſince you began to be. But if I ask you what that *You* is, which began then to be, you can ſcarce tell me. The Matter, whereof you are made, began not then to be; for if it did, then it is not eternal: But it began to be put together in ſuch a Faſhion and Frame as makes up your Body; but yet that Frame of Particles is not You, it makes not that thinking Thing you are; (for I have now to do with one who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking Being, but would have unthinking Matter eternal too) therefore when did that thinking Thing begin to be? If it did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking Thing from Eternity? the Abſurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one who is ſo void of Underſtanding as to own it. If therefore you can allow a thinking Thing to be made out of nothing (as all Things that are not eternal muſt be) why alſo can you not allow it poſſible, for a material Being to be made out of nothing, by an equal Power, but that you have the Experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Tho', when well conſider'd, Creation of a Spirit will be found to require no leſs Power than the Creation of Matter. Nay poſſibly, if we would emancipate our ſelves from vulgar Notions, and raiſe our Thoughts as far as they could reach, to a cloſer Contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at ſome dim and ſeeming Conception how Matter might at firſt be made, and begin to exiſt, by the Power of that eternal firſt Being: But to give Beginning and Being to a Spirit, would be found a more inconceivable Effect of Omnipotent Power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the Notions on which the Philoſophy now in the World is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate ſo far from them; or to enquire, ſo far as Grammar it ſelf would authorize, if the common ſettled Opinion oppoſes it: eſpecially in this place, where the receiv'd Doctrine ſerves well enough to our preſent purpoſe, and leaves this paſt doubt, that the Creation or Beginning of any one SUBSTANCE out of nothing, being once admitted, the Creation of all other, but the CREATOR himſelf, may, with the ſame eaſe, be ſuppos'd.

Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind.

§. 19. But you will ſay, It is not impoſſible to admit of the *making any thing out of nothing*, ſince we cannot poſſibly conceive it? I anſwer, No: 1. Becauſe it is not reaſonable to deny the Power of an infinite Being, becauſe we cannot comprehend its Operations. We do not deny other Effects upon this ground, becauſe we cannot poſſibly conceive the manner of their Production. We cannot conceive how any thing but Impulſe of Body can move Body; and yet that is not a Reaſon ſufficient to make us deny it poſſible, againſt the conſtant Experience we have of it in our ſelves, in all our voluntary Motions, which are produc'd in us only by the free Action or Thought of our own Minds; and are not, nor can be the Effects of the Impulſe or Determination of the Motion of blind Matter in or upon our Bodies; for then it could not be in our Power or Choice to alter it. For example: My right Hand writes, whilſt my left Hand is ſtill: What cauſes Reſt in one, and Motion in the other? Nothing but my Will, a Thought of my Mind; my Thought only changing, the right Hand

Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind.

Hand reſts, and the left Hand moves. This is matter of Fact, which cannot be deny'd: Explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next ſtep will be to underſtand Creation. For the giving a new Determination to the Motion of the animal Spirits (which ſome make uſe of to explain voluntary Motion) clears not the Difficulty one jot: To alter the Determination of Motion, being in this caſe no eaſier nor leſs, than to give Motion it ſelf; ſince the new Determination given to the animal Spirits, muſt be either immediately by Thought, or by ſome other Body put in their way by Thought, which was not in their way before, and ſo muſt owe its Motion to Thought; either of which leaves voluntary Motion as unintelligible as it was before. In the mean time, 'tis an overvaluing our ſelves, to reduce all to the narrow meaſure of our Capacities; and to conclude all things impoſſible to be done, whoſe manner of doing exceeds our Comprehenſion. This is to make our Comprehenſion infinite, or GOD finite, when what he can do is limited to what we can conceive of it. If you do not underſtand the Operations of your own finite Mind, that thinking Thing within you, do not deem it ſtrange, that you cannot comprehend the Operations of that eternal infinite Mind, who made and governs all things, and whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain.

CHAP. XI.

Of our Knowledg of the Exiſtence of other Things.

It is to be had only by Senſation.

§. 1. THE Knowledg of our own Being, we have by Intuition. The Exiſtence of a GOD, Reaſon clearly makes known to us, as has been ſhewn.

The *Knowledg of the Exiſtence* of any other thing, we can have only by *Senſation*: For there being no neceſſary Connection of *real Exiſtence* with any *Idea* a Man hath in his Memory, nor of any other Exiſtence but that of GOD, with the Exiſtence of any particular Man; no particular Man can know the *Exiſtence* of any other Being, but only when by actual operating upon him, it makes it ſelf perceiv'd by him. For the having the *Idea* of any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Exiſtence of that thing, then the Picture of a Man evidences his being in the World, or the Viſions of a Dream make thereby a true Hiſtory.

Inſtance, Whiteneſs of this Paper.

§. 2. 'Tis therefore the actual receiving of *Ideas* from without, that gives us notice of the *Exiſtence* of other things, and makes us know that ſomething doth exiſt at that time without us, which cauſes that *Idea* in us, tho' perhaps we neither know nor conſider how it does it: For it takes not from the Certainty of our Senſes, and the *Ideas* we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produc'd: *v. g.* whilſt I write this, I have, by the Paper affecting my Eyes, that *Idea* produc'd in my Mind, which, whatever Object cauſes, I call *White*; by which I know that that Quality or Accident (*i. e.* whoſe Appearance before my Eyes always cauſes that *Idea*) doth really exiſt, and hath a Being without me. And of this, the greateſt Aſſurance I can poſſibly have, and to which my Faculties can attain, is the Teſtimony of my Eyes, which are the proper and ſole Judges of this thing, whoſe Teſtimonies I have reaſon to rely on as ſo certain, that I can no more doubt, which I write this, that I ſee White and Black, and that ſomething really exiſts, that cauſes that Senſation in me, than that I write or move my Hand: which is a certainty as great as human Nature is capable of, concerning the Exiſtence of any thing, but a Man's ſelf alone, and of GOD.

This tho' not ſo certain as Demonſtration, yet may be call'd Knowledg, and proves the Exiſtence of things without us.

§. 3. *The notice we have by our Senſes, of the exiſting of things without us,* tho' it be not altogether ſo certain as our intuitive Knowledg, or the Deductions of our Reaſon, employ'd about the clear abſtract *Ideas* of our own Minds; yet it is an aſſurance that *deſerves the Name of Knowledg.* If we perſuade our ſelves, that our Faculties act and inform us right, concerning the Exiſtence of thoſe Objects that affect them, it cannot paſs for an ill-grounded Confidence: For I think no body can, in earneſt, be ſo ſceptical, as to be uncertain of the Exiſtence of thoſe things he ſees and feels. At leaſt, he that can doubt ſo far

far (whatever he may have with his own Thoughts) will never have any controverſy with me; ſince he can never be ſure I ſay any thing contrary to his Opinion. As to my ſelf, I think GOD has given me Aſſurance enough of the Exiſtence of things without me; ſince by their different Application I can produce in my ſelf both Pleaſure and Pain, which is one great Concernment of my preſent ſtate. This is certain, the Confidence that our Faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greateſt Aſſurance we are capable of, concerning the Exiſtence of material Beings. For we cannot act any thing, but by our Faculties; nor talk of Knowledg it ſelf, but by the help of thoſe Faculties, which are fitted to apprehend even what Knowledg is. But beſides the Aſſurance we have from our Senſes themſelves, that they do not err in the Information they give us of the Exiſtence of things without us, when they are affected by them, we are farther confirm'd in this Aſſurance by other concurrent Reaſons.

1. *Becauſe we cannot have them but by the Inlet of the Senſes.*

§. 4. *Firſt*, 'Tis plain thoſe Perceptions are produc'd in us by exterior Cauſes affecting our Senſes; becauſe *thoſe that want the Organs of any Senſe never can have the* Ideas *belonging to that Senſe* produc'd in their Minds. This is too evident to be doubted: and therefore we cannot but be aſſur'd, that they come in by the Organs of that Senſe, and no other way. The Organs themſelves, 'tis plain, do not produce them; for then the Eyes of a Man in the dark would produce Colours, and his Noſe ſmell Roſes in the Winter: but we ſee no body gets the Reliſh of a Pine-Apple, till he goes to the *Indies*, where it is, and taſtes it.

2. *Becauſe an Idea from actual Senſation, and another from Memory, are very diſtinct Perceptions.*

§. 5. *Secondly*, Becauſe *ſometimes I find, that I cannot avoid the having thoſe* Ideas *produc'd in my Mind*. For tho' when my Eyes are ſhut, or Windows faſt, I can at pleaſure recal to my Mind the *Ideas* of *Light*, or the *Sun*, which former Senſations had lodg'd in my Memory; ſo I can at pleaſure lay by that *Idea*, and take into my view that of the *Smell* of a Roſe, or *Taſte* of Sugar. But if I turn my Eyes at Noon towards the Sun, I cannot avoid the *Ideas*, which the Light, or Sun, then produces in me. So that there is a manifeſt difference between the *Ideas* laid up in my Memory, (over which, if they were there only, I ſhould have conſtantly the ſame Power to diſpoſe of them, and lay them by at pleaſure) and thoſe which force themſelves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore it muſt needs be ſome exteriour cauſe, and the brisk acting of ſome Objects without me, whoſe Efficacy I cannot reſiſt, that produces thoſe *Ideas* in my Mind, whether I will or no. Beſides, there is no body who doth not perceive the difference in himſelf between contemplating the Sun, as he hath the *Idea* of it in his Memory, and actually looking upon it: of which two, his Perception is ſo diſtinct, that few of his *Ideas* are more diſtinguiſhible one from another. And therefore he hath certain Knowledg, that they are not both Memory, or the Actions of his Mind, and Fancies only within him; but that actual Seeing hath a Cauſe without.

3. *Pleaſure or Pain which accompanies actual Senſation, accompanies not the returning of thoſe* Ideas *without the external Objects.*

§. 6. *Thirdly*, Add to this, that *many of thoſe* Ideas *are produced in us with Pain, which afterwards we remember without the leaſt Offence.* Thus the Pain of Heat or Cold, when the *Idea* of it is reviv'd in our Minds, gives us no diſturbance; which, when felt, was very troubleſom, and is again, when actually repeated: which is occaſion'd by the diſorder the external Object cauſes in our Bodies when apply'd to it. And we remember the Pain of *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, or the *Head-ach*, without any Pain at all; which would either never diſturb us, or elſe conſtantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but *Ideas* floating in our Minds, and Appearances entertaining our Fancies, without the real Exiſtence of things affecting us from abroad. The ſame may be ſaid of Pleaſure, accompanying ſeveral actual Senſations: And tho' mathematical Demonſtration depends not upon Senſe, yet the examining them by Diagrams gives great Credit to the Evidence of our Sight, and ſeems to give it a Certainty approaching to that of Demonſtration it ſelf. For it would be very ſtrange, that a Man ſhould allow it for an undeniable Truth, that two Angles of a Figure, which he meaſures by Lines and Angles of a Diagram, ſhould be bigger one than the other; and yet doubt of the Exiſtence of thoſe Lines and Angles, which, by looking on, he makes uſe of to meaſure that by.

4. *Our Senſes aſſiſt one another's Teſtimony of the Exiſtence of outward things.*

§. 7. *Fourthly*, Our *Senſes* in many caſes bear *witneſs* to the Truth of each other's Report, concerning the Exiſtence of ſenſible things without us. He that

that ſees a *Fire*, may, if he doubt whether it be any thing more than a bare Fancy, feel it too; and be convinc'd, by putting his Hand in it. Which certainly could never be put into ſuch exquiſite Pain, by a bare *Idea* or Phantom, unleſs the Pain be a Fancy too: which yet he cannot, when the Burn is well, by raiſing the *Idea* of it, bring upon himſelf again.

Thus I ſee, whilſt I write this, I can change the Appearance of the Paper; and by deſigning the Letters, tell before-hand what new *Idea* it ſhall exhibit the very next moment, barely by drawing my Pen over it: which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my Hands ſtand ſtill; or tho' I move my Pen, if my Eyes be ſhut: nor when thoſe Characters are once made on the Paper, can I chuſe afterwards but ſee them as they are; that is, have the *Ideas* of ſuch Letters as I have made. Whence it is manifeſt, that they are not barely the Sport and Play of my own Imagination, when I find that the Characters, that were made at the pleaſure of my own Thoughts, do not obey them; nor yet ceaſe to be, whenever I ſhall fancy it, but continue to affect my Senſes conſtantly and regularly, according to the Figures I made them. To which if we will add, that the Sight of thoſe ſhall, from another Man, draw ſuch Sounds, as I before-hand deſign they ſhall ſtand for; there will be little reaſon left to doubt, that thoſe Words I write, do really exiſt without me, when they cauſe a long Series of regular Sounds to affect my Ears, which could not be the effect of my Imagination, nor could my Memory retain them in that order.

This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs.

§. 8. But yet, if after all this any one will be ſo ſceptical, as to diſtruſt his Senſes, and to affirm that all we ſee and hear, feel and taſte, think and do, during our whole Being, is but the Series and deluding Appearances of a long Dream, whereof there is no reality; and therefore will queſtion the Exiſtence of all things, or our Knowledg of any thing: I muſt deſire him to conſider, that if all be a Dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the queſtion; and ſo it is not much matter, that a waking Man ſhould anſwer him. But yet, if he pleaſes, he may dream that I make him this Anſwer, That *the Certainty of Things exiſting in rerum Natura*, when we have *the Teſtimony of our Senſes* for it, is not only *as great* as our Frame can attain to, but *as our Condition needs*. For our Faculties being ſuited not to the full extent of Being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehenſive Knowledg of things, free from all Doubt and Scruple; but to the Preſervation of us in whom they are; and accommodated to the uſe of Life; they ſerve to our purpoſe well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of thoſe things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that ſees a Candle burning, and hath experimented the Force of its Flame, by putting his Finger in it, will little doubt that this is ſomething exiſting without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain: which is Aſſurance enough, when no Man requires greater Certainty to govern his Actions by, than what is as certain as his Actions themſelves. And if our Dreamer pleaſes to try, whether the glowing Heat of a Glaſs Furnace, be barely a wandring Imagination in a drowſy Man's Fancy; by putting his Hand into it, he may perhaps be waken'd into a Certainty greater than he could wiſh, that it is ſomething more than bare Imagination. So that this Evidence is as great as we can deſire, being as certain to us as our Pleaſure or Pain, *i. e.* Happineſs or Miſery; beyond which we have no Concernment, either of Knowing or Being. Such an Aſſurance of the Exiſtence of things without us, is ſufficient to direct us in the attaining the Good, and avoiding the Evil, which is caus'd by them; which is the important Concernment we have of being made acquainted with them.

But reaches no farther than actual Senſation.

§. 9. In fine then, when our Senſes do actually convey into our Underſtandings any *Idea*, we cannot but be ſatisfy'd that there doth ſomething at that time really exiſt without us, which doth affect our Senſes, and by them give notice of it ſelf to our apprehenſive Faculties, and actually produce that *Idea* which we then perceive: and we cannot ſo far diſtruſt their Teſtimony, as to doubt, that ſuch Collections of ſimple *Ideas*, as we have obſerv'd by our Senſes to be united together, do really exiſt together. But *this Knowledg extends as far as the preſent Teſtimony of our Senſes*, employ'd about particular Objects that do then affect them, *and no farther*. For if I ſaw ſuch a Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, as is wont to be call'd *Man*, exiſting together one minute ſince, and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the ſame Man exiſts now, ſince there is no neceſſary

ceſſary Connexion of his Exiſtence a Minute ſince, with his Exiſtence now: by a thouſand ways he may ceaſe to be, ſince I had the Teſtimony of my Senſes for his Exiſtence. And if I cannot be certain, that the Man I ſaw laſt to day is now in Being, I can leſs be certain that he is ſo, who hath been longer remov'd from my Senſes, and I have not ſeen ſince yeſterday, or ſince the laſt Year: and much leſs can I be certain of the Exiſtence of Men that I never ſaw. And therefore tho' it be highly probable, that Millions of Men do now exiſt, yet whilſt I am alone writing this, I have not that Certainty of it which we ſtrictly call Knowledg; tho' the great Likelihood of it puts me paſt doubt, and it be reaſonable for me to do ſeveral things upon the confidence that there are Men (and Men alſo of my Acquaintance, with whom I have to do) now in the World: But this is but Probability, not Knowledg.

Folly to expect Demonſtration in every thing.

§. 10. Whereby yet we may obſerve, how fooliſh and vain a thing it is, for a Man of narrow Knowledg, who having Reaſon given him to judg of the different Evidence and Probability of things, and to be ſway'd accordingly; how *vain*, I ſay, it is *to expect Demonſtration* and Certainty *in things not capable of it*; and refuſe Aſſent to very rational Propoſitions, and act contrary to very plain and clear Truths, becauſe they cannot be made out ſo evident, as to ſurmount every the leaſt (I will not ſay Reaſon, but) Pretence of doubting. He that in the ordinary Affairs of Life would admit of nothing but direct plain Demonſtration, would be ſure of nothing in this World, but of periſhing quickly. The Wholeſomneſs of his Meat or Drink would not give him reaſon to venture on it: And I would fain know, what 'tis he could do upon ſuch grounds, as are capable of no Doubt, no Objection.

Paſt Exiſtence is known by Memory.

§. 11. As when our Senſes are actually employ'd about any Object, we do know that it does exiſt; ſo *by our Memory* we may be aſſur'd, that heretofore, things that affected our Senſes, have exiſted. And thus *we have Knowledg of the paſt Exiſtence* of ſeveral things, whereof our Senſes having inform'd us, our Memories ſtill retain the *Ideas*; and of this we are paſt all doubt, ſo long as we remember well. But this Knowledg alſo reaches no farther than our Senſes have formerly aſſur'd us. Thus ſeeing Water at this inſtant, 'tis an unqueſtionable Truth to me, that Water doth exiſt: and remembring that I ſaw it yeſterday, it will alſo be always true; and as long as my Memory retains it, always an undoubted Propoſition to me, that Water did exiſt the 10th of *July* 1688. as it will alſo be equally true, that a certain number of very fine Colours did exiſt, which at the ſame time I ſaw upon a Bubble of that Water: But being now quite out of the ſight both of the Water and Bubbles too, it is no more certainly known to me that the Water doth now exiſt, than that the Bubbles or Colours therein do ſo; it being no more neceſſary that Water ſhould exiſt to day, becauſe it exiſted yeſterday, than that the Colours or Bubbles exiſt to day, becauſe they exiſted yeſterday; tho' it be exceedingly much more probable, becauſe Water hath been obſerv'd to continue long in Exiſtence, but Bubbles and the Colours on them quickly ceaſe to be.

The Exiſtence of Spirits not knowable.

§. 12. What *Ideas* we have of Spirits, and how we come by them, I have already ſhewn. But tho' we have thoſe *Ideas* in our Minds, and know we have them there, the having the *Ideas* of Spirits does not make us *know*, that any ſuch things do exiſt without us, or *that there are any finite Spirits*, or any other ſpiritual Beings but the Eternal GOD. We have ground from Revelation, and ſeveral other Reaſons, to believe with aſſurance, that there are ſuch Creatures: but our Senſes not being able to diſcover them, we want the means of knowing their particular Exiſtences. For we can no more know, that there are finite Spirits really exiſting, by the *Idea* we have of ſuch Beings in our Minds, than by the *Ideas* any one has of Fairies, or Centaurs, he can come to know that things anſwering thoſe *Ideas* do really exiſt.

And therefore concerning the Exiſtence of finite Spirits, as well as ſeveral other things, we muſt content our ſelves with the Evidence of Faith; but univerſal certain Propoſitions concerning this matter, are beyond our reach. For however true it may be, *v. g.* that all the intelligent Spirits that GOD ever created, do ſtill exiſt; yet it can never make a part of our certain Knowledg. Theſe and the like Propoſitions we may aſſent to as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in this ſtate capable of knowing. We are not then to put others upon

upon demonſtrating, nor our ſelves upon ſearch of univerſal Certainty in all thoſe matters, wherein we are not capable of any other Knowledg, but what our Senſes give us in this or that particular.

Particular Propoſitions concerning Exiſtence are knowable.

§. 13. By which it appears, that there are two ſorts of *Propoſitions*. 1. There is one ſort of Propoſitions *concerning* the *Exiſtence* of any thing anſwerable to ſuch an *Idea*: as having the *Idea* of an *Elephant*, *Phœnix*, *Motion*, or an *Angel*, in my Mind, the firſt and natural Enquiry is, Whether ſuch a thing does any where exiſt? And this Knowledg is only of *Particulars*. No Exiſtence of any thing without us, but only of GOD, can certainly be known farther than our Senſes inform us. 2. There is another ſort of *Propoſitions*, wherein is expreſs'd the Agreement or Diſagreement of our abſtract *Ideas*, and their Dependence one on another. Such Propoſitions may be *univerſal* and certain. So, having the *Idea* of GOD and my ſelf, of Fear and Obedience, I cannot but be ſure that GOD is to be fear'd and obey'd by me: And this Propoſition will be certain, concerning *Man* in general, if I have made an abſtract *Idea* of ſuch a Species, whereof I am one particular. But yet this Propoſition, how certain ſoever, That Men ought to fear and obey GOD, proves not to me the Exiſtence of Men in the World, but will be true of all ſuch Creatures, whenever they do exiſt: which *Certainty* of ſuch general Propoſitions, depends on the Agreement or Diſagreement to be diſcover'd in thoſe abſtract *Ideas*.

And general Propoſitions concerning abſtract Ideas.

§. 14. In the former caſe, our Knowledg is the Conſequence of the Exiſtence of things producing *Ideas* in our Minds by our Senſes: in the latter, Knowledg is the Conſequence of the *Ideas* (be they what they will) that are in our Minds producing there general certain Propoſitions. Many of theſe are call'd *æternæ veritates*, and all of them indeed are ſo; not from being written all or any of them in the Minds of all Men, or that they were any of them Propoſitions in any one's Mind, till he, having got the abſtract *Ideas*, join'd or ſeparated them by Affirmation or Negation. But whereſoever we can ſuppoſe ſuch a Creature as *Man* is, endow'd with ſuch Faculties, and thereby furniſh'd with ſuch *Ideas* as we have, we muſt conclude, he muſt needs, when he applies his Thoughts to the Conſideration of his *Ideas*, know the truth of certain Propoſitions, that will ariſe from the Agreement or Diſagreement which he will perceive in his own *Ideas*. Such Propoſitions are therefore call'd *Eternal Truths*, not becauſe they are Eternal Propoſitions actually form'd, and antecedent to the Underſtanding, that at any time makes them; nor becauſe they are imprinted on the Mind from any Patterns, that are any where of them out of the Mind, and exiſted before: but becauſe being once made about abſtract *Ideas*, ſo as to be true, they will, whenever they can be ſuppos'd to be made again at any time paſt or to come, by a Mind having thoſe *Ideas*, always actually be true. For Names being ſuppos'd to ſtand perpetually for the ſame *Ideas*, and the ſame *Ideas* having immutably the ſame Habitudes one to another; Propoſitions concerning any abſtract *Ideas*, that are once true, muſt needs be *eternal Verities*.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledg.

Knowledg is not from Maxims.

§. 1. IT having been the common receiv'd Opinion amongſt Men of Letters, that *Maxims* were the Foundation of all Knowledg; and that the Sciences were each of them built upon certain *Præcognita*, from whence the Underſtanding was to take its riſe, and by which it was to conduct it ſelf, in its enquiries into the matters belonging to that Science; the beaten Road of the Schools has been, to lay down in the beginning one or more general Propoſitions, as Foundations whereon to build the Knowledg that was to be had of that Subject. Theſe Doctrines thus laid down for Foundations of any Science, were call'd *Principles*, as the Beginnings from which we muſt ſet out, and look no farther backwards in our Enquiries, as we have already obſerv'd.

(The occaſion of that Opinion)

§. 2. One thing, which might probably give an occaſion to this way of proceeding in other Sciences, was (as I ſuppoſe) the good Succeſs it ſeem'd to have in

in *Mathematicks*, wherein Men, being obſerv'd to attain a great Certainty of Knowledg, theſe Sciences came by Pre-eminence to be call'd μαθήματα and μάθησις, Learning, or things Learn'd, thorowly learn'd, as having of all others the greateſt Certainty, Clearneſs and Evidence in them.

§. 3. But if any one will conſider, he will (I gueſs) find that *the great Advancement* and Certainty of *real Knowledg*, which Men attriv'd to in theſe Sciences, was not owing to the Influence of theſe Principles, nor deriv'd from any peculiar Advantage they receiv'd from two or three general Maxims, laid down in the beginning; but from the *clear, diſtinct, compleat Ideas* their Thoughts were imploy'd about, and the Relation of Equality and Exceſs ſo clear between ſome of them, that they had an intuitive Knowledg, and by that a way to diſcover it in others, and this without the help of thoſe *Maxims*. For I ask, Is it not poſſible for a young Lad to know, that his whole Body is bigger than his little Finger, but by virtue of this Axiom, that *the whole is bigger than a Part*; nor be aſſur'd of it, till he has learn'd that *Maxim?* Or cannot a Country-Wench know, that having receiv'd a Shilling from one that owes her three, and a Shilling alſo from another that owes her three, the remaining Debts in each of their Hands are equal? Cannot ſhe know this, I ſay, unleſs ſhe fetch the Certainty of it from this Maxim, That *if you take Equals from Equals, the Remainder will be Equals*, a Maxim which poſſibly ſhe never heard or thought of? I deſire any one to conſider, from what has been elſewhere ſaid, which is known firſt and cleareſt by moſt People, the particular Inſtance, or the general Rule; and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other. Theſe general Rules are but the comparing our more general and abſtract *Ideas*, which are the Workmanſhip of the Mind made, and Names given to them, for the eaſier diſpatch in its Reaſonings, and drawing into comprehenſive Terms, and ſhort Rules, its various and multiply'd Obſervations. But Knowledg began in the Mind, and was founded on Particulars; tho' afterwards, perhaps, no notice be taken thereof: It being natural for the Mind (forward ſtill to enlarge its Knowledg) moſt attentively to lay up thoſe general Notions, and make the proper uſe of them, which is to diſburden the Memory of the cumberſome Load of Particulars. For I deſire it may be conſider'd what more Certainty there is to a Child, or any one, that his Body, little Finger and all, is bigger than his little Finger alone, after you have given to his Body the name *Whole*, and to his little Finger the name *Part*, than he could have had before; or what new Knowledge concerning his Body, can theſe two relative Terms give him, which he could not have without them? Could he not know that his Body was bigger than his little Finger, if his Language were yet ſo imperfect, that he had no ſuch relative Terms as *Whole* and *Part*? I ask farther, when he has got theſe Names, how is he more certain that his Body is a *Whole*, and his little Finger a *Part*, than he was or might be certain, before he learnt thoſe Terms, that his Body was bigger than his little Finger? Any one may as reaſonably doubt or deny that his little Finger is a part of his Body, as that it is leſs than his Body. And he that can doubt whether it be leſs, will as certainly doubt whether it be a Part. So that the Maxim, *The Whole is bigger than a Part*, can never be made uſe of to prove the little Finger leſs than the Body, but when it is uſeleſs, by being brought to convince one of a Truth which he knows already. For he that does not certainly know that any parcel of Matter, with another parcel of Matter join'd to it, is bigger than either of them alone, will never be able to know it by the help of theſe two relative Terms, *Whole* and *Part*, make of them what Maxim you pleaſe.

But from the comparing clear and diſtinct Ideas.

§. 4. But be it in the Mathematicks as it will, whether it be clearer, that taking an Inch from a black Line of two Inches, and an Inch from a red Line of two Inches, the remaining Parts of the two Lines will be equal, or that *if you take Equals from Equals, the remainder will be Equals*: Which, I ſay, of theſe two is the clearer and firſt known, I leave to any one to determine, it not being material to my preſent occaſion. That which I have here to do, is to enquire, whether if it be the readieſt way to Knowledg to begin with general Maxims, and build upon them, it be yet a ſafe way to take the *Principles*, which are laid down in any other Science as unqueſtionable Truths; and ſo receive them without Examination, and adhere to them, without ſuffering to be doubted of, becauſe

Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles.

cauſe Mathematicians have been ſo happy, or, ſo fair, to uſe none but ſelf-evident and undeniable. If this be ſo, I know not what may not paſs for Truth in Morality, what may not be introduc'd and prov'd in Natural Philoſophy.

Let that principle of ſome of the Philoſophers, That all is Matter, and that there is nothing elſe, be receiv'd for certain and indubitable, and it will be eaſy to be ſeen by the Writings of ſome that have reviv'd it again in our Days, what Conſequences it will lead us into. Let any one, with *Polemo*, take the World; or with the *Stoicks*, the *Æther*, or the Sun; or with *Anaximenes*, the Air to be *God*; and what a Divinity, Religion and Worſhip muſt we needs have! *Nothing* can be ſo *dangerous as Principles* thus *taken up without queſtioning or examination*; eſpecially if they be ſuch as concern Morality, which influence Mens Lives, and give a Biaſs to all their Actions. Who might not juſtly expect another kind of Life in *Ariſtippus*, who plac'd Happineſs in bodily Pleaſure; and in *Antiſthenes*, who made Virtue ſufficient to Felicity? And he who, with *Plato*, ſhall place Beatitude in the Knowledg of GOD, will have his Thoughts rais'd to other Contemplations than thoſe who look not beyond this Spot of Earth, and thoſe periſhing things which are to be had in it. He that, with *Archelaus*, ſhall lay it down as a Principle, That Right and Wrong, Honeſt and Diſhoneſt, are defin'd only by Laws, and not by Nature, will have other meaſures of moral Rectitude and Pravity, than thoſe who take it for granted, that we are under Obligations antecedent to all human Conſtitutions.

This is no certain way to Truth.

§. 5. It therefore thoſe that paſs for *Principles*, are *not certain* (which we muſt have ſome way to know, that we may be able to diſtinguiſh them from thoſe that are doubtful) but are only made ſo to us by our blind Aſſent, we are liable to be miſled by them; and inſtead of being guided into Truth, we ſhall, by Principles, be only confirm'd in Miſtake and Error.

But to compare clear compleat Ideas under ſteddy Names.

§. 6. But ſince the Knowledg of the Certainty of Principles, as well as of all other Truths, depends only upon the Perception we have of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Ideas*, *the way to improve our Knowledg*, is not, I am ſure, blindly, and with an implicit Faith, to receive and ſwallow Principles; but is, I think, *to* get and *fix in our Minds clear, diſtinct and compleat* Ideas, as far as they are to be had, *and annex to them proper and conſtant Names.* And thus, perhaps, without any other Principles, but barely conſidering thoſe *Ideas*, and by *comparing them one with another*, finding their Agreement and Diſagreement, and their ſeveral Relations and Habitudes; we ſhall get more true and clear Knowledg, by the Conduct of this one Rule, than by taking up Principles, and thereby putting our Minds into the diſpoſal of others.

The true Method of advancing Knowledg is by conſidering our abſtract Ideas.

§. 7. *We muſt* therefore, if we will proceed, as Reaſon adviſes, *adapt our Methods of Inquiry to the nature of the* Ideas *we examine*, and the Truth we ſearch after. General and certain Truths are only founded in the Habitudes and Relations of abſtract *Ideas*. A ſagacious and methodical Application of our Thoughts, for the finding out theſe Relations, is the only way to diſcover all that can be put, with Truth and Certainty concerning them, into general Propoſitions. By what Steps we are to proceed in theſe, is to be learned in the Schools of the Mathematicians, who from very plain and eaſy Beginnings, by gentle degrees, and a continu'd Chain of Reaſonings, proceed to the Diſcovery and Demonſtration of Truths, that appear at firſt ſight beyond human Capacity. The Art of finding Proofs, and the admirable Methods they have invented for the ſingling out, and laying in order thoſe intermediate *Ideas*, that demonſtratively ſhew the Equality or Inequality of unapplicable Quantities, is that which has carry'd them ſo far, and produc'd ſuch wonderful and unexpected Diſcoveries: but whether ſomething like this, in reſpect of other *Ideas*, as well as thoſe of Magnitude, may not in time be found out, I will not determine. This, I think, I may ſay, that if other *Ideas*, that are the real as well as nominal Eſſences of their Species, were purſu'd in the way familiar to Mathematicians, they would carry our Thoughts farther, and with greater Evidence and Clearneſs than poſſibly we are apt to imagine.

By which Morality alſo may be made clearer.

§. 8. This gave me the confidence to advance that Conjecture, which I ſuggeſt, *chap.* 3. viz. That *Morality is capable of Demonſtration*, as well as Mathematicks. For the *Ideas* that Ethicks are converſant about being all real Eſſences, and ſuch as I imagine have a diſcoverable Connection and Agreement one

with

with another; ſo far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations, ſo far we ſhall be poſſeſs'd of certain, real and general Truths: and I doubt not, but if a right Method were taken, a great part of Morality might be made out with that Clearneſs, that could leave, to a conſidering Man, no more reaſon to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the Truth of Propoſitions in Mathematicks, which have been demonſtrated to him.

§. 9. In our ſearch after the Knowledg of *Subſtances*, our want of *Ideas*, that are ſuitable to ſuch a way of proceeding, obliges us to a quite different Method. We advance not here as in the other (where our abſtract *Ideas* are real as well as nominal Eſſences) by contemplating our *Ideas*, and conſidering their Relations and Correſpondencies; that helps us very little, for the Reaſons, that in another place we have at large ſet down. By which, I think it is evident, that Subſtances afford Matter of very little general Knowledg; and the bare Contemplation of their abſtract *Ideas*, will carry us but a very little way in the Search of Truth and Certainty. What then are we to do for the Improvement of our *Knowledg in ſubſtantial Beings?* Here we are to take a quite contrary Courſe; the want of *Ideas* of their real *Eſſences*, ſends us from our own Thoughts, to the things themſelves, as they exiſt. *Experience here muſt teach me*, what Reaſon cannot; and 'tis by trying alone, that I can certainly know, what other Qualities co-exiſt with thoſe of my complex *Idea*, *v. g.* whether that *yellow*, *heavy*, *fuſible* Body, I call *Gold*, be *malleable*, or no; which Experience (which way ever it prove, in that particular Body, I examine) makes me not certain, that it is ſo in all, or any other *yellow*, *heavy*, *fuſible* Bodies, but that which I have try'd. Becauſe it is no Conſequence one way or t'other from my complex *Idea*; the Neceſſity or Inconſiſtence of *Malleability* hath no viſible Connection with the Combination of that *Colour*, *Weight* and *Fuſibility* in any Body. What I have ſaid here of the nominal Eſſence of *Gold*, ſuppos'd to conſiſt of a Body of ſuch a determinate *Colour*, *Weight* and *Fuſibility*, will hold true, if *Malleableneſs*, *Fixedneſs*, and *Solubility* in *Aqua Regia* be added to it. Our Reaſonings from theſe *Ideas* will carry us but a little way in the certain Diſcovery of the other Properties in thoſe Maſſes of Matter wherein all theſe are to be found. Becauſe the other Properties of ſuch Bodies, depending not on theſe, but on that unknown real Eſſence, on which theſe alſo depend, we cannot by them diſcover the reſt; we can go no farther than the ſimple *Ideas* of our nominal Eſſence will carry us, which is very little beyond themſelves; and ſo afford us but very ſparingly any certain, univerſal and uſeful Truths. For upon trial having found that particular Piece (and all others of that Colour, Weight and Fuſibility that I ever try'd) *malleable*, that alſo makes now perhaps a part of my complex *Idea*, part of my nominal Eſſence of *Gold*: Whereby tho' I make my complex *Idea*, to which I affix the name *Gold*, to conſiſt of more ſimple *Ideas* than before; yet ſtill, it not containing the real Eſſence of any Species of Bodies, it helps me not certainly to know (I ſay to know, perhaps it may to conjecture) the other remaining Properties of that Body, farther than they have a viſible Connection with ſome or all of the ſimple *Ideas*, that make up my nominal Eſſence. For example, I cannot be certain from this complex *Idea*, whether *Gold* be fix'd, or no; becauſe as before, there is no neceſſary Connection or Inconſiſtence to be diſcover'd betwixt a complex *Idea* of a Body, *yellow*, *heavy*, *fuſible*, *malleable*; betwixt theſe, I ſay, and *Fixedneſs*: So that I may certainly know, that in whatſoever body theſe are found, there *Fixedneſs* is ſure to be. Here again for Aſſurance, I muſt apply my ſelf to *Experience*; as far as that reaches, I may have certain Knowledge, but no farther.

But Knowledg of Bodies is to be improv'd only by Experience.

§. 10. I deny not but a Man, accuſtom'd to rational and regular Experiments, ſhall be able to ſee farther into the nature of Bodies, and gueſs righter at their yet unknown Properties, than one that is a Stranger to them: But yet, as I have ſaid, this is but Judgment and Opinion, not Knowledg and Certainty. This *way of* getting, and *improving our Knowledg in Subſtances only by Experience* and Hiſtory, which is all that the Weakneſs of our Faculties in this State of *Mediocrity*, which we are in in this World, can attain to, makes me ſuſpect, that natural Philoſophy is not capable of being made a Science. We are able, I imagine, to reach very little general Knowledg concerning the Species of Bodies, and their ſeveral Properties. Experiments and Hiſtorical Obſervations we

This may procure us Convenience, not Science.

we may have, from which we may draw Advantages of Eaſe and Health, and thereby increaſe our Stock of Conveniences for this Life; but beyond this I fear our Talents reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I gueſs, able to advance.

We are fitted for moral Knowledg and natural Improvements.

§. 11. From whence it is obvious to conclude, that ſince our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal Fabrick and real Eſſences of Bodies; but yet plainly diſcover to us the Being of a GOD, and the Knowledg of our ſelves, enough to lead us into a full and clear Diſcovery of our Duty, and great Concernment; it will become us, as rational Creatures, to imploy thoſe Faculties we have about what they are adapted to, and follow the Direction of Nature, where it ſeems to point us out the way. For 'tis rational to conclude, that our proper Imployment lies in thoſe Enquiries, and in that ſort of Knowledg which is moſt ſuited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it our greateſt Intereſt, *i. e.* the Condition of our eternal Eſtate. Hence I think I may conclude, that *Morality* is *the proper Science, and Buſineſs of Mankind in general*; (who are both concern'd, and fitted to ſearch out their *Summum Bonum*) as ſeveral Arts, converſant about ſeveral Parts of Nature, are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men, for the common uſe of human Life, and their own particular Subſiſtence in this World. Of what Conſequence the Diſcovery of one natural Body, and its Properties may be to human Life, the whole great Continent of *America* is a convincing Inſtance: whoſe Ignorance in uſeful Arts, and want of the greateſt part of the Conveniences of Life, in a Country that abounded with all ſorts of natural Plenty, I think, may be attributed to their Ignorance, of what was to be found in a very ordinary deſpicable Stone, I mean the Mineral of *Iron*. And whatever we think of our Parts or Improvements in this part of the World, where Knowledg and Plenty ſeem to vie each with other; yet to any one, that will ſeriouſly reflect on it, I ſuppoſe, it will appear paſt doubt, that were the uſe of *Iron* loſt among us, we ſhould in a few Ages be unavoidably reduc'd to the Wants and Ignorance of the antient ſavage *Americans*, whoſe natural Endowments and Proviſions come no way ſhort of thoſe of the moſt flouriſhing and polite Nations. So that he who firſt made known the uſe of that one contemptible Mineral, may be truly ſtil'd the Father of Arts, and Author of Plenty.

But muſt beware of Hypotheſes and wrong Principles.

§. 12. I would *not therefore* be thought to diſeſteem, or *diſſuade the Study of Nature*. I readily agree the Contemplation of his Works gives us occaſion to admire, revere, and glorify their Author: and it rightly directed, may be of greater Benefit to Mankind, than the Monuments of exemplary Charity, that have at ſo great Charge been rais'd by the Founders of Hoſpitals and Almshouſes. He that firſt invented Printing, diſcover'd the Uſe of the Compaſs, or made publick the Virtue and right Uſe of *Kin Kina*, did more for the Propagation of Knowledg, for the ſupplying and increaſe of uſeful Commodities, and ſav'd more from the Grave, than thoſe who built Colleges, Work-houſes and Hoſpitals. All that I would ſay, is, that we ſhould not be too forwardly poſſeſs'd with the Opinion, or Expectation of Knowledg, where it is not to be had; or by ways that will not attain to it: That we ſhould not take doubtful Syſtems for compleat Sciences, nor unintelligible Notions for ſcientifical Demonſtrations. In the knowledg of Bodies, we muſt be content to glean what we can from particular Experiments: Since we cannot, from a Diſcovery of their real Eſſences, graſp at a time whole Sheaves; and in Bundles comprehend the Nature and Properties of whole Species together. Where our Inquiry is concerning Co-exiſtence, or Repugnancy to co-exiſt, which by Contemplation of our *Ideas* we cannot diſcover; there Experience, Obſervation and Natural Hiſtory muſt give us by our Senſes, and by Retail, an Inſight into corporeal Subſtances. The Knowledg of Bodies we muſt get by our Senſes, warily imploy'd in taking notice of their Qualities and Operations on one another: And what we hope to know of ſeparate Spirits in this World, we muſt, I think, expect only from Revelation. He that ſhall conſider *how little general Maxims, precarious Principles, and Hypotheſes laid down at Pleaſure, have promoted true Knowledg*, or help'd to ſatisfy the Inquiries of rational Men after real Improvements; how little, I ſay, the ſetting out at that end has, for many Ages together, advanc'd Mens Progreſs towards the knowledg of Natural Philoſophy, will think we have reaſon to thank thoſe, who in this latter Age have taken another Courſe, and

and have trod out to us, tho' not an eaſier way to learned Ignorance, yet a ſurer way to profitable Knowledg.

The true uſe of Hypotheſes.

§. 13. Not that we may not, to explain any *Phænomena* of Nature, make uſe of any probable *Hypotheſis* whatſoever: *Hypotheſes*, if they are well made, are at leaſt great Helps to the Memory, and often direct us to new Diſcoveries. But my Meaning is, that we ſhould *not take up any one too haſtily* (which the Mind, that would always penetrate into the Cauſes of Things, and have Principles to reſt on, is very apt to do) till we have very well examin'd Particulars, and made ſeveral Experiments, in that thing which we would explain by our Hypotheſis, and ſee whether it will agree to them all; whether our Principles will carry us quite thro', and not be as inconſiſtent with one *Phænomenon* of Nature, as they ſeem to accommodate, and explain another. And at leaſt that we take care, that the name of *Principles* deceive us not, nor impoſe on us, by making us receive that for an unqueſtionable Truth, which is really, at beſt, but a very doubtful Conjecture, ſuch as are moſt (I had almoſt ſaid all) of the *Hypotheſes* in natural Philoſophy.

Clear and diſtinct Ideas *with ſettled Names, and the finding of thoſe which ſhew their Agreement or Diſagreement, are the ways to inlarge our Knowledg.*

§. 14. But whether Natural Philoſophy be capable of Certainty or no, the *the ways to inlarge our Knowledg*, as far as we are capable, ſeem to me, in ſhort, to be theſe two:

Firſt, The *Firſt* is *to get and ſettle in our Minds* determin'd *Ideas* of thoſe things, whereof we have general or ſpecifick Names; at leaſt of ſo many of them as we would conſider and improve our Knowledg in, or reaſon about. And if they be *ſpecifick* Ideas of *Subſtances*, we ſhould endeavour alſo to make them as compleat as we can, whereby I mean, that we ſhould put together as many ſimple *Ideas*, as being conſtantly obſerv'd to co-exiſt, may perfectly determine the *Species*: And each of thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, which are the Ingredients of our complex ones, ſhould be clear and diſtinct in our Minds. For it being evident, that our Knowledg cannot exceed our *Ideas*; as far as they are either imperfect, confus'd, or obſcure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect or clear Knowledg.

Secondly, The other is the Art of *finding out* thoſe *intermediate Ideas*, which may ſhew us the Agreement or Repugnancy of other *Ideas*, which cannot be immediately compar'd.

Mathematicks, an Inſtance of it.

§. 15. That theſe two (and not the relying on Maxims, and drawing Conſequences from ſome general Propoſitions) are the right Method of improving our Knowledg in the *Ideas* of other Modes beſides thoſe of Quantity, the Conſideration of Mathematical Knowledg will eaſily inform us. Where firſt we ſhall find, that he that has not a perfect and clear *Idea* of thoſe Angles, or Figures of which he deſires to know any thing, is utterly thereby uncapable of any Knowledg about them. Suppoſe but a Man, not to have a perfect exact *Idea* of a *right Angle*, a *Scalenum*, or *Trapezium*; and there is nothing more certain, than that he will in vain ſeek any Demonſtration about them. Farther, it is evident, that it was not the Influence of thoſe Maxims, which are taken for Principles in Mathematicks, that hath led the Maſters of that Science into thoſe wonderful Diſcoveries they have made. Let a Man of good Parts know all the Maxims generally made uſe of in Mathematicks ever ſo perfectly, and contemplate their Extent and Conſequences as much as he pleaſes, he will by their Aſſiſtance, I ſuppoſe, ſcarce ever come to know that *the Square of the Hypotenuſe in a right angled Triangle, is equal to the Squares of the two other Sides.* The Knowledg, that *the Whole is equal to all its Parts*, and *if you take Equals from Equals, the Remainder will be Equal*, &c. help'd him not, I preſume, to this Demonſtration: And a Man may, I think, pore long enough on thoſe Axioms, without ever ſeeing one jot the more of Mathematical Truths. They have been diſcover'd by the Thoughts otherwiſe apply'd: The Mind had other Objects, other Views before it, far different from thoſe Maxims, when it firſt got the Knowledg of ſuch kind of Truths in Mathematicks, which Men well enough acquainted with thoſe receiv'd Axioms, but ignorant of their Method, who firſt made theſe Demonſtrations, can never ſufficiently admire. And who knows what Methods, to inlarge our Knowledg in other Parts of Science, may hereafter be invented, anſwering that of *Algebra* in Mathematicks, which ſo readily finds out *Ideas* of Quantities to meaſure others by; whoſe Equality or Proportion we could otherwiſe very hardly, or, perhaps, never come to know?

CHAP. XIII.

Some farther Considerations concerning our Knowledg.

Our Knowledg partly necessary, partly voluntary.

§. 1. OUR *Knowledg*, as in other things, so in this, has a great Conformity with our Sight, that it is *neither wholly necessary, nor wholly voluntary.* If our Knowledg were altogether necessary, all Mens Knowledg would not only be alike, but every Man would know all that is knowable: and if it were wholly voluntary, some Men so little regard or value it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men that have Senses cannot chuse but receive some *Ideas* by them; and if they have Memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have any distinguishing Faculty, cannot but perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of some of them one with another: As he that has Eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but see some Objects, and perceive a difference in them. But tho' a Man, with his Eyes open in the Light, cannot but see; yet there be certain Objects, which he may chuse whether he will turn his Eyes to; there may be in his reach a Book containing Pictures and Discourses, capable to delight or instruct him, which yet he may never have the Will to open, never take the Pains to look into.

The Application voluntary; but we know as things are, not as we please.

§. 2. There is also another thing in a Man's Power, and that is, tho' he turns his Eyes sometimes towards an Object, yet he may chuse whether he will curiously survey it, and with an intent Application endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it. But yet what he does see, he cannot see otherwise than he does. It depends not on his Will to see that *Black*, which appears *Yellow*; nor to persuade himself, that what actually *scalds* him, feels *cold*. The Earth will not appear painted with Flowers, nor the Fields cover'd with Verdure, whenever he has a mind to it: In the cold Winter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if he will look abroad. Just thus is it with our Understanding all that is *voluntary* in our Knowledg, is the *employing* or with-holding any of *our Faculties* from this or that sort of Objects, and a more or less accurate Survey of them: But they being imploy'd, *our Will hath no Power to determine the Knowledg of the Mind* one way or other; that is done only by the Objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discover'd. And therefore, as far as Mens Senses are conversant about external Objects, the Mind cannot but receive those *Ideas*, which are presented by them, and be inform'd of the Existence of things without: and so far as Mens Thoughts converse with their own determined *Ideas*, they cannot but, in some measure, observe the Agreement and Disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them, which is so far Knowledg: and if they have Names for those *Ideas* which they have thus consider'd, they must needs be assur'd of the Truth of those Propositions, which express that Agreement or Disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinc'd of those Truths. For what a Man sees, he cannot but see; and what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.

Instance, in Numbers.

§. 3. Thus he that has got the *Ideas* of Numbers, and hath taken the pains to compare *One*, *Two* and *Three* to *Six*, cannot chuse but know that they are equal: He that hath got the *Idea* of a Triangle, and found the ways to measure its Angles, and their Magnitudes, is certain that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; and can as little doubt of that, as of this Truth, that *it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.*

In Natural Religion.

He also that hath the *Idea* of an intelligent, but frail and weak Being, made by and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipotent, perfectly wise and good, will as certainly know that Man is to honour, fear and obey GOD, as that the Sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but the *Ideas* of two such Beings in his Mind, and will turn his Thoughts that way, and consider them, he will as certainly find that the Inferior, Finite and Dependant, is under an Obligation to obey the Supreme and Infinite, as he is certain to find, that *Three*, *Four* and *Seven* are less than *Fifteen*, if he will consider and compute those Numbers; nor can he be surer in a clear Morning that the Sun is risen, if he will but open his Eyes, and turn them that way. But yet these Truths, being ever so certain, ever so clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them, who will never take the pains to imploy his Faculties, as he should, to inform himself about them.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

§. 1. THE underſtanding Faculties being given to Man, not barely for Speculation, but alſo for the Conduct of his Life, Man would be at a great loſs, if he had nothing to direct him but what has the Certainty of true *Knowledg*. For that being very ſhort and ſcanty, as we have ſeen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in moſt of the Actions of his Life, perfectly at a ſtand, had he nothing to guide him in the Abſence of clear and certain Knowledg. He that will not eat, till he has Demonſtration that it will nouriſh him; he that will not ſtir, till he infallibly knows the Buſineſs he goes about will ſucceed; will have little elſe to do, but ſit ſtill and periſh. *Our Knowledg being ſhort, we want ſomething elſe.*

§. 2. Therefore as God has ſet ſome things in broad Day-light; as he has given us ſome certain Knowledg, tho' limited to a few things in compariſon, probably as a Taſte of what intellectual Creatures are capable of, to excite in us a Deſire and Endeavour after a better State: So in the greateſt part of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the Twilight, as I may ſo ſay, of *Probability*; ſuitable, I preſume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probationerſhip, he has been pleas'd to place us in here; wherein, to check our Over-confidence and Preſumption, we might by every day's Experience be made ſenſible of our Short-ſightedneſs and Liableneſs to Error; the Senſe whereof might be a conſtant Admonition to us, to ſpend the Days of this our Pilgrimage with Induſtry and Care, in the ſearch and following of that way, which might lead us to a State of greater Perfection: It being highly rational to think, even were Revelation ſilent in the caſe, That as Men employ thoſe Talents God has given them here, they ſhall accordingly receive their Rewards at the Cloſe of the Day, when their Sun ſhall ſet, and Night ſhall put an end to their Labours. *What uſe to be made of this twilight State.*

§. 3. The Faculty which God has given Man to ſupply the want of clear and certain Knowledg, in caſes where that cannot be had, is *Judgment*, whereby the Mind takes its *Ideas* to agree or diſagree; or which is the ſame, any Propoſition to be true or falſe, without perceiving a demonſtrative Evidence in the Proofs. The Mind ſometimes exerciſes this *Judgment* out of neceſſity, where demonſtrative Proofs, and certain Knowledg are not to be had; and ſometimes out of Lazineſs, Unskilfulneſs, or Haſte, even where demonſtrative and certain Proofs are to be had. Men often ſtay not warily to examine the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas*, which they are deſirous or concern'd to know, but either incapable of ſuch Attention as is requiſite in a long Train of Gradations, or impatient of Delay, lightly caſt their Eyes on, or wholly paſs by the Proofs; and ſo without making out the Demonſtration, determine of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas*, as it were by a View of them as they are at a diſtance, and take it to be the one or the other, as ſeems moſt likely to them upon ſuch a looſe Survey. This Faculty of the Mind, when it is exercis'd immediately about things, is call'd *Judgment*; when about Truths deliver'd in Words, is moſt commonly call'd *Aſſent* or *Diſſent*; which being the moſt uſual way, wherein the Mind has occaſion to employ this Faculty, I ſhall under theſe Terms treat of it, as leaſt liable in our Language to Equivocation. *Judgment ſupplies the want of Knowledg.*

§. 4. Thus the Mind has two Faculties, converſant about Truth and Falſhood. *Judgment is the preſuming things to be ſo, without perceiving it.*

Firſt, *Knowledg*, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly ſatisfy'd of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any *Ideas*.

Secondly, *Judgment*, which is the putting *Ideas* together, or ſeparating them from one another in the Mind, when their certain Agreement or Diſagreement is not perceiv'd, but preſum'd to be ſo; which is as the Word imports, taken to be ſo before it certainly appears. And if it ſo unites, or ſeparates them, as in reality Things are, it is *right Judgment*.

CHAP. XV.

Of Probability.

Probability is the Appearance of Agreement upon fallible Proofs.

§. 1. AS Demonſtration is the ſhewing the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas*, by the Intervention of one or more Proofs, which have a conſtant, immutable, and viſible Connection one with another; ſo *Probability* is nothing but the Appearance of ſuch an Agreement or Diſagreement, by the Intervention of Proofs, whoſe Connection is not conſtant and immutable, or at leaſt is not perceiv'd to be ſo, but is, or appears for the moſt part to be ſo, and is enough to induce the Mind to *judg* the Propoſition to be true or falſe, rather than the contrary. For Example: In the Demonſtration of it, a Man perceives the certain immutable Connection there is of Equality between the three Angles of a *Triangle*, and thoſe intermediate ones which are made uſe of to ſhew their Equality to two right ones; and ſo by an intuitive Knowledg of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the intermediate *Ideas* in each Step of the Progreſs, the whole Series is continu'd with an Evidence, which clearly ſhews the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe three Angles in Equality to two right ones: And thus he has certain Knowledg that it is ſo. But another Man, who never took the pains to obſerve the Demonſtration, hearing a Mathematician, a Man of Credit, affirm the three Angles of a Triangle to be equal to two right ones, *aſſents* to it, *i. e.* receives it for true. In which caſe the Foundation of his Aſſent is the Probability of the thing, the Proof being ſuch as for the moſt part carries Truth with it: the Man, on whoſe Teſtimony he receives it, not being wont to affirm any thing contrary to, or beſides his Knowledg, eſpecially in Matters of this kind. So that That which cauſes his Aſſent to this Propoſition, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes him take theſe *Ideas* to agree, without knowing them to do ſo, is the wonted Veracity of the Speaker in other caſes, or his ſuppos'd Veracity in this.

It is to ſupply the want of Knowledg.

§. 2. Our Knowledg, as has been ſhewn, being very narrow, and we not happy enough to find certain Truth in every thing which we have occaſion to conſider; moſt of the Propoſitions we think, reaſon, diſcourſe, nay act upon, are ſuch, as we cannot have undoubted Knowledg of their Truth: yet ſome of them border ſo near upon Certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them; but *aſſent* to them as firmly, and act, according to that Aſſent, as reſolutely as if they were infallibly demonſtrated, and that our Knowledg of them was perfect and certain. But there being degrees herein from the very Neighbourhood of Certainty and Demonſtration, quite down to Improbability and Unlikelineſs, even to the Confines of Impoſſibility; and alſo degrees of *Aſſent* from full *Aſſurance* and Confidence, quite down to *Conjecture*, Doubt, and *Diſtruſt*: I ſhall come now (having, as I think, found out the Bounds of Human Knowledg and Certainty) in the next place, to conſider *the ſeveral Degrees and Grounds of Probability, and Aſſent or Faith.*

Being that which makes us preſume things to be true before we know them to be ſo.

§. 3. *Probability* is Likelineſs to be true, the very Notation of the Word ſignifying ſuch a Propoſition, for which there be Arguments or Proofs, to make it paſs or be receiv'd for true. The Entertainment the Mind gives this ſort of Propoſitions, is call'd *Belief*, *Aſſent*, or *Opinion*, which is the admitting or receiving any Propoſition for true, upon Arguments or Proofs that are found to perſuade us to receive it as true, without certain Knowledge that it is ſo. And herein lies the *Difference between Probability* and *Certainty*, *Faith* and *Knowledg*, that in all the Parts of Knowledg there is Intuition; each immediate *Idea*, each Step has its viſible and certain Connection; in Belief, not ſo. That which makes me believe, is ſomething extraneous to the thing I believe; ſomething not evidently join'd on both ſides to, and ſo not manifeſtly ſhewing the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe *Ideas* that are under conſideration.

§. 4. *Probability* then, being to ſupply the Defect of our Knowledg, and to guide us where that fails, is always converſant about Propoſitions, whereof we have

have no certainty, but only ſome Inducements to receive them for true. The *Grounds* of it are, in ſhort, theſe two following.

The Grounds of Probability are two; Conformity with our own Experience, or the Teſtimony of others Experience.

Firſt, The Conformity of any thing with our own Knowledg, Obſervation, and Experience.

Secondly, The Teſtimony of others, vouching their Obſervation and Experience. In the Teſtimony of others is to be conſidered, 1. The Number. 2. The Integrity. 3. The Skill of the Witneſſes. 4. The Deſign of the Author, where it is a Teſtimony out of a Book cited. 5. The Conſiſtency of the Parts, and Circumſtances of the Relation. 6. Contrary Teſtimonies.

§. 5. Probability wanting that intuitive Evidence, which infallibly determines the Underſtanding, and produces certain Knowledg, *the Mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the Grounds of Probability*, and ſee how they make more or leſs, *for or againſt* any Propoſition, before it aſſents to or diſſents from it; and upon a due ballancing the whole, reject, or receive it, with a more or leſs firm Aſſent, proportionably to the Preponderancy of the greater Grounds of Probability on one ſide or the other. For example:

In this all the Agreements pro and con ought to be examin'd before we come to a Judgment.

If I my ſelf ſee a Man walk on the Ice, it is paſt *Probability*, 'tis Knowledg: but if another tells me he ſaw a Man in *England* in the midſt of a ſharp Winter, walk upon Water harden'd with Cold; this has ſo great Conformity with what is uſually obſerv'd to happen, that I am diſpos'd by the Nature of the thing it ſelf to aſſent to it, unleſs ſome manifeſt Suſpicion attend the Relation of that Matter of Fact. But if the ſame thing be told to one born between the Tropicks, who never ſaw nor heard of any ſuch thing before, there the whole Probability relies on Teſtimony: And as the Relators are more in Number, and of more Credit, and have no Intereſt to ſpeak contrary to the Truth; ſo that Matter of Fact is like to find more or leſs Belief. Tho' to a Man, whoſe Experience has been always quite contrary, and has never heard of any thing like it, the moſt untainted Credit of a Witneſs will ſcarce be able to find Belief. As it happen'd to a *Dutch* Ambaſſador, who entertaining the King of *Siam* with the Particularities of *Holland*, which he was inquiſitive after, among other things told him, that the Water in his Country would ſometimes, in cold Weather, be ſo hard, that Men walk'd upon it, and that it would bear an Elephant if he were there. To which the King reply'd, *Hitherto I have believ'd the ſtrange things you have told me, becauſe I look upon you as a ſober fair Man, but now I am ſure you lye.*

They being capable of great Variety.

§. 6. Upon theſe Grounds depends the *Probability* of any Propoſition: And as the Conformity of our Knowledg, as the Certainty of Obſervations, as the Frequency and Conſtancy of Experience, and the Number and Credibility of Teſtimonies, do more or leſs agree or diſagree with it, ſo is any Propoſition in it ſelf more or leſs probable. There is another, I confeſs, which tho' by it ſelf it be no true Ground of *Probability*, yet is often made uſe of for one, by which Men moſt commonly regulate their Aſſent, and upon which they pin their Faith more than any thing elſe, and that is the Opinion of others: Tho' there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to miſlead one; ſince there is much more Falſhood and Error among Men, than Truth and Knowledg. And if the Opinions and Perſuaſions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a Ground of Aſſent, Men have reaſon to be Heathens in *Japan*, Mahometans in *Turkey*, Papiſts in *Spain*, Proteſtants in *England*, and Lutherans in *Sweden*. But of this wrong Ground of Aſſent, I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large in another place.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Assent.

Our Assent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability.

§. 1. THE Grounds of Probability we have laid down in the foregoing Chapter; as they are the Foundation on which our *Assent* is built, so are they also the Measure whereby its several Degrees are, or ought to be *regulated:* only we are to take notice, that whatever Grounds of Probability there may be, they yet operate no farther on the Mind, which searches after Truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear, at least in the first Judgment or Search that the Mind makes. I confess, in the Opinions Men have, and firmly stick to, in the World, their *Assent* is not always from an actual View of the Reasons that at first prevail'd with them: It being in many cases almost impossible, and in most very hard, even for those who have very admirable Memories, to retain all the Proofs, which upon a due Examination made them embrace that side of the Question. It suffices that they have once with Care and Fairness sifted the Matter as far as they could; and that they have search'd into all the Particulars, that they could imagine to give any light to the Question; and with the best of their Skill cast up the account upon the whole Evidence: and thus having once found, on which side the Probability appear'd to them, after as full and exact an Enquiry, as they can make, they lay up the Conclusion in their Memories, as a Truth they have discover'd; and for the future they remain satisfy'd with the Testimony of their Memories, that this is the Opinion, that by the Proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a *degree* of their *Assent* as they afford it.

These cannot always be actually in view and then we must content our selves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a degree of Assent.

§. 2. This is all that the greatest part of Men are capable of doing, in regulating their *Opinions* and Judgments; unless a Man will exact of them, either to retain distinctly in their Memories all the Proofs concerning any probable Truth, and that too in the same order, and regular deduction of Consequences in which they have formerly plac'd or seen them; which sometimes is enough to fill a large Volume upon one single Question: Or else they must require a Man, for every Opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the Proofs: both which are impossible. It is unavoidable therefore, that the Memory be rely'd on in the case, and that *Men be perswaded of several Opinions, whereof the Proofs are not actually in their Thoughts*; nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recal. Without this the greatest part of Men must be either very Scepticks, or change every moment, and yield themselves up to whoever, having lately study'd the Question, offers them Arguments; which, for want of Memory, they are not able presently to answer.

The ill Consequence of this, if our former Judgment were not rightly made.

§. 3. I cannot but own, that Men's *sticking* to their *past Judgment*, and adhering firmly to Conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of great Obstinacy in Error and Mistake. But the Fault is not that they rely on their Memories, for what they have before well judg'd; but because they judg'd before they had well examin'd. May we not find a great Number (not to say the greatest part) of Men that think they have form'd right Judgment of several Matters; and that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise? who imagine themselves to have judg'd right, only because they never question'd, never examin'd their own Opinions? Which is indeed to think they judg'd right, because they never judg'd at all: And yet these of all Men hold their Opinions with the greatest Stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their Tenets, who have least examin'd them. What we once know, we are certain is so: and we may be secure, that there are no latent Proofs undiscover'd, which may overturn our Knowledg, or bring it in doubt. But in Matters of Probability, 'tis not in every case we can be sure that we have all the Particulars before us, that any way concern the Question; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which may cast the Probability on the other side, and outweigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath the Leisure, Patience, and Means, to collect

leſt together all the Proofs concerning moſt of the Opinions he has, ſo as ſafely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view; and that there is no more to be alledg'd for his better Information? And yet we are forc'd to determine our ſelves on the one ſide or other. The Conduct of our Lives, and the Management of our great Concerns, will not bear Delay: for thoſe depend, for the moſt part, on the Determination of our Judgment in Points, wherein we are not capable of certain and demonſtrative Knowledg, and wherein it is neceſſary for us to embrace the one ſide or the other.

§. 4. Since therefore it is unavoidable to the greateſt part of Men, if not all, to have ſeveral *Opinions*, without certain and indubitable Proofs of their Truths; and it carries too great an Imputation of Ignorance, Lightneſs, or Folly, for Men to quit and renounce their former Tenets preſently upon the Offer of an Argument, which they cannot immediately anſwer, and ſhew the Inſufficiency of: it would methinks become all Men to maintain *Peace*, and the common Offices of Humanity *and Friendſhip, in the Diverſity of Opinions*; ſince we cannot reaſonably expect, that any one ſhould readily and obſequiouſly quit his own Opinion, and embrace our's with a blind Reſignation to an Authority, which the Underſtanding of Man acknowledges not. For however it may often miſtake, it can own no other Guide but Reaſon, nor blindly ſubmit to the Will and Dictates of another. If he, you would bring over to your Sentiments, be one that examines before he aſſents, you muſt give him leave at his leiſure to go over the Account again, and recalling what is out of his Mind, examine all the Particulars, to ſee on which ſide the Advantage lies: And if he will not think our Arguments of weight enough to engage him a-new in ſo much Pains, 'tis but what we do often our ſelves in the like Caſe; and we ſhould take it amiſs, if others ſhould preſcribe to us what Points we ſhould ſtudy. And if he be one who takes his Opinions upon truſt, How can we imagine that he ſhould renounce thoſe Tenets which Time and Cuſtom have ſo ſettled in his Mind, that he thinks them ſelf-evident, and of an unqueſtionable Certainty; or which he takes to be Impreſſions he has received from GOD Himſelf, or from Men ſent by Him? How can we expect, I ſay, that Opinions thus ſettled ſhould be given up to the Arguments or Authority of a Stranger, or Adverſary; eſpecially if there be any Suſpicion of Intereſt or Deſign, as there never fails to be, where Men find themſelves ill-treated? We ſhould do well to commiſerate our mutual Ignorance, and endeavour to remove it in all the gentle and fair Ways of Information; and not inſtantly treat others ill, as obſtinate and perverſe, becauſe they will not renounce their own, and receive our Opinions, or at leaſt thoſe we would force upon them, when 'tis more than probable, that we are no leſs obſtinate in not embracing ſome of their's. For where is the Man that has unconteſtable Evidence of the Truth of all that he holds, or of the Falſhood of all he condemns; or can ſay, that he has examin'd to the Bottom, all his own, or other mens Opinions? The Neceſſity of believing without Knowledg, nay, often upon very ſlight Grounds, in this fleeting State of Action and Blindneſs we are in, ſhould make us more buſy and careful to inform our ſelves, than conſtrain others. At leaſt thoſe, who have not thorowly examin'd to the bottom all their own Tenets, muſt confeſs they are unfit to preſcribe to others; and are unreaſonable in impoſing that as Truth on other Mens Belief, which they themſelves have not ſearch'd into, nor weigh'd the Arguments of Probability, on which they ſhould receive or reject it. Thoſe who have fairly and truly examin'd, and are thereby got paſt doubt in all the Doctrines they profeſs and govern themſelves by, would have a juſter Pretence to require others to follow them: But theſe are ſo few in Number, and find ſo little reaſon to be magiſterial in their Opinions, that nothing inſolent and imperious is to be expected from them: And there is reaſon to think, that if Men were better inſtructed themſelves, they would be leſs impoſing on others.

The right uſe of it, mutual Charity and Forbearance.

§. 5. But to return to the Grounds of Aſſent, and the ſeveral Degrees of it: We are to take notice, that the Propoſitions we receive upon Inducements of *Probability*, are *of two ſorts*; either concerning ſome particular Exiſtence, or, as it is uſually term'd, Matter of Fact, which falling under Obſervation, is capable

Probability is either of Matter of Fact or Speculation.

capable of human Teſtimony; or elſe concerning things, which being beyond the Diſcovery of our Senſes, are not capable of any ſuch Teſtimony.

The concurrent Experience of all other Men with ours, produces Aſſurance approaching to Knowledg.

§. 6. Concerning the *firſt* of theſe, *viz. Particular Matter of Fact.*

Firſt, Where any particular thing, conſonant to the conſtant Obſervation of our ſelves and others in the like caſe, comes atteſted by the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, we receive it as eaſily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain Knowledg; and we reaſon and act thereupon with as little doubt, as if it were perfect Demonſtration. Thus, if all *Engliſhmen*, who have occaſion to mention it, ſhould affirm that it froze in *England* the laſt Winter, or that there were Swallows ſeen there in the Summer; I think a Man could almoſt as little doubt of it, as that Seven and Four are Eleven. The firſt therefore, and *higheſt Degree of Probability*, is, when the general Conſent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a Man's conſtant and never-failing Experience in like caſes, to confirm the Truth of any particular Matter of Fact atteſted by fair Witneſſes: ſuch are all the ſtated Conſtitutions and Properties of Bodies, and the regular Proceedings of Cauſes and Effects in the ordinary Courſe of Nature. This we call an Argument from the Nature of things themſelves. For what our own and other Mens conſtant Obſervation has found always to be after the ſame manner, that we with reaſon conclude to be the Effects of ſteady and regular Cauſes, tho' they come not within the reach of our Knowledg. Thus, that Fire warm'd a Man, made Lead fluid, and chang'd the Colour or Conſiſtency in Wood or Charcoal; that Iron ſunk in Water, and ſwam in Quickſilver: Theſe and the like Propoſitions about particular Facts, being agreeable to our conſtant Experience, as often as we have to do with theſe matters; and being generally ſpoke of (when mention'd by others) as things found conſtantly to be ſo, and therefore not ſo much as controverted by any body; we are put paſt doubt, that a Relation affirming any ſuch thing to have been, or any Predication that it will happen again in the ſame manner, is very true. Theſe *Probabilities* riſe ſo near to *Certainty*, that they govern our Thoughts as abſolutely, and influence all our Actions as fully, as the moſt evident Demonſtration; and in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them and certain Knowledg. Our Belief thus grounded, riſes to *Aſſurance.*

Unqueſtionable Teſtimony and Experience for the moſt part produce Confidence.

§. 7. *Secondly*, *The next degree of Probability* is, when I find by my own Experience, and the Agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be, for the moſt part, ſo; and that the particular inſtance of it is atteſted by many and undoubted Witneſſes, *v. g.* Hiſtory giving us ſuch an account of Men in all Ages; and my own Experience, as far as I had an Opportunity to obſerve, confirming it, that moſt Men prefer their private Advantage to the publick: If all Hiſtorians that write of *Tiberius*, ſay that *Tiberius* did ſo, it is extremely probable. And in this caſe, our Aſſent has a ſufficient foundation to raiſe it ſelf to a degree, which we may call *Confidence.*

Fair Teſtimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, produces alſo confident Belief.

§. 8. *Thirdly*, In things that happen indifferently, as that a Bird ſhould fly this or that way; that it ſhould thunder on a Man's right or left Hand, *&c.* when any particular matter of fact is vouch'd by the concurrent Teſtimony of unſuſpected Witneſſes, there our Aſſent is alſo unavoidable. Thus, That there is ſuch a City in *Italy* as *Rome*; That about 1700 Years ago, there lived in it a Man, call'd *Julius Cæſar*; that he was a General, and that he won a Battel againſt another, call'd *Pompey*: This, tho' in the nature of the thing there be nothing for nor againſt it, yet being related by Hiſtorians of credit, and contradicted by no one Writer, a Man cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it, as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance, whereof he himſelf is a Witneſs.

Experiences and Teſtimonies clashing, infinitely vary the degrees of Probability.

§. 9. Thus far the matter goes eaſy enough. Probability upon ſuch grounds carries ſo much Evidence with it, that it naturally determines the Judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or diſbelieve, as a Demonſtration does, whether we will know, or be ignorant. The difficulty is, when Teſtimonies contradict common Experience, and the Reports of Hiſtory and Witneſſes claſh with the ordinary courſe of Nature, or with one another; there it is, where Diligence, Attention, and Exactneſs is requir'd, to form a right Judgment, and to proportion the *Aſſent* to the different Evidence and Probability of the thing;

thing; which riſes and falls, according as thoſe two Foundations of Credibility, *viz.* common Obſervation in like caſes, and particular Teſtimonies in that particular Inſtance, favour or contradict it. Theſe are liable to ſo great variety of contrary Obſervations, Circumſtances, Reports, different Qualifications, Tempers, Deſigns, Overſights, *&c.* of the Reporters, that 'tis impoſſible to reduce to preciſe Rules the various degrees wherein Men give their Aſſent. This only may be ſaid in general, That as the Arguments and Proofs *pro* and *con*, upon due Examination, nicely weighing every particular Circumſtance, ſhall to any one appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater or leſs degree, to preponderate on either ſide; ſo they are fitted to produce in the Mind ſuch different Entertainment, as we call *Belief, Conjecture, Gueſs, Doubt, Wavering, Diſtruſt, Diſbelief*, &c.

Traditional Teſtimonies, the farther remov'd, the leſs their Proof.

§. 10. This is what concerns *Aſſent* in matters wherein Teſtimony is made uſe of: concerning which, I think, it may not be amiſs to take notice of a Rule obſerv'd in the Law of *England*; which is, That tho' the atteſted Copy of a Record be good Proof, yet the Copy of a Copy ever ſo well atteſted, and by ever ſo credible Witneſſes, will not be admitted as a proof in Judicature. This is ſo generally approv'd as reaſonable, and ſuited to the Wiſdom and Caution to be uſed in our Enquiry after material Truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This Practice, if it be allowable in the Deciſions of Right and Wrong, carries this Obſervation along with it, *viz.* That any Teſtimony, the farther off it is from the original Truth, the leſs force and proof it has. The Being and Exiſtence of the thing it ſelf, is what I call the original Truth. A credible Man vouching his Knowledg of it, is a good proof: But if another equally credible to witneſs it from his Report, the Teſtimony is weaker; and a third that atteſts the Hear-ſay of an Hear-ſay, is yet leſs conſiderable. So that *in traditional Truths, each Remove weakens the Force of the Proof:* And the more hands the Tradition has ſucceſſively paſs'd thro', the leſs ſtrength and evidence does it receive from them. This I thought neceſſary to be taken notice of, becauſe I find amongſt ſome Men the quite contrary commonly practis'd, who look on Opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thouſand years ſince would not, to a rational Man, contemporary with the firſt Voucher, have appear'd at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond all queſtion, only becauſe ſeveral have ſince, from him, ſaid it one after another. Upon this ground, Propoſitions evidently falſe or doubtful enough in their firſt beginning, come by an inverted Rule of Probability to paſs for authentick Truths; and thoſe which found or deſerv'd little credit from the mouths of their firſt Authors, are thought to grow venerable by Age, and are urg'd as undeniable.

Yet Hiſtory is of great uſe.

§. 11. I would not be thought here to leſſen the Credit and Uſe of *Hiſtory*: 'tis all the light we have in many caſes, and we receive from it a great part of the uſeful Truths we have, with a convincing Evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the Records of Antiquity: I wiſh we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this Truth it ſelf forces me to ſay, That no *Probability* can ariſe higher than its firſt Original. What has no other Evidence than the ſingle Teſtimony of one only Witneſs, muſt ſtand or fall by his only Teſtimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; and tho' cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is ſo far from receiving any ſtrength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Paſſion, Intereſt, Inadvertency, Miſtake of his Meaning, and a thouſand odd Reaſons, or Capricio's, Mens Minds are acted by (impoſſible to be diſcover'd) may make one Man quote another Man's Words or Meaning wrong. He that has but ever ſo little examin'd the Citations of Writers, cannot doubt how little Credit the Quotations deſerve, where the Originals are wanting; and conſequently how much leſs, Quotations of Quotations can be rely'd on. This is certain, that what in one Age was affirm'd upon ſlight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future Ages, by being often repeated. But the farther ſtill it is from the Original, the leſs valid it is, and has always leſs force in the mouth or writing of him that laſt made uſe of it, than in his from whom he receiv'd it.

In things which Senſe cannot diſcover, Analogy is the great Rule of Probability.

§. 12. The Probabilities we have hitherto mention'd, are only ſuch as concern matter of fact, and ſuch things as are capable of Obſervation and Teſtimony. There remains that other ſort, *concerning* which Men entertain Opinions with variety

variety of Aſſent, tho' the *Things* be ſuch, *that falling not under the reach of our Senſes, they are not capable of Teſtimony.* Such are, 1. The Exiſtence, Nature, and Operations of finite immaterial Beings without us; as Spirits, Angels, Devils, *&c.* or the Exiſtence of material Beings; which either for their Smalneſs in themſelves, or Remoteneſs from us, our Senſes cannot take notice of, as whether there be any Plants, Animals, and intelligent Inhabitants in the Planets, and other Manſions of the vaſt Univerſe. 2. Concerning the manner of Operation in moſt parts of the Works of Nature: wherein tho' we ſee the ſenſible Effects, yet their Cauſes are unknown, and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produc'd. We ſee Animals are generated, nouriſh'd, and move; the Load ſtone draws Iron; and the parts of a Candle ſucceſſively melting, turn into Flame, and give us both Light and Heat. Theſe and the like Effects we ſee and know: but the Cauſes that operate, and the Manner they are produc'd in, we can only gueſs, and probably conjecture. For theſe and the like coming not within the Scrutiny of human Senſes, cannot be examin'd by them, or be atteſted by any body; and therefore can appear more or leſs probable, only as they more or leſs agree to Truths that are eſtabliſh'd in our Minds, and as they hold proportion to other parts of our Knowledg and Obſervation. *Analogy* in theſe matters is the only help we have, and 'tis from that alone we draw all our grounds of Probability. Thus obſerving that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently one upon another, produces Heat, and very often Fire it ſelf, we have reaſon to think, that what we call Heat and Fire, conſiſts in a violent Agitation of the imperceptible minute Parts of the burning Matter: obſerving likewiſe that the different Refractions of pellucid Bodies produce in our Eyes the different Appearances of ſeveral Colours; and alſo that the different ranging and laying the ſuperficial Parts of ſeveral Bodies, as of Velvet, water'd Silk, *&c.* does the like, we think it probable that the Colour and ſhining of Bodies, is in them nothing but the different Arrangement and Refraction of their minute and inſenſible Parts. Thus finding in all parts of the Creation, that fall under human Obſervation, that there is a gradual Connection of one with another, without any great or diſcernible Gaps between, in all that great variety of things we ſee in the World, which are ſo cloſely link'd together, that in the ſeveral Ranks of Beings, it is not eaſy to diſcover the Bounds betwixt them; we have reaſon to be perſuaded, that by ſuch gentle ſteps things aſcend upwards in Degrees of Perfection. 'Tis a hard matter to ſay where Senſible and Rational begin, and where Inſenſible and Irrational end: and who is there quick-ſighted enough to determine preciſely, which is the loweſt Species of living things, and which the firſt of thoſe which have no Life? Things, as far as we can obſerve, leſſen and augment, as the Quantity does in a regular Cone; where tho' there be a manifeſt odds betwixt the Bigneſs of the Diameter at a remote diſtance, yet the difference betwixt the upper and under, where they touch one another, is hardly diſcernible. The difference is exceeding great between ſome Men, and ſome Animals: But if we will compare the Underſtanding and Abilities of ſome Men and ſome Brutes, we ſhall find ſo little difference, that 'will be hard to ſay, that that of the Man is either clearer or larger. Obſerving, I ſay, ſuch gradual and gentle Deſcents downwards in thoſe Parts of the Creation that are beneath Men, the Rule of Analogy may make it probable, that it is ſo alſo in things above us and our Obſervation; and that there are ſeveral Ranks of intelligent Beings, excelling us in ſeveral Degrees of Perfection, aſcending upwards towards the infinite Perfection of the Creator, by gentle Steps and Differences, that are every one at no great diſtance from the next to it. This ſort of Probability, which is the beſt Conduct of rational Experiments, and the Riſe of Hypotheſes, has alſo its Uſe and Influence; and a wary Reaſoning from Analogy, leads us often into the Diſcovery of Truths and uſeful Productions, which would otherwiſe lie conceal'd.

One Caſe where contrary Experience leſſens not the Teſtimony.

§. 13. Tho' the common Experience and the ordinary Courſe of things have juſtly a mighty influence on the Minds of Men, to make them give or refuſe Credit to any thing propos'd to their Belief; yet there is one Caſe, wherein the Strangeneſs of the Fact leſſens not the Aſſent to a fair Teſtimony given of it. For where ſuch ſupernatural Events are ſuitable to Ends aim'd at by him, who has the power to change the Courſe of Nature, there, under ſuch Circumſtances, they

they may be the fitter to procure Belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary Obſervation. This is the proper caſe of *Miracles*, which well atteſted do not only find credit themſelves, but give it alſo to other Truths, which need ſuch Confirmation.

The bare Teſtimony of Revelation is the higheſt Certainty.

§. 14. Beſides thoſe we have hitherto mention'd, there is one ſort of Propoſitions that challenge the higheſt degree of our Aſſent upon bare Teſtimony, whether the thing propos'd agree or diſagree with common Experience, and the ordinary Courſe of things, or no. The reaſon whereof is, becauſe the Teſtimony is of ſuch an one, as cannot deceive, nor be deceiv'd, and that is of God himſelf. This carries with it Aſſurance beyond doubt, Evidence beyond exception. This is call'd by a peculiar name, *Revelation*; and our Aſſent to it, *Faith*: which as abſolutely determines our Minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering, as our Knowledg it ſelf; and we may as well doubt of our own Being, as we can, whether any Revelation from GOD be true. So that Faith is a ſettled and ſure Principle of Aſſent and Aſſurance, and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Heſitation. Only we muſt be ſure, that it be a divine Revelation, and that we underſtand it right: elſe we ſhall expoſe our ſelves to all the Extravagancy of Enthuſiaſm, and all the Error of wrong Principles, if we have Faith and Aſſurance in what is not divine Revelation. And therefore in thoſe caſes our Aſſent can be rationally no higher than the Evidence of its being a Revelation, and that this is the meaning of the Expreſſions it is deliver'd in. If the Evidence of its being a Revelation, or that this its true Senſe be only on probable Proofs, our Aſſent can reach no higher than an Aſſurance or Diffidence, ariſing from the more or leſs apparent Probability of the Proofs. But of Faith, and the precedency it ought to have before other Arguments of Perſuaſion, I ſhall ſpeak more hereafter, where I treat of it, as it is ordinarily placed, in contradiſtinction to Reaſon; tho' in truth it be nothing elſe but an Aſſent founded on the higheſt Reaſon.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Reaſon.

Various Significations of the word Reaſon.

§. 1. THE word *Reaſon* in the *Engliſh* Language has *different Significations*: ſometimes it is taken for true and clear Principles; ſometimes for clear and fair Deductions from thoſe Principles; and ſometimes for the Cauſe, and particularly the final Cauſe. But the Conſideration I ſhall have of it here, is in a Signification different from all theſe; and that is, as it ſtands for a Faculty in Man, that Faculty whereby Man is ſuppos'd to be diſtinguiſh'd from Beaſts, and wherein it is evident he much ſurpaſſes them.

Wherein Reaſoning conſiſts.

§. 2. If general Knowledg, as has been ſhewn, conſiſts in a Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our own *Ideas*; and the Knowledg of the Exiſtence of all things without us (except only of a GOD, whoſe Exiſtence every Man may certainly know and demonſtrate to himſelf from his own Exiſtence) be had only by our Senſes: what room then is there for the Exerciſe of any other Faculty, but outward Senſe and inward Perception? What need is there of Reaſon? Very much; both for the enlargement of our Knowledg, and regulating our Aſſent: For it hath to do both in Knowledg and Opinion, and is neceſſary and aſſiſting to all our other intellectual Faculties, and indeed contains two of them, *viz. Sagacity and Illation.* By the one, it finds out; and by the other, it ſo orders the intermediate *Ideas*, as to diſcover what Connection there is in each Link of the Chain, whereby the Extremes are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the Truth ſought for, which is that we call *Illation* or *Inference*, and conſiſts in nothing but the Perception of the Connection there is between the *Ideas*, in each ſtep of the Deduction, whereby the Mind comes to ſee either the certain Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas* as in Demonſtration, in which it arrives at Knowledg; or their probable Connection, on which it gives or with-holds its Aſſent, as in Opinion. Senſe and Intuition reach but a very little way. The greateſt part of our Knowledg depends

pends upon Deductions and intermediate *Ideas*: And in those cases, where we are fain to substitute Assent instead of Knowledg, and take Propositions for true, without being certain they are so, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the grounds of their Probability. In both these cases, the Faculty which finds out the Means, and rightly applies them to discover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we call Reason. For as Reason perceives the necessary and indubitable Connection of all the *Ideas* or Proofs one to another, in each Step of any Demonstration that produces Knowledg; so it likewise perceives the probable Connection of all the *Ideas* or Proofs one to another, in every Step of a Discourse, to which it will think Assent due. This is the lowest Degree of that, which can be truly call'd Reason. For where the Mind does not perceive this probable Connection, where it does not discern whether there be any such Connection or no; there Mens Opinions are not the Product of Judgment, or the Consequence of Reason, but the Effects of Chance and Hazard, or a Mind floating at all adventures, without Choice, and without Direction.

Its four Parts. §. 3. So that we may in *Reason* consider these *four Degrees*: the first and highest, is the discovering and finding out of Proofs; the second, the regular and methodical Disposition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit Order, to make their Connection and Force be plainly and easily perceiv'd; the third is the perceiving their Connection; and the fourth, a making a right Conclusion. These several degrees may be observ'd in any mathematical Demonstration; it being one thing to perceive the Connection of each Part, as the Demonstration is made by another; another to perceive the Dependence of the Conclusion on all the Parts; a third, to make out a Demonstration clearly and neatly one's self; and something different from all these, to have first found out those intermediate *Ideas* or Proofs by which it is made.

Syllogism not the great Instrument of Reason. §. 4. There is one thing more, which I shall desire to be consider'd concerning Reason; and that is, whether *Syllogism*, as is generally thought, be the proper Instrument of it, and the usefullest way of exercising this Faculty. The Causes I have to doubt, are these:

First, Because Syllogism serves our Reason, but in one only of the fore-mention'd Parts of it; and that is, to shew the Connection of the Proofs in any one Instance, and no more: but in this it is of no great use, since the Mind can perceive such Connection where it really is, as easily, nay perhaps better, without it.

If we will observe the Actings of our Minds, we shall find that we reason best and clearest, when we only observe the Connection of the Proof, without reducing our Thoughts to any Rule of Syllogism. And therefore we may take notice, that there are many Men that reason exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a Syllogism. He that will look into many Parts of *Asia* and *America*, will find Men reason there perhaps as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a Syllogism, nor can reduce any one Argument to those Forms: And I believe scarce any one ever makes Syllogisms in reasoning within himself. Indeed Syllogism is made use of on occasion, to discover a Fallacy hid in a rhetorical Flourish, or cunningly wrap'd up in a smooth Period; and stripping an Absurdity of the Cover of Wit and good Language, shew it in its naked Deformity. But the Weakness or Fallacy of such a loose Discourse, it shews, by the artificial Form it is put into, only to those who have thorowly study'd *Mode* and *Figure*, and have so examin'd the many ways that three Propositions may be put together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what grounds it is that they do so. All who have so far consider'd *Syllogism*, as to see the reason why in three Propositions laid together in one Form, the Conclusion will be certainly right, but in another, not certainly so; I grant are certain of the Conclusion they draw from the Premises in the allow'd *Modes* and *Figures*. But they who have not so far look'd into those Forms, are not sure by virtue of Syllogism, that the Conclusion certainly follows from the Premises; they only take it to be so by an implicit Faith in their Teachers, and a Confidence in those Forms of Argumentation; but this is still but believing, not being certain. Now if, of all Mankind, those who can make Syllogisms are extremely few in comparison of those who cannot; and if

if of thoſe few who have been taught Logick, there is but a very ſmall Number, who do any more than believe that Syllogiſms in the allow'd *Modes* and *Figures* do conclude right, without knowing certainly that they do ſo; if Syllogiſms muſt be taken for the only proper Inſtrument of Reaſon and Means of Knowledg, it will follow, that before *Ariſtotle* there was not one Man that did or cou'd know any thing by Reaſon; and that ſince the Invention of Syllogiſms, there is not one of ten thouſand that doth.

But God has not been ſo ſparing to Men to make them barely two-leg'd Creatures, and left it to *Ariſtotle* to make them Rational, *i. e.* thoſe few of them that he could get ſo to examine the Grounds of Syllogiſms, as to ſee, that in above threeſcore ways that three Propoſitions may be laid together, there are but about fourteen, wherein one may be ſure that the Concluſion is right, and upon what ground it is, that in theſe few the Concluſion is certain, and in the other not. God has been more bountiful to Mankind than ſo. He has given them a Mind that can reaſon, without being inſtructed in Methods of ſyllogizing: The underſtanding is not taught to reaſon by theſe Rules; it has a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of its *Ideas*, and can range them right, without any ſuch perplexing Repetitions. I ſay not this any way to leſſen *Ariſtotle*, whom I look on as one of the greateſt Men amongſt the Antients; whoſe large Views, Acuteneſs and Penetration of Thought, and Strength of Judgment, few have equal'd: And who in this very Invention of Forms of Argumentation, wherein the Concluſion may be ſhewn to be rightly infer'd, did great Service againſt thoſe who were not aſham'd to deny any thing. And I readily own, that all right Reaſoning may be reduc'd to his Forms of Syllogiſm. But yet I think without any Diminution to him I may truly ſay, that they are not the only, nor the beſt way of Reaſoning, for the leading of thoſe into Truth who are willing to find it, and deſire to make the beſt Uſe they may of their Reaſon, for the Attainment of Knowledg. And he himſelf, it is plain, found out ſome Forms to be concluſive, and others not, not by the Forms themſelves, but by the original Way of Knowledg, *i. e.* by the viſible Agreement of *Ideas*. Tell a Country Gentlewoman that the Wind is South-Weſt, and the Weather lowering, and like to rain, and ſhe will eaſily underſtand, 'tis not ſafe for her to go abroad thin clad, in ſuch a day, after a Fever: ſhe clearly ſees the probable Connection of all theſe, *viz.* South-Weſt-Wind, and Clouds, Rain, Wetting, taking Cold, Relapſe, and Danger of Death, without tying them together in thoſe artificial and cumberſom Fetters of ſeveral Syllogiſms, that clog and hinder the Mind, which proceeds from one part to another quicker and clearer without them; and the Probability which ſhe eaſily perceives in things thus in their native State would be quite loſt, if this Argument were manag'd learnedly, and propos'd in Mode and Figure. For it very often confounds the Connection: And, I think, every one will perceive in mathematical Demonſtrations, that the Knowledg gain'd thereby comes ſhorteſt and cleareſt without Syllogiſms.

Inference is look'd on as the great Act of the Rational Faculty, and ſo it is when it is rightly made; but the Mind, either very deſirous to enlarge its Knowledg, or very apt to favour the Sentiments it has once imbib'd, is very forward to make Inferences, and therefore often makes too much haſte before it perceives the Connection of the *Ideas* that muſt hold the Extremes together.

To infer, is nothing but by virtue of one Propoſition laid down as true, to draw in another as true, *i. e.* to ſee or ſuppoſe ſuch a Connection of the two *Ideas* of the infer'd Propoſition. *v. g.* Let this be the Propoſition laid down, *Men ſhall be puniſh'd in another World*, and from thence be infer'd this other, *then Men can determine themſelves*. The Queſtion now is to know whether the Mind has made this Inference right or no; if it has made it by finding out the intermediate *Ideas*, and taking a view of the Connection of them, plac'd in a due order, it has proceeded rationally, and made a right Inference. If it has done it without ſuch a view, it has not ſo much made an Inference that will hold, or an Inference of right Reaſon, as ſhewn a Willingneſs to have it be, or be taken for ſuch. But in neither Caſe is it *Syllogiſm* that diſcover'd thoſe *Ideas*, or ſhew'd the Connection of them, for they muſt be both found out, and

and the Connection every where perceiv'd, before they can rationally be made uſe of in *Syllogiſm*: unleſs it can be ſaid, that any *Idea*, without conſidering what Connection it hath with the two other, whoſe Agreement ſhould be ſhewn by it, will do well enough in a *Syllogiſm*, and may be taken at a venture for the *Medius Terminus*, to prove any Concluſion. But this no body will ſay, becauſe it is by virtue of the perceiv'd Agreement of the intermediate *Idea* with the Extremes, that the Extremes are concluded to agree; and therefore each intermediate *Idea* muſt be ſuch, as in the whole Chain hath a viſible Connection with thoſe two it is plac'd between, or elſe thereby the Concluſion cannot be infer'd or drawn in: for wherever any Link of the Chain is looſe, and without Connection, there the whole Strength of it is loſt, and it hath no Force to infer or draw in any thing. In the Inſtance above-mention'd, what is it ſhews the Force of the Inference, and conſequently the Reaſonableneſs of it, but a view of the Connection of all the intermediate *Ideas* that draw in the Concluſion, or Propoſition infer'd? *v. g. Men ſhall be puniſh'd*,——*God the Puniſher*,——*juſt Puniſhment*.——*the Puniſh'd guilty*——*could have done otherwiſe*——*Freedom*——*Self-determination*: By which chain of *Ideas* thus viſibly link'd together in train, *i. e.* each intermediate *Idea* agreeing on each ſide with thoſe two it is immediately plac'd between, the *Ideas* of Men and Self-determination appear to be connected, *i. e.* this Propoſition *Men can determine themſelves* is drawn in, or infer'd from this, *that they ſhall be puniſh'd in the other World*. For here the Mind ſeeing the Connection there is between the *Idea of Mens Puniſhment in the other World*, and the *Idea of God puniſhing*, between *God puniſhing* and *the Juſtice of the Puniſhment*; between *Juſtice of Puniſhment* and *Guilt*, between *Guilt* and a *Power to do otherwiſe*, between a *Power to do otherwiſe* and *Freedom*, and between *Freedom* and *Self-determination*; ſees the Connection between *Men* and *Self-determination*.

Now I ask whether the Connection of the Extremes be not more clearly ſeen in this ſimple and natural Diſpoſition, than in the perplex'd Repetitions, and Jumble of five or ſix *Syllogiſms*. I muſt beg pardon for calling it Jumble, till ſome body ſhall put theſe *Ideas* into ſo many *Syllogiſms*, and then ſay, that they are leſs jumbled, and their Connection more viſible, when they are tranſpos'd and repeated, and ſpun out to the greater length in artificial Forms; than in that ſhort natural plain Order they are laid down in here, wherein every one may ſee it; and wherein they muſt be ſeen before they can be put into a Train of *Syllogiſms*. For the natural Order of the connecting *Ideas* muſt direct the Order of the *Syllogiſms*, and a Man muſt ſee the Connection of each intermediate *Idea* with thoſe that it connects, before he can with reaſon make uſe of it in a *Syllogiſm*. And when all thoſe Syllogiſms are made, neither thoſe that are, nor thoſe that are not Logicians will ſee the Force of the Argumentation, *i. e.* the Connection of the Extremes, one jot the better. [For thoſe that are not Men of Art, not knowing the true Forms of *Syllogiſm*, nor the Reaſons of them, cannot know whether they are made in right and concluſive *Modes* and *Figures* or no, and ſo are not at all help'd by the Forms they are put into; tho' by them the natural Order, wherein the Mind could judg of their reſpective Connection, being diſturb'd, renders the Illation much more uncertain than without them.] And as for Logicians themſelves, they ſee the Connection of each intermediate *Idea* with thoſe it ſtands between (on which the Force of the Inference depends) as well before as after the *Syllogiſm* is made, or elſe they do not ſee it at all. For a *Syllogiſm* neither ſhews nor ſtrengthens the Connection of any two *Ideas* immediately put together, but only by the Connection ſeen in them, ſhews what Connection the Extremes have one with another. But what Connection the intermediate has with either of the Extremes in that Syllogiſm, that no Syllogiſm does or can ſhew. That the Mind only doth or can perceive, as they ſtand there in that *juxta-poſition*, by its own view, to which the Syllogiſtical Form it happens to be in gives no help or light at all; it only ſhews that if the intermediate *Idea* agrees with thoſe it is on both ſides immediately apply'd to; then thoſe two remote ones, or as they are call'd *Extremes*, do certainly agree, and therefore the immediate Connection of each *Idea* to that which it is apply'd to on each ſide, on which the Force of the Reaſoning depends, is as well ſeen before as after the *Syllogiſm* is made, or elſe but

that

that makes the Syllogiſm could never ſee it at all. This, as has been already obſerv'd, is ſeen only by the Eye, or the perceptive Faculty of the Mind, taking a view of them laid together in a *juxta-poſition*; which View of any two it has equally, whenever they are laid together in any Propoſition, whether that Propoſition be plac'd as a *Major*, or a *Minor*, in a *Syllogiſm* or no.

Of what uſe then are *Syllogiſms?* I anſwer, their chief and main uſe is in the Schools, where Men are allow'd without ſhame to deny the Agreement of *Ideas* that do manifeſtly agree; or out of the Schools to thoſe who from thence have learned without ſhame to deny the Connection of *Ideas*, which even to themſelves is viſible. But to an ingenuous Searcher after Truth, who has no other aim than to find it, there is no need of any ſuch Form to force the allowing of the Inference: the Truth and Reaſonableneſs of it is better ſeen in ranging of the *Ideas* in a ſimple and plain Order: And hence it is, that Men, in their own Enquiries after Truth, never uſe *Syllogiſms* to convince themſelves, [or in teaching others to inſtruct willing Learners.] Becauſe, before they can put them into a *Syllogiſm*, they muſt ſee the Connection that is between the intermediate *Idea* and the two other *Ideas* it is ſet between and apply'd to, to ſhew their Agreement; and when they ſee that, they ſee whether the Inference be good or no, and ſo *Syllogiſm* comes too late to ſettle it. For to make uſe again of the former Inſtance; I ask whether the Mind, conſidering the *Idea* of Juſtice, plac'd as an intermediate *Idea* between the *Puniſhment* of Men, and the Guilt of the puniſh'd, (and, till it does ſo conſider it, the Mind cannot make uſe of it as a *medius terminus*) does not as plainly ſee the Force and Strength of the Inference, as when it is form'd into Syllogiſm? To ſhew it in a very plain and eaſy Example; let *Animal* be the intermediate *Idea* or *medius terminus* that the Mind makes uſe of to ſhew the Connection of *Homo* and *Vivens*: I ask whether the Mind does not more readily and plainly ſee that Connection in the ſimple and proper Poſition of the connecting *Idea* in the middle; thus,

Homo——*Animal*——*Vivens*,

than in this perplex'd one,

Animal——*Vivens*——*Homo*——*Animal*:

Which is the Poſition theſe *Ideas* have in a Syllogiſm, to ſhew the Connection between *Homo* and *Vivens* by the intervention of *Animal*.

Indeed Syllogiſm is thought to be of neceſſary uſe, even to the Lovers of Truth, to ſhew them the Fallacies that are often conceal'd in florid, witty or involv'd Diſcourſes. But that this is a Miſtake, will appear, if we conſider, that the reaſon why ſometimes Men, who ſincerely aim at Truth, are impos'd upon by ſuch looſe, and as they are call'd Rhetorical Diſcourſes, is, that their Fancies being ſtruck with ſome lively metaphorical Repreſentations, they neglect to obſerve, or do not eaſily perceive what are the true *Ideas*, upon which the Inference depends. Now to ſhew ſuch Men the Weakneſs of ſuch an Argumentation, there needs no more but to ſtrip it of the ſuperfluous *Ideas*, which blended and confounded with thoſe on which the Inference depends, ſeem to ſhew a Connection where there is none; or at leaſt do hinder the Diſcovery of the want of it; and then to lay the naked *Ideas*, on which the Force of the Argumentation depends, in their due Order, in which Poſition the Mind, taking a view of them, ſees, what Connection they have, and ſo is able to judg of the Inference, without any need of a Syllogiſm at all.

I grant that *Mode* and *Figure* is commonly made uſe of in ſuch caſes, as if the Detection of the Incoherence of ſuch looſe Diſcourſes were wholly owing to the Syllogiſtical Form; and ſo I my ſelf formerly thought, till upon a ſtricter Examination I now find, that laying the intermediate *Ideas* naked in their due Order, ſhews the Incoherence of the Argumentation better than Syllogiſm; not only as ſubjecting each Link of the Chain, to the immediate view of the Mind in its proper place, whereby its Connection is beſt obſerv'd; but alſo becauſe Syllogiſm ſhews the Incoherence only to thoſe (who are not one of

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ten thouſand) who perfectly underſtand *Mode* and *Figure*, and the Reaſon upon which thoſe Forms are eſtabliſh'd: whereas a due and orderly placing of the *Ideas*, upon which the Inference is made, makes every one, whether Logician or not Logician, who underſtands the Terms, and hath the Faculty to perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of ſuch *Ideas* (without which, in or out of Syllogiſm, he cannot perceive the Strength or Weakneſs, Coherence or Incoherence of the Diſcourſe) ſee the want of Connection in the Argumentation, and the Abſurdity of the Inference.

And thus I have known a Man unskilful in Syllogiſm, who at firſt hearing could perceive the Weakneſs and Inconcluſiveneſs of a long artificial and plauſible Diſcourſe, wherewith others better skill'd in Syllogiſm have been miſled. And I believe there are few of my Readers who do not know ſuch. And indeed if it were not ſo, the Debates of moſt Princes Councils, and the Buſineſs of Aſſemblies would be in danger to be miſmanag'd, ſince thoſe who are rely'd upon, and have uſually a great ſtroke in them, are not always ſuch, who have the good luck to be perfectly knowing in the Forms of *Syllogiſm*, or expert in *Mode* and *Figure*. And if Syllogiſm were the only, or ſo much as the ſureſt way to detect the Fallacies of artificial Diſcourſes; I do not think that all Mankind, even Princes in Matters that concern their Crowns and Dignities, are ſo much in love with Falſhood and Miſtake, that they would every where have neglected to bring Syllogiſm into the Debates of moment; or thought it ridiculous ſo much as to offer them in Affairs of conſequence: a plain Evidence to me, that Men of Parts and Penetration, who were not idly to diſpute at their eaſe, but were to act according to the Reſult of their Debates, and often pay for their Miſtakes with their Heads or Fortunes, found thoſe ſcholaſtick Forms were of little uſe to diſcover Truth or Fallacy, whilſt both the one and the other might be ſhewn, and better ſhewn without them to thoſe who would not refuſe to ſee what was viſibly ſhewn them.

Secondly, Another Reaſon that makes me doubt whether Syllogiſm be the only proper Inſtrument of Reaſon in the Diſcovery of Truth, is, that of whatever uſe *Mode* and *Figure* is pretended to be in the laying open of Fallacy (which has been above conſider'd) thoſe ſcholaſtick Forms of Diſcourſe are not leſs liable to Fallacies than the plainer ways of Argumentation: And for this I appeal to common Obſervation, which has always found theſe artificial Methods of Reaſoning more adapted to catch and intangle the Mind, than to inſtruct and inform the Underſtanding. And hence it is, that Men even when they are baffl'd and ſilenc'd in this ſcholaſtick way, are ſeldom or never convinc'd, and ſo brought over to the conquering ſide: they perhaps acknowledg their Adverſary to be the more skilful Diſputant; but reſt nevertheleſs perſuaded of the Truth on their ſide; and go away, worſted as they are, with the ſame Opinion they brought with them, which they could not do, if this way of Argumentation carry'd Light and Conviction with it, and made Men ſee where the Truth lay. And therefore Syllogiſm has been thought more proper for the attaining Victory in Diſpute, than for the Diſcovery or Confirmation of Truth in fair Enquiries. And if it be certain, that Fallacy can be couch'd in Syllogiſm, as it cannot be deny'd, it muſt be ſomething elſe, and not Syllogiſm that muſt diſcover them.

I have had Experience how ready ſome Men are, when all the Uſe which they have been wont to aſcribe to any thing is not allow'd, to cry out, that I am for laying it wholly aſide. But to prevent ſuch unjuſt and groundleſs Imputations, I tell them, that I am not for taking away any Helps to the Underſtanding, in the attainment of Knowledg. And if Men skill'd in, and us'd to Syllogiſms, find them aſſiſting to their Reaſon in the diſcovery of Truth, I think they ought to make uſe of them. All that I aim at is, that they ſhould not aſcribe more to theſe Forms than belongs to them; and think that Men have no uſe, or not ſo full a uſe of their reaſoning Faculty without them. Some Eyes want Spectacles to ſee things clearly and diſtinctly; but let not thoſe that uſe them therefore ſay, nobody can ſee clearly without them: Thoſe who do ſo will be thought in favour with Art (which perhaps they are beholden to) a little too muſt to depreſs and diſcredit Nature. Reaſon, by its own Penetration where it is ſtrong and exercis'd, uſually ſees quicker and clearer without Syllogiſm.

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If uſe of thoſe Spectacles has ſo dimm'd its Sight, that it cannot without them ſee Conſequences or Inconſequences in Argumentation, I am not ſo unreaſonable as to be againſt the uſing them. Every one knows what beſt fits his own Sight. But let him not hence conclude all in the dark, who uſe not juſt the ſame Helps that he finds a need of.

Helps little in Demonſtration, leſs in Probability.

§. 5. But however it be in Knowledg, I think I may truly ſay, it is of *far* leſs, or *no uſe* at all *in Probabilities.* For the Aſſent there, being to be determin'd by the Preponderancy, after a due weighing of all the Proofs, with all Circumſtances on both ſides, nothing is ſo unfit to aſſiſt the Mind in that, as Syllogiſm; which running away with one aſſum'd Probability, or one topical Argument, purſues that, till it has led the Mind quite out of ſight of the thing under Conſideration; and forcing it upon ſome remote Difficulty, holds it faſt there, entangled perhaps, and as it were manacled in the Chain of Syllogiſms, without allowing it the liberty, much leſs affording it the Helps requiſite to ſhew on which ſide, all things conſider'd, is the greater Probability.

Serves not to increaſe our Knowledg, but fence with it.

§. 6. But let it help us (as perhaps may be ſaid) in convincing Men of their Errors and Miſtakes: (and yet I would fain ſee the Man that was forc'd out of his Opinion by dint of *Syllogiſm*) yet ſtill it fails *our Reaſon* in that Part, which, if not its higheſt Perfection, is yet certainly its hardeſt Task, and that which we moſt need its help in; and that is *the finding out of Proofs, and making new Diſcoveries.* The Rules of *Syllogiſm* ſerve not to furniſh the Mind with thoſe intermediate *Ideas* that may ſhew the Connection of remote ones. This way of reaſoning diſcovers no new Proofs, but is the Art of marſhalling and ranging the old ones we have already. The 47th Propoſition of the firſt Book of *Euclid* is very true; but the Diſcovery of it, I think, not owing to any Rules of common Logick. A Man knows firſt, and then he is able to prove ſyllogiſtically. So that *Syllogiſm* comes after Knowledg, and then a Man has little or no need of it. But 'tis chiefly by the finding out thoſe *Ideas* that ſhew the Connection of diſtant ones, that our Stock of Knowledg is increas'd, and that uſeful Arts and Sciences are advanc'd. *Syllogiſm* at beſt is but the Art of Fencing with the little Knowledg we have, without making any Addition to it. And if a Man ſhould employ his Reaſon all this way, he will not do much otherwiſe than he, who having got ſome Iron out of the Bowels of the Earth, would have it beaten up all into Swords, and put it into his Servants Hands to fence with, and bang one another. Had the King of *Spain* imploy'd the Hands of his People, and his *Spaniſh* Iron ſo, he had brought to light but little of that Treaſure that lay ſo long hid in the dark Entrails of *America.* And I am apt to think, that he who ſhall employ all the Force of his Reaſon only in brandiſhing of *Syllogiſms*, will diſcover very little of that Maſs of Knowledg, which lies yet conceal'd in the ſecret Receſſes of Nature; and which I am apt to think, native ruſtick Reaſon (as it formerly has done) is likelier to open a way to, and add to the common ſtock of Mankind, rather than any ſcholaſtick Proceeding by the ſtrict Rules of Mode and Figure.

Other Helps ſhould be ſought.

§. 7. I doubt not nevertheleſs, but there are ways to be found to aſſiſt our Reaſon in this moſt uſeful Part; and this the judicious *Hooker* incourages me to ſay, who in his *Eccl. Pol. l.* 1. §. 6. ſpeaks thus: *If there might be added the right Helps of true Art and Learning (which Helps I muſt plainly confeſs, this Age of the World carrying the name of a learned Age, doth neither much know, nor generally regard) there would undoubtedly be almoſt as much difference in Maturity of Judgment between Men therewith imur'd, and that which now Men are, as between Men that are now, and Innocents.* I do not pretend to have found, or diſcover'd here any of thoſe *right Helps of Art*, this great Man of deep Thought mentions; but this is plain, that *Syllogiſm*, and the Logick now in uſe, which were as well known in his days, can be none of thoſe he means. It is ſufficient for me, if by a Diſcourſe, perhaps ſomething out of the way, I am ſure as to me wholly new and unborrow'd, I ſhall have given occaſion to others, to caſt about for new Diſcoveries, and to ſeek in their own Thoughts, for thoſe *right Helps of Art*, which will ſcarce be found, I fear, by thoſe who ſervilely confine themſelves to the Rules and Dictates of others. For beaten Tracks lead theſe ſort of Cattle (as an obſerving *Roman* calls them) whoſe Thoughts reach only to imitation, *non quo eundum eſt, ſed quo itur.* But I can be bold to ſay, that

this Age is adorn'd with ſome Men of that Strength of Judgment, and Largeneſs of Comprehenſion, that if they would imploy their Thoughts on this Subject, could open new and undiſcover'd ways to the Advancement of Knowledg.

We reaſon about Particulars.

§. 8. Having here had an occaſion to ſpeak of *Syllogiſm* in general, and the Uſe of it in Reaſoning, and the Improvement of our Knowledg; 'tis fit, before I leave this Subject, to take notice of one manifeſt Miſtake in the Rules of *Syllogiſm, viz.* That no Syllogiſtical Reaſoning can be right and concluſive, but what has, at leaſt, one general Propoſition in it. As if we could not *reaſon*, and have Knowledg *about Particulars:* Whereas, in truth, the Matter rightly conſider'd, the immediate Object of all our Reaſoning and Knowledg, is nothing but Particulars. Every Man's Reaſoning and Knowledg is only about the *Ideas* exiſting in his own Mind, which are truly, every one of them, particular Exiſtences; and our Knowledg and Reaſoning about other things, is only as they correſpond with thoſe our particular *Ideas*. So that the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our particular *Ideas*, is the whole and utmoſt of all our Knowledg. Univerſality is but accidental to it, and conſiſts only in this, That the particular *Ideas*, about which it is, are ſuch, as more than one particular thing can correſpond with, and be repreſented by. But the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas*, and conſequently our Knowledg is equally clear and certain, whether either, or both, or neither of thoſe *Ideas* be capable of repreſenting more real Beings than one, or no. One thing more I crave leave to offer about Syllogiſm, before I leave it, *viz.* May one not upon juſt Ground enquire whether the Form Syllogiſm now has, is that which in Reaſon it ought to have? For the *Medius Terminus* being to join the Extremes, *i. e.* the intermediate *Ideas* by its Intervention, to ſhew the Agreement or Diſagreement of the two in queſtion, would not the Poſition of the *Medius Terminus* be more natural, and ſhew the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Extremes clearer and better, if it were plac'd in the middle between them? Which might be eaſily done by tranſpoſing the Propoſitions, and making the *Medius Terminus* the Predicate of the Firſt, and the Subject of the Second. As thus,

Omnis Homo eſt Animal,
Omne Animal eſt vivens,
Ergo omnis Homo eſt vivens.

Omne Corpus eſt extenſum & ſolidum,
Nullum extenſum & ſolidum eſt pura extenſio,
Ergo corpus non eſt pura extenſio.

I need not trouble my Reader with Inſtances in *Syllogiſms*, whoſe Concluſions are particular. The ſame Reaſon holds for the ſame Form in them, as well as in the general.

1. *Reaſon fails us for want of* Ideas.

§. 9. *Reaſon*, tho' it penetrates into the Depths of the Sea and Earth, elevates our Thoughts as high as the Stars, and leads us thro' the vaſt Spaces and large Room of this mighty Fabrick, yet it comes far ſhort of the real Extent of even corporeal Being; and there are many Inſtances wherein it *fails us*: As,

Firſt, It perfectly fails us, *where our* Ideas *fail*. It neither does, nor can extend it ſelf farther than they do. And therefore wherever we have no *Ideas*, our Reaſoning ſtops, and we are at an end of our Reckoning: And if at any time we reaſon about Words, which do not ſtand for any *Ideas*, 'tis only about thoſe Sounds, and nothing elſe.

2. *Becauſe of obſcure and imperfect* Ideas.

§. 10. *Secondly*, Our Reaſon is often puzzled, and at a loſs, *becauſe of the Obſcurity, Confuſion or Imperfection of the* Ideas *it is imploy'd about*; and there we are involv'd in Difficulties and Contradictions. Thus not having any perfect *Idea* of the leaſt Extenſion of Matter, nor of Infinity, we are at a loſs about the Diviſibility of Matter; but having perfect, clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of Number, our Reaſon meets with none of thoſe inextricable Difficulties in Numbers, nor finds it ſelf involv'd in any Contradictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect *Ideas* of the Operations of our Minds, and of the beginning of Motion or Thought, how the Mind produces either of them in us, and much imperfecter

perfecter yet, of the Operation of GOD, run into great Difficulties about free created Agents, which Reason cannot well extricate it self out of.

§. 11. *Thirdly*, Our Reason is often at a stand, *because it perceives not those* Ideas, *which could serve to shew the certain or probable Agreement or Disagreement of any two other* Ideas: and in this, some Mens Faculties far outgo others. Till *Algebra*, that great Instrument and Instance of human Sagacity, was discover'd, Men, with Amazement, look'd on several of the Demonstrations of antient Mathematicians, and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those Proofs to be something more than human. 3. *For want of intermediate* Ideas.

§. 12. *Fourthly*, The Mind, *by proceeding upon false Principles*, is often ingag'd in Absurdities and Difficulties, brought into Straits and Contradictions, without knowing how to free it self: And in that case it is in vain to implore the help of Reason, unless it be to discover the Falshood, and reject the Influence of those wrong Principles. Reason is so far from clearing the Difficulties which the building upon false Foundations brings a Man into, that if he will pursue it, it entangles him the more, and engages him deeper in Perplexities. 4. *Because of wrong Principles.*

§. 13. *Fifthly*, As obscure and imperfect *Ideas* often involve our Reason, so, upon the same Ground, do *dubious Words*, and uncertain Signs, *often* in Discourses and Arguings, when not warily attended to, *puzzle Mens Reason*, and bring them to a *Non-plus*. But these two latter are our Fault, and not the Fault of Reason. But yet the Consequences of them are nevertheless obvious; and the Perplexities or Errors they fill Mens Minds with, are every where observable. 5. *Because of doubtful Terms.*

§. 14. Some of the *Ideas* that are in the Mind, are so there, that they can be by themselves immediately compar'd one with another: And in these the Mind is able to perceive, that they agree or disagree as clearly, as that it has them. Thus the Mind perceives, that an Arch of a Circle is less than the whole Circle, as clearly as it does the *Idea* of a Circle: And this therefore, as has been said, I call *intuitive Knowledg*; which is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no Probation, nor can have any; this being the highest of all human Certainty. In this consists the Evidence of all those *Maxims*, which no Body has any Doubt about, but every Man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be true, as soon as ever they are propos'd to his Understanding. In the Discovery of, and Assent to these Truths, there is no use of the discursive Faculty, *no need of Reasoning*, but they are known by a superior and higher degree of *Evidence*. And such, if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think, that Angels have now, and the Spirits of just Men made perfect shall have, in a future State, of Thousands of Things, which now either wholly escape our Apprehensions, or which, our short-sighted Reason having got some faint Glimpse of, we, in the dark, grope after. *Our highest degree of Knowledg is intuitive, without Reasoning.*

§. 15. But tho' we have, here and there, a little of this clear Light, some Sparks of bright Knowledg; yet the greatest part of our *Ideas* are such, that we cannot discern their Agreement or Disagreement by an immediate comparing them. And in all these we have *need of Reasoning*, and must, by Discourse and Inference, make our Discoveries. Now of these there are two sorts, which I shall take the liberty to mention here again. *The next is Demonstration by Reasoning.*

First, Those whose Agreement or Disagreement, tho' it cannot be seen by an immediate putting them together, yet may be examin'd by the Intervention of other *Ideas*, which can be compar'd with them. In this Case when the Agreement or Disagreement of the intermediate *Idea* on both sides, with those which we would compare, is plainly discern'd, there it amounts to Demonstration, whereby Knowledg it produc'd; which tho' it be certain, yet it is not so easy, nor altogether so clear as *intuitive Knowledg*. Because in that there is barely one simple Intuition, wherein there is no room for any the least Mistake or Doubt; the Truth is seen all perfectly at once. In Demonstration, 'tis true, there is Intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there must be a Remembrance of the Intuition of the Agreement of the *Medium*, or intermediate *Idea*, with that we compar'd it with before, when we compare it with the other; and where there be many *Mediums*, there the Danger of the Mistake is the greater. For each Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* must be observ'd and seen in each Step of the whole Train, and retain'd in the Memory, just as it is; and the Mind must be sure that no part of what is necessary to

make up the Demonſtration is omitted or overlook'd. This makes ſome Demonſtrations long and perplex'd, and too hard for thoſe who have not Strength of Parts diſtinctly to perceive, and exactly carry ſo many Particulars orderly in their Heads. And even thoſe, who are able to maſter ſuch intricate Speculations, are fain ſometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one Review before they can arrive at Certainty. But yet where the Mind clearly retains the Intuition it had of the Agreement of any *Idea* with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, *&c.* there the Agreement of the firſt and the fourth is a Demonſtration, and produces certain Knowledg, which may be call'd *Rational Knowledg*, as the other is *Intuitive*.

To ſupply the Narrowneſs of this, we have nothing but Judgment upon probable Reaſoning.

§. 16. *Secondly*, There are other *Ideas*, whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement can no otherwiſe be judg'd of, but by the Intervention of others, which have not a certain Agreement with the Extremes, but an uſual or likely one: And in theſe it is that the *Judgment* is properly exercis'd, which is the acquieſcing of the Mind, that any *Ideas* do agree, by comparing them with ſuch probable *Mediums*. This, tho' it never amounts to Knowledg, no not to that which is the loweſt degree of it; yet ſometimes the intermediate *Ideas* tie the Extremes ſo firmly together, and the Probability is ſo clear and ſtrong, that Aſſent as neceſſarily follows it, as Knowledg does Demonſtration. The great Excellency and Uſe of the Judgment is to obſerve right, and take a true Eſtimate of the Force and Weight of each Probability; and then caſting them up all right together, chuſe that ſide which has the Over-balance.

Intuition, Demonſtration, Judgment.

§. 17. *Intuitive Knowledg* is the Perception of the certain Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas* immediately compar'd together.

Rational Knowledg is the Perception of the certain Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas*, by the intervention of one or more other *Ideas*.

Judgment is the thinking or taking two *Ideas* to agree or diſagree, by the intervention of one or more *Ideas*, whoſe certain Agreement or Diſagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath obſerv'd to be frequent and uſual.

Conſequences of Words, and Conſequences of Ideas.

§. 18. Tho' the deducing one Propoſition from another, or making *Inference in Words*, be a great part of Reaſon, and that which it is uſually imploy'd about; yet the principal Act of Ratiocination is the finding the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas* one with another, by the intervention of a third. As a Man, by a Yard, finds two Houſes to be of the ſame Length, which could not be brought together to meaſure their Equality by *Juxta-Poſition*. Words have their Conſequences, as the Signs of ſuch *Ideas*: and things agree or diſagree, as really they are; but we obſerve it only by our *Ideas*.

Four ſorts of Arguments.

§. 19. Before we quit this Subject, it may be worth our while a little to reflect on *four Sorts of Arguments*, that Men, in their Reaſonings with others, do ordinarily make uſe of, to prevail on their Aſſent; or at leaſt ſo to awe them, as to ſilence their Oppoſition.

1. Ad Verecundiam.

Firſt, The firſt is, to alledg the Opinions of Men, whoſe Parts, Learning, Eminency, Power, or ſome other Cauſe has gain'd a Name, and ſettled their Reputation in the common Eſteem with ſome kind of Authority. When Men are eſtabliſh'd in any kind of Dignity, 'tis thought a breach of Modeſty for others to derogate any way from it, and queſtion the Authority of Men who are in poſſeſſion of it. This is apt to be cenſur'd, as carrying with it too much of Pride, when a Man does not readily yield to the Determination of approv'd Authors, which is wont to be receiv'd with Reſpect and Submiſſion by others: and 'tis look'd upon as Inſolence for a Man to ſet up, and adhere to his own Opinion, againſt the current Stream of Antiquity; or to put it in the ballance againſt that of ſome learned Doctor, or otherwiſe approv'd Writer. Whoever backs his Tenets with ſuch Authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the Cauſe, and is ready to ſtile it Impudence in any one who ſhall ſtand out againſt them. This, I think, may be call'd *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*.

2. Ad Ignorantiam.

§. 20. *Secondly*, Another way that Men ordinarily uſe to drive others, and force them to ſubmit their Judgments, and receive the Opinion in Debate, is to require the Adverſary to admit what they alledg as a Proof, or to aſſign a better. And this I call *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*.

3. Ad Hominem.

§. 21. *Thirdly*, A third way is, to preſs a Man with Conſequences drawn from his own Principles, or Conceſſions. This is already known under the name of *Argumentum ad Hominem*.

§. 22.

§. 22. *Fourthly*, The fourth is, the uſing of Proofs drawn from any of the Foundations of Knowledg or Probability. This I call *Argumentum ad Judicium*. This alone of all the four, brings true Inſtruction with it, and advances us in our way to Knowledg. For, 1. It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right, becauſe I out of Reſpect, or any other Conſideration but that of Conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another Man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the ſame with him, becauſe I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another Man is in the right way, becauſe he has ſhewn me that I am in the wrong. I may be modeſt, and therefore not oppoſe another Man's Perſuaſion: I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an Error, and another may ſhew me that I am ſo. This may diſpoſe me, perhaps, for the Reception of Truth, but helps me not to it; that muſt come from Proofs and Arguments, and Light ariſing from the Nature of Things themſelves, and not from my Shamefacedneſs, Ignorance or Error. 4. Ad Judicium.

§. 23. By what has been before ſaid of *Reaſon*, we may be able to make ſome gueſs at the Diſtinction of Things, into thoſe that are according to, above, and contrary to Reaſon. 1. *According to Reaſon* are ſuch Propoſitions, whoſe Truth we can diſcover, by examining and tracing thoſe *Ideas* we have from *Senſation* and *Reflection*; and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable. 2. *Above Reaſon* are ſuch Propoſitions, whoſe Truth or Probability we cannot by Reaſon derive from thoſe Principles. 3. *Contrary to Reaſon* are ſuch Propoſitions, as are inconſiſtent with, or irreconcilable to our clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. Thus the Exiſtence of one GOD is according to Reaſon; the Exiſtence of more than one GOD, contrary to Reaſon; the Reſurrection of the Dead, above Reaſon. Farther, as *Above Reaſon* may be taken in a double Senſe, *viz.* either as ſignifying above Probability, or above Certainty; ſo in that large Senſe alſo, *Contrary to Reaſon*, is, I ſuppoſe, ſometimes taken. *Above, contrary, and according to Reaſon.*

§. 24. There is another uſe of the word *Reaſon*, wherein it is *oppos'd to Faith*; which tho' it be in it ſelf a very improper way of ſpeaking, yet common Uſe has ſo authoriz'd it, that it would be Folly either to oppoſe or hope to remedy it: Only I think it may not be amiſs to take notice, that however *Faith* be oppos'd to Reaſon, *Faith* is nothing but a firm Aſſent of the Mind: which if it be regulated, as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good Reaſon; and ſo cannot be oppoſite to it. He that believes, without having any Reaſon for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies; but neither ſeeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him uſe thoſe diſcerning Faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Miſtake and Error. He that does not this to the beſt of his Power, however he ſometimes lights on Truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the Luckineſs of the Accident will excuſe the Irregularity of his Proceeding. This at leaſt is certain, that he muſt be accountable for whatever Miſtakes he runs into: whereas he that makes uſe of the Light and Faculties GOD has given him, and ſeeks ſincerely to diſcover Truth by thoſe Helps and Abilities he has, may have this Satisfaction in doing his Duty as a rational Creature, that tho' he ſhould miſs Truth, he will not miſs the Reward of it. For he governs his Aſſent right, and places it as he ſhould, who in any Caſe or Matter whatſoever, believes or disbelieves according as Reaſon directs him. He that does otherwiſe, tranſgreſſes againſt his own Light, and miſuſes thoſe Faculties which were given him to no other End but to ſearch and follow the clearer Evidence, and greater Probability. But ſince Reaſon and Faith are by ſome Men oppos'd, we will ſo conſider them in the following Chapter. *Reaſon and Faith not oppoſite.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reaſon, and their diſtinct Provinces.

Neceſſary to know their Boundaries.

§. 1. IT has been above ſhewn, 1. That we are of neceſſity ignorant, and want Knowledg of all ſorts, where we want *Ideas*. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational Knowledg, where we want Proofs. 3. That we want general Knowledg and Certainty, as far as we want clear and determin'd ſpecifick *Ideas*. 4. That we want Probability to direct our Aſſent in Matters where we have neither Knowledg of our own, nor Teſtimony of other Men, to bottom our Reaſon upon.

From theſe things thus premis'd, I think we may come to lay down the Meaſures and *Boundaries between Faith and Reaſon*; the want whereof may poſſibly have been the cauſe, if not of great Diſorders, yet at leaſt of great Diſputes, and perhaps Miſtakes in the World. For till it be reſolv'd how far we are to be guided by Reaſon, and how far by Faith, we ſhall in vain diſpute, and endeavour to convince one another in Matters of Religion.

Faith and Reaſon what, as contradiſtinguiſh'd.

§. 2. I find every Sect, as far as Reaſon will help them, make uſe of it gladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, *'Tis matter of Faith, and above Reaſon.* And I do not ſee how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a Gainſayer who makes uſe of the ſame Plea, without ſetting down ſtrict Boundaries between *Faith* and *Reaſon*; which ought to be the firſt Point eſtabliſh'd in all Queſtions, where *Faith* has any thing to do.

Reaſon therefore here, as contra-diſtinguiſh'd to *Faith*, I take to be the Diſcovery of the Certainty or Probability of ſuch Propoſitions or Truths, which the Mind arrives at by Deduction made from ſuch *Ideas*, which it has got by the uſe of its natural Faculties, *viz.* by Senſation or Reflection.

Faith, on the other ſide, is the Aſſent to any Propoſition, not thus made out by the Deductions of Reaſon; but upon the Credit of the Propoſer, as coming from GOD, in ſome extraordinary way of Communication. This way of diſcovering Truths to Men we call *Revelation*.

No new ſimple Idea can be convey'd by Traditional Revelation.

§. 3. *Firſt* then I ſay, That *no Man inſpir'd by GOD, can by any Revelation communicate to others any new ſimple Ideas*, which they had not before from Senſation or Reflection. For whatſoever Impreſſions he himſelf may have from the immediate Hand of GOD, this Revelation, if it be of new ſimple *Ideas*, cannot be convey'd to another, either by Words, or any other Signs. Becauſe Words by their immediate Operation on us, cauſe no other *Ideas*, but of their natural Sounds: and 'tis by the cuſtom of uſing them for Signs, that they excite and revive in our Minds latent *Ideas*; but yet only ſuch *Ideas* as were there before. For Words ſeen or heard, recal to our Thoughts thoſe *Ideas* only, which to us they have been wont to be Signs of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new, and formerly unknown ſimple *Ideas*. The ſame holds in all other Signs, which cannot ſignify to us things, of which we have before never had any *Idea* at all.

Thus whatever things were diſcover'd to St. *Paul*, when he was wrap'd up into the third Heaven, whatever new *Ideas* his Mind there receiv'd, all the Deſcription he can make to others of that Place, is only this, That there are ſuch things, *as Eye hath not ſeen, nor Ear heard, nor hath it enter'd into the Heart of Man to conceive.* And ſuppoſing GOD ſhould diſcover to any one, ſupernaturally, a Species of Creatures inhabiting, for example, *Jupiter*, or *Saturn*, (for that it is poſſible there may be ſuch, no body can deny) which had ſix Senſes; and imprint on his Mind the *Ideas* convey'd to theirs by that ſixth Senſe; he could no more, by Words, produce in the Minds of other Men thoſe *Ideas*, imprinted by that ſixth Senſe, than one of us could convey the *Idea* of any Colour by the Sounds of Words into a Man, who having the other four Senſes perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth of Seeing. For our ſimple *Ideas* then, which are the Foundation and ſole Matter of all our Notions and Knowledg, we muſt depend wholly on our Reaſon, I mean our natural Faculties; and

and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from *Traditional Revelation*; I ſay, *Traditional Revelation*, in diſtinction to *Original Revelation*. By the one, I mean that firſt Impreſſion, which is made immediately by GOD, on the Mind of any Man, to which we cannot ſet any bounds; and by the other, thoſe Impreſſions deliver'd over to others in Words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another.

Traditional Revelation may make us know Propoſitions knowable alſo by Reaſon, but not with the ſame Certainty that Reaſon doth.

§. 4. *Secondly*, I ſay, that *the ſame Truths may be diſcover'd, and convey'd down from Revelation, which are diſcoverable to us by Reaſon*, and by thoſe *Ideas* we naturally may have. So GOD might, by Revelation, diſcover the Truth of any Propoſition in *Euclid*; as well as Men, by the natural uſe of their Faculties, come to make the Diſcovery themſelves. In all things of this kind, there is little need or uſe of *Revelation*, GOD having furniſh'd us with natural and ſurer means to arrive at the knowledg of them. For whatſoever Truth we come to the clear diſcovery of, from the Knowledg and Contemplation of our own *Ideas*, will always be certainer to us, than thoſe which are convey'd to us by *Traditional Revelation*. For the Knowledg we have, that this *Revelation* came at firſt from GOD, can never be ſo ſure, as the Knowledg we have from the clear and diſtinct Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our own *Ideas*, *v. g.* if it were reveal'd ſome Ages ſince, That the three Angles of a Triangle were equal to two right ones, I might aſſent to the Truth of that Propoſition, upon the Credit of the Tradition, that it was reveal'd: But that would never amount to ſo great a Certainty, as the Knowledg of it, upon the comparing and meaſuring my own *Ideas* of two right Angles, and the three Angles of a Triangle. The like holds in Matter of Fact, knowable by our Senſes, *v. g.* the Hiſtory of the Deluge is convey'd to us by Writings, which had their Original from Revelation: And yet no body, I think, will ſay he has as certain and clear a Knowledg of the Flood, as *Noah* that ſaw it; or that he himſelf would have had, had he then been alive, and ſeen it. For he has no greater an Aſſurance than that of his Senſes, that it is writ in the Book ſuppos'd writ by *Moſes* inſpir'd: but he has not ſo great an Aſſurance that *Moſes* writ that Book, as if he had ſeen *Moſes* write it. So that the Aſſurance of its being a Revelation, is leſs ſtill than the Aſſurance of his Senſes.

Revelation cannot be admitted againſt the clear Evidence of Reaſon.

§. 5. In Propoſitions then, whoſe Certainty is built upon the clear Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Ideas*, attain'd either by immediate Intuition, as in ſelf-evident Propoſitions, or by evident Deductions of Reaſon in Demonſtrations, we need not the Aſſiſtance of *Revelation*, as neceſſary to gain our Aſſent, and introduce them into our Minds. Becauſe the natural ways of Knowledg could ſettle them there, or had done it already; which is the greateſt Aſſurance we can poſſibly have of any thing, unleſs where GOD immediately reveals it to us: And there too our Aſſurance can be no greater, than our Knowledg is, that it is a *Revelation* from GOD. But yet nothing, I think, can under that title, ſhake or over-rule plain Knowledg; or rationally prevail with any Man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear Evidence of his own Underſtanding. For ſince no Evidence of our Faculties, by which we receive ſuch *Revelations*, can exceed, if equal, the Certainty of our intuitive Knowledg, we can never receive for a Truth any thing, that is directly contrary to our clear and diſtinct Knowledg; *v. g.* the *Ideas* of one Body, and one Place, do ſo clearly agree, and the Mind has ſo evident a Perception of their Agreement, that we can never aſſent to a Propoſition, that affirms the ſame Body to be in two diſtant places at once, however it ſhould pretend to the Authority of a divine *Revelation*: Since the Evidence, *Firſt*, That we deceive not our ſelves, in aſcribing it to GOD; *Secondly*, That we underſtand it right; can never be ſo great, as the Evidence of our own intuitive Knowledg, whereby we diſcern it impoſſible for the ſame Body to be in two places at once. And therefore *no Propoſition can be receiv'd for Divine Revelation*, or obtain the Aſſent due to all ſuch, *if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledg*. Becauſe this would be to ſubvert the Principles and Foundations of all Knowledg, Evidence, and Aſſent whatſoever: And there would be left no difference between Truth and Falſhood, no Meaſures of Credible and Incredible in the World, if doubtful Propoſitions ſhall take place before ſelf-evident; and what we certainly know, give way to what we may poſſibly be miſtaken in. In Propoſitions therefore contrary to the clear

clear Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of our *Ideas*, 'twill be in vain to urge them as Matters of *Faith*. They cannot move our Aſſent, under that or any other title whatſoever. For *Faith* can never convince us of any thing, that contradicts our Knowledg. Becauſe tho' *Faith* be founded on the Teſtimony of GOD (who cannot lye) revealing any Propoſition to us; yet we cannot have an Aſſurance of the Truth of its being a Divine Revelation, greater than our own Knowledg: Since the whole ſtrength of the Certainty depends upon our Knowledg that GOD reveal'd it, which in this caſe, where the Propoſition ſuppos'd reveal'd contradicts our Knowledg or Reaſon, will always have this Objection hanging to it, *viz.* that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from GOD, the bountiful Author of our Being, which if receiv'd for true, muſt overturn all the Principles and Foundations of Knowledg he has given us, render all our Faculties uſeleſs, wholly deſtroy the moſt excellent part of his Workmanſhip, our Underſtandings; and put a Man in a condition, wherein he will have leſs Light, leſs Conduct than the Beaſt that periſheth. For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not ſo clear) Evidence of any thing to be a divine *Revelation*, as it has of the Principles of its own Reaſon, it can never have a ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reaſon, to give place to a Propoſition, whoſe *Revelation* has not a greater Evidence than thoſe Principles have.

Traditional Revelation much leſs.

§. 6. Thus far a Man has uſe of Reaſon, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original *Revelation*, where it is ſuppos'd to be made to himſelf: But to all thoſe who pretend not to immediate *Revelation*, but are requir'd to pay Obedience, and to receive the Truths reveal'd to others, which by the Tradition of Writings, or Word of Mouth, are convey'd down to them; Reaſon has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For Matter of Faith being only Divine Revelation, and nothing elſe; *Faith*, as we uſe the word, (call'd commonly *Divine Faith*) has to do with no Propoſitions, but thoſe which are ſuppos'd to be divinely reveal'd. So that I do not ſee how thoſe, who make Revelation alone the ſole Object of *Faith*, can ſay that it is a Matter of *Faith*, and not of *Reaſon*, to believe that ſuch or ſuch a Propoſition, to be found in ſuch or ſuch a Book, is of Divine Inſpiration; unleſs it be reveal'd, that that Propoſition, or all in that Book, was communicated by Divine Inſpiration. Without ſuch a *Revelation*, the believing, or not believing that Propoſition or Book to be of Divine Authority, can never be Matter of *Faith*, but Matter of *Reaſon*; and ſuch as I muſt come to an Aſſent to, only by the uſe of my Reaſon, which can never require or enable me to believe that, which is contrary to it ſelf: it being impoſſible for Reaſon ever to procure any Aſſent to that, which to it ſelf appears unreaſonable.

In all things therefore, where we have clear Evidence from our *Ideas*, and thoſe Principles of Knowledg I have above mention'd, *Reaſon* is the proper Judg; and *Revelation*, tho' it may in conſenting with it confirm its Dictates, yet cannot in ſuch caſes invalidate its Decrees: *Nor can we be oblig'd, where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reaſon, to quit it for the contrary Opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of Faith*; which can have no Authority againſt the plain and clear Dictates of *Reaſon*.

Things above Reaſon,

§. 7. But, *Thirdly*, there being many things, wherein we have very imperfect Notions, or none at all; and other things, of whoſe paſt, preſent, or future Exiſtence, by the natural Uſe of our Faculties we can have no Knowledg at all: Theſe, as being beyond the Diſcovery of our natural Faculties, and above *Reaſon*, are, when reveal'd, *the proper matter of Faith*. Thus, that part of the Angels rebel'd againſt GOD, and thereby loſt their firſt happy State; and that the Dead ſhall riſe, and live again: theſe, and the like, being beyond the Diſcovery of *Reaſon*, are purely matters of *Faith*; with which *Reaſon* has directly nothing to do.

Or not contrary to Reaſon, if reveal'd, are matter of Faith.

§. 8. But ſince GOD in giving us the Light of *Reaſon* has not thereby tied up his own Hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the Light of *Revelation* in any of thoſe matters, wherein our natural Faculties are able to give a probable Determination; *Revelation*, where God has been pleas'd to give it, *muſt carry it againſt the probable Conjectures of Reaſon*. Becauſe the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the Probability

bility that appears in it, is bound to give up its Aſſent to ſuch a Teſtimony; which, it is ſatisfy'd, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it ſtill belongs to *Reaſon* to judg of the Truth of its being a Revelation, and of the Signification of the Words wherein it is deliver'd. Indeed, if any thing ſhall be thought *Revelation*, which is contrary to the plain Principles of Reaſon, and the evident Knowledg the Mind has of its own clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; there *Reaſon* muſt be hearken'd to, as to a Matter within its Province: ſince a Man can never have ſo certain a Knowledg, that a Propoſition which contradicts the clear Principles and Evidence of his own Knowledg, was divinely reveal'd, or that he underſtands the Words rightly wherein it is deliver'd; as he has, that the contrary is true: and ſo is bound to conſider and judg of it as a matter of *Reaſon*, and not ſwallow it, without Examination, as a matter of *Faith*.

Revelation in Matters where Reaſon cannot judg, or but probably, ought to be hearken'd to.

§. 9. *Firſt*, Whatever Propoſition is reveal'd, of whoſe Truth our Mind, by its natural Faculties and Notions, cannot judg; that is purely *matter of Faith*, and above Reaſon.

Secondly, All Propoſitions, whereof the Mind, by the uſe of its natural Faculties, can come to determine and judg from naturally acquir'd *Ideas*, are *matter of Reaſon*; with this difference ſtill, that in thoſe concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence, and ſo is perſuaded of their Truth only upon probable grounds, which ſtill admit a Poſſibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain Evidence of its own Knowledg, and overturning the Principles of all Reaſon; in ſuch probable Propoſitions, I ſay, an evident *Revelation* ought to determine our Aſſent even againſt Probability. For where the Principles of Reaſon have not evidenc'd a Propoſition to be certainly true or falſe, there clear *Revelation*, as another Principle of Truth, and Ground of Aſſent, may determine; and ſo it may be matter of *Faith*, and be alſo above *Reaſon*. Becauſe *Reaſon*, in that particular matter, being able to reach no higher than Probability, *Faith* gave the Determination, where *Reaſon* came ſhort; and *Revelation* diſcover'd on which ſide the Truth lay.

In Matters where Reaſon can afford certain Knowledg that is to be hearken'd to.

§. 10. Thus far the Dominion of *Faith* reaches, and that without any Violence or Hindrance to *Reaſon*; which is not injur'd or diſturb'd, but aſſiſted and improv'd, by new Diſcoveries of Truth coming from the eternal Fountain of all Knowledg. Whatever GOD hath reveal'd, is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of *Faith*: But whether it be a divine Revelation or no, *Reaſon* muſt judg; which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence, to embrace what is leſs evident, nor allow it to entertain Probability in oppoſition to Knowledg and Certainty. There can be no Evidence, that any traditional Revelation is of divine Original, in the Words we receive it, and in the Senſe we underſtand it, ſo clear and ſo certain, as that of the Principles of Reaſon; and therefore, *Nothing that is contrary to and inconſiſtent with the clear and ſelf-evident Dictates of Reaſon, has a right to be urged or aſſented to as a matter of Faith, wherein Reaſon hath nothing to do.* Whatſoever is divine *Revelation*, ought to over-rule all our Opinions, Prejudices, and Intereſts, and hath a right to be receiv'd with full Aſſent. Such a Submiſſion as this, of our *Reaſon* to *Faith*, takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledg: This ſhakes not the Foundations of Reaſon, but leaves us that Uſe of our Faculties, for which they were given us.

If the Boundaries be not ſet between Faith and Reaſon, no Enthuſiaſm or Extravagancy in Religion can be contradicted.

§. 11. *If the Provinces of Faith and Reaſon are not kept diſtinct by thoſe Boundaries*, there will, in matter of Religion, be no room for *Reaſon* at all; and thoſe extravagant Opinions and Ceremonies that are to be found in the ſeveral Religions of the World, will not deſerve to be blamed. For, to this crying-up of *Faith*, in oppoſition to *Reaſon*, we may, I think, in good meaſure aſcribe thoſe Abſurdities that fill almoſt all the Religions which poſſeſs and divide Mankind. For Men having been principled with an Opinion, that they muſt not conſult *Reaſon* in the things of Religion, however apparently contradictory to common Senſe, and the very Principles of all their Knowledg, have let looſe their Fancies and natural Superſtition; and have been by them led into ſo ſtrange Opinions and extravagant Practices in Religion, that a conſiderate Man cannot but ſtand amaz'd at their Follies, and judg them ſo far from being acceptable to the great and wiſe GOD, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous, and offenſive

offensive to a sober good Man. So that in effect Religion, which should most distinguish us from Beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational Creatures, above Brutes, is that wherein Men often appear most irrational, and more senseless than Beasts themselves. *Credo, quia impossibile est; I believe, because it is impossible,* might in a good Man pass for a Sally of Zeal; but would prove a very ill Rule for Men to chuse their Opinions or Religion by.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Enthusiasm.

Love of Truth necessary.

§. 1. HE that would seriously set upon the Search of Truth, ought in the first place to prepare his Mind with a Love of it. For he that loves it not, will not take much pains to get it, nor be much concerned when he misses it. There is no body in the Commonwealth of Learning, who does not profess himself a Lover of Truth; and there is not a rational Creature, that would not take it amiss to be thought otherwise of. And yet for all this, one may truly say, there are very few Lovers of Truth for Truth-sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a Man may know whether he be so in earnest, is worth enquiry: And I think there is this one unerring Mark of it, *viz.* The not entertaining any Proposition with greater Assurance, than the Proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of Assent, 'tis plain receives not Truth in the love of it; loves not Truth for Truth-sake, but for some other By-end. For the Evidence that any Proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the Proofs a Man has of it, whatsoever Degrees of Assent he affords it beyond the Degrees of that Evidence, 'tis plain that all the Surplusage of Assurance is owing to some other Affection, and not to the Love of Truth: it being as impossible, that the Love of Truth should carry my Assent above the Evidence there is to me that it is true, as that the Love of Truth should make me assent to any Proposition for the sake of that Evidence, which it has not, that it is true; which is in effect to love it as a Truth, because it is possible or probable that it may not be true. In any Truth that gets not possession of our Minds by the irresistible Light of Self evidence, or by the force of Demonstration, the Arguments that gain it Assent are the Vouchers and Gage of its Probability to us; and we can receive it for no other, than such as they deliver it to our Understandings. Whatsoever Credit or Authority we give to any Proposition, more than it receives from the Principles and Proofs it supports it self upon, is owing to our Inclinations that way, and is so far a Derogation from the Love of Truth as such: which, as it can receive no Evidence from our Passions or Interests, so it should receive no Tincture from them.

A Forwardness to dictate, from whence.

§. 2. The assuming an Authority of dictating to others, and a Forwardness to prescribe to their Opinions, is a constant Concomitant of this Byas and Corruption of our Judgments. For how almost can it be otherwise, but that he should be ready to impose on others Belief, who has already impos'd on his own? Who can reasonably expect Arguments and Conviction from him, in dealing with others, whose Understanding is not accustom'd to them in his dealing with himself? Who does violence to his own Faculties, tyrannizes over his own Mind, and usurps the Prerogative that belongs to Truth alone, which is to command Assent by only its own Authority, *i. e.* by and in proportion to that Evidence which it carries with it.

Force of Enthusiasm.

§. 3. Upon this occasion I shall take the liberty to consider a third Ground of Assent, which with some Men has the same Authority, and is as confidently rely'd on as either *Faith* or *Reason*; I mean *Enthusiasm*: which laying by Reason, would set up Revelation without it. Whereby in effect it takes away both Reason and Revelation, and substitutes in the room of it the ungrounded Fancies of a Man's own Brain, and assumes them for a Foundation both of Opinion and Conduct.

§. 4.

§. 4. *Reaſon* is natural *Revelation*, whereby the eternal Father of Light, and Fountain of all Knowledg, communicates to Mankind that Portion of Truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural Faculties: *Revelation* is natural *Reaſon* enlarg'd by a new Set of Diſcoveries communicated by GOD immediately, which *Reaſon* vouches the Truth of, by the Teſtimony and Proofs it gives that they come from GOD. So that he that takes away *Reaſon*, to make way for *Revelation*, puts out the Light of both, and does much-what the ſame, as if he would perſuade a Man to put out his Eyes, the better to receive the remote Light of an inviſible Star by a Teleſcope. *Reaſon and Revelation*

§. 5. Immediate *Revelation* being a much eaſier way for Men to eſtabliſh their Opinions, and regulate their Conduct, than the tedious and not always ſucceſsful Labour of ſtrict Reaſoning, it is no wonder that ſome have been very apt to pretend to Revelation, and to perſuade themſelves that they are under the peculiar Guidance of Heaven in their Actions and Opinions, eſpecially in thoſe of them which they cannot account for by the ordinary Methods of Knowledg, and Principles of Reaſon. Hence we ſee, that in all Ages, Men, in whom Melancholy has mix'd with Devotion, or whoſe Conceit of themſelves has rais'd them into an Opinion of a greater Familiarity with GOD, and a nearer Admittance to his Favour than is afforded to others, have often flatter'd themſelves with a Perſuaſion of an immediate Intercourſe with the Deity, and frequent Communications from the Divine Spirit. GOD, I own, cannot be deny'd to be able to enlighten the Underſtanding by a Ray darted into the Mind immediately from the Fountain of Light: This they underſtand he has promis'd to do, and who then has ſo good a Title to expect it as thoſe who are his peculiar People, choſen by him, and depending on him? *Riſe of Enthuſiaſm.*

§. 6. Their Minds being thus prepar'd, whatever groundleſs Opinion comes to ſettle it ſelf ſtrongly upon their Fancies, is an Illumination from the Spirit of GOD, and preſently of divine Authority: and whatſoever odd Action they find in themſelves a ſtrong Inclination to do, that impulſe is concluded to be a Call or Direction from Heaven, and muſt be obey'd; 'tis a Commiſſion from above, and they cannot err in executing it. *Enthuſiaſm.*

§. 7. This I take to be properly Enthuſiaſm, which, tho' founded neither on Reaſon nor Divine Revelation, but riſing from the Conceits of a warm'd or over-weening Brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the Perſuaſions and Actions of Men, than either of thoſe two, or both together: Men being moſt forwardly obedient to the Impulſes they receive from themſelves; and the whole Man is ſure to act more vigorouſly, where the whole Man is carry'd by a natural Motion. For ſtrong Conceit, like a new Principle, carries all eaſily with it, when got above common Senſe, and freed from all Reſtraint of Reaſon, and Check of Reflection, it is heighten'd into a Divine Authority, in concurrence with our own Temper and Inclination.

§. 8. Tho' the odd Opinions and extravagant Actions *Enthuſiaſm* has run Men into, were enough to warn them againſt this wrong Principle, ſo apt to miſguide them both in their Belief and Conduct; yet the Love of ſomething extraordinary, the Eaſe and Glory it is to be inſpir'd, and be above the common and natural ways of Knowledg, ſo flatters many Mens Lazineſs, Ignorance and Vanity, that when once they are got into this way of immediate Revelation, of Illumination without Search, and of Certainty without Proof, and without Examination, 'tis a hard matter to get them out of it. Reaſon is loſt upon them, they are above it: they ſee the Light infus'd into their Underſtandings, and cannot be miſtaken; 'tis clear and viſible there, like the Light of bright Sun-ſhine; ſhews it ſelf, and needs no other Proof but its own Evidence: they feel the Hand of GOD moving them within, and the Impulſes of the Spirit, and cannot be miſtaken in what they feel. Thus they ſupport themſelves, and are ſure Reaſon hath nothing to do with what they ſee and feel in themſelves: what they have a ſenſible Experience of, admits no Doubt, needs no Probation. Would he not be ridiculous, who ſhould require to have it prov'd to him that the Light ſhines, and that he ſees it? It is it's own Proof, and can have no other. When the Spirit brings Light into our Minds, it diſpels Darkneſs. We ſee it, as we do that of the Sun at noon, and need not the Twilight of Reaſon to ſhew it us. This Light from Heaven is ſtrong, clear, and pure, carries *Enthuſiaſm miſtaken for ſeeing and feeling.*

carries its own Demonſtration with it; and we may as rationally take a Glow-worm to aſſiſt us to diſcover the Sun, as to examine the Celeſtial Ray by our dim Candle, Reaſon.

§. 9. This is the way of talking of theſe Men: they are ſure, becauſe they are ſure: and their Perſuations are right, only becauſe they are ſtrong in them. For, when what they ſay is ſtrip'd of the Metaphor of ſeeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to: and yet theſe Similes ſo impoſe on them, that they ſerve them for Certainty in themſelves, and Demonſtration to others.

Enthuſiaſm how to be diſcover'd.

§. 10. But to examine a little ſoberly this internal Light, and this Feeling on which they build ſo much. Theſe Men have, they ſay, clear Light, and they ſee; they have an awaken'd Senſe, and they feel: this cannot, they are ſure, be diſputed them. For when a Man ſays he ſees or feels, no body can deny it him that he does ſo. But here let me ask: This ſeeing, is it the Perception of the Truth of the Propoſition, or of this, that it is a Revelation from GOD? This feeling, is it a Perception of an Inclination or Fancy to do ſomething, or of the Spirit of GOD moving that Inclination? Theſe are two very different Perceptions, and muſt be carefully diſtinguiſh'd, if we would not impoſe upon our ſelves. I may perceive the Truth of a Propoſition, and yet not perceive that it is an immediate Revelation from GOD. I may perceive the Truth of a Propoſition in *Euclid*, without its being, or my perceiving it to be a Revelation: Nay, I may perceive I came not by this Knowledg in a natural way, and ſo may conclude it reveal'd, without perceiving that it is a Revelation from GOD; becauſe there be Spirits, which, without being divinely commiſſion'd, may excite thoſe *Ideas* in me, and lay them in ſuch order before my Mind, that I may perceive their Connection. So that the Knowledg of any Propoſition coming into my Mind I know not how, is not a Perception that it is from GOD. Much leſs is a ſtrong Perſuaſion, that it is true, a Perception that it is from GOD, or ſo much as true. But however it be call'd Light and Seeing, I ſuppoſe it is at moſt but Belief and Aſſurance: and the Propoſition taken for a Revelation, is not ſuch as they know to be true, but take to be true. For where a Propoſition is known to be true, Revelation is needleſs: and it is hard to conceive how there can be a Revelation to any one of what he knows already. If therefore it be a Propoſition which they are perſuaded, but do not know, to be true, whatever they may call it, it is not ſeeing, but believing. For theſe are two ways, whereby Truth comes into the Mind, wholly diſtinct, ſo that one is not the other. What I ſee, I know to be ſo by the Evidence of the thing it ſelf: what I believe, I take to be ſo upon the Teſtimony of another: But this Teſtimony I muſt know to be given, or elſe what ground have I of believing? I muſt ſee that 'tis GOD that reveals this to me, or elſe I ſee nothing. The queſtion then here is, How do I know that GOD is the Revealer of this to me; that this Impreſſion is made upon my Mind by his holy Spirit, and that therefore I ought to obey it? If I know not this, how great ſoever the Aſſurance is that I am poſſeſs'd with, it is groundleſs; whatever Light I pretend to, it is but *Enthuſiaſm*. For whether the Propoſition ſuppos'd to be reveal'd, be in it ſelf evidently true, or viſibly probable, or by the natural ways of Knowledg uncertain, the Propoſition that muſt be well grounded, and manifeſted to be true, is this, That GOD is the Revealer of it, and that what I take to be a Revelation is certainly put into my Mind by him, and is not an Illuſion drop'd in by ſome other Spirit, or rais'd by my own Fancy. For if I miſtake not, theſe Men receive it for true, becauſe they preſume GOD reveal'd it. Does it not then ſtand them upon, to examine on what grounds they preſume it to be a Revelation from GOD? or elſe all their Confidence is mere Preſumption: and this Light, they are ſo dazzled with, is nothing but an *ignis fatuus* that leads them continually round in this Circle; *It is a Revelation, becauſe they firmly believe it*, and *they believe it becauſe it is a Revelation.*

Enthuſiaſm fails of Evidence, that the Propoſition is from GOD.

§. 11. In all that is of Divine *Revelation*, there is need of no other Proof but that it is an Inſpiration from GOD: For he can neither deceive, nor be deceiv'd. But how ſhall it be known that any Propoſition in our Minds is a Truth infus'd by GOD; a Truth that is reveal'd to us by him, which he declares to us, and therefore we ought to believe? Here it is that *Enthuſiaſm* fails of the Evidence it pretends to. For Men thus poſſeſs'd boaſt of a Light where-

by

by they ſay they are enlighten'd, and brought into the Knowledg of this or that Truth. But if they know it to be a Truth, they muſt know it to be ſo, either by its own Self evidence to natural Reaſon, or by the rational Proofs that make it out to be ſo. If they ſee and know it to be a Truth, either of theſe two ways, they in vain ſuppoſe it to be a Revelation. For they know it to be true by the ſame way, that any other Man naturally may know that it is ſo without the help of Revelation. For thus all the Truths, of what kind ſoever, that Men uninſpir'd are enlighten'd with, came into their Minds, and are eſtabliſh'd there. If they ſay they know it to be true, becauſe it is a Revelation from GOD, the Reaſon is good: but then it will be demanded how they know it to be a Revelation from GOD? If they ſay, by the Light it brings with it, which ſhines bright in their Minds, and they cannot reſiſt: I beſeech them to conſider whether this be any more than what we have taken notice of already, *viz.* That it is a Revelation becauſe they ſtrongly believe it to be true. For all the Light they ſpeak of is but a ſtrong, tho' ungrounded, Perſuaſion of their own Minds, that it is a Truth. For rational Grounds from Proofs that it is a Truth, they muſt acknowledg to have none; for then it is not receiv'd as a Revelation, but upon the ordinary grounds that other Truths are receiv'd: And if they believe it to be true, becauſe it is a Revelation, and have no other reaſon for its being a Revelation, but becauſe they are fully perſuaded without any other reaſon that it is true, they believe it to be a Revelation only becauſe they ſtrongly believe it to be a Revelation; which is a very unſafe ground to proceed on, either in our Tenets or Actions. And what readier way can there be to run our ſelves into the moſt extravagant Errors and Miſcarriages, than thus to ſet up Fancy for our ſupreme and ſole Guide, and to believe any Propoſition to be true, any Action to be right, only becauſe we believe it to be ſo? The Strength of our Perſuaſions are no Evidence at all of their own Rectitude: Crooked things may be as ſtiff and unflexible as ſtreight: and Men may be as poſitive and peremptory in Error as in Truth. How come elſe the untractable Zealots in different and oppoſite Parties? For if the Light, which every one thinks he has in his Mind, which in this caſe is nothing but the Strength of his own Perſuaſion, be an Evidence that it is from GOD, contrary Opinions may have the ſame Title to be Inſpirations; and GOD will be not only the Father of Lights, but of oppoſite and contradictory Lights, leading Men contrary ways; and contradictory Propoſitions will be Divine Truths, if an ungrounded Strength of Aſſurance be an Evidence, that any Propoſition is a Divine Revelation.

Firmneſs of Perſuaſion no Proof that any Propoſition is from GOD.

§. 12. This cannot be otherwiſe, whilſt Firmneſs of Perſuaſion is made the Cauſe of believing, and Confidence of being in the right is made an Argument of Truth. St. *Paul* himſelf believ'd he did well, and that he had a Call to it when he perſecuted the Chriſtians, whom he confidently thought in the wrong: But yet it was he, and not they, who were miſtaken. Good Men are Men ſtill, liable to Miſtakes; and are ſometimes warmly engag'd in Errors, which they take for Divine Truths, ſhining in their Minds with the cleareſt Light.

Light in the Mind, what.

§. 13. Light, true Light in the Mind is, or can be nothing elſe but the Evidence of the Truth of any Propoſition; and if it be not a ſelf-evident Propoſition, all the Light it has, or can have, is from the Clearneſs and Validity of thoſe Proofs, upon which it is receiv'd. To talk of any other Light in the Underſtanding, is to put our ſelves in the dark, or in the power of the Prince of Darkneſs, and by our own Conſent to give our ſelves up to Deluſion to believe a Lye. For if Strength of Perſuaſion be the Light which muſt guide us; I ask how ſhall any one diſtinguiſh between the Deluſions of Satan, and the Inſpirations of the Holy Ghoſt? He can transform himſelf into an Angel of Light. And they who are led by this Son of the Morning, are as fully ſatisfy'd of the Illumination, *i. e.* are as ſtrongly perſuaded, that they are enlighten'd by the Spirit of God, as any one who is ſo: They acquieſce and rejoice in it, are acted by it: and no Body can be more ſure, nor more in the right (if their own ſtrong Belief may be judg) than they.

Revelation muſt be judged of by Reaſon.

§. 14. He therefore that will not give himſelf up to all the Extravagancies of Deluſion and Error, muſt bring this Guide of his Light within to the Trial. GOD, when he makes the Prophet, does not unmake the Man. He leaves all his Faculties

Faculties in the natural State, to enable him to judg of his Inſpirations, whether they be of Divine Original or no. When he illuminates the Mind with ſupernatural Light, he does not extinguiſh that which is natural. If he would have us aſſent to the Truth of any Propoſition, he either evidences that Truth by the uſual Methods of natural Reaſon, or elſe makes it known to be a Truth which he would have us aſſent to, by his Authority; and convinces us that it is from him, by ſome Marks which Reaſon cannot be miſtaken in. *Reaſon* muſt be our laſt Judg and Guide in every thing. I do not mean that we muſt conſult Reaſon, and examine whether a Propoſition reveal'd from GOD can be made out by natural Principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: but conſult it we muſt, and by it examine, whether it be a Revelation from GOD or no. And if *Reaſon* finds it to be reveal'd from GOD, *Reaſon* then declares for it, as much as for any other Truth, and makes it one of her Dictates. Every Conceit that thorowly warms our Fancies muſt paſs for an Inſpiration, if there be nothing but the Strength of our Perſuaſions, whereby to judg of our Perſuaſions: If *Reaſon* muſt not examine their Truth by ſomething extrinſecal to the Perſuaſions themſelves, Inſpirations and Deluſions, Truth and Falſhood, will have the ſame Meaſure, and will not be poſſible to be diſtinguiſh'd.

Belief no Proof of Revelation.

§. 15. If this internal Light, or any Propoſition which under that Title we take for inſpir'd, be conformable to the Principles of Reaſon, or to the Word of GOD, which is atteſted Revelation, *Reaſon* warrants it, and we may ſafely receive it for true, and be guided by it in our Belief and Actions: if it receive no Teſtimony nor Evidence from either of theſe Rules, we cannot take it for a Revelation, or ſo much as for true, till we have ſome other Mark that it is a Revelation, beſides our believing that it is ſo. Thus we ſee the holy Men of old, who had Revelations from GOD, had ſomething elſe beſides that internal Light of Aſſurance in their own Minds, to teſtify to them that it was from GOD. They were not left to their own Perſuaſions alone, that thoſe Perſuaſions were from GOD; but had outward Signs to convince them of the Author of thoſe Revelations. And when they were to convince others, they had a Power given them to juſtify the Truth of their Commiſſion from Heaven; and by viſible Signs to aſſert the Divine Authority of a Meſſage they were ſent with. *Moſes* ſaw the Buſh burn without being conſumed, and heard a Voice out of it. This was ſomething beſides finding an Impulſe upon his Mind to go to *Pharaoh*, that he might bring his Brethren out of *Egypt:* and yet he thought not this enough to authorize him to go with that Meſſage, till GOD, by another Miracle of his Rod turn'd into a Serpent, had aſſur'd him of a Power to teſtify his Miſſion, by the ſame Miracle repeated before them, whom he was ſent to. *Gideon* was ſent by an Angel to deliver *Iſrael* from the *Midianites*, and yet he deſir'd a Sign to convince him that this Commiſſion was from GOD. Theſe, and ſeveral the like Inſtances to be found among the Prophets of old, are enough to ſhew that they thought not an inward Seeing or Perſuaſion of their own Minds, without any other Proof, a ſufficient Evidence that it was from GOD, tho' the Scripture does not every where mention their demanding or having ſuch Proofs.

§. 16. In what I have ſaid, I am far from denying, that GOD can, or doth ſometimes enlighten Mens Minds in the apprehending of certain Truths, or excite them to good Actions by the immediate Influence and Aſſiſtance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary Signs accompanying it. But in ſuch caſes too we have Reaſon and Scripture, unerring Rules to know whether it be from GOD or no. Where the Truth embrac'd is conſonant to the Revelation in the written Word of GOD, or the Action conformable to the Dictates of right *Reaſon* or Holy Writ, we may be aſſur'd that we run no risk in entertaining it as ſuch; becauſe tho' perhaps it be not an immediate Revelation from GOD, extraordinarily operating on our Minds, yet we are ſure it is warranted by that Revelation which he has given us of Truth. But it is not the Strength of our private Perſuaſion within our ſelves, that can warrant it to be a Light or Motion from Heaven: Nothing can do that but the written Word of GOD without us, or that Standard of Reaſon which is common to us with all Men. Where Reaſon or Scripture is expreſs for any Opinion or Action,

Action, we may receive it as of Divine Authority: But 'tis not the Strength of our own Persuations which can by it self give it that Stamp. The bent of our own Minds may favour it as much as we please; that may shew it to be a Fondling of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an Offspring of Heaven, and of Divine Original.

CHAP. XX.

Of Wrong Assent, or Error.

§. 1. KNOWLEDG being to be had only of visible certain Truth, *Error* is not a Fault of our Knowledg, but a Mistake of our Judgment, giving Assent to that which is not true. *Causes of Error.*

But if Assent be grounded on Likelyhood, if the proper Object and Motive of our Assent be Probability, and that Probability consists in what is laid down in the foregoing Chapters, it will be demanded how Men come to give their Assents contrary to Probability. For there is nothing more common than Contrariety of Opinions; nothing more obvious than that one Man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third stedfastly believes, and firmly adheres to. The Reasons whereof, tho' they may be very various, yet, I suppose, may all be reduc'd to these four.

1. *Want of Proofs.*
2. *Want of Ability to use them.*
3. *Want of Will to use them.*
4. *Wrong Measures of Probability.*

§. 2. *First*, By *Want of Proofs*, I do not mean only the Want of those Proofs which are no where extant, and so are no where to be had; but the Want even of those Proofs which are in being, or might be procur'd. And thus Men want Proofs who have not the Convenience or Opportunity to make Experiment and Observations themselves tending to the Proof of any Proposition; nor likewise the Convenience to enquire into, and collect the Testimonies of others: And in this state are the greatest part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour, and enslav'd to the Necessity of their mean Condition; whose Lives are worn out only in the Provisions for living. These Mens Opportunity of Knowledg and Enquiry are commonly as narrow as their Fortunes; and their Understandings are but little instructed, when all their whole Time and Pains is laid out to still the Croaking of their own Bellies, or the Cries of their Children. 'Tis not to be expected that a Man, who drudges on all his Life in a laborious Trade, should be more knowing in the variety of Things done in the World, than a Pack-horse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards in a narrow Lane, and dirty Road, only to Market, should be skill'd in the Geography of the Country. Nor is it at all more possible, that he who wants Leisure, Books, and Languages, and the Opportunity of conversing with Variety of Men, should be in a Condition to collect those Testimonies and Observations which are in being, and are necessary to make out many, nay most of the Propositions that, in the Societies of Men, are judg'd of the greatest moment; or to find out grounds of Assurance so great as the Belief of the Points he would build on them, is thought necessary; so that a great part of Mankind are, by the natural and unalterable State of things in this World, and the Constitution of human Affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of those Proofs on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those Opinions: The greatest part of Men, having much to do to get the Means of Living, are not in a Condition to look after those of learned and laborious Enquiries. *1. Want of Proofs.*

§. 3. What shall we say then? Are the greatest part of Mankind, by the Necessity of their Condition, subjected to unavoidable Ignorance in those things which are of greatest Importance to them? (for of these 'tis obvious to enquire.) Have the Bulk of Mankind no other Guide but Accident, and blind Chance, to conduct them to their Happiness or Misery? Are the current Opinions, *Ob. what shall become of those who want them, answered.*

nions, and licens'd Guides of every Country, ſufficient Evidence and Security to every Man to venture his greateſt Concernments on; nay, his everlaſting Happineſs or Miſery? Or can thoſe be the certain and infallible Oracles and Standards of Truth, which teach one thing in *Chriſtendom*, and another in *Turkey*? Or ſhall a poor Country-man be eternally happy for having the Chance to be born in *Italy*; or a Day-labourer be unavoidably loſt, becauſe he had the ill luck to be born in *England*? How ready ſome Men may be to ſay ſome of theſe things, I will not here examine: but this I am ſure, that Men muſt allow one or other of theſe to be true, (let them chuſe which they pleaſe) or elſe grant, That GOD has furniſh'd Men with Faculties ſufficient to direct them in the way they ſhould take, if they will but ſeriouſly employ them that way, when their ordinary Vocations allow them the leiſure. No Man is ſo wholly taken up with the Attendance on the Means of Living, as to have no ſpare time at all to think of his Soul, and inform himſelf in Matters of Religion. Were Men as intent upon this, as they are on things of lower Concernment, there are none ſo enſlav'd to the Neceſſities of Life, who might not find many Vacancies that might be husbanded to this Advantage of their Knowledg.

People hindered from Enquiry.

§. 4. Beſides thoſe, whoſe Improvements and Informations are ſtraiten'd by the narrowneſs of their Fortunes, there are others whoſe Largeneſs of Fortune would plentifully enough ſupply Books and other Requiſites for clearing of Doubts, and diſcovering of Truth: But they are *cooped in* cloſe, *by the Laws* of their Countries, and the ſtrict Guards of thoſe whoſe Intereſt it is to keep them ignorant, leſt, knowing more, they ſhould believe the leſs in them. Theſe are as far, nay farther *from the Liberty and Opportunities of a fair Enquiry*, than thoſe poor and wretched Labourers we before ſpoke of. And, however they may ſeem high and great, are confin'd to Narrowneſs of Thought, and enſlav'd in that which ſhould be the freeſt Part of Man, their Underſtandings. This is generally the Caſe of all thoſe who live in Places where care is taken to propagate Truth without Knowledg; where Men are forc'd, at a venture, to be of the Religion of the Country; and muſt therefore ſwallow down Opinions, as ſilly People do Empirick Pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do but believe that they will do the Cure: but in this are much more miſerable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refuſe ſwallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone; or to chuſe the Phyſician, to whoſe Conduct they would truſt themſelves.

2. *Want of Skill to uſe them.*

§. 5. *Secondly*, Thoſe who *want Skill to uſe thoſe Evidences they have* of Probabilities; who cannot carry a Train of Conſequences in their Heads, nor weigh exactly the Preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Teſtimonies, making every Circumſtance its due Allowance, may be eaſily miſled to aſſent to Poſitions that are not probable. There are ſome Men of one, ſome but of two Syllogiſms, and no more; and others that can but advance one ſtep farther. Theſe cannot always diſcern that ſide on which the ſtrongeſt Proofs lie; cannot conſtantly follow that which in it ſelf is the more probable Opinion. Now that there is ſuch a difference between Men, in reſpect of their Underſtandings, I think no body, who has had any Converſation with his Neighbours, will queſtion: tho' he never was at *Weſtminſter-Hall*, or the *Exchange* on the one hand; nor at *Alms-Houſes*, or *Bedlam* on the other. Which great difference in Mens Intellectuals, whether it riſes from any Defect in the Organs of the Body, particularly adapted to Thinking; or in the Dulneſs or Untractableneſs of thoſe Faculties for want of Uſe; or, as ſome think, in the natural Differences of Mens Souls themſelves; or ſome, or all of theſe together; it matters not here to examine: Only this is evident, that there is a difference of Degrees in mens Underſtandings, Apprehenſions, and Reaſonings, to ſo great a Latitude, that one may, without doing injury to Mankind, affirm, that there is a greater diſtance between ſome Men and others, in this reſpect, than between ſome Men and ſome Beaſts. But how this comes about is a Speculation, tho' of great Conſequence, yet not neceſſary to our preſent Purpoſe.

3. *Want of Will to uſe them.*

§. 6. *Thirdly*, There are another ſort of People that *want Proofs*, not becauſe they are out of their reach, but *becauſe they will not uſe them*: who tho' they have Riches and Leiſure enough, and want neither Parts nor other Helps, are yet never the better for them. Their hot purſuit of Pleaſure, or conſtant Drudgery

Drudgery in Buſineſs, engages ſome Mens Thoughts elſewhere: Lazineſs and Oſcitancy in general, or a particular Averſion for Books, Study and Meditation, keep others from any ſerious Thoughts at all: and ſome out of Fear, that an impartial Enquiry would not favour thoſe Opinions which beſt ſuit their Prejudices, Lives, and Deſigns, content themſelves without Examination to take upon truſt what they find convenient and in faſhion. Thus moſt Men, even of thoſe that might do otherwiſe, paſs their Lives without an acquaintance with, much leſs a rational Aſſent to Probabilities they are concern'd to know, tho' they lie ſo much within their View, that to be convinc'd of them, they need but turn their Eyes that way. But we know ſome Men will not read a Letter which is ſuppos'd to bring ill News; and many Men forbear to caſt up their Accounts, or ſo much as think upon their Eſtates, who have reaſon to fear their Affairs are in no very good Poſture. How Men, whoſe plentiful Fortunes allow them leiſure to improve their Underſtandings, can ſatisfy themſelves with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot tell: But methinks they have a low Opinion of their Souls, who lay out all their Incomes in Proviſions for the Body, and employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps of Knowledg; who take great care to appear always in a neat and ſplendid Outſide, and would think themſelves miſerable in coarſe Clothes, or a patch'd Coat, and yet contentedly ſuffer their Minds to appear abroad in a pie-bald Livery of coarſe Patches, and borrow'd Shreds, ſuch as it has pleas'd Chance, or their Country-Taylor (I mean the common Opinion of thoſe they have convers'd with) to clothe them in. I will not here mention how unreaſonable this is for Men that ever think of a future State, and their Concernment in it, which no rational Man can avoid to do ſometimes: nor ſhall I take notice what a Shame and Confuſion it is, to the greateſt Contemners of Knowledg, to be found ignorant in things they are concern'd to know. But this at leaſt is worth the Conſideration of thoſe who call themſelves Gentlemen, That however they may think Credit, Reſpect, Power and Authority, the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune; yet they will find all theſe ſtill carry'd away from them, by Men of lower Condition, who ſurpaſs them in Knowledg. They who are blind will always be led by thoſe that ſee, or elſe fall into the Ditch: and he is certainly the moſt ſubjected, the moſt enſlav'd, who is ſo in his Underſtanding. In the foregoing Inſtances, ſome of the Cauſes have been ſhewn of wrong Aſſent, and how it comes to paſs, that probable Doctrines are not always receiv'd with an Aſſent proportionable to the Reaſons which are to be had for their Probability; but hitherto we have conſider'd only ſuch Probabilities, whoſe Proofs do exiſt, but do not appear to him who embraces the Error.

§. 7. *Fourthly*, There remains yet the laſt ſort, who, even where the real Probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the Conviction, nor yield unto manifeſt Reaſons, but do either ἐπέχειν, ſuſpend their Aſſent, or give it to the leſs probable Opinion: And to this Danger are thoſe expos'd, who have taken up *wrong Meaſures of Probability*; which are, *4. wrong meaſures of Probability; Whereof,*

1. *Propoſitions that are not in themſelves certain and evident, but doubtful and falſe, taken up for Principles.*
2. *Receiv'd Hypotheſes.*
3. *Predominant Paſſions or Inclinations.*
4. *Authority.*

§. 8. *Firſt*, The firſt and firmeſt Ground of Probability, is the Conformity any thing has to our own Knowledg; eſpecially that Part of our Knowledg which we have embrac'd, and continue to look on as *Principles*. Theſe have ſo great an Influence upon our Opinions, that 'tis uſually by them we judg of Truth, and meaſure Probability to that degree, that what is inconſiſtent with our *Principles*, is ſo far from paſſing for probable with us, that it will not be allow'd poſſible. The Reverence borne to theſe *Principles* is ſo great, and their Authority ſo paramount to all other, that the Teſtimony not only of other Men, but the Evidence of our own Senſes are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to theſe eſtabliſh'd Rules. How much the Doctrine of innate *Principles*, and that *Principles* are not to be prov'd or queſtion'd, has contributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that one Truth cannot contradict another: but withal I take leave alſo to ſay, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a *Principle*, to examine *1. Doubtful Propoſitions taken for Principles.*

amine it ſtrictly, and ſee whether he certainly knows it to be true of it ſelf by its own Evidence, or whether he does only with Aſſurance believe it to be ſo upon the Authority of others. For he hath a ſtrong Biaſs put into his Underſtanding, which will unavoidably miſguide his Aſſent, who hath imbib'd *wrong Principles*, and has blindly given himſelf up to the Authority of any Opinion in it ſelf not evidently true.

§. 9. There is nothing more ordinary, than *Childrens* receiving into their Minds Propoſitions (eſpecially about Matters of Religion) from their Parents, Nurſes, or thoſe about them: which being inſinuated into their unwary, as well as unbiaſs'd Underſtandings, and faſten'd by degrees, are at laſt (equally, whether true or falſe) riveted there by long Cuſtom and Education, beyond all Poſſibility of being pull'd out again. For Men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their Opinions, and finding thoſe of this ſort to be as antient in their Minds as their very Memories, not having obſerved their early Inſinuation, nor by what Means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as ſacred things, and not to ſuffer them to be profan'd, touch'd, or queſtion'd: They look on them as the *Urim* and *Thummim* ſet up in their Minds immediately by GOD Himſelf, to be the great and unerring Deciders of Truth and Falſhood, and the Judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of Controverſies.

§. 10. This Opinion of his *Principles* (let them be what they will) being *once eſtabliſh'd in any one's Mind*, it is eaſy to be imagin'd what Reception any Propoſition ſhall find, how clearly ſoever prov'd, that ſhall invalidate their Authority, or at all thwart with theſe internal Oracles; whereas the groſſeſt Abſurdities and Improbabilities, being but agreeable to ſuch Principles, go down glibbly, and are eaſily digeſted. The great Obſtinacy that is to be found in Men firmly believing quite contrary Opinions, tho' many times equally abſurd, in the various Religions of Mankind, are as evident a Proof as they are an unavoidable Conſequence of this way of Reaſoning from receiv'd traditional Principles. So that Men will disbelieve their own Eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Senſes, and give their own Experience the lye, rather than admit of any thing diſagreeing with the ſacred Tenets. Take an intelligent *Romaniſt*, that from the very firſt dawning of any Notions in his Underſtanding, hath had this Principle conſtantly inculcated, *viz.* That he muſt believe as the Church (*i. e.* thoſe of his Communion) believes, or that the Pope is infallible; and this he never ſo much as heard queſtion'd, till at forty or fifty Years old he met with one of other Principles: how is he prepar'd eaſily to ſwallow, not only againſt all Probability, but even the clear Evidence of his Senſes, the Doctrine of *Tranſubſtantiation*? This Principle has ſuch an Influence on his Mind, that he will believe that to be Fleſh which he ſees to be Bread. And what way will you take to convince a Man of any improbable Opinion he holds, who, with ſome Philoſophers, hath laid down this as a Foundation of Reaſoning, That he muſt believe his Reaſon (for ſo Men improperly call Arguments drawn from their Principles) againſt his Senſes? Let an *Enthuſiaſt* be principled, that he or his Teacher is inſpir'd, and acted by an immediate Communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain bring the Evidence of clear Reaſons againſt his Doctrine. Whoever therefore have imbibed wrong *Principles*, are not, in things inconſiſtent with theſe Principles, to be mov'd by the moſt apparent and convincing Probabilities, till they are ſo candid and ingenuous to themſelves, as to be perſuaded to examine even thoſe very *Principles*, which many never ſuffer themſelves to do.

2. *Receiv'd Hypotheſes.*

§. 11. *Secondly*, Next to theſe are Men whoſe Underſtandings are caſt into a Mold, and faſhion'd juſt to the ſize of a *receiv'd Hypotheſis*. The difference between theſe and the former, is, that they will admit of Matter of Fact, and agree with Diſſenters in that; but differ only in aſſigning of Reaſons, and explaining the Manner of Operation. Theſe are not at that open defiance with their Senſes, as the former: they can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently, but will by no means admit of their Reports in the Explanation of Things; nor be prevail'd on by Probabilities, which would convince them that things are not brought about juſt after the ſame manner that they have decreed within themſelves that they are. Would it not be an inſufferable thing for a learned Profeſſor, and that which his Scarlet would

bluſh

bluſh at, to have his Authority of forty Years ſtanding wrought out of hard Rock *Greek* and *Latin*, with no ſmall Expence of Time and Candle, and confirm'd by general Tradition and a Reverend Beard, in an inſtant over-turn'd by an upſtart Noveliſt? Can any one expect that he ſhould be made to confeſs, That what he taught his Scholars thirty Years ago, was all Error and Miſtake; and that he ſold them hard Words and Ignorance at a very dear rate? What Probabilities, I ſay, are ſufficient to prevail in ſuch a caſe? And who ever by the moſt cogent Arguments will be prevail'd with, to diſrobe himſelf at once of all his old Opinions, and Pretences to Knowledg and Learning, which with hard Study he hath all his time been labouring for; and turn himſelf out ſtark naked, in queſt a freſh of new Notions? All the Arguments can be uſed, will be as little able to prevail, as the Wind did with the Traveller to part with his Cloke, which he held only the faſter. To this of wrong Hypotheſis, may be reduc'd the Errors that may be occaſion'd by a true Hypotheſis, or right Principles, but not rightly underſtood. There is nothing more familiar than this. The Inſtances of Men contending for different Opinions, which they all derive from the infallible Truth of the Scripture, are an undeniable Proof of it. All that call themſelves Chriſtians, allow the Text, that ſays, Μετανοεῖτε, to carry in it the Obligation to a very weighty Duty. But yet however erroneous will one of their Practices be, who underſtanding nothing but the *French*, take this Rule with one Tranſlation to be *repentez vous*, repent; or with the other, *faitiez Penitence*, do Penance.

§. 12. *Thirdly*, Probabilities, which croſs Mens Appetites and *prevailing Paſſions*, run the ſame fate. Let ever ſo much Probability hang on one ſide of a covetous Man's Reaſoning, and Money on the other; it is eaſy to foreſee which will outweigh. Earthly Minds, like Mud-Walls, reſiſt the ſtrongeſt Batteries: and tho' perhaps ſometimes the Force of a clear Argument may make ſome Impreſſion; yet they nevertheleſs ſtand firm, keep out the Enemy Truth, that would captivate or diſturb them. Tell a Man, paſſionately in love, that he is jilted; bring a ſcore of Witneſſes of the Falſhood of his Miſtreſs, 'tis ten to one but three kind Words of her's ſhall invalidate all their Teſtimonies. *Quod volumus, facile credimus; What ſuits our Wiſhes, is forwardly believ'd*; is, I ſuppoſe, what every one hath more than once experimented: and tho' Men cannot always openly gain-ſay or reſiſt the Force of manifeſt Probabilities that make againſt them, yet yield they not to the Argument. Not but that it is the Nature of the Underſtanding conſtantly to cloſe with the more probable ſide; but yet a Man hath a power to ſuſpend and reſtrain its Enquiries, and not permit a full and ſatisfactory Examination, as far as the matter in queſtion is capable, and will bear it to be made. Until that be done, there will be always theſe *two ways left of evading the moſt apparent Probabilities.* 3. *Predominant Paſſions.*

§. 13. *Firſt*, That the Arguments being (as for the moſt part they are) brought in words, *there may be a Fallacy latent* in them: and the Conſequences being, perhaps, many in train, they may be ſome of them incoherent. There are very few Diſcourſes ſo ſhort, clear, and conſiſtent, to which moſt Men may not, with Satisfaction enough to themſelves, raiſe this doubt; and from whoſe *Conviction* they may not, without reproach of Diſingenuity or Unreaſonableneſs, ſet themſelves free with the old Reply, *Non perſuadebis, etiamſi perſuaſeris; Tho' I cannot anſwer, I will not yield.* *The means of evading Probabilities:* 1. *Suppos'd Fallacy.*

§. 14. *Secondly*, Manifeſt Probabilities may be evaded, and the Aſſent withheld upon this Suggeſtion, That *I know not yet all that may be ſaid on the contrary ſide:* And therefore tho' I be beaten, 'tis not neceſſary I ſhould yield, not knowing what Forces there are in reſerve behind. This is a Refuge againſt *Conviction* ſo open and ſo wide, that it is hard to determine, when a Man is quite out of the Verge of it. 2. *Suppos'd Arguments for the contrary.*

§. 15. But yet there is ſome end of it; and a Man having carefully enquir'd into all the Grounds of Probability and Unlikelineſs, done his utmoſt to inform himſelf in all particulars fairly, and caſt up the Sum total on both ſides, may in moſt caſes come to acknowledg, upon the whole matter, on which ſide the Probability reſts: wherein ſome Proofs in matter of Reaſon, being Suppoſitions upon univerſal Experience, are ſo cogent and clear; and ſome Teſtimonies in matter of Fact ſo univerſal, that he cannot refuſe his Aſſent. So that, I think, *What Probabilities determine the Aſſent.*

we may conclude, that in Propoſitions where tho' the Proofs in view are of moſt moment, yet there are ſufficient grounds to ſuſpect that there is either Fallacy in Words, or certain Proofs as conſiderable to be produc'd on the contrary ſide, there Aſſent, Suſpence, or Diſſent are often voluntary Actions: But *where* the Proofs are ſuch as make it highly probable, and there is not ſufficient ground to ſuſpect, that there is either Fallacy of Words (which ſober and ſerious Conſideration may diſcover) nor equally valid Proofs, yet undiſcover'd, latent on the other ſide (which alſo the nature of the thing may, in ſome caſes, make plain to a conſiderate Man) there, I think, *a Man*, who has weigh'd them, *can ſcarce refuſe his Aſſent* to the ſide, on which the greater Probability appears. Whether it be probable, that a promiſcuous Jumble of Printing Letters ſhould often fall into a method and order, which ſhould ſtamp on Paper a coherent Diſcourſe; or that a blind fortuitous Concourſe of Atoms, not guided by an underſtanding Agent, ſhould frequently conſtitute the Bodies of any Species of Animals: in theſe and the like caſes, I think, no body that conſiders them can be one jot at a ſtand which ſide to take, nor at all waver in his Aſſent. Laſtly, when there can be no Suppoſition (the thing in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the Teſtimony of Witneſſes) that there is as fair Teſtimony againſt, as for the Matter of Fact atteſted; which by Enquiry is to be learned, *v. g.* whether there was 1700 Years ago ſuch a Man at *Rome* as *Julius Cæſar*: in all ſuch caſes, I ſay, I think it is not in any rational Man's power to refuſe his Aſſent; but that it neceſſarily follows, and cloſes with ſuch Probabilities. In other leſs clear caſes, I think, it is in a Man's power to ſuſpend his Aſſent; and perhaps content himſelf with the Proofs he has, if they favour the Opinion that ſuits with his Inclination or Intereſt, and ſo ſtop from farther ſearch. But that a Man ſhould afford his Aſſent to that ſide, on which the leſs Probability appears to him, ſeems to me utterly impracticable, and as impoſſible, as it is to believe the ſame thing probable and improbable at the ſame time.

Where it is in our power to ſuſpend it.

§. 16. As Knowledg is no more arbitrary than Perception; ſo, I think, Aſſent is no more in our power than Knowledg. When the Agreement of any two *Ideas* appears to our Minds, whether immediately, or by the aſſiſtance of Reaſon, I can no more refuſe to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid ſeeing thoſe Objects which I turn my Eyes to, and look on in Day-light: And what upon full examination I find the moſt probable, I cannot deny my Aſſent to. But tho' we cannot hinder our Knowledg, where the Agreement is once perceiv'd; nor our Aſſent, where the Probability manifeſtly appears upon due Conſideration of all the Meaſures of it: yet *we can hinder both Knowledg and Aſſent, by ſtopping our Enquiry*, and not employing our Faculties in the Search of any Truth. If it were not ſo, Ignorance, Error, or Infidelity could not in any caſe be a Fault. Thus in ſome caſes we can prevent or ſuſpend our Aſſent: But can a Man, vers'd in modern or antient Hiſtory, doubt whether there be ſuch a Place as *Rome*, or whether there was ſuch a Man as *Julius Cæſar*? Indeed there are millions of Truths, that a Man is not, or may not think himſelf concern'd to know; as whether our King *Richard* the Third was crook-back'd, or no; or whether *Roger Bacon* was a Mathematician, or a Magician. In theſe and ſuch-like caſes, where the Aſſent one way or other is of no importance to the Intereſt of any one; no Action, no Concernment of his following or depending thereon; there 'tis not ſtrange, that the Mind ſhould give it ſelf up to the common Opinion, or render it ſelf to the firſt Comer. Theſe and the like Opinions are of ſo little weight and moment, that, like Motes in the Sun, their Tendencies are very rarely taken notice of. They are there, as it were, by Chance, and the Mind lets them float at liberty. But where the Mind judges that the Propoſition has concernment in it; where the Aſſent or not Aſſenting is thought to draw Conſequences of moment after it, and Good and Evil to depend on chuſing or refuſing the right ſide, and the Mind ſets it ſelf ſeriouſly to enquire and examine the Probability: there, I think, it is not in our choice to take which ſide we pleaſe, if manifeſt odds appear on either. The greater Probability, I think, in that caſe will determine the Aſſent: and a Man can no more avoid aſſenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater

greater Probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas*.

If this be ſo, the Foundation of Error will lie in wrong Meaſures of Probability; as the Foundation of Vice in wrong Meaſures of Good.

§. 17. *Fourthly*, The fourth and laſt *wrong Meaſure of Probability* I ſhall take notice of, and which keeps in Ignorance or Error more People than all the other together, is that which I have mention'd in the fore-going Chapter; I mean, the *giving up our Aſſent to the common receiv'd Opinions*, either of our Friends or Party, Neighbourhood or Country. How many Men have no other ground for their Tenets, than the ſuppos'd Honeſty, or Learning, or Number of thoſe of the ſame Profeſſion? As if honeſt or bookiſh Men could not err, or Truth were to be eſtabliſh'd by the Vote of the Multitude: yet this with moſt Men ſerves the turn. The Tenet has had the Atteſtation of reverend Antiquity, it comes to me with the Paſſport of former Ages, and therefore I am ſecure in the Reception I give it: other Men have been, and are of the ſame Opinion (for that is all is ſaid) and therefore it is reaſonable for me to embrace it. A Man may more juſtifiably throw up Croſs and Pile for his Opinions, than take them up by ſuch Meaſures. All Men are liable to Error, and moſt Men are in many points, by Paſſion or Intereſt, under Temptation to it. If we could but ſee the ſecret Motives that influenc'd the Men of Name and Learning in the World, and the Leaders of Parties, we ſhould not always find that it was the embracing of Truth for its own ſake, that made them eſpouſe the Doctrines they own'd and maintain'd. This at leaſt is certain, there is not an Opinion ſo abſurd, which a Man may not receive upon this ground: There is no Error to be nam'd, which has not had its Profeſſors: And a Man ſhall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has the Footſteps of others to follow. 4. *Authority.*

§. 18. But notwithſtanding the great noiſe is made in the World about Errors and Opinions, I muſt do Mankind that right as to ſay, *There are not ſo many Men in Errors and wrong Opinions, as is commonly ſuppos'd.* Not that I think they embrace the Truth; but indeed, becauſe concerning thoſe Doctrines they keep ſuch a ſtir about, they have no Thought, no Opinion at all. For if any one ſhould a little catechize the greateſt part of the Partizans of moſt of the Sects in the World, he would not find, concerning thoſe matters they are ſo zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own: much leſs would he have reaſon to think, that they took them upon the Examination of Arguments, and Appearance of Probability. They are reſolv'd to ſtick to a Party, that Education or Intereſt has engag'd them in; and there, like the common Soldiers of an Army, ſhew their Courage and Warmth as their Leaders direct, without ever examining or ſo much as knowing the Cauſe they contend for. If a Man's Life ſhews, that he has no ſerious Regard for Religion; for what reaſon ſhould we think, that he beats his Head about the Opinions of his Church, and troubles himſelf to examine the Grounds of this or that Doctrine? 'Tis enough for him to obey his Leaders, to have his Hand and his Tongue ready for the Support of the common Cauſe, and thereby approve himſelf to thoſe, who can give him Credit, Preferment or Protection in that Society. Thus Men become Profeſſors of, and Combatants for thoſe Opinions, they were never convinc'd of, nor Proſelytes to; no, nor ever had ſo much as floating in their Heads: And tho' one cannot ſay, there are fewer improbable or erroneous Opinions in the World than there are; yet this is certain, there are fewer that actually aſſent to them, and miſtake them for Truths, than is imagin'd. *Men not ſo many Errors as is imagin'd.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Division of the Sciences.

Three sorts. §. 1. ALL that can fall within the compass of Human Understanding, being either, *First*, The Nature of things as they are in themselves, their Relations, and their Manner of Operation: Or, *Secondly*, That which Man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary Agent, for the Attainment of any End, especially Happiness: Or, *Thirdly*, The ways and means, whereby the Knowledg of both the one and the other of these are attain'd and communicated: I think, *Science* may be divided properly into these *three sorts*.

1. Physica. §. 2. *First*, The Knowledg of things, as they are in their own proper Beings, their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations; whereby I mean not only Matter and Body, but Spirits also, which have their proper Natures, Constitutions, and Operations, as well as Bodies. This in a little more enlarged Sense of the Word, I call φυσικὴ, or *Natural Philosophy*. The End of this, is bare speculative Truth; and whatsoever can afford the Mind of Man any such, falls under this branch, whether it be God himself, Angels, Spirits, Bodies, or any of their Affections, as Number, and Figure, &c.

2. Practica. §. 3. *Secondly*, πρακτικὴ, The Skill of right applying our own Powers and Actions, for the attainment of things good and useful. The most considerable under this head, is *Ethicks*, which is the seeking out those Rules and Measures of human Actions, which lead to Happiness, and the means to practise them. The End of this is not bare Speculation, and the Knowledg of Truth; but Right, and a Conduct suitable to it.

3. σημειωτικὴ. §. 4. *Thirdly*, The third Branch may be call'd σημειωτικὴ, or *the Doctrine of Signs*, the most usual whereof being Words, it is aptly enough term'd also λογικὴ, *Logick*; the Business whereof, is to consider the Nature of Signs the Mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its Knowledg to others. For since the things the Mind contemplates, are none of them, besides it self, present to the Understanding, 'tis necessary that something else, as a Sign or Representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are *Ideas*. And because the Scene of *Ideas* that makes one Man's Thoughts, cannot be laid open to the immediate View of another, nor laid up any where but in the Memory, a no very sure Repository: Therefore to communicate our Thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own use, Signs of our *Ideas* are also necessary. Those which Men have found most convenient, and therefore generally make use of, are articulate Sounds. The Consideration then of *Ideas* and *Words*, as the great Instruments of Knowledg, makes no despicable part of their Contemplation, who would take a view of human Knowledg in the whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weigh'd, and duly consider'd, they would afford us another sort of Logick and Critick, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.

This is the first Division of the Objects of Knowledg. §. 5. This seems to me *the first and most general, as well as natural Division* of the Objects of our Understanding. For a Man can employ his Thoughts about nothing, but either the Contemplation of *Things* themselves for the Discovery of Truth; or about the things in his own power, which are his own *Actions*, for the attainment of his own Ends; or the *Signs* the Mind makes use of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them for its clearer Information. All which three, *viz. Things* as they are in themselves knowable; *Actions* as they depend on us, in order to Happiness; and the right Use of *Signs* in order to Knowledg, being *toto cœlo* different, they seem'd to me to be the three great Provinces of the intellectual World, wholly separate and distinct one from another.

The End of the Essay of Human Understanding.

A

LETTER

To the Right Reverend

Edward Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter*,

Concerning ſome Paſſages relating to

Mr. Locke's Eſſay of *Human Underſtanding:*

IN A

Late DISCOURSE of his Lordſhip's, in *Vindication of the* Trinity.

My Lord,

I Cannot but look upon it as a great Honour that your Lordſhip, who are ſo thorowly acquainted with the incomparable Writings of Antiquity, and know ſo well how to entertain your Self with the Great Men in the Commonwealth of Letters, ſhould at any time take into your Hand my mean Papers; and ſo far beſtow any of your valuable Minutes on my *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, as to let the World ſee you have thought my Notions worth your Lordſhip's Conſideration. My Aim in that, as well as every thing elſe written by me, being purely to follow Truth as far as I could diſcover it; I think my ſelf beholden to whoever ſhews me my Miſtakes, as to one who, concurring in my Deſign, helps me forward in my way.

Your Lordſhip has been pleas'd to favour me with ſome Thoughts of your's in this kind, in your late *Learned Diſcourſe in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*; and I hope I may ſay, have gone a little out of your way to do me that Kindneſs; for the Obligation is thereby the greater. And if your Lordſhip has brought in the mention of my Book in a Chapter, entitled, *Objections againſt the Trinity in Point of Reaſon, anſwer'd*; when in my whole Eſſay, I think there is not to be found any thing like an Objection againſt the Trinity: I have

have the more to acknowledg to your Lordſhip, who would not let the Forreigneſs of the Subject hinder your Lordſhip from endeavouring to ſet me right, as to ſome Errors your Lordſhip apprehends in my Book; when other Writers uſing ſome Notions like mine, gave you that which was occaſion enough for you to do me the Favour to take notice of what you diſlike in my *Eſſay*.

Your Lordſhip's Name is of ſo great Authority in the Learned World, that I who profeſs my ſelf more ready, upon Conviction, to recant, than I was at firſt to publiſh my Miſtakes, cannot pay that Reſpect is due to it, without telling the Reaſons why I ſtill retain any of my Notions, after your Lordſhip's having appear'd diſſatisfy'd with them. This muſt be my Apology, and I hope ſuch a one as your Lordſhip will allow, for my examining what you have printed againſt ſeveral Paſſages in my Book, and my ſhewing the Reaſons why it has not prevail'd with me to quit them.

That your Lordſhip's Reaſonings may loſe none of their Force by my miſapprehending or miſrepreſenting them, (a way too familiarly us'd in Writings that have any appearance of Controverſy) I ſhall crave leave to give the Reader your Lordſhip's Arguments in the full ſtrength of your own Expreſſions; that ſo in them he may have the Advantage to ſee the Deficiency of my Anſwers, in any Point where I ſhall be ſo unfortunate as not to perceive, or not to follow the Light your Lordſhip affords me.

Your Lordſhip having in the two or three preceding Pages, juſtly, as I think, found fault with the account of Reaſon, given by the Unitarians and a late Writer, in thoſe Paſſages you quote out of them; and then coming to the *Nature of Subſtance*, p. 233. and relating what that Author has ſaid concerning the Mind's getting of ſimple Ideas, and thoſe ſimple Ideas being the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſonings, your Lordſhip thus concludes,

p. 234. *Then it follows, That we can have no Foundation of Reaſoning, where there can be no ſuch Ideas from Senſation or Reflection.*

Now this is the Caſe of Subſtance; it is not intromitted by the Senſes, nor depends upon the Operation of the Mind; and ſo it cannot be within the compaſs of our Reaſon. And therefore I do not wonder, that the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning, have almoſt diſcarded Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World. For they not only tell us, &c.

This, as I remember, is the firſt place where your Lordſhip is pleas'd to quote any thing out of my *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, which your Lordſhip does in theſe Words following.

p. 234. "That we can have no Idea of it by Senſation or Reflection; but that "nothing is ſignify'd by it, only an uncertain Suppoſition of we know not "what." *and therefore it is parallel'd more than once, with the* Indian Philoſopher's "He-knew-not-what, which ſupported the Tortoiſe, that ſupported the Elephant, that ſupported the Earth: ſo Subſtance was found out only to ſupport "Accidents. And, that when we talk of Subſtances, we talk like Children; "who being ask'd a Queſtion about ſomewhat which they knew not, readily "give this ſatisfactory Anſwer, That it is ſomething."

Theſe Words of mine, your Lordſhip brings to prove, That I am one of *the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning, that have almoſt diſcarded Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World.* An Accuſation which your Lordſhip will pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, becauſe I do not underſtand what is *almoſt to diſcard Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World.* If your Lordſhip means by it, That I deny or doubt that there is in the World any ſuch Thing as Subſtance, that your Lordſhip will acquit me of, when your Lordſhip looks again into that Chapter, which you have cited more than once, where your Lordſhip will find theſe Words.

Human Underſtanding, B. 2. C. 23. §. 4. "When we talk or think of any particular ſort of Corporeal Subſtances, "as Horſe, Stone, &c. tho' the Idea we have of either of them, be but the "Complication or Collection of thoſe ſeveral ſimple Ideas of ſenſible Qualities, "which we uſe to find united in the thing called Horſe or Stone; yet becauſe "we cannot conceive how they ſhould ſubſiſt alone, nor one in another, we ſup"poſe them exiſting in, and ſupported by ſome common Subject, which Sup"port

" port we denote by the name Subſtance; tho' it be certain, we have no clear
" or diſtinct Idea of that thing we ſuppoſe a Support." And again,

" The ſame happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, *viz.* §. 5.
" Thinking, Reaſoning, Fearing, *&c.* which we conſidering not to ſubſiſt of
" themſelves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be pro-
" duc'd by it, we are apt to think theſe the Actions of ſome other Sub-
" ſtance, which we call Spirit: Whereby yet it is evident, that having no o-
" ther Idea or Notion of Matter, but ſomething wherein thoſe many ſenſi-
" ble Qualities, which affect our Senſes, do ſubſiſt; by ſuppoſing a Subſtance,
" wherein Thinking, Knowing, Doubting, and a Power of Moving, *&c.* do
" ſubſiſt, we have as clear a Notion of the Nature or Subſtance of Spirit,
" as we have of Body; the one being ſuppos'd to be (without knowing what
" it is) the *Subſtratum* to thoſe ſimple Ideas we have from without; and the
" other ſuppoſed (with a like Ignorance of what it is) to be the *Subſtratum*
" to thoſe Operations, which we experiment in our ſelves within." And
again,

" Whatever therefore be the ſecret Nature of Subſtance in general, all §. 6.
" the Ideas we have of particular diſtinct Subſtances, are nothing but ſeve-
" ral Combinations of ſimple Ideas, co-exiſting in ſuch, tho' unknown, Cauſe
" of their Union, as makes the whole ſubſiſt of it ſelf."

And I further ſay in the ſame Section, " That we ſuppoſe theſe Combina-
" tions to reſt in, and to be adherent to that unknown, common Subject,
" which inheres not in any Thing elſe. And that our Complex Ideas of
" Subſtances, beſides all thoſe ſimple Ideas they are made up of, have always
" the confus'd Idea of ſomething to which they belong, and in which they
" ſubſiſt: And therefore when we ſpeak of any ſort of Subſtance, we ſay it is a
" thing having ſuch and ſuch Qualities; a Body is a thing that is extended,
" figur'd and capable of Motion; a Spirit, a thing capable of Thinking."

Theſe, and the like Faſhions of ſpeaking, intimate, That the Subſtance is ſuppoſed *always ſomething*, beſides the Extenſion, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking, or other obſervable Idea, tho' we know not what it is.

" Our Idea of Body, *I ſay*, is an extended, ſolid Subſtance; and our Idea B. 2. c. 23.
" of our Souls, is of a Subſtance that thinks." So that as long as there is §. 22.
any ſuch thing as Body or Spirit in the World, I have done nothing towards the *diſcarding Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World*. Nay, as long as there is any ſimple Idea or ſenſible Quality left, according to my way of arguing, Subſtance cannot be diſcarded; becauſe all ſimple Ideas, all ſenſible Qualities, carry with them a Suppoſition of a *Subſtratum* to exiſt in, and of a Subſtance wherein they inhere: and of this that whole Chapter is ſo full, that I challenge any one who reads it, to think I have *almoſt*, or one jot *diſcarded Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World*. And of this, *Man*, *Horſe*, *Sun*, *Water*, *Iron*, *Diamond*, &c. which I have mention'd of diſtinct ſorts of *Subſtances*, will be my Witneſſes as long as any ſuch thing remains in being; of which I ſay, " That the Ideas of Subſtances are ſuch Com- B. 2. c. 12.
" binations of ſimple Ideas, as are taken to repreſent diſtinct, particular Things, §. 6.
" ſubſiſting by themſelves, in which the ſuppos'd or confus'd Idea of Sub-
" ſtance is always the firſt and chief."

If by almoſt *diſcarding Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World*, your Lordſhip means, That I have deſtroy'd, and *almoſt diſcarded* the true Idea we have of it, by calling it a *Subſtratum*, *A ſuppoſition of we know not what Sup-* B. 2. c. 23.
port of ſuch Qualities as are capable of producing ſimple Ideas in us, *an obſcure* §. 1.
and relative Idea: That without knowing what it is, it is that which ſupports Ac- §. 2.
cidents; ſo that of Subſtance we have no Idea of what it is, but only a confus'd, §. 3.
obſcure one, of what it does: I muſt confeſs this, and the like I have ſaid of B. 2. c. 13.
our Idea of Subſtance; and ſhould be very glad to be convinc'd by your §. 19.
Lordſhip, or any body elſe, that I have ſpoken too meanly of it. He that would ſhew me a more clear and diſtinct Idea of Subſtance, would do me a Kindneſs I ſhould thank him for. But this is the beſt I can hitherto find, either in my own Thoughts, or in the Books of Logicians: For their Account or Idea of it is, that it is *Ens* or *res per ſe ſubſiſtens & ſubſtans accidentibus*; which in effect is no more, but that Subſtance is a *Being* or *Thing*; or in ſhort,

ſhort, *ſomething* they know not what, or of which they have no clearer Idea, than that it is *ſomething* which ſupports Accidents, or other ſimple Ideas or Modes, and is not ſupported it ſelf as a Mode or an Accident. So that I do not ſee but *Burgerſdicius*, *Sanderſon*, and the whole Tribe of Logicians, muſt be reckon'd with *the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning, who have almoſt diſcarded* Subſtance *out of the reaſonable part of the World.*

But ſuppoſing, my Lord, that I or theſe Gentlemen, Logicians of Note in the Schools, ſhould own, that we have a very imperfect, obſcure, inadequate Idea of Subſtance; would it not be a little too hard to charge us with diſcarding Subſtance out of the World? For what *almoſt* diſcarding, and *reaſonable part* of the World, ſignifies, I muſt confeſs I do not clearly comprehend: But let *almoſt* and *reaſonable part* ſignify here what they will, for I dare ſay your Lordſhip meant ſomething by them, would not your Lordſhip think you were a little hardly dealt with, if for acknowledging your ſelf to have a very imperfect and inadequate Idea of God, or of ſeveral other things which in this very Treatiſe, you confeſs our Underſtandings come ſhort in and cannot comprehend, you ſhould be accus'd to be one of theſe *Gentlemen that have almoſt diſcarded* God, or thoſe other myſterious Things, whereof you contend we have very imperfect and inadequate Ideas, *out of the reaſonable World?* For I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip means by *almoſt diſcarding out of the reaſonable World*, ſomething that is blameable, for it ſeems not to be inſerted for a Commendation; and yet I think he deſerves no Blame, who owns the having imperfect, inadequate, obſcure Ideas, where he has no better: however, if it be infer'd from thence, that either he *almoſt excludes* thoſe Things out of Being, or out of rational Diſcourſe, if that be meant by the *reaſonable World*; for the firſt of theſe will not hold, becauſe the Being of Things in the World depends not on our Ideas: The latter indeed is true, in ſome degree, but is no Fault; for it is certain, that where we have imperfect, inadequate, confus'd, obſcure Ideas, we cannot diſcourſe and reaſon about thoſe things ſo well, fully and clearly, as if we had perfect, adequate, clear and diſtinct Ideas.

Your Lordſhip, I muſt own, with great Reaſon, takes notice that I *paralleld more than once*, our Idea of Subſtance, with the *Indian* Philoſopher's He-knew-not-what, which ſupported the Tortoiſe, *&c.*

This Repetition is, I confeſs, a Fault in exact Writing: But I having acknowledg'd and excus'd it in theſe Words in my Preface; "I am not ig-"norant how little I herein conſult my own Reputation, when I know-"ingly let my Eſſay go with a Fault ſo apt to diſguſt the moſt *Judicious*, "*who are always* the niceſt Readers. And there further add, That I did not "publiſh my Eſſay for ſuch great Maſters of Knowledg as your Lordſhip; "but fitted it for Men of my own Size, to whom Repetitions might be "ſometimes uſeful." It would not therefore have been beſides your Lordſhip's Generoſity (who were not intended to be provok'd by this Repetition) to have paſs'd by ſuch a Fault as this, in one who pretends not beyond the lower Rank of Writers. But I ſee your Lordſhip would have me exact and without any Faults; and I wiſh I could be ſo, the better to deſerve your Lordſhip's Approbation.

My ſaying, "That when we talk of Subſtance, we talk like Children, who, "being ask'd a Queſtion about ſomething which they know not, readily "give this ſatisfactory Anſwer, That it is ſomething;" your Lordſhip ſeems mightily to lay to Heart, in theſe Words that follow.

P. 235. *If this be the Truth of the Caſe, we muſt ſtill talk like Children, and I know not how it can be remedied. For if we cannot come at a rational Idea of Subſtance, we can have no Principle of Certainty to go upon in this Debate.*

If your Lordſhip has any better and diſtincter Idea of Subſtance than mine is, which I have given an account of, your Lordſhip is not at all concern'd in what I have there ſaid. But thoſe whoſe Idea of *Subſtance*, whether a *rational* or not rational Idea, is like mine, ſomething they know not what, muſt in that, with me, talk like Children, when they ſpeak of ſomething they know not what. For a Philoſopher that ſays, That which ſupports Accidents is *ſomething* he knows not what; and a Country-man that ſays, The Foun-

dation

dation of the great Church at *Harlem*, is ſupported by *ſomething* he knows not what; and a Child that ſtands in the Dark upon his Mother's Muff, and ſays he ſtands upon *ſomething* he-knows-not-what, in this reſpect talk all Three alike. But if the Country-man knows, that the Foundation of the Church at *Harlem* is ſupported by a Rock, as the Houſes about *Briſtol* are; or by Gravel, as the Houſes about *London* are; or by wooden Piles, as the Houſes in *Amſterdam* are; it is plain, that then, having a clear and diſtinct Idea of the thing that ſupports the Church, he does not talk of this matter as a Child; nor will he of the ſupport of Accidents, when he has a clearer and more diſtinct Idea of it, than that it is barely *ſomething*. But as long as we think like Children, in Caſes where our Ideas are no clearer, nor diſtincter than their's, I agree with your Lordſhip, *That I know not how it can be remedied*, but that we muſt talk like them.

Your Lordſhip's next Paragraph begins thus: *I do not ſay, That we can have a clear Idea of Subſtance, either by Senſation or Reflection; but from hence I argue, That this is a very inſufficient diſtribution of the Ideas neceſſary to Reaſon.* P. 235.

Your Lordſhip here argues againſt a Propoſition that I know no body that holds: I am ſure the Author of *The Eſſay of Human Underſtanding* never thought, nor in that *Eſſay* hath any where ſaid, That the Ideas that come into the Mind by *Senſation and Reflection, are all the Ideas that are neceſſary to Reaſon*, or that Reaſon is exercis'd about; for then he muſt have laid by all the Ideas of ſimple and mix'd Modes and Relations, and the complex Ideas of the Species of Subſtances, about which he has ſpent ſo many Chapters; and muſt have deny'd that theſe complex Ideas are the Objects of Mens Thoughts or Reaſonings, which he is far enough from. All that he has ſaid about *Senſation* and *Reflection* is, That all our *ſimple Ideas* are receiv'd by them, and that theſe ſimple Ideas are the Foundation of all our Knowledg, for as much as all our complex, relative, and general Ideas are made by the Mind, abſtracting, enlarging, comparing, compounding and referring, *&c.* theſe ſimple Ideas, and their ſeveral Combinations, one to another, whereby complex and general Ideas are formed of Modes, Relations, and the ſeveral Species of Subſtances, all which are made uſe of by *Reaſon*, as well as the other Faculties of the Mind.

I therefore agree with your Lordſhip, That the Ideas of Senſation or Reflection *is a very inſufficient diſtribution of the Ideas neceſſary to Reaſon.* Only my Agreement with your Lordſhip had been more intire to the whole Sentence, if your Lordſhip had rather ſaid *Ideas* made uſe of by *Reaſon*; becauſe I do not well know what is meant by *Ideas neceſſary to Reaſon*. For Reaſon being a Faculty of the Mind, nothing, in my poor Opinion, can properly be ſaid to be *neceſſary* to that Faculty, but what is requir'd to its being. As nothing is neceſſary to Sight in a Man, but ſuch a Conſtitution of the Body and Organ, that a Man may have the power of Seeing; ſo I ſubmit it to your Lordſhip, whether any thing can properly be ſaid to be *neceſſary to Reaſon* in a Man, but ſuch a Conſtitution of Body or Mind, or both, as may give him the Power of Reaſoning. Indeed ſuch a particular ſort of Objects or Inſtruments may be ſometimes ſaid neceſſary to the Eye, but that is never ſaid in reference to the Faculty of Seeing, but in reference to ſome particular end of Seeing; and then a Microſcope and a Mite may be neceſſary to the Eye, if the End propos'd be to know the Shape and Parts of that Animal. And ſo if a Man would reaſon about *Subſtance*, then the Idea of *Subſtance* is neceſſary to his Reaſon: But yet I doubt not but that many a Rational Creature has been, who, in all his Life, never bethought himſelf of any neceſſity his Reaſon had of an Idea of Subſtance.

Your Lordſhip's next Words are; *For beſides theſe, there muſt be ſome general Ideas which the Mind doth form, not by mere comparing thoſe Ideas it has got from Senſe or Reflection; but by forming diſtinct general Notions of Things from particular Ideas.* P. 233.

Here, again, I perfectly agree with your Lordſhip, that beſides the particular Ideas received from Senſation and Reflection, the Mind *forms general Ideas, not by mere comparing thoſe Ideas it has got by Senſation and Reflection*; for this I do not remember I ever ſaid. But this I ſay, "Ideas become general, B. 3. c. 3. §. 6.

" by ſeparating from them the Circumſtances of Time and Place, and any other " Ideas that may determine them to this or that particular Exiſtence. By this
B. 1. c. 11. §. 9. " way of Abſtraction they are made, *&c.*" And to the ſame purpoſe I explain my ſelf in another place.

Your Lordſhip ſays, *The Mind forms general Ideas, by forming general Notions of Things from particular Ideas.* And I ſay, " The Mind forms general " Ideas, by abſtracting from particular ones." So that there is no difference that I perceive between us in this Matter, but only a little in Expreſſion.

P. 235. It follows, *And among theſe general Notions, or rational Ideas, Subſtance is one of the firſt; becauſe we find, that we can have no true Conceptions of any Modes or Accidents (no matter which) but we muſt conceive a* Subſtratum, *or Subject wherein they are. Since it is a Repugnancy to our firſt Conceptions of Things, that Modes or Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves; and therefore the rational Idea of Subſtance, is one of the firſt and moſt natural Ideas in our Minds.*

Whether the general Idea of Subſtance be *one of the firſt or moſt natural Ideas in our Minds*, I will not diſpute with your Lordſhip, as not being, I think, very material to the matter in hand. But as to the Idea of Subſtance, what it is, and how we come by it, your Lordſhip ſays, *It is a Repugnancy to our Conceptions of Things, that Modes and Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves; and therefore we muſt conceive a* Subſtratum *wherein they are.*

And, I ſay, " Becauſe we cannot conceive how ſimple Ideas of ſenſible Qua-
B. 2. c. 23. §. 4. " lities ſhould ſubſiſt alone, or one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in " and ſupported by ſome common Subject." Which I, with your Lordſhip, call
§. 1. alſo *Subſtratum.*

What now can be more conſonant to it ſelf, than what your Lordſhip and I have ſaid in theſe two Paſſages is conſonant to one another? Whereupon, my Lord, give me leave, I beſeech you, to boaſt to the World, That what I have ſaid concerning our general Idea of Subſtance, and the way how we come by it, has the Honour to be confirm'd by your Lordſhip's Authority. And that from hence I may be ſure the ſaying, That the general Idea we have of Subſtance is, that it is a *Subſtratum* or Support to Modes or Accidents, wherein they do ſubſiſt: and that the Mind forms it, becauſe it cannot conceive how they ſhould ſubſiſt of themſelves, has no Objection in it againſt the Trinity; for then your Lordſhip would not, I know, be of that Opinion, nor own it in a Chapter where you are anſwering Objections againſt the Trinity, however my Words, which amount to no more, have been (I know not how) brought into that Chapter: Tho' what they have to do there, I muſt confeſs to your Lordſhip, I do not yet ſee.

In the next Words your Lordſhip ſays, *But we are ſtill told, That our Underſtandings can have no other Ideas, but either from Senſation or Reflection.*
P. 236. The Words of that Section your Lordſhip quotes, are theſe; " The Un-
B. 2. c. 1. §. 5. " derſtanding ſeems to me, not to have the leaſt glimmering of any Ideas, " which it doth not receive from one of theſe two. External Objects furniſh the Mind with the Ideas of ſenſible Qualities, which are all thoſe different Perceptions they produce in us: And the Mind furniſhes the Underſtanding with Ideas of its own Operations. Theſe, when we have taken " a full Survey of them, and their ſeveral Modes, and the Compoſitions " made out of them, we ſhall find to contain all our whole Stock of Ideas; " and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of " thoſe two ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and thorowly " ſearch into his Underſtanding, and then let him tell me, whether all the " original Ideas he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his Senſes, " or of the Operations of his Mind, conſider'd as Objects of his Reflection: " And how great a Maſs of Knowledg ſoever he imagines to be lodg'd " there, he will, upon taking a ſtrict View, ſee, that he has not any Idea in " his Mind but what one of theſe two have imprinted, tho', perhaps, with " infinite variety compounded and inlarged by the Underſtanding, as we ſhall " ſee hereafter."

Theſe Words ſeem to me to ſignify ſomething different from what your Lordſhip has cited out of them; and if they do not, were intended, I am ſure,

ſure, by me, to ſignify all thoſe complex Ideas of Modes, Relations and Specifick Subſtances; which how the Mind it ſelf forms out of ſimple Ideas, I have ſhewn in the following part of my Book, and intended to refer to it by theſe Words, "As we ſhall ſee hereafter," with which I cloſe that Paragraph. But if by *Ideas* your Lordſhip ſignifies *ſimple Ideas*, in the Words you have ſet down, I grant then they contain my Senſe, *viz. That our Underſtandings can have* (*i. e.* in the natural exerciſe of our Faculties) *no other ſimple Ideas, but either from Senſation or Reflection.*

Your Lordſhip goes on: *And* [*we are ſtill told*] *that herein chiefly lies the Excellency of Mankind above Brutes, That theſe cannot abſtract and inlarge Ideas, as Men do.*

Had your Lordſhip done me the Favour to have quoted the Place in my Book, from whence you had taken theſe Words, I ſhould not have been at a loſs where to find them. Thoſe in my Book, which I can remember any where come neareſt to them, run thus.

"This, I think, I may be poſitive in, that the power of abſtracting is B. 2. c. 11. "not at all in Brutes; and that the having of general Ideas, is that which §. 10. "puts a perfect diſtinction betwixt Man and Brutes; and is an Excellency "which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to."

Tho', ſpeaking of the Faculties of the Human Underſtanding, I took occaſion, by the bye, to conjecture how far Brutes partook with Men in any of the intellectual Faculties; yet it never enter'd into my Thoughts, on that occaſion, to compare the utmoſt Perfections of Human Nature with that of Brutes, and therefore was far from ſaying, *Herein chiefly lies the Excellency of Mankind above Brutes, that theſe cannot abſtract and inlarge their Ideas, as Men do.* For it ſeems to me an Abſurdity I would not willingly be guilty of, to ſay, That the *Excellency of Mankind lies chiefly*, or any ways in this, *that Brutes cannot abſtract.* For *Brutes* being not able to do any thing, cannot be any *Excellency* of *Mankind.* The Ability of *Mankind* does not lie in the Impotency or Diſabilities of *Brutes.* If your Lordſhip had charg'd me to have ſaid, That *herein lies* one *Excellency of Mankind* above *Brutes, viz.* That Men can, and Brutes cannot abſtract; I muſt have own'd it to be my Senſe: But what I ought to ſay, to what your Lordſhip approved or diſapproved of in it, I ſhall better underſtand, when I know to what purpoſe your Lordſhip was pleas'd to cite it.

The immediately following Paragraph runs thus: *But how comes the gene-* P. 236. *ral Idea of Subſtance to be fram'd in our Minds? Is this by* "abſtracting and "inlarging ſimple Ideas? No, "But it is by a Complication of many ſim- B. 2. c. 23. §. 1. "ple Ideas together: Becauſe not imagining how theſe ſimple Ideas can ſubſiſt "by themſelves, we accuſtom our ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum* wherein "they do ſubſiſt, and from whence they do reſult, which therefore we call "Subſtance." *And is this all indeed, that is to be ſaid for the being of Subſtance,* "That we accuſtom our ſelves to ſuppoſe a *Subſtratum?*" *Is that Cuſtom grounded upon true Reaſon, or not? If not, then Accidents or Modes muſt ſubſiſt of themſelves, and theſe ſimple Ideas need no Tortoiſe to ſupport them: For Figures and Colours, &c. would do well enough of themſelves, but for ſome Fancies Men have accuſtomed themſelves to.*

Herein your Lordſhip ſeems to charge me with two Faults: One, that I make the *general Idea of Subſtance to be fram'd, not by abſtracting and enlarging ſimple Ideas, but by a Complication of many ſimple Ideas together*: The other, as if I had ſaid, The *being of Subſtance* had no other foundation but the Fancies of Men.

As to the firſt of theſe, I beg leave to remind your Lordſhip, that I ſay in more places than one, and particularly thoſe above quoted, where *ex profeſſo* I treat of Abſtraction and general Ideas, that they are all made by abſtracting; and therefore could not be underſtood to mean, that that of *Subſtance* was made any other way; however my Pen might have ſlip'd, or the negligence of Expreſſion, where I might have ſomething elſe than the general Idea of Subſtance in view, might make me ſeem to ſay ſo.

That I was not ſpeaking of the *general Idea of Subſtance* in the Paſſage your Lordſhip quotes, is manifeſt from the Title of that Chapter, which is, *Of the Complex*

Complex Ideas of Subſtances. And the firſt Section of it, which your Lordſhip cites for thoſe Words you have ſet down, ſtands thus:

B. 2. c. 23. §. 1. "The Mind being, as I have declar'd, furniſh'd with a great number of the "ſimple Ideas convey'd in by the Senſes, as they are found in exterior things, "or by Reflections on its own Operations, takes notice alſo, that a certain "number of theſe ſimple Ideas go conſtantly together; which being preſumed "to belong to one thing, and Words being ſuited to common Apprehenſion, "and made uſe of for quick Diſpatch, are call'd, ſo united in one Subject, by "one Name; which, by Inadverteney, we are apt afterward to talk of, and "conſider as one ſimple Idea, which indeed is a Complication of many Ideas "together: Becauſe, as I have ſaid, not imagining how theſe ſimple Ideas can "ſubſiſt by themſelves, we accuſtom our ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum* "wherein they do ſubſiſt, and from which they do reſult; which therefore we "call *Subſtance.*"

In which words, I do not obſerve any that deny the *general Idea of Subſtance* to be made by Abſtraction; nor any that ſay, it is made *by a Complication of many ſimple Ideas together.* But ſpeaking in that place of the Ideas of diſtinct Subſtances, ſuch as Man, Horſe, Gold, &c. I ſay they are made up of certain Combinations of ſimple Ideas; which Combinations are look'd upon, each of them, as one ſimple Idea, tho' they are many; and we call it by one Name of *Subſtance*, tho' made up of Modes, from the cuſtom of ſuppoſing a *Subſtratum*, wherein that Combination does ſubſiſt. So that in this Paragraph I only give an account of the Idea of diſtinct Subſtances, ſuch as *Oak, Elephant, Iron*, &c. how, tho' they are made up of diſtinct Complications of Modes, yet they are look'd on as one Idea, call'd by one Name, as making diſtinct ſorts of Subſtances.

But that my Notion of *Subſtance in general* is quite different from theſe, and has no ſuch Combination of ſimple *Ideas* in it, is evident from the immediate

B. 2. c. 23. §. 2. following words, where I ſay, "The Idea of *pure Subſtance in general*, is only a "Suppoſition of we know not what Support of ſuch Qualities as are capable of "producing ſimple Ideas in us." And theſe two I plainly diſtinguiſh all along,

§. 6. particularly where I ſay, "Whatever therefore be the ſecret and *abſtract* Na-"ture of Subſtance in general, all the Ideas we have of particular diſtinct Sub-"ſtances, are nothing but ſeveral Combinations of ſimple Ideas, co-exiſting "in ſuch, tho' unknown, cauſe of their Union, as makes the whole ſubſiſt of "it ſelf."

The other thing laid to my charge, is, as if I took the *Being of Subſtance* to be doubtful, or render'd it ſo by the imperfect and ill-grounded Idea I have given of it. To which I beg leave to ſay, That I ground not the *Being*, but the *Idea* of Subſtance, on our accuſtoming our ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum*; for 'tis of the *Idea* alone I ſpeak there, and not of the *Being of Subſtance.* And having every where affirm'd and built upon it, That a *Man* is a Subſtance; I cannot be ſuppos'd to queſtion or doubt of the *Being of Subſtance*, till I can

Ib. §. 29. queſtion or doubt of my own *Being.* Further I ſay, "Senſation convinces us "that there are ſolid extended Subſtances; and Reflection, that there are "thinking ones". So that I think the *Being of Subſtance* is not ſhaken by what I have ſaid: And if the Idea of it ſhould be, yet (the *Being* of things depending not on our *Ideas*) the *Being of Subſtance* would not be at all ſhaken by my ſaying, We had but an obſcure imperfect *Idea* of it, and that that *Idea* came from our accuſtoming our ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum*; or indeed if I ſhould ſay, We had no *Idea* of Subſtance at all. For a great many things may be and are granted to have a *Being*, and be in Nature, of which we have no *Ideas.* For example; It cannot be doubted but there are diſtinct Species of ſeparate Spirits, of which yet we have no diſtinct *Ideas* at all: It cannot be queſtion'd but Spirits have ways of communicating their Thoughts, and yet we have no *Idea* of it at all.

The *Being* then of *Subſtance* being ſafe and ſecure, notwithſtanding any thing I have ſaid, let us ſee whether the *Idea* of it be not ſo too. Your Lordſhip aſks,

P. 236. with concern, *And is this all indeed that is to be ſaid for the Being* (if your Lordſhip pleaſe, let it be the *Idea*) *of Subſtance*, that we accuſtom our ſelves to ſup-

B. 2. c. 23. §. 4. poſe a *Subſtratum? Is that Cuſtom grounded upon true Reaſon, or no?* I have ſaid, that it is grounded upon this, "That we cannot *conceive* how ſimple *Ideas* of

"ſenſible

" ſenſible Qualities ſhould ſubſiſt alone, and therefore we ſuppoſe them to " exiſt in, and to be ſupported by ſome common Subject, which Support we " denote by the name *Subſtance.*" Which I think is a *true Reaſon*, becauſe it is the ſame your Lordſhip grounds the Suppoſition of a *Subſtratum* on, in this very Page; even on the *Repugnancy to our Conceptions, that Modes and Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves.* So that I have the good luck here again to agree with your Lordſhip: And conſequently conclude, I have your Approbation in this, That the *Subſtratum* to Modes or Accidents, which is our *Idea* of Subſtance in general, is founded in this, " That we cannot *conceive* how Modes or Accidents can ſubſiſt by themſelves."

The Words next following, are: *If it be grounded upon plain and evident Reaſon, then we muſt allow an Idea of Subſtance, which comes not in by Senſation or Reflection; and ſo we may be certain of ſomething which we have not, by thoſe Ideas.* P. 237.

Theſe Words of your Lordſhip's contain nothing as I ſee in them, againſt me: for I never ſaid, that the *general Idea of Subſtance comes in by* Senſation *and* Reflection; or, that it is a ſimple Idea of Senſation or Reflection, tho' it be ultimately founded in them: for it is a complex *Idea*, made up of the general *Idea* of *Something*, or *Being*, with the Relation of a Support to Accidents. For general *Ideas* come not into the Mind by Senſation or Reflection, but are the Creatures or Inventions of the Underſtanding, as, I think, I have ſhewn; and alſo, how the Mind makes them from *Ideas*, which it has got by Senſation and Reflection: And as to the *Ideas* of Relation, how the Mind forms them, and how they are deriv'd from, and ultimately terminate in *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection, I have likewiſe ſhewn. B. 3. c. 3.

But that I may not be miſtaken what I mean, when I ſpeak of *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection, as the Materials of all our Knowledg; give me leave, my Lord, to ſet down here a place or two out of my Book, to explain my ſelf; as, I thus ſpeak of *Ideas* of *Senſation* and Reflection. B. 2. c. 25. & c. 28. §. 18.

" That theſe, when we have taken a full Survey of them, and their ſeveral " Modes, and the Compoſitions made out of them, we ſhall find to contain all " our whole Stock of *Ideas*; and we have nothing in our Minds, which did " not come in one of theſe two ways." This Thought, in another place, I expreſs thus: B. 2. c. 1. §. 5.

" Theſe ſimple *Ideas*, the Materials of all our Knowledg, are ſuggeſted and " furniſh'd to the Mind only by thoſe two ways above-mention'd, *viz.* Sen- " ſation and Reflection." And again. B. 2. c. 2. §. 2.

" Theſe are the moſt conſiderable of thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which the Mind has, " and out of which is made all its other Knowledg; all which it receives by the " two fore-mention'd ways of Senſation and Reflection." And, B. 2. c. 7. §. 10.

" Thus I have, in a ſhort Draught, given a View of our original *Ideas*, from " whence all the reſt are deriv'd, and of which they are made up." B. 2. c. 21. §. 73.

This, and the like ſaid in other places, is what I have thought concerning *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection, as the Foundation and Materials of all our *Ideas*, and conſequently of all our Knowledg. I have ſet down theſe Particulars out of my Book, that the Reader having a full view of my Opinion herein, may the better ſee what in it is liable to your Lordſhip's Reprehenſion. For that your Lordſhip is not very well ſatisfy'd with it, appears not only by the Words under conſideration, but by theſe alſo: *But we are ſtill told, That our Underſtanding can have no other Ideas, but either from Senſation or Reflection.* And, P. 236. *Let us ſuppoſe this Principle to be true, That the ſimple Ideas, by Senſation or Reflection, are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning.* P. 240.

Your Lordſhip's Argument, in the Paſſage we are upon, ſtands thus: *If the general Idea of Subſtance be grounded upon plain and evident Reaſon, then we muſt allow an Idea of Subſtance, which comes not in by* Senſation *or* Reflection. This is a Conſequence which, with Submiſſion, I think will not hold, becauſe it is founded upon a Suppoſition which, I think, will not hold, *viz.* That *Reaſon* and *Ideas* are inconſiſtent; for if that Suppoſition be not true, then the *general Idea* of Subſtance may be *grounded on plain and evident Reaſon*: and yet it will not follow from thence, that it is not ultimately grounded on and deriv'd from *Ideas which come in by Senſation or Reflection*, and ſo cannot be ſaid to come in by *Senſation* or *Reflection*.

To

To explain my ſelf, and clear my Meaning in this Matter: All the *Ideas* of all the ſenſible Qualities of a Cherry come into my Mind by Senſation; the *Ideas* of *Perceiving*, *Thinking*, *Reaſoning*, *Knowing*, &c. come into my Mind by *Reflection:* The *Ideas* of theſe Qualities and Actions, or Powers, are perceiv'd by the Mind, to be by themſelves inconſiſtent with Exiſtence; or, as your Lord-

P. 236. ſhip well expreſſes it, *We find that we can have no true Conception of any Modes or Accidents, but we muſt conceive a* Subſtratum *or Subject, wherein they are*; i. e. That they cannot exiſt or ſubſiſt of themſelves. Hence the Mind perceives their neceſſary Connection with Inherence or being ſupported; which being a relative *Idea* ſuperadded to the *red Colour* in a Cherry, or to *Thinking* in a Man, the Mind frames the correlative *Idea* of a *Support*. For I never deny'd, That the Mind could frame to it ſelf *Ideas* of Relation, but have ſhew'd the quite contrary in my Chapters about *Relation*. But becauſe a Relation cannot be founded in nothing, or be the Relation of nothing, and the thing here related as a *Supporter* or a *Support*, is not repreſented to the Mind by any clear and diſtinct *Idea*; therefore the obſcure, indiſtinct, vague *Idea* of *Thing* or *Something*, is all that is left to be the poſitive *Idea*, which has the relation of a *Support* or *Subſtratum* to Modes or Accidents; and that general indetermin'd *Idea* of *Something*, is, by the abſtraction of the Mind, deriv'd alſo from the ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection: And thus the Mind, from the poſitive ſimple *Ideas* got by Senſation or Reflection, comes to the general relative *Idea* of *Subſtance*; which, without theſe poſitive ſimple *Ideas*, it would never have.

This your Lordſhip (without giving by Retail all the particular Steps of the Mind in this Buſineſs) has well expreſs'd in this more familiar way.

P. 236. *We find we can have no true Conception of any Modes or Accidents, but we muſt conceive a* Subſtratum *or Subject wherein they are; ſince it is a Repugnancy to our Conceptions of Things, that Modes or Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves.*

Ibid. P. 253. Hence your Lordſhip calls it the *rational Idea of Subſtances:* And ſays, *I grant that by Senſation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of things; but our Reaſon is ſatisfied that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe, becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves.* So that if this be that which your Lordſhip means by *the rational Idea of Subſtance*, I ſee nothing there is in it againſt what I have ſaid, that it is founded on ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation or Reflection, and that it is a very obſcure *Idea*.

P. 273. Your Lordſhip's Concluſion from your foregoing Words, is, *And ſo we may be certain of ſome things which we have not by thoſe Ideas*: which is a Propoſition, whoſe preciſe meaning your Lordſhip will forgive me, if I profeſs, as it ſtands there, I do not underſtand. For it is uncertain to me, whether your Lordſhip means, We may certainly know the Exiſtence of ſomething which we have not by thoſe *Ideas*; or certainly know the diſtinct Properties of ſomething which we have *not by thoſe Ideas*; or certainly know the Truth of ſome Propoſition *which we have not by thoſe Ideas*: for to be *certain of ſomething*, may ſignify either of theſe. But in which ſoever of theſe it be meant, I do not ſee how I am concern'd in it.

Your Lordſhip's next Paragraph is as followeth:

P. 273. "The *Idea* of Subſtance, *we are told again*, is nothing but the ſuppoſed, but "unknown Support of thoſe Qualities we find exiſting, which we imagine can-"not ſubſiſt *ſine re ſubſtante*; which, according to the true Import of the "Word, is in plain *Engliſh* ſtanding under or upholding.". *But very little weight is to be laid upon a bare Grammatical Etymology, when the Word is uſed in another Senſe by the beſt Authors, ſuch as* Cicero *and* Quintilian; *who take Subſtance for the ſame as Eſſence, as* Valla *hath prov'd; and ſo the* Greek *Word imports: But* Boetius *in tranſlating* Ariſtotle's *Predicaments, rather choſe the word* Subſtance, *as more proper to expreſs a compound Being, and reſerv'd* Eſſence *for what was more ſimple and immaterial. And in this ſenſe,* Subſtance *was not apply'd to God, but only* Eſſence, *as St.* Auguſtine *obſerves.*

Your Lordſhip here ſeems to diſlike my taking notice, That the Derivation of the Word *Subſtance* favours the *Idea* we have of it: And your Lordſhip tells me, *That very little weight is to be laid on a bare* Grammatical *Etymology*. Tho' little weight were to be laid on it, if there were nothing elſe to be ſaid for it; yet when it is brought to confirm an *Idea* which your Lordſhip allows of, nay, calls

calls a *Rational Idea*, and ſays is founded in *evident Reaſon*, I do not ſee what your Lordſhip had to blame in it. For tho' *Cicero* and *Quintilian* take *Subſtantia* for the ſame with *Eſſence*, as your Lordſhip ſays; or for Riches and Eſtate, as I think they alſo do; yet I ſuppoſe it will be true, that *Subſtantia* is deriv'd *à Subſtando*, and that that ſhews the original import of the word. For, My Lord, I have been long of Opinion, as may be ſeen in my Book, that if we knew the Original of all the Words we meet with, we ſhould thereby be very much help'd to know the *Ideas* they were firſt apply'd to, and made to ſtand for; and therefore I muſt beg your Lordſhip to excuſe this Conceit of mine, this *Etymological* Obſervation, eſpecially ſince it hath nothing in it againſt the Truth, not againſt your Lordſhip's *Idea* of *Subſtance*.

But your Lordſhip oppoſes to this Etymology, the uſe of the Word *Subſtance by the beſt Authors in another Senſe*; and thereupon give the World a learned Account of the uſe of the Word *Subſtance*, in a Senſe wherein it is not taken for the *Subſtratum* of Accidents: However, I think it a ſufficient Juſtification of my ſelf to your Lordſhip, that I uſe it in the ſame Senſe your Lordſhip does, and that your Lordſhip thinks not fit to govern your ſelf by thoſe Authorities; for then your Lordſhip could not apply the Word *Subſtance to God*, as *Boethius* did not, and as your Lordſhip has prov'd out of St. *Auguſtine*, that it was not apply'd. Tho' I gueſs 'tis the Conſideration of *Subſtance*, as it is apply'd to God, that brings it into your Lordſhip's preſent Diſcourſe. But if your Lordſhip and I (if without Preſumption I may join my ſelf with you) have in the uſe of the Word *Subſtance*, quitted the Example of the *beſt Authors*, I think the Authority of the Schools, which has a long time been allow'd in Philoſophical Terms, will beat us out in this matter.

In the remaining part of this Paragraph it follows: *But afterwards the* P. 238.
Names of Subſtance *and* Eſſence *were promiſcuouſly uſed, with reſpect to God and his Creatures; and do imply, that which makes the real Being, as diſtinguiſh'd from Modes and Properties. And ſo the* Subſtance *and* Eſſence *of a Man are the ſame; not being taken for the individual* Subſtance, *which cannot be underſtood without particular Modes and Properties; but the general* Subſtance *or* Nature *of Man abſtractly from all the Circumſtances of Perſons.*

Here your Lordſhip makes theſe Terms *general Subſtance*, *Nature* and *Eſſence*, to ſignify the ſame thing; how properly, I ſhall not here inquire. Your Lordſhip goes on.

And I deſire to know, whether according to true Reaſon, that be not a clear Idea *of* P. 238.
Man; not of Peter, James *or* John, *but of a Man as ſuch.*

This, I think, no body denies: Nor can any one deny it, who will not ſay, That the general abſtract *Idea* which he has in his Mind of a Sort or Species of Animals that he calls Man, ought not to have that general Name *Man* applied to it: For that is all (as I humbly conceive) which theſe Words of your Lordſhip here amount to.

This, your Lordſhip ſays, *is not a mere univerſal Name, or Mark, or Sign.* Your P. 238.
Lordſhip ſays it is an *Idea*, and every Body muſt grant it to be an *Idea*; and therefore it is, in my Opinion, ſafe enough from being thought a *mere Name, or Mark, or Sign of that Idea.* For he muſt think very oddly, who takes the *general Name* of any *Idea*, to be the *general Idea* it ſelf: It is a *mere Mark or Sign* of it without doubt, and nothing elſe. Your Lordſhip adds,

But there is as clear and diſtinct a Conception of this in our Minds, as we can have P. 238.
from any ſuch ſimple Ideas *as are conveyed by our Senſes.*

If your Lordſhip means by this, (as the Words ſeem to me to import) that we have as clear and diſtinct an *Idea* of the *general Subſtance*, or *Nature*, or *Eſſence* of the Species *Man*, as we have of the particular Colour and Figure of a Man when we look on him, or of his Voice when we hear him ſpeak, I muſt crave leave to diſſent from your Lordſhip. Becauſe the *Idea* we have of the Subſtance, wherein the Properties of a Man do inhere, is a very obſcure *Idea*: So in that part, our general *Idea* of *Man* is obſcure and confuſed: As alſo, how that Subſtance is differently modify'd in the different Species of Creatures, ſo as to have different Properties and Powers whereby they are diſtinguiſh'd, that alſo we have very obſcure, or rather no diſtinct *Ideas* of at all. But there is no Obſcurity or Confuſion at all in the *Idea* of a Figure that I clearly ſee, or of

a Sound that I diſtinctly hear; and ſuch are, or may be, the *Ideas* that are conveyed in by Senſation or Reflection. It follows:

P. 238. *I do not deny* that the Diſtinction *of particular Subſtances, is by the ſeveral Modes and Properties of them, (which they may call a Complication of ſimple* Ideas *if they pleaſe) but I do aſſert, That the general* Idea *which relates to the Eſſence, without theſe, is ſo juſt and true an* Idea, *that without it the Complication of ſimple* Ideas *will never give us a right Notion of it.*

Here, I think, that your Lordſhip *aſſerts*, That *the general* Idea *of the real Eſſence* (for ſo I underſtand general *Idea which relates to the Eſſence*) *without the Modes and Properties, is a juſt and true* Idea. For example: The real Eſſence of a Thing, is that internal Conſtitution on which the Properties of that Thing depend. Now your Lordſhip ſeems to me to acknowledg, that that
256. internal Conſtitution or Eſſence we cannot know; for your Lordſhip ſays, *That from the Powers and Properties of Things which are knowable by us, we may know as much of the internal Eſſence of Things, as theſe Powers and Properties diſcover.* That is unqueſtionably ſo; but if thoſe Powers and Properties diſcover no more of thoſe *internal Eſſences*, but that there are *internal Eſſences*, we ſhall know only that there are *internal Eſſences*, but ſhall have no *Idea* or Conception at all of what they are; as your Lordſhip ſeems to confeſs in the next Words of the ſame 256th page, where you add; *I do not ſay, that we can know all Eſſences of Things alike, nor that we can attain to a perfect Underſtanding of all that belong to them; but if we can know ſo much, as that there are certain Beings in the World, endued with ſuch diſtinct Powers and Properties, what is it we complain of the want of?* Wherein your Lordſhip ſeems to terminate our Knowledg of thoſe internal Eſſences in this, *That there are certain* Beings *indued with diſtinct Powers and Properties.* But what theſe *Beings*, theſe *internal Eſſences* are, that we have no diſtinct Conceptions of; as your Lordſhip confeſſes yet plainer a
257. little after, in theſe Words: *For altho' we cannot comprehend the internal Frame and Conſtitution of things.* So that we having, as is confeſs'd, no *Idea* of what this *Eſſence*, this *internal Conſtitution* of Things on which their Properties depend, is; how can we ſay it is any way *a juſt and true Idea?* But your Lordſhip ſays, *It is ſo juſt and true an* Idea, *that without it the Contemplation of ſimple* Ideas *will never give us a right Notion of it.* All the *Idea* we have of it, which is only that there is an internal, tho' unknown Conſtitution of Things on which their Properties depend, ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection, and the Contemplation of them have alone help'd us to; and becauſe they can help us no further, that is the Reaſon we have no perfecter Notions of it.

That which your Lordſhip ſeems to me principally to drive at, in this and the foregoing Paragraph, is, to aſſert, That the *general Subſtance of Man*, and ſo of any other Species, is that which makes the real Being of that Species abſtractly from the Individuals of that Species. By *general Subſtance* here, I ſuppoſe, your Lordſhip means the general *Idea* of Subſtance: And that which induces me to take the liberty to ſuppoſe ſo, is, that I think your Lordſhip is here diſcourſing of the *Idea* of Subſtance, and how we come by it. And if your Lordſhip ſhould mean otherwiſe, I muſt take the liberty to deny there is any ſuch thing in *rerum Natura*, as a *general Subſtance* that exiſts it ſelf, or makes any thing.

Taking it then for granted that your Lordſhip ſays; that this is the general *Idea* of Subſtance, *viz.* That it is *that which makes the real Being of any thing*; your Lordſhip ſays, *That it is as clear and diſtinct a Conception in our Minds, as we can have from any ſuch ſimple* Ideas *as are convey'd by our Senſes.* Here I muſt crave leave to diſſent from your Lordſhip. Your Lordſhip ſays in the former part of this Page, *That Subſtance and Eſſence do imply that which makes the real Being.* Now what I beſeech your Lordſhip, do theſe Words *That which*, here ſignify more than *ſomething?* And the *Idea* expreſs'd by *ſomething*, I am apt to think your Lordſhip will not ſay *is as clear and diſtinct a Conception* or *Idea* in the Mind, as the *Idea* of the red Colour of a Cherry, or the bitter Taſte of Wormwood, or the Figure of a Circle brought into the Mind by the Senſes.

Your

Your Lordſhip farther ſays, *It makes* (whereby, I ſuppoſe, your Lordſhip means, *conſtitutes* or is) the *real Being, as diſtinguiſh'd from Modes and Properties.*

For example, my Lord, ſtrip this ſuppos'd general *Idea* of a *Man* or *Gold*, of all its Modes and Properties, and then tell me whether your Lordſhip has as clear and diſtinct an *Idea* of what remains, as you have of the Figure of the one, or the yellow Colour of the other. I muſt confeſs the remaining *ſomething* to me affords ſo vague, confus'd and obſcure an *Idea*, that I cannot ſay I have any diſtinct Conception of it; for barely by being *ſomething*, it is not in my Mind clearly diſtinguiſh'd from the Figure or Voice of a Man, or the Colour or Taſte of a Cherry, for they are *ſomething* too. If your Lordſhip has a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of that *ſomething, which makes the real Being as diſtinguiſhed from all its Modes and Properties*, your Lordſhip muſt enjoy the privilege of the Sight and clear *Ideas* you have: Nor can you be deny'd them, becauſe I have not the like; the dimneſs of my Conceptions muſt not pretend to hinder the clearneſs of your Lordſhip's, any more than the want of them in a blind Man can debar your Lordſhip of the clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of Colours. The obſcurity I find in my own Mind, when I examine what poſitive, general, ſimple *Idea* of Subſtance I have, is ſuch as I profeſs, and further than that I cannot go: But what, and how clear it is in the Underſtanding of a Seraphim, or of an elevated Mind, that I cannot determine. Your Lordſhip goes on.

I muſt do that right to the ingenious Author of The Eſſay of Human Underſtanding (*from whence theſe Notions are borrow'd to ſerve other Purpoſes than he intended them*) *that he makes the Caſe of* Spiritual *and* Corporeal Subſtances *to be alike, as to their* Ideas. *And* "That we have as clear a Notion of a Spi- p. 239.
"rit, as we have of a Body; the one being ſuppos'd to be the *Subſtratum* to
"thoſe ſimple *Ideas* we have from without, and the other of thoſe Opera-
"tions we find within our ſelves. And that it is as rational to affirm,
"there is no Body, becauſe we cannot know its Eſſence, as 'tis called, or
"have no *Idea* of the Subſtance of Matter; as to ſay there is no Spirit,
"becauſe we know not its Eſſence, or have no *Idea* of a ſpiritual Sub-
"ſtance."

From hence it follows, that we may be certain that there are both Spiritual and Bodily Subſtances, *altho' we can have* no clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of them. *But if our Reaſon depend upon our* clear and diſtinct *Ideas, how is this poſſible? We cannot reaſon without* clear Ideas, *and yet we may be certain without them: Can we be certain without Reaſon? Or, doth our Reaſon give us true Notions of Things, without theſe* Ideas? *If it be ſo, this new Hypotheſis about Reaſon muſt appear to be very unreaſonable.*

That which your Lordſhip ſeems to argue here, is, That we may *be certain without clear and diſtinct* Ideas. Who your Lordſhip here argues againſt, under the Title of this *new Hypotheſis about Reaſon*, I confeſs I do not know. For I do not remember that I have any where plac'd *Certainty* only *in clear and diſtinct Ideas*, but in the clear and viſible Connection of any of our *Ideas*, be thoſe *Ideas* what they will; as will appear to any one who will look into *B.* 4. *c.* 4. §. 18. and *B.* 4. *c.* 6. §. 3. of my Eſſay, in the latter of which he will find theſe Words: "Certainty of Knowledge is to perceive the a-
"greement or diſagreement of *Ideas*, as expreſs'd in any Propoſition." As in the Propoſition your Lordſhip mentions, *v. g. That we may be certain there are Spiritual and Bodily Subſtances*; or, That Bodily Subſtances do exiſt, is a Propoſition of whoſe Truth we may be certain; and ſo of Spiritual Subſtances. Let us now examine wherein the certainty of theſe Propoſitions conſiſts.

Firſt, As to the Exiſtence of bodily Subſtances, I know by my Senſes that ſomething extended, and ſolid, and figur'd does exiſt; for my Senſes are the utmoſt Evidence and Certainty I have of the Exiſtence of extended, ſolid, figur'd Things. Theſe Modes being then known to exiſt by our Senſes, the Exiſtence of them (which I cannot conceive can ſubſiſt without ſomething to ſupport them) makes me ſee the Connection of thoſe *Ideas* with a Support, or, as it is called, a Subject of Inheſion, and ſo conſequently the Connection

of that Support (which cannot be nothing) with Exiſtence. And thus I come by a certainty of the Exiſtence of that *ſomething* which is a Support of thoſe ſenſible Modes, tho' I have but a very confus'd, looſe, and undetermin'd *Idea* of it, ſignify'd by the name *Subſtance*. After the ſame manner experimenting Thinking in my ſelf by the Exiſtence of *Thought* in me, to which *ſomething* that thinks is evidently and neceſſarily connected in my Mind; I come to be certain that there exiſts in me *ſomething* that thinks, tho' of that *ſomething* which I call *Subſtance* alſo, I have but a very obſcure imperfect *Idea*.

Before I go any farther, it is fit I return my Acknowledgments to your Lordſhip, for the good Opinion you are pleas'd here to expreſs of the Author of *The Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, and that you do not impute to him the ill Uſe ſome may have made of his Notions. But he craves leave to ſay, That he ſhould have been better preſerv'd from the hard and ſiniſter Thoughts which ſome Men are always ready for, if in what you have here publiſh'd, your Lordſhip had been pleas'd to have ſhewn where you directed your Diſcourſe againſt him, and where againſt others, from *p.* 234. to *p.* 262. of your *Vindication of the Trinity*. For nothing but my Book and my Words being quoted, the World will be apt to think that I am the Perſon who argue againſt the Trinity, and deny Myſteries againſt whom your Lordſhip directs thoſe Pages. And indeed, my Lord, tho' I have read them over with great Attention, yet, in many places, I cannot diſcern whether it be againſt me or any body elſe, that your Lordſhip is arguing. That which often makes the difficulty is, That I do not ſee how what I ſay, does at all concern the Controverſy your Lordſhip is engag'd in, and yet I alone am quoted. Your Lordſhip goes on.

P. 240. *Let us ſuppoſe this Principle to be true*, that the ſimple *Ideas* by Senſation or Reflection, are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning: *I ask then how we come to be certain, that there are* Spiritual Subſtances *in the World, ſince we can have no* clear and diſtinct Ideas *concerning them? Can we be certain, without any* Foundation of Reaſon? *This is a new ſort of Certainty, for which we do not envy theſe Pretenders to* Reaſon. *But methinks, they ſhould not at the ſame time aſſert the abſolute neceſſity of theſe* Ideas *to our Knowledg, and declare that we may have certain Knowledg without them. If there be any other Method, they overthrow their own Principle; if there be none, how come they to any certainty that there are both* Bodily *and* Spiritual Subſtances?

This Paragraph, which continues to prove, that we may have Certainty without *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, I would flatter my ſelf is not meant againſt me, becauſe it oppoſes nothing that I have ſaid; and ſo ſhall not ſay any thing to it, but only ſet it down to do your Lordſhip right, that the Reader may judg. Tho' I do not find how he will eaſily over-look me, and think I am not at all concern'd in it, ſince my Words alone are quoted in ſeveral Pages immediately preceding and following: And in the very next Paragraph it is ſaid, *How THEY come to know*; which word *They* muſt ſignify ſome body beſides the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*; and then I think, by the whole Tenor of your Lordſhip's Diſcourſe, no Body will be left but me that can poſſibly be taken to be the other: for in the ſame Paragraphy our Lordſhip ſays, *The ſame PERSONS ſay, That notwithſtanding THEIR Ideas, it is poſſible for Matter to think.*

I know not what other *Perſon ſays* ſo but I; but if any one does, I am ſure no *Perſon* but I *ſay* ſo in my Book, which your Lordſhip has quoted for them, *viz. Human Underſtanding*, B. 4. c. 3. This which is a Riddle to me, the more amazes me, becauſe I find it in a Treatiſe of your Lordſhip's, who ſo perfectly underſtands the Rules and Methods of Writing, whether in Controverſy or any other way. But this which ſeems wholly new to me, I ſhall better underſtand when your Lordſhip pleaſes to explain it. In the mean time I mention it as an Apology for my ſelf, if ſometimes I miſtake your Lordſhip's Aim, and ſo miſapply my Anſwer. What follows in your Lordſhip's next Paragraph, is this:

P. 240. *As to theſe latter (which is my Buſineſs) I muſt enquire farther, how THEY come to know there are ſuch? The anſwer is*, by Self-Reflection on thoſe Powers we find in our ſelves, which cannot come from a mere bodily Subſtance. *I*

allow

allow the Reaſon to be very good; but the Queſtion I ask, is, Whether this Argument be from the clear and diſtinct Idea *or not?* We have *Ideas* in our ſelves of the ſeveral Operations of our Minds, of Knowing, Willing, Conſidering, *&c.* which cannot come from a bodily Subſtance. *Very true; but is all this contained in the* ſimple Idea *of theſe* Operations? *How can that be, when the ſame PERSONS ſay, That notwithſtanding their Ideas, it is poſſible for* Matter to think? *For it is ſaid,* "That we have the *Ideas* of Matter and Thinking, "but poſſibly ſhall never be able to know whether any material Being "thinks or not; it being impoſſible for us, by the Contemplation of our own "*Ideas*, without Revelation, to diſcover whether Omnipotency hath not gi-"ven to ſome Syſtems of Matter, fitly diſpoſed, a Power to perceive or think." *Human Underſtanding*, L. 4. c. 3. §. 6. 2d Edit. p. 310. *If this be true, then for all that we can know by our* Ideas *of* Matter *and* Thinking, *Matter may have a Power of Thinking: And if this hold, then it is impoſſible to prove a ſpiritual Subſtance in us, from the* Idea of Thinking: *For how can we be aſſur'd by our* Ideas, *that God hath not given ſuch a Power of Thinking to Matter ſo diſpos'd as our Bodies are? Eſpecially ſince it is ſaid,* "That in "reſpect of our Notions, it is not much more remote from our Compre-"henſion to conceive that God can, if he pleaſes, ſuper-add to our *Idea* of "Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he ſhould ſuper-add to it ano-"ther Subſtance, with a Faculty of Thinking." *Whoever aſſerts this, can never prove a ſpiritual Subſtance in us from a Faculty of Thinking; becauſe he cannot know from the* Idea *of Matter and Thinking, that Matter ſo diſpos'd cannot think. And he cannot be certain, that God hath not fram'd the Matter of our Bodies ſo as to be capable of it.*

Theſe Words, my Lord, I am forced to take to my ſelf; for tho' your Lordſhip has put it *The ſame Perſons ſay*, in the Plural Number, yet there is no body quoted for the following Words but my *Eſſay*; nor do I think any body but I has ſaid ſo. But ſo it is in this preſent Chapter, I have the good luck to be join'd with others for what I do not ſay, and others with me for what I imagine they do not ſay; which, how it came about, your Lordſhip can beſt reſolve. But to the Words themſelves: In them your Lordſhip argues, That upon my Principles *it cannot be prov'd that there is a ſpiritual Subſtance in us.* To which give me leave, with Submiſſion, to ſay, That I think it may be prov'd from my Principles, and I think I have done it; and the Proof in my Book ſtands thus. Firſt, We experiment in our ſelves *Thinking*. The *Idea* of this Action or Mode of *Thinking*, is inconſiſtent with the *Idea* of Self-Subſiſtence, and therefore has a neceſſary Connection with a Support or Subject of Inhelion: The *Idea* of that Support is what we call *Subſtance*; and ſo from *Thinking* experimented in us, we have a proof of a *thinking Subſtance* in us, which in my ſenſe is a *Spirit*. Againſt this your Lordſhip will argue, that by what I have ſaid of the poſſibility that God may, if he pleaſes, ſuper-add to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, it can never be prov'd that there is a ſpiritual Subſtance in us, becauſe upon that Suppoſition, it is poſſible it may be a material Subſtance that thinks in us. I grant it; but add, That the general *Idea* of Subſtance being the ſame every where, the Modification of *Thinking*, or the Power of *Thinking* joined to it, makes it a *Spirit*, without conſidering what other Modifications it has, as whether it has the Modification of *Solidity* or no. As on the other ſide, *Subſtance*, that has the Modification of *Solidity*, is Matter, whether it has the Modification of *Thinking* or no. And therefore, if your Lordſhip means by a *Spiritual*, an immaterial Subſtance, I grant I have not prov'd, nor upon my Principles can it be prov'd (your Lordſhip meaning as I think you do, demonſtratively *proved*) That there is an immaterial Subſtance in us that thinks. Tho' I preſume, from what I have ſaid about the ſuppoſition of a Syſtem of Matter, Thinking (which there demonſtrates that God is immaterial) will *prove* it in the higheſt degree probable, that the thinking Subſtance in us is immaterial. But your Lordſhip thinks not Probability enough; and by charging the want of Demonſtration upon my Principles, that the thinking Thing in us is immaterial, your Lordſhip ſeems to conclude it demonſtrable from Principles of Philoſophy. That Demonſtration I ſhould with Joy receive from your Lordſhip, or any one. For tho' all the great ends of B. 4. c. 10. §. 16.

Morality

B. 4. c. 3. §. 6. Morality and Religion are well enough ſecur'd without it, as I have ſhewn, yet it would be a great advance of our Knowledg in Nature and Philoſophy.

To what I have ſaid in my Book, to ſhew that all the great Ends of Religion and Morality are ſecur'd barely by the Immortality of the Soul, without a neceſſary Suppoſition that the Soul is immaterial, I crave leave to add, That Immortality may and ſhall be annex'd to that, which in its own nature is neither immaterial nor immortal, as the Apoſtle expreſly declares in theſe words; *For*

1 Cor. 15. 53. *this Corruptible muſt put on Incorruption, and this Mortal muſt put on Immortality.*

Perhaps my uſing the word *Spirit* for a thinking Subſtance, without excluding Materiality out of it, will be thought too great a Liberty, and ſuch as deſerves Cenſure, becauſe I leave Immateriality out of the *Idea* I make it a ſign of. I readily own, that words ſhould be ſparingly ventur'd on in a Senſe wholly new; and nothing but abſolute neceſſity can excuſe the Boldneſs of uſing any Term, in a Senſe whereof we can produce no Example. But in the preſent Caſe, I think I have great Authorities to juſtify me. The Soul is agreed, on all hands, to be that in us which thinks. And he that will look into the firſt Book of *Cicero's Tuſculan* Queſtions, and into the ſixth Book of *Virgil's Æneids*, will find that theſe two great Men, who of all the *Romans* beſt underſtood Philoſophy, thought, or at leaſt did not deny the Soul to be a ſubtil matter, which might come under the name of *Aura*, or *Ignis*, or *Æther*; and this Soul they both of them call'd *Spiritus*: In the Notion of which, 'tis plain they included only Thought and active Motion, without the total Excluſion of Matter. Whether they thought right in this, I do not ſay, that is not the queſtion; but whether they ſpoke properly, when they call'd an active, thinking, ſubtil Subſtance, out of which they excluded only groſs and palpable Matter, *Spiritus*, *Spirit*: I think that no body will deny, That if any among the *Romans* can be allow'd to ſpeak properly, *Tully* and *Virgil* are the two who may moſt ſecurely be depended on for it: And one of them ſpeaking of the Soul, ſays *Dum Spiritus hos regit artus*; and the other, *Vita continetur Corpore & Spiritu.* Where 'tis plain, by *Corpus* he means (as generally every where) only groſs Matter that may be felt and handled; as appears by theſe words: *Si Cor aut Sanguis, aut Cerebrum eſt Animus, certe, quoniam eſt Corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore; ſi Anima eſt, forte diſſipabitur; ſi Ignis, extinguetur.* Tuſc. Quæſt. l. 1. c. 11. Here *Cicero* oppoſes *Corpus* to *Ignis* and *Anima*, i. e. *Aura* or *Breath*: And the Foundation of that his diſtinction of the Soul, from that which he calls *Corpus* or Body, he gives a little lower in theſe words; *Tanta ejus tenuitas ut fugiat aciem*, ib. c. 22.

Nor was it the Heathen World alone that had this Notion of *Spirit*; the moſt enlighten'd of all the antient People of God, *Solomon* himſelf, ſpeaks after the

Eccleſ. 3. 19. ſame manner: *That which befalleth the Sons of Men befalleth Beaſts, even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth, ſo dieth the other, yea they have all one Spirit.* So I tranſlate the Hebrew word רוח, here, for ſo I find it tranſlated the very next

Ver. 21. Verſe but one; *Who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth upward, and the Spirit of a Beaſt that goeth down to the Earth.* In which places it is plain that *Solomon* applies the word רוח, and our Tranſlators of him the word *Spirit* to a Subſtance, out of which Immateriality was not wholly excluded, *unleſs the Spirit of a Beaſt that goeth downwards to the Earth* be immaterial. Nor did the way of

Chap. 24. 37. ſpeaking in our Saviour's time vary from this: St. *Luke* tells us, That when our Saviour, after his Reſurrection, ſtood in the midſt of them, *They were affrighted, and ſuppos'd that they had ſeen* πνεῦμα, the *Greek* word which always anſwers *Spirit* in *Engliſh*; and ſo the Tranſlators of the Bible render it here, *They ſup-*

Ver. 39. *pos'd that they had ſeen a Spirit.* But our Saviour ſays to them, *Behold my Hands and my Feet, that it is I my ſelf, handle me and ſee; for a Spirit hath not Fleſh and Bones, as you ſee me have.* Which words of our Saviour put the ſame diſtinction between *Body* and *Spirit*, that *Cicero* did in the place above-cited, *viz.* That the one was a groſs Compages that could be felt and handled; and the other

Lib. vi. ſuch as *Virgil* deſcribes the Ghoſt or Soul of *Anchiſes*,

Ter conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum,
Ter fruſtra comprenſa manus effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis volucrique ſimillima ſomno.

I would

I would not be thought hereby to ſay, That *Spirit* never does ſignify a purely immaterial Subſtance. In that ſenſe the Scripture, I take it, ſpeaks, when it ſays, *God is a Spirit*: and in that Senſe I have us'd it; and in that ſenſe I have prov'd from my Principles, that there is a *ſpiritual Subſtance*; and am *certain that there is a ſpiritual* immaterial *Subſtance*: which is, I humbly conceive, a direct Anſwer to your Lordſhip's Queſtion in the beginning of this Argument, *viz. How come we to be certain that there are ſpiritual Subſtances, ſuppoſing this Principle to be true*, That the ſimple *Ideas* by Senſation and Reflection, are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning? But this hinders not, but that if God, that infinite, omnipotent, and perfectly immaterial Spirit, ſhould pleaſe to give a Syſtem of very ſubtil Matter, Senſe and Motion, it might, with Propriety of Speech, be call'd *Spirit*; tho' Materiality were not excluded out of its complex *Idea*. Your Lordſhip proceeds:

It is ſaid indeed elſewhere, " That it is repugnant to the *Idea* of ſenſleſs Mat- P. 242.
" ter, that it ſhould put into it ſelf Senſe, Perception and Knowledg" *But* B. 4. c. 10.
this doth not reach the preſent Caſe; which is not what Matter can do of it ſelf, but §. 5.
what Matter prepar'd by an Omnipotent Hand can do. And what Certainty can we have that he hath done it? We can have none from the Ideas, *for thoſe are given up in this Caſe; and conſequently, we can have no Certainty upon theſe Principles, whether we have any ſpiritual Subſtance within us or not.*

Your Lordſhip in this Paragraph proves, that from what I ſay, *we can have no* B. 4. c. 10.
Certainty whether we have any ſpiritual Subſtance *in us or not*. If by ſpiritual Sub- §. 5.
ſtance your Lordſhip means an immaterial Subſtance *in us*, as you ſpeak, *p.* 246. I grant what your Lordſhip ſays is true, That it cannot, upon *theſe Principles*, be demonſtrated. But I muſt crave leave to ſay at the ſame time, That upon *theſe Principles* it can be prov'd, to the higheſt degree of probability. If by *ſpiritual Subſtance* your Lordſhip means a thinking Subſtance, I muſt diſſent from your Lordſhip, and ſay, That we can *have a certainty, upon my Principles, that there is a ſpiritual Subſtance in us*. In ſhort, my Lord, *upon* my *Principles, i. e.* from the *Idea* of Thinking, *we can have a Certainty* that there is a thinking Subſtance in us; from hence we have a Certainty that there is an eternal *thinking Subſtance*. This thinking Subſtance, which has been from Eternity, I have B. 4.
prov'd to be immaterial. This eternal, immaterial, thinking Subſtance, has put into us a thinking Subſtance, which whether it be a material or immaterial Subſtance, cannot be infallibly demonſtrated from our *Ideas*; tho' from them it may be prov'd, that it is to the higheſt degree probable that it is immaterial. This in ſhort, my Lord, is what I have to ſay on this point; which may, in good meaſure, ſerve for an Anſwer to your Lordſhip's next Leaf or two; which I ſhall ſet down, and then take notice of ſome few Particulars which I wonder to find your Lordſhip accuſe me of. Your Lordſhip ſays:

But we are told, " That from the Operations of our Minds, we are able to P. 242.
" frame a complex *Idea* of a Spirit." *How can that be, when we cannot from* B. 2. c. 23.
thoſe Ideas be aſſured, but that thoſe Operations may come from a material Sub- §. 15.
ſtance? If we frame an Idea on ſuch grounds, it is at moſt but a poſſible Idea; for it may be otherwiſe, and we can have no aſſurance from our Ideas, that it is not: So that the moſt Men may come to in this way of Ideas, is, That it is poſſible it may be ſo, and it is poſſible it may not; but that it is impoſſible for us, from our Ideas, to determine either way. And is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reaſon?

I am very glad to find the Idea of a ſpiritual Subſtance made as conſiſtent and intel- P. 243.
ligible, as that of a corporeal: " For as the one conſiſts of a Coheſion of ſolid
" Parts, and the Power of communicating Motion by Impulſe, ſo the other
" conſiſts in a Power of Thinking, and Willing, and moving the Body; and
" that the Coheſion of ſolid Parts, is as hard to be conceiv'd as Thinking:
" And we are as much in the dark about the Power of communicating Motion §. 27.
" by Impulſe, as in the Power of exciting Motion by Thought. We have by
" daily Experience clear Evidence of Motion, produc'd both by Impulſe and
" by Thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our Comprehenſion;
" we are equally at a loſs in both." §. 28.

From whence it follows, That we may be certain of a Being of a ſpiritual Subſtance, altho' we have no clear and diſtinct Idea of it, nor are able to comprehend the manner

of

of its Operations: And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend, that all our Reason and Certainty is founded on clear and diſtinct Ideas; *and that they have Reaſon to reject any Doctrine which relates to ſpiritual Subſtances, becauſe they cannot comprehend the manner of it. For the ſame thing is confeſs'd by the moſt inquiſitive Men, about the manner of Operation, both in material and immaterial Subſtances. It is affirmed, That* "the very Notion of Body implies ſomething very §. 31. "hard, if not impoſſible to be explain'd or underſtood by us; and that the "natural Conſequence of it, *viz.* Diviſibility, involves us in Difficulties impoſ- "ſible to be explicated, or made conſiſtent; That we have but ſome few §. 32. "ſuperficial *Ideas* of Things; That we are deſtitute of Faculties to attain "to the true Nature of them; and that when we do that, we fall preſently "into Darkneſs and Obſcurity, and can diſcover nothing further but our own "Blindneſs and Ignorance."

Theſe are very fair and ingenuous Confeſſions of the ſhortneſs of Human Underſtanding, with Reſpect to the nature and manner of ſuch Things which we are moſt certain of the Being of, by conſtant and undoubted Experience. I appeal now to the Reaſon of Mankind, whether it can be any reaſonable Foundation for rejecting a Doctrine propos'd to us as of Divine Revelation, becauſe we cannot comprehend the manner of it; eſpecially §. 33, 34, 35. *when it relates to the Divine Eſſence. For as the ſame Author obſerves,* "Our *Idea* "of God is fram'd from the Complex *Ideas* of thoſe Perfections we find in our "ſelves, but enlarging them ſo, as to make them ſuitable to an infinite Being, §. 36. "as Knowledg, Power, Duration, *&c.* And the Degrees or Extent of theſe "which we aſcribe to the Sovereign Being, are all boundleſs and infinite. "For it is Infinity, which joined to our *Ideas* of Exiſtence, Power, Knowledg, "*&c.* makes that Complex *Idea*, whereby we repreſent to our ſelves the beſt we "can, the ſupreme Being."

Now when our knowledg of groſs material Subſtances is ſo dark; when the Notion of ſpiritual Subſtances is above all Ideas *of Senſation; when the higher any Subſtance is, the more remote from our Knowledg; but eſpecially when the very* Idea *of a ſupreme Being implies its being Infinite and Incomprehenſible; I know not whether it argues more Stupidity or Arrogance, to expoſe a Doctrine relating to the Divine Eſſence, becauſe they cannot comprehend the manner of it: But of this more afterwards. I am yet upon the Certainty of our Reaſon, from clear and diſtinct* Ideas: *And if we can attain to Certainty without them, and where it is confeſs'd we cannot have them, as about Subſtance; then theſe cannot be the ſole Matter and Foundation of our Reaſoning, which is peremptorily aſſerted by this late Author.*

Here, after having argu'd, that notwithſtanding what I ſay about our *Idea* of a Spirit, *'tis impoſſible, from our* Ideas, *to determine whether* that Spirit in us be a *material Subſtance* or no, your Lordſhip concludes the Paragraph thus: *And is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reaſon?*

P. 243. I anſwer; I think it is a way *to bring us to a Certainty* in theſe Things which I have offer'd as certain; but I never thought it a way to Certainty, where we cannot reach *Certainty*; nor ſhall I think the worſe of it, if your Lordſhip ſhould inſtance in an hundred other things, as well as the Immateriality of the Spirit in us, wherein this way does not bring *us to a Certainty*; unleſs, at the ſame time, your Lordſhip ſhall ſhew us another *way* that will bring us to a *Certainty* in thoſe Points, wherein this way of *Ideas* failed. If your Lordſhip, or any body elſe, will ſhew me a better way to a Certainty in them, I am ready to learn, and will lay by that of *Ideas*. The *way of Ideas* will not, from Philoſophy, afford us a Demonſtration, that the thinking Subſtance in us is immaterial. Whereupon your Lordſhip asks, *And is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reaſon?* The *way of Argument* which your Lordſhip oppoſes to the *way of Ideas*, will, I humbly conceive, from Philoſophy, as little afford us a Demonſtration, that the thinking Subſtance in us is immaterial. Whereupon, may not any one likewiſe ask, *And is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reaſon?* Is any way, I beſeech your Lordſhip, to be condemn'd as an ill way to bring us to *Certainty*, demonſtrative *Certainty*, becauſe it brings us not to it in a Point where Reaſon cannot attain to ſuch Certainty? *Algebra* is a way to bring us to Certainty in Mathematicks; but muſt it be preſently condemn'd as an ill way, becauſe there are ſome Queſtions in Mathematicks, which a Man cannot come to Certainty in by the way of *Algebra?*

In

In page 247. after having ſet down ſeveral Confeſſions of mine, *of the ſhortneſs of Human Underſtanding*, your Lordſhip adds theſe Words: *I appeal now to the Reaſon of Mankind, whether it can be any reaſonable Foundation for rejecting a Doctrine propos'd to us as of Divine Revelation, becauſe we cannot comprehend the manner of it; eſpecially when it relates to the Divine Eſſence.* And I beſeech you, my Lord, where did I ever ſay ſo, or any thing like it? And yet it is impoſſible for any Reader but to imagine, that that Propoſition which your Lordſhip *appeals to the Reaſon of Mankind* againſt, is a Propoſition of mine, which your Lordſhip is confuting out of *Confeſſions* of my own, great Numbers whereof ſtand quoted out of my Eſſay, in ſeveral Pages of your Lordſhip's Book, both before and after this your Lordſhip's Appeal *to the Reaſon of Mankind*. And now I muſt appeal to your Lordſhip, Whether you find any ſuch Propoſition in my Book? If your Lordſhip does not, I too muſt then appeal to the Reaſon of Mankind, Whether it be reaſonable for your Lordſhip to bring ſo many *Confeſſions* out of my Book to confute a Propoſition that is no where in it? There is no doubt, Reaſon for it; which ſince your Lordſhip does not, that I ſee, declare, and I have not Wit enough to diſcover, I ſhall therefore leave to the Reaſon of Mankind to find out.

Your Lordſhip has, in this part of your Diſcourſe, ſpoke very much of Reaſon; as, *Is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reaſon?* P. 243. *And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend, That all our Reaſon and Certainty is founded on clear and diſtinct* Ideas. *I appeal now to the Reaſon of Mankind. I am yet upon the certainty of our Reaſon. The Certainty is not plac'd in the* Idea, *but in good and ſound Reaſon. Allowing the Argument to be good, yet it is not taken from the* Idea, *but from Principles of true Reaſon.* P. 244. P. 245. P. 246. P. 250. P. 251.

What your Lordſhip ſays at the beginning of this Chapter, in theſe Words, *We muſt conſider what we underſtand by Reaſon*, made me hope I ſhould here P. 230. find what your Lordſhip *underſtands by Reaſon* explain'd, that ſo I might rectify my Notion of it, and might be able to avoid the Obſcurity and Confuſion which very much perplex moſt of the Diſcourſes, wherein it is appeal'd to or from as Judg. But notwithſtanding the Explication I flatter'd my ſelf with the hopes of, from what I thought your Lordſhip had promis'd, I find no other account of *Reaſon*, but in Quotations out of others, which your Lordſhip juſtly blames. Had I been ſo happy as to have been inlighten'd in this Point by your Lordſhip's learned Pen, ſo as to have ſeen diſtinctly what your Lordſhip *underſtands by Reaſon*, I ſhould poſſibly have excus'd my ſelf from giving your Lordſhip the trouble of theſe Papers, and been able to have perceiv'd, without applying my ſelf any farther to your Lordſhip, how ſo much of my *Eſſay* came into a Chapter, which was deſigned to anſwer *Objections againſt the Trinity, in Point of Reaſon*. It follows:

But I go yet farther: And as I have already ſhew'd, we can have no Certainty P. 246. *of an immaterial Subſtance within us, from theſe ſimple* Ideas; *ſo I ſhall now ſhew, that there can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from them, by their own Confeſſion, concerning the Exiſtence of the moſt ſpiritual and infinite Subſtance, even God himſelf.* And then your Lordſhip goes on to give an account of my Proof of a God; which your Lordſhip cloſes with theſe Words:

That which I deſign is to ſhew, that the Certainty of it is not placed upon any P. 252. *clear and diſtinct* Ideas, *but upon the force of Reaſon diſtinct from it; which was the thing I intended to prove.*

If this be *the thing your Lordſhip deſigned*, I am then at a loſs who your Lordſhip deſign'd it againſt: For I do not remember that I have any where ſaid, that we could not be convinc'd by Reaſon of any Truth, but where all the *Ideas* concerned in that Conviction were *clear and diſtinct*; for Knowledg and Certainty in my Opinion, lies in the Perception of the agreement or diſagreement of *Ideas*, ſuch as they are, and not always in having perfectly clear and diſtinct Ideas. Tho' thoſe, I muſt own, the clearer and more diſtinct they are, contribute very much to our more clear and diſtinct reaſoning and diſcourſing about them. But in ſome Caſes we may have Certainty about obſcure *Ideas*; v.g. by the clear *Idea* of *Thinking* in me, I find the Agreement of the clear *Idea* of *Exiſtence*, and the obſcure *Idea* of a *Subſtance* in me, becauſe I perceive the

the neceſſary Agreement of *Thinking*, and the relative *Idea* of a *Support*; which Support, without having any clear and diſtinct *Idea* of what it is, beyond this relative one of a *Support*, I call *Subſtance*.

If your Lordſhip *intended* this againſt another, who has ſaid, *Clear and diſtinct* Ideas *are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning*; it ſeems very ſtrange to me, that your Lordſhip ſhould *intend* it againſt one, and quote only the Words of another. For above ten Pages before, your Lordſhip had quoted nothing but my Book; and in the immediate preceding Pa-
P. 251. ragraph bring a large Quotation out of the tenth Section of the tenth Chapter of my fourth Book; of which your Lordſhip ſays, *This is the Subſtance of the Argument uſed, to prove an infinite ſpiritual Being, which I am far from weakning the force of; but that which I deſign is to ſhew, That the Certainty of it is not plac'd upon clear and diſtinct Ideas.* Whom now, I beſeech your Lordſhip, can this be underſtood to be intended againſt, but me? For how can my uſing an *Argument*, whoſe *Certainty is not plac'd upon clear and diſtinct Ideas*, prove any thing againſt another Man, who ſays, That *clear and diſtinct* Ideas *are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning?* This proves only againſt him that uſes the Argument; and therefore either I muſt be ſuppoſed here to hold, That clear and diſtinct *Ideas* are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning, (which I do not remember that I ever ſaid) or elſe that your Lordſhip here proves againſt no Body.

But tho' I do not remember that I have any where ſaid, That *clear and diſtinct Ideas* are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning; yet I do own, that ſimple *Ideas* are the Foundations of all our Knowledg, if that be it which your Lordſhip queſtions: And therefore I muſt think my ſelf concern'd in what your Lordſhip ſays in this very place, *p.* 246 in theſe Words, *I ſhall now ſhew, that there can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from theſe ſimple* Ideas, *by* THEIR *own Confeſſion, concerning the Exiſtence of God himſelf.*

This being ſpoken in the Plural Number, cannot be underſtood to be meant of the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, and no body elſe: And whom can any Reader reaſonably apply it to, but the Author of *The Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*; ſince, beſides that it ſtands in the midſt of a great many Quotations out of that Book, without any other Perſon being named, or any one's Words but mine quoted, my Proof alone of a Deity is brought out of that Book, to make good what your Lordſhip here ſays; and no body elſe is any where mention'd or quoted concerning it?

P. 238. The ſame way of ſpeaking of the Perſons you are arguing againſt in the Plural Number, your Lordſhip uſes in other places; as, *Which* THEY *may call a Complication of ſimple Ideas, if* THEY *pleaſe.*

P. 240. *We do not envy* THESE *Pretenders to Reaſon; but methinks* THEY *ſhould not at the ſame time aſſert the abſolute neceſſity of theſe* Ideas *to our Knowledg, and declare that we may have certain Knowledg without them.* And all along in that Page THEY. And in the very next Page my Words being quoted,
P. 241. your Lordſhip asks, *How that can be, when the ſame* PERSONS *ſay, That notwithſtanding* THEIR *Ideas, it is poſſible for Matter to think?* So that I do not ſee how I can exempt my ſelf from being meant to be one of thoſe Pretenders to Reaſon, wherewith we can be certain without any Foundation of
P. 240. Reaſon; which your Lordſhip, in the immediate foregoing Page, *does not envy for this new ſort of Certainty.* How can it be underſtood but that I am one of thoſe Perſons, that *at the ſame time aſſert the abſolute neceſſity of theſe* Ideas *to our Knowledg, and declare that we may have certain Knowledg without them?* Tho' your Lordſhip very civilly ſays, *p.* 239. That *you muſt do that right to the ingenious Author of* The Eſſay of Human Underſtanding *(from whence theſe Notions are borrow'd, to ſerve other Purpoſes than he intended them) that,* &c. yet, methinks, it is the Author himſelf, and his uſe of theſe Notions, that is blamed and argued againſt; but ſtill in the Plural Number, which he confeſſes himſelf not to underſtand.

My Lord, if your Lordſhip can ſhew me where I pretend to *Reaſon* or *Certainty* without any Foundation of Reaſon; or where it is I aſſert the abſolute Neceſſity of any *Ideas* to our Knowledg, and declare that we may have certain Knowledg without them, your Lordſhip will do me a great

Favour:

Favour: for this, I grant, is *a new ſort of Certainty* which I long to be rid of, and to diſown to the World. But truly, my Lord, *as I pretend to no new ſort of Certainty*, but juſt ſuch as *Human Underſtanding* was poſſeſs'd of before I was born; and ſhould be glad I could get more out of the Books and Writings that come abroad in my Days: ſo, my Lord, if I have any where *pretended to any new ſort of Certainty*, I beſeech your Lordſhip ſhew me the place, that I may correct the Vanity of it, and unſay it to the World.

Again, your Lordſhip ſays thus, *I know not whether it argues more Stupidity* P. 246. *or Arrogance, to expoſe a Doctrine relating to the Divine Eſſence, becauſe* THEY *cannot comprehend the manner of it.*

Here, my Lord, I find the ſame THEY again, which ſome Pages back, evidently involv'd me: and ſince that you have nam'd no body beſides me, nor alledg'd any body's Writings but mine; give me leave, therefore to ask your Lordſhip, Whether I am one of theſe THEY here alſo, that I may know whether I am concern'd to anſwer for my ſelf? I am aſham'd to importune your Lordſhip ſo often about the ſame Matter; but I meet with ſo many places in your Lordſhip's (I had almoſt ſaid new) way of Writing, that put me to a ſtand, not knowing whether I am meant or no, that I am at a loſs whether I ſhould clear my ſelf from what poſſibly your Lordſhip does not lay to my Charge; and yet the Reader, thinking it meant of me, ſhould conclude that to be in my Book which is not there, and which I utterly diſown.

Tho' I cannot be joined with thoſe who *expoſe* a *Doctrine relating to the* P. 246. *Divine Eſſence, becauſe they cannot comprehend the manner of it*; unleſs your Lordſhip can ſhew where I have ſo *expoſed* it, which I deny that I have any where done: yet your Lordſhip, before you come to the bottom of the ſame Page, has theſe Words, *I ſhall now ſhew, that there can be no ſufficient Evidence brought* P. 246. *from them, by* THEIR *own Confeſſion, concerning the Exiſtence of the moſt ſpiritual and infinite Subſtance, even God himſelf.*

If your Lordſhip did mean me in that THEY which is ſome Lines backwards, I muſt complain to your Lordſhip that you have done me an Injury, in imputing that to me which I have not done. And if THEIR here were not meant by your Lordſhip to relate to the ſame perſons, I ask by what ſhall the Reader diſtinguiſh them? And how ſhall any body know who it is your Lordſhip means? for that I am comprehended here is apparent, by your quoting my Eſſay in the very next Words, and arguing againſt it in the following Pages.

I enter not here into your Lordſhip's Argument; that which I am now conſidering is your Lordſhip's peculiar way of Writing in this part of your Treatiſe, which makes me often in a doubt, whether the Reader will not condemn Book upon your Lordſhip's Authority, where he thinks me concern'd, if I ſay nothing: and yet your Lordſhip may look upon my Defence as ſuperfluous, when I did not hold what your Lordſhip argued againſt.

But to go on with your Lordſhips Argument, your Lordſhip ſays, *I ſhall* P. 246. *now ſhew that there can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from ſimple* Ideas *by their own Confeſſion, concerning the Exiſtence of the moſt ſpiritual and infinite Subſtance, even God himſelf.*

Your Lordſhip's way of proving it, is this: Your Lordſhip ſays, *We are told*, Book IV. Chap. 10. Sect. 1. "That the Evidence of it is equal to Ma- P. 246. "thematical Certainty;" *and very good Arguments are brought to prove it, in a Chapter on purpoſe: But that which I take notice of, is, that the Argument from the clear and diſtinct* Idea *of a God, is paſs'd over.* Suppoſing all this to be ſo, your Lordſhip, methinks, with Submiſſion, does not prove the Propoſition you undertook, which was this; *There can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from ſimple* Ideas, *by their own Confeſſion concerning* [*i. e.* to prove] *the Exiſtence of a God.* For if I did in that Chapter, as your Lordſhip ſays, *Paſs over the Proof from the clear and diſtinct* Idea *of God*, that I preſume, is no *Confeſſion that there can be no ſufficient Evidence brought* from *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, much leſs from *ſimple Ideas, concerning the Exiſtence of a God*; becauſe the uſing of one Argument brought from one Foundation, is no Confeſſion that

there is not another *Principle* or *Foundation*. But, my Lord, I ſhall not inſiſt upon this, whether it be a *Confeſſion* or no.

Leaving *Confeſſion* out of the Propoſition, I humbly conceive your Lordſhip's Argument does not prove. Your Lordſhip's Propoſition to be prov'd, is, *There can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from ſimple Ideas to prove the Exiſtence of a God*; and your Lordſhip's Reaſon is, becauſe *the Argument from the* CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEA OF GOD, *is omitted* in my Proof of a God. I will ſuppoſe, for the ſtrengthening your Lordſhip's Reaſoning in the caſe, that I had ſaid (which I am far enough from ſaying) That there was no other Argument to prove the Exiſtence of God, but what I had uſed in that Chapter; yet, my Lord, with all this, your Lordſhip's Argument, I humbly conceive, would not hold: for I might bring Evidence from ſimple *Ideas*, tho' I brought none from the *Idea of God*; for the *Idea* we have of God is a complex, and no *ſimple Idea*. So that the Terms being chang'd from *ſimple Ideas* to a *clear and diſtinct* complex *Idea of God*, the Propoſition which was undertaken to be prov'd, ſeems to me unprov'd.

P. 247. Your Lordſhip's next words are, *How can this be conſiſtent with deducing our Certainty of Knowledg from clear and ſimple Ideas?*

Here your Lordſhip joins ſomething that is mine, with ſomething that is not mine. I do ſay, That all our Knowledg is founded in ſimple *Ideas*; but I do not ſay, it is all *deduced from clear Ideas*; much leſs that we cannot have any *certain* Knowledg of the Exiſtence of any thing, whereof we have not a clear, diſtinct, complex *Idea*; or, that the complex *Idea* muſt be clear enough to be in it ſelf the Evidence of the Exiſtence of that thing; which ſeems to be your Lordſhip's meaning here. Our Knowledg is all founded on *ſimple Ideas*, as I have before explain'd, tho' not always about *ſimple Ideas*; for we may know the Truth of Propoſitions which include *complex Ideas*, and thoſe complex *Ideas* may not always be perfectly clear *Ideas*.

P. 247. In the remaining part of this Page, it follows: *I do not go about to juſtify thoſe* who lay the whole ſtreſs upon that Foundation, *which I grant to be too weak to ſupport ſo important a Truth*; *and that thoſe are very much to blame*, who go about to invalidate other Arguments for the ſake of that: *but I doubt all that Talk about* clear and diſtinct *Ideas* being made the Foundation of Certainty, *came originally from theſe Diſcourſes or Meditations, which are aim'd at. The Author of them was an ingenious thinking Man, and he endeavour'd to lay the Foundation of Certainty, as well as he could. The firſt thing he found any Certainty in, was his own Exiſtence; which he founded upon the Perceptions of the Acts of his Mind, which ſome call an internal infallible Perception that we are. From hence he proceeded to enquire, How we came by this Certainty? And he reſolv'd it into this, That he had a clear and diſtinct Perception of it; and from hence he form'd this general Rule, That what he had a clear and diſtinct Perception of, was true. Which in Reaſon ought to go no farther than where there is the like degree of Evidence.*

This Account which your Lordſhip gives here, what it was wherein *Deſcartes* laid the Foundation of Certainty, containing nothing in it to ſhew what your Lordſhip propos'd here, *viz. That there can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from* Ideas, *by my own Confeſſion, concerning the Exiſtence of God himſelf*; I willingly excuſe my ſelf from troubling your Lordſhip concerning it. Only I crave leave to make my Acknowledgment to your Lordſhip, for what you are pleas'd, by the way, to drop in theſe words: *But I doubt all this Talk about clear and diſtinct Ideas being made the Foundation of Certainty, came originally from theſe Diſcourſes or Meditations, which are aim'd at.*

By the Quotations in your Lordſhip's immediately preceding words taken out
B. 4. c. 10. §. 7. of my Eſſay, which relate to that *ingenious thinking Author*, as well as by what in your following words is ſaid of his *founding Certainty in his own Exiſtence*; it is hard to avoid thinking that your Lordſhip means, that I borrow'd from him my Notions concerning *Certainty*. And your Lordſhip is ſo great a Man, and every way ſo far above my Meanneſs, that it cannot be ſuppos'd that your Lordſhip intended this for any thing but a Commendation of me to the World, as the Scholar of ſo great a Maſter. But tho' I muſt always acknowledg to that juſtly admir'd Gentleman, the great Obligation of my firſt Deliverance from the unintelligible way of talking of the Philoſophy in uſe in the Schools in his time;

time; yet I am ſo far from entitling his Writings to any of the Errors or Imperfections which are to be found in my Eſſay, as deriving their *Original* from him, that I muſt own to your Lordſhip they were ſpun barely out of my own Thoughts, reflecting as well as I could on my own Mind, and the *Ideas* I had there, and were not, that I know, deriv'd from any other *Original*. But, poſſibly, I all this while aſſume to my ſelf an Honour which your Lordſhip did not intend to me by this Intimation; for tho' what goes before and after, ſeems to appropriate thoſe Words to me, yet ſome part of them brings me under my uſual Doubt, which I ſhall remain under, till I know whom theſe Words, *viz. This Talk about clear and diſtinct Ideas being made the Foundation of Certainty*, belong to.

The remaining part of this Paragraph contains a diſcourſe of your Lordſhip's upon *Deſcartes's* general Rule of Certainty, in theſe Words: *For the* Certainty *here was not grounded on the Clearneſs of the* Perception, *but on the Plainneſs of the Evidence, which is of that nature, that the very* doubting *of it proves it; ſince it is impoſſible, that any thing ſhould doubt or queſtion its own Being, that had it not. So that here it is not* the Clearneſs of the Idea, *but an immediate Act of Perception, which is the true Ground of Certainty. And this cannot extend to things without our ſelves, of which we can have no other Perception, than what is caus'd by the Impreſſions of outward Objects. But whether we are to judg according to theſe Impreſſions, doth not depend on the Ideas themſelves, but upon the Exerciſe of our Judgment and Reaſon about them, which put the difference between true and falſe, and adequate and inadequate Ideas. So that our Certainty is not from the Ideas themſelves, but from the Evidence of Reaſon, that thoſe Ideas are true and juſt, and conſequently that we may build our Certainty upon them.* P. 248.

Granting all this to be ſo, yet I muſt confeſs, my Lord, I do not ſee how it any ways tends to ſhew either your Lordſhip's Proof, or my *Confeſſion*, that my Proof of an *infinite ſpiritual Being is not placed upon Ideas*; which is what your Lordſhip profeſſes to be your Deſign here.

But tho' we are not yet come to your Lordſhip's Proof, That the *Certainty* in my proof of a Deity is not placed on *Ideas*; yet I crave leave to conſider what your Lordſhip ſays here concerning *Certainty*, about which one cannot employ too many Thoughts to find wherein it is placed. Your Lordſhip ſays, That *Deſcartes's* Certainty *was not grounded on the Clearneſs of the Perception, but on the Plainneſs of the Evidence.* And a little lower; *Here* (*i. e.* in *Deſcartes's* Foundation of Certainty) *it is not the Clearneſs of the Idea, but an immediate Act of Perception, on which is the true Ground of* Certainty. And a little lower, *That in things without us, our* Certainty *is not from the Ideas, but from the Evidence of Reaſon that thoſe Ideas are true and juſt.* P. 248.

Your Lordſhip, I hope, wil pardon my Dulneſs, if after your Lordſhip has placed the Grounds of Certainty of our own Exiſtence, ſometimes *in the Plainneſs of the Evidence*, in oppoſition *to the Clearneſs of the Perception*; ſometimes in the *immediate Act of Perception*, in oppoſition to *the Clearneſs of the Idea*, and the Certainty of other things without us, *in the Evidence of Reaſon that theſe Ideas are true and juſt*, in oppoſition to *the Ideas themſelves*: I know not, by theſe Rules, wherein to place *Certainty*; and therefore ſtick to my own plain way, by *Ideas*, deliver'd in theſe Words: "Wherever we perceive the Agreement "or Diſagreement of any of our *Ideas*, there is *certain* Knowledg; and where-"ever we are ſure thoſe *Ideas* agree with the Reality of things, there is *cer-"tain real Knowledg*. Of which Agreement of our *Ideas* with the Reality of "things, I think I have ſhewn wherein it is that *Certainty*, *real Certainty*, con-"ſiſts." Whereof more may be ſeen in Chap. 6. in which, if your Lordſhip find any Miſtakes, I ſhall take it as a great Honour to be ſet right by you. B. 4. c. 4. §. 18

Your Lordſhip, as far as I can gueſs your Meaning (for I muſt own I do not clearly comprehend it) ſeems to me, in the foregoing Paſſage, to oppoſe this Aſſertion, That the *Certainty* of the Being of any thing, might be made out *from the Idea* of that thing. Truly, my Lord, I am ſo far from ſaying (or thinking) ſo, that I never knew any one of that mind but *Deſcartes*, and ſome that have follow'd him in his Proof of a God, from the *Idea* which we have of God in us; which I was ſo far from thinking a ſufficient Ground of Certainty,

that

that your Lordſhip makes uſe of my denying or doubting of it, againſt me, as we ſhall ſee in the following Words, *p.* 248.

But th' Idea of an infinite Being has this peculiar to it, that neceſſary Exiſtence is imply'd in it. This is a clear and diſtinct Idea, *and yet it is deny'd that this doth prove the Exiſtence of God. How then can the Grounds of our* Certainty *ariſe from* clear and diſtinct Ideas, *when in one of the cleareſt Ideas of our Minds, we can come to no Certainty by it?*

Your Lordſhip's Proof here, as far as I comprehend it, ſeems to be, that it is confeſs'd, *That* Certainty *does not ariſe from clear and diſtinct Ideas*, becauſe *it is deny'd that the clear and diſtinct Idea of an infinite Being, that implies neceſſary Exiſtence in it, does prove the Exiſtence of a God.*

Here your Lordſhip ſays, *it is deny'd*; and in five Lines after you recal that Saying, and uſe theſe words, *I do not ſay that it is deny'd, to prove it:* Which of theſe two Sayings of your Lordſhip's muſt I now anſwer to? If your Lordſhip ſays *it is deny'd*, I fear that will not hold to be ſo in matter of Fact, which made your Lordſhip unſay it; tho' that being moſt to your Lordſhip's purpoſe, occaſion'd, I ſuppoſe, its dropping from your Pen. For if it be not deny'd, I think the whole Force of your Lordſhip's Argument fails. But your Lordſhip helps that out as well as the thing will bear, by the Words that follow in the Sentence, which altogether ſtands thus: *I do not ſay, that it is deny'd to prove it; but this is ſaid, that it is a doubtful thing*, " from the different Make " of Mens Tempers, and Application of their Thoughts." *What can this mean, unleſs it be to let us know that even* clear and diſtinct Ideas *may loſe their effect, by the difference of Mens Tempers and Studies? So that beſides* Ideas, *in order to a right Judgment, a due Temper and Application of the Mind is requir'd.*

If I meant in thoſe words of mine, quoted here by your Lordſhip, juſt as your Lordſhip concludes they mean, I know not why I ſhould be aſham'd of it; for I never thought that *Ideas, even* the moſt *clear and diſtinct*, would make Men certain of what might be demonſtrated from them, unleſs they were of a Temper to conſider, and would apply their Minds to them. There are no *Ideas* more clear and diſtinct than thoſe of Numbers, and yet there are a thouſand Demonſtrations concerning Numbers, which Millions of Men do not know, (and ſo have not the Certainty about them they might have) for want of *Application.*

I could not avoid here to take this to my ſelf: For this Paſſage of your Lordſhip's is pinn'd down upon me ſo cloſe, by your Lordſhip's citing the 7th Sect. of the 10th Chapter of my 4th Book, that I am forc'd here to anſwer for my ſelf; which I ſhall do, after having firſt ſet down my words, as they ſtand in the place quoted by your Lordſhip: " How far the *Idea* of a moſt per- B. 4. c. 10. §. 7.
" fect Being, which a Man may frame in his Mind, does or does not prove the
" Exiſtence of a God, I will not here examine. For in the different Make of
" Mens Tempers and Application of their Thoughts, ſome *Arguments* prevail
" more on one, and ſome on another, for the Confirmation of the ſame Truth.
" But yet, I think, this I may ſay, That it is an ill way of eſtabliſhing this
" Truth, and ſilencing Atheiſts, to lay the whole ſtreſs of ſo important a
" Point as this, upon that ſole Foundation, and take ſome Mens having that
" *Idea* of God in their Minds (for 'tis evident, ſome Men have none, and ſome
" a worſe than none, and the moſt very different) for the only Proof of a Deity;
" and out of an Over-fondneſs of that darling Invention, caſhier, or at leaſt
" endeavour to invalidate all other Arguments, and forbid us to hearken to thoſe
" Proofs, as being weak, or fallacious, which our own Exiſtence, and the ſen-
" ſible Parts of the Univerſe, offer ſo clearly and cogently to our Thoughts,
" that I deem it impoſſible for a conſidering Man to withſtand them. For I
" judg it as certain and clear a Truth, as can any where be deliver'd, That
" the inviſible things of God are clearly ſeen from the Creation of the World,
" being underſtood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and
" Godhead.

The meaning of which Words of mine, were not to deny that the *Idea* of a moſt perfect Being doth *prove a God*, but to blame thoſe who take it for the *only Proof*, and *endeavour to invalidate all others.* For the Belief of a God being, as I ſay in the ſame Section, the Foundation of all Religion and genuine Mora-

lity,

lity, I thought no *Arguments* that are made uſe of to work the Perſuaſion of a God into Mens Minds, ſhould be invalidated. And the Reaſon I give why they ſhould all be left to their full Strength, and none of them rejected as unfit to be hearken'd to, is this: Becauſe " in the different make of Mens " Tempers and Application of their Thoughts, ſome *Arguments* prevail more " on one, and ſome on another, for the Confirmation of the ſame Truth." So that my meaning here was not, as your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, to ground Certainty *on the different Make of Mens Tempers, and Application of their Thoughts*, in oppoſition to *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, as is very evident from my Words; but to ſhew of what ill Conſequence it is, to go about to invalidate any *Argument*, which hath a tendency to ſettle the Belief of a God in any one's Mind; becauſe in the difference of Mens Tempers and Application, ſome *Arguments* prevail more on one, and ſome on another: ſo that I ſpeaking of *Belief*, and your Lordſhip, as I take it, ſpeaking in that place of *Certainty*, nothing can (I crave leave to ſay) be infer'd from theſe Words of mine to your Lordſhip's purpoſe. And that I meant *Belief*, and not *Certainty*, is evident from hence, That I look upon the Argument there ſpoke of, as not concluſive, and ſo not able to produce Certainty in any one, tho' I did not know how far it might prevail on ſome Mens Perſuaſions to confirm them in the Truth. And ſince not all, nor the moſt of thoſe that believe a God, are at the Pains, or have the Skill, to examine and clearly comprehend the Demonſtrations of his Being; I was unwilling to ſhew the weakneſs of the Argument there ſpoke of; ſince poſſibly by it, ſome Men might be confirmed in the *Belief* of a God, which is enough to preſerve in them true Sentiments of Religion and Morality.

Your Lordſhip hereupon asks, *Wherein is this different from what all Men of Underſtanding have ſaid?* P. 249.

I anſwer: In nothing that I know; nor did I ever that I remember, ſay that it was. Your Lordſhip goes on to demand,

Why then ſhould theſe clear and ſimple Ideas *be made the ſole Foundation of Reaſon?* P. 249.

I anſwer: That I know not: They muſt give your Lordſhip a Reaſon for it, who have *made CLEAR* Ideas *the ſole Foundation of Reaſon.* Why I have made *ſimple* ones the Foundation of all Knowledg, I have ſhewn. Your Lordſhip goes on;

One would think by this——. P. 249.

By what, I beſeech your Lordſhip?

That theſe Ideas *would preſently ſatisfy Mens Minds, if they attended to them.*

What *thoſe Ideas* are from which your Lordſhip *would* expect ſuch preſent Satisfaction, and upon what Grounds your Lordſhip expects it, I do not know. But this I will venture to ſay, That all the Satisfaction *Mens Minds* can have in their Enquiries after Truth and *Certainty*, is to be had only from conſidering, obſerving, and rightly laying together of *Ideas*, ſo as to find out their Agreement or Diſagreement, and no other way.

But I do not think *Ideas* have Truth and Certainty always ſo ready to ſatisfy the Mind in its Enquiries, that there needs no more to be *ſatisfy'd*, than to *attend to them*, as one does to a Man whom one asks a Queſtion to be ſatisfied; which your Lordſhip's way of Expreſſion ſeems to me to intimate. But they muſt be conſider'd well, and their Habitudes exa min'd; and where their Agreement or Diſagreement cannot be perceiv'd by an immediate Compariſon, other *Ideas* muſt be found out to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe under Conſideration, and then all laid in a due order, before the Mind can be ſatisfy'd in the Certainty of that Truth, which it is ſeeking after. This, my Lord, requires often a little more Time and Pains, than *attending* to a Tale that is told for *preſent Satisfaction.* And I believe ſome of the incomparable Mr. *Newton's* wonderful Demonſtrations coſt him ſo much Pains, that tho' they were all founded in nothing but ſeveral *Ideas* of Quantity, yet thoſe *Ideas* did not *preſently ſatisfy his Mind*, tho' they were ſuch that with great application and labour of Thought, they were able to ſatisfy him with *Certainty*, *i. e.* produce Demonſtration. Your Lordſhip adds,

But even this will not do as to the Idea *of an infinite Being.* P. 249.

Tho'

Tho' the complex *Idea* for which the Sound *God* ſtands (whether containing in it the *Idea* of neceſſary Exiſtence or no, for the Caſe is the ſame) will not prove the real Exiſtence of a Being anſwering that *Idea*, any more than any other *Idea* in any one's Mind will prove the Exiſtence of any real Being anſwering that *Idea*; yet, I humbly conceive, it does not hence follow, but that there may be other *Ideas* by which the Being of a God may be proved. For no body that I know, ever ſaid, that every *Idea* would prove every thing, or that an *Idea* in Men's Minds would prove the Exiſtence of ſuch a real Being: And therefore if this *Idea* fails to prove what is propos'd to be prov'd by it, it is no more an Exception againſt *the way of Ideas*, than it would be an Exception againſt the way of a *medium terminum*, in arguing that ſome body us'd one that did not prove. It follows:

P. 249. *It is not enough to ſay* THEY will not examine how far it will hold; *for* THEY *ought either to ſay, That it doth hold, or give up this Ground of Certainty from* clear and diſtinct Ideas.

Here, my Lord, I am got again into the Plural Number: But not knowing any body but my ſelf who has us'd theſe Words which are ſet down out of my *Eſſay*, and which you are in this and the foregoing Paragraph arguing againſt, I am forc'd to beg your Lordſhip to let me know, who thoſe Perſons are whom your Lordſhip, joining with me, entitles with me to theſe Words of my Book; or to whom your Lordſhip joining me, intitles me by theſe Words of mine, to what they have publiſh'd, that I may ſee how far I am anſwerable for them.

Now as to the Words themſelves, *viz. I will not examine how far the Idea* propos'd *does or does not prove the Exiſtence of a God*, becauſe they are mine; and your Lordſhip excepts againſt them, and tells me, *It was not enough to ſay*, "I will not examine, *&c.*" *For I ought* either to have ſaid, *That it doth hold, or give up this ground of Certainty from clear and diſtinct Ideas.* I will anſwer as well as I can.

I could not then, my Lord, well ſay, *That that doth hold*, which I thought did not hold; but I imagin'd I might, without entring into the *examen*, and ſhewing the weakneſs of that Argument, paſs it by with ſaying, *I would not examine*, and ſo left it with this Thought, *Valeat quantum valere poteſt.*

But tho' I did this, and ſaid not then, *It will hold*, nay think now *it will not hold*, yet I do not ſee how from thence I was then, or am now under any Neceſſity to give up the *Ground of Certainty from Ideas*; becauſe the *Ground of Certainty from Ideas* may be right, tho' in the preſent Inſtance a right uſe were not made of them, or a right *Idea* was not made uſe of to produce the Certainty ſought. *Ideas* in Mathematicks are a ſure Ground of Certainty; and yet every one may not make ſo right a uſe of them, as to attain to Certainty by them: But yet any one's failing of Certainty by them, is not the overturning of this Truth, That Certainty is to be had by them. *Clear and diſtinct* I have omitted here to join with *Ideas*, not becauſe *clear and diſtinct* make any *Ideas* unfit to produce Certainty, which have all other fitneſs to do it; but becauſe I do not limit Certainty to *clear* and *diſtinct Ideas* only, ſince there may be Certainty from *Ideas* that are not in all their parts perfectly *clear* and *diſtinct*.

Your Lordſhip, in the following Paragraph, endeavours to ſhew, That I have not prov'd the Being of a God by *Ideas*; and from thence, with an Argument not unlike the preceding, you conclude, that *Ideas* cannot be the *Grounds of Certainty*, becauſe I have not grounded my Proof of a God on *Ideas*. To which way of Argumentation I muſt crave leave here again to reply, That your Lordſhip's ſuppoſing, as you do, that there is another way to Certainty, which is not that *of Ideas*, does not prove that *Certainty* may not be had from *Ideas*, becauſe I make uſe of that other way. This being premiſ'd, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, that my Proof of a Deity is all grounded on *Ideas*, however your Lordſhip is pleas'd to call it by other Names. Your Lordſhip's Words are:

P. 249. §. 6. *But inſtead of the proper Argument from* Ideas, *we are told, That* "from the "Conſideration of our Selves, and what we find in our own Conſtitutions, "our

" our Reaſon leads us to the Knowledg of this certain and evident Truth; " That there is an eternal, moſt powerful, and moſt knowing Being." *All which I readily yield; but we ſee plainly, the Certainty is not plac'd in the Idea, but in good and ſound Reaſon,* from the Conſideration of our Selves and our Conſtitutions. *What! in the* Idea *of our Selves? no certainly.*

Give me leave, my Lord, to ask where I ever ſaid, That *Certainty was plac'd in the Idea,* which your Lordſhip urges my words as a Contradiction of? I think I never ſaid ſo. 1. Becauſe I do not remember it. 2. Becauſe your Lordſhip has not quoted any place where I have ſaid ſo. 3. Becauſe I all along in my Book, which has the Honour to be ſo often quoted here by your Lordſhip, ſay the quite contrary. For I *place* Certainty where I think every body will find it, and no where elſe, *viz.* in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*; ſo that in my Opinion, it is impoſſible to be plac'd in any one ſingle *Idea,* ſimple or complex. I muſt own, that I think Certainty grounded on *Ideas:* And therefore to make your Lordſhip's Words here, as I think they are meant, in oppoſition to what I ſay, I ſhall take the liberty to change your Lordſhip's Words here, *What! in the* Idea *of our ſelves? No certainly*; into Words us'd by your Lordſhip in the foregoing Page, to the ſame purpoſe, *What! can the Grounds of our Certainty ariſe from the* Idea *of our ſelves? No certainly.*

To which permit me, my Lord, with due reſpect to reply, Yes *Certainly.* The Certainty of the Being of a God in my Proof, is grounded *on the* Idea *of our ſelves,* as we are thinking Beings. But your Lordſhip urges my own Words, which are, That, " from the Conſideration of our ſelves, and what " we find in our Conſtitutions, our Reaſon leads us to the Knowledg of this " certain and evident Truth."

My Lord, I muſt confeſs I never thought, that the Conſideration of our ſelves, and what we find in our own Conſtitutions, excluded the Conſideration of the *Idea* either of *Being* or of *Thinking,* two of the *Ideas* that make a part of the complex *Idea* a Man has of himſelf. If Conſideration of our ſelves excludes thoſe *Ideas,* I may be charg'd with ſpeaking improperly: but 'tis plain, nevertheleſs, that I ground the Proof of a God on thoſe *Ideas,* and I thought I ſpoke properly enough; when meaning, That the Conſideration of thoſe *Ideas,* which our own Being offer'd us, and ſo finding their agreement or diſagreement with others, we were thereby, *i. e.* by thus reaſoning, led into the Knowledg of the Exiſtence of the firſt infinite Being, *i. e.* of God. I expreſs'd it as I did, in the more familiar way of ſpeaking: For my purpoſe, in that Chapter, being to make out the Knowledg of the Exiſtence of a God, and not to prove that it was by *Ideas,* I thought it moſt proper to expreſs my ſelf in the moſt uſual and familiar way, to let it the eaſier into Mens Minds, by common Words and known Ways of Expreſſion: And therefore, as I think, I have ſcarce us'd the Word *Idea* in that whole Chapter, but only in that one place, where my ſpeaking againſt laying the whole Proof only upon our *Idea* of a moſt perfect Being, obliged me to it.

But your Lordſhip ſays, that in this way of coming to a certain Knowledg of the Being of a God, " from the Conſideration of our ſelves, and what " we find in our own Conſtitutions," *the Certainty is placed in good and ſound Reaſon.* I hope ſo. *But not in the Idea.*

What your Lordſhip here means by not placed *in the Idea,* I confeſs I do not well underſtand; but if your Lordſhip means that it is not grounded on *the Ideas* of *Thinking* and *Exiſtence* before-mention'd, and the comparing of them, and finding their Agreement or Diſagreement with other *Ideas*; that I muſt take the liberty to diſſent from: For in this ſenſe it may be placed in *Ideas,* and in *good and ſound Reaſon too,* i. e. in Reaſon rightly managing thoſe *Ideas,* ſo as to produce Evidence by them. So that, my Lord, I muſt own I ſee not the force of the Argument, which ſays, not *in Ideas but in ſound Reaſon*; ſince I ſee no ſuch oppoſition between them, but that *Ideas* and *ſound Reaſon* may conſiſt together. For inſtance: When a Man would ſhew the certainty of this Truth, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones; the firſt thing probably that he does, is to draw

a Diagram. What is the uſe of that Diagram? but ſteddily to ſuggeſt to his Mind thoſe ſeveral *Ideas* he would make uſe of in that Demonſtration. The conſidering and laying theſe together in ſuch Order, and with ſuch Connection, as to make the Agreement of the *Ideas* of the three Angles of the Triangle, with the *Ideas* of two right ones, to be perceiv'd, is call'd *right Reaſoning*, and is the buſineſs of that Faculty which we call *Reaſon*; which when it operates rightly, by conſidering and comparing *Ideas* ſo as to produce Certainty, this ſhewing or Demonſtration that the thing is ſo, is call'd *good and ſound Reaſon*. The Ground of this Certainty lies in *Ideas* themſelves, and their agreement or diſagreement, which Reaſon neither does nor can alter, but only lays them ſo together as to make it perceivable; and without ſuch a due conſideration and ordering of the *Ideas*, Certainty could not be had: and thus Certainty is plac'd *both in Ideas, and in good and ſound Reaſon.*

This affords an eaſy Anſwer to your Lordſhip's next Words, brought to prove, That the Certainty of a God is not placed on the *Idea* of our ſelves. They ſtand thus:

P. 250. *For let our Idea be taken which way we pleaſe, by* Senſation *or* Reflection, *yet it is not the Idea that makes us certain, but the Argument from that which we perceive in and about our ſelves.*

Nothing truer than *that it is not the Idea that makes us certain* without *Reaſon*, or without the *Underſtanding:* But it is as true, that 'tis not *Reaſon*, 'tis not the *Underſtanding, that makes us certain* without *Ideas*. 'Tis not the Sun makes me certain it is Day, without my Eyes; nor 'tis not my Sight makes me certain it is Day, without the Sun; but the one imploy'd about the other. Nor it is one *Idea* by it ſelf, that in this or any Caſe, *makes us certain*; but Certainty conſiſts in the perceiv'd agreement or diſagreement of all the *Ideas*, that ſerve to ſhew the agreement or diſagreement of diſtinct *Ideas*, as they ſtand in the Propoſition, whoſe Truth or Falſhood we would be certain of. The uſing of intermediate *Ideas* to ſhew this, is called *Argumentation*, and the *Ideas* ſo us'd in train, *an Argument*; ſo that in my poor Opinion, to ſay, *That the Argument makes us certain*, is no more than ſaying, *The Ideas* made uſe of, *make us certain.*

The *Idea* of *Thinking* in our ſelves, which we receive by Reflection, we may by intermediate *Ideas*, perceive to have a neceſſary agreement and connection with the *Idea* of the Exiſtence of an *eternal, thinking Being*. This, whether your Lordſhip will call placing *of Certainty in the Idea*, or *placing the Certainty in Reaſon*; whether your Lordſhip will ſay, *it is not the Idea that gives us the Certainty, but the Argument*, is indifferent to me; I ſhall not be ſo unmannerly as to preſcribe to your Lordſhip what way you ſhould ſpeak, in this or any other Matter. But this your Lordſhip will give me leave to ſay, That let it be called how your Lordſhip pleaſes, there is no Contradiction in it to what I have ſaid concerning Certainty, or the way how we came by it, or the Ground on which I place it. Your Lordſhip farther urges my Words out of the fifth Section of the ſame Chapter.

P. 250. But, "we find in our ſelves Perception and Knowledg." *It's very true. But how doth this prove there is a God? is it from* the clear and diſtinct Idea *of it? No, but from this Argument*, That "either there muſt have been a "knowing Being from Eternity, or an unknowing, for ſomething muſt have "been from Eternity: But if an unknowing Being, then it was impoſſible "there ever ſhould have been any Knowledg; it being as impoſſible that "a thing without Knowledg ſhould produce it, as that a Triangle ſhould "make it ſelf three Angles bigger than two right ones." *Allowing the Argument to be good, yet it is not taken from the* Idea, *but from the Principles of true Reaſon; as, That no Man can doubt his own Perception; That every thing muſt have a Cauſe; That this Cauſe muſt either have Knowledg or not; if it have, the Point is gain'd: if it hath not, nothing can produce nothing; and conſequently a not knowing Being cannot produce a knowing.*

Your Lordſhip here contends, That *my Argument is not taken from the* Idea, *but from true Principles of Reaſon.* I do not ſay it is *taken from* any one *Idea*, but from all the *Ideas* concerned in it. But your Lordſhip, if you herein oppoſe any thing I have ſaid, muſt, I humbly conceive, ſay, *Not from* Ideas, *but from*

from true Principles of Reaſon; ſeveral whereof your Lordſhip has here ſet down. And whence, I beſeech your Lordſhip, comes the Certainty of any of thoſe Propoſitions, which your Lordſhip calls *true Principles of Reaſon*, but from the perceivable agreement or diſagreement of the *Ideas* contain'd in them? Juſt as it is expreſſed in thoſe Propoſitions, *v. g. a Man cannot doubt of his own Perception*, is a true Principle of Reaſon, or a true Propoſition, or a certain propoſition: But to the Certainty of it we arrive, only by perceiving the neceſſary agreement of the two *Ideas* of *Perception* and Self-conſciouſneſs.

Again, *Every thing muſt have a Cauſe*: Tho' I find it ſo ſet down for one by your Lordſhip, yet, I humbly conceive, is not a true Principle of Reaſon, nor a true Propoſition; but the contrary. The Certainty whereof we attain by the Contemplation of our *Ideas*, and by perceiving that the *Idea* of Eternity, and the *Idea* of the Exiſtence of ſomething do agree, and the *Idea* of Exiſtence from Eternity and of having a Cauſe do not agree, or are inconſiſtent within the ſame thing. But *every Thing that has a Beginning muſt have a Cauſe*, is a true Principle of Reaſon, or a Propoſition certainly true; which we come to know by the ſame way, *i. e.* by contemplating our *Ideas*, and perceiving that the *Idea* of *beginning to be*, is neceſſarily connected with the *Idea* of *ſome Operation*; and the *Idea* of *Operation*, with the *Idea* of *ſomething Operating*, which we call a Cauſe; and ſo the beginning to be, is perceiv'd to agree with the *Idea* of a *Cauſe*, as is expreſs'd in the Propoſition: And thus it comes to be a certain Propoſition; and ſo may be call'd a *Principle of Reaſon*, as every true Propoſition is to him that perceives the Certainty of it.

This, my Lord, is my *way of Ideas*, and of coming to Certainty by them; which, when your Lordſhip has again conſider'd, I am apt to think your Lordſhip will no more condemn, that I do except againſt your Lordſhip's way of *Arguments* or *Principles of Reaſon*. Nor will it, I ſuppoſe any longer offend your Lordſhip, under the Notion of a *New way of Reaſoning*; ſince I flatter my ſelf, both theſe ways will be found to be equally old, one as the other, tho' perhaps formerly they have not been ſo diſtinctly taken notice of, and the Name of *Ideas* is of later date in our *Engliſh* Language.

If your Lordſhip ſays, as I think you mean, *viz.* That my *Argument* to prove a God is not *taken from Ideas*, your Lordſhip will pardon me, if I think otherwiſe. For I beſeech your Lordſhip, are not *Ideas*, whoſe agreement or diſagreement as they are expreſs'd in Propoſitions is perceiv'd, immediately or by Intuition, the *Principles of true Reaſon?* And does not the Certainty we have of the Truth of theſe Propoſitions, conſiſt in the Perception of ſuch agreement or diſagreement? And does not the agreement or diſagreement depend upon the *Ideas* themſelves? Nay, ſo intirely depend upon the *Ideas* themſelves, that it is impoſſible for the *Mind*, or *Reaſon*, or *Argument*, or any thing to alter it? All that *Reaſon* or the Mind does, in Reaſoning or Arguing, is to find out and obſerve that agreement or diſagreement: And all that Argument does, is by an intervening *Idea*, to ſhew it, where an immediate putting the *Ideas* together will not do it.

As for example, in the preſent Caſe: The Propoſition, of whoſe Truth I would be certain, is thus: *A knowing Being has eternally exiſted.* Here the Ideas *joined*, are *eternal Exiſtence* with a *knowing Being*. But does my mind perceive any immediate connection or repugnancy in theſe *Ideas?* No. The Propoſition then at firſt view affords me no Certainty; or, as our Engliſh *Idiom* phraſes it, *It is not certain*, or *I am not certain of it.* But tho' I am not, yet I would be certain whether it it be true or no. What then muſt I do? Find Arguments to prove that it is true, or the contrary. And what is that, but to caſt about and find out intermediate *Ideas*, which may ſhew me the neceſſary connection or inconſiſtency of the *Ideas* in the Propoſition? Either of which, when by theſe intervening *Ideas* I am brought to perceive, I am then certain that the Propoſition is true, or I am certain that it is falſe. As in the preſent Caſe, I perceive in my ſelf *Thought* and *Perception*; the *Idea* of actual *Perception* has an evident connection with an actual Being, that doth perceive and think: The *Idea* of an actual thinking Being, hath a

perceivable connection with the eternal Exiſtence of ſome knowing Being, by the intervention of the negation of all Being, or the *Idea* of *nothing*, which has a neceſſary Connection with *no Power*, *no Operation*, *no Cauſality*, *no Effect*, i. e. with *nothing*. So that the *Idea* of once actually *nothing*, has a viſible Connection with *nothing* to Eternity, for the future; and hence the *Idea* of an actual Being, is perceiv'd to have a neceſſary Connection with ſome actual Being from Eternity. And by the like way of *Ideas*, may be perceiv'd the actual Exiſtence of a knowing Being, to have a Connection with the Exiſtence of an actual knowing Being from Eternity; and the *Idea* of an eternal, actual, knowing Being, with the *Idea* of Immateriality, by the intervention of the *Idea* of Matter, and of its actual Diviſion, Diviſibility and want of Perception, *&c.* which are the *Ideas*, or, as your Lordſhip is pleas'd to call them, *Arguments*, I make uſe of in this Proof, which I need not here go over again; and which is partly contain'd in theſe following Words, which your Lordſhip thus quotes out of the 10th Section of the ſame Chapter.

P. 251. *Again*, " If we ſuppoſe nothing to be firſt, Matter can never begin to be; if " bare matter without Motion to be eternal, Motion can never begin to be; " if Matter and Motion be ſuppos'd eternal, Thought can never begin to be: " For if Matter could produce Thought, then Thought muſt be in the power " of Matter; and if it be in Matter as ſuch, it muſt be the inſeparable Property " of all Matter; which is contrary to the Senſe and Experience of Mankind. " If only ſome parts of Matter have a power of Thinking, how comes ſo great " a difference in the Properties of the ſame Matter? What Diſpoſition of " Matter is requir'd to Thinking? And from whence comes it? Of which no " account can be given in Reaſon." To which your Lordſhip ſubjoins:

P. 251. *This is the Subſtance of the Argument uſed, to prove an infinite ſpiritual Being, which I am far from weakening the force of: But that which I deſign, is to ſhew, That the Certainty of it is not placed upon any* clear and diſtinct Ideas, *but upon the Force of Reaſon diſtinct from it; which was the thing I intended to prove.*

Your Lordſhip ſays, That *the Certainty of it* (I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip means the *Certainty* produc'd by my Proof of a Deity) *is not placed* upon *clear and diſtinct Ideas*. It is placed, among others, upon the *Ideas* of *Thinking*, *Exiſtence*, and *Matter*, which I think are all *clear and diſtinct Ideas*; ſo that there are ſome *clear and diſtinct Ideas* in it: And one can hardly ſay there are *not any clear and diſtinct Ideas* in it, becauſe there is one obſcure and confuſed one in it, *viz.* That of *Subſtance*; which yet hinders not the *Certainty* of the Proof.

P. 252. The Words which your Lordſhip ſubjoins to the former, *viz. But upon the Force of* REASON *diſtinct from it*; ſeem to me to ſay, as far as I can underſtand them, That the *Certainty* of my *Argument* for a Deity, is *placed not on clear and diſtinct Ideas, but upon the Force of Reaſon.*

This, among other Places before ſet down, makes me wiſh your Lordſhip had told us, what you underſtand by REASON, for in my acceptation of the word REASON, I do not ſee but the ſame Proof may be placed upon clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, and upon *Reaſon* too. As I ſaid before, I can perceive no Inconſiſtency or Oppoſition between them, no more than there is any Oppoſition between a clear Object and my Faculty of Seeing, in the Certainty of any thing I receive by my Eyes; for this Certainty may be placed very well on both the Clearneſs of the Object, and the Exerciſe of that Faculty in me.

P. 245. Your Lordſhip's next words, I think, ſhould be read thus; *Diſtinct from them:* For if they were intended as they are printed, *Diſtinct from it*, I confeſs I do not underſtand them. *Certainty not placed on clear and diſtinct Ideas, but upon the Force of Reaſon diſtinct from them*, my Capacity will reach the Senſe of: But then I cannot but wonder what *diſtinct from them* do there; for I know no body that does not think that *Reaſon*, or the Faculty of Reaſoning, is *diſtinct from* the *Ideas* it makes uſe of or is employ'd about, whether thoſe *Ideas be clear and diſtinct*, or obſcure and confus'd. But if that Sentence be to be read as it is printed, *viz. The Certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and diſtinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reaſon diſtinct from it*; I acknowledg your Lordſhip's meaning is above my Comprehenſion. Upon the whole matter, my Lord, I muſt confeſs, That I do not ſee that what your Lordſhip ſays you *intended here to prove*, is prov'd, *viz.* That *Certainty* in my proof of a God *is not placed on Ideas.* And

next, if it were prov'd, I do not ſee how it anſwers any *Objection againſt the Trinity, in point of Reaſon.*

Before I go on to what follows, I muſt beg leave to confeſs, I am troubled to find theſe Words of your Lordſhip, among thoſe I have above ſet down out of the foregoing Page, *viz. Allowing the Argument to be good*; and cannot forbear to P. 250. wiſh, That when your Lordſhip was writing this Paſſage, you had had in your Mind what you are pleas'd here to ſay, *viz. That you are far from weakening the Force of my Argument which I uſed to prove an infinite ſpiritual Being.*

My Lord, your Lordſhip is a great Man, not only by the Dignity your Merits are inveſted with, but more by the Merits of your Parts and Learning. Your Lordſhip's Words carry Weight and Authority with them; and he that ſhall quote but a Saying or a Doubt of your Lordſhip's, that queſtions the Force of my Argument for the Proof of a God, will think himſelf well founded and to be hearken'd to, as gone a great way in the Cauſe. Theſe Words *Allowing the Argument to be good*, in the receiv'd way of ſpeaking, are uſually taken to ſignify, That he that ſpeaks them, does not judg the *Argument to be good*; but that for Diſcourſe-ſake he at preſent admits it. Truly, my Lord, till I read theſe Words in your Lordſhip, I always took it for a *good Argument*; and was ſo fully perſuaded of its Goodneſs, that I ſpoke higher of it than of any Reaſoning of mine any where, becauſe I thought it equal to a Demonſtration. If it be not ſo, it is fit I recall my Words, and that I do not betray ſo important and fundamental a Truth, by a weak, but over-valu'd Argument: And therefore I cannot, upon this occaſion, but importune your Lordſhip, That if your Lordſhip (as your Words ſeem to intimate) ſees any Weakneſs in it, your Lordſhip would be pleas'd to ſhew it me; that either I may amend that Fault, and make it concluſive, or elſe retract my Confidence, and leave that Cauſe to thoſe who have Strength ſuitable to its Weight. But to return to what follows in your Lordſhip's next Paragraph.

2. *The next thing neceſſary to be clear'd in this Diſpute, is, the Diſtinction between* P. 252. *Nature and Perſon, and of this we can have no* clear and diſtinct Idea from Senſation or Reflection. *And yet all our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right underſtanding of it. For we muſt talk unintelligibly about this Point, unleſs we have clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning* Nature *and* Perſon, *and the Grounds of* Identity *and* Diſtinction. *But that theſe come not into our Minds by theſe* ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection, *I ſhall now make it appear.*

By this it is plain, that the Buſineſs of the following Pages is to make it appear, That *we have no clear and diſtinct Idea of the Diſtinction of Nature and Perſon, from* Senſation *or* Reflection: Or, as your Lordſhip expreſſes it a little lower, *The Apprehenſion concerning Nature and Perſon, and the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction, come not into our Minds by the ſimple Ideas of* Senſation *and* Reflection.

And what, pray my Lord, can be infer'd from hence, if it ſhould be ſo? Your Lordſhip tells us,

All our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right Underſtanding of the Diſtinction between *Nature* and *Perſon*; *and we muſt talk unintelligibly about this Point, unleſs we have clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon, and the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction.*

If it be ſo, the Inference I ſhould draw from thence (if it were fit for me to draw any) would be this, That it concerns thoſe who write on that Subject to have themſelves, and to lay down to others, *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions*, or Notions, or Ideas (call them what you pleaſe) of what they mean by *Nature* and *Perſon*, and of the *Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction*.

This ſeems, to me, the natural Concluſion flowing from your Lordſhip's Words; which ſeem here to ſuppoſe *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions* (ſomething like *clear and diſtinct Ideas*) neceſſary for the avoiding *unintelligible Talk in the Doctrine of the Trinity*. But I do not ſee how your Lordſhip can, from the neceſſity of *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions* of *Nature* and *Perſon*, &c. in the *Diſpute* of the *Trinity*, bring in one, who has perhaps miſtaken the way to clear and diſtinct Notions concerning *Nature* and *Perſon*, &c. as fit to be anſwer'd among thoſe, who bring *Objections againſt the Trinity in point of Reaſon*. I do not ſee why an Unitarian may not as well bring him in, and argue againſt his *Eſſay*, in a

Chapter

Chapter that he ſhould write, to anſwer Objections againſt the Unity of God *in point of Reaſon* or Revelation: For upon what ground ſoever any one writes *in this Diſpute* or any other, it is not tolerable to talk *unintelligibly* on either ſide.

If by the *way of Ideas*, which is that of the Author of *The Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, a Man cannot come to *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions* concerning *Nature* and *Perſon*; if, as he propoſes from the ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection, ſuch *Apprehenſions* cannot be got; it will follow from thence, that he is a miſtaken Philoſopher: But it will not follow from thence, That he is not an Orthodox Chriſtian; for he might (as he did) write his *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, without any Thought of the Controverſy between the Trinitarians and Unitarians: nay, a Man might have writ all that is in his Book, that never heard one Word of any ſuch Diſpute.

There is in the World a great and fierce Conteſt about *Nature* and *Grace*: 'Twould be very hard for me, if I muſt be brought in as a Party on either ſide, becauſe a Diſputant, in that Controverſy, ſhould think the *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of* Nature *and* Grace, *come not into our Minds by the ſimple Ideas of* Senſation *and* Reflection. If this be ſo, I may be reckon'd among the Objectors againſt all Sorts and Points of Orthodoxy, whenever any one pleaſes: I may be call'd to account as one Heterodox, in the Points of *Free-Grace*, *Free-will*, *Predeſtination*, *Original Sin*, *Juſtification by Faith*, *Tranſubſtantiation*, *the Pope's Supremacy*, and what not? as well as in the *Doctrine of the Trinity*; and all becauſe they cannot be furniſh'd with clear and diſtinct Notions of *Grace*, *Free-Will*, *Tranſubſtantiation*, &c. by Senſation or Reflection. For in all theſe, or any other Points, I do not ſee but there may be Complaint made, that they have not always a *right Underſtanding* and *clear Notions* of thoſe things, on which the *Doctrine* they diſpute of, *depends*. And 'tis not altogether unuſual, for Men to *talk unintelligibly* to themſelves and others, in theſe and other *Points* of Controverſy, for want of *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions*, or (as I would call them, did not your Lordſhip diſlike it) *Ideas*: For all which unintelligible Talking, I do not think my ſelf accountable, tho' it ſhould ſo fall out that my way, by *Ideas*, would not help them to what it ſeems is wanting, *clear and diſtinct* Notions. If my way be ineffectual to that purpoſe, they may, for all me, make uſe of any other more ſucceſsful, and leave me out of the Controverſy, as one uſeleſs to either Party, for deciding of the Queſtion.

Suppoſing, as your Lordſhip ſays, and as you have undertaken to *make appear*, That the *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon, and the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction, ſhould not come into the Mind by the ſimple Ideas of* Senſation *and* Reflection; what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, is this to the Diſpute concerning the *Trinity*, on either ſide? And if after your Lordſhip has endeavour'd to give *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon*, the Diſputants in this Controverſy ſhould ſtill *talk unintelligibly about this Point*, for want of *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon*; ought your Lordſhip to be brought in among the Partiſans on the other ſide, by any one who writ *a Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*? In good earneſt, my Lord, I do not ſee how the *clear and diſtinct* Notions of *Nature* and *Perſon*, *not coming into the Mind* by the ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection, any more contains any *Objection* againſt the Doctrine of the Trinity, than *the clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions* of Original Sin, Juſtification or Tranſubſtantiation, *not coming to the Mind by the ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection*, contains any Objection againſt the Doctrine of Original Sin, Juſtification or Tranſubſtantiation, and ſo of all the reſt of the Terms uſed in any Controverſy in Religion; however your Lordſhip, in a Treatiſe of the *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, and in the Chapter where you make it your buſineſs to anſwer *Objections in point of Reaſon*, ſet your ſelf ſeriouſly to prove, That *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon, and the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction, come not into our Minds by theſe ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection*. In order to *the making this appear*, we read as followeth:

P. 252. *As to Nature, that is ſometimes taken for the eſſential Property of a thing: as, when we ſay, That ſuch a thing is of a different nature from another; we mean no more, than that it is differenced by ſuch Properties as come to our Knowledg. Sometimes Nature is taken for the thing it ſelf in which theſe Properties are; and ſo* Ariſtotle

took

took Nature for a Corporeal Subſtance, which had the Principles of Motion in it ſelf: But Nature and Subſtance are of an equal extent; and ſo that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties, is the Nature, whether it be meant of bodily or ſpiritual Subſtances.

Your Lordſhip, in this Paragraph, gives us two Significations of the Word *Nature*; 1. That *it is ſometimes taken for eſſential Properties*, which I eaſily admit. 2. *That ſometimes it is taken for the thing it ſelf in which theſe Properties are*, and conſequently for *Subſtance* it ſelf. And this your Lordſhip proves out of *Ariſtotle*.

Whether *Ariſtotle* call'd the thing it ſelf wherein the *Eſſential Properties* are, *Nature*, I will not diſpute: But that your Lordſhip thinks fit to call *Subſtance Nature*, is evident. And from thence I think your Lordſhip endeavours to prove in the following Words, That we can have from *Ideas* no *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature*. Your Lordſhip's Words are:

I grant, That by Senſation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of things; but our Reaſon is ſatisfy'd that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe, becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. So that the NATURE of things properly belongs to our Reaſon, and not to mere Ideas. P. 253.

How we come by the *Idea* of *Subſtance*, from the ſimple ones of Senſation and Reflection, I have endeavour'd to ſhew in another place, and therefore ſhall not trouble your Lordſhip with here again. But what your Lordſhip infers, in theſe Words, *So that the Nature of Things properly belongs to our Reaſon, and not to mere Ideas*; I do not well underſtand. Your Lordſhip indeed here again ſeems to oppoſe *Reaſon* and *Ideas*; and to that I ſay, *mere Ideas* are the Objects of the Underſtanding, and *Reaſon* is one of the Faculties of the Underſtanding employ'd about them; and that the Underſtanding, or *Reaſon*, which-ever your Lordſhip pleaſes to call it, makes or forms, out of the ſimple ones that come in by Senſation and Reflection, all the other *Ideas*, whether general, relative, or complex, by abſtracting, comparing and compounding its poſitive ſimple *Ideas*, whereof it cannot make or frame any one, but what it receives by Senſation or Reflection. And therefore, I never deny'd that *Reaſon* was employ'd about our particular ſimple *Ideas*, to make out of them *Ideas* general, relative, and complex; nor about all our *Ideas*, whether ſimple or complex, poſitive or relative, general or particular: it being the proper buſineſs of *Reaſon*, in the ſearch after Truth and Knowledg, to find out the Relations between all theſe ſorts of *Ideas*, in the perception whereof Knowledg and Certainty of Truth conſiſts.

Theſe, my Lord, are, in ſhort, my Notions about *Ideas*, their Original and Formation, and of the uſe the Mind, or Reaſon, makes of them in Knowledg. Whether your Lordſhip thinks fit to call this *a new way of Reaſoning*, muſt be left to your Lordſhip; whether it be a right way, is that alone which I am concern'd for. But your Lordſhip ſeems all along (I crave leave here once for all to take notice of it) to have ſome particular Exception againſt *Ideas*, and particularly *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, as if they were not to be uſed, or were of no uſe in *Reaſon* and Knowledg; or, as if *Reaſon* were oppos'd to them, or leads us into the Knowledg and Certainty of things without them; or, the Knowledg of things did not at all depend on them. I beg your Lordſhip's pardon for expreſſing my ſelf ſo variouſly and doubtfully in this matter; the reaſon whereof is, becauſe I muſt own, That I do not every where clearly underſtand what your Lordſhip means, when you ſpeak, as you do, of *Ideas*; as if I aſcrib'd more to them, than belong'd to them; or expected more of them, than they could do; *v. g.* where your Lordſhips ſays,

But is all this contain'd in the ſimple Idea of theſe Operations? And again, *So that here it is not the Clearneſs of the Idea, but an immediate Act of Perception, which is the true Ground of Certainty.* And farther, *So that our Certainty is not from the Ideas themſelves, but from the Evidence of Reaſon.* And in another place, *It is not the Ideas that makes us certain, but the Argument from that which we perceive in and about our ſelves. Is it from the clear and diſtinct Idea of it? No! but from this Argument.* And here, P. 253. *The Nature of things belongs to our Reaſon, and not to mere Ideas.* P. 241. P. 248. P. 250.

Theſe, and ſeveral the like Paſſages, your Lordſhip has againſt what your Lordſhip calls *This new way of Ideas*, and *an admirable way to bring us to the Certainty of Reaſon.* P. 243.

I never

I never ſaid nor thought *Ideas*, or any thing elſe, could *bring us to the Certainty of Reaſon*, without the Exerciſe of *Reaſon*. And then my Lord, if we will imploy our Minds, and exerciſe our Reaſons, to bring us to Cer-
B. 1. c. 1. §. 8. tainty; what, I beſeech you, ſhall they be imploy'd about but *Ideas*? For *Ideas*, in my Senſe of the Word, are. "Whatſoever is the Object of the
B. 2. c. 8. "Underſtanding, when a Man thinks; *Or*, Whatſoever it is the Mind can be
§. 8. "imploy'd about in thinking." And again, I have theſe Words, "Whatſoever is the immediate Object of Perception, Thought, or Underſtanding, "that I call *Idea*." So that my *way of Ideas*, and of coming to *Certainty* by them, is to imploy our Minds in thinking upon ſomething; and I do not ſee but your Lordſhip your ſelf, and every body elſe, muſt make uſe of my *way of Ideas*, unleſs they can find out a way that will bring them to Certainty, by thinking on nothing. So that let *Certainty* be *placed* as much as it will on *Reaſon*, let the *Nature of Things belong* as *properly* as it will *to our Reaſon*, it will nevertheleſs be true, That Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the agreement or diſagreement of *Ideas*; and that the complex *Idea* the word *Nature* ſtands for, is ultimately made up of the ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection. Your Lordſhip proceeds.

P. 253. *But we muſt yet proceed farther: For* Nature *may be conſider'd two ways:*

1. *As it is in diſtinct Individuals; as the* Nature *of a* Man *is equally in* Peter, James *and* John; *and this is the* common Nature, *with a particular Subſiſtence proper to each of them. For the Nature of Man, as in* Peter, *is diſtinct from the ſame Nature, as it is in* James *and* John; *otherwiſe, they would be but* one Perſon, *as well as have the* ſame Nature. *And this diſtinction of* Perſons *in them, is diſcern'd both by our* Senſes, *as to their different Accidents; and by our Reaſon, becauſe they have a ſeparate Exiſtence; not coming into it at once, and in the ſame manner.*

2. Nature *may be conſider'd* abſtractly, *without reſpect to individual Perſons; and then it makes an intire Notion of it ſelf. For however the ſame Nature may be in different Individuals, yet the Nature in it ſelf remains one and the ſame; which appears from this evident Reaſon, that otherwiſe every Individual muſt make a different kind.*

I am ſo little confident of my own Quickneſs, and of having got, from what your Lordſhip has ſaid here, a *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſion concerning Nature*, that I muſt beg your Lordſhip's pardon, if I ſhould happen to diſſatisfy your Lordſhip, by talking *unintelligible*, or beſides the purpoſe about it. I muſt then confeſs to your Lordſhip, 1. That I do not clearly underſtand whether your Lordſhip, in theſe two Paragraphs, ſpeaks of *Nature*, as ſtanding for *Eſſential Properties*; or of *Nature*, as ſtanding for *Subſtance*: and yet it is of great moment in the Caſe, becauſe your Lordſhip allows, That the Notion of *Nature* in the former of theſe Senſes, may be had from Senſation and Reflection; but of *Nature* in the latter Senſe, your Lordſhip ſays, *It pro-*
P. 253. *perly belongs to Reaſon, and not mere* Ideas. 2. Your Lordſhip's ſaying in the firſt of theſe Paragraphs, *That the Nature of Man, as in* Peter, *is diſtinct from the ſame Nature as it is in* James *and* John; and in the ſecond of them, *That how-*
P. 254. *ever the SAME Nature may be in different Individuals, yet the Nature it ſelf remains ONE AND THE SAME*; does not give me ſo *clear and diſtinct an Apprehenſion concerning Nature*, that I know which, in your Lordſhip's Opinion, I ought to think, either that one *and the ſame Nature* is in *Peter* and *John*; or that a Nature diſtinct from that in *John*, is in *Peter*: And the Reaſon is, becauſe I cannot, in my *way by Ideas*, well put together *one and the ſame* and *diſtinct*. My *Apprehenſion concerning the Nature of Man, or the common Nature of Man*) if your Lordſhip will, upon this Occaſion, give me leave to trouble your Lordſhip with it) is, in ſhort, this; That it is a Collection of ſeveral *Ideas*, combined into one complex, abſtract *Idea*, which when they are found united in any Individual exiſting, tho' joined in that Exiſtence with ſeveral other *Ideas*, that individual or particular Being is truly ſaid to have the Nature of a *Man*, or the Nature of a *Man* to be in him; for as much as all theſe ſimple *Ideas* are found united in him, which anſwer the complex, abſtract *Idea*, to which the ſpecifick Name *Man* is given by any one: which abſtract, ſpecifick *Idea*, he keeps the ſame, when he applies the

ſpecifick

ſpecifick Name ſtanding for it, to diſtinct Individuals; *i. e.* no body changes his *Idea* of a *Man*, when he ſays *Peter* is a *Man*, from that *Idea* which he makes the Name *Man* to ſtand for, when he calls *John* a *Man*. This ſhort way by *Ideas*, has not, I confeſs, thoſe different, and more learned and ſcholaſtick Conſiderations ſet down by your Lordſhip. But how they are neceſſary, or at all tend to prove what your Lordſhip has propos'd to prove, *viz.* That we have no clear and diſtinct *Idea* of *Nature*, from the ſimple *Ideas* got from Senſation and Reflection, I confeſs I do not yet ſee. But your Lordſhip goes on to it:

Let us now ſee how far theſe Things can come from our ſimple Ideas, *by Reflection and Senſation. And I ſhall lay down the Hypotheſis of* THOSE, *who reſolve our Certainty into* Ideas, *as plainly and intelligibly as I can.* P. 254.

Here I am got again into the Plural Number: For tho' it be ſaid *the Hypotheſis of* THOSE, yet my Words alone are quoted for that *Hypotheſis*, and not a word of any body elſe in this whole Buſineſs concerning *Nature*. What they are, I ſhall give the Reader, as your Lordſhip has ſet them down.

1. *We are told*, "That all ſimple *Ideas* are true and adequate. Not, that "they are the true Repreſentations of things without us; but that they are "the true Effects of ſuch Powers in them, as produce ſuch Senſation within "us." *So that really we can underſtand nothing certainly by them, but the Effects they have upon us:* *Human Underſtanding*, L. 2. ch. 30, 31.

For theſe Words of mine, I find *Human Underſtanding*, L. 2. ch. 30, 31. quoted; but I crave leave to obſerve to your Lordſhip, That in neither of theſe Chapters do I find the Words, as they ſtand here in your Lordſhip's Book. In B. 2. Ch. 31. Sect. 2. of my Eſſay, I find theſe Words, "That all our ſimple "*Ideas* are adequate, becauſe being nothing but the Effects of certain Powers "in things fitted or ordained by God, to produce ſuch Senſations in us, they "cannot but be correſpondent and adequate to thoſe Powers." And in Chap. 30. Sect. 2. I ſay, That "our ſimple *Ideas* are all real, all agree to the reality "of Things. Not that they are all of them the Images or Repreſentations "of what does exiſt; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary Qualities "of Bodies, hath been already ſhew'd."

Theſe are the Words in my Book, from whence thoſe in your Lordſhip's ſeem to be gather'd, but with ſome difference; For I do not remember that I have any where ſaid, of all *our ſimple Ideas*, That they are none of them *true Repreſentations of Things without us*; as the Words I find in your Lordſhip's Book, ſeem to make me ſay. The contrary whereof, appears from the Words which I have ſet down, out of Chap. 30. where I deny only the ſimple *Ideas* of ſecondary Qualities, to be Repreſentations; but do every where affirm, That the ſimple *Ideas* of primary Qualities, are the Images or Repreſentation of what does exiſt without us. So that my Words, in the Chapters quoted by your Lordſhip, not ſaying that all our ſimple *Ideas* are only *Effects*, and none of them *Repreſentations*, your Lordſhip, I humbly conceive, cannot, upon that account, infer from my Words, as you do here, *viz. So that really we can underſtand nothing certainly by them.* P. 245.

The remaining Words of this Sentence, I muſt beg your Lordſhip's Pardon, if I profeſs I do not underſtand: They are theſe; *But the Effects they have upon us. They* here, and *Them* in the preceding Words to which they are joined, ſignify ſimple *Ideas*; for 'tis of thoſe your Lordſhip infers, *So that really we can underſtand nothing certainly by them, but the Effects they have upon us.* And then your Lordſhip's Words import thus much, *So that really we can underſtand nothing certainly by* ſimple Ideas, *but the Effects* ſimple Ideas *have upon us*: which I cannot underſtand to be what your Lordſhip intended to infer from the preceding Words taken to be mine. For, I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip argues, from my Opinion concerning the ſimple *Ideas* of ſecondary Qualities, the little real Knowledg we ſhould receive from them, if it be true, that they are not Repreſentations or Images of any thing in Bodies, but only Effects of certain Powers in Bodies to produce them in us: And in that Senſe I take the liberty to read your Lordſhip's words thus; *So that really we can underſtand nothing certainly by* [theſe Ideas] *but the Effects* [thoſe Powers] *have upon us.* To which I anſwer, P. 254.

1. That we as *certainly* know and diſtinguiſh Things by *Ideas*, ſuppoſing them nothing but Effects produc'd in us by theſe Powers, as if they were Repreſentations. I can as *certainly*, when I have occaſion for either, diſtinguiſh Gold from Silver by the Colour, or Wine from Water by the Taſte; if the Colour of the one, or the Taſte of the other, be only an *effect* of their Powers on me, as if that Colour and that Taſte were Repreſentations and Reſemblances of ſomething in thoſe Bodies.

2. I anſwer; That we have certainly as much Pleaſure and Delight by thoſe *Ideas*, one way as the other. The Smell of a Violet or Taſte of a Peach, gives me as real and certain Delight, if it be only an Effect, as if it were the true Reſemblance of ſomething in that Flower and Fruit. And I a little the more wonder, to hear your Lordſhip complain ſo much of want of *Certainty* in this Caſe, when I read theſe Words of your Lordſhip in another place:

P. 256. *That from the Powers and Properties of Things which are knowable by us, we may know as much of the internal Eſſence of Things, as thoſe Powers and Properties diſcover. I do not ſay, That we can know all Eſſences of Things alike; nor that we can attain to a perfect Underſtanding of all that belong to them: But if we can know ſo much, as that there are certain Beings in the World, endued with ſuch diſtinct Powers and Properties; What is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of Things? But we do not ſee the bare* Eſſence *of Things. What is that bare* Eſſence, *without the Powers and Properties belonging to it?* It is that internal Conſtitution of Things, from whence thoſe Powers and Properties flow. *Suppoſe we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be, for any Diſcoveries that have been yet made) that is a good Argument, to prove the uncertainty of Philoſophical Speculations, about the real* Eſſence *of Things; but it is no prejudice to us, who enquire after the Certainty of ſuch* Eſſences. *For altho' we cannot comprehend the* internal *Frame* or Conſtitution of Things, *nor in what manner they do flow from the Subſtance; yet by them we certainly know, that there are ſuch* Eſſences, *and that they are diſtinguiſh'd from each other by their Powers and Properties.*

Give me leave, if your Lordſhip pleaſe, to argue after the ſame manner in the preſent Caſe: *That from* theſe ſimple Ideas which *are knowable by us, we know as much of the* Powers and *internal* Conſtitutions of Things, *as theſe Powers diſcover; and if we can know ſo much as that there are* ſuch Powers, *and that there are certain Beings in the World, endued with ſuch Powers and Properties,* that by theſe ſimple *Ideas* that are but the Effects of theſe Powers, we can as certainly diſtinguiſh the Beings wherein thoſe Powers are, and receive as certain Advantage from them, as if thoſe ſimple *Ideas* were Reſemblances: *What is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of Things? But we do not ſee that internal Conſtitution from whence thoſe Powers flow. Suppoſe we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be for any Diſcoveries that have been yet made) that is a good Argument, to ſhew how ſhort our Philoſophical Speculations are about the real, internal Conſtitutions of Things; but is no prejudice to us,* who by thoſe ſimple *Ideas* ſearch out, find and diſtinguiſh Things for our Uſes. *For tho',* by thoſe *Ideas* which are not Reſemblances, *we cannot comprehend the internal Frame or Conſtitution of Things, nor in what manner* theſe Ideas are produc'd in us by thoſe Powers; *yet by them we certainly know, That there are ſuch Eſſences or Conſtitutions of theſe Subſtances,* that have thoſe Powers, whereby they regularly produce thoſe *Ideas* in us; *and that they are diſtinguiſh'd from each other by thoſe Powers.*

The next Words your Lordſhip ſets down, as out of my Book, are:

P. 254. 2. "All our *Ideas* of Subſtances are imperfect and inadequate, becauſe they "refer to the real Eſſences of Things of which we are ignorant, and no "Man knows what Subſtance is in it ſelf: And they are all falſe, when look'd "on as the Repreſentations of the unknown Eſſences of Things."

In theſe too, my Lord, you muſt give me leave to take notice, That there is a little Variation from my Words: For I do not ſay, *That all our* Ideas *of Subſtances are imperfect and inadequate, becauſe they refer to the real Eſſences of Things*; for ſome People may not refer them to *real Eſſences*. But I do ſay,

B. 2. c. 21. "That all *Ideas* of Subſtances, which are refer'd to real Eſſences, are in "that

" that reſpect inadequate:" As may be ſeen more at large in that Chapter.

Your Lordſhip's next Quotation has in it ſomething of a like Slip. The Words which your Lordſhip ſets down, are, P. 254.

3. *Abſtract Ideas are only general Names, made by ſeparating Circumſtances of Time and Place, &c. from them, which are only the Inventions and Creatures of the Underſtanding.*

For theſe your Lordſhip quotes Chap. 3. Sect. 6. of my third Book; where my Words are, " The next thing to be conſider'd, is, how general Words come to " be made. For ſince all things that exiſt are only Particulars, how come we " by general Terms? or where find we thoſe general Natures they are ſup- " pos'd to ſtand for? Words become general, by being made Signs of general " *Ideas*; and *Ideas* become general, by ſeparating from them the Circumſtances " of Time or Place, and any other *Ideas* that may determine them to this or " that particular Exiſtence. By this way of Abſtraction, they are made capa- " ble of repreſenting more Individuals than one; each of which, having in it a " Conformity to that abſtract *Idea*, is (as we call it) of that ſort." By which Words it appears, that I am far enough from ſaying, *That abſtract Ideas are only general Names.* Your Lordſhip's next Quotation out of my Book, is,

4. " Eſſence may be taken two ways. 1. For the real, internal, unknown P. 255. " Conſtitutions of Things; and in this ſenſe it is underſtood as to particular " Things. 2. For the abſtract *Idea*; and one is ſaid to be the nominal, the " other the real Eſſence. And the nominal Eſſences only are immutable, and " are Helps to enable them to conſider things, and to diſcourſe of them."

Here too, I think, there are ſome Words left out, which are neceſſary to make my Meaning clearly underſtood; which your Lordſhip will find, if you think fit to give your ſelf the trouble to caſt your eye again on that Chapter, which you here quote. But not diſcerning clearly what uſe your Lordſhip makes of them, as they are either in your Lordſhip's Quotation, or in my Book, I ſhall not trouble your Lordſhip about them. Your Lordſhip goes on:

But two Things are granted, which tend to clear this matter. P. 255.

1. *That there is a* real Eſſence, *which is the Foundation of Powers and Properties.*

2. *That we may know theſe Powers and Properties, altho' we are ignorant of the real Eſſence.*

If by that indefinite Expreſſion, *We may know theſe Powers and Properties*, your Lordſhip means, *That we may know ſome of the Powers and Properties that* depend on the real Eſſences of Subſtances; I grant it to be my Meaning. If your Lordſhip, in thoſe Words, comprehends all their *Powers and Properties*, that goes beyond my Meaning. From theſe two things, which I grant your Lordſhip ſays, you infer,

1. *That from thoſe true and adequate Ideas, which we have of the Modes and Proper-* P. 255. *ties of Things, we have ſufficient Certainty of the real Eſſence of them: For theſe Ideas are allow'd to be true; and either by them we may judg of the Truth of Things, or we can make no Judgment at all of any thing without our ſelves.*

If our Ideas be only the Effects we ſee of the Powers of Things without us; yet our Reaſon muſt be ſatisfy'd, That there could be no ſuch Powers, unleſs there were ſome real Beings which had them. So that either we may be certain, by theſe Effects, of the real Being of Things; or it is not poſſible, as we are framed, to have any Certainty at all of any thing without our ſelves.

All this, if I miſtake not your Lordſhip, is only to prove, That by the *Ideas* of *Properties* and *Powers* which we obſerve in things, *our Reaſon muſt be ſatisfy'd that there are without us real Beings, with real Eſſences:* which being that which I readily own and have ſaid in my Book, I cannot but acknowledg my ſelf oblig'd to your Lordſhip, for being at the pains to collect Places out of my Book, to prove what I hold in it; and the more, becauſe your Lordſhip does it by ways and ſteps, which poſſibly I ſhould never have thought of. Your Lordſhip's next Inference is,

2. *That from the Powers and Properties of things, which are knowable by us, we* P. 256. *may know as much of the internal Eſſence of things, as thoſe Powers and Properties diſcover. I do not ſay, That we can know all Eſſences of things alike; nor that we can attain to a perfect Underſtanding of all that belong to them: But if we can know ſo much, as that there are certain Beings in the World, endu'd with ſuch diſtinct Powers and*

and Properties; what is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of Things? But we do not ſee the bare Eſſence of Things. *What is* that bare Eſſence *without the* Powers and Properties *belonging to it? It is that* internal Conſtitution of things, *from whence thoſe Powers and Properties flow. Suppoſe we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be, for any Diſcoveries that have been yet made) that is a good Argument to prove the Uncertainty of Philoſophical Speculations, about the real Eſſences of things; but it is no prejudice to us, who inquire after the Certainty of ſuch Eſſences. For altho' we cannot comprehend the* internal Frame or Conſtitution of Things, *nor in what manner they do flow from the Subſtance; yet, by them, we certainly know that there are ſuch Eſſences, and that they are diſtinguiſh'd from each other by their Powers and Properties.*

This ſecond Inference ſeems to be nothing but a Reproof to thoſe who *complain, That they do not ſee the bare Eſſences of Things.* Complaining that God did not make us otherwiſe than he has, and with larger Capacities than he has thought fit to give us, is, I confeſs, a Fault worthy of your Lordſhip's Reproof. But to ſay, That if we knew the real Eſſences or internal Conſtitutions of thoſe Beings, ſome of whoſe Properties we know, we ſhould have much more certain Knowledg concerning thoſe Things and their Properties, I am ſure is true, and I think no faulty complaining; and if it be, I muſt own my ſelf to your Lordſhip to be one of thoſe Complainers.

But your Lordſhip asks, *What is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of things?*

If your Lordſhip means, as your Words ſeem to import, *What is it we complain of, in order to our Certainty*, that thoſe Properties are the Properties of ſome *Beings*, or that ſomething does exiſt when thoſe Properties exiſt? I anſwer, *We complain of the want of* nothing *in order to that Certainty*, or ſuch a *Certainty* as that is. But there are other very deſirable *Certainties*, or other parts of Knowledg concerning the ſame things, which we may want when we have thoſe Certainties. Knowing the Colour, Figure, and Smell of Hyſop, *I can*, when I ſee Hyſop, *know ſo much, as that there is a certain Being in the World, endu'd with ſuch diſtinct Powers and Properties*; and yet I may juſtly *complain*, that I want ſomething *in order to Certainty*, that Hyſop will cure a Bruiſe or a Cough, or that it will kill Moths; or, uſed in a certain way, harden Iron; or an hundred other uſeful Properties that may be in it, which I ſhall never know; and yet might be certain of, if I knew the real Eſſences, or internal Conſtitution of Things, on which all their Properties depend.

Your Lordſhip agreeing with me, That the real *Eſſence is that internal Conſtitution of Things, from whence their Powers and Properties flow*; adds farther, *Suppoſe we be ignorant of this* [Eſſence] *as we are like to be for any Diſcoveries have been yet made, that is a good Argument to prove the Uncertainty of Philoſophical Speculations about the real Eſſences of Things; but it is no prejudice to us, who enquire after the Certainty of ſuch Eſſences.*

I know no body that ever deny'd the Certainty of ſuch *real Eſſences* or *internal Conſtitutions*, in things that do exiſt, if it be that that your Lordſhip means by *Certainty of ſuch Eſſences*. If it be any other *Certainty* that your Lordſhip *enquires after*, relating to *ſuch Eſſences*, I confeſs I know not what it is, ſince your Lordſhip acknowledges, *We are ignorant of thoſe real Eſſences, thoſe internal Conſtitutions, and are like to be ſo*; and ſeem to think it the uncurable Cauſe of *Uncertainty in Philoſophical Speculations.*

Your Lordſhip adds, *For altho' we cannot comprehend the internal Frame and Conſtitution of Things, nor in what manner they do flow from the Subſtance.*

Here I muſt acknowledg to your Lordſhip, That my Notion of theſe Eſſences differs a little from your Lordſhip's; for I do not take them to flow from the Subſtance in any created Being, but to be in every thing that *internal Conſtitution*, or Frame, or Modification of the *Subſtance*, which God in his Wiſdom and good Pleaſure thinks fit to give to every particular Creature, when he gives it a Being: And ſuch *Eſſences* I grant there are in all things that exiſt. Your Lordſhip's third Inference begins thus:

P. 257. 3. *The Eſſences of Things, as they are knowable by us, have a Reality in them: For they are founded on the natural Conſtitution of Things.*

I think

I think the real *Eſſences of Things* are not ſo much founded on, as that they are the very real *Conſtitutions of Things*, and therefore I eaſily grant there is *Reality* in them; and 'twas from that *Reality* that I call'd them *real Eſſences*. But yet from hence, I cannot agree to what follows.

And however the abſtracted Ideas are the Work of the Mind, yet they are not mere Creatures of the Mind; as appears by an inſtance produc'd of the "Eſſence of the "Sun, being in one ſingle Individual; *in which caſe it is granted*, That the Idea "may be ſo abſtracted, that more Suns might agree in it, and it is as much a "ſort, as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars." *So that here we have a real Eſſence ſubſiſting in one Individual, but capable of being multiply'd into more and the ſame Eſſence remaining. But in this one Sun there is a real Eſſence, and not a mere nominal or abſtracted Eſſence: But ſuppoſe there were more Suns; would not each of them have the real Eſſence of the Sun? For what is it makes the ſecond Sun, but having the ſame real Eſſence with the firſt? If it were but a nominal Eſſence, then the ſecond would have nothing but the Name.* P. 257.

This, my Lord, as I underſtand it, is to prove, That the abſtract general Eſſence of any ſort of things, or things of the ſame Denomination, *v. g.* of *Man* or *Marigolds*, hath a *real Being* out of the Underſtanding; which I confeſs, my Lord, I am not able to conceive. Your Lordſhip's Proof here brought out of my *Eſſay*, concerning the *Sun*, I humbly conceive will not reach it: Becauſe what is ſaid there, does not at all concern the *real*, but nominal *Eſſence*; as is evident from hence, That the *Idea* I ſpeak of there, is a *complex Idea*; but we have no *complex Idea* of the internal Conſtitution, or real Eſſence, of the Sun. Beſides, I ſay expreſly, That our diſtinguiſhing Subſtances into Species by Names, is not at all founded on their real Eſſences. So that the Sun being one of theſe Subſtances, I cannot, in the place quoted by your Lordſhip, be ſuppos'd to mean by *Eſſence of the Sun*, the real Eſſence of the Sun, unleſs I had ſo expreſs'd it. But all this Argument will be at an End, when your Lordſhip ſhall have explain'd what you mean by theſe words, *True Sun*. In my ſenſe of them, any thing will be a *True Sun*, to which the name *Sun* may be truly and properly apply'd; and to that Subſtance or Thing, the name *Sun* may be truly and properly apply'd, which has united in it that Combination of ſenſible Qualities, by which any thing elſe that is call'd *Sun* is diſtinguiſh'd from other Subſtances, *i. e.* by the *nominal Eſſence*: And thus our Sun is denominated and diſtinguiſh'd from a fixed Star; not by a *real Eſſence*, that we do not know (for if we did, 'tis poſſible we ſhould find the *real Eſſence* or *Conſtitution* of one of the fix'd Stars, to be the ſame with that of our *Sun*) but by a complex *Idea* of ſenſible Qualities coexiſting; which, wherever they are found, *make a true Sun*. And thus I crave leave to anſwer your Lordſhip's Queſtion, *For what is it makes the ſecond Sun to be a true Sun, but having the ſame real Eſſence with the firſt? If it were but a nominal Eſſence, then the ſecond would have nothing but the Name.*

I humbly conceive, if it had the *Nominal Eſſence*, it would have ſomething beſides *the Name, viz.* That *Nominal Eſſence*, which is ſufficient to denominate it truly a *Sun*, or to make it be a *true Sun*, tho' we know nothing of that real Eſſence whereon that nominal one depends. Your Lordſhip will then argue, That that *real Eſſence* is in the *ſecond Sun*, and *makes the ſecond Sun*. I grant it, when the *ſecond Sun* comes to exiſt, ſo as to be perceiv'd by us to have all the *Ideas* contain'd in our complex *Idea*, *i. e.* in our *Nominal Eſſence* of a *Sun*. For ſhould it be true (as is now believ'd by Aſtronomers) that the real Eſſence of the Sun were in any of the fix'd Stars, yet ſuch a Star could not for that be by us call'd a *Sun*, whilſt it anſwers not our complex *Idea* or nominal Eſſence of a *Sun*. But how far that will prove, *That the Eſſences of Things, as they are knowable by us, have a Reality in them*, diſtinct from that of *abſtract Ideas* in the Mind, which are *merely Creatures of the Mind*, I do not ſee; and we ſhall farther enquire, in conſidering your Lordſhip's following words:

Therefore there muſt be a real Eſſence in every Individual of the ſame kind. Yes, and I beg leave of your Lordſhip to ſay, of a *different kind* too. *For that alone is it which makes it to be what it is.* P. 258.

That every individual Subſtance has a real, internal, individual Conſtitution, *i. e.* a *real Eſſence*, that makes it to be what it is, I readily grant. Upon this your Lordſhip ſays,

Peter,

P. 258. Peter, James *and* John *are all true and real Men. Anſw.* Without doubt ſuppoſing them to be *Men*, they *are true and real Men*, *i. e.* ſuppoſing the Name of that Species belongs to them. And ſo three *Bobaques* are all true and real *Bobaques*, ſuppoſing the Name of that Species of Animals belongs to them.

For I beſeech your Lordſhip to conſider, whether in your way of Arguing, by naming them *Peter*, *James* and *John*, Names familiar to us, as appropriated to Individuals of the Species *Man*, your Lordſhip does not firſt ſuppoſe them *Men*; and then very ſafely ask, Whether they be not *all true and real Men?* But if I ſhould ask your Lordſhip, Whether *Weweena*, *Chuckery* and *Couſbeda*, were true and real Men or no? Your Lordſhip would not be able to tell me, till I having pointed out to your Lordſhip the Individuals called by thoſe Names; your Lordſhip by examining whether they had in them thoſe ſenſible Qualities, which your Lordſhip has combined into that Complex *Idea*, to which you give the ſpecifick Name *Man*, determin'd them all, or ſome of them, to be of the Species which you call *Man*, and ſo to be *true and real Men*: which when your Lordſhip has determin'd, 'tis plain you did it by that which is only the nominal Eſſence, as not knowing the *real* one. But your Lordſhip farther asks,

P. 258. *What is it makes* Peter, James, *and* John, *real Men? Is it the attributing the general Name to them? No certainly; but that the true and real Eſſence of a Man is in every one of them.*

If when your Lordſhip asks, What *makes them Men?* your Lordſhip us'd the word *making* in the proper Senſe for the efficient Cauſe, and in that Senſe it were true, that the Eſſence of a Man, *i. e.* the ſpecifick Eſſence of that Species, made a Man; it would undoubtedly follow, that this ſpecifick Eſſence had a reality beyond that of being only a general abſtract *Idea* in the Mind. But when it is ſaid, That it is the *true and real Eſſence of a Man in every one of them, that makes* Peter, James *and* John, *true and real Men*; the true and real meaning of theſe Words is no more, but that the Eſſence of that Species, *i. e.* the Properties anſwering the complex abſtract *Idea*, to which the ſpecifick Name is given, being found in them, that makes them be properly and truly called Men, or is the Reaſon why they are called Men. Your Lordſhip adds,

P. 258. *And we muſt be as certain of this, as we are that they are Men.*

How, I beſeech your Lordſhip, are we certain, that they are *Men*, but only by our Senſes, finding thoſe Properties in them which anſwer the abſtract complex *Idea*, which is in our Minds of the ſpecifick *Idea*, to which we have annexed the ſpecifick Name *Man?* This I take to be the true meaning of what your Lordſhip ſays in the next Words, *viz. They take their denomination of being Men from that common Nature or Eſſence which is in them*; and I am apt to think, theſe Words will not hold true in any other Senſe.

P. 258.

Your Lordſhip's fourth Inference begins thus:

P. 258. *That the general* Idea *is not made from the ſimple* Ideas, *by the mere Act of the Mind abſtracting from Circumſtances, but from Reaſon and Conſideration of the Nature of Things.*

I thought, my Lord, That *Reaſon* and *Conſideration* had been *Acts of the Mind, mere Acts of the Mind*, when any thing was done by them. Your Lordſhip gives a Reaſon for it, *viz.*

P. 258. *For when we ſee ſeveral Individuals that have the ſame Powers and Properties, we thence infer, that there muſt be ſomething common to all, which makes them of one kind.*

I grant the Inference to be true; but muſt beg leave to deny that this proves, That the general *Idea* the Name is annexed to, is not made by the Mind. I have ſaid, and it agrees with what your Lordſhip here ſays, That "the Mind, in making its complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, only follows B. 3. c. 6. §. 28, 29. "Nature, and puts no *Ideas* together, which are not ſuppoſed to have an "Union in Nature: no body joins the Voice of a Sheep, with the Shape "of an Horſe; nor the Colour of Lead, with the Weight and Fixedneſs of "Gold, to be the complex *Ideas* of any real Subſtances; unleſs he has a "mind to fill his Head with Chimeras, and his Diſcourſe with unintelligible

"Words

" Words. Men obſerving certain Qualities always joined and exiſting toge-
" ther, therein copied Nature, and of *Ideas* ſo united, made their comple[x]
" ones of Subſtances, *&c.*" Which is very little different from what your Lordſhip here ſays, That 'tis from our Obſervation of *Individuals*, that we come to *infer*, *That there is ſomething common to them all.* But I do not ſee how it will thence follow, that the *general* or ſpecifick *Idea* is not made by the mere Act of the Mind. No, ſays your Lordſhip;

There is ſomething common to them all, which makes them of one Kind; and if the difference of Kinds be real, that which makes them all of one Kind, muſt not be a nominal, *but* real Eſſence. P. 259.

This may be ſome Objection to the Name of *Nominal Eſſence*; but is, as I humbly conceive, none to the Thing deſigned by it. There is an internal Conſtitution of things, on which their Properties depend. This your Lordſhip and I are agreed of, and this we call the *real Eſſence*. There are alſo certain complex *Ideas*, or Combinations of theſe Properties in Men's Minds, to which they commonly annex ſpecifick Names, or Names of ſorts or *kinds* of Things. This, I believe, your Lordſhip does not deny. Theſe Complex *Ideas*, for want of a better Name, I have called *Nominal Eſſences*; how properly, I will not diſpute. But if any one will help me to a better Name for them, I am ready to receive it; till then I muſt, to expreſs my ſelf, uſe this. Now, my Lord, *Body*, *Life*, and the Power of *Reaſoning*, being not the *real* Eſſence of a *Man*, as I believe your Lordſhip will agree; will your Lordſhip ſay, That they are not enough to make the Thing wherein they are found of the kind called *Man*, and not of the kind called Baboon, becauſe the *difference of theſe Kinds is real?* If this be not real enough to make the *Thing of one kind* and *not of another*, I do not ſee how *Animal rationale* can be enough *really* to diſtinguiſh a *Man* from an *Horſe*: For that is but the *nominal*, not *real Eſſence* of that kind, deſigned by the name *Man*. And yet, I ſuppoſe, every one thinks it *real* enough, to make a *real difference* between that and other *Kinds*. And if nothing will ſerve the turn, to MAKE Things *of one Kind and not of another*, (which as I have ſhew'd, ſignifies no more but ranking of them under different ſpecifick Names) but their real, unknown Conſtitutions, which are the *real Eſſences* we are ſpeaking of, I fear it would be a long while before we ſhould have really different kinds of Subſtances, or diſtinct Names for them; unleſs we could diſtinguiſh them by theſe differences, of which we have no diſtinct Conceptions. For I think it would not be readily anſwer'd me, if I ſhould demand, Wherein lies the *real difference* in the internal Conſtitution of a *Stag* from that of a *Buck*, which are each of them very well known to *be of one Kind*, and not *of the other*; and no body queſtions but that the *Kinds* whereof each of them is, are *really different*. Your Lordſhip farther ſays,

And this difference doth not depend upon the complex Ideas of *Subſtances, whereby Men arbitrarily join Modes together in their Minds.* P. 259.

I confeſs, my Lord, I know not what to ſay to this, becauſe I do not know what theſe *complex Ideas* of Subſtances are, *whereby* Men arbitrarily join Modes together in their Minds. But I am apt to think there is a miſtake in the Matter, by the Words that follow, which are theſe:

For let them miſtake in their Complication of Ideas, *either in leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them; and let their* Ideas *be what they pleaſe, the real Eſſence of a Man, and an Horſe, and a Tree, are juſt what they were.* P. 259.

The miſtake I ſpoke of, I humbly ſuppoſe is this, That things are here taken to be diſtinguiſh'd by their *real Eſſences*; when by the very way of ſpeaking of them, it is clear, that they are already diſtinguiſh'd by their nominal Eſſences, and are ſo taken to be. For what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, does your Lordſhip mean, when you ſay, The *real Eſſence of a Man, and an Horſe, and a Tree*, but that there are ſuch *Kinds* already ſet out by the ſignification of theſe Names, *Man*, *Horſe*, *Tree?* And what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, is the ſignification of each of theſe ſpecifick Names, but the complex *Idea* it ſtands for? And that complex *Idea* is the nominal Eſſence, and nothing elſe. So that taking *Man*, as your Lordſhip does here, to ſtand for a kind or ſort of Individuals, all which agree in that common, complex *Idea*, which

which that ſpecifick Name ſtands for; it is certain that the real Eſſence of all the Individuals, comprehended under the ſpecifick name *Man*, in your uſe of it, would be juſt the ſame, let others leave out or put into their complex *Idea* of *Man* what they pleaſe; becauſe the real Eſſence on which that unalter'd complex *Idea*, *i. e.* thoſe Properties depend, muſt neceſſarily be concluded to be the ſame.

For I take it for granted, That in uſing the Name *Man*, in this place, your Lordſhip uſes it for that complex *Idea* which is in your Lordſhip's Mind of that Species. So that your Lordſhip, by putting it for, or ſubſtituting it in the place of that complex *Idea*, where you ſay, the *real Eſſence* of it is *juſt as it was*, or the very ſame it was, does ſuppoſe the *Idea* it ſtands for, to be ſteddily the ſame. For if I change the ſignification of the word *Man*, whereby it may not comprehend juſt the ſame Individuals which in your Lordſhip's Senſe it does, but ſhut out ſome of thoſe that to your Lordſhip are *Men* in your ſignification of the Word *Man*, or take in others to which your Lordſhip does not allow the Name *Man*: I do not think your Lordſhip will ſay, That the real Eſſence of *Man*, in both the Senſes, is the ſame; and yet your Lordſhip ſeems to ſay ſo, when you ſay, *Let Men miſtake in the Complication of their* Ideas, *either in leaving out or putting in what does not belong to them; and let their* Ideas *be what they pleaſe, the real Eſſence* of the Individuals comprehended under the Names annexed to theſe *Ideas*, will be the ſame: For ſo, I humbly conceive, it muſt be put, to make out what your Lordſhip aims at. For as your Lordſhip puts it by the Name of *Man*, or any other ſpecifick Name, your Lordſhip ſeems to me to ſuppoſe, that that Name ſtands for, and not for the ſame *Idea* at the ſame time.

For example, my Lord, let your Lordſhip's *Idea*, to which you annex the ſign *Man*, be a rational Animal: Let another Man's *Idea* be a rational Animal of ſuch a Shape; let a third Man's *Idea* be of an Animal of ſuch a Size and Shape, leaving out Rationality; let a fourth's be an Animal with a Body of ſuch a Shape, and an immaterial Subſtance, with a Power of Reaſoning; let a fifth leave out of his *Idea*, an immaterial Subſtance: 'Tis plain every one of theſe will call his a *Man*, as well as your Lordſhip; and yet 'tis as plain that *Man*, as ſtanding for all theſe diſtinct, complex *Ideas*, cannot be ſuppoſed to have the ſame internal Conſtitution, *i. e.* the ſame *real Eſſence*. The truth is, every diſtinct, abſtract *Idea*, with a Name to it, makes a real, diſtinct Kind, whatever the *real Eſſence* (which we know not of any of them) be.

And therefore I grant it true, what your Lordſhip ſays in the next Words,

P. 259. *And let the nominal Eſſences differ never ſo much, the real, common Eſſence or Nature of the ſeveral Kinds, are not at all alter'd by them*; i. e. that our Thoughts or *Ideas* cannot alter the real Conſtitutions that are in Things that exiſt; there is nothing more certain. But yet 'tis true, That the change of *Ideas* to which we annex them, can and does alter the ſignification of their Names, and thereby alter the Kinds, which by theſe Names we rank and ſort them into. Your Lordſhip farther adds,

P. 259. *And theſe real Eſſences are unchangeable, i. e.* the internal Conſtitutions *are unchangeable.* Of what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, are the *internal Conſtitutions unchangeable?* Not of any Thing that exiſts, but of God alone; for they may be changed all as eaſily by that Hand that made them, as the internal Frame of a Watch. What then is it that is *unchangeable?* The internal Conſtitution or real Eſſence of a Species: Which, in plain Engliſh, is no more but this, whilſt the ſame ſpecifick Name, *v. g.* of *Man*, *Horſe* or *Tree*, is annexed to, or made the Sign of the ſame abſtract, complex *Idea*, under which I rank ſeveral Individuals, it is impoſſible but the real Conſtitution on which that unalter'd, complex *Idea*, or nominal Eſſence depends, muſt be the ſame; *i. e.* in other Words, where we find all the ſame Properties, we have reaſon to conclude there is the ſame real, internal Conſtitution, from which thoſe Properties flow.

But your Lordſhip proves the real Eſſences to be unchangeable, becauſe God makes them, in theſe following Words:

P. 259. *For however there may happen ſome variety in Individuals by particular Accidents, yet the Eſſences of Men and Horſes, and Trees, remain always the ſame; becauſe they do not depend on the* Ideas *of Men, but on the Will of the Creator, who hath made ſeveral ſorts of Beings*

'Tis

'Tis true, the real Conſtitutions or Eſſences of particular Things exiſting, *do not depend on the* Ideas *of Men, but on the Will of the Creator*; but their being ranked into ſorts, under ſuch and ſuch Names, does depend, and wholly depend upon the *Ideas* of Men.

Your Lordſhip here ending your four Inferences, and all your Diſcourſe about *Nature*; you come, in the next place to treat of *Perſon*, concerning which your Lordſhip diſcourſeth thus:

2. *Let us now come to the* Idea *of a Perſon. For altho' the common Nature in Mankind be the ſame, yet we ſee a difference in the ſeveral Individuals, from one another: So that* Peter, *and* James, *and* John, *are all of the ſame kind; yet* Peter *is not* James, *and* James *is not* John. *But what is this Diſtinction founded upon? They may be diſtinguiſh'd from each other by our Senſes as to difference of Features, diſtance of Place,* &c. *but that is not all; for ſuppoſing there were no ſuch external Difference, yet there is a Difference between them, as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame Nature. And here lies the true common* Idea *of a Perſon, which ariſes from that manner of Subſiſtence which is in one Individual, and is not communicable to another. An individual, intelligent Subſtance, is rather ſuppos'd to the making of a Perſon, than the proper Definition of it: for a Perſon relates to ſomething, which doth diſtinguiſh it from another intelligent Subſtance in the ſame Nature; and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subſiſtence, which agrees to one, and to none elſe of the Kind: and this is it which is called Perſonality.* P. 259.

But then your Lordſhip asks, *But how do our ſimple* Ideas *help us out in this Matter? Can we learn from them the difference of Nature and Perſon?*

If *Nature* and *Perſon* are taken for two real Beings, that do or can exiſt any where, without any relation to theſe two Names, I muſt confeſs I do not ſee how *ſimple* Ideas, or any thing elſe, *can help us out in this matter*; nor can we from *ſimple Ideas*, or any thing elſe that I know, *learn the difference* between them, nor what they are.

The reaſon why I ſpeak thus, is, becauſe your Lordſhip, in your fore-cited Words, ſays, *Here lies the true* Idea *of a Perſon*; and in the foregoing Diſcourſe ſpeaks of *Nature*, as if it were ſome ſteddy, eſtabliſh'd Being, to which one certain preciſe *Idea* neceſſarily belongs to make it a *true Idea*: whereas, my Lord, *in the way of Ideas*, I begin at the other end, and think that the Word *Perſon* in it ſelf ſignifies nothing; and ſo no *Idea* belonging to it, nothing can be ſaid to be the *true Idea* of it. But as ſoon as the common uſe of any Language has appropriated it to any *Idea*, then that is the *true Idea of a Perſon*, and ſo of *Nature*: but becauſe the Propriety of Language, *i. e.* the preciſe *Idea* that every Word ſtands for, is not always exactly known, but is often diſputed, there is no other way for him that uſes a Word which is in Diſpute, but to define what he ſignifies by it; and then the Diſpute can be no longer verbal, but muſt neceſſarily be about the *Idea* which he tells us he puts it for.

Taking therefore *Nature* and *Perſon* for the Signs of two *Ideas* they are put to ſtand for, there is nothing, I think, that helps us ſo ſoon, nor ſo well to find the difference of *Nature* and *Perſon*, as *ſimple Ideas*; for by enumerating all the ſimple *Ideas*, that are contain'd in the complex *Idea* that each of them is made to ſtand for, we ſhall immediately ſee the whole difference that is between them.

Far be it from me to ſay there is no other way but this: Your Lordſhip propoſing to *clear the diſtinction* between *Nature* and *Perſon*, and having declared, *We can have no clear and diſtinct* Idea *of it by Senſation or Reflection*, and that *the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction come not into our Minds by the ſimple* Ideas *of Senſation and Reflection*; gave me ſome hopes of getting farther inſight into theſe Matters, ſo as to have more *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon*, than was to be had by *Ideas*. But after having, with Attention, more than once read over what your Lordſhip with ſo much Application has writ thereupon; I muſt, with regret, confeſs, That the Way is too delicate, and the Matter too abſtruſe, for my Capacity; and that I have learned nothing out of your Lordſhip's elaborate Diſcourſe, but this, That I muſt content my ſelf with the condemn'd *way by Ideas*, and deſpair of ever attaining any Knowledg by any other than that, or farther than that will lead me to it. P. 252. P. 252.

The remaining part of the Chapter containing no Remarks of your Lordſhip, upon any thing in my Book, I am glad I have no occaſion to give your

Lordſhip any farther Trouble, but only to beg your Lordſhip's Pardon for this, and to aſſure your Lordſhip, that I am,

My LORD,

Your Lordſhip's moſt humble

and moſt obedient Servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

POSTSCRIPT.

My Lord,

UPON a Review of theſe Papers, I can hardly forbear wondering at my ſelf what I have been doing in them; ſince I can ſcarce find upon what Ground this Controverſy with me ſtands, or whence it roſe, or whether it tends. And I ſhould certainly repent my Pains in it, but that I conclude that your Lordſhip, who does not throw away your Time upon ſlight Matters and Things of ſmall moment, having a quicker Sight and larger Views than I have, would not have troubled your ſelf ſo much with my Book, as to beſtow on it Seven and Twenty Pages together of a very learned Treatiſe, and that on a very weighty Subject; and in thoſe Twenty ſeven Pages, bring Seven and twenty Quotations out of my Book, unleſs there were ſomething in it wherein it is very material that the World ſhould be ſet right; which is what I earneſtly deſire ſhould be done. And to that purpoſe alone, have taken the liberty to trouble your Lordſhip with this Letter.

If I have any where omitted any Thing of moment in your Lordſhip's Diſcourſe concerning my Notions, or any where miſtaken your Lordſhip's Senſe in what I have taken notice of, I beg your Lordſhip's Pardon; with this Aſſurance, That it was not wilfully done. And if any where, in the warm purſuit of an Argument, Over-attention to the Matter ſhould have made me let ſlip any Form of Expreſſion, in the leaſt Circumſtance not carrying with it the utmoſt Marks of that Reſpect that I acknowledg due, and ſhall always pay to your Lordſhip's Perſon and known great Learning, I diſown it; and deſire your Lordſhip to look on it as not coming from my Intention, but Inadvertency.

No body's Notions, I think, are the better or truer, for ill Manners joined with them; and I conclude your Lordſhip, who ſo well knows the different Caſt of Mens Heads, and of the Opinions that poſſeſs them, will not think it ill Manners in any one, if his Notions differ from your Lordſhip's, and that he owns that difference, and explains the Grounds of it as well as he can. I have always thought, that Truth and Knowledg, by the ill and over-eager management of Controverſies, loſe a great deal of the Advantages they might receive from the variety of Conceptions there is in Mens Underſtandings. Could the Heats, and Paſſion, and ill Language be left out of them, they would afford great Improvements to thoſe who could ſeparate them from by-Intereſts and perſonal Prejudices. Theſe I look upon your Lordſhip to be altogether above.

It is not for me, who have ſo mean a Talent in it my ſelf, to preſcribe to any one how he ſhould write; for when I have ſaid all I can, he, 'tis like, will follow his own Method, and perhaps cannot help it. Much leſs would it be good Manners in me, to offer any thing that way to a Perſon of your Lordſhip's high Rank above me in Parts and Learning, as well as Place and Dignity. But yet your Lordſhip will excuſe it to my ſhort-ſightedneſs, if I wiſh ſometimes that your Lordſhip would have been pleas'd, in this Debate, to have kept every one's part ſeparate to himſelf; that what I am concerned in, might not have been ſo mingled with the Opinions of others, which are no Tenets of mine, nor, as I think, does what I have written any way relate to; but that I, and every one might have ſeen whom your Lordſhip's Arguments bore upon, and what Intereſt he had in the Controverſy, and how far. At leaſt, my Lord, give me leave to wiſh, that your Lordſhip had ſhewn what Connection any thing I have ſaid about *Ideas*, and particularly about the *Idea of*

Subſtance,

Subſtance, about the poſſibility *that God, if he pleas'd, might indue ſome Syſtems of Matter with a Power of Thinking*; or what I have ſaid to *prove a God*, &c. has with any *Objections*, that are made by others againſt *the Doctrine of the Trinity*, or againſt *Myſteries*: For many Paſſages concerning *Ideas*, *Subſtances*, the Poſſibility of God's beſtowing *Thought* on ſome Syſtems of Matter, and the *Proof of a God*, &c. your Lordſhip has quoted out of my Book, in a Chapter wherein your Lordſhip profeſſes to anſwer *Objections againſt the Trinity in point of Reaſon*. Had I been able to diſcover in theſe Paſſages of my Book, quoted by your Lordſhip, what tendency your Lordſhip had obſerved in them to any ſuch *Objections*, I ſhould perhaps have troubled your Lordſhip with leſs impertinent Anſwers. But the uncertainty I was very often in, to what purpoſe your Lordſhip brought them, may have made my Explications of my ſelf leſs appoſite, than what your Lordſhip might have expected. If your Lordſhip had ſhewed me any thing in my Book, that contained or implied any oppoſition in it to any Thing revealed in Holy Writ concerning the *Trinity*, or any other Doctrine contain'd in the Bible, I ſhould have been thereby oblig'd to your Lordſhip for freeing me from that Miſtake, and for affording me an opportunity to own to the World that Obligation, by publickly retracting my Error. For I know not any thing more diſingenuous, than not publickly to own a Conviction one has receiv'd concerning any Thing erroneous in what one has printed; nor can there, I think, be a greater Offence againſt Mankind, than to propagate a Falſhood whereof one is convinced, eſpecially in a Matter wherein Men are highly concerned not to be miſled.

The Holy Scripture is to me, and always will be, the conſtant Guide of my Aſſent; and I ſhall always hearken to it, as containing infallible Truth, relating to Things of the higheſt Concernment. And I wiſh I could ſay, there were no Myſteries in it: I acknowledg there are to me, and I fear always will be. But where I want the Evidence of Things, there yet is Ground enough for me to believe, becauſe God has ſaid it: And I ſhall preſently condemn and quit any Opinion of mine, as ſoon as I am ſhewn that it is contrary to any Revelation in the Holy Scripture. But I muſt confeſs to your Lordſhip, that I do not yet perceive any ſuch Contrariety in any Thing in my *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*.

Oates, *Jan.* 7.
$169\frac{6}{7}$.

Mr. *LOCKE*'s REPLY

To the Right Reverend the

Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter*'s Anſwer to his Letter,

Concerning ſome PASSAGES relating to

Mr. LOCKE's *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*:

IN A

Late DISCOURSE of his Lordſhip's, in *Vindication of the* TRINITY.

My LORD,



OUR Lordſhip having done my Letter the Honour to think it worth your Reply, I think my ſelf bound in good Manners publickly to acknowledg the Favour, and to give your Lordſhip an Account of the Effect it has had upon me, and the Grounds upon which I yet differ from you in thoſe Points, wherein I am ſtill under the mortification of not being able to bring my Sentiments wholly to agree with your Lordſhip's. And this I the more readily do, becauſe it ſeems to me, that that wherein the great difference now lies between us, is founded only on your Fears; which, I conclude, upon a ſedate Review, your Lordſhip will either part with, or elſe give me other Reaſons, beſides your Apprehenſions, to convince me of Miſtakes in my Book, which your Lordſhip thinks to be of conſequence even in Matters of Religion.

Your Lordſhip makes my Letter to conſiſt of two Parts: *my Complaint* of your Lordſhip, and *my Vindication of my ſelf*. You begin with my Complaint; one part whereof was, That I was brought into a Controverſy, wherein I had never meddled, nor knew how I came to be concern'd in. To this your Lordſhip is pleas'd to promiſe me *Satisfaction*.

Since your Lordſhip has condeſcended ſo far, as to be at the pains *to give* me and *others Satisfaction* in *this Matter*; I crave leave to ſecond your Deſign herein, and to premiſe a Remark or two for the clearer underſtanding the nature of my Complaint, which is the only way to *Satisfaction* in it.

1. Then it is to be obſerv'd, That the Propoſition which you diſpute againſt, as oppoſite to the Doctrine of the Trinity, is this, That *clear and diſtinct Ideas are neceſſary*

neceſſary to Certainty. This is evident not only from what your Lordſhip ſubjoins to the Account of Reaſon, given by the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*; but alſo by what your Lordſhip ſays here again in your Anſwer to me, in theſe words: *To lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and diſtinct Ideas, was the Opinion I oppos'd.* Vindica. p. 232. P. 14.

2. It is to be obſerv'd, That this you call *a new way of Reaſon*; and thoſe that build upon it, *Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning.* Vindicat. p. 233, 234.

3. It is to be obſerv'd, that a great part of my *Complaint* was, That I was made one of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning*, without any reaſon at all.

To this Complaint of mine, your Lordſhip has had the Goodneſs to make this Anſwer:

Now to give you, and others, Satisfaction as to this matter, I ſhall firſt give an account of the Occaſion of it; and then ſhew what Care I took to prevent Miſunderſtanding about it. Anſw. p. 4.

The firſt part of the Satisfaction your Lordſhip is pleas'd to offer, is contain'd in theſe Words.

The Occaſion was this: Being to anſwer the Objections in point of Reaſon (which had not been anſwer'd before) the firſt I mention'd was; That it was above Reaſon, and therefore not to be believ'd. *In anſwer to this, I propos'd two things to be conſider'd:* 1. *What we underſtand by Reaſon.* 2. *What ground in Reaſon there is to reject any Doctrine above it, when it is propos'd as a Matter of Faith.* P. 4. P. 5.

As to the former I obſerv'd, That the Unitarians, *in their late Pamphlets, talk'd very much about clear and diſtinct Ideas and Perceptions, and that the Myſteries of Faith were repugnant to them; but never went about to ſtate the Nature and Bounds of Reaſon, in ſuch a manner as they ought to have done, who make it the Rule and Standard of what they are to believe. But I added, That a late Author, in a Book call'd,* Chriſtianity not Myſterious, *had taken upon him to clear this matter, whom for that cauſe I was bound to conſider: The Deſign of his Diſcourſe related wholly* to Matters of Faith, *and not to* Philoſophical Speculations; *ſo that there can be no diſpute about his Application of thoſe he calls* Principles of Reaſon and Certainty.

" When the Mind makes uſe of intermediate *Ideas*, to diſcover the Agree-
" ment or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* receiv'd into them; this Method of
" Knowledg, *he ſaith*, is properly call'd Reaſon or Demonſtration.

" The Mind, *as he goes on*, receives *Ideas* two ways.

" 1. By Intromiſſion of the Senſes.

" 2. By conſidering its own Operations. P. 6.

" And theſe ſimple and diſtinct *Ideas* are the ſole Matter and Foundation of
" all our Reaſoning."

And ſo all our Certainty is reſolv'd into two things, either " immediate Percep-
" tion, which is Self-evidence: *or* the uſe of intermediate *Ideas*, which diſco-
" vers the Certainty of any thing dubious:" *which is what he calls* Reaſon.

Now this, I ſaid, did ſuppoſe, That we muſt have clear and diſtinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds (by Reaſon) and that the only way to attain this Certainty, is by comparing theſe Ideas together; which excludes all Certainty of Faith or Reaſon, where we cannot have ſuch clear and diſtinct Ideas.

From hence I proceeded to ſhew, That we could not have ſuch clear and diſtinct Ideas as were neceſſary in the preſent Debate, either by Senſation or Reflection, and conſequently we could not attain to any Certainty about it; for which I inſtanc'd in the Nature of Subſtance and Perſon, and the Diſtinction between them.

And by virtue of theſe Principles, I ſaid, That I did not wonder that the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning had almoſt diſcarded Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World. P. 7.

This is all your Lordſhip ſays here, to give me, and others, *Satisfaction, as to the Matters* of my *Complaint*. For what follows, to the 35th Page of your Anſwer, is nothing but your Lordſhip's arguing againſt what I have ſaid concerning *Subſtance.*

In theſe words therefore, above quoted, I am to find the *Satisfaction* your Lordſhip has promis'd, as to the *Occaſion* why your Lordſhip made me One of *the Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning*, and in that join'd me *with the Unitarians, and the Author of* Chriſtianity not Myſterious. But I crave leave to repreſent to your Lordſhip, wherein the Words above-quoted come ſhort of giving me *Satisfaction.*

In

In the firſt place, 'tis plain they were intended for a ſhort Narrative of what was contain'd in the tenth Chapter of your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, relating to this matter. But how could your Lordſhip think, that the repeating the ſame things over again, could give me or any body elſe *Satisfaction*, as to my being made one of *the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning?*

Indeed I cannot ſay it is an exact Repetition of what is to be found in the beginning of that tenth Chapter; becauſe your Lordſhip ſaid, in that tenth
Vind. p. 232. Chapter, That the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* gives an *Account of Reaſon*, which *ſuppoſes that we muſt have clear and diſtinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to a Certainty of in our Minds.* But here in the Paſſage above ſet down, out of your Anſwer to my Letter, I find it is not to his Account of Reaſon, but to ſomething taken out of that, and ſomething borrow'd by him out of my Book, to which your Lordſhip annexes this Suppoſition. For your Lordſhip ſays,
Anſw. p. 6. *Now THIS, I ſaid, did ſuppoſe that we muſt have clear and diſtinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds (by Reaſon.)*

If your Lordſhip did ſay ſo in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, your Printer did your Lordſhip two manifeſt Injuries, The one is, That he omitted theſe words [*by Reaſon*]: And the other, That he annex'd your Lordſhip's words to the Account of Reaſon, there given by the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*; and not to thoſe words your Lordſhip here ſays you annex'd them to. For THIS here refers to other Words, and not barely to that Author's *Account of Reaſon*; as any one may ſatisfy himſelf, who will but compare theſe two Places together.

One thing more ſeems to me very remarkable in this matter, and that is, That *the laying all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and*
Anſw. p. 14. *diſtinct Ideas, ſhould be the Opinion which you oppoſe*, as your Lordſhip declares; and that this ſhould be it for which the *Unitarians*, the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, and I, are jointly brought on the Stage, under the title of *the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning:* and yet no one Quotation be brought out of the *Unitarians*, to ſhew it to be their Opinion; nor any thing alledg'd out of the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, to ſhew it to be his; but only ſome things quoted out of him, which are ſaid to ſuppoſe *all Foundation of Certainty to be laid upon clear and diſtinct Ideas:* which that they do ſuppoſe it, is not, I think, ſelf-evident, nor yet prov'd. But this I am ſure, as to my ſelf, I do no where *lay all Foundation of Certainty in clear and diſtinct Ideas*; and therefore am ſtill at a loſs, why I was made One of *the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning.*

Another thing wherein your Lordſhip's Narrative, intended for my *Satisfaction*, comes ſhort of giving it me, is this; That at moſt it gives but an *Account of the Occaſion* why the Unitarians, and the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* were made by your Lordſhip the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning.* But it pretends not to ſay a word why I was made One of them; which was the thing wherein I needed *Satisfaction.* For your Lordſhip breaks off your Report of the Matter of *Fact*, juſt when you were come to the Matter of my Complaint; which you paſs over in ſilence, and turn your Diſcourſe to what I have ſaid in my Letter: For your Lordſhip ends the *Account of the Occaſion*, in theſe words:
Anſw. p. 7. *The Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning had almoſt diſcarded Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World.* And there your Lordſhip ſtops. Whereas, 'tis in the words that immediately follow, that I am brought in as One of thoſe Gentlemen, of which I would have been glad to have known the *Occaſion*; and 'tis
Vind. p. 234. in this that I needed *Satisfaction.* For that which concerns the others, I meddle not with; I only deſire to know upon what *Occaſion*, or why I was brought into this Diſpute of the Trinity? But of that, in this *Account of the Occaſion*, I do not ſee that your Lordſhip ſays any thing.

I have been forc'd therefore to look again a little cloſer into this whole matter: And, upon a freſh Examination of what your Lordſhip has ſaid, in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, and in your *Anſwer to my Letter*, I come now to ſee a little clearer, that the Matter, in ſhort, ſtands thus. The Author of *Chriſtianity not myſterious*, was One of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning*, becauſe he had laid down a Doctrine concerning *Reaſon, which ſuppoſ'd clear and diſtinct Ideas neceſſary to Certainty.* But that Doctrine of his tied me not at all to him, as may be ſeen by comparing his Account of Reaſon with what

what I have ſaid of Reaſon in my *Eſſay*, which your Lordſhip accuſes of no ſuch Suppoſition; and ſo I ſtood clear from his Account of Reaſon, or any thing it ſuppoſes. But he having given an Account of the Original of our *Ideas*, and having ſaid ſomething about them conformable to what is in my *Eſſay*, that has tied him and me ſo cloſe together, that by this ſort of Connection I came to be one of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning*, which conſiſts in making *clear and diſtinct Ideas neceſſary to Certainty*, tho' I no where ſay, or ſuppoſe, clear and diſtinct *Ideas* neceſſary to Certainty.

How your Lordſhip came to join me with the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, I think is now evident. And he being the Link whereby your Lordſhip joins me to the Unitarians, in *Objections againſt the Trinity in point of Reaſon, anſwer'd*; give me leave, my Lord, a little to examine the Connection of this Link on that ſide alſo, *i. e.* What has made your Lordſhip join him and the Unitarians in this point, *viz.* making *clear and diſtinct Ideas neceſſary to Certainty*; that great Battery, it ſeems, which they make uſe of againſt the *Doctrine of the Trinity in point of Reaſon.*

Now as to this, your Lordſhip ſays, *That the* Unitarians *having not explain'd the Nature and Bounds of Reaſon, as they ought*; *the Author of* Chriſtianity not Myſterious *hath endeavour'd to make amends for this, and takes upon him to make this matter clear.* And then your Lordſhip ſets down his Account of Reaſon at large. Vindic. p. 231.

I will not examine how it appears, that the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* gave this *account of Reaſon*, to ſupply the defect of the Unitarians herein, or *to make amends* for their not having done it. Your Lordſhip does not quote any thing out of him, to ſhew that it was *to make amends* for what the Unitarians had neglected. I only look to ſee how the Unitarians and he come to be united, in this dangerous Principle of *the neceſſity of clear and diſtinct Ideas to Certainty*: which is that which makes him a *Gentleman of this new* and dangerous *way of Reaſoning*; and conſequently me too, becauſe he agrees in ſome Particulars with my *Eſſay*.

Now, my Lord, having look'd over his Account of Reaſon, as ſet down by your Lordſhip; give me leave to ſay, That he that ſhall compare that Account of Reaſon, with your Lordſhip's Animadverſion annex'd to it, in theſe words, *This is offer'd to the World as an account of Reaſon; but to ſhew how very looſe and unſatisfactory it is, I deſire it may be conſider'd, that this Doctrine ſuppoſes that we muſt have clear and diſtinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds; and that the only way to attain this Certainty, is by comparing theſe Ideas together; which excludes all Certainty of Faith or Reaſon, where we cannot have ſuch clear and diſtinct Ideas:* will, I fear, hardly defend himſelf from wondering at the way your Lordſhip has taken to *ſhew, how looſe and unſatisfactory an Account of Reaſon his is*; but by imagining that your Lordſhip had a great mind to ſay ſomething againſt *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, as neceſſary to *Certainty*; or that your Lordſhip had ſome reaſon for bringing them in, that does not appear in that *Account of Reaſon*; ſince in it, from one end to the other, there is not the leaſt mention of *clear and diſtinct Ideas.* Nor does he, (that I ſee) ſay any thing that *ſuppoſes that we muſt have clear and diſtinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds.* Vindic. p. 232.

But whether he and the Unitarians do or do not *lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and diſtinct Ideas*, I concern not my ſelf: All my Enquiry, is, How he and I and the Unitarians come to be join'd together, as *Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning?* Which, in ſhort, as far as I can trace and obſerve the Connection, is only thus.

The Unitarians are *the Men of this new way of Reaſoning*, becauſe they ſpeak of *clear and diſtinct Perceptions*, in their Anſwer to your Lordſhip's Sermon, as your Lordſhip ſays. The Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, is join'd to the Unitarians, as a *Gentleman of this new way of Reaſoning*, becauſe his *Doctrine*, concerning *Reaſon, ſuppoſes we muſt have clear and diſtinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds*: And I am join'd to that Author, becauſe he ſays, "That the uſing of intermediate *Ideas* to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagree-"ment of the *Ideas* receiv'd into our Minds, is Reaſon; and that the Mind re-"ceives *Ideas* by the intromiſſion of the Senſes, and by conſidering its own Vindic. p. 231.

"Opera-

" Operations. And theſe ſimple and diſtinct *Ideas* are the ſole Matter and " Foundation of all our Reaſoning." This, becauſe it ſeems to be borrow'd out of my Book, is that which unites me to him, and by him conſequently to the Unitarians.

And thus I am come to the end of the Thred of your Lordſhip's Diſcourſe, whereby I am brought into the Company of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning*, and thereby bound up in the Bundle and Cauſe of the Unitarians arguing againſt the Doctrine of the Trinity, by *Objections in point of Reaſon.*

I have been longer upon this, than I thought I ſhould be: But the Thred that ties me to the Unitarians being ſpun very fine and ſubtil, is, as it naturally falls out, the longer for it, and the harder to be follow'd, ſo as to diſcover the Connection every where. As for example; The Thred that ties me to the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, is ſo fine and delicate, that without laying my Eyes cloſe to it, and poring a good while, I can hardly perceive how it hangs together; that becauſe he ſays what your Lordſhip charges him to ſay, in the 234th Page of your *Vindication*, &c. and becauſe I ſay what your Lordſhip quotes out of my *Eſſay*, in the ſame Page, that therefore I am one of *the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning*, which your Lordſhip oppoſes in the Unitarians, as dangerous to the Doctrine of the Trinity. This Connection of me with the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*; and by him, with the Unitarians; (being in a Point wherein I agree with your Lordſhip, and not with them, if they do lay all the Foundation of Knowledg in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*) is, I ſay, pretty hard for me clearly to perceive now, tho' your Lordſhip has given me, in your Letter, that end of the Clue which was to lead me to it, for my *Satisfaction*; but was impoſſible for me, or (as I think) any body elſe to diſcover, whilſt it ſtood as it does in your Lordſhip's *Vindication, &c.*

And now, my Lord, 'tis time I ask your Lordſhip's pardon for ſaying in my firſt Letter, " That I hoped I might ſay, you had gone a little out of your " way to do me a kindneſs;" which your Lordſhip, by ſo often repeating of it, ſeems to be diſpleas'd with. For, beſides that there is nothing out of the way to a willing Mind, I have now the *Satisfaction* to be join'd to the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, for his agreeing with me in the Original of our *Ideas* and the Materials of our Knowledg (tho' I agree not with him, or any body elſe, in *laying all Foundation of Certainty in Matters of Faith, in clear and diſtinct Ideas*;) and his being join'd with the Unitarians, by giving *an account of Reaſon, which ſuppoſes clear and diſtinct Ideas* as neceſſary to all Knowledg and Certainty: I have now, I ſay, the Satisfaction to ſee how I lay directly in your Lordſhip's way, in oppoſing theſe Gentlemen, who *lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and diſtinct Ideas*; *i. e.* the Unitarians, the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning*; ſo dangerous *to the Doctrine of the Trinity.* For the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* agreeing with them in ſome things, and with me in others; he being join'd to them on one ſide by an *account of Reaſon, that ſuppoſes clear and diſtinct Ideas neceſſary to Certainty*; and to me on the other ſide, by ſaying, *The Mind has its Ideas from Senſation and Reflection, and that thoſe are the Materials and Foundations of all our Knowledg*, &c. Who can deny, but ſo rang'd in a Row, your Lordſhip may place your ſelf ſo, that we may ſeem to you but one Object, and ſo one Shot be aim'd at us all together? Tho', if your Lordſhip ſhould be at the pains to change your Station a little, and view us on the other ſide, we ſhould viſibly appear to be very far aſunder; and I, in particular, be found, in the matter controverted, to be nearer to your Lordſhip, than to either of them, or any body elſe, who *lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and diſtinct Ideas.* For I perfectly aſſent to what your Lordſhip ſaith, *That there are many things of*
Vind. p. 233. *which we may be certain, and yet can have no clear and diſtinct Ideas of them.*

Beſides this Account of the Occaſion of bringing me into your Lordſhip's Chapter, wherein *Objections againſt the Trinity in point of Reaſon are anſwer'd*, which we have conſider'd; your Lordſhip promiſes to *ſhew what Care you*
P. 4. *took to prevent being miſunderſtood about it, to give* me *and others Satisfaction, as to this Matter:* which I find about the end of the firſt quarter of your Lordſhip's Anſwer to me. All the Pages between, being taken up in a Diſpute againſt what I have ſaid about *Subſtance*, and our *Idea* of it, that I think has now no

more

more to do with the Queſtion, whether I ought to have been made one of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning*, or with my Complaint about it; tho' there be many things in it that I ought to conſider apart, to ſhew the reaſon why I am not yet brought to your Lordſhip's Sentiments, by what you have there ſaid. To return therefore to the buſineſs in hand.

Your Lordſhip ſays, *I come therefore now to ſhew the care I took to prevent being miſunderſtood; which will beſt appear by my own words, viz. I muſt do that right to the Ingenious Author of the* Eſſay of Human Underſtanding *(from whence theſe Notions are borrow'd, to ſerve other Purpoſes than he intended them) that he makes the caſe of Spiritual and Corporeal Subſtances to be alike.* P. 35.

Theſe words, my Lord, which you have quoted out of your *Vindication*, &c. I, with Acknowledgment, own, will keep your Lordſhip from *being miſunderſtood*, if any one ſhould be in danger to be ſo fooliſhly miſtaken, as to think your Lordſhip could not treat me with great Civility when you pleas'd; or that you did not here make me a great Compliment, in the Epithet which you here beſtow upon me. Theſe words alſo of your Lordſhip, will certainly *prevent* your Lordſhip's *being miſunderſtood*, in allowing me to have *made the Caſe of Spiritual and Corporeal Subſtances to be alike.* But this was not what I complain'd of: My *Complaint* was, that I was brought into a Controverſy, wherein what I had written had nothing more to do, than in any other Controverſy whatſoever; and that I was made a Party on one ſide of a Queſtion, tho' what I ſaid in my Book made me not more on the one ſide of that Queſtion than the other. And that your Lordſhip had ſo mix'd me, in many places, with thoſe Gentlemen, whoſe *Objections againſt the Trinity in point of Reaſon* your Lordſhip was anſwering, that the Reader could not but take me to be One of them that had *objected againſt the Trinity in point of Reaſon.* As for example; where your Lordſhip firſt introduces me, your Lordſhip ſays, *That the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning have almoſt diſcarded Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World. For they not only tell us,* " That we can have no *Idea* of it by Senſation " and Reflection; *but that* nothing is ſignify'd by it, only an uncertain Suppo- " ſition of we know not what." And for theſe words, *L.* 1. *Ch.* 4. §. 18. of my *Eſſay*, is quoted. Vindic. p. 234.

Now my Lord, what *Care* is there taken? What Proviſion is there made, in the words above alledg'd by your Lordſhip, to prevent your *being miſunderſtood*, if you meant not that I was One of *the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning?* And if you did mean that I was, your Lordſhip did me a manifeſt Injury. For I no where make *clear and diſtinct Ideas neceſſary to Certainty*; which is the *new way of Reaſoning* which your Lordſhip oppoſes in the Unitarians, as contrary to the Doctrine of the Trinity. Your Lordſhip ſays, *You took care not to be miſunderſtood.* And the words wherein you took that care, are theſe: *I muſt do that right to the Ingenious Author of the* Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, *(from whence theſe Notions are borrow'd, to ſerve other Purpoſes than he intended them) that he makes the Caſe of Spiritual and Corporeal Subſtances to be alike.* But which of theſe words are they, my Lord, I beſeech you, which are to hinder People from taking me to be one of *the Gentlemen of that new way of Reaſoning*, wherewith they overturn the Doctrine of the Trinity? I confeſs, my Lord, I cannot ſee any of them that do: And that I did not ſee any of them that could hinder Men from that Miſtake, I ſhew'd your Lordſhip, in my firſt Letter to your Lordſhip, where I take notice of that Paſſage in your Lordſhip's Book. My words are: " I return my Acknowledgment to your Lordſhip, for the good " Opinion you are here pleas'd to expreſs of the Author of the *Eſſay of Human* " *Underſtanding*; and that you do not impute to him the ill uſe ſome may have " made of his Notions. But he craves leave to ſay, That he ſhould have been " better preſerv'd from the hard and ſiniſter Thoughts which ſome Men are " always ready for; if, in what you have here publiſh'd, your Lordſhip had been " pleas'd to have ſhewn where you directed your Diſcourſe againſt him, and " where againſt others, from *p.* 234, to *p.* 262. Nothing but my Words and " my Book being quoted, the World will be apt to think that I am the Perſon " who argue againſt the Trinity and deny Myſteries, againſt whom your Lord- " ſhip directs thoſe Pages. And indeed, my Lord, tho' I have read them over " with great attention, yet, in many places, I cannot diſcern whether it be P. 35. P. 58.

" againſt me, or any body elſe, that your Lordſhip is arguing. That which " often makes the difficulty, is, that I do not ſee how what I ſay does at all " concern the Controverſy your Lordſhip is engag'd in, and yet I alone am " quoted." To which *Complaint* of mine, your Lordſhip returns no other Anſwer, but refers me to the ſame Paſſage again for *Satisfaction*; and tells me, that therein *you took care not to be miſunderſtood.* Your Lordſhip might ſee that thoſe words did not ſatisfy me in that point, when I did my ſelf the honour to write to your Lordſhip; and how your Lordſhip ſhould think the repetition of them in your Anſwer, ſhould ſatisfy me better, I confeſs I cannot tell.

P. 60. I make the like Complaint in theſe words: " This Paragraph, which con- " tinues to prove, that we may have Certainty without clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, " I would flatter my ſelf is not meant againſt me, becauſe it oppoſes nothing " that I have ſaid, and ſo ſhall not ſay any thing to it; but only ſet it down to " do your Lordſhip right, that the Reader may judg. Tho' I do not find how " he will eaſily overlook me, and think I am not at all concern'd in it, ſince " my words alone are quoted in ſeveral Pages immediately preceding and fol- " lowing: And in the very next Paragraph it is ſaid, how *THEY* come to " know; which word *THEY* muſt ſignify ſome body, beſides the Author of " *Chriſtianity not myſterious*: and then, I think, by the whole Tenour of your " Lordſhip's Diſcourſe, no Body will be left but me, poſſible to be taken to be " the other; for in the ſame Paragraph your Lordſhip ſays, the ſame *PER-* " *SONS* ſay, that notwitſtanding *THEIR* Ideas, it is poſſible for Matter " to think."

" I know not what other *Perſon* ſays ſo but I; but if any one does, I am " ſure no *Perſon* but I ſay ſo in my Book, which your Lordſhip has quoted for " them, *viz. Human Underſtanding*, B. 4. Ch. 3. This, which is a Riddle to " me, the more amazes me, becauſe I find it in a Treatiſe of your Lordſhip's, " who ſo perfectly underſtand the Rules and Methods of Writing, whether in " Controverſy or any other way: But this which ſeems wholly new to me, I " ſhall better underſtand, when your Lordſhip pleaſes to explain it. In the " mean time, I mention it as an Apology for my ſelf, if ſometimes I miſtake " your Lordſhip's Aim, and ſo miſapply my Anſwer."

To this alſo your Lordſhip anſwers nothing, but for *Satisfaction* refers me to the *Care you took to prevent being miſunderſtood*; which, you ſay, *appears* by thoſe words of your's above-recited. But what there is in thoſe words that can prevent the Miſtake I complain'd I was expos'd to; what there is in them, that can hinder any one from thinking that I am one of the *THEY* and *THEM* that oppoſe the Doctrine of the Trinity, *with Arguments in point of Reaſon*; that I muſt confeſs, my Lord, I cannot ſee, tho' I have read them over and over again to find it out.

The like might be ſaid in reſpect of all thoſe other Paſſages, where I make the like Complaint, which your Lordſhip takes notice I was frequent in; nor could I avoid it, being almoſt every Leaf perplex'd to know whether I was concern'd, and how far, in what your Lordſhip ſaid, ſince my words were quoted, and others argu'd againſt. And for *Satisfaction* herein, I am ſent to a Compliment of your Lordſhip's. I ſay not this, my Lord, that I do not highly value the Civility and good Opinion your Lordſhip has expreſs'd of me therein; but to let your Lordſhip ſee, that I was not ſo rude as to complain of want of Civility in your Lordſhip: but my Complaint was of ſomething elſe; and therefore it was ſomething elſe wherein I wanted *Satisfaction.*

P. 35. Indeed your Lordſhip ſays, in that Paſſage; *From the Author of the* Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, *THESE NOTIONS are borrow'd, to ſerve other Purpoſes than he intended them.* But, my Lord, how this helps in the caſe to *prevent* my being miſtaken to be one of *THOSE* whom your Lordſhip had to do with in this Chapter, in anſwering *Objections in point of Reaſon againſt the Trinity*, I muſt own, I do not yet perceive: for theſe Notions, which your Lordſhip is there arguing againſt, are all taken out of my Book, and made uſe of by no body that I know, but your Lordſhip, or my ſelf: And which of us two it is, that hath *borrow'd them to ſerve other Purpoſes than I intended them*, I muſt leave to your Lordſhip to determine. I, and I think every body elſe with me, will be at a loſs to know who they are, till either their Words, and not mine, are

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produc'd to prove, that they do uſe thoſe Notions of mine, which your Lordſhip there calls *THESE NOTIONS, to Purpoſes to which I intended them not.*

But to thoſe Words in your Lordſhip's *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, you, in your Anſwer to my Letter, for farther *Satisfaction*, add as followeth: *It was too plain, that the bold Writer againſt the Myſteries of our Faith, took his Notions and Expreſſions from thence: And what could be ſaid more for your Vindication, than that he turn'd them into other Purpoſes than the Author intended them?* P. 35.

With Submiſſion, my Lord, it is as plain as Print can make it, that whatever *Notions and Expreſſions that Writer* took from my Book; thoſe in queſtion, which your Lordſhip there calls *Theſe Notions*, my Book is only quoted for; nor does it appear, that your Lordſhip knew that that *Writer* had any where made uſe of them: or, if your Lordſhip knew them to be any where in his Writings, the Matter of Aſtoniſhment and *Complaint* is ſtill the greater, that your Lordſhip ſhould know where they were in his Writings uſed *to ſerve other Purpoſes than I intended them*; and yet your Lordſhip ſhould quote only my Book, where they were uſed *to ſerve only thoſe Purpoſes I intended them.* Vind. p. 239.

How much this is for my *Vindication*, we ſhall preſently ſee: But what it can do to *give Satisfaction* to me or others, *as to the Matters of my Complaint*, for which it is brought by your Lordſhip, that I confeſs I do not ſee. For my *Complaint* was not againſt thoſe Gentlemen, that they had caſt any Aſperſion upon my Book, againſt which I deſir'd your Lordſhip to vindicate me; but my Complaint was of your Lordſhip, that you had brought me into a Controverſy, and ſo join'd me with thoſe againſt whom you were diſputing in defence of the *Trinity*, that thoſe who read your Lordſhip's Book, would be apt to miſtake me for one of them.

But your Lordſhip asks, *What could be ſaid more for my Vindication?* My Lord, I ſhall always take it for a very great Honour, to be vindicated by your Lordſhip againſt others. But in the preſent Caſe, I wanted no *Vindication* againſt others: If my Book or Notions had need of any *Vindication*, it was only againſt your Lordſhip; for it was your Lordſhip, and not others, who had in your Book diſputed againſt Paſſages quoted out of mine, for ſeveral Pages together.

Nevertheleſs, my Lord, I gratefully acknowledg the Favour you have done me, for being Guarantee for my Intentions, which you can have no reaſon to repent of. For as it was not in my Intention to write any thing againſt Truth, much leſs againſt any of the Sacred Truths contain'd in the Scriptures; ſo I will be anſwerable for it, that there is nothing in my Book, which can be made uſe of to other purpoſes, but what may be turn'd upon them, who ſo uſe it, to ſhew their Miſtake and Error. No Body can hinder but that Syllogiſm, which was intended for the Service of Truth, will ſometimes be made uſe of againſt it. But it is nevertheleſs of Truth's ſide, and always turns upon the Adverſaries of it.

Your Lordſhip adds, *And the true Reaſon why the* Plural Number *was ſo often uſed by me, was, becauſe he* [*i. e.* the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*] *built upon thoſe which he imagin'd had been your Grounds.* P. 36.

Whether 'twas your Lordſhip, or he, that imagin'd thoſe to be my Grounds, which were not my Grounds, I will not pretend to ſay. Be that as it will; 'tis plain from what your Lordſhip here ſays, That all the Foundation of your Lordſhip's ſo poſitively, and in ſo many Places, making me One of *the Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning*, was but an Imagination of an Imagination. Your Lordſhip ſays, he *built upon thoſe which he imagin'd had been my Grounds*; but it is but an Imagination in your Lordſhip, that he did ſo *imagine*; and with all due reſpect, give me leave to ſay, a very ill-grounded Imagination too. For it appears to me no Foundation to think, that becauſe he or any body agrees with me in things that are in my Book, and ſo appear to be my Opinion; therefore he imagines he agrees with me in other things, which are not in my Book, and are not my Opinion. As in the matter before us; what reaſon is there to imagine, that the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious imagin'd*, that he built on my Grounds, in *laying all foundation of Certainty in clear and diſtinct Ideas*, (if he does ſo) which is no where laid down in my Book; becauſe he builds on my Grounds, concerning

concerning the Original of our *Ideas*, or any thing elſe he finds in my Book, or quotes out of it? for this is all the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* has done in this Caſe, or can be brought to ſupport ſuch an Imagination.

But ſuppoſing it true, That *he imagin'd he built upon* my Grounds; what Reaſon, I beſeech your Lordſhip, is that for uſing the *Plural Number*, in quoting words which I alone ſpoke, and he no where makes uſe of? To this your Lord-
P. 36. ſhip ſays, That *he imagin'd he built upon my Grounds; and your Lordſhip's Buſineſs was to ſhew thoſe Expreſſions of* mine, *which ſeem'd moſt to countenance his Method of Proceeding, could not give any reaſonable Satisfaction*: which, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much. The Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, writes ſomething which your Lordſhip diſapproves: Your Lordſhip imagines, *he builds upon my Grounds*; and then your Lordſhip picks out ſome *Expreſſions of mine*, which you imagine do *moſt countenance his Method of Proceeding*, and quote them, as belonging in common to us both; tho' it be certain he no where uſed them. And this your Lordſhip tells me (*to give* me *Satisfaction*, what *Care you took not to be miſunderſtood*) *was the true Reaſon, why you ſo often uſed the Plural Number*: Which, with Submiſſion, my Lord, ſeems to me to be no Reaſon at all; unleſs in can be a Reaſon to aſcribe my Words to another Man, and me together, which he never ſaid; becauſe your Lordſhip imagines he might, if he would, have ſaid them. And ought not this, my Lord, to ſatisfy me of the *Care you took, not to be miſunderſtood*?

Your Lordſhip goes on to ſhew your *care to prevent your being miſunderſtood*:
P. 36. Your Words are, *But you* [*i. e.* the Author of the Letter to your Lordſhip] *ſay, you don't* "place Certainty only in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, but in the clear and "viſible Connection of any of our *Ideas*. *And*, Certainty of Knowledg, *you "tell us*, is to perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, as expreſs'd "in any Propoſition." *Whether this be a true Account of the* Certainty of Knowledg, *or not, will be preſently conſider'd. But it is very poſſible he might miſtake, or miſapply your Notions; but there is too much Reaſon to believe, he thought them the ſame: And we have no reaſon to be ſorry, that he hath given you this occaſion for explaining your meaning, and for the Vindication of your ſelf, in the matters you apprehend I had charg'd you with.*

Your Lordſhip herein ſays, *It is very poſſible the Author of* Chriſtianity not Myſterious *might miſtake, or miſapply my Notions.* I find it indeed very poſſible, that my Notions may be *miſtaken and miſapply'd*; if by miſapply'd, be meant drawing Inferences from thence, which belong not to them. But if that Poſſibility be Reaſon enough to join me, in the *Plural* Number, with the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, or with the Unitarians; it is as much a reaſon to join me in the Plural Number with the *Papiſts*, when your Lordſhip has an occaſion to write againſt them next; or with the *Lutherans*, or *Quakers*, &c. for 'tis *poſſible*, that any of theſe may *miſtake*, or in that ſenſe *miſapply* my Notions. But if *miſtaking*, or *miſapplying* my *Notions*, does actually join me to any body, I know no body that I am ſo ſtrictly join'd to, as your Lordſhip: For, as I humbly conceive, no body has ſo much *miſtaken* and *miſapply'd my Notions*, as your Lordſhip. I ſhould not take the liberty to ſay this, were not my thinking ſo the very Reaſon and Excuſe for my troubling your Lordſhip with this ſecond Letter. For, my Lord, I do not ſo well love Controverſy, eſpecially with ſo great and ſo learned a Man as your Lordſhip, as to ſay a Word more; had I not hopes to ſhew, for my Excuſe, that it is my Misfortune to have my *Notions* to be *miſtaken* or *miſapply'd* by your Lordſhip.

P. 36. Your Lordſhip adds, *But there is too much Reaſon to believe, that he thought them the ſame*; i. e. That the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* thought that I had *laid all Foundation of Certainty in clear and diſtinct Ideas*, as well as he did; for that is it, upon which all this Diſpute is rais'd. Whether he himſelf *laid all Foundation of Certainty in clear and diſtinct Ideas*, is more than I know. But what that *too much Reaſon is to believe, that he thought* that I did, I am ſure is hard for me to gueſs, till your Lordſhip is pleas'd to name it. For that there is not any ſuch thing in my Book, to give him, or any body elſe, reaſon to think ſo, I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip is now ſatisfy'd: And I would not willingly ſuppoſe *the Reaſon* to be, that unleſs he, or ſomebody elſe thought ſo, my Book could not be brought into the diſpute; tho' it be not eaſy to find any other. It follows in your Lordſhip's Letter.

And

And we have no Reaſon to be ſorry, that he hath given you this Occaſion for the explaining your meaning, and for the Vindication of your ſelf in the matter you apprehended, I had charged you with. P. 36.

My Lord, I know not *any Occaſion he has given* Me, *of vindicating my ſelf*: Your Lordſhip was pleaſed to join me with the *Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning*, who laid all Foundation of Certainty in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. All the *Vindication* I make, or need to make in the Caſe, is, That I lay not *all Foundation of Certainty in clear and diſtinct Ideas*; and ſo there was no Reaſon to join me with thoſe that do. And for this *Vindication of my ſelf*, your Lordſhip alone gives me Occaſion: But whether your Lordſhip *has Reaſon* to be ſorry, or *not ſorry*, your Lordſhip beſt knows.

Your Lordſhip goes on, in what is deſigned for my *Satisfaction*, as followeth:

And if your Anſwer doth not come fully up in all Things, to what I could wiſh; *yet I am glad to find, that in general you own the Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith, and the Scriptures to be the* Rule *and Foundation of it.* P. 37.

Which words, my Lord, ſeem to me rather to ſhew, that your Lordſhip is not willing to be ſatisfy'd with my Book, than to ſhew any Care your Lordſhip took to prevent Peoples being led by your Lordſhip's Book into a Miſtake, that I was One of *the Gentlemen of that new way of Reaſoning*, who argued againſt the Doctrine of the Trinity.

The Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning, whom your Lordſhip ſets your ſelf to anſwer in that 10th Chapter *Of your Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, are thoſe *who lay all Foundation of Certainty in clear and diſtinct Ideas*; and from that Foundation, raiſe *Objections againſt the Trinity in point of Reaſon*. Your Lordſhip joins me with theſe *Gentlemen* in that Chapter, and calls me One of them. Of this I complain; and tell your Lordſhip, in the Place and Words you have quoted out of my Letter, "That I do not place Certainty only in "clear and diſtinct *Ideas*." I expected upon this, that your Lordſhip would have aſſoiled me, and ſaid, that then I was none of them; nor ſhould have been joined with them. But inſtead of that, your Lordſhip tells me, *My Anſwer doth not come fully up in all things, to what your Lordſhip could wiſh*. The Queſtion is, Whether I ought to be liſted with theſe, and ranked on their ſide, who *place Certainty only in clear and diſtinct Ideas*? What more direct and categorical Anſwer could your Lordſhip wiſh for, to decide this Queſtion, than that which I give? To which nothing can be reply'd, but that it is not true: But that your Lordſhip does not object to it; but ſays, *It does not come fully up in all Things, to what your Lordſhip could wiſh*. What other Things there can be wiſh'd for in an Anſwer, which, if it be true, decides the Matter, and which is not doubted to be true, comes not within my gueſs. But tho' my Anſwer be an unexceptionable Anſwer, as to the Point in Queſtion, yet, it ſeems, my Book is not an unexceptionable Book, becauſe I own, that in it I ſay, "That Certainty of Knowledg is to perceive the Agreement or "Diſagreement of any *Ideas*, as expreſſed in any Propoſition." Whether it be true, that Certainty of Knowledg lies in ſuch a Perception, is nothing to the Queſtion here; that, perhaps, we may have an occaſion to examine in another place. The Queſtion here is, Whether I ought to have been ranked with thoſe, who *lay all Foundation of Certainty in clear and diſtinct Ideas*? And to that, I think my Anſwer is a full and deciſive Anſwer; and there is nothing wanting in it, which your Lordſhip could wiſh for, to make it fuller.

But 'tis natural the Book ſhould be found fault with, when the Author, it ſeems, has had the ill Luck to be under your Lordſhip's ill Opinion. This I could not but be ſurpriz'd to find in a Paragraph, which your Lordſhip declares was deſigned *to give me ſatisfaction*. Your Lordſhip ſays, Tho' my *Anſwer doth not come up in all Things to what you could wiſh; yet you are glad to find, that in general I own the Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith, and the Scriptures to be the Foundation and Rule of it.*

My Lord, I do not remember that ever I declar'd to your Lordſhip, or any body elſe, that I did not own all the Doctrines of the Chriſtian Faith, and the Scriptures to be the ſole Rule and Foundation of it. And therefore I know no more Reaſon your Lordſhip had to ſay, *That you are glad to find, that in general I own*, &c. than I have Reaſon to ſay, *That I am glad to find, that in*

general

general your Lordſhip owns the Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith, and the Scriptures to be the Foundation and Rule of it. Unleſs it be taken for granted that thoſe who do not write and appear in Print, in Controverſies of Religion, do not own the Chriſtian Faith, and the Scriptures as the Rule of it.

I know, my Lord, of what weight a Commendation from your Lordſhip's Pen is in the World: And I perceive your Lordſhip knows the Value of it, which has made your Lordſhip temper your's of me with ſo large an Alloy, for fear poſſibly leſt it ſhould work too ſtrongly on my Vanity. For whether I conſider where theſe words ſtand, or how they are brought in, or what Intimation they carry with them; which way ſoever I turn them, I do not find they were intended to puff me up, tho' they are in a Paragraph purpoſely written *to give me Satisfaction*; and grounded on Words of mine, which ſeem to be approv'd by your Lordſhip before any in my Letter; but which yet have nothing to do in this Place (whether your Lordſhip has been at the pains to fetch them from my Poſtſcript) unleſs it be to give vent to ſo extraordinary a ſort of Compliment: For they are, I think, in their Subject, as well as Place, the remoteſt of any in my Letter, from the Argument your Lordſhip was then upon; which was to ſhew what Care you had taken *not to be miſunderſtood* to my Prejudice. For what, I beſeech you, my Lord, would you think of him, who from ſome Words of your Lordſhip's, that ſeem'd to expreſs *much of a Chriſtian Spirit and Temper* (for ſo your Lordſhip is pleas'd to ſay, of theſe of mine) ſhould ſeek occaſion to tell your Lordſhip, and the World, That he was glad to find that your Lordſhip was a Chriſtian, and that you believed the Bible? For this, common Humanity, as well as Chriſtian Charity, obliges us to believe of every one who calls himſelf a Chriſtian, till he manifeſts the contrary. Whereas the ſaying, *I am glad to find* ſuch an one *believes the Scripture*, is underſtood to intimate, That I knew the Time when he did not; or, at leaſt, when I ſuſpected he did not. But perhaps your Lordſhip had ſome other meaning in it, which I do not ſee. The Largeneſs of your Lordſhip's Mind, and the Charity of a Father of our Church, makes me hope that I paſs'd not in your Lordſhip's Opinion for a Heathen, till your Lordſhip read that Paſſage in the Poſtſcript of my late Letter to you.

P. 37. But to return to the *Satisfaction* your Lordſhip is giving me. To thoſe Words quoted out of my Poſtſcript, your Lordſhip ſubjoins: *Which words ſeem to expreſs ſo much of a Chriſtian Spirit and Temper, that I cannot believe you intended to give any Advantage to the Enemies of the* Chriſtian Faith; *but whether there hath not been too juſt occaſion for them to apply* THEM *in that manner, is a Thing very fit for you to conſider.*

Your Lordſhip here again expreſſes a favourable Opinion of my Intentions, which I gratefully acknowledg: But you add, *That it is fit for me to conſider, whether there hath not been too juſt occaſion for them to apply* THEM *in that manner.* My Lord, I ſhall do what your Lordſhip thinks is *fit* for me to do, when your Lordſhip does me the Favour to tell me, who thoſe *Enemies of the Faith* are, who have *applied* thoſe Words of my Poſtſcript, (for to thoſe alone, by any kind of Conſtruction, can I make your Lordſhip's Word THEM refer) and the *manner* which they have apply'd them in, and the *too juſt occaſion* they have had ſo to apply them. For I confeſs, my Lord, I am at a loſs as to all theſe; and thereby unable to obey your Lordſhip's Commands, till your Lordſhip does me the Favour to make me underſtand all theſe Particulars better.

But if by any new way of Conſtruction, unintelligible to me, the Word THEM here ſhall be apply'd to any Paſſages of my *Eſſay of human Underſtanding*; I muſt humbly crave leave to obſerve this one Thing, in the whole courſe of what your Lordſhip has deſigned for my *Satisfaction*, That tho' my Complaint be of your Lordſhip's *manner of applying* what I had publiſh'd in my *Eſſay*, ſo as to intereſt me in a Controverſy wherein I meddled not; your Lordſhip all along tells me of others, that have *miſapply'd* I know not what Words in my Book, after I know not what *manner*. Now as to this matter, I beſeech your Lordſhip to believe, that when any one, in ſuch a manner, applies my Words contrary to what I intended them, ſo as to make them oppoſite to the Doctrine of the Trinity, and me a Party in that Controverſy againſt the Trinity, as your Lordſhip knows I complain your Lordſhip has

done

done, I ſhall complain of them too; and conſider, as well as I can, what *Satisfaction* they give me and others in it.

Your Lordſhip's next Words are: *For in an Age, wherein the Myſteries of Faith are ſo much expos'd, by the Promoters of Scepticiſm and Infidelity; it is a thing of dangerous Conſequence, to ſtart ſuch new Methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before; as will ſoon appear from your own Conceſſion.* P. 37.

Theſe Words contain a farther Accuſation of my Book, which ſhall be conſider'd in its due place. What I am now upon, is the *Satisfaction* your Lordſhip is giving me, in reference to my Complaint. And as to that, what follows to the 46th Page, is brought only to ſhew that your Lordſhip had reaſon to ſay, *That my Notions were carry'd beyond my Intentions:* For, in theſe words your Lordſhip winds up all the following eight or nine Pages, *viz. Thus far I have endeavour'd, with all poſſible Brevity and Clearneſs, to lay down your Senſe about this Matter; by which it is ſufficiently prov'd, that I had Reaſon to ſay, That your Notions were carry'd beyond your Intention.* P. 46.

I beg leave to mind your Lordſhip, that my *Complaint* was not that your Lordſhip ſaid, *That my Notions were carry'd beyond my Intentions.* I was not ſo abſurd, as to turn what was matter of Acknowledgement into matter of Complaint. And therefore, in ſhewing the Care you had taken of me for my *Satisfaction*, your Lordſhip needed not to have been at ſo much Pains, in ſo long a Deduction, to prove to me, that you had Reaſon for ſaying what was ſo manifeſtly in my favour, whether you had Reaſon for ſaying it or no. But my Complaint was, That the *new way of Reaſon*, accus'd by your Lordſhip, as oppoſite to the Doctrine of the Trinity, being *in laying all Foundation of Certainty in clear and diſtinct Ideas*, your Lordſhip rank'd me amongſt the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning*, tho' I laid not *all Foundation of Certainty in clear and diſtinct Ideas.* And this being my *Complaint*, 'tis for this that there needs a Reaſon. Your Lordſhip ſubjoins.

But you ſtill ſeem concern'd that I quote your Words; altho' I declare they were us'd to other Purpoſes than you intended them. I do confeſs to you, that the Reaſon of it was, that I found your Notions as to Certainty, by Ideas, was the main Foundation which the Author of Chriſtianity not Myſterious *went upon; and that he had nothing which look'd like Reaſon, if that Principle were remov'd; which made me ſo much endeavour to ſhew that it would not hold. And ſo, I ſuppoſe, the Reaſon of my mentioning your Words ſo often, is no longer a Riddle to you.* P. 46. P. 47.

My Lord, he that will give himſelf the trouble to look into the 61ſt Page of my former Letter, where I ſpeak of your Lordſhip's way of proceeding as *a Riddle to me*; or in the 59th Page, which your Lordſhip here quoted, for my *ſeeming concern'd* at it; will find my Complaint, in both Places, as well as ſeveral others, was, That I was ſo every where join'd with others under the comprehenſive Words of *They* and *Them*, &c. tho' my Book alone was every where quoted, "That the world would be apt to think I was the Perſon "who argued againſt the Trinity and deny'd Myſteries;" againſt whom your Lordſhip directed theſe very Pages. For ſo I expreſs my ſelf in that very 59th Page, which your Lordſhip here quotes. And as to this, your Lordſhip's way of Writing (which is the Subject of my *Complaint*) is (for any thing your Lordſhip has in your Anſwer ſaid to give me *Satisfaction*) as much ſtill a Riddle to me as ever.

For that which your Lordſhip here ſays, and is the only thing I can find your Lordſhip has ſaid to clear it, ſeems to me to do nothing towards it. Your Lordſhip ſays, *The Reaſon of it was, that you found my Notions, as to Certainty by Ideas, was the main Foundation which the Author of* Chriſtianity not Myſterious *went upon*, &c. P. 47.

With Submiſſion, I thought your Lordſhip had *found*, That the *Foundation*, which the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* went upon, and for which he was made One of *the Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning*, oppoſite to the Doctrine of the Trinity, was, That he made, or ſuppos'd, *clear and diſtinct Ideas neceſſary to Certainty*; but that is not *my Notion as to Certainty by* Ideas. My Notion of *Certainty by Ideas* is, That Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, ſuch as we have, whether they be in all Vindicat. p. 232, *and* Anſ. P. 14.

their

their Parts perfectly clear and diſtinct or no: Nor have I any *Notions* of Certainty more than this one. And if your Lordſhip had for this call'd me a *Gentleman of a new way of Reaſoning*, or made me One of the Oppoſers of the Doctrine of the Trinity, I ſhould perhaps have wonder'd; but ſhould not at all have complain'd of your Lordſhip, for directly queſtioning this or any of my Opinions: I ſhould only have examin'd what your Lordſhip had ſaid to ſupport, or have deſir'd you to make out that Charge againſt me; which is what I ſhall do by and by, when I come to examine what your Lordſhip now charges this Opinion with: But I ſhall not add any *Complaints* to my Defence.

That which I complain'd of, was, that I was made One of the *Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning*, without being guilty of what made them ſo; and ſo was brought into a Chapter, wherein I thought my ſelf not concern'd: which was manag'd ſo, that my Book was all along quoted, and others argu'd againſt: Others were entitled to what I ſaid, and I to what others ſaid, without knowing why, or how. Nor am I yet, I muſt own, much enlighten'd in the Reaſon of it: That was the Cauſe why I then thought it a new way of Writing; and that muſt be my Apology for thinking ſo ſtill, till I light upon, or am directed to ſome Author who has ever writ thus before.

And thus I come to the end of what your Lordſhip has ſaid to that part of my Letter which your Lordſhip calls my *Complaint*; wherein, I think, I have omitted nothing which your Lordſhip has alledged for the *Satisfaction* of others, or my ſelf, under thoſe two Heads, of the *Occaſion* of your Lordſhip's way of Writing as you did, and the *Care you took not to be miſunderſtood*. And if, my Lord, as to me, it has not poſſibly had all the ſucceſs your Lordſhip propos'd; I beg your Lordſhip to attribute it to my Dulneſs, or any thing rather than an Unwillingneſs to be ſatisfy'd.

My Lord, I ſo little love Controverſy, that I never began a Diſpute with any body; nor ſhall ever continue it, where others begin with me, any longer than the appearance of Truth, which firſt made me write, obliges me not to quit it. But leaſt of all, would I have any Controverſy with your Lordſhip, if I had any Deſign in writing, but the Defence of Truth. I do not know my own Weakneſs, or your Lordſhip's Strength ſo little, as to enter the Liſts with your Lordſhip only for a Tryal of Skill, or the vain and ridiculous hopes of Victory. Nothing, I know, but Truth on my Side, can ſupport me againſt ſo great a Man; whoſe very Name in Writing, and Authority in the learned World, is of Weight enough to cruſh and ſink whatever Opinion has not that ſolid Baſis to bear it up.

There are Men that enter into Diſputes to get a Name in Controverſy, or for ſome little By-ends of a Party: Your Lordſhip has been ſo long in the firſt Rank of the Men of Letters, and by common conſent ſettled at the top of this learned Age, that it muſt paſs for the utmoſt Folly, not to think, that if your Lordſhip condeſcended ſo far, as to meddle with any of the Opinions of ſo inconſiderable a Man as I am, it was with a Deſign to convince me of my Errors, and not to gain Reputation on one ſo infinitely below your Match. 'Tis upon this Ground that I ſtill continue to offer my Doubts to your Lordſhip, in thoſe Parts wherein I am not yet ſo happy as to be convinc'd; and 'tis with this ſatisfaction, I return this Anſwer to your Lordſhip, that if I am in a Miſtake, your Lordſhip will certainly detect it, and lead me into the Truth; which I ſhall embrace, with the acknowledgment of the Benefit I have received from your Lordſhip's Inſtructions. And, that your Lordſhip, in the mean time, will have the Goodneſs to allow me, as becomes a Scholar, willing to profit by the Favour you do me, to ſhew your Lordſhip where I ſtick, and in what Points your Lordſhip's Arguments have fail'd to work upon me. For, as on the one Side it would not become one that would learn of your Lordſhip to acknowledg himſelf convinc'd, before he is convinc'd: and I know your Lordſhip would blame me for it, if I ſhould do ſo: So on the other ſide, to continue to diſſent from your Lordſhip, where you have done me the Honour to take Pains with me, without giving you my Reaſons for it, would, I think, be an ungrateful and unmannerly Sullenneſs.

Your

Your Lordſhip has had the Goodneſs to write ſeveral Leaves, *to give me ſatisfaction as to the Matter of my Complaints.* I return your Lordſhip my moſt humble Thanks for this great condeſcenſion; which I take as a Pledge, that you will bear with the repreſentation of my Doubts, in other Points, wherein I am ſo unlucky as not to be yet thorowly enlighten'd by your Lordſhip. And ſo I go on to the remaining parts of your Letter, which, I think, may be comprehended under theſe two, *viz.* thoſe things in my *Eſſay*, which your Lordſhip now charges, as concern'd in the Controverſy of the Trinity; and others, as faulty in themſelves, whether we conſider them with reſpect to any Doctrines of Religion or no.

In the cloſe of your Lordſhip's Letter, after ſome other Expreſſions of Civility to me, for which I return your Lordſhip my thanks, I find theſe Words: *I do aſſure you, that it is out of no Diſreſpect, or the leaſt Ill-will to you, that I have again conſider'd this Matter; but becauſe I am further convinc'd, that as you have ſtated your Notion of* Ideas, *it may be of dangerous Conſequence to that Article of Chriſtian Faith, which I endeavour'd to defend.* P. 133.

This now is a direct Charge againſt my Book; and I muſt own it a great ſatisfaction to me, that I ſhall now be no longer at a loſs, who it is your Lordſhip means; that I ſhall ſtand by my ſelf, and by my ſelf anſwer for my own Faults, and not be ſo plac'd in ſuch an Aſſociation with others, that will hinder me from knowing what is my particular Guilt and Share in the Accuſation. Had your Lordſhip done me the Favour to have treated me ſo before, you had heard nothing of all thoſe *Complaints* which have been ſo troubleſome to your Lordſhip.

To take now a right view of this matter, it is fit to conſider the Beginning and Progreſs of it: Your Lordſhip had a Controverſy with the *Unitarians*; they, in their Anſwer to your Lordſhip's Sermons, and elſewhere, *talk of Ideas*; the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* (whether an *Unitarian* or no, your Lordſhip ſays not, neither do I enquire,) gives *an account of Reaſon*, which, as your Lordſhip ſays, *ſuppoſes* Certainty to conſiſt only in *clear and diſtinct Ideas*; and becauſe he expreſſes himſelf in ſome other Things conformable to what I had ſaid in my Book, my Book is brought into the Controverſy, tho' there be no ſuch Opinion in it, as your Lordſhip oppos'd. For what that was, is plain both from what has been obſerv'd out of the beginning of the tenth Chapter of your *Vindication of the Trinity*, and the fourteenth Page *of your* Letter, *viz.* this Propoſition, *That Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, is founded upon clear and diſtinct Ideas:* But my Book not having that Propoſition in it, which your Lordſhip then oppos'd, as *overthrowing Myſteries of Faith*, at that time, fell, by I know not what Chance and Misfortune, into the *Unitarian* Controverſy.

Upon examination, my Book being not found guilty of that Propoſition, which your Lordſhip, in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, oppoſed*, becauſe it *overthrows the Myſteries of Faith*; I thought it acquitted, and clear from that Controverſy. No, it muſt not 'ſcape ſo: Your Lordſhip, having *again conſider'd this Matter*, has found new Matter of Accuſation, and a new Charge is brought againſt my Book; and what now is it? even this, *That as I have ſtated my Notion of* Ideas, *it may be of dangerous Conſequence to that Article of the Chriſtian Faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavour'd to defend.*

The Accuſation then, as it now ſtands, is, That *my Notion of* Ideas *may be of dangerous Conſequence*, &c.

Such an Accuſation as this brought in any Court in *England*, would, no doubt, be thought to ſhew a great Inclination to have the Accuſed be ſuſpected, rather than any Evidence of being guilty of any thing; and ſo would immediately be diſmiſs'd, without hearing any Plea to it. But in Controverſies in print, wherein an Appeal is made to the Judgment of Mankind, the ſtrict Rules of proceeding in Juſtice, are not always thought neceſſary to be obſerv'd; and the Sentence of thoſe who are appeal'd to, being never formally pronoune'd, a Cauſe can never be diſmiſs'd as long as the Proſecutor is pleas'd to continue or renew his Charge.

As to the Matter in hand, tho' what your Lordſhip ſays here againſt my Book, be nothing but your Apprehenſion of what *may be*; yet no body will

think it ſtrange, or unſuitable to your Lordſhip's Character and Station, to be watchful over any *Article of the Chriſtian Faith*, eſpecially one *that you have endeavour'd to defend*; and to warn the World of any thing your Lordſhip may ſuſpect to be *of dangerous conſequence* to it, as far as you can ſpy it. And to this give me leave, my Lord, to attribute the Trouble your Lordſhip has been at, to write again in this matter.

Another thing I muſt take notice of, in this your Lordſhip's new Charge againſt my Book, That it is againſt *my Notion of Ideas, as I have ſtated it.* This containing all that I have ſaid in my *Eſſay* concerning *Ideas*, which as your Lordſhip takes notice, is not a little; your Lordſhip, I know, would not be thought to leave ſo general an Accuſation upon my Book, as you could receive no anſwer to: and therefore tho' your Lordſhip has not been pleas'd plainly to ſpecify here the Particulars in *my Notion of Ideas*, which your Lordſhip apprehends to be of *dangerous conſequence to that Article which your Lordſhip has defended*; I ſhall endeavour to find them, in other parts of your Letter.

P. 132. Your Lordſhip's words, in the immediately preceding Page, run thus: *I can eaſily bear the putting of Philoſophical Notions into a modern and faſhionable Dreſs.*

Let Men expreſs their Minds by Ideas, if they pleaſe; and take pleaſure in ſorting, and comparing, and connecting of them, I am not forward to condemn them: For every Age muſt have its new Modes; and it is very well, if Truth and Reaſon be receiv'd in any Garb. I was therefore far enough from condemning your way of Ideas, till I found it made the only Ground of Certainty, and made uſe of to overthrow the Myſteries of our Faith, *as I told you in the beginning.*

Theſe words, leading to your Lordſhip's Accuſation, I thought the likelieſt to ſhew me what it was in my Book, that your Lordſhip now declar'd againſt, as what *might be of dangerous conſequence to that Article you have defended*; and that ſeem'd to me, to lie in theſe two Particulars, *viz.* The making ſo much uſe of the word *Ideas*; and my placing, as I do, Certainty in *Ideas, i. e.* in the things ſignify'd by them. And theſe two ſeem here to be the Particulars which your Lordſhip comprehends under *my way by Ideas.* But that I might not be led into Miſtake by this Paſſage, which ſeem'd a little more obſcure and doubtful to me, than I could have wiſh'd; I conſulted thoſe other places, wherein your Lordſhip ſeem'd to expreſs what it was that your Lordſhip now accus'd in my Book, in reference to the *Unitarian* Controverſy; and which your Lordſhip apprehends *may be of Dangerous conſequence to that Article.*

Your Lordſhip, in the cloſe of the words above-quoted, out of the 132d Page of your Anſwer, tells me: You were *far enough from condemning my way of Ideas, till your Lordſhip found it made the only Ground of Certainty, and made uſe of to overthrow the Myſteries of our Faith, as you told me in the beginning.*

My Lord, the way of *Ideas* which your Lordſhip oppos'd at firſt, was the way of *Certainty only by clear and diſtinct Ideas*; as appears by your words above-quoted, out of your 14th Page: But that, your Lordſhip now knows, was not *my way of Certainty by Ideas*; and therefore that, and all the uſe can be made of it, to *overthrow the Myſteries of our Faith*, be that as it will, cannot any more be charg'd on my Book, but is quite out of doors: And therefore what you ſaid *in the beginning* gave me no light into what was your Lordſhip's preſent Accuſation.

P. 23. But, Page the 23d, I found theſe Words: *When new Terms are made uſe of by ill Men, to promote Scepticiſm and Infidelity, and to overthrow the Myſteries of our Faith, we have then reaſon to enquire into them, and to examine the Foundation and Tendency of them. And this was the true and only Reaſon of my looking into this way of Certainty by Ideas, becauſe I found it apply'd to ſuch Purpoſes.*

Here, my Lord, your Lordſhip ſeems to lay your Accuſation wholly againſt *new Terms* and *their Tendency.*

And in another place, your Lordſhip has theſe Words:

P. 93. *The world hath been ſtrangely amus'd with Ideas of late; and we have been told, that ſtrange things might be done by the help of Ideas; and yet theſe Ideas, at laſt, come to be only common Notions of things, which we muſt make uſe of in our Reaſoning. You* [i. e. the Author of the *Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding*] *ſay in that Chapter about the Exiſtence of God, You thought it moſt proper to expreſs your ſelf, in the moſt uſual and familiar way, by common Words and Expreſſions. I would*

you

you had done ſo quite thro' your Book; for then you had never given that occaſion to the Enemies of our Faith, to take up your new way of Ideas, as an effectual Battery (as they imagin'd) againſt the Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith. But you might have enjoy'd the Satisfaction of your Ideas long enough, before I had taken notice of them, unleſs I had found them employ'd about doing miſchief.

By which places 'tis plain, That that which your Lordſhip apprehends in my Book *may be of dangerous conſequence to the Article which your Lordſhip has endeavour'd to defend*, is my introducing *new Terms*; and that which your Lordſhip inſtances in, is that of *Ideas*. And the Reaſon your Lordſhip gives, in every of theſe places, why your Lordſhip has ſuch an apprehenſion of *Ideas*, as that they *may be of dangerous conſequence to that Article of Faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavour'd to defend*, is, becauſe they have *been apply'd to ſuch Purpoſes*. And *I might* (your Lordſhip ſays) *have enjoy'd the Satisfaction of my Ideas long enough, before you had taken notice of them, unleſs your Lordſhip had found them employ'd in doing miſchief*. Which, at laſt, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much, and no more, *viz.* That your Lordſhip fears *Ideas*, *i. e.* the Term *Ideas*, *may*, ſometime or other, prove of *very dangerous conſequence* to what your Lordſhip has endeavour'd to defend, becauſe they have been made uſe of in arguing againſt it. For I am ſure your Lordſhip does not mean, That you apprehended the things, ſignify'd by *Ideas*, *may be of dangerous conſequence to the Article of Faith your Lordſhip endeavours to defend*, becauſe they have been made uſe of againſt it: For (beſides that your Lordſhip mentions *Terms*) that would be to expect that thoſe who oppoſe that Article, ſhould oppoſe it without any Thoughts; for the thing ſignify'd by *Ideas*, is nothing but the immediate Objects of our Minds in Thinking: So that unleſs any one can oppoſe the *Article your Lordſhip defends*, without thinking on ſomething, he muſt uſe the things ſignify'd by *Ideas*: For he that thinks, muſt have ſome immediate Object of his Mind in Thinking, *i. e.* muſt have *Ideas*.

But whether it be the Name or the Thing; *Ideas* in Sound, or *Ideas* in Signification, that your Lordſhip apprehends *may be of dangerous conſequence to that Article of Faith, which your Lordſhip endeavours to defend*; it ſeems to me, I will not ſay a new way of Reaſoning (for that belongs to me) but were it not your Lordſhip's, I ſhould think it a very extraordinary way of Reaſoning, to write againſt a Book, wherein your Lordſhip acknowledges they are not uſed to bad purpoſes, nor imploy'd to do miſchief: Only becauſe that you find that *Ideas* are, by thoſe who oppoſe your Lordſhip, *employ'd to do miſchief*; and ſo apprehend, *they may be of dangerous conſequence to the Article* your Lordſhip has engag'd in the defence of. For whether *Ideas* as *Terms*, or *Ideas* as the immediate Objects of the Mind ſignify'd by thoſe *Terms*, *may be*, in your Lordſhip's Apprehenſion, *of dangerous conſequence to that Article*; I do not ſee how your Lordſhip's writing againſt the *Notion of Ideas*, as ſtated in my Book, will at all hinder your Oppoſers from *employing them in doing miſchief* as before.

However, be that as it will, ſo it is, that your Lordſhip apprehends theſe *new Terms*, theſe *Ideas*, *with which the World hath, of late, been ſo ſtrangely amus'd* (tho' *at laſt they come to be only common Notions of Things*, as your Lordſhip owns) *may be of dangerous conſequence to that Article.* P. 93.

My Lord, if any, in their *Anſwer* to your Lordſhip's *Sermons*, and in their other *Pamphlets*, wherein your Lordſhip complains they have talk'd ſo much of *Ideas*, have been troubleſom to your Lordſhip with that *Term*; it is not ſtrange that your Lordſhip ſhould be tired with that Sound: But how natural ſoever it be to our weak Conſtitutions to be offended with any Sound, wherewith an importunate Din hath been made about our ears; yet, my Lord, I know your Lordſhip has a better Opinion of the Articles of our Faith, than to think any of them can be overturn'd, or ſo much as ſhaken with a Breath, form'd into any Sound or *Term* whatſoever.

Names are but the Arbitrary Marks of Conceptions; and ſo they be ſufficiently appropriated to them in their Uſe, I know no other difference any of them have in particular, but as they are of eaſy or difficult Pronunciation, and of a more or leſs pleaſant Sound: and what particular Antipathies there may be in Men, to ſome of them upon that account, is not eaſy to be foreſeen. This I am ſure, no *Term* whatſoever in it ſelf bears, one more than another,

any oppoſition to Truth of any kind; they are only Propoſitions that do, or can oppoſe the Truth of any Article or Doctrine: And thus no *Term* is priviledg'd from being ſet in oppoſition to Truth.

There is no Word to be found, which may not be brought into a Propoſition, wherein the moſt ſacred and moſt evident Truths may be oppos'd; but that is not a fault in the *Term*, but him that uſes it. And therefore I cannot eaſily perſuade my ſelf (whatever your Lordſhip hath ſaid in the Heat of your Concern) that you have beſtow'd ſo much pains upon my Book, becauſe the word *Idea* is ſo much uſed there. For tho' upon my ſaying, in my Chapter about the Exiſtence of God, "That I ſcarce uſed the word *Idea* in that whole
P. 93. Chapter;" your Lordſhip wiſhes, That *I had done ſo quite thro' my Book*: Yet I muſt rather look upon that as a Compliment to me, wherein your Lordſhip wiſh'd, That my Book had been all through ſuited to vulgar Readers, not uſed to that and the like *Terms*, than that your Lordſhip has ſuch an apprehenſion of the word *Idea*; or that there is any ſuch harm in the uſe of it, inſtead of
P. 23. the word *Notion* (with which your Lordſhip ſeems to take it to agree in Signification) that your Lordſhip would think it worth your while to ſpend any part of your valuable Time and Thoughts about my Book, for having the word *Idea* ſo often in it: For this would be to make your Lordſhip to write only againſt an Impropriety of Speech. I own to your Lordſhip, it is a great Condeſcenſion in your Lordſhip to have done it, if that word have ſuch a ſhare in what your Lordſhip has writ againſt my Book, as ſome Expreſſions would perſuade one; and I would, for the Satisfaction of your Lordſhip, change the *Term* of *Idea* for a better, if your Lordſhip, or any one, could help me to it. For that *Notion* will not ſo well ſtand for every immediate Object of the Mind in Thinking, as *Idea* does, I have (as I gueſs) ſomewhere given a Reaſon in my Book, by ſhewing that the Term *Notion* is more peculiarly appropriated to a certain ſort of thoſe Objects, which I call mix'd Modes: And, I think, it would not ſound altogether ſo well, to ſay, the *Notion of Red*, and the *Notion of a Horſe*; as the *Idea of Red*, and the *Idea of a Horſe*. But if any one thinks it will, I contend not; for I have no Fondneſs for, nor Antipathy to any particular Articulate Sounds: Nor do I think there is any Spell or Faſcination in any of them.

But be the word *Idea* proper or improper, I do not ſee how it is the better or worſe, becauſe *ill Men* have made uſe of it, or becauſe it has been made uſe of to *bad Purpoſes*; for if that be a Reaſon to condemn, or lay it by, we muſt lay by the Terms of *Scripture*, *Reaſon*, *Perception*, *Diſtinct*, *Clear*, &c. nay, the Name of *God* himſelf will not ſcape: For I do not think any one of theſe, or any other Term, can be produc'd, which has not been made uſe of by ſuch Men, and to ſuch Purpoſes. And therefore, if the Unitarians, *in their late Pamphlets, have talk'd very much of, and ſtrangely amus'd the World with Ideas*; I cannot believe your Lordſhip will think that Word one jot the worſe, or the more dangerous, becauſe they uſe it; any more than, for their uſe of them, you will think *Reaſon* or *Scripture*, Terms ill or dangerous. And therefore what your Lordſhip ſays, in the bottom of this 93d Page, That *I might have enjoy'd the ſatisfaction of my Ideas long enough, before your Lordſhip had taken notice of them, unleſs you had found them employ'd in doing miſchief*; will, I preſume, when your Lordſhip has conſider'd again of this matter, prevail with your Lordſhip to let me *enjoy* ſtill the *Satisfaction I take in my Ideas*, *i. e.* as much Satisfaction as I can take in ſo ſmall a matter, as is the uſing of a proper Term, notwithſtanding it *ſhould be employ'd by others in doing miſchief*.

For, my Lord, if I ſhould leave it wholly out of my Book, and ſubſtitute the word *Notion* every where in the room of it; and every body elſe do ſo too (tho' your Lordſhip does not, I ſuppoſe, ſuſpect that I have the Vanity to think they would follow my Example) my Book would, it ſeems, be the more to your Lordſhip's liking: But I do not ſee how this would one jot abate the *Miſchief* your Lordſhip complains of. For the Unitarians might as much employ *Notions*, as they do now *Ideas*, to do *Miſchief*: unleſs they are ſuch Fools as to think, they can conjure with this notable Word *Idea*; and that the force of what they ſay lies in the Sound, and not the Signification of their Terms.

This

This I am ſure of, that the Truths of the Chriſtian Religion can be no more *batter'd* by one word than another; nor can they be beaten down nor endanger'd by any Sound whatſoever. And I am apt to flatter my ſelf, that your Lordſhip is ſatisfy'd there is no harm in the word *Ideas*, becauſe you ſay you ſhould not have taken any notice of my *Ideas*, if the *Enemies of our Faith had not taken up my new way of Ideas, as an effectual Battery againſt the Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith.* In which Place, by *new way of Ideas*, nothing, I think, can be conſtru'd to be meant, but my expreſſing my ſelf by that of *Ideas*; and not by other more common Words, and of antienter ſtanding in the *Engliſh* Language.

My new way by Ideas, or *my way by Ideas*, which often occurs in your Lordſhip's Letter, is, I confeſs, a very large and doubtful Expreſſion; and may, in the full latitude, comprehend my whole *Eſſay*: becauſe treating in it of the *Underſtanding*, which is nothing but the Faculty of Thinking, I could not well treat of that Faculty of the Mind, which conſiſts in Thinking, without conſidering the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, which I call *Ideas*: And therefore in treating of the Underſtanding, I gueſs it will not be thought ſtrange, that the greateſt Part of my Book has been taken up, in conſidering what theſe Objects of the Mind, in Thinking, are; whence they come; what uſe the Mind makes of them, in its ſeveral ways of Thinking; and what are the outward Marks, whereby it ſignifies them to others, or records them for its own uſe. And this, in ſhort, is *my way by Ideas*, that which your Lordſhip calls *my new way by Ideas*: which, my Lord, if it be *new*, it is but a new Hiſtory of an old thing. For I think it will not be doubted, that Men always perform'd the Actions of Thinking, Reaſoning, Believing and Knowing, juſt after the ſame manner that they do now: Tho', whether the ſame account has heretofore been given of the way how they perform'd theſe Actions, or wherein they conſiſted, I do not know. Were I as well read as your Lordſhip, I ſhould have been ſafe from that gentle Reprimand of your Lordſhip's for thinking *my way of Ideas NEW, for want of looking into other Mens Thoughts, which appear in their Books.* P. 81.

Your Lordſhip's Words, as an Acknowledgment of your Inſtructions in the caſe, and as a Warning to others, who will be ſo bold Adventurers as *to ſpin any thing barely out of their own Thoughts*; I ſhall ſet down at large: and they run thus; *Whether you took this way of Ideas from the modern Philoſophers, mention'd by you, is not at all material; but I intended no Reflection upon you in it (for that you mean by my commending you as a Scholar of ſo great a Maſter) I never meant to take from you the Honour of your own Inventions; And I do believe you, when you ſay,* That you wrote from your own Thoughts, and the *Ideas* you had there. *But many things may ſeem New to one that converſes only with his own Thoughts, which really are not ſo; as he may find, when he looks into the Thoughts of other Men, which appear in their Books. And therefore, altho' I have a juſt Eſteem for the Invention of ſuch, who can ſpin Volumes barely out of their own Thoughts; yet I am apt to think, they would oblige the World more, if, after they have thought ſo much themſelves, they would examine what Thoughts others have had before them, concerning the ſame things: that ſo thoſe may not be thought their own Inventions, which are common to themſelves and others. If a Man ſhould try all the Magnetical Experiments himſelf, and publiſh them as his own Thoughts, he might take himſelf to be the Inventor of them: But he that examines and compares them with what* Gibbert *and others have done before him, will not diminiſh the Praiſe of his Diligence, but may wiſh he had compar'd his thoughts with other Mens; by which the World would receive greater Advantage, altho' he loſt the Honour of being an Original.* P. 80.

To alleviate my Fault herein, I agree with your Lordſhip, That *many things may ſeem NEW to one that converſes only with his own Thoughts, which really are not ſo:* But I muſt crave leave to ſuggeſt to your Lordſhip, That if in the ſpinning them out of his own Thoughts, they *ſeem new* to him, he is certainly the Inventor of them; and they may as juſtly be thought *his own Invention*, as any one's; and he is as certainly the *Inventor* of them, as any one who thought on them before him: The Diſtinction of Invention, or not Invention, lying not in thinking firſt or not firſt, but in borrowing or not borrowing your Thoughts from another: And he to whom, ſpinning them out of his own Thoughts, they *ſeem new*, could not certainly borrow them from another. So he truly

invented

invented Printing in *Europe*, who, without any Communication with the *Chineſes*, ſpun it out of his own Thoughts; tho' it were ever ſo true, that the *Chineſes* had the uſe of Printing, nay, of Printing in the very ſame way among them many Ages before him. So that he that ſpins any thing out of his own Thoughts, that *ſeems new to him*, cannot ceaſe to think it his own Invention, ſhould he *examine* ever ſo far *what Thoughts others have had before him, concerning the ſame thing*; and ſhould find, by examining, that they had the ſame Thoughts too.

But what great *Obligation this would* be to the *World*, or weighty Cauſe of turning over and looking into *Books*, I confeſs I do not ſee. The great End to me, in converſing with my own or other Mens Thoughts, in Matters of Speculation, is to find Truth, without being much concern'd whether my own ſpinning of it out of mine, or their ſpinning of it out of their own Thoughts, helps me to it. And how little I affect the *Honour of an Original*, may be ſeen in that place of my Book, where, if any where, that Itch of Vain-glory was likelieſt to have ſhewn it ſelf, had I been ſo over-run with it, as to need a Cure. It is where I ſpeak of Certainty, in theſe following words, taken notice
P. 39. of by your Lordſhip in another place: "I think I have ſhewn wherein it is that "Certainty, real Certainty, conſiſts; which, whatever it was to others, was, "I confeſs, to me heretofore one of thoſe *Deſiderata* which I found great want "of."

Here, my Lord, however *new* this *ſeem'd* to me, and the more ſo becauſe poſſibly I had in vain hunted for it in the *Books of others*; yet I ſpoke of it as new only to my ſelf; leaving *others* in the undiſturb'd Poſſeſſion of what either by Invention or Reading was their's before; without aſſuming to my ſelf any other Honour, but that of my own Ignorance till that time, if others before had ſhewn wherein Certainty lay. And yet, my Lord, if I had upon this occaſion been forward to aſſume to my ſelf the *Honour of an Original*, I think I had been pretty ſafe in it; ſince I ſhould have had your Lordſhip for my Guarantee and *Vindicator* in that point, who are pleas'd to call it *New*; and, as ſuch, to write againſt it.

And truly, my Lord, in this reſpect my Book has had very unlucky Stars, ſince it hath had the misfortune to diſpleaſe your Lordſhip, with many things
Vind. p. 234, 240. in it, for their Novelty; as *New way of Reaſoning*; *New Hypotheſis about Reaſon*; *New ſort of Certainty*; *New Terms*; *New way of Ideas*; *New Method of Certainty*,
Anſ. p. 23, 83, 93. &c. And yet in other places your Lordſhip ſeems to think it worthy in me of your Lordſhip's Reflection, for ſaying but what others have ſaid before. As where I ſay, "In the different Make of Mens Tempers and Application of "their Thoughts, ſome Arguments prevail more on one, and ſome on another, "for the Confirmation of the ſame Truth:" Your Lordſhip asks, *What is this*
Vind. p. 249. *different from what all Men of Underſtanding have ſaid?* Again, I take it, your Lordſhip meant not theſe words for a Commendation of my Book, where you ſay; *But if no more be meant by* "the ſimple *Ideas* that come in by Senſation or
P. 23. "Reflection, and their being the Foundation of our Knowledg;" *but that our Notions of things come in, either from our Senſes, or the Exerciſe of our Minds: As there is nothing extraordinary in the Diſcovery, ſo your Lordſhip is far enough from oppoſing that, wherein you think all Mankind are agreed.*

P. 92. And again, *But what need all this great noiſe about Ideas and Certainty, true and real Certainty by Ideas; if, after all, it comes only to this, That our Ideas only repreſent to us ſuch things, from whence we bring Arguments to prove the Truth of things?*

P. 93. And, *The World hath been ſtrangly amus'd with* Ideas *of late; and we have been told, That ſtrange things might be done by the help of* Ideas; *and yet theſe* Ideas, *at laſt, come to be only common Notions of things, which we muſt make uſe of in our Reaſoning.* And to the like purpoſe, in other places.

Whether therefore at laſt your Lordſhip will reſolve, That it is *New* or no, or more faulty by its being *new*, muſt be left to your Lordſhip. This I find by it, that my Book cannot avoid being condemn'd on the one ſide or the other; nor do I ſee a poſſibility to help it. If there be Readers that like only *New* Thoughts; or, on the other ſide, others that can bear nothing but what can be juſtify'd by receiv'd Authorities in Print; I muſt deſire them to make themſelves amends in that part which they like, for the diſpleaſure they receive in

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the other: But if many ſhould be ſo exact as to find fault with both, truly I know not well what to ſay to them. The Caſe is a plain Caſe, the Book is all over naught, and there is not a Sentence in it that is not, either for its Antiquity or Novelty, to be condemn'd; and ſo there is a ſhort end of it. From your Lordſhip indeed in particular, I can hope for ſomething better; for your Lordſhip thinks the *general Deſign of it ſo good*, that that, I flatter my ſelf, P. 35. would prevail on your Lordſhip to preſerve it from the Fire.

But as to the way your Lordſhip thinks I ſhould have taken to prevent the *having it thought my Invention, when it was common to me with others*; it unluckily ſo fell out, in the Subject of my *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, that I could not look into the thoughts of other Men to inform my ſelf. For my Deſign being, as well as I could, to copy Nature, and to give an account of the Operations of the Mind in Thinking, I could look into no body's Underſtanding but my own, to ſee how it wrought; nor have a Proſpect into other Mens Minds to view their Thoughts there, and obſerve what Steps and Motions they took, and by what Gradations they proceeded in their acquainting themſelves with Truth, and their Advance to Knowledg. What we find of their Thoughts in Books, is but the Reſult of this, and not the Progreſs and Working of their Minds, in coming to the Opinions or Concluſions they ſet down and publiſh'd.

All therefore that I can ſay of my Book, is, That it is a Copy of my own Mind, in its ſeveral ways of Operation. And all that I can ſay for the publiſhing of it, is, That I think the intellectual Faculties are made, and operate alike in moſt Men; and that ſome, that I ſhew'd it to before I publiſh'd it, liked it ſo well, that I was confirm'd it that Opinion. And therefore if it ſhould happen, that it ſhould not be ſo, but that ſome Men ſhould have ways of Thinking, Reaſoning, or arriving at Certainty, different from others, and above thoſe that I find my Mind to uſe and acquieſce in, I do not ſee of what uſe my Book can be to them. I can only make it my humble Requeſt, in my own Name, and in the Name of thoſe that are of my ſize, who find their Minds work, reaſon and know in the ſame low way that mine does, that thoſe Men of more happy Genius would ſhew us the way of their nobler Flights; and particularly would diſcover to us their ſhorter or ſurer way to Certainty, than by *Ideas*, and the obſerving their Agreement or Diſagreement.

In the mean time, I muſt acknowledg, that if I had been guilty of affecting to be thought an *Original*, a Correction could not have come from any body ſo diſintereſted in the Caſe, as your Lordſhip; ſince your Lordſhip ſo much declines being thought an *Original*, for writing in a way wherein it is hard to avoid thinking that you are the firſt, till ſome other can be produc'd that writ ſo before you.

But to return to your Lordſhip's preſent Charge againſt my Book: In the 38th Page of your Lordſhip's Anſwer, I find theſe words; *In an Age, wherein the Myſteries of Faith are ſo much expos'd by the Promoters of Scepticiſm and Infidelity; it is a thing of dangerous conſequence, to ſtart ſuch new Methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before.*

By which Paſſage, and ſome Expreſſions that ſeem to look that way, in the places above quoted; I take it for granted, that another Particular in my Book, which your Lordſhip ſuſpects *may be of dangerous conſequence to that Article of Faith which your Lordſhip has endeavour'd to defend*, is my placing of Certainty as I do, in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Ideas*.

Tho' I cannot conceive how any Term *new* or old, *Idea* or not *Idea*, can have any Oppoſition, or Danger in it, to any *Article of Faith*, or any Truth whatſoever; yet I eaſily grant, that Propoſitions are capable of being oppoſite to Propoſitions, and may be ſuch as, if granted, may *overthrow Articles of Faith*, or any other Truth they are oppoſite to. But your Lordſhip not having, as I remember, ſhewn, or gone about to ſhew, how this Propoſition, *viz.* That Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas*, is oppoſite or inconſiſtent with *that Article of Faith which your Lordſhip has endeavour'd to defend*: 'tis plain, 'tis but your Lordſhip's fear that it *may be of dangerous conſequence to it*; which, as I humbly conceive, is no proof that it is any way inconſiſtent with that Article.

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No body, I think, can blame your Lordſhip, or any one elſe, for being concern'd for any Article of the Chriſtian Faith: But if that Concern (as it may, and as we know it has done) makes any one apprehend Danger, where no Danger is; are we therefore, to give up and condemn any Propoſition, becauſe any one, tho' of the firſt Rank and Magnitude, fears *it may be of dangerous Conſequence* to any Truth of Religion, without ſhewing that it is ſo? If ſuch Fears be the Meaſures whereby to judge of Truth and Falſehood, the affirming that there are Antipodes would be ſtill a Hereſy; and the Doctrine of the Motion of the Earth muſt be rejected, as overthrowing the Truth of the Scripture: For of that *dangerous Conſequence* it has been apprehended to be, by many learned and pious Divines, out of their great Concern for Religion. And yet, notwithſtanding thoſe great Apprehenſions *of what dangerous Conſequence it might be*, it is now univerſally receiv'd by learned Men, as an undoubted Truth; and writ-for by ſome, whoſe Belief of the Scriptures is not at all queſtion'd; and particularly, very lately, by a Divine of the Church of *England*, with great ſtrength of Reaſon, in his wonderfully ingenious *new Theory of the Earth.*

The Reaſon your Lordſhip gives of your Fears, that *it may be of ſuch dangerous Conſequence to that Article of Faith which your Lordſhip endeavours to defend*, tho' it occurs in more Places than one, is only this, *viz.* That it is *made uſe of by ill Men to do Miſchief, i. e.* to oppoſe that Article of Faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavour'd to defend. But, my Lord, if it be a Reaſon to lay by any thing as bad, becauſe it is, or may be us'd to an ill Purpoſe; I know not what will be innocent enough to be kept. Arms, which were made for our Defence, are ſometimes made uſe of to do *Miſchief*; and yet they are not thought of *dangerous Conſequence* for all that. No body lays-by his Sword and Piſtols, or thinks them of ſuch *dangerous Conſequence* as to be neglected, or thrown away, becauſe Robbers, and the worſt of Men, ſometimes make uſe of them to take away honeſt Mens Lives or Goods. And the Reaſon is, becauſe they were deſign'd, and will ſerve to preſerve them. And who knows but this may be the preſent Caſe? If your Lordſhip thinks, that placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, be to be rejected as falſe, becauſe you apprehend it *may be of dangerous Conſequence to that Article of Faith*; on the other ſide, perhaps others, with me, may think it a Defence againſt Error, and ſo, (as being of good uſe) to be receiv'd and adhered to.

I would not, my Lord, be hereby thought to ſet up my own, or any one's Judgment againſt your Lordſhip's: But I have ſaid this only to ſhew, while the Argument lies for or againſt the Truth of any Propoſition, barely in an Imagination that *it may be* of Conſequence to the ſupporting or overthrowing of any remote Truth; it will be impoſſible, that way, to determine of the Truth or falſhood of that Propoſition. For Imagination will be ſet up againſt Imagination, and the ſtronger probably will be againſt your Lordſhip; the ſtrongeſt Imaginations being uſually in the weakeſt Heads. The only way, in this Caſe, to put it paſt doubt, is to ſhew the Inconſiſtency of the two Propoſitions; and then it will be ſeen, that one overthrows the other; the true the falſe one.

Your Lordſhip ſays indeed, this is a *New Method of Certainty*. I will not ſay ſo my ſelf, for fear of deſerving a ſecond Reproof from your Lordſhip, for being too forward to aſſume to my ſelf the *honour of being an Original*. But this, I think, gives me occaſion, and will excuſe me from being thought impertinent, if I ask your Lordſhip, Whether there be any other, nor older *Method of Certainty*? and what it is? For if there be no other, nor older than this, either this was always the *Method of Certainty*, and ſo mine is no *New* one; or elſe the World is oblig'd to me for this *New* one, after having been ſo long in the want of ſo neceſſary a thing, as a *Method of Certainty*. If there be an older, I am ſure your Lordſhip cannot but know it; your condemning mine as *New*, as well as your thorow Inſight into Antiquity, cannot but ſatisfy every body that you do. And therefore to ſet the World right in a thing of that great Concernment, and to overthrow mine, and thereby prevent the *dangerous Conſequence* there is in my having unſeaſonably *ſtarted* it, will not, I humbly conceive, misbecome your Lordſhip's Care of *that Article*

ticle you have endeavour'd to defend; nor the good Will you bear to Truth in general. For I will be anſwerable for my ſelf, that I ſhall; and I think I may be for all others, that they all will give off the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, if your Lordſhip will be pleas'd to ſhew that it lies in any thing elſe.

But truly, not to aſcribe to my ſelf an Invention of what has been as old as Knowledg is in the World, I muſt own, I am not guilty of what your Lordſhip is pleas'd to call *ſtarting new Methods of Certainty*. Knowledg, ever ſince there has been any in the World, has conſiſted in one particular Action of the Mind; and ſo, I conceive, will continue to do to the end of it: And to *ſtart new Methods of Knowledg* or *Certainty*, (for they are to me the ſame thing) *i. e.* to find out and propoſe new Methods of attaining Knowledg, either with more Eaſe and Quickneſs, or in Things yet unknown, is what I think no body could blame: But this is not that which your Lordſhip here means by *new Methods of Certainty*. Your Lordſhip, I think, means by it, the placing of *Certainty* in ſomething, wherein either it does not conſiſt, or elſe wherein it was not placed before now; if this be to be call'd a *new Method of Certainty*: As to the latter of theſe, I ſhall know whether I am guilty or no, when your Lordſhip will do me the Favour to tell me, wherein it was plac'd before: which your Lordſhip knows I profeſs'd my ſelf ignorant of, when I writ my Book, and ſo am ſtill. But if *ſtarting of new Methods of Certainty*, be the placing of Certainty in ſomething wherein it does not conſiſt; whether I have done that or no, I muſt appeal to the Experience of Mankind.

There are ſeveral Actions of Mens Minds that they are conſcious to themſelves of performing, as *Willing*, *Believing*, *Knowing*, &c. which they have ſo particular a Senſe of, that they can diſtinguiſh them one from another; or elſe they could not ſay when they *Willed*, when they *Believed*, and when they *Knew* any Thing. But tho' theſe Actions were different enough from one another, not to be confounded by thoſe who ſpoke of them; yet no Body, that I had met with, had, in their writings, particularly ſet down wherein the Act of *Knowing* preciſely conſiſted.

To this Reflection, upon the Actions of my own Mind, the Subject of my *Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding* naturally led me; wherein, if I have done any thing *New*, it has been to deſcribe to others more Particularly than had been done before, what it is their Minds do, when they perform that Action which they call *Knowing*: and if, upon Examination, they obſerve I have given a true Account of that Action of their Minds in all the Parts of it; I ſuppoſe it will be in vain to diſpute againſt what they find and feel in themſelves. And if I have not told them right, and exactly what they find and feel in themſelves, when their Minds perform the Act of Knowing, what I have ſaid will be all in vain; Men will not be perſuaded againſt their Senſes. Knowledg is an internal Preception of their Minds; and if, when they reflect on it, they find it is not what I have ſaid it is, my groundleſs Conceit will not be hearken'd to, but be exploded by every Body, and die of it ſelf: and no Body need to be at any Pains to drive it out of the World. So impoſſible is it to find out, or *ſtart new Methods of Certainty*, or to have them receiv'd, if any one places it in any thing, but in that wherein it really conſiſts: much leſs can any one be in danger to be miſled into Error, by any ſuch *new*, and to every one viſibly ſenſleſs Project. Can it be ſuppos'd, that any one could *ſtart a new Method of ſeeing*, and perſuade Men thereby, that they do not ſee what they do ſee? Is it to be fear'd, that any one can caſt ſuch a Miſt over their Eyes that they ſhould not know when they ſee, and ſo be led out of their Way by it?

Knowledg, I find, in my ſelf, and, I conceive, in others, conſiſts in the Preception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, which I call *Ideas*: But whether it does ſo in others or no, muſt be determin'd by their own Experience, reflecting upon the Action of their Mind in Knowing; for that I cannot alter, nor I think they themſelves. But whether they will call thoſe immediate Objects of their Minds in thinking *Ideas* or no, is perfectly in their own Choice. If they diſlike that Name, they may call them *Notions* or *Conceptions*, or how they pleaſe; it mattersnot,

if they uſe them ſo as to avoid Obſcurity and Confuſion. If they are conſtantly us'd in the ſame and a known Senſe, every one has the liberty to pleaſe himſelf in his *Terms*; there lies neither Truth, nor Error, nor Science, in that: tho' thoſe that take them for Things, and not for what they are, bare arbitrary Signs of our *Ideas*, make a great deal of doe often about them, as if ſome great Matter lay in the uſe of this or that Sound. All that I know or can imagine of difference about them, is, that thoſe Words are always beſt, whoſe Significations are beſt known in the Senſe they are us'd; and ſo are leaſt apt to breed Confuſion.

My Lord, your Lordſhip has been pleas'd to find fault with my uſe of the new *Term*, *Ideas*, without telling me a better Name for the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking. Your Lordſhip has alſo been pleas'd to find fault with my Definition of Knowledg, without doing me the Favour to give me a better. For it is only about my Definition of Knowledg, that all this ſtir, concerning *Certainty*, is made. For with me, to know and be certain, is the ſame thing; what I know, that I am certain of; and what I am certain of, that I know. What reaches to Knowledg, I think may be call'd Certainty; and what comes ſhort of Certainty, I think cannot be call'd Knowledg; as your Lordſhip could not but obſerve in the 18th Sect. of Ch. 4. of my 4th Book, which you have quoted.

My Definition of Knowledg, in the beginning of the 4th Book of my *Eſſay*, ſtands Thus: "Knowledg ſeems to me to be nothing but the Perception of "the Connection, and Agreement or Diſagreement, and Repugnancy of any of "our *Ideas*." This Definition your Lordſhip diſlikes, and apprehends *it may be of dangerous Conſequence as to that Article of Chriſtian Faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend.* For this there is a very eaſy Remedy: It is but for your Lordſhip to ſet *aſide* this Definition of Knowledg, by giving us a better, and this Danger is over. But your Lordſhip chuſes rather to have a Controverſy with my Book, for having it in it, and to put me upon the Defence of it; for which I muſt acknowledg my ſelf oblig'd to your Lordſhip, for affording me ſo much of your Time, and for allowing me the Honour of converſing ſo much with one ſo far above me in all reſpects.

Your Lordſhip ſays, *It may be of dangerous Conſequence to that Article of Chriſtian Faith, which you have endeavour'd to defend.* Tho' the Laws of diſputing allow bare Denial as a ſufficient Anſwer to Sayings, without any offer of a Proof; yet, my Lord, to ſhew how willing I am to give your Lordſhip all Satisfaction, in what you apprehend may be of *dangerous Conſequence* in my Book, as to *that Article*, I ſhall not ſtand ſtill ſullenly, and put your Lordſhip upon the difficulty of ſhewing wherein that Danger lies; but ſhall, on the other ſide, endeavour to ſhew your Lordſhip that that Definition of mine, whether true or falſe, right or wrong, can be of no *dangerous Conſequence to that Article of Faith.* The Reaſon which I ſhall offer for it, is this; Becauſe it can be of no Conſequence to it at all.

That which your Lordſhip is afraid it may be *dangerous* to, is an *Article of Faith*: That which your Lordſhip labours and is *concern'd* for, is the *Certainty of Faith.* Now, my Lord, I humbly conceive the *Certainty of Faith*, if your Lordſhip thinks fit to call it ſo, has nothing to do with the *Certainty of Knowledg.* And to talk of the *Certainty of Faith*, ſeems all one to me, as to talk of the Knowledg of Believing; a way of ſpeaking not eaſy to me to underſtand.

Place Knowledg in what you will, *ſtart what new Methods of Certainty* you pleaſe, *that are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before*; place Certainty on ſuch Grounds as will leave little or no Knowledg in the World: (for theſe are the Arguments your Lordſhip uſes againſt my Definition of Knowledg) this ſhakes not at all, nor in the leaſt concerns the Aſſurance of Faith; that is quite diſtinct from it, neither ſtands nor falls with Knowledg.

Faith ſtands by it ſelf, and upon Grounds of its own; nor can be remov'd from them, and plac'd on thoſe of Knowledg. Their Grounds are ſo far from being the ſame, or having any thing common, that when it is brought to *Certainty, Faith is deſtroy'd*; 'tis Knowledg then, and Faith no longer.

With

With what aſſurance ſoever of Believing, I aſſent to any *Article of Faith*, ſo that I ſtedfaſtly venture my All upon it, it is ſtill but *Believing*. Bring it to *Certainty*, and it ceaſes to be *Faith*. I believe, that Jeſus Chriſt was crucify'd, dead and buried, roſe again the third Day from the Dead, and aſcended into Heaven: Let now *ſuch Methods* of Knowledg or *Certainty be ſtarted, as leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before*: Let the grounds of Knowledg be reſolv'd into what any one pleaſes, it touches not my *Faith*; the Foundation of that ſtands as ſure as before, and cannot be at all ſhaken by it: and one may as well ſay, that any thing that weakens the Sight, or caſts a Miſt before the Eyes, endangers the Hearing; as that any thing which alters the nature of Knowledg (if that could be done) ſhould be of *dangerous Conſequence to an Article of Faith*.

Whether then I am or am not miſtaken, in the placing *Certainty* in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*; whether this Account of Knowledg be true or falſe, enlarges or ſtraitens the Bounds of it more than it ſhould; *Faith* ſtill ſtands upon its own Baſis, which is not at all alter'd by it; and every Article of that has juſt the ſame unmov'd Foundation, and the very ſame Credibility that it had before. So that, my Lord, whatever I have ſaid about *Certainty*, and how much ſoever I may be out in it; if I am miſtaken, your Lordſhip has no reaſon to apprehend any *Danger* to any *Article of Faith* from thence; every one of them ſtands upon the ſame bottom it did before, out of the reach of what belongs to Knowledg and *Certainty*. And thus much of my *way of Certainty by Ideas*; which, I hope, will ſatisfy your Lordſhip, how far it is from being *dangerous to any Article of the Chriſtian Faith* whatſoever.

I find one thing more your Lordſhip charges on me, in reference to the *Unitarian* Controverſy; and that is, where your Lordſhip ſays, That *if theſe* [*i. e.* my *Notions of Nature and Perſon*] *hold, your Lordſhip does not ſee how it is poſſible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity.* P. 103.

My Lord, ſince I have a great Opinion that your Lordſhip ſees as far as any one, and I ſhall be juſtify'd to the World in relying upon your Lordſhip's Foreſight more than on any one's; theſe diſcomforting Words of your Lordſhip's would diſhearten me ſo, that I ſhould be ready to give up what your Lordſhip confeſſes ſo untenable; with this acknowledgment however to your Lordſhip, as its great Defender,

——————*Si Pergama dextra*
Defendi poſſent, etiam hac defenſa fuiſſent.

This, I ſay, after ſuch a Declaration of your Lordſhip's, I ſhould think, out of a due value for your Lordſhip's great Penetration and Judgment, I had reaſon to do, were it in any other Cauſe but that of an *Article of the Chriſtian Faith*. For theſe, I am ſure, ſhall All be defended and ſtand firm to the World's end; tho' we are not always ſure what hand ſhall defend them. I know as much may be expected from your Lordſhip's in the Caſe, as any body's; and therefore I conclude, when you have taken a View of this Matter again, out of the Heat of Diſpute, you will have a better Opinion of the *Articles of the Chriſtian Faith*, and of your own Ability to defend them, than to pronounce, that if *my Notions of Nature and Perſon hold*, your Lordſhip *cannot ſee how it is poſſible to defend that Article of the Chriſtian Faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavour'd to defend*. For 'tis, methinks, to put that Article upon a very ticklish Iſſue, and to render it as ſuſpected and as doubtful as is poſſible to Mens Minds, that your Lordſhip ſhould declare it not poſſible to be defended, if *my Notions of Nature and Perſon hold*; when all that I can find that your Lordſhip excepts againſt in my *Notions of Nature and Perſon*, is nothing but this, *viz.* That theſe are two Sounds which *in themſelves ſignify nothing*.

But before I come to examine how by *Nature* and *Perſon* your Lordſhip, at preſent in your Anſwer, engages me in the *Unitarian* Controverſy, it will not be beſides the Matter to conſider, how by them your Lordſhip at firſt brought my Book into it.

Vind. p. 252. In your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, your Lordſhip ſays, *The next thing to be cleared in* THIS DISPUTE, *is the Diſtinction between Nature and Perſon. And of this we have no clear and diſtinct Idea from* Senſation *or* Reflection: *And yet all our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right underſtanding of it. For we muſt talk unintelligibly about this Point, unleſs we have clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon, and the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction: But that theſe come not into our Minds by theſe ſimple Ideas of* Senſation *and* Reflection.

P. 148. To this I reply'd, " If it be ſo, the Inference I ſhould draw from thence (if " it were fit for me to draw any) would be this; That it concerns thoſe who " write on that Subject, to have themſelves, and to lay down to others, clear " and diſtinct Apprehenſions, or Notions, or *Ideas* (call them what you pleaſe) " of what they mean by *Nature* and *Perſon*, and of the Grounds of Identity and " Diſtinction.

" This appears to me to be the natural Concluſion flowing from your Lordſhip's " Words; which ſeems here to ſuppoſe clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions (ſome- " thing like clear and diſtinct *Ideas*) neceſſary for the avoiding unintelligible Talk " in the Doctrine of the Trinity. But I do not ſee how your Lordſhip can, " from the Neceſſity of clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of *Nature* and *Perſon*, " &c. in the Diſpute of the Trinity, being in one, who has perhaps miſtaken " the way to clear and diſtinct Notions concerning *Nature* and *Perſon*, &c. as " fit to be anſwer'd among thoſe, who bring Objections againſt the Trinity in " Point of Reaſon. I do not ſee why an Unitarian may not as well bring him " in, and argue againſt his *Eſſay*, in a Chapter that he ſhould write to an- " ſwer Objections againſt the Unity of God, in point of Reaſon or Revelation: " For upon what ground ſoever any one writes in this Diſpute or any other, it " is not tolerable to talk unintelligibly on either ſide.

" If by the way of *Ideas*, which is that of the Author of the *Eſſay of Human* " *Underſtanding*, a Man cannot come to clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions con- " cerning *Nature* and *Perſon*; if, as he oppoſes, from the ſimple *Ideas* of Sen- " ſation and Reflection, ſuch Apprehenſions cannot be got; it will follow from " thence that he is a miſtaken Philoſopher: but it will not follow from thence, " that he is not an Orthodox Chriſtian; for he might (as he did) write his " *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, without any Thought of the Controverſy be- " tween the *Trinitarians* and the *Unitarians*. Nay, a Man might have writ all " that is in his Book, that never heard one word of any ſuch Diſpute.

" There is in the World a great and fierce Conteſt about *Nature* and *Grace*: " 'Twould be very hard for me, if I muſt be brought in as a Party on either " ſide, becauſe a Diſputant in that Controverſy ſhould think, the clear and diſ- " tinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Grace come not into our Minds by theſe " ſimple *Ideas* of *Senſation* and *Reflection*. If this be ſo, I may be reckon'd among " the Objectors againſt all ſorts and points of Orthodoxy, whenever any one " pleaſes: I may be call'd to account as one Heterodox in the points of Free- " grace, Free-will, Predeſtination, Original Sin, Juſtification by Faith, Tran- " ſubſtantiation, the Pope's Supremacy, and what not; as well as in the Doctrine " of the Trinity; and all becauſe they cannot be furniſh'd with clear and diſtinct " Notions of Grace, Free-will, Tranſubſtantiation, &c. by Senſation or Re- " flection. For in all theſe, or any other Points, I do not ſee but there may " be a Complaint made, That they have not always a right Underſtanding and " clear Notions of thoſe things on which the Doctrine they diſpute of depends. " And 'tis not altogether unuſual for Men to talk unintelligibly to themſelves, " and others, in theſe and other Points in Controverſy, for want of *clear and* " *diſtinct Apprehenſions*, or (as I would call them, did not your Lordſhip diſlike " it) *Ideas*: For all which unintelligible Talking, I do not think my ſelf ac- " countable, tho' it ſhould ſo fall out, that my way by *Ideas* would not help " them to what it ſeems is wanting, clear and diſtinct Notions. If my way " be ineffectual to that purpoſe, they may, for all me, make uſe of any other " more ſucceſsful; and leave me out of the Controverſy, as one uſeleſs to either " Party, for deciding of the Queſtion.

" Supposing, as your Lordſhip ſays, and as you have undertaken to make " appear, that the clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning *Nature* and *Per-* " *ſon*,

" *ſon*, and the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction, ſhould not come into the " Mind by ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection; what, I beſeech your Lord- " ſhip, is this to the Diſpute concerning the Trinity, on either ſide? And if, " after your Lordſhip has endeavour'd to give clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions " of *Nature* and *Perſon*, the Diſputants in this Controverſy ſhould ſtill talk " unintelligibly about this Point, for want of clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions " concerning *Nature* and *Perſon*; ought your Lordſhip to be brought in among " the Partiſans on the other ſide, by any one who writ a *Vindication of the Do-* " *ctrine of the Trinity?* In good earneſt, my Lord, I do not ſee how the *clear* " *and diſtinct* Notions *of Nature and Perſon*, not coming into the Mind by the " ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection, any more contains any Objection a- " gainſt the Doctrine of the Trinity, than the clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of " Original Sin, Juſtification, or Tranſubſtantiation, not coming into the Mind " by the ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection, contains any Objection a- " gainſt the Doctrine of Original Sin, Juſtification, or Tranſubſtantiation: " And ſo of all the reſt of the Terms uſed in any Controverſy in Religion."

All that your Lordſhip anſwers to this, is in theſe Words: *The next thing I undertook to ſhew, was, That we can have no clear and diſtinct Idea of Nature and Perſon, from Senſation or Reflection. Here you ſpend many Pages to ſhew, that this doth not concern you. Let it be ſo. But it concerns the Matter I was upon; which was to ſhew, That we muſt have Ideas* [I think, my Lord, it ſhould be clear and diſtinct Ideas] *of theſe things, which we cannot come to by Senſation and Reflection.* Anſw. p. 100.

But be that as it will; I have troubled your Lordſhip here, with this large Repetition out of my former Letter, becauſe I think it clearly ſhews, That my Book is no more concern'd in the Controverſy about the Trinity, than any other Controverſy extant; nor any more oppoſite to that ſide of the Queſtion that your Lordſhip has *endeavour'd to defend*, than to the contrary: And alſo becauſe, by your Lordſhip's Anſwer to it in theſe Words, *Let it be ſo*, I thought you had not only agreed to all that I had ſaid, but that by it I had been diſmiſs'd out of that Controverſy.

It is an Obſervation I have ſomewhere met with, That whoever is once got into the Inquiſition, guilty or not guilty, ſeldom ever gets clear out again. I think your Lordſhip is ſatisfy'd there is no Hereſy in my Book. The Suſpicion it was brought into, upon the account of placing *Certainty only upon clear and diſtinct Ideas*, is found groundleſs, there being no ſuch thing in my Book; and yet it is not diſmiſs'd out of the Controverſy. 'Tis alledg'd ſtill, That *my Notion of Ideas, as I have ſtated it, may be of dangerous conſequence as to that Article of the Chriſtian Faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavour'd to defend*; and ſo I am bound over to another Tryal. *Clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning* Nature *and* Perſon, *and the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction, ſo neceſſary in the Diſpute of the Trinity, cannot be had from Senſation and Reflection*, was another Accuſation. To this, whether true or falſe, I pleaded, that it makes me no Party in this Diſpute of the Trinity, more than in any Diſpute that can ariſe; nor of one ſide of the Queſtion more than another. My Plea is allowed, *Let it be ſo*; and yet *Nature* and *Perſon* are made uſe of again, to hook me into the heretical ſide of the Diſpute: and what is now the Charge againſt me, in reference to the Unitarian Controverſy, upon the account of *Nature* and *Perſon?* Even this new one, viz. That *if* my *Notions of Nature and Perſon hold*, your Lordſhip *does not ſee* how it is poſſible to *defend the Doctrine of the Trinity*. How is this new Charge prov'd? even thus, in theſe Words annex'd to it: *For if theſe Terms really ſignify nothing in themſelves, but are only abſtract and complex Ideas, which the common uſe of Language hath appropriated to be the Signs of two Ideas; then it is plain, that they are only Notions of the Mind, as all abſtracted and complex Ideas are; and ſo One Nature and Three Perſons can be no more.* P. 103.

My Lord, I am not ſo conceited of my *Notions*, as to think that they deſerve that your Lordſhip ſhould dwell long upon the Conſideration of them. But pardon me, my Lord, if I ſay, that it ſeems to me that this Repreſentation which your Lordſhip here makes to your ſelf, of *my Notions of Nature and Perſon*, and the Inference from it, were made a little in haſte: And that if it had not been ſo, your Lordſhip would not, from the preceding words, have drawn this Concluſion; *And ſo One Nature and Three Perſons can be no more*; nor charg'd it upon me.

For

For as to that part of your Lordſhip's Repreſentation of my Notions of *Nature* and *Perſon*, wherein 'tis ſaid, *If theſe Terms in themſelves ſignify nothing*; tho' I grant that to be my Notion of the Terms *Nature* and *Perſon*, That they are two Sounds that naturally ſignify not one thing more than another, nor in themſelves ſignify any thing at all, but have the Signification which they have, barely by Impoſition; yet in this *my Notion* of them give me leave to preſume, that upon more leiſurely Thoughts I ſhall have your Lordſhip, as well as the reſt of Mankind that ever thought of this Matter concurring with me. So that if your Lordſhip continues poſitive in it, That *you cannot ſee how it is poſſible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity, if this my Notion of Nature and Perſon hold*; I, as far as my Eye-ſight will reach in the Caſe (which poſſibly is but a little way) cannot ſee, but it will be plain to all Mankind, that your Lordſhip gives up the *Doctrine of the Trinity*: ſince this *Notion of Nature and Perſon* that are two words that ſignify by Impoſition, is what *will hold* in the common Senſe of all Mankind. And then, my Lord, all thoſe who think well of your Lordſhip's Ability to defend it, and believe that you ſee as far into that Queſtion as any body (which I take to be the common Sentiment of all the Learned World, eſpecially of thoſe of our Country and Church) will be in great danger to have an ill Opinion of the Evidence of that Article: ſince, I imagine, there is ſcarce one of them, who does not think this *Notion* will *hold*, *viz.* That theſe Terms *Nature* and *Perſon* ſignify what they do ſignify by Impoſition, and not by Nature.

Tho', if the contrary were true, *viz.* That theſe two Words, *Nature* and *Perſon*, had this particular Priviledge, above other Names of Things, that they did naturally and in themſelves ſignify what they do ſignify, and that they receiv'd not their ſignifications from the arbitrary Impoſition of Men; I do not ſee how the Defence of the *Doctrine of the Trinity* ſhould depend hereon: unleſs your Lordſhip concludes, that it is neceſſary to the Defence of the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, that theſe two articular Sounds ſhould have natural Significations, and that unleſs they are uſed in thoſe Significations, it were impoſſible to defend the *Doctrine of the Trinity*. Which is in Effect to ſay, That where theſe two words are not in uſe and in their natural Signification, the Doctrine of the Trinity cannot be defended. And if this be ſo, I grant your Lordſhip had reaſon to ſay, That if it hold, that the Terms *Nature* and *Perſon* ſignify by Impoſition, your Lordſhip does not *ſee how it is poſſible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity*. But then, my Lord, I beg your Lordſhip to conſider, whether this be not mightily to prejudice that Doctrine, and to undermine the Belief of that Article of Faith, to make ſo extraordinary a Suppoſition neceſſary to the Defence of it; and of *more dangerous Conſequence to it*, than any thing your Lordſhip can imagine deducible from my Book?

As to the remaining part of what your Lordſhip has, in the foregoing Paſſages, ſet down as ſome of my Notions of *Nature* and *Perſon*, *viz.* That *theſe Terms are only abſtract or complex Ideas*: I crave leave to plead, That I never ſaid any ſuch thing, and I ſhould be aſham'd if I ever had ſaid, that *theſe*, or any other *Terms*, were *Ideas*: which is all one as to ſay, that the Sign is the thing ſignify'd. Much leſs did I ever ſay, *That theſe Terms are only abſtract and complex Ideas, which the common Uſe of Language hath appropriated to be the Signs of two Ideas.* For to ſay, That *the common Uſe of Language has appropriated abſtract and complex Ideas to be the Signs of Ideas*, ſeems to me ſo extraordinary a way of Talking, that I can ſcarce perſuade my ſelf it would be of credit to your Lordſhip, to think it worth your while to anſwer a Man, whom you could ſuppoſe to vent ſuch groſs Jargon.

This therefore containing none of my *Notions of Nature and Perſon*, nor indeed any thing that I underſtand: whether your Lordſhip rightly deduces from it this Conſequence, *viz. And ſo One Nature and Three Perſons can be no more*; is what I neither know nor am concern'd to examine.

Your Lordſhip has been pleas'd to take my *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding* to task, in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*; becauſe the Doctrine of
Vind. p. 252. it will not furniſh your Lordſhip with *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon, and the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction. For*, ſays your Lordſhip,

Lordſhip, *we muſt talk unintelligibly about this Point* [of the Trinity] *unleſs we have clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon*, &c.

Whether, by my way of *Ideas*, one can have clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of *Nature* and *Perſon*, I ſhall not now diſpute, how much ſoever I am of the mind one may. Nor ſhall I queſtion the Reaſonableneſs of this Principle your Lordſhip goes upon, *viz.* That my Book is to be diſputed againſt, as oppoſite to the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, becauſe it fails to furniſh your Lordſhip with *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon, and the Diſtinction between them*; tho' I promis'd no ſuch *clear and Diſtinct Apprehenſions*, nor have treated in my Book any where of *Nature* at all. But upon this Occaſion I cannot but obſerve, That your Lordſhip your ſelf, in that Place, makes *clear and diſtinct Ideas neceſſary to that Certainty of Faith*, which your Lordſhip thinks requiſite, tho' it be that very thing for which you blame *the Men of the new way of Reaſoning*, and is the very ground of your diſputing againſt the Unitarians, the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, and me, jointly under that Title.

Your Lordſhip, to ſupply that Defect in my Book, of *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon*, for the Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, without which it cannot be talk'd of intelligibly, nor defended, undertook *to clear the Diſtinction between Nature and Perſon*. This, I told your Lordſhip, gave me hopes of getting farther inſight into theſe Matters, and more *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon*, than was to be had by *Ideas*; but that after all the Attention and Application I could uſe, in reading what your Lordſhip had writ of it, I found my ſelf ſo little enlighten'd concerning *Nature* and *Perſon*, by what your Lordſhip had ſaid, that I found no other Remedy, but that I muſt be *content with the condemn'd way by Ideas*. Vindic. p. 252.

This, which I thought not only an innocent, but a reſpectful Anſwer, to what your Lordſhip had ſaid about *Nature* and *Perſon*, has drawn upon me a more ſevere Reflection than I thought it deſerv'd. *Scepticiſm* is a pretty hard Word, which I find dropt in more places than one: but I ſhall refer the Conſideration of that to another place. All that I ſhall do now, ſhall be to mark out (ſince your Lordſhip forces me to it) more particularly than I did before, what I think very hard to be underſtood, in that which your Lordſhip has ſaid to *clear the Diſtinction between Nature and Perſon*; which I ſhall do, for theſe two Ends: P. 125.

Firſt, As an Excuſe for my ſaying, "That I had learnt nothing out of your "Lordſhip's elaborate Diſcourſe of them, but this; That I muſt content my "ſelf with my condemn'd way by *Ideas*."

And next to ſhew, why not only I, but ſeveral others, think, That if my Book deſerv'd to be brought-in, and taken notice of among the *Anti-Trinitarian* Writers, for want of *clear and diſtinct Ideas* of *Nature* and *Perſon*; what your Lordſhip has ſaid upon theſe Subjects, will more juſtly deſerve, by him that writes next in *Defence of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, to be brought-in among the Oppoſers of the Doctrine of the Trinity, *as of dangerous conſequence to it*, for want of giving *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon*; unleſs the ſame thing ranks one Man among the *Unitarians*, and another among the *Trinitarians*.

What your Lordſhip had ſaid for clearing of the *Diſtinction of Nature and Perſon*, having ſurpaſs'd my Underſtanding, as I told your Lordſhip in my former Letter; I was reſolv'd not to incur your Lordſhip's Diſpleaſure a ſecond time, by confeſſing I found not my ſelf enlighten'd by it, till I had taken all the Help I could imagine, to find out theſe *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon*, which your Lordſhip had ſo much declar'd for. To this Purpoſe, I conſulted others upon what you had ſaid; and deſir'd to find ſome body, who underſtanding it himſelf, would help me out, where my own Application and Endeavours had been uſed to no Purpoſe. But my Misfortune has been, my Lord, that among ſeveral whom I have deſir'd to tell me their Senſe of what your Lordſhip has ſaid for *clearing* the Notions of *Nature* and *Perſon*, there has not been one who own'd, that he underſtood your Lordſhip's meaning; but confeſs'd, the farther he look'd into what your Lordſhip had there ſaid about *Nature* and *Perſon*, the more he was at a Loſs about them.

One

Vindic. p. 252.

One ſaid, Your Lordſhip began with giving two Significations of the Word *Nature*. One of them, as it ſtood for *Properties*, he ſaid he underſtood: But the other, wherein *Nature was taken for the Thing it ſelf wherein thoſe Properties were*, he ſaid, he did not underſtand. But that, he added, I was not to wonder at, in a Man who was not very well acquainted with *Greek*: and therefore might well be allow'd not to have Learning enough to underſtand an *Engliſh* Word, that *Ariſtotle* was brought to explain and ſettle the Senſe of. Beſides, he added, that which puzzl'd him the more in it, was the very Explication which was brought of it out of *Ariſtotle*, viz. That *Nature was a Corporeal Subſtance, which had the Principles of Motion in it ſelf*; becauſe he could not conceive a *Corporeal Subſtance, having the Principles of Motion in it ſelf*. And if *Nature* were a *Corporeal Subſtance, having the Principles of Motion in it ſelf*; it muſt be good ſenſe to ſay, that a *Corporeal Subſtance*, or, which is the ſame thing, *a Body having the Principles of Motion in it ſelf, is Nature*; which he confeſs'd, if any Body ſhould ſay to him, he could not underſtand.

Another thing he ſaid, that perplex'd him in this Explication of *Nature*, was, That if *Nature was a Corporeal Subſtance, which had the Principles of Motion in it ſelf*, he thought it might happen that there might be no *Nature* at all. For *Corporeal Subſtances* having all equally Principles, or no Principles of Motion in themſelves; and all Men who do not make Matter and Motion eternal, being poſitive in it, that a Body, at reſt, has no Principle of Motion in it: muſt conclude, that *Corporeal Subſtance has no Principle of Motion in it ſelf*: From hence it will follow, that to all thoſe who admit not Matter and Motion to be eternal, no *Nature* in that Senſe, will be left at all, ſince *Nature* is ſaid to be a *Corporeal Subſtance, which hath the Principles of Motion in it ſelf*; but ſuch a Sort of *Corporeal Subſtance* thoſe Men have no Notion of at all, and conſequently none of *Nature*, which is ſuch a *Corporeal Subſtance*.

Now, ſaid he, if this be that *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſion of Nature*, which is ſo neceſſary to the Doctrine of the Trinity; they who have found it out for that Purpoſe, and find it *clear and diſtinct*, have reaſon to be ſatisfy'd with it upon that account: But how they will reconcile it to the Creation of Matter, I cannot tell. I, for my part, ſaid he, can make it conſiſt neither with the Creation of the World, nor with any other Notions; and ſo, plainly, cannot underſtand it.

Vindic. p. 252.

He farther ſaid, in the following Words, which are theſe, *But Nature and Subſtance are of an equal extent; and ſo that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties is the Nature, whether it be meant of Bodily or Spiritual Subſtances*; he neither underſtood the Connection nor Senſe: Firſt, he underſtood not, he ſaid, that *Nature and Subſtance were of the ſame Extent*. *Nature*, he ſaid, in his Notion if it, extended to things that were not Subſtances; as he thought it might properly be ſaid, the Nature of a Rectangular Triangle was, That the Square of the Hypotenuſe, was equal to the Square of the two other Sides; or, it is the *Nature* of Sin, to offend God: Tho' it be certain, that neither *Sin*, nor a *Rectangular Triangle*, to which *Nature* is attributed in theſe Propoſitions, are either of them *Subſtances*.

Further, he ſaid, that he did not ſee how the Particle *But*, connects this to the preceding Words. But leaſt of all, could he comprehend the Inference from hence: *And ſo that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties is Nature, whether it be meant of Bodily or Spiritual Subſtances*. Which Deduction, ſaid he, ſtands thus: *Ariſtotle* takes *Nature* for a *Corporeal Subſtance, which has the Principle of Motion in it ſelf*; therefore *Nature and Subſtance are of an equal Extent*, and ſo both Corporeal and Incorporeal *Subſtances are Nature*. This is the very Connection, ſaid he, of the whole Deduction, in the foregoing Words; which I underſtand not, if I underſtand the Words: And if I underſtand not the Words, I am yet farther from underſtanding any thing of this Explication of *Nature*, whereby we are to come to *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of it*.

Methinks, ſaid he, going on, I underſtand how by making *Nature* and *Subſtance* one and the ſame thing, that may ſerve to bring *Subſtance* into this Diſpute; but for all that, I cannot, for my Life, underſtand *Nature* to be *Subſtance*, nor *Subſtance* to be *Nature*.

There is another Inference, ſaid he, in the cloſe of this Paragraph, which both for its Connection and Expreſſion ſeems to me very hard to be underſtood, it being ſet down in theſe words: *So that the nature of things properly belongs to our Reaſon, and not to mere Ideas.* For when a Man knows what it is for the *Nature of Things properly to belong to Reaſon, and not to mere Ideas*, there will, I gueſs, ſome Difficulty remain, in what ſenſe ſoever he ſhall underſtand that Expreſſion, to deduce this Propoſition as an Inference from the foregoing words, which are theſe: *I grant, that by Senſation and Reflection, we come to know the Powers and Properties of Things; but our Reaſon is ſatisfy'd that there muſt be ſomething beyond thoſe, becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves: So that the Nature of Things properly belongs to our Reaſon, and not to mere Ideas.* Vind. p. 253.

'Tis true, ſaid I; but his Lordſhip, upon my taking *Reaſon* in that place for the power of Reaſoning, hath, in his Anſwer, with a little kind of Warmth, corrected my Miſtake, in theſe Words: *Still you are at it, That* " you can find " no oppoſition between *Ideas* and Reaſon: But *Ideas* are Objects of the Underſtanding, and the Underſtanding is one of the Faculties imploy'd about " them." *No doubt of it. But you might eaſily ſee that by Reaſon, I underſtood Principles of Reaſon, allow'd by Mankind; which, I think, are very different from Ideas. But I perceive Reaſon, in this Senſe, is a thing you have no Idea of; or one as obſcure as that of Subſtance.* Anſ. p. 101.

I imagine, ſaid the Gentleman, that if his Lordſhip ſhould be ask'd, How he perceives you have *no Idea of Reaſon in that Senſe, or one as obſcure as that of Subſtance*; he would ſcarce have a Reaſon ready to give for his ſaying ſo: And what we ſay which Reaſon cannot account for, muſt be aſcrib'd to ſome other Cauſe.

Now truly, ſaid I, my Miſtake was ſo innocent and ſo unaffected, that if I had had theſe very Words ſaid to me then, which his Lordſhip ſounds in my Ears now, to awaken my Underſtanding, *viz. That the principles of Reaſon are very different from Ideas*; I do not yet find how they would have help'd me to ſee what, it ſeems, was no ſmall Fault, that I did not ſee before. Becauſe, let *Reaſon*, taken for *Principles of Reaſon*, be as *different as it will from Ideas*; Reaſon taken as a Faculty, is as different from them, in my apprehenſion: And in both Senſes of the word *Reaſon*, either as taken for a Faculty, or for the *Principles of Reaſon allow'd by Mankind*, Reaſon and *Ideas* may conſiſt together.

Certainly, ſaid the Gentleman, *Ideas* have ſomething in them that you do not ſee; or elſe ſuch a ſmall Miſtake as you made in endeavouring to make them conſiſtent with *Reaſon*, as a Faculty, would not have mov'd ſo great a Man as my Lord Biſhop of *W.* ſo as to make him tell you, *That Reaſon*, taken for the *common Principles of Reaſon, is a thing whereof you have no Idea, or one as obſcure as that of Subſtance.* For, if I miſtake not, you have in your Book, in more places than one, ſpoke, and that pretty *largely*, of ſelf-evident Propoſitions and Maxims: So that, if his Lordſhip has ever read thoſe parts of your *Eſſay*, he cannot doubt, but that you have *Ideas* of thoſe *common Principles of Reaſon.*

It may be ſo, I reply'd; but ſuch things are to be borne from great Men, who often uſe them as Marks of Diſtinction: Tho' I ſhould leſs expect them from my Lord Biſhop of *W.* than from almoſt any one; becauſe he has the ſolid and interior Greatneſs of Learning, as well as that of outward Title and Dignity. But ſince he expects it from me, I will do what I can to *ſee* what he ſays is his meaning here by *Reaſon*. I will repeat it juſt as his Lordſhip ſays, *I might eaſily have ſeen* what he *underſtood by it.* My Lord's words immediately following thoſe above taken notice of, are: *And ſo that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties is the Nature, whether it be meant of Bodily or Spiritual Subſtances.* And then follow theſe, which to be rightly *underſtood* his Lordſhip ſays muſt be read thus: *I grant, that by Senſation and Reflection we come to know the Properties of Things; but our Reaſon, i. e.* the Principles of Reaſon allow'd by Mankind, *are ſatisfy'd that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe, becauſe it is impoſſible they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves: So that the nature* Vind. p. 252.

of things properly belongs to our Reaſon, i. e. to the Principles of Reaſon allow'd by Mankind; *and not to mere Ideas.* This Explication of it, reply'd the Gentleman, which my Lord Biſhop has given of this Paſſage, makes it more unintelligible to me than it was before; and I know him to be ſo great a Maſter of Senſe, that I doubt whether he himſelf will be better ſatisfy'd with this Senſe of his Words, than with that which you underſtood it in. But let us go on to the two next Paragraphs, wherein his Lordſhip is at farther pains to give us *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature:* And, that we may not miſtake, let us firſt read his words, which run thus:

Vind. *p.* 253. *But we muſt yet proceed farther; For* Nature *may be conſider'd two ways:*

1. *As it is in diſtinct Individuals; as the* Nature *of a* Man *is equally in* Peter, James, *and* John; *and this is the* common Nature, *with a particular Subſiſtence proper to each of them. For the Nature of a Man, as in* Peter, *is diſtinct from that ſame Nature, as it is in* James *and* John; *otherwiſe they would be but one Perſon, as well as have the ſame Nature. And this Diſtinction of Perſons in them, is diſcern'd both by our Senſes, as to their different Accidents; and by our Reaſon, becauſe they have a ſeparate Exiſtence, not coming into it at once, and in the ſame manner.*

2. Nature *may be conſider'd* abſtractly, *without reſpect to individual Perſons; and then it makes an intire Notion of it ſelf. For, however the ſame Nature may be in different Individuals, yet the Nature in it ſelf remains one and the ſame; which appears from this evident Reaſon, That otherwiſe every Individual muſt make a different Kind.*

In theſe words, ſaid he, having read them, I find the ſame Difficulties you took notice of in your Letter. As firſt, That it is not declar'd whether his Lordſhip ſpeaks here of Nature, as ſtanding for *Eſſential Properties*, or of *Nature*, as ſtanding for *Subſtance*; which Dubiouſneſs caſts an Obſcurity on the whole place. And next, I can no more tell than you, whether it be his Lordſhip's Opinion that I ought to think, That *one and the ſame Nature* is in *Peter* and *John*; or, That a *Nature diſtinct* from that in *John*, is in *Peter*; and that for the ſame reaſon which left you at a loſs, *viz.* Becauſe I cannot put together *one and the ſame* and *diſtinct*. But ſince his Lordſhip, in his Anſwer to you, has ſaid nothing to give us light in theſe matters, we muſt be content to be in the dark; and if he has not thought fit to explain it, ſo as to make himſelf to be underſtood by us, we may be ſure he has a Reaſon for it. But pray tell me, Did you underſtand the reſt of theſe two Paragraphs that you mention'd, only thoſe two Difficulties? For I muſt profeſs to you, That I underſtand ſo little of either of them, that they contribute nothing at all to give me thoſe *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon*, which I find, by his Lordſhip, it is neceſſary to have, before one can have a right Underſtanding of the Doctrine of the Trinity. Nay, I am ſo far from gaining by his Lordſhip's Diſcourſe thoſe *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon*, that what he objects to your *new Method of Certainty*, I found verify'd in this his *clearing the Diſtinction between Nature and Perſon*, that it left me in *more doubt than* I was in *before*.

Truly, Sir, reply'd I, that was juſt my Caſe; but minding then only what I thought immediately related to the Objections to my Book, which follow'd; I paſs'd by what I might have retorted concerning the Obſcurity and Difficulty in his Lordſhip's Doctrine about *Nature* and *Perſon*, and contented my ſelf to tell his Lordſhip, in as reſpectful Terms as I could find, that I could not underſtand him: which drew from him that ſevere Reflection, That I obſtinately ſtick to a way that leads to *Scepticiſm*, which is the *way of Ideas*. But now that, for the Vindication of my Book, I am ſhewing that his Lordſhip's way, *without Ideas*, does as little (I will not ſay leſs) furniſh us with *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon*, as my *Eſſay* does; I do not ſee but that his Lordſhip's *Vindication of the Trinity* is as much againſt the Doctrine of the Trinity, as my *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*; and may, with as much reaſon on that account, be animadverted on by another, who vindicates *the Doctrine of the Trinity*, as my Book is by his Lordſhip.

Indeed, ſaith he, if failing of *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon*, render any Book obnoxious to one that vindicates *the Doctrine of the Trinity*, and gives him ſufficient Cauſe to write againſt it, as oppoſite to that Doctrine; I know no Book of more *dangerous conſequence* to that Article of Faith,

Faith, nor more neceſſary to be writ againſt by a Defender of that Article, than h at part of his Lordſhip's Vindication, which we are now upon. For to my thinking, I never met with any thing more unintelligible about that Subject, nor that is more remote from *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon.* For what more effectual method could there be to confound the Notions of *Nature* and *Perſon*, inſtead of clearing their *Diſtinction*, than to diſcourſe of them without firſt defining them? Is this a way, to give *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions* of two Words, *upon a right Underſtanding of which, all our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity depend*; and without which, we *muſt talk unintelligibly about that Point?*

His Lordſhip tells us here, *Nature may be conſider'd two ways.* What is it the near to be told, *Nature may be conſider'd two* or twenty ways, till we know what that is which is to be conſider'd two ways? *i. e.* till he defines the Term *Nature*, that we may know what preciſely is the thing meant by it. Vind. p. 253.

He tells us, *Nature may be conſider'd,*

1. *As it is in Individuals.*
2. *Abſtractly.*

1. His Lordſhip ſays, *Nature may be conſider'd, as in diſtinct Individuals.* 'Tis true, by thoſe that know what Nature is. But his Lordſhip having not yet told me what Nature is, nor what he here means by it, it is impoſſible for me to *conſider Nature in* or out of *Individuals*, unleſs I can conſider I know not what: So that this Conſideration is, to me, as good as no Conſideration; neither does or can it help at all to any *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature.* Indeed he ſays, *Ariſtotle* by Nature ſignify'd a *Corporeal Subſtance*; and from thence his Lordſhip takes occaſion to ſay, that *Nature and Subſtance are of an equal extent:* Tho' *Ariſtotle, taking Nature for a Corporeal Subſtance*, gave no ground for ſuch a Saying, becauſe *Corporeal Subſtance* and *Subſtance are* not *of an equal extent.* But to paſs by that: If his Lordſhip would have us underſtand here, that by Nature he means Subſtance, this is but ſubſtituting one Name in the place of another; and, which is worſe, a more doubtful and obſcure Term, in the place of one that is leſs ſo: which will, I fear, not give us very *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature.* His Lordſhip goes on:

As the Nature of a Man is equally in Peter, James, *and* John; *and this is the common Nature, with a particular Subſiſtence proper to each of them.*

Here his Lordſhip does not tell us what Conſideration of Nature there may be, but actually affirms and teaches ſomething. I wiſh I had the Capacity to learn by it *the clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon*, which is the Leſſon he is upon here. He ſays, *That the Nature of a Man is equally in* Peter, James, *and* John. That's more than I know: Becauſe I do not know what things *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, are. They may be Drills, or Horſes, for ought I know; as well as *Weweena*, *Cuchipe*, and *Couſheda*, *may be Drills*, as his Lordſhip ſays, *for ought he knows.* For I know no Law of Speech that more neceſſarily makes theſe three Sounds, *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, ſtand for three Men; than *Weweena*, *Cuchipe*, and *Couſheda*, ſtand for three Men: For I knew a Horſe that was call'd *Peter*; and I do not know but the Maſter of the ſame Team might call other of his Horſes, *James* and *John.* Indeed if *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, are ſuppos'd to be the Names only of a Men, it cannot be queſtion'd but *the nature of Man is equally in them*; unleſs one can ſuppoſe each of them to be a Man, without having the Nature of Man in him: that is, ſuppoſe him to be a Man, without being a Man. But then this to me, I confeſs, gives no manner of *clear or diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning nature* in general, or the *Nature* of Man in particular; it ſeeming to me to ſay no more but this, That a Man is a Man, and a Drill is a Drill, and a Horſe is a Horſe: Or, which is all one, what has the Nature of a Man, has the Nature of a Man, or is a Man; and what has the Nature of a Drill, has the Nature of a Drill, or is a Drill; and what has the Nature of a Horſe, has the Nature of a Horſe, or is a Horſe; whether it be call'd *Peter*, or not call'd *Peter.* But if any one ſhould repeat this a thouſand times to me, and go over all the Species of Creatures, with ſuch an unqueſtionable Aſſertion of every one of them; I do not find, that thereby I ſhould get one jot *clearer or diſtincter Apprehenſions* either of Nature in general, or of the Nature of a Man, a Horſe, or a Drill, &c. in particular.

His Lordſhip adds, *And this is the common Nature, with a particular Subſiſtence proper to each of them.* I do not doubt but his Lordſhip ſet down theſe words with a very good Meaning; but ſuch is my Misfortune, that I, for my Life, cannot find it out. I have repeated *And this* twenty times to my ſelf; and my weak Underſtanding always rejolts, And what? To which I am always ready to anſwer, *The Nature of a Man in* Peter, *and the Nature of a Man in* James, *and the Nature of a Man in* John, *is the common Nature*; and there I ſtop, and can go no farther to make it coherent to my ſelf, till I add *of Man*: and then it muſt be read thus; *The Nature of Man in* Peter *is the common Nature of Man, with a particular Subſiſtence proper to* Peter. That the *Nature of Man* in *Peter*, is the *Nature of a Man*, if *Peter* be ſuppos'd to be a Man, I certainly know, let the Nature of Man be what it will, of which I yet know nothing: But if *Peter* be not ſuppos'd to be the Name of a Man, but be the Name of a Horſe, all that Knowledg vaniſhes, and I know nothing. But let *Peter* be ever ſo much a Man, and let it be impoſſible to give that Name to a Horſe; yet I cannot underſtand theſe words, That the *common Nature* of Man is in *Peter*; for whatſoever is in *Peter*, exiſts in *Peter*; and whatever exiſts in *Peter*, is particular: But the common Nature of Man, is the general Nature of Man, or elſe I underſtand not what is meant by *common Nature*. And it confounds my Underſtanding, to make a General a Particular.

But to help me to conceive this matter, I am told, *It is the common Nature, with a particular Subſiſtence proper to* Peter. But this helps not my Underſtanding in the caſe: For firſt, I do not underſtand what *Subſiſtence* is, if it ſignify any thing different from *Exiſtence*; and if it be the ſame with *Exiſtence*, then it is ſo far from looſening the Knot, that it leaves it juſt as it was, only cover'd with the obſcure and leſs known Term *Subſiſtence*. For the difficulty to me, is, to conceive an Univerſal Nature, or Univerſal Any-thing, to exiſt; which would be, in my mind, to make an Univerſal a Particular: which, to me, is impoſſible.

No, ſaid another who was by, 'tis but uſing the word *Subſiſtence* inſtead of *Exiſtence*, and there is nothing eaſier; if you will conſider this *common* or univerſal *Nature, with a particular Exiſtence*, under the name of *Subſiſtence*, the Buſineſs is done.

Juſt as eaſy, reply'd the former, I find it in my ſelf, as to conſider the Nature of a Circle with four Angles; for to conſider a Circle with four Angles, is no more impoſſible to me, than to conſider a Univerſal with a *particular Exiſtence*; which is to conſider a Univerſal really exiſting, and in effect a Particular. But the words *Proper to each of them*, follow to help me out. I hoped ſo, till I conſider'd them; and then I found I underſtood them as little as all the reſt. For I know not what is *a Subſtance proper to* Peter, more than to *James* or *John*, till I know *Peter* himſelf; and then indeed my Senſes will diſcern him from *James* or *John*, or any Man living.

His Lordſhip goes on: *For the Nature of Man, as in* Peter, *is diſtinct from that ſame Nature as it is in* James *and* John; *otherwiſe they would be but one Perſon, as well as have the ſame Nature.* Theſe words, by the cauſal Particle *For*, which introduces them, ſhould be a Proof of ſomething that goes before: but what they are meant for a Proof of, I confeſs I underſtand not. For the Propoſition preceding, as far as I can make any thing of it, is this; That the general Nature of a Man has a particular Exiſtence in each of the three, *Peter*, *James*, and *John*. But then how the ſaying, That *the Nature of Man, as in* Peter, *is diſtinct from the ſame Nature as it is in* James *and* John, does prove that the general Nature of Man does or can exiſt in either of them, I cannot ſee.

The words which follow, *Otherwiſe they would be but one Perſon, as well as have the ſame Nature*, I ſee the Connection of: for it is viſible they were brought to prove, that the Nature in *Peter* is *diſtinct* from the Nature in *James* and *John*. But with all that, I do not ſee of what Uſe or Significancy they are here: becauſe, to me, they are more obſcure and doubtful, than the Propoſition they are brought to prove. For I ſcarce think there can be a clearer Propoſition than this, *viz.* That three Natures, that have three diſtinct Exiſtences in three Men, are, as his Lordſhip ſays, three diſtinct Natures, and ſo needs no Proof. But to prove it by this, That *otherwiſe they could not be three Perſons*, is to prove it by a Pro-

Propoſition unintelligible to me; becauſe his Lordſhip has not yet told me, what the *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſion of Perſon is*, which I ought to have. For his Lordſhip ſuppoſing it, as he does, to be a Term, which has in it ſelf a certain Signification; I, who have no ſuch Conception of it ſhould in vain look for it in the Propriety of our Language, which is eſtabliſh'd upon arbitrary Impoſition; and ſo can, by no means, imagine what *Perſon* here ſignifies, till his Lordſhip ſhall do me the favour to tell me.

To this I reply'd, That Page 259, which is but ſix Pages farther, your Lordſhip explains the Notion of *Perſon*.

To which the Gentleman anſwer'd, Whether I can get clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of *Perſon*, by what his Lordſhip ſays there of *Perſon*, I ſhall ſee when I come to it. But this, in the mean time muſt be confeſs'd, That *Perſon* comes in here ſix Pages too ſoon for thoſe who want his Lordſhip's Explication of it, to make them have *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions* of what he means when he uſes it.

For we muſt certainly talk *unintelligibly* about *Nature* and *Perſon*, as well as *about the Doctrine of the Trinity*, unleſs we have *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon*; as his Lordſhip ſays, in the foregoing Page.

It follows, *And this Diſtinction of Perſon in them, it diſcern'd both by our Senſes, as to their different Accidents; and by our Reaſon, becauſe they have a ſeparate Exiſtence; not coming into it at once and in the ſame manner.*

Theſe Words, ſaid he, which conclude this Paragraph, tell us how *Perſons* are diſtinguiſh'd; but, as far as I can ſee, ſerve not at all to give us any *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature, by conſidering it in diſtinct Individuals*: which was the Buſineſs of this Paragraph.

His Lordſhip ſays, *We may conſider* Nature *as in diſtinct Individuals*: And ſo I do as much, when I conſider it in three diſtinct Phyſical Atoms or Particles, of *Air* or *Æther*, as when I conſider it in *Peter*, *James* and *John*. For three diſtinct Phyſical Atoms are three diſtinct Individuals, and have three diſtinct Natures in them, as certainly as three diſtinct Men; tho' I cannot *diſcern* the *Diſtinction* between them *by my Senſes, as to their different Accidents*; nor is their *ſeparate Exiſtence* diſcernible to my *Reaſon, by their not coming into it at once and in the ſame manner*: For they did, for ought I know, or at leaſt might, come into Exiſtence at once and in the ſame manner, which was by *Creation*. I think it will be allow'd, That God did, or might, create more than one Phyſical Atom of Matter at once: So that here *Nature may be conſider'd in diſtinct Individuals*, without any of thoſe ways of Diſtinction which his Lordſhip here ſpeaks of: And ſo I cannot ſee how theſe laſt Words contribute ought to give us *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature*, by *conſidering Nature in diſtinct Individuals*.

But to try what *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature*, his Lordſhip's way of conſidering *Nature* in this Paragraph carries in it; let me repeat his Lordſhip's Diſcourſe to you here, only changing one *common Nature* for another, *viz.* putting the *common Nature of Animal*, for the *common Nature of Man*, which his Lordſhip has choſe to inſtance in; and then his Lordſhip's Words would run thus: *Nature may be conſider'd two ways*; Firſt, *As it is in diſtinct Individuals; as the Nature of an* Animal *is equally in* Alexander, Bucephalus, *and* Podargus: *And this is the common Nature, with a particular Subſiſtence, proper to each of them. For the Nature of* Animal, *as in* Bucephalus, *is diſtinct from the ſame Nature, as in* Podargus *and* Alexander; *otherwiſe they would be but one Perſon, as well as have the ſame Nature. And this Diſtinction of Perſons in them, is diſcern'd both by our Senſes, as to their different Accidents; and by our Reaſon, becauſe they have a ſeparate Exiſtence, not coming into it at once and in the ſame manner.*

To this I ſaid, I thought he did violence to your Lordſhip's Senſe, in applying the word *Perſon*, which ſignifies an intelligent Individual, to *Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, which were two irrational Animals.

To which the Gentleman reply'd, That he fell into this Miſtake, by his thinking your Lordſhip had ſomewhere ſpoken, as if an individual intelligent *Subſtance were not the proper Definition of Perſon*. But, continu'd he, I lay no

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ſtreſs on the word *Perſon*, in the Inſtance wherein I have us'd his Lordſhip's Words, and therefore, if you pleaſe, put *Individual* for it; and then reading it ſo, let me ask you, Whether that way of conſidering it contributes any thing to the giving you *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature?* which it ought to do, if his Lordſhip's way of *conſidering Nature* in that Paragraph, were of any uſe to that purpoſe: Since the *common Nature* of Animal is as much the ſame; or, as his Lordſhip ſays in the next Paragraph, *as much an entire Notion of it ſelf*, as the *common Nature of Man*. And the *common Nature* of Animal is as equally in *Alexander*, *Bucephalus*, and *Podargus*, with *a particular Subſiſtence proper to each of them*, as the *common Nature of Man is equally in* Peter, James, *and* John, *with a particular Subſiſtence proper to each of them*, &c. But pray what does all this do towards the giving you *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature?*

I reply'd, Truly neither the Conſideration of Nature, as in his Lordſhip's diſtinct Individuals, *viz.* in *Peter*, *James*, and *John*; nor the Conſideration of Nature, as in your diſtinct Individuals, *viz.* in *Alexander*, *Bucephalus*, and *Podargus*,; did any thing towards the giving me *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature*. Nay, they were ſo far from it, that after having gone over both the one and the other ſeveral times in my Thoughts, I ſeem to have leſs *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature*, than I had before, but whether it will be ſo with other People, as I perceive it is with you, and me, and ſome others, none of the dulleſt, whom I have talk'd with upon this Subject, that muſt be left to Experience; and if there be others that do hereby get ſuch *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature*, which may help them in their *Notions* of the Trinity, that cannot be deny'd them.

That's true, ſaid he: But if that be ſo, I muſt neceſſarily conclude, That the *Notioniſts* and the *Ideiſts* have their apprehenſive Faculties very differently turn'd; ſince in their explaining themſelves (which they on both ſides think clear and intelligible) they cannot underſtand one another.

But let us go on to *Nature*, *conſider'd abſtractly*, in the next Words.

Secondly, *Nature may be conſider'd*, ſays his Lordſhip, *abſtractly, without reſpect to individual Perſons.*

I do not ſee, ſaid he, what *Perſons* do here, more than any other Individuals. For *Nature*, *conſider'd abſtractly*, has no more reſpect to *Perſons*, than any other ſort of Individuals.

And then, ſays his Lordſhip, *it makes an entire Notion of it ſelf.* To make an *entire Notion of it ſelf*, being an Expreſſion I never met with before, I ſhall not, I think, be much blam'd if I be not confident, that I perfectly underſtand it. To gueſs therefore, as well as I can, what can be meant by it, I conſider, That whatever the Mind makes an Object of its Contemplation at any time, may be call'd one *Notion*, or as you perhaps would call it, one *Idea*; which may be an *entire Notion* or *Idea*, tho' it be but the half of what is the Object of the Mind at another time. For methinks the Number Five is as much an *entire Notion of it ſelf*, when the Mind contemplates the Number Five by it ſelf; as the Number Ten is *an entire Notion by it ſelf*, when the Mind contemplates that alone and its Properties: And in this Senſe I can underſtand an *entire Notion by it ſelf*. But if it mean any thing elſe, I confeſs I do not underſtand it. But then the Difficulty remains; For I cannot ſee how in this Senſe, *Nature abſtractly conſider'd makes an entire Notion*, more than the Nature of *Peter makes an entire Notion*. For if the Nature in *Peter* be conſider'd by it ſelf, or if the abſtract *Nature of Man* be conſider'd by it ſelf, or if the *Nature* of Animal (which is yet more abſtract) be conſider'd by it ſelf; every one of theſe, being made the whole Object that the Mind at any time contemplates, ſeems to me, as *much an entire Notion* as either of the other.

But farther, What the calling *Nature abſtractly conſider'd an entire Notion in it ſelf*, contributes to our having or not having *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature*, is yet more remote from my Comprehenſion.

Vind. *p.* 254. His Lordſhip's next Words are; *For however the ſame Nature may be in different Individuals; yet the Nature in it ſelf remains one and the ſame: Which appears from this evident Reaſon, That otherwiſe every Individual muſt make a different kind.*

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The Coherence of which Diſcourſe, continu'd he, tending, as it ſeems, to prove, That *Nature, conſider'd abſtractly, makes an entire Notion of it ſelf*; ſtands, as far as I can comprehend it, thus: Becauſe *every Individual muſt not make a different Kind*; therefore *Nature, however it be in different Individuals, yet in it ſelf it remains one and the ſame.* And becauſe *Nature, however it be in different Individuals, yet in it ſelf remains one and the ſame*; therefore, *conſider'd abſtractly, it makes an entire Notion of it ſelf.* This is the Argument of this Paragraph; and the Connection of it, if I underſtand the connecting Words, *For*, and *from this evident Reaſon.* But if they are us'd for any thing elſe but to tie thoſe Propoſitions together, as the Proofs one of another, in that way I have mention'd them; I confeſs, I underſtand them not, nor any thing that is meant by this whole Paragraph. And in that Senſe I underſtand it in, what it does towards the giving us *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature*, I muſt confeſs I do not ſee at all.

Thus far, ſaid he, we have conſider'd his Lordſhip's Explication of *Nature*; and my underſtanding what his Lordſhip has diſcours'd upon it, under ſeveral Heads, for *the giving us clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning it.*

Let us now read what his Lordſhip has ſaid concerning *Perſon*; that I may, ſince you deſire it of me, let you ſee how far I have got any *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſion of Perſon* from his Lordſhip's Explications of that. His Lordſhip's Words are; *Let us now come to the Idea of a* Perſon. *For, altho' the* common Nature *of Mankind be the ſame, yet we ſee a difference in the ſeveral Individuals from one another: So that* Peter, *and* James, *and* John, *are all of the ſame kind; yet* Peter *is not* James, *and* James *is not* John. *But what is this Diſtinction founded upon? They may be diſtinguiſhed from each other by our Senſes, as to Difference of Features, Diſtance of Place,* &c. *but that is not all; for ſuppoſing there were no external Difference, yet there is a Difference between them, as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature. And here lies the true Idea of a Perſon, which ariſes from the manner of Subſtance, which is in one Individual, and is not communicable to another. An Individual intelligent Subſtance is rather ſuppos'd to the making of a* Perſon, *than the proper Definition of it; for a Perſon relates to ſomething which doth diſtinguiſh it from another* Intelligent Subſtance *in the* ſame Nature; *and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subſiſtence, which agrees to one, and to none elſe, of the kind; and this is it which is call'd Perſonality.* Vindic. p. 259.

In theſe Words, this I underſtand very well, That ſuppoſing *Peter, James* and *John* to be all three Men; and Man being a Name for one *Kind* of Animals, *they are all of the ſame Kind.* I underſtand too very well, *That* Peter *is not* James, *and* James *is not* John, *but that there is a Difference in theſe ſeveral Individuals.* I underſtand alſo, *That they may be diſtinguiſh'd from each other by our Senſes, as to different Features and diſtance of Place,* &c. But what follows, I do confeſs I do not underſtand, where his Lordſhip ſays, *But that is not all; for ſuppoſing there were no ſuch external difference, yet there is a difference between them, as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame Nature.* For firſt, whatever Willingneſs I have to gratify his Lordſhip in whatever he would have me ſuppoſe, yet I cannot, I find, ſuppoſe, That there is no ſuch *external difference* between *Peter* and *James*, as difference of Place; for I cannot ſuppoſe a Contradiction: And it ſeems to me to imply a Contradiction to ſay, *Peter* and *James* are not in different Places. The next thing I do not underſtand, is what his Lordſhip ſays in theſe Words; *For ſuppoſing there were no ſuch external difference, yet there is a difference between them, as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame Nature.* For theſe words being here to ſhew what the *Diſtinction of* Peter, James *and* John *is founded upon*, I do not underſtand how they at all do it.

His Lordſhip ſays, Peter *is not* James, *and* James *is not* John. He then asks, *But what is this Diſtinction founded upon?* And to reſolve that, he anſwers, *Not by difference of Features, or diſtance of Place*, with an &c. Becauſe, *Suppoſing there were no ſuch external difference, yet there is a difference between them.* In which Paſſage, by theſe Words, *Such external difference*, muſt be meant all other difference but what his Lordſhip, in the next Words, is going to name; or elſe I do not ſee how his Lordſhip ſhews *what this Diſtinction is founded upon.* For if, *ſuppoſing ſuch external differences* away, there may be other differences

ſerences *on which to found their Diſtinction*, beſides that other which his Lordſhip ſubjoins, *viz. The difference that is between them, as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame Nature*: I cannot ſee that his Lordſhip has ſaid any thing to ſhew what the Diſtinction between thoſe Individuals is founded on; becauſe if he has not, under the Terms *external difference*, compriz'd all the differences beſides that his chief and fundamental one, *viz. The difference between them as ſeveral Individuals, in the ſame common Nature*; it may be founded on what his Lordſhip has not mention'd. I conclude then it is his Lordſhip's meaning, (or elſe I can ſee no meaning in his Words) That *ſuppoſing* no *Difference* between them, *of Features or diſtance of Place*, &c. *i. e.* no other difference between them, *yet there would be* ſtill the true Ground of Diſtinction, in the *difference between them, as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature.*

Let us then underſtand, if we can, what is the *difference between things*, barely *as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature, all* other differences laid aſide.

Truly, ſaid I, that I cannot conceive.

Nor I neither, reply'd the Gentleman: For conſidering them as ſeveral Individuals, was what his Lordſhip did, when he ſaid, Peter *was not* James, *and* James *was not* John; and if that were enough to ſhew *on what the Diſtinction between them was founded*, his Lordſhip needed have gone no farther in his Enquiry after that, for that he had found already: And yet methinks thither are we at laſt come again, *as to the Foundation of the Diſtinction* between them, *viz. That they are ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature.* Nor can I here ſee any other *Ground of the Diſtinction* between thoſe, that are *ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature*, but this, That they are *ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature.* Either this is all the meaning that his Lordſhip's Words, when conſider'd, carry in them; or elſe I do not underſtand what they mean: And either way, I muſt own, they do not much towards the giving me *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon.*

One thing more I muſt remark to you, in his Lordſhip's way of expreſſing himſelf here; and that is, in the former part of the Words laſt read he ſpeaks, as he does all along, of the *ſame common Nature being in Mankind*, or in the ſeveral Individuals: And in the latter part of them, he ſpeaks of *ſeveral Individuals being in the ſame common Nature.* I do by no means find fault with ſuch figurative and common way of ſpeaking, in popular and ordinary Diſcourſes, where inaccurate Thoughts allow inaccurate ways of ſpeaking: but I think I may ſay, That Metaphorical Expreſſions (which ſeldom terminate in preciſe Truth) ſhould be as much as poſſible avoided, when Men undertake to deliver *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions*, and exact Notions of Things: Becauſe, being taken ſtrictly and according to the Letter, (as we find they are apt to be) they always puzzle and miſlead, rather than inlighten and inſtruct.

I do not ſay this (continued he) with an Intention to accuſe his Lordſhip of inaccurate Notions; but yet, I think, his ſticking ſo cloſe all along to that vulgar way of ſpeaking of the *ſame common Nature* being *in ſeveral Individuals*, has made him leſs eaſy to be underſtood. For to ſpeak truly and preciſely of this Matter, as in reality it is, there is no ſuch thing as *one and the ſame common Nature in ſeveral Individuals*: For all that in Truth is in them, is particular, and can be nothing but particular. But the true meaning (when it has any) of that metaphorical and popular Phraſe, I take to be this, and no more, That every particular individual Man or Horſe, &c. has ſuch a Nature or Conſtitution, as agrees, and is conformable to that Idea which that general Name ſtands for.

His Lordſhip's next Words are; *And here lies the true Idea of a Perſon, which ariſes from that manner of Subſiſtence which is in one Individual, and is not communicable to another.* The reading of theſe Words, ſaid he, makes me wiſh, That we had ſome other way of communicating our Thoughts, than by Words; for, no doubt, it would have been as much a Pleaſure to have ſeen what his Lordſhip's Thoughts were when he writ this, as it is now an Uneaſineſs to pudder in Words and Expreſſions, whoſe meaning one does not

not comprehend. But let us do the beſt we can. *And here,* ſays his Lordſhip, *lies the true Idea of Perſon.*

Perſon being a Diſ ſyllable that in it ſelf ſignifies nothing; what is meant by the *true Idea* of it (it having no *Idea*, one more than another, that belongs to it, but the *Idea* of the articulate Sound, that thoſe two Syllables make in pronouncing) I do not underſtand. If by *true Idea* be meant true Signification, then theſe words will run thus; *Here lies* the true Signification of the word *Perſon*; and then to make it more intelligible, we muſt change *Here* into *Herein*, and then the whole Comma will ſtand thus; *Herein lies the true* Signification *of* the word *Perſon:* which reading *Herein*, muſt refer to the preceding words: And then the meaning of theſe words will be, The true Signification *of Perſon lies* in this, that *ſuppoſing* there were no other *difference in the ſeveral Individuals of the ſame kind*; yet there is *a difference between them, as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature.* Now, if in this *lies* the true Signification of the word *Perſon*, he muſt find it here that can. For if he does find it in theſe words, he muſt find it to be ſuch a Signification as will make the word *Perſon* agree as well to *Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, as to *Alexander*: For let the *difference between* Bucephalus *and* Podargus, *as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature*, be what it will; 'tis certain, 'twill always be as great, as the difference between *Alexander* and *Hector, as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature.* So that, if the true Signification of *Perſon* lies in that *difference*, it will belong to *Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, as well as to *Alexander* and *Hector.* But let any one reaſon ever ſo ſubtilly or profoundly about the *true Idea*, or true Signification of the Term *Perſon*, he will never be able to make me underſtand, That *Bucephalus* and *Podargus* are *Perſons*, in the true Signification of the word *Perſon*, as commonly us'd in the *Engliſh* Tongue.

But that which more certainly and for ever will hinder me from finding the true Signification of *Perſon*, *lying* in the foregoing words, is, That they require me to do what I find is impoſſible for me to do, *i. e.* find a difference between two Individuals, *as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature*, without any other difference. For if I never found any other difference, I ſhould never find two Individuals. For firſt, we find ſome difference, and by that we find they are two or ſeveral Individuals; but in this way we are bid to find two Individuals, without any difference: But that, I find, is too ſubtil and ſublime for my weak Capacity. But when by any difference of Time, or Place, or any thing elſe, I have once found them to be two, or *ſeveral*, I cannot for ever after conſider them but as ſeveral. They being once, by ſome difference, found to be two, 'tis unavoidable for me from thenceforth to conſider them as two. But to find *ſeverals* where I find no *difference*; or, as his Lordſhip is pleas'd to call it, *external difference* at all; is, I confeſs, too hard for me.

This his Lordſhip farther tells us, in theſe words which follow; *Which ariſes from the manner of Subſiſtence, which is in one Individual, which is not communicable to another:* Which is, I own, a learned way of ſpeaking, and is ſuppos'd to contain ſome refin'd Philoſophick Notion in it, which to me is either wholly incomprehenſible, or elſe may be expreſs'd in theſe plain and common Words, *viz.* That every Thing that exiſts has, in the Time or Place, or other perceivable differences of its Exiſtence, ſomething incommunicable to all thoſe of its own kind, whereby it will eternally be kept *ſeveral* from all the reſt. This, I think, is that which the Learned have been pleas'd to term a *peculiar manner of Subſiſtence*; but if this *manner of Subſiſtence* be any thing elſe, it will need ſome farther Explication to make me underſtand it.

His Lordſhip's next words which follow, I muſt acknowledg are alſo wholly incomprehenſible to me: They are, *An individual intelligent Subſtance is rather ſuppos'd to the making of a Perſon, than the proper Definition of it.*

Perſon is a Word; and the *Idea* that Word ſtands for, or the proper Signification of that Word, is what I take his Lordſhip is here giving us. Now what is meant by ſaying, *An individual intelligent Subſtance is rather ſuppos'd to the making* the Signification of the word *Perſon*, than the *proper Definition*

of it, is beyond my reach. And the Reaſon his Lordſhip adjoins, puts it in that, or any other Senſe, farther from my Comprehenſion. *For a Perſon relates to ſomething which does diſtinguiſh it from another intelligent Subſtance in the ſame Nature; and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subſiſtence, which agrees to one, and none elſe, of the kind: and this is that which is call'd Perſonality.*

Theſe words, if nothing elſe, convince me that I am *Davus*, and not *Oedipus*; and ſo I muſt leave them.

His Lordſhip, at laſt, gives us what, I think, he intends for a Definition of
Vind. p. 261. *Perſon*, in theſe words: *Therefore a Perſon is a compleat intelligent Subſtance, with a peculiar manner of Subſiſtence.* Where I cannot but obſerve, That what was, as I think, deny'd or half-deny'd to be the proper Definition of *Perſon*; in ſaying, *It was rather ſuppos'd to the making of a Perſon, than the proper Definition of it*, is yet here got into his Lordſhip's Definition of *Perſon*; which I cannot ſuppoſe, but his Lordſhip takes to be a proper *Definition*. There is only one word chang'd in it; and inſtead of *individual intelligent Subſtance*, his Lordſhip has put it *compleat intelligent Subſtance*: which, whether it makes his the more *proper Definition*, I leave to others; ſince poſſibly ſome will be apt to think, That a *proper Definition of Perſon* cannot be well made, without the Term *individual*, or an equivalent. But his Lordſhip has, as
Vind. p. 216. appears by the Place, put in *compleat*, to exclude the *Soul* from being a *Perſon*; which, whether it does it or no, to me ſeems doubtful: Becauſe poſſibly many may think, that the Soul is a *compleat intelligent Subſtance* by it ſelf, whether in the Body or out of the Body; becauſe every Subſtance that has a Being, is a *compleat Subſtance*, whether join'd or not join'd to another. And as to the Soul's being intelligent, no body, I gueſs, thinks, that the Soul is compleated in that, by its Union with the Body; for then it would follow, that it would not be equally intelligent out of the Body; which, I think, no body will ſay.

And thus I have, at your Requeſt, gone over all that his Lordſhip has ſaid, to give us *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon*, which are ſo neceſſary to the underſtanding the Doctrine of the Trinity, and talking intelligibly about it. And if I ſhould judg of others by my own Dulneſs, I ſhould fear that by his Lordſhip's Diſcourſe, Few would be helped to think or talk intelligibly about it. But I meaſure not others by my narrow Capacity: I wiſh others may profit by his Lordſhip's Explication of *Nature* and *Perſon*, more than I have done. And ſo the Converſation ended.

My Lord, I ſhould not have troubled your Lordſhip with a Dialogue of this kind, had not your Lordſhip forc'd me to it in my own Defence. Your Lordſhip, at the end of your above-mention'd Explication of *Nature*, has theſe
Vind. p. 254. words: *Let us now ſee how far theſe Things can come from our Ideas, by Senſation and Reflection.* And to the like purpoſe, in the cloſe of your Explication of *Perſon*, your Lordſhip ſays, *But how do our ſimple Ideas help us out in this Matter? Can we learn from them the difference of Nature and Perſon?* Your Lordſhip concludes we cannot. But you ſay, what makes a *Perſon, muſt be underſtood ſome other way.* And hereupon, my Lord, my Book is thought worthy by your Lordſhip, to be brought into the Controverſy and argu'd againſt, in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*; becauſe, as your Lordſhip conceives, *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon* cannot be had from it.

I humbly crave leave to repreſent to your Lordſhip, That if want of affording *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon*, make any Book Anti-trinitarian, and, as ſuch, fit to be writ againſt by your Lordſhip; your Lordſhip ought, in the Opinion of a great many Men, in the firſt place, to write againſt your own *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*: ſince, among the many I have conſulted concerning your Lordſhip's Notions of *Nature and Perſon*, I do not find any one that underſtands them better, or has got from them any *clearer or more diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon*, than I my ſelf; which indeed is none at all.

The owning of this to your Lordſhip in my former Letter, I find, diſpleas'd your Lordſhip: I therefore here laid before your Lordſhip ſome

part

part of thoſe Difficulties which appear to me, and others, in your Lordſhip's Explication of *Nature* and *Perſon*, as my Apology for ſaying, I had not learn'd any thing by it. And to make it evident, that if want of *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature and Perſon*, involve any Treatiſe in the *Unitarian* Controverſy; your Lordſhip's upon that account, is, I humbly conceive, as guilty as mine; and may be reckon'd one of the firſt that ought to be charg'd with that Offence againſt the *Doctrine of the Trinity*.

This, my Lord, I cannot help thinking, till I underſtand better. Whether the not being able to get *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon*, from what your Lordſhip has ſaid of them, be the want of Capacity in my Underſtanding, or want of Clearneſs in that which I have endeavour'd to underſtand, I ſhall not preſume to ſay; of that the World muſt judg. If it be my Dulneſs (as I cannot preſume much upon my own Quickneſs, having every Day experience how ſhort-ſighted I am) I have this yet to defend me from any very ſevere Cenſure in the Caſe, That I have as much endeavour'd to underſtand your Lordſhip, as I ever did to underſtand any Body. And if your Lordſhip's Notions, laid down about *Nature* and *Perſon*, are plain and intelligible, there are a great many others, whoſe Parts lie under no Blemiſh in the World, who find them neither *plain nor intelligible*.

Pardon me therefore, I beſeech you, my Lord, if I return your Lordſhip's Queſtion, *How do* your Lordſhip's Notions *help us out in this Matter? Can we learn from them, clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon, and the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction?* To which the Anſwer will ſtand, No; till your Lordſhip has explain'd your Notions of them a little clearer, and ſhewn what ultimately they were founded on, and made up of, if they are not ultimately founded on and made up of our ſimple *Ideas*, receiv'd from Senſation and Reflection; which is that for which, in this Point, you except againſt my Book: And yet, tho' your Lordſhip ſets your ſelf to prove, that they cannot be had from *our ſimple Ideas by Senſation and Reflection*; tho' your Lordſhip lays down ſeveral Heads about them; yet you do not, that I ſee, offer any thing to inſtruct us from what other Original they come, or whence they are to be had. Vind. *p.* 254, &c.

But perhaps this may be my want of Underſtanding what your Lordſhip has ſaid about them: And, poſſibly, from the ſame cauſe it is, that I do not ſee how the four Paſſages your Lordſhip ſubjoins, as out of my Book, (tho' there be no ſuch Paſſages in my Book; as, I think, your Lordſhip acknowledges, ſince your Lordſhip anſwers nothing to what I ſaid thereupon;) the two things your Lordſhip ſays *are granted*, *that tend to the clearing this matter*; and the four Inferences your Lordſhip makes; are all or any of them, apply'd by your Lordſhip, to ſhew that *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon* cannot be had upon my Principles; at leaſt as clear as can be had upon your Lordſhip's, when you pleaſe to let us know them. Vind. *p.* 254, 255.---259. P. 255. P. 255.-259.

Hitherto, my Lord, I have conſider'd only what is charg'd upon my Book by your Lordſhip, in reference to the Unitarian Controverſy, *viz.* The Manner and Grounds on which my Book has been, by your Lordſhip, endeavour'd to be brought into the Controverſy concerning the Trinity, with which it hath nothing to do: nor has your Lordſhip, as I humbly conceive, yet ſhewn that it has.

There remains to be conſider'd ſeveral things, which your Lordſhip thinks faulty in my Book; which, whether they have any thing to do or no with the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, I think my ſelf oblig'd to give your Lordſhip Satisfaction in, either by acknowledging my Errors, or giving your Lordſhip an account wherein your Lordſhip's Diſcourſe comes ſhort of convincing me of them. But theſe Papers being already grown to a Bulk that exceeds the ordinary ſize of a Letter, I ſhall reſpit your Lordſhip's farther trouble in this matter for the preſent, with this Promiſe, That I ſhall not fail to return my Acknowledgments to your Lordſhip, for thoſe other parts of the Letter you have honour'd me with.

Before I conclude, 'tis fit, with due Acknowledgment, I take notice of theſe Words, in the cloſe of your Lordſhip's Letter: *I hope, that in the managing this Debate, I have not either tranſgreſs'd the Rules of Civility, or miſtaken your Meaning; both which I have endeavour'd to avoid. And I return you Thanks for the Civilities* P. 133. *you*

you have Expreſs'd to me, through your Letter: And I do aſſure you, That it is out of no Diſreſpect, or the leaſt Ill-will to you, that I have again conſider'd this matter, &c.

Your Lordſhip *hopes you have not miſtaken my Meaning:* And I, my Lord, hope that where you have (as I humbly conceive I ſhall make it appear you have) *miſtaken my Meaning*, I may, without offence, lay it before your Lordſhip. And I the more confidently ground that Hope upon this Expreſſion of your Lordſhip here, which I take to be intended to that Purpoſe: ſince, in thoſe ſeveral Inſtances I gave in my former Letter, of your Lordſhip's miſtaking not only my Meaning, but the very Words of my Book which you quoted, your Lordſhip has had the Goodneſs to bear with me, without any manner of Reply.

Anſ. p. 133. Your Lordſhip *aſſures* me, *That it is out of no Diſreſpect or the leaſt Ill-will* to me, *that you have again conſider'd this matter.*

My Lord, my never having, by any Act of mine, deſerv'd otherwiſe of your Lordſhip, is a ſtrong Reaſon to keep me from queſtioning what your Lordſhip ſays. And, I hope, my part in the Controverſy has been ſuch, that I may be excus'd from making any ſuch Profeſſion, in reference to what I write to your Lordſhip. And I ſhall take care to continue to defend my ſelf ſo, in this Controverſy, which your Lordſhip is pleas'd to have with me, that I ſhall not come within the need of any Apology, That what I ſay *is out of no Diſreſpect or the leaſt Ill-will to your Lordſhip.* But this muſt not hinder me any where, from laying the Argument in its due light, for the Advantage of Truth.

This, my Lord, I ſay not to your Lordſhip, who propoſing to your ſelf, as you ſay in this very Page, nothing but *Truth*, will not, I know, take it amiſs, that I endeavour to make every thing as plain and as clear as I can: But this I ſay, upon occaſion of ſome Exceptions of this kind, which I have heard others have made againſt the former Letter I did my ſelf the Honour to write to your Lordſhip, as if I did therein *bear too hard upon your Lordſhip.* Tho' your Lordſhip, who knows very well the End of Arguing, as well as Rules of Civility, finds nothing to blame in my way of writing; and I ſhould be very ſorry it ſhould deſerve any other Character, than what your Lordſhip has been pleas'd to give it in the Beginning of your *Poſtſcript.* It is my Misfortune to have any Controverſy with your Lordſhip; but ſince the Concern of Truth alone engages me in it, as I know your Lordſhip will expect that I ſhould omit nothing that ſhould make for Truth, for that is the End we both profeſs to aim at; ſo I ſhall take care to avoid all foreign, paſſionate, and unmannerly Mixtures, which do no way become a Lover of Truth in any Debate, eſpecially with one of your Lordſhip's Character and Dignity.

My Lord, the Imputation of a *Tendency to Scepticiſm*, and to the *overthrowing any Article of the Chriſtian Faith*, are no ſmall Charge; and all Cenſures of that high nature, I humbly conceive, are with the more Caution to be paſs'd, the greater the Authority is of the Perſon they come from. But whether to pronounce ſo hardly of the Book, merely upon Surmiſes, be to be taken for a Mark of Good-will to the Author, I muſt leave to your Lordſhip. This I am ſure, I find the World thinks me oblig'd to vindicate my ſelf. I have taken leave to ſay, merely upon Surmiſes, becauſe I cannot ſee any Argument your Lordſhip has any where brought, to ſhew its Tendency to Scepticiſm, beyond what your Lordſhip has in theſe Words in this Page, *viz.* That it is your Lordſhip's *great Prejudice againſt it that it leads to Scepticiſm*; or, That *your Lordſhip can find no way to attain to Certainty in it, upon my Grounds.*

I confeſs, my Lord, I think that there is a great part of the viſible, and a great deal more of the yet much larger intellectual World, wherein our poor and weak Underſtandings, in this State, are not capable of Knowledg; and this, I think, a great part of Mankind agrees with me in. But whether or no my way of *Certainty by Ideas* comes ſhort of what it ſhould, or your Lordſhip's way, with or without *Ideas*, will carry us to clearer and larger degrees of Certainty; we ſhall ſee, when your Lordſhip pleaſes to let us know wherein your way of Certainty conſiſts. Till then, I think, to avoid *Scepticiſm*, it is better to have ſome way of *Certainty* (tho' it will not lead us to it in every thing) than no way at all.

The neceſſity your Lordſhip has put upon me of vindicating my ſelf, muſt be my Apology for giving your Lordſhip this ſecond Trouble; which, I aſſure my

ſelf,

ſelf, you will not take amiſs, ſince your Lordſhip was ſo much concern'd for my *Vindication*, as to declare, You *had no reaſon to be ſorry*, that the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious had given me occaſion to* vindicate my ſelf. I return your Lordſhip my humble Thanks for affording me this ſecond Opportunity to do it; and am, with the utmoſt Reſpect, P. 36.

London, 29 *June*, 1697.

My LORD,

Your Lordſhip's moſt Humble

And moſt Obedient Servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

POSTSCRIPT.

My LORD,

THO' I have ſo great a Precedent, as your Lordſhip has given me in the Letter you have honour'd me with; yet, I doubt, whether even your Lordſhip's Example will be enough to juſtify me to the World, if, in a Letter writ to one, I ſhould put a Poſtſcript in anſwer to another Man, to whom I do not ſpeak in my Letter: I ſhall therefore only beg, That your Lordſhip will be pleas'd to excuſe it, if you find a ſhort Anſwer to the Paper of another Man, not big enough to be publiſh'd by it ſelf, appear under the ſame Cover with my Anſwer to your Lordſhip. The Paper it ſelf came to my hands, at the ſame time that your Lordſhip's Letter did; and, containing ſome Exceptions to my *Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding*, is not wholly foreign in the matter of it.

A N

AN

ANSWER

TO

REMARKS

UPON

An Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding, &c.

BEFORE any thing came out againſt my *Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding* the laſt Year, I was told, That I muſt prepare my ſelf for a Storm that was coming againſt it; it being reſolv'd by ſome Men, That it was neceſſary that Book of mine ſhould, as 'tis phras'd, be run down. I do not ſay, that the Author of theſe *Remarks* was one of thoſe Men: but I premiſe this as the Reaſon of the Anſwer I am about to give him. And tho' I do not ſay he was one of them, yet in this, I think, every indifferent Reader will agree with me, That his Letter does not very well ſuit with the Character he takes upon himſelf, or the Deſign he pretends in writing it.

P. 4. He pretends, the Buſineſs of his Letter is *to be inform'd:* But if that were in earneſt ſo, I ſuppoſe he would have done two things quite otherwiſe than he has. The firſt is, That he would not have thought it neceſſary, for his particular Information, that his Letter (that pretends Inquiry in the Body of it, tho' it carries *Remarks* in the Title) ſhould have been publiſh'd in Print: Whereby I am apt to think, that however in it he puts on the Perſon of a Learner, yet he would miſs his Aim, if he were not taken notice of as a Teacher; and particularly, that his *Remarks* ſhew'd the World great Faults in my Book.

The other is, That he has not ſet his Name to his Letter of Inquiries; whereby I might, by knowing the Perſon that inquires, the better know how to ſuit my Anſwer to him. I cannot much blame him in another reſpect, for concealing his Name: for, I think, any one who appears among Chriſtians, may be well
P. 6, & 7. aſham'd of his Name, when he raiſes ſuch a Doubt as this, *viz.* Whether an infinitely powerful and wiſe Being, be *veracious* or no; unleſs Falſhood be in ſuch reputation with this Gentleman, that he concludes Lying to be no Mark of Weakneſs and Folly. Beſides, this Author might, if he had pleas'd, have taken notice, that in more places than one I ſpeak of the *Goodneſs* of God; another Evidence, as I take it, of his *Veracity*.

P. 6. He ſeems concern'd to know *upon what Ground I will build the Divine Law*, when I *purſue Morality to a Demonſtration?*

If he had not been very much in haſte, he would have ſeen, that his Queſtions, in that Paragraph, are a little too forward; unleſs he thinks it neceſſary

I ſhould write, when and upon what he thinks fit. When I know him better, I may perhaps think I owe him great Obſervance; but ſo much as that, very few Men think due to themſelves.

I have ſaid indeed in my Book, That I thought Morality capable of Demonſtration, as well as Mathematicks: But I do not remember where I promis'd this Gentleman to demonſtrate it to him.

He ſays, *If he knew upon what Grounds I would build my Demonſtration of Morality, he could make a better Judgment of it.* His Judgment who makes ſuch Demands as this, and is ſo much in haſte to be a Judg, that he cannot ſtay till what he has ſuch a Mind to be ſitting upon, be born; does not ſeem of that conſequence, that any one ſhould be in haſte to gratify his Impatience.

And ſince *he thinks the illiterate part of Mankind (which is the greateſt) muſt have a more compendious way to know their Duty, than by long Deductions*; he may do well to conſider, whether it were for their ſakes he publiſh'd this Queſtion, *viz. What is the Reaſon and Ground of the Divine Law?* P. 4. P. 6.

Whoever ſincerely acknowledges any Law to be the Law of God, cannot fail to acknowledg alſo, That it hath all that *Reaſon and Ground* that a juſt and wiſe Law can or ought to have; and will eaſily perſuade himſelf to forbear raiſing ſuch Queſtions and Scruples about it.

A Man that inſinuates, as he does, as if I held, that the *Diſtinction of Vertue and Vice*, was to be *pick'd up by our Eyes, our Ears, or our Noſtrils*; ſhews ſo much Ignorance, or ſo much Malice, that he deſerves no other Anſwer but Pity. P. 4.

The Immortality of the Soul is another thing, he ſays, *he cannot clear to himſelf, upon my Principles.* It may be ſo. The Right Reverend the Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter*, in the Letter he has lately honour'd me with in Print, has undertaken to prove, upon my Principles, the Soul's Immateriality; which, I ſuppoſe, this Author will not queſtion to be a Proof of its *Immortality*. And to his Lordſhip's Letter, I refer him for it. But if that will not ſerve his turn, I will tell him a *Principle* of mine that will *clear* it to him; and that is, The Revelation of Life and *Immortality* by Jeſus Chriſt, thro' the Goſpel. P. 8. P. 69.

He mentions other Doubts he has, unreſolv'd by my *Principles*. If my Principles do not reach them, the World I think will, I am ſure I ſhall be oblig'd to him to direct me to ſuch as will ſupply that Defect in mine. For I never had the Vanity to hope to out-do all other Men. Nor did I propoſe to my ſelf, in publiſhing my *Eſſay*, to be an Anſwerer of Queſtions; or expect that all Doubts ſhould go out of the World, as ſoon as my Book came into it.

The World has now my Book, ſuch as it is: If any one finds, that there be many Queſtions that my Principles will not reſolve, he will do the World more Service to lay down ſuch Principles as will reſolve them, than to quarrel with my Ignorance (which I readily acknowledg) and poſſibly for that which cannot be done. I ſhall never think the worſe of mine, becauſe they will not reſolve every one's Doubts, till I ſee thoſe Principles, laid down by any one, that will; and then I will quit mine.

If any one finds any thing in my *Eſſay* to be corrected, he may, when he pleaſes, write againſt it; and when I think fit, I will anſwer him. For I do not intend my Time ſhall be waſted at the Pleaſure of every one, who may have a mind to pick holes in my Book, and ſhew his Skill in the Art of Confutation.

To conclude; Were there nothing elſe in it, I ſhould not think it fit to trouble my ſelf about the Queſtions of a Man, which he himſelf does not think worth the owning.

Mr.

Mr. *LOCKE*'s REPLY

TO THE

Right Reverend the Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter*'s ANSWER to his Second *LETTER:*

Wherein, beſides other incident Matters, what his Lordſhip has ſaid concerning Certainty by Reaſon, Certainty by Ideas, and Certainty of Faith; the Reſurrection of the ſame Body; the Immateriality of the Soul; the Inconſiſtency of Mr. LOCKE's Notions with the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith, and their Tendency to *Scepticiſm*; is examin'd.

My LORD,

YOUR Lordſhip, in the Beginning of the laſt Letter you honour'd me with, ſeems ſo uneaſy and diſpleas'd at my having ſaid too much already in the Queſtion between us, that I think I may conclude, you would be well enough plea'd if I ſhould ſay no more; and you would diſpenſe with me, for not keeping my Promiſe I made you, to anſwer the other Parts of your firſt Letter. If this proceeds from any Tenderneſs in your Lordſhip for my Reputation, that you would not have me expoſe my ſelf by an Overflow of Words, in many places void of Clearneſs, Coherence, and Argument, and that therefore might have been ſpar'd; I muſt acknowledg it is a piece of great Charity, and ſuch wherein you will have a laſting Advantage over me, ſince good Manners will not permit me to return you the like. Or ſhould I, in the *Ebullition of Thoughts*, which in me your Lordſhip finds as impetuous as *the Springs of* Modena *mention'd by* Ramazzini, be in danger to forget my ſelf, and to think I had ſome Right to return the general Complaint of Length and Intricacy without Force; yet you have ſecur'd yourſelf from the Suſpicion of any ſuch Traſh on your Side, by making *Cobwebs* the eaſy Product of *thoſe who write out of their own Thoughts*, which it might be a Crime in me to impute to your Lordſhip.

2d Lett. *p.* 167.

P. 4.

If this Complaint of your's be not a charitable Warning to me, I cannot well gueſs at the Deſign of it; for I would not think that in a Controverſy, which you, my Lord, have drag'd me into, you would aſſume it as a Privilege due to your

your ſelf to be as copious as you pleaſe, and ſay what you think fit, and expect I ſhould reply only ſo, and ſo much, as would juſt ſuit your good liking, and ſerve to ſet the Cauſe right on that ſide which your Lordſhip contends for.

My Lord, I ſhall always acknowledg the great diſtance that is between your Lordſhip and my ſelf, and pay that Deference that is due to your Dignity and Perſon. But Controverſy, tho' it excludes not good Manners, will not be manag'd with all that Submiſſion which one is ready to pay in other Caſes. Truth, which is inflexible, has here its Intereſt, which muſt not be given up in a Compliment. *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, and other great Names muſt give way, rather than make us renounce Truth, or the Friendſhip we have for her.

This poſſibly your Lordſhip will allow, for it is not *ſpun out of my own Thoughts*; I have the Authority of others for it, and I think it was in Print before I was born. But you will ſay however, I am too long in my Replies. It is not impoſſible but it may be ſo. But with all due Reſpect to your Lordſhip's Authority (the Greatneſs whereof I ſhall always readily acknowledg) I muſt crave leave to ſay, that in this caſe you are by no means a proper Judg. We are now, as well your Lordſhip as my ſelf, before a Tribunal to which you have appeal'd, and before which you have brought me: 'Tis the Publick muſt be judg, whether your Lordſhip has enlarg'd too far in accuſing me, or I in defending my ſelf. Common Juſtice makes great Allowance to a Man pleading in his own Defence, and a little length (if he ſhould be guilty of it) finds Excuſe in the Compaſſion of By-Standers, when they ſee a Man cauſeleſly attack'd, after a new way, by a potent Adverſary; and, under various Pretences, Occaſions ſought, and Words wreſted to his Diſadvantage.

This, my Lord, you muſt give me leave to think to be my Caſe, whilſt this ſtrange way your Lordſhip has brought me into this Controverſy; your gradual Accuſations of my Book, and the different Cauſes your Lordſhip has aſſign'd of them; together with Quotations out of it, which I cannot find there, and other things I have complain'd of (to ſome of which your Lordſhip has not vouchſaf'd any Anſwer) ſhall remain unaccounted for, as I humbly conceive they do.

I confeſs my Anſwers are long, and I wiſh they could have been ſhorter. But the Difficulty I have to find out, and ſet before others your Lordſhip's meaning, that they may ſee what I am anſwering to, and ſo be able to judg of the Pertinency of what I ſay, has unavoidably inlarg'd them. Whether this be wholly owing to my Dulneſs, or whether a little Perplexedneſs both as to Grammar and Coherence, caus'd by thoſe numbers of Thoughts, whether of your own or others, that crowd from all Parts to be ſet down when you write, may not be allow'd to have ſome ſhare in it, I ſhall not preſume to ſay. I am at the mercy of your Lordſhip, and my other Readers in the point, and know not how to avoid a Fault that has no Remedy.

Your Lordſhip ſays, *The World ſoon grows weary of Controverſies, eſpecially when they are about perſonal Matters; which made your Lordſhip wonder, that one who underſtands the World ſo well, ſhould ſpend above fifty Pages in renewing and inlarging a Complaint wholly concerning himſelf.* P. 4

To which give me leave to ſay, That if your Lordſhip had ſo much conſider'd the *World*, and what it is not much pleas'd with, when you publiſh'd your *Diſcourſe in Vindication of the Trinity*, perhaps your Lordſhip had not ſo perſonally concern'd me in that Controverſy, as it appears now you have, and continue ſtill to do.

Your Lordſhip *wonders that I ſpend above fifty Pages in renewing and enlarging my Complaint concerning my ſelf.* Your Wonder, I humbly conceive, will not be ſo great, when you recollect, That your Anſwer to my Complaint, and the *Satisfaction* you propos'd to *give me and others in that perſonal Matter*, began the firſt Letter you honour'd me with, and ended in the 47th Page of it; where you ſaid, *You ſuppoſe the Reaſon of your mentioning my Words ſo often, was now no longer a Riddle to me*; and ſo *you proceeded to other Particulars of my Vindication.* If therefore *I have ſpent fifty Pages* of my Anſwer, in ſhewing that what you offer'd in forty ſeven Pages for my *Satisfaction*, was none, but that the *Riddle* was a Riddle ſtill; the diſproportion in the number of Pages is not ſo great as to be the Subject of much *wonder*; eſpecially to thoſe who conſider, that in P. 4

what

what you call *Perſonal Matter*, I was ſhewing that my *Eſſay*, having in it nothing contrary to the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, was yet brought into that Diſpute; and that therefore I had reaſon to complain of it, and of the manner of its being brought in: And if you had pleas'd not to have mov'd other Queſtions, nor brought other Charges againſt my Book till this, which was the Occaſion and Subject of my firſt Letter, had been clear'd; by making out that the Paſſages you had, in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, quoted out of my Book, had ſomething in them againſt the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, and ſo were, with juſt reaſon, brought by you, as they were, into that Diſpute; there had been no other but that *Perſonal Matter*, as you call it, between us.

In the Examination of thoſe Pages meant, as you ſaid, for my *Satisfaction*, and of other Parts of your Letter, I found (contrary to what I expected) Matter of *renewing and enlarging my Complaint*, and this I took notice of and ſet down in my Reply, which it ſeems I ſhould not have done: *The Knowledg of the World* ſhould have taught me better; and I ſhould have taken that for Satisfaction which you were pleas'd to give, in which I could not find any, nor, as I believe, any *intelligent or impartial Reader*. So that your Lordſhip's Care of the *World*, that it ſhould not *grow weary* of this *Controverſy*, and the Fault you find of my miſimploying fifty Pages of my Letter, reduces it ſelf at laſt in effect to no more but this, That your Lordſhip ſhould have a liberty to ſay what you pleaſe, pay me in what Coin you think fit; my part ſhould be, to be ſatisfy'd with it, reſt content, and ſay nothing. This indeed might be a way not to *weary the World*, and to ſave fifty Pages of clean Paper, and put ſuch an end to the Controverſy, as your Lordſhip would not diſlike.

P. 178. I learn from your Lordſhip, that it is *the firſt part of Wiſdom*, in ſome Mens Opinions, *not to begin in ſuch Diſputes*. What the knowledg of the World (which is a ſort of Wiſdom) ſhould in your Lordſhip's Opinion make a Man do, when one of your Lordſhip's Character begins with him, is very plain: He is not to reply, ſo far as he judges his Defence and the Matter requires, but as your Lordſhip is pleas'd to allow; which ſome may think no better than if one might not reply at all.

After having thus rebuk'd me for having been too copious in my Reply, in the next words your Lordſhip inſtructs me what I ſhould have anſwer'd; That

P. 4. I ſhould have *clear'd my ſelf by declaring to the World, that I own'd the Doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been receiv'd in the Chriſtian Church.*

This, as I take it, is a mere *Perſonal Matter*, of the ſame Woof with a *Spaniſh Sant-Benito*, and, as it ſeems to me, deſign'd to ſit cloſe to me. What muſt I do now, my Lord? Muſt I ſilently put on and wear this Badg of your Lordſhip's Favour, and, as one *well underſtanding the World*, ſay not a word of it, becauſe the World *ſoon grows weary of Perſonal Matters?* If in Gratitude for this *Perſonal* Favour I ought to be ſilent; yet I am forc'd to tell you, that in what you require of me here, you poſſibly have cut out too much Work for a poor ordinary Layman, for whom it is too hard to know how a Doctrine ſo diſputed has been *receiv'd in the Chriſtian Church*, and who might have thought it enough to own it as deliver'd in the Scriptures. Your Lordſhip herein lays upon me what I cannot do, without owning to know what I am ſure I do not know: For how the Doctrine of the Trinity has been always *receiv'd in the Chriſtian Church*, I confeſs my ſelf ignorant. I have not had time to examine the Hiſtory of it, and to read thoſe Controverſies that have been writ about it: And to own a Doctrine as receiv'd by others, when I do not know how thoſe others receiv'd it, is perhaps a ſhort way to Orthodoxy, that may ſatisfy ſome Men: But he that takes this way to give Satisfaction, in my Opinion makes a little bold with Truth; and it may be queſtion'd whether ſuch a Profeſſion be pleaſing to that God, who requires Truth in the inward Parts, however acceptable it may in any Man be to his Dioceſan.

I preſume your Lordſhip, in your *Diſcourſe in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, intends to give it us *as it has been receiv'd in the Chriſtian Church*. And

P. 87. I think your words, *viz. It is the Senſe of the Chriſtian Church which you are bound to defend, and no particular Opinions of your own*, authorize one to think ſo. But if I am to own it as your Lordſhip has there deliver'd it, I muſt own what I do not underſtand; for I confeſs your Expoſition of the Senſe of the Church wholly tranſcends my Capacity.

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If you require me to own it with an implicit Faith, I ſhall pay that Deference as ſoon to your Lordſhip's Expoſition of the Doctrine of the Church, as any one's. But if I muſt underſtand and know what I *own*, it is my Misfortune, and I cannot deny it, that I am as far from owning what you in that Diſcourſe deliver, as I can be from profeſſing the moſt unintelligible thing that ever I read, to be the Doctrine that I *own*.

Whether I make more uſe of my poor underſtanding in the Caſe, than you are willing to allow every one of your Readers, I cannot tell: but ſuch an Underſtanding as God has given me, is the beſt I have, and that which I muſt uſe in the apprehending what others ſay, before I can *own* the Truth of it: and for this there is no help that I know.

That which keeps me a little in countenance, is, That, if I miſtake not, Men of no mean Parts, even Divines of the Church of *England*, and thoſe of neither the loweſt Reputation nor Rank, find their Underſtandings fail them on this occaſion; and ſtick not to *own*, that they underſtand not your Lordſhip in that *Diſcourſe*, and particularly that your ſixth Chapter is unintelligible to them as well as me; whether the fault be in their or my Underſtanding, the World muſt be Judg. But this is only by the bye, for this is not the Anſwer I here intend your Lordſhip.

Your Lordſhip tells me, that to *clear my ſelf*, I ſhould have *own'd to the World the Doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been receiv'd*, &c. *Anſwer*. I know not whether in a Diſpute manag'd after a new way, wherein one Man is argu'd againſt, and another Man's words are all along quoted, it may not alſo be a good, as well as a new Rule, for the Anſwerer to reply to what was never objected, and *clear himſelf* from what was never laid to his charge. If this be not ſo, and that this new way of attacking requires not this new way of Defence, your Lordſhip's Preſcription to me here what I ſhould have done, will, *amongſt the moſt intelligent and impartial Readers*, paſs for a ſtrange Rule in Controverſy, and ſuch as the learneſt of them will not be able to find in all Antiquity; and therefore muſt be imputed to ſomething elſe than your Lordſhip's great Learning.

Did your Lordſhip in the *Diſcourſe of the Vindication of the Trinity*, wherein you firſt fell upon my Book, or in your Letter (my Anſwer to which you are here correcting) did your Lordſhip, I ſay, any where object to me, That I did not *own the Doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been receiv'd in the Chriſtian Church*, &c? If you did, the Objection was ſo ſecret, ſo hidden, ſo artificial, that your words declar'd quite the contrary. In the *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, your Lordſhip ſays, That my *Notions were borrow'd to ſerve other Purpoſes* [whereby, if I underſtand you right, you meant againſt the Doctrine of the Trinity] *than I intended them*; which you repeat again * for my *Satisfaction*, and inſiſt † upon for my *Vindication*. Vind. p. 239. *Anſ. 1. p. 35. † Ib. p. 36, 37, 40, 42, 46.

You having ſo ſolemnly more than once profeſs'd to *clear* me and my Intentions from all Suſpicion of having any part in that Controverſy, as appears farther in the cloſe of your firſt Letter, where all you charge on me, is the ill uſe that others had made, or might make of my Notions; how could I ſuppoſe ſuch an Objection made by your Lordſhip, which you declare againſt, without accuſing your Lordſhip of manifeſt Prevarication? Anſ. 1. p. 132, 133.

If your Lordſhip had any thing upon your Mind, any ſecret Aims, which you did not think fit to own, but yet would have me divine and anſwer to, as if I knew them; this, I confeſs, is too much for me, who *look no* farther *into Mens Thoughts*, than as they *appear in their Books*. Where you have given your Thoughts vent in your Words, I have not, I think, omitted to take notice of them, not wholly paſſing by thoſe Inſinuations, which have been drop'd from your Lordſhip's Pen; which from another, who had not profeſs'd ſo much perſonal Reſpect, would have ſhewn no exceeding good Diſpoſition of Mind towards me.

When your Lordſhip ſhall go on to accuſe me of not believing the *Doctrine of the Trinity, as receiv'd in the Chriſtian Church*, or any other Doctrine you ſhall think fit, I ſhall anſwer as I would to an Inquiſitor. For tho' your Lordſhip tells me, That *I need not be afraid of the Inquiſition, or that you intended to charge me with Hereſy in denying the Trinity*; yet he that ſhall conſider your Lordſhip's Proceeding with me from the beginning, as far as it is hitherto gone, may have P. 5.

reaſon to think, that the Methods and Management of that *Holy Office* are not wholly unknown to your Lordſhip, nor have eſcaped your great reading. Your Proceedings with me have had theſe ſteps:

1. Several Paſſages of my *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, and ſome of them relating barely to the Being of a God, and other Matters wholly remote from any Queſtion about the Trinity, were brought into the *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, and there argu'd againſt as containing the Errors of *Thoſe* and *Them*; which *Thoſe* and *Them*, are not known to this day.

2. In your Lordſhip's Anſwer to my firſt Letter, when what was given as the great reaſon why my *Eſſay* was brought into that Controverſy, *viz.* becauſe in it *Certainty was founded upon clear and diſtinct Ideas*; was found to fail, and was only a Suppoſition of your own; other Accuſations were ſought out againſt it, in relation to the Doctrine of the Trinity: *viz.* That *it might be of dangerous conſequence*, to that Doctrine, *to introduce the new Term of Ideas*, and to *place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our Ideas.* What are become of theſe Charges, we ſhall ſee in the Progreſs of this Letter, when we come to conſider what your Lordſhip has reply'd to my Anſwer upon theſe Points.

Anſw. 1. p. 133.

3. Theſe Accuſations not having, it ſeems, weight enough to effect what you intended, my Book has been rumaged again to find new and more important Faults in it; and now at laſt, at the third Effort, *my Notions of Ideas are found inconſiſtent with the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith.* This indeed carries ſome Sound in it, and may be thought worthy the Name and Pains of ſo great a Man, and zealous a Father of the Church, as your Lordſhip.

Anſw. 2. Title-page.

That I may not be too bold in affirming a thing I was not privy to, give me leave, my Lord, to tell your Lordſhip why I preſume my Book has upon this occaſion been look'd over again, to ſee what could be found in it capable to bear a deeper Accuſation, that might look like ſomething in a Title-Page. Your Lordſhip, by your Station in the Church, and the Zeal you have ſhewn in defending its Articles, could not be ſuppos'd, when you firſt brought my Book into this Controverſy, to have omitted theſe great Enormities that it now ſtands accus'd of, and to have cited it for ſmaller Miſtakes, ſome whereof were not found, but only imagin'd to be, in it; if you had then known theſe great Faults, which you now charge it with, to have been in it. If your Lordſhip had been appriz'd of its being guilty of ſuch dangerous Errors, you would not certainly have paſs'd them by: and therefore, I think, one may reaſonably conclude, that my *Eſſay* was new look'd into on purpoſe.

P. 177. Your Lordſhip ſays, *That what you have done herein, you thought it your Duty to do, not with reſpect to your ſelf, but to ſome of the Myſteries of our Faith, which you* do not charge *me with oppoſing, but by laying ſuch Foundations as do tend to the overthrow of them.* It cannot be doubted but *your Duty* would have made you at the firſt warn the World, that my *Notions were inconſiſtent with the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith*, if your Lordſhip had then known it: Tho' the exceſſive Reſpect and Tenderneſs you expreſs towards me perſonally, in the immediately preceding words, would be enough utterly to confound me, were I not a little acquainted with your Lordſhip's Civilities in this kind. For you tell me, That *theſe things* P. 177. *laid together, made your Lordſhip think it neceſſary to do that which you was* unwilling *to do, till I had driven you to it; which was to ſhew the Reaſons you had why you look'd on my Notion of Ideas and of Certainty by them, as inconſiſtent with it ſelf, and with ſome important Articles of the Chriſtian Faith.*

What muſt I think now, my Lord of theſe words? Muſt I take them as a mere Compliment, which is never to be interpreted rigorouſly, according to the preciſe meaning of the Words? Or muſt I believe that your *Unwillingneſs* to do ſo hard a thing to me, reſtrain'd your *Duty*, and you could not prevail on your ſelf (how much ſoever the *Myſteries of Faith* were in danger to be *overthrown*) to get out theſe harſh Words, *viz.* That *my Notions were inconſiſtent with the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith*, till your third Onſet, after I had forc'd you to *your Duty* by two Replies of mine?

It will not become me, my Lord, to make my ſelf a Compliment from your words, which you did not intend me in them. But on the other ſide, I would not willingly neglect to acknowledg any Civility from your Lordſhip in the full extent of it. The Buſineſs is a little nice, becauſe what is contain'd in thoſe

two

two Paſſages, cannot by a leſs skilful Hand than your's be well put together, tho' they immediately follow one another. This, I am ſure, falls out very untowardly, that your Lordſhip ſhould *drive* me (who had much rather have been otherwiſe employ'd) to *drive* your Lordſhip to do that which you were *unwilling* to do. The World ſees how much I was *driven*: for what Cenſures, what Imputations muſt my Book have lain under, if I had not clear'd it from thoſe Accuſations your Lordſhip brought againſt it; when I am charg'd now with *Evaſions*, for not *clearing* my ſelf from an Accuſation which you never brought againſt me? But if it be an *Evaſion*, not to anſwer to an Objection that has not been made, what is it, I beſeech you, my Lord, to make no Reply to Objections that have been made? Of which I promiſe to give your Lordſhip a Liſt, whenever you ſhall pleaſe to call for it. P. 177.

I forbear it now, for fear that, if I ſhould ſay all that I might upon this new Accuſation, it would be more than would ſuit with your Lordſhip's liking; and you ſhould complain again that you have *open'd a Paſſage* which brings *to your mind* Ramazzini *and his ſprings of* Modena. But your Lordſhip need not *be afraid of being overwhelm'd with the Ebullition of my Thoughts*, nor much trouble your ſelf to *find a way to give check to it*: *Mere Ebullition of Thoughts never overwhelms* or ſinks any one but the Author himſelf; but if it carries Truth with it, that I confeſs has force, and it may be troubleſome to thoſe that ſtand in its way.

Your Lordſhip ſays, *You ſee how dangerous it is to give occaſion to one of ſuch a fruitful Invention as I am, to write.* P. 3.

I am oblig'd to your Lordſhip, that, you think my *Invention* worth concerning your ſelf about, tho' it be ſo unlucky as to have your Lordſhip and me always differ about the meaſure of its *Fertility*. In your firſt Anſwer, you thought I too much extended the *Fertility* of my *Invention*, and aſcrib'd to it what it had no title to; and here, I think, you make the *Fertility* of my *Invention* greater than it is. For in what I have anſwered to your Lordſhip, there ſeems to me no need at all of a *Fertile Invention*. 'Tis true it has been hard for me to find out whom you writ againſt, or what you meant in many Places. As ſoon as that was found, the Anſwer lay always ſo obvious and ſo eaſy, that there needed no labour of *Invention* to diſcover what one ſhould reply. The things themſelves (where there were any) ſtrip'd of the Ornaments of ſcholaſtick Language, and the leſs obvious ways of learned Writings, ſeem'd to me to carry their Anſwers viſibly with them. This permit me, my Lord, to ſay, that however *fertile* my *Invention* is, it has not in all this Controverſy produc'd one Fiction or wrong Quotation. P. 80.

But before I leave the Anſwer you dictate, permit me to obſerve that I am ſo unfortunate to be blamed for *owning* what I was not accus'd to diſown; and here for not *owning* what I was never charg'd to diſown. The like misfortune have my poor Writings: They offend your Lordſhip in ſome Places, becauſe they are *New*; and in others, becauſe they are not *New*. Anſw. 1. *p.* 8.

Your next Words, which are a new Charge, I ſhall paſs over till I come to your Proof of them, and proceed to the next Paragraph. Your Lordſhip tells me, *You ſhall wave all unneceſſary Repetitions, and come Immediately to the matter of my Complaint, as it is renew'd in my ſecond Letter.* P. 5.

What your Lordſhip means by *unneceſſary Repetitions* here, ſeems to be of a piece with your blaming me in the foregoing Page, for having ſaid too much in my own defence; and this, taken all together, confirms my Opinion, That in your thoughts it would have been better I ſhould have reply'd nothing at all. For you having ſet down here near twenty Lines as a *neceſſary Repetition* out of your former Letter, your Lordſhip omits my Anſwer to them as wholly *unneceſſary* to be ſeen; and conſequently you muſt think was at firſt *unneceſſary* to have been ſaid. For when the ſame words are *neceſſary* to be repeated again, if the ſame Reply which was made to them be not thought fit to be *repeated* too, it is plainly judg'd to be nothing to the purpoſe, and ſhould have been ſpared at firſt.

'Tis true, your Lordſhip has ſet down ſome few Expreſſions taken out of ſeveral parts of my Reply; but in what manner, the Reader cannot clearly ſee, without going back to the Original of this matter. He muſt therefore pardon me the trouble of a Deduction, which cannot be avoided where Controverſy is

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manag'd at this rate; which neceſſitates, and ſo excuſes the length of the Anſwer.

My Book was brought into the Trinitarian Controverſy by theſe ſteps. Your Lordſhip ſays, That,

Vind. *p.* 231. 1. *The Unitarians have not explain'd the Nature and Bounds of Reaſon.*

Ibid. 2. *The Author of* Chriſtianity not Myſterious, *to make amends for this, has offer'd an Account of Reaſon.*

Ibid. *p.* 232. 3. *His Doctrine* concerning Reaſon, *ſuppoſes that we muſt have clear and diſtinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Mind.*

Ibid. *p.* 233. 4. Your Lordſhip calls this a *new way of Reaſoning.*

5. This *Gentleman of this new way of Reaſoning*, in his firſt Chapter, ſays ſomething which has a Conformity with ſome of the Notions in my Book. But it is to be obſerv'd he ſpeaks them as his own Thoughts, and not upon my Authority, nor with taking any Notice of me.

Vind. *p.* 234. 6. By Virtue of this, he is preſently entitled to I know not how much of my Book; and divers Paſſages of my *Eſſay* are quoted, and attributed to him under the title of *The Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning* (for he is by this time turn'd into a Troop) and certain unknown (if they are not all contain'd in this one Author's Doublet) *They* and *Theſe* are made by your Lordſhip to lay about them ſhrewdly for ſeveral Pages together in your Lordſhip's *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, &c. with Paſſages taken out of my Book, which your Lordſhip was at the Pains to quote as *Theirs*, *i. e.* certain unknown Anti-Trinitarians.

Of this your Lordſhip's way, ſtrange and new to me, of dealing with my Book, I took notice.

Lett. *p.* 59.

P. 5. To which your Lordſhip tells me here you reply'd in theſe following words, which your Lordſhip has ſet down as no *unneceſſary Repetition.* Your words are: *It was becauſe the Perſon who oppos'd the Myſteries of Chriſtianity went upon my Grounds, and made uſe of my Words; altho' your Lordſhip declar'd withal, That they were uſed to other purpoſes than I intended them: and your Lordſhip confeſs'd, that the Reaſon why you quoted my Words ſo much, was, becauſe your Lordſhip found my Notions as to Certainty by Ideas, was the main foundation on which the Author of* Chriſtianity not Myſterious *went; and that he had nothing that look'd like Reaſon, if that Principle were remov'd, which made your Lordſhip ſo much endeavour to ſhew, that it would not hold; and ſo you ſuppos'd the Reaſon why your Lordſhip ſo often mention'd my Words, was no longer a Riddle to me.* And to this Repetition your

P. 6. Lordſhip ſubjoins, That *I ſet down theſe Paſſages in my Second Letter*, but with theſe words annex'd, "That all this ſeems to me to do nothing to the clearing "of this matter."

Anſwer. I ſay ſo indeed in the place quoted by your Lordſhip, and if I had ſaid no more, your Lordſhip had done me juſtice in ſetting down barely theſe words as my reply, which being ſet down when your Lordſhip was in the way of *repeating* your own words with no ſparing Hand, as we ſhall ſee by and by, theſe few of mine ſet down thus, without the leaſt Intimation that I had ſaid any thing more, cannot but leave the Reader under an Opinion, that this was my whole Reply.

Lett. 2. *p.* 48, &c. But if your Lordſhip will pleaſe to turn to that Place of my Second Letter, out of which you take theſe Words, I preſume you will find that I not only ſaid, but prov'd, "That what you had ſaid in the Words above repeated, to "clear the Riddle in your Lordſhip's way of writing, did nothing towards it."

That which was the Riddle to me, was, That your Lordſhip writ againſt others, and yet quoted only my words; and that you pinn'd my words, which you argued againſt, upon a certain Sort of *Theſe* and *Them* that no where appear'd, or were to be found; and by this way brought my Book into the Controverſy.

To this your Lordſhip ſays, *You told me it was becauſe the Perſon who oppos'd the Myſteries of Chriſtianity, went upon my Grounds, and made uſe of my Words.*

Anſwer. He that will be at the Pains to compare this, which you call a *Repetition* here, with the Place you quote for it, *viz. Anſw.* 1. *p.* 46. will, I humbly conceive, find it a new Sort of *Repetition*; unleſs the ſetting down of Words

and

and Expreſſions not to be found in it, be the *Repetition* of any Paſſage. But for a *Repetition*, let us take it of what your Lordſhip had ſaid before.

The Reaſon, and the only Reaſon there given why you quoted my words after the manner you did, was, *Becauſe you found my Notions as to Certainty by Ideas, was the main Foundation which the Author of* Chriſtianity not Myſterious *went upon.* Theſe are the Words in your Lordſhip's firſt Letter, and this the only Reaſon there given, tho' it hath grown a little by *Repetition.* And to this my Reply was; "That I thought your Lordſhip had found, that that which the Author of "*Chriſtianity not Myſterious* went upon, and for which he was made one of *the* "*Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning*, oppoſite to the Doctrine of the Trini- "ty, was, that he made or ſuppos'd *clear and diſtinct Ideas neceſſary to Certainty*: "But that was not my Notion *as to Certainty by Ideas*, &c." Which Reply, my Lord, did not barely *ſay*, but ſhew'd the Reaſon why I ſaid, That what your Lordſhip had offer'd as the Reaſon of your manner of proceeding, did nothing towards the clearing of it: unleſs it could clear the Matter, to ſay you join'd me with the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* who goes upon a different Notion of Certainty from mine, becauſe he goes upon the ſame with me. For he (as your Lordſhip ſuppoſes) making Certainty to conſiſt in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; and I, on the contrary, making it conſiſt in the perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of ſuch *Ideas* as we have, whether they be perfectly in all their parts clear and diſtinct or no: it is impoſſible he ſhould go upon my Grounds, whilſt they are ſo different, or that his going upon my Grounds ſhould be the Reaſon of your Lordſhip's joining me with him. And now I leave your Lordſhip to judg, how you had *clear'd* this matter; and whether what I had anſwered, did not prove, that what you ſaid did nothing towards the clearing of it.

Anſw. 1. p. 46.

Lett. 2. p. 49.

This one thing, methinks, your Lordſhip has made very clear, That you thought it neceſſary to find ſome way to bring in my Book, where you were arguing againſt that *Author*, that he might be the Perſon, and mine the Words you would argue againſt together. But 'tis as clear that the particular matter which your Lordſhip made uſe of to this purpoſe, happen'd to be ſomewhat unluckily choſen. For your Lordſhip having accus'd him of *ſuppoſing clear and diſtinct Ideas neceſſary to Certainty*, which you declar'd to be *the Opinion you oppos'd*, and for that Opinion having made him a *Gentleman of the new way of Reaſoning*, your Lordſhip imagin'd that was the Notion of Certainty I went on. But it falling out otherwiſe, and I denying it to be mine, the imaginary Tie between that *Author* and me was unexpectedly diſſolv'd; and there was no appearance of Reaſon for bringing Paſſages out of my Book, and arguing againſt them as your Lordſhip did, as if they were that *Author's*.

Vind. p. 232. Anſw. 1. p. 14.

To juſtify this (ſince my Notion of Certainty could not be brought to agree with what he was charg'd with, as oppoſite to *the Doctrine of the Trinity*) he at any rate muſt be brought to agree with me, and to *go upon my Notion of Certainty*. Pardon me, my Lord, that I ſay at any rate. The Reaſon I have to think ſo, is this: Either that *Author* does make clear and diſtinct *Ideas* neceſſary to Certainty, and ſo does not go upon my Notion of Certainty; and then your aſſigning his going upon my Notion of Certainty, as the Reaſon for your joining us as you did, ſhews no more but a Willingneſs in your Lordſhip to have us join'd: Or he does not *lay all Certainty only in clear and diſtinct Ideas*, and ſo poſſibly, for ought I know, may *go upon my Notion of Certainty*. But then, my Lord, the Reaſon of your firſt bringing him and me into this Diſpute, will appear to have been none. All your arguing againſt the *Gentleman of this new way of Reaſoning*, will be found to be againſt no body, ſince there is no body to be *found* that *lays all Foundation of Certainty only in clear and diſtinct Ideas*; no body to be *found*, that holds the *Opinion* that your Lordſhip *oppoſes*.

Having thus given you an Account of ſome part of my Reply (to what your Lordſhip really anſwer'd in that 46th Page of your firſt Letter) to ſhew that my Reply contain'd ſomething more than theſe Words here ſet down by your Lordſhip, *viz.* "That all this ſeems to me to do nothing to the "clearing this matter:" I come now to thoſe Parts of your *Repetition*, as your Lordſhip is pleas'd to call it, wherein there is nothing repeated.

P. 6.

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P. 5. Your Lordſhip ſays, *That you told me* the Reaſon why I was brought into the Controverſy after the manner I had complain'd of, *was becauſe the Perſon who oppos'd the Myſteries of Chriſtianity, went upon my Grounds*; and for this you quote the 46th Page of your firſt Letter. But having turn'd to that place, and finding there theſe Words, *That you found my Notions as to Certainty by Ideas was the main Foundation which that Author went upon*; which are far from being repeated in the words ſet down here, unleſs *Grounds* in general be the ſame with *Notions as to Certainty by Ideas*: I beg leave to conſider what you here ſay as new to me, and not *repeated*.

Your Lordſhip ſays, that you brought me into the Controverſy as you did, *becauſe that Author went upon my Grounds*. 'Tis poſſible he did, or did not; But it cannot appear that he did *go upon my Grounds*, till thoſe *Grounds* are aſſign'd, and the Places both out of him and me produc'd to ſhew, that we agree in the ſame *Grounds*, and *go* both *upon them*; when this is done, there will be Room to conſider whether it be ſo or no.

In the mean time, you have brought me into the Controverſy, for his going upon this particular Ground, ſuppos'd to be mine, *That clear and diſtinct Ideas are neceſſary to Certainty*. It can do nothing towards the clearing this, to ſay
P. 6. in general, as your Lordſhip does, *That he went upon my Grounds*; becauſe tho' he ſhould agree with me in ſeveral other things, but differ from me in this one *Notion of Certainty*, there could be no reaſon for your dealing with me as you have done: That *Notion of Certainty* being your very Exception againſt his *Account of Reaſon*, and the ſole Occaſion you took of bringing in Paſſages out of my Book, and the very Foundation of arguing againſt them.

P. 6. You Lordſhip farther ſays here, in this *Repetition*, which you did not ſay before in the Place refer'd to as *repeated*, *That he made uſe of my Words*. I think he did of Words ſomething like mine. But as I humbly conceive alſo, *he made uſe of them*, as his own, and not *as my Words*; for I do not remember that he quotes me for them. This I am ſure, That in the Words quoted out of him by your Lordſhip, upon which my Book is brought in, there is not one Syllable of *Certainty by Ideas*.

No doubt whatever he or I, or any one have ſaid, if your Lordſhip diſapproves of it, you have a Right to queſtion him that ſaid it. But I do not ſee how this gives your Lordſhip any Right to entitle any body to what he does not ſay, whoever elſe ſays it.

The Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* ſays in his Book ſomething ſuitable to what I had ſaid in mine; borrow'd or not borrow'd from mine, I leave your Lordſhip to determine for him. But I do not ſee what ground that gives your Lordſhip to concern me in the Controverſy you have with him, for things I ſay which he does not; and which I ſay to a different Purpoſe from his. Let that *Author* and I agree in this one *Notion of Certainty* as much as you pleaſe, what Reaſon, I beſeech your Lordſhip, could this be, to quote my Words as his, who never us'd them; and to Purpoſes, as you ſay more than once, to which I never intended them? This was that which I complain'd was a Riddle to me. And ſince your Lordſhip can give no other Reaſon for it, than thoſe we have hitherto ſeen, I think it ſufficiently unriddled, and you are in the right when you ſay, *you think it is no longer a Riddle to me*.

I eaſily grant my little Reading may not have inſtructed me, what has been, or what may be done, in the ſeveral ways of writing and managing of Controverſy, which like War always produces new Stratagems: Only I beg my Ignorance may be my Apology, for ſaying, that this appears a new way of writing to me, and this is the firſt time I ever met with it.

Vind. p. 234. But let the ten Lines which your Lordſhip has ſet down out of him be, if you pleaſe, ſuppos'd to be preciſely my Words, and that he quoted my Book for them: I do not ſee how even this entitles him to any more of my Book than he has quoted; or how any words of mine, in other parts of my Book, can be aſcrib'd to him; or argued againſt as his, or rather, as I know not whoſe, which was the thing I complain'd of: for the *Theſe* and *They*, thoſe Paſſages of my Book were aſcrib'd to, could not be that Author, for he us'd them not; nor the Author of the *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, for he was not argued againſt, but was diſcharg'd from the Controverſy under Debate. So that neither he

nor

nor I being the *They* and *Thoſe*, that ſo often occur, and deſerv'd ſo much Pains from your Lordſhip; I could not but complain of this, to me, incomprehenſible way of bringing my Book into that Controverſy.

Another Part of your Lordſhip's *Repetition*, which I humbly conceive, is no *Repetition*, becauſe this alſo I find not in that Paſſage quoted for it, is this, That your Lordſhip *confeſs'd that the Reaſon why you quoted my Words* ſo much. P. 6.

My Lord, I do not remember any need your Lordſhip had to give *a Reaſon why you quoted my Words ſo much*, becauſe I do not remember that I made that the matter of my Complaint. That which I complain'd of, was not the quantity of what was quoted out of my Book, but the manner of quoting it, *viz.* "That I was ſo every where join'd with others, under the comprehen- Lett. 2. *p.* 49. "ſive Words *They* and *Them*, tho' my Book alone were every where quoted, "that the World would be apt to think, I was the Perſon who argu'd a- "gainſt the Trinity." And again, "That which I complain'd of was, That Ibid. *p.* 51. "I was made One of *the Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning*, without be- "ing guilty of what made them ſo, and ſo was brought into a Chapter "wherein I thought my ſelf not concern'd; which was manag'd ſo, that my "Book was all along quoted, and others argu'd againſt; others were en- "tituled to what I ſaid, and I to what others ſaid, without knowing why or "how." Nay, I told your Lordſhip in that very Reply, "That if your Lett. 2. *p.* 50. "Lordſhip had *directly* queſtion'd any of my Opinions, I ſhould not have "complain'd." Thus your Lordſhip ſees my Complaint was not of the largeneſs, but of the manner of your Quotations. But of that, in all theſe many Pages imploy'd by your Lordſhip for my *Satisfaction*, you, as I remember, have not been pleas'd to offer any reaſon, nor can I hitherto find it any way *clear'd*: When I do, I ſhall readily acknowledg your great Maſtery in this, as in all other ways of writing.

I have in the foregoing Pages, for the clearing this matter, been oblig'd to take notice of *Them* and *Thoſe*, as directly ſignifying no body. Whether your Lordſhip will excuſe me for ſo doing, I know not, ſince I perceive ſuch ſlight words as *Them* and *Thoſe*, are not to be minded in your Lordſhip's Writings: Your Lordſhip has a Priviledge to uſe ſuch trifling *Particles*, without taking any great care what or whom they refer to.

To ſhew the Reader that I do not talk without Book in the caſe, I ſhall ſet down your Lordſhip's own Words: *What a hard Fate doth that Man lie under, that falls into the hands of a ſevere Critick! He muſt have a care of his* But, *and* For, *and* Them, *and* It. *For the leaſt Ambiguity in any of theſe, will fill up Pages in an Anſwer, and make a Book look conſiderable for the Bulk of it. And what muſt a Man do, who is to anſwer all ſuch Objections about the uſe of Particles?* P. 90. I humbly conceive 'tis not without Reaſon, that your Lordſhip here claims an Exemption from having a care of your *But*, and your *For*, and your *Them*, and other *Particles*. The Sequel of your Letter will ſhew, That 'tis a Priviledge your Lordſhip makes great uſe of, and therefore have reaſon to be tender of it, and to cry out againſt thoſe unmannerly *Criticks*, who queſtion it. Upon this Conſideration, I cannot but look on it as a Misfortune to me, that it ſhould fall in my way to diſpleaſe your Lordſhip, by diſturbing you in the quiet, and perhaps antient Poſſeſſion of ſo convenient a Privilege. But how great ſoever the Advantages of it may be to a Writer, I, upon Experience, find it is very troubleſom and perplexing, to a Reader, who is concern'd to underſtand what is written, that he may anſwer to it. But to return to the Place we were upon:

Your Lordſhip goes on and ſays, *Whether it doth or no*, i. e. Whether what your Lordſhip had ſaid doth clear this Matter or no, *you are content to leave it to any Indifferent Reader; and there it muſt reſt at laſt, altho' I ſhould write Volumes about it.* P. 6.

Upon the reading of theſe laſt Words of your Lordſhip's, I thought you had quite done with this *Perſonal Matter*, ſo apt, as you ſay, *to weary the World*. But whether it be that your Lordſhip is not much ſatisfy'd in the handling of it, or in the letting it alone; whether your Lordſhip meant by theſe laſt Words, that what I write about it is *Volumes*, i. e. too much, as your Lordſhip has told me in the firſt Page; but what your Lordſhip ſays about it,

it, is but neceſſary: whether theſe or any other be the cauſe of it, *Perſonal Matter*, as it ſeems, is very importunate and troubleſome to your Lordſhip, as it is to the World. You turn it going in the end of one Paragraph, and *Perſonal Matter* thruſts it ſelf in again in the beginning of the next, whether of it ſelf, without your Lordſhip's notice or Conſent, I examine not. But thus ſtands the immediate following words, wherein your Lordſhip asks me, *But for what Cauſe do I continue ſo unſatisfy'd?* To which you make me
P. 6. give this Anſwer, *That* "the Cauſe why I continue ſo unſatisfy'd, is, That "the Author mention'd went upon this Ground, That clear and diſtinct *Ideas* "are neceſſary to Certainty, but that is not my Notion as to Certainty by "Ideas; which is, That Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agree-"ment or Diſagreement of Ideas, ſuch as we have, whether they be in all "their Parts perfectly clear and diſtinct or no; and that I have no Notions "of Certainty more than this one."

Theſe Words, which your Lordſhip has ſet down for mine, I have printed in a diſtinct Character, that the Reader may take particular notice of them; not that there is any thing very remarkable in this Paſſage it ſelf, but becauſe it makes the buſineſs of the fourſcore following Pages. For the *three ſeveral Anſwers* that your Lordſhip ſays you have *given to it*, and that which you call your *Defence* of them, reach, as I take it, to the 87th Page. But another particular Reaſon why this Anſwer, which your Lordſhip has made for me to a Queſtion of your own putting, is diſtinguiſh'd by a particular Character, is to ſave frequent Repetitions of it; that the Reader, by having recourſe to it, may ſee whether thoſe things, which your Lordſhip ſays of it, be ſo or no, and judg whether I am in the wrong, when I aſſure him, that I cannot find them to be as you ſay.

Only before I come to what your Lordſhip poſitively ſays of this which you call my *Anſwer*, I crave leave to obſerve that it ſuppoſes I *continue unſatisfy'd*: To which I reply, That I no where ſay that I *continue unſatisfy'd*. I may ſay, That what is offer'd for Satisfaction, gives none to me or any body elſe; and yet I, as well as other People, may be ſatisfy'd concerning the matter.

I now come to what your Lordſhip ſays poſitively of it.

1. You ſay that *I tell you, That* "the Cauſe why I continu'd unſatisfy'd, "is, That the Author mention'd went upon this Ground: That clear and "diſtinct Ideas are neceſſary to Certainty; but that is not my Notion of "Certainty by Ideas, *&c.*"

To which I crave leave to reply, That neither in the 50th Page of my ſecond Letter, which your Lordſhip quotes for it, nor any where elſe, did I tell your Lordſhip any ſuch thing. Neither could I aſſign, *That Author's going upon that Ground*, there mention'd, as any Cauſe of diſſatisfaction to me; becauſe I know not *that he went upon this Ground, That clear and diſtinct Ideas are neceſſary to Certainty*: for I have met with nothing produc'd by your Lordſhip out of him, to prove that he did ſo. And if it be true, that he *goes upon Grounds of Certainty* that are not mine, I know no body that ought to be *diſſatisfy'd* with it but your Lordſhip, who have taken ſo much Pains to make his Grounds mine, and my Grounds his, and to entitle us both to what each has ſet apart.

2. Your Lordſhip ſays, *THIS is no more than what I had ſaid before in my former Letter. Anſw.* For this I appeal to the 57th, or rather (as I think you writ) 87th Page quoted for it by your Lordſhip; where any one muſt have very good Eyes, to find all that is ſet down here in *this Anſwer* (as you a little lower call it) which you have been pleas'd to put into my Mouth. For neither in the one nor the other of thoſe Pages, is there any ſuch *Anſwer* of mine. Indeed in the 87th Page there are theſe Words; That Certainty, "in my Opinion, lies in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of "*Ideas*, ſuch as they are, and not always in having perfectly clear and diſtinct "*Ideas*." But theſe words there are not given as an Anſwer to this Queſtion, *Why do I continue ſo unſatisfy'd?* And the remarkable Anſwer above ſet down, is, as I take it, more than theſe Words, as much more in proportion as your Lordſhip's whole Letter is more than the half of it.

3. Your

3. Your Lordſhip ſays of the remarkable Anſwer above ſet down, that *you took particular notice of it.*

To which I crave leave to reply, that your Lordſhip no where before took notice of *this Anſwer*, as you call it; for it was no where before extant, tho' it be true ſome part of the words of it were. But ſome part of the words of *this Anſwer* (which too were never given as an Anſwer to the Queſtion propos'd) can never be *this Anſwer* it ſelf.

4. Your Lordſhip farther ſays, that *you gave three ſeveral Anſwers to it.*

To which I muſt crave leave further to reply, that never an one of the *three Anſwers*, which you here ſay you gave to *this my Anſwer*, were given to *this Anſwer*; which, in the words above ſet down, you made me give to your Queſtion, why *I continued ſo unſatisfy'd?*

To juſtify this my Reply, there needs no more but to ſet down theſe your Lordſhip's *three Anſwers*, and to turn to the Places where you ſay *you gave* them.

The firſt of your three Anſwers is this, *That thoſe who offer at clear and diſtinct* P. 7.
Ideas, *bid much fairer for Certainty than I do (according to this Anſwer) and ſpeak more agreeably to my Original Grounds of Certainty.* The place you quote for this, is, *Anſw.* 1. *p.* 80. but in that place it is not given as an *Anſwer* to my ſaying, That " the Cauſe why I continue unſatisfy'd, is, That the Author mention'd, " went upon this Ground, that clear and diſtinct Ideas are neceſſary to Cer- " tainty, but," *&c.* And if it be given for Anſwer to it here, it ſeems a very ſtrange one. For I am ſuppoſed to ſay, That " the Cauſe why I continue " unſatisfy'd, is, that the Author mention'd, went upon a Ground different " from mine;" and to ſatisfy me, I am told his way is better than mine; which cannot but be thought an Anſwer very likely to ſatisfy me.

Your ſecond Anſwer, which you ſay *you gave* to that remarkable Paſſage a- bove ſet down, is this; *That it is very poſſible the Author of* Chriſtianity not Miſte- P. 15.
rious *might miſtake or miſapply my Notions; but there is too much reaſon to believe he thought them the ſame, and we have no reaſon to be ſorry, that he hath given me this occaſion for the explaining my meaning, and for the Vindication of my ſelf in the matters I apprehend he had charg'd me with:* and for this you quote your firſt Letter, *p.* 36. But neither are theſe words in that place an Anſwer to my ſaying, " That the Cauſe why I continu'd diſſatisfy'd, is, That that Author went " upon this Ground, that clear and diſtinct *Ideas* are neceſſary to Certainty, " but, *&c.*"

Your third Anſwer, which you ſay you gave to that Paſſage above ſet down, is, *That my own Grounds of Certainty tend to Scepticiſm, and that in an Age wherein the* P. 20.
Myſteries of Faith are too much expos'd by the Promoters of Scepticiſm and Infidelity, it is a thing of dangerous Conſequence to ſtart ſuch new Methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before: For this you refer the Reader to your firſt Letter. But I muſt crave leave alſo to obſerve, that theſe words P. 36.
are not all to be found in that place, and thoſe of them which are there, are by no means an *Anſwer* to my ſaying, " That the Cauſe why I continue unſa- tisfy'd, is, *&c.*"

What the words which your Lordſhip has here ſet down as your *three Anſwers*, are brought in for in thoſe three places quoted by your Lordſhip, any one that will conſult them may ſee; it would hold me too long in *Perſonal Matter* to explain that here, and therefore for your Lordſhip's Satisfaction I paſs by thoſe Particulars. But this I crave leave to be poſitive in, That in neither of them they are *given* in Reply to that which is above ſet down, as my Anſwer to your Lordſhip's Queſtion, *For what Cauſe do I continue ſo unſatisfy'd?* Tho' your Lord- ſhip here ſays, That to *this Anſwer* they were given as a Reply, and it was it P. 7.
you had *taken notice of*, and *given* theſe *three ſeveral* Replies to. As *Anſwers* therefore to what you make me ſay here, *viz. That the Cauſe of my continuing unſatisfy'd, is, That the Author mention'd, went upon a Ground of Certainty that is none of mine*; I cannot conſider them. For to this neither of them is given as an Anſwer; tho' *this* and *it*, in ordinary Conſtruction, make them have that re- ference. But theſe are ſome of your priviledg'd *Particles*, and may be apply'd how and to what you pleaſe.

But tho' neither of theſe Paſſages be any manner of Anſwer to what your Lordſhip calls them *Anſwers* to; yet you laying ſuch ſtreſs on them, that well-

nigh half your Letter, as I take it, is ſpent in the Defence of them; 'tis fit I conſider what you ſay under each of them.

I ſay, *as I take it*, near half your Letter is in defence of theſe three Paſſages.

P. 7. One reaſon why I ſpeak ſo doubtfully, is, that tho' you ſay here, that *you will lay them together, and defend them*, and that in effect all that is ſaid to the 87th Page is rang'd under theſe three Heads; yet they being brought in as *Anſwers* to what I am made to ſay, is *the Cauſe why I continu'd unſatisfy'd*. I ſhould ſcarce think your Lordſhip ſhould ſpend ſo many Pages in this *Perſonal Matter*, after you had but two or three Pages before ſo openly blam'd me for ſpending a leſs number of Pages in my Anſwer, concerning *Perſonal Matters*, to what your Lordſhip had in your Letter concerning them.

Another reaſon why I ſpeak ſo doubtfully, is, becauſe I do not ſee how theſe three Paſſages need ſo long, or any *Defences*, where they are not attack'd; or if they be attack'd, methinks the *Defences* of them ſhould have been apply'd to the Anſwers I had made to them; or if I have made none, and they be of ſuch moment that they require Anſwers, your Lordſhip's minding me that they did ſo, would either, by my continu'd Silence, have left to your Lordſhip all that you can pretend to for my granting them, or elſe my Anſwers to them have given your Lordſhip an occaſion to *defend* them, and perhaps to have defended them otherwiſe than you have done. This is certain, that theſe Defences had come time enough when they had been attack'd, and then it would have been ſeen, whether what was ſaid did defend them or no. The truth is, my Lord, if you will give me leave to ſpeak my Thoughts freely, when I conſider theſe *three*, as you call them, *Anſwers*, how they themſelves are brought in, and what relation that which is brought under each of them has to them, and to the Matter in queſtion; methinks they look rather like Texts choſen to be diſcours'd on, than as Anſwers to be *defended* in a Controverſy. For the Connection of that which in train is tack'd on to them, is ſuch that makes me ſee I am wholly miſtaken in what I thought the eſtabliſh'd Rule of Controverſy. This was alſo another Reaſon why I ſaid you ſpent, *as I take it*, near half of your Letter in defence of them. For when I conſider how one thing hangs on to another, under the third *Anſwer*, from *pag.* 20. where it is brought in, to *pag.* 87. where I think that which you call your defending it ends; 'tis a hard matter by the Relation and Dependency of the Parts of that Diſcourſe (contain'd in thoſe Pages) one on another, to tell where it ends.

But to conſider the Paſſages themſelves, and the Defence of them.

That which you call your *firſt Anſwer*, and which you ſay you will *defend*, is

P. 7. in theſe words: *Thoſe who offer at clear and diſtinct* Ideas, *bid much fairer for Certainty than I do* (*according to* this Anſwer) *and ſpeak more agreeably to my Original Grounds of Certainty.* Theſe words being brought in at firſt as a Reply to what was call'd *my Anſwer*, but was not my *Anſwer*, as may be ſeen, *Lett.* 1. *pag.* 87. I took no notice of them in my ſecond Letter, as being nothing at all to the point in hand; and therefore what need they have of a farther *Defence*, when nothing is objected to them, I do not ſee. To what purpoſe is it to ſpend ſeven or eight Pages to ſhew, that another's Notion about Certainty is better than mine; when that tends not to ſhew how your ſaying, *That the Certainty of my Proof of a God is not plac'd upon any clear and diſtinct* Ideas, *but upon the force of Reaſon diſtinct from it*, concerns me; which was the thing there to be ſhewn, as is viſible to any one who will vouchſafe to look into that 87th Page of my firſt Letter? And indeed why ſhould your Lordſhip trouble your ſelf to prove, which of two different ways of Certainty by *Ideas* is the beſt, when you have ſo ill an Opinion of the whole way of Certainty by *Ideas*, that you accuſe it of Tendency to *Scepticiſm*? But it ſeems your Lordſhip is reſolv'd to have all the Faults in my Book clear'd or corrected, and ſo you go on to *defend* theſe words: *That thoſe who offer at clear and diſtinct* Ideas, *bid much fairer for Certainty than I do.* I could have wiſh'd that your Lordſhip had pleas'd a little to explain them, before you had defended them; for they are not, to me, without ſome Obſcurity. However, to gueſs as well as I can, I think the Propoſition that you intend here, is this, That thoſe who place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of only clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, are more in the right than I am, who place it in the Perception of the Agreement

or

or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, ſuch as we have, tho' they be not in all their Parts perfectly clear and diſtinct.

Whether your Lordſhip has prov'd this, or no, will be ſeen when we come to conſider what you have ſaid in the *Defence* of it. In the mean time, I have no reaſon to be ſorry to hear your Lordſhip ſay ſo; becauſe this ſuppoſes, that Certainty can be attain'd by the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. For if Certainty cannot be attain'd by the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, how can they be more in the right, who place Certainty in one ſort of *Ideas*, that it cannot be had in, than thoſe who place it in another ſort of *Ideas*, that it cannot be had in?

I ſhall proceed now to examine what your Lordſhip has ſaid in Defence of the Propoſition you have here ſet down to *defend*, which you may be ſure I ſhall do with all the Favourableneſs that Truth will allow; ſince, if your Lordſhip makes it out to be true, it puts an end to the Diſpute you have had with me: For it confutes that main Propoſition, which you have ſo much contended for; *That to lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and diſtinct* Ideas, *does Certainly overthrow all Myſteries of Faith*: unleſs you will ſay, that Myſteries of Faith cannot conſiſt with what you have prov'd to be true.

To prove that they are more in the right than I, who place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of clear and diſtinct *Ideas* only, your Lordſhip ſays, *That it is a wonderful thing, in Point of Reaſon, for me to pre-* P. 7. *tend to Certainty by* Ideas, *and not allow theſe* Ideas *to be clear and diſtinct*. This, my Lord, looks as if I plac'd Certainty only in obſcure and confus'd *Ideas*, and did not *allow* it might be had by clear and diſtinct ones. But I have declar'd my ſelf ſo clearly and ſo fully to the contrary, that I doubt not but your Lordſhip would think I deſerv'd to be ask'd, whether *this were fair and ingenuous dealing to repreſent this Matter* as this Expreſſion does? But the Inſtances are ſo many, how apt my unlearned way of writing is to miſlead your Lordſhip, and that always on the Side leaſt favourable to my Senſe, that if I ſhould cry out as often as I think I meet with occaſion for it, your Lordſhip would have reaſon to be uneaſy at the *Ebullition* and *Inlarging* of my Complaints.

Your Lordſhip farther asks, *How can I clearly perceive the Agreement or Diſa-* P. 7, & 8. *greement of* Ideas, *if I have not clear and diſtinct* Ideas? *For how is it poſſible for a Man's Mind to know whether they agree or diſagree, if there be ſome Parts of thoſe* Ideas, *we have only general and confus'd* Ideas *of*. I would rather read theſe latter words, if your Lordſhip pleaſe, *If there be ſome Parts of thoſe* Ideas that are *only general and confus'd*; for *Parts of* Ideas *that we have only general and confus'd* Ideas *of*, is not very clear and intelligible to me.

Taking then your Lordſhip's Queſtion as clear'd of this Obſcurity, it will ſtand thus: *How is it poſſible for a Man's Mind to know, whether* Ideas *agree or diſagree, if there be ſome Parts of thoſe* Ideas *obſcure and confus'd?* In anſwer to which I crave leave to ask; *Is it poſſible for a Man's Mind to perceive, whether* Ideas *agree or diſagree, if no Parts of thoſe* Ideas *be obſcure and confus'd*, and by that Perception to attain Certainty? If your Lordſhip ſays, No: how do you hereby prove, that they who place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of only clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, are more in the right than I? For they who place Certainty, where it is impoſſible to be had, can in that be no more in the right, than he who places it in any other Impoſſibility. If you ſay Yes, Certainty may be attain'd by the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, you give up the main Queſtion: You grant the Propoſition, which you declare you chiefly oppoſe; and ſo all this great Diſpute with me is at an end. Your Lordſhip may take which of theſe two you pleaſe: if the former, the Propoſition here to be prov'd is given up; if the latter, the whole Controverſy is given up: one of them, 'tis plain, you muſt ſay.

This, and what your Lordſhip ſays farther on this Point, ſeems to me to prove nothing, but that you ſuppoſe, that either there are no ſuch things as obſcure and confus'd *Ideas*; and then, with ſubmiſſion, the diſtinction between clear and obſcure, diſtinct and confus'd, is uſeleſs; and 'tis in vain to talk of clear and obſcure, diſtinct and confus'd *Ideas*, in oppoſition to one another: Or elſe

your

your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, that an obſcure and confus'd *Idea* is wholly undiſtinguiſhible from all other *Ideas*, and ſo in effect is all other *Ideas*. For if an obſcure and confus'd *Idea* be not one and the ſame with all other *Ideas*, as it is impoſſible for it to be, then the obſcure and confus'd *Idea* may and will be ſo far different from ſome other *Ideas*, that it may be perceiv'd whether it agrees or diſagrees with them or no. For every *Idea* in the Mind, clear or obſcure, diſtinct or confus'd, is but that one *Idea* that it is, and not another *Idea* that it is not; and the Mind perceives it to be the *Idea* that it is, and not another *Idea* that it is different from.

Eſſay, B. 2. c. 29. What therefore I mean by obſcure and confus'd *Ideas*, I have at large ſhewn, and ſhall not trouble your Lordſhip with a Repetition of here. For that there are ſuch obſcure and confus'd *Ideas*, I ſuppoſe the Inſtances your Lordſhip gives

P. 24. here evince: to which I ſhall add this one more; Suppoſe you ſhould in the Twilight, or in a thick Miſt, ſee two things ſtanding upright, near the ſize and ſhape of an ordinary Man; but in ſo dim a light, or at ſuch a diſtance, that they appear'd very much alike, and you could not perceive them to be what they really were, the one a Statue, the other a Man; would not theſe two be obſcure and confus'd *Ideas*? And yet could not your Lordſhip be certain of the Truth of this Propoſition concerning either of them, that it was ſomething, or did exiſt; and that by perceiving the Agreement of that *Idea* (as obſcure and confus'd as it was) with that of Exiſtence, as expreſs'd in that Propoſition?

This, my Lord, is juſt the caſe of *Subſtance*, upon which you rais'd this Argument concerning obſcure and confus'd *Ideas*; which this Inſtance ſhews may have Propoſitions made about them, of whoſe Truth we may be certain.

Hence I crave Liberty to conclude, That I am nearer the Truth than thoſe who ſay that *Certainty is founded only in clear and diſtinct Ideas*, if any body does ſay ſo. For no ſuch Saying of any one of thoſe, with whom your Lordſhip join'd me for ſo ſaying, is, that I remember, yet produc'd; tho' this be that for which *They* and *Thoſe*, whoever they be, had from your Lordſhip the title

Vind. p. 233, 234. of *the Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning*; and this be the *Opinion* which your Lordſhip declares you *oppoſe, as certainly overthrowing all Myſteries of Faith, and*

Anſ. 1. p. 14. *excluding the Notion of Subſtance out of rational Diſcourſe*. Which terrible termagant Propoſition, *viz. That Certainty is founded only in clear and diſtinct Ideas*, which has made ſuch a noiſe, and been the cauſe of the *ſpending* above ten times *fifty Pages*, and given occaſion to very large *Ebullition of Thoughts*; appears not by any thing that has been yet produc'd, to be any where in their Writings, with whom upon this Score you have had ſo warm a Controverſy, but only in your Lordſhip's Imagination, and what you have, at leaſt for this once, *writ out of your own Thoughts*.

But if this Paragraph contain too little in *Defence* of the Propoſition which your Lordſhip, in the beginning of it, ſet down on purpoſe to *defend*; what follows is viſibly more remote from it. But ſince your Lordſhip has been pleas'd to tack it on here, tho' without applying of it any way, that I ſee, to the *defence* of the Propoſition to be *defended*, which is already got clean out of ſight; I am taught, that 'tis fit I conſider it here in this, which your Lordſhip has thought the *proper place* for it.

P. 9. In the next Paragraph, your Lordſhip is pleas'd to take notice of this part of my Complaint, *viz.* That *I ſay more than twice or ten times*, "That you blame "thoſe who place Certainty in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; but I do not: and yet "you bring me in amongſt them." And for this, your Lordſhip quotes ſeventeen ſeveral Pages of my ſecond Letter. Whoever will give himſelf the trouble to turn to thoſe Pages, will ſee how far I am in thoſe places from barely ſaying, *That you blame thoſe who place Certainty*, &c. and what reaſon you had to point to ſo many places for my ſo ſaying, as a Repetition of my Complaint. And I believe they will find the Propoſition about *Placing Certainty only in clear and diſtinct Ideas*, is mention'd in them upon ſeveral occaſions, and to different purpoſes, as the Argument requir'd.

Be that as it will, this is a part of my *Complaint*, and you do me a Favour, that after having, as you ſay, met with it in ſo many places, you are pleas'd at laſt to take notice of it, and promiſe me *a full Anſwer to it*. The firſt part of

P. 9. which *full Anſwer* is in theſe words; That *you do not deny but the firſt occaſion*

of

of your Lordſhip's Charge, was in the Suppoſition that clear and diſtinct Ideas were neceſſary, in order to any Certainty in our Minds. And that the only way "to attain "this Certainty, was by comparing *theſe* Ideas together."

My Lord, tho' I have faithfully ſet down theſe Words out of your ſecond Anſwer, yet I muſt own I have printed them in ſomething a different Character from that which they ſtand in, in your Letter. For your Lordſhip has publiſh'd this Sentence ſo, as if *the Suppoſition that clear and diſtinct Ideas were neceſſary in order to any Certainty in our Minds*, were my *Suppoſition*; whereas I muſt crave leave to let my Reader know, That that *Suppoſition* is purely your Lordſhip's: for you neither in *your Defence of the Trinity*, nor in your *firſt Anſwer*, produce any thing to prove, that that was either an Aſſertion or *Suppoſition* of mine; but your Lordſhip was pleas'd to ſuppoſe it for me. As to the latter Words, "And that the only way to attain this Certainty, was by comparing *theſe* "*Ideas* together:" If your Lordſhip means by *theſe Ideas*, *Ideas* in general; then I acknowledg theſe to be my words, or to be my Senſe: but then they are not any *Suppoſition* in my Book, tho' they are made part of the *Suppoſition* here; but their Senſe is expreſs'd in my *Eſſay* at large in more Places than one. But if by *theſe Ideas* your Lordſhip means only clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, I crave leave to deny that to be my Senſe, or any *Suppoſition* of mine. P. 9.

Your Lordſhip goes on; *But to prove* this. Prove what, I beſeech you my Lord? That Certainty was to be attain'd by comparing *Ideas*, was a Suppoſition of mine. To prove that, there needed no *Words* or *Principles* of mine to be *produced*, unleſs your Lordſhip would prove that which was never deny'd. P. 9.

But if it were to prove *this*, *viz.* That it was a *Suppoſition* of mine, That *clear and diſtinct Ideas were neceſſary to Certainty*; and that, to *prove* this to be a *Suppoſition* of mine, *my Words were produc'd, and my Principles of Certainty laid down, and none elſe*; I anſwer, I do not remember any *Words* or *Principles* of mine *produced* to ſhew any ground for ſuch a *Suppoſition*, that I plac'd Certainty only in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; and if there had been any ſuch *produced*, your Lordſhip would have done me and the Reader a favour, to have mark'd the pages wherein one might have found them *produced*, unleſs your Lordſhip thinks you make amends for quoting ſo many Pages of my ſecond Letter, which might have been ſpared, by neglecting wholly to quote any of your own where it needed. When your Lordſhip ſhall pleaſe to direct me to thoſe Places where ſuch *Words* and *Principles* of mine were *produced* to prove ſuch a *Suppoſition*, I ſhall readily turn to them, to ſee how far this do really give ground for it. But my bad Memory not ſuggeſting to me any thing like it, your Lordſhip, I hope, will pardon me if I do not turn over your *Defence of the Trinity* and your *Firſt Letter*, to ſee whether you have any ſuch *Proofs*, which you your ſelf ſeem ſo much to doubt or think ſo meanly of, that you do not ſo much as point out the Places where they are to be found; tho' we have in this very Page ſo eminent an Example, that you are not ſparing of your Pains in this kind, where you have the leaſt thought that it might ſerve your Lordſhip to the meaneſt Purpoſe. P. 9.

But tho' you *produced* no *Words* or *Principles* of mine to *prove* this a *Suppoſition* of mine; yet in your next words here your Lordſhip *produces* a Reaſon why you your ſelf ſuppos'd it. For you ſay, *You could not imagine that I could place Certainty in the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, and not ſuppoſe thoſe Ideas to be clear and diſtinct*: ſo that at laſt the Satisfaction you give me, why my Book was brought into a Controverſy wherein it was not concern'd, is, that your Lordſhip *imagin'd* I *ſuppos'd* in it what I did not *ſuppoſe* in it. And here I crave leave to ask, Whether the Reader may not well ſuppoſe that you had a great mind to bring my Book into that Controverſy, when the only handle you could find for it, was an Imagination of a *Suppoſition* to be in it, which in truth was not there? P. 9.

Your Lordſhip adds, *That I finding my ſelf join'd in ſuch Company which I did not deſire to be ſeen in, I rather choſe to diſtinguiſh my ſelf from them, by denying clear and diſtinct Ideas to be neceſſary to Certainty.* P. 9.

If it might be permitted to another to gueſs at your Thoughts, as well as you do at mine, he perhaps would turn it thus; That your Lordſhip finding no readier way, as you thought, to ſet a Mark upon my Book, than by bringing ſeveral Paſſages of it into a Controverſy concerning the Trinity, wherein they had

had nothing to do; and ſpeaking of them under the name of *Thoſe* and *Them*, as if your Adverſaries in that Diſpute had made uſe of thoſe Paſſages againſt the Trinity, when no one Oppoſer of the Doctrine of the Trinity, that I know or that you have produc'd, ever made uſe of one of them: you thought fit to jumble my Book with other Peoples Opinions after a new way, never uſed by any other Writer that I ever heard of. If any one will conſider what your Lordſhip has ſaid for my *Satisfaction* (wherein you have, as I humbly conceive I have ſhewn, produc'd nothing but Imaginations of Imaginations, and Suppoſitions of Suppoſitions) he will, I conclude, without ſtraining of his Thoughts, be carry'd to this Conjecture.

P. 9. But Conjectures apart, your Lordſhip ſays, *That I finding my ſelf join'd in ſuch Company which I did not deſire to be ſeen in, I rather choſe to diſtinguiſh my ſelf*: If keeping to my Book can be call'd *diſtinguiſhing my ſelf*. You ſay, *I rather choſe: Rather!* than what, my Lord, I beſeech you? Your learned way of writing, I find, is every where beyond my Capacity; and unleſs I will gueſs at your meaning (which is not very ſafe) beyond what I can certainly underſtand by your words, I often know not what to anſwer to. 'Tis certain, you mean here, that I prefer'd *diſtinguiſhing my ſelf from them I found my ſelf join'd with* to ſomething; but to what, you do not ſay. If you mean to owning that for my Notion of Certainty, which is not my Notion of Certainty: this is true, I did and ſhall always *rather chuſe to diſtinguiſh my ſelf from any* Them, than own that for my Notion which is not my Notion: If you mean that I prefer'd *my diſtinguiſhing my ſelf from them, to my being join'd with them*; you make me *chuſe*, where there neither is nor can be any Choice. For what is wholly out of one's power, leaves no room for Choice: And I think I ſhould be laugh'd at, if I ſhould ſay, *I rather chuſe to diſtinguiſh my ſelf* from the Papiſts, than that it ſhould rain. For it is no more in my Choice not to be join'd, as your Lordſhip has been pleas'd to join me, with the unknown *They* and *Them*, than it is in my power that it ſhould not rain.

'Tis like you will ſay here again, this is a *nice Criticiſm*; I grant, my Lord, it is about Words and Expreſſions: But ſince I cannot know your Meaning but by your Words and Expreſſions, if this Defect in my Underſtanding very frequently overtake me in your Writings to and concerning me, 'tis troubleſome, I confeſs; but what muſt I do? Muſt I play at Blind-Man's-buff? Catch at what I do not ſee? Anſwer to I know not what; to no Meaning, *i. e.* to nothing? Or muſt I preſume to know your Meaning, when I do not?

For example, Suppoſe I ſhould preſume it to be your Meaning here, That *I found my ſelf join'd in Company*, by your Lordſhip, with the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, by your Lordſhip's imputing the ſame Notions of Certainty to us both; That *I did not deſire to be ſeen in his Company*, i. e. to be thought to be of his Opinion in other things; and therefore *I chuſe rather to diſtinguiſh my ſelf from him, by denying clear and diſtinct Ideas to be neceſſary to Certainty, than to be ſo join'd with him*: If I ſhould preſume this to be the Senſe of theſe your words here, and that by the doubtful Signification of the Expreſſions of being *join'd in Company* and *ſeen in company*, uſed equivocally, your Lordſhip ſhould mean, that becauſe I was ſaid to be of his Opinion in one thing, I was to be thought to be of his Opinion in all things, and therefore diſown'd to be of his Opinion in that wherein I was of his Opinion, becauſe I would not be thought of his Opinion all thro': would not your Lordſhip be diſpleas'd with me for ſuppoſing you to have ſuch a Meaning as this, and ask me again, whether *I could think you a Man of ſo little Senſe* to talk thus? And yet, my Lord, this is the beſt I can make of theſe words, which ſeem to me rather to diſcover a Secret in your way of dealing with me, than any thing in me that I am aſham'd of.

For I am not, nor ever ſhall be aſham'd to own any Opinion I have, becauſe another Man holds the ſame; and ſo far as that brings me *into his Company*, I ſhall not be troubled to be *ſeen* in it. But I ſhall never think, that that entitles me to any other of his Opinions, or makes me of *his Company* in any other Senſe, how much ſoever that be the Deſign: For your Lordſhip has uſed no ſmall Art and Pains to make me of his and the Unitarians Company in all that they ſay, only becauſe that Author has ten Lines in the beginning of his Book, which agrees with ſomething I have ſaid in mine; from whence we become Companions,

panions, ſo univerſally united in Opinion, That *They* muſt be entitled to all that I ſay, and I to all that *They* ſay.

My Lord, when I writ my Book, I could not deſign *to diſtinguiſh my ſelf from the Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning*, who were not then in being, nor are, that I ſee, yet: ſince I find nothing produc'd out of the *Unitarians*, nor the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, to ſhew, that they make clear and diſtinct *Ideas* neceſſary to Certainty. And all that I have done ſince, has been to ſhew, That you had no reaſon to join my Book with Men (let them be what *They* or *Thoſe* you pleaſe) who founded Certainty only upon clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, when my Book did not found it only upon clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. And I cannot tell why the appealing to my Book now, ſhould be call'd a *chuſing rather to diſtinguiſh my ſelf*.

My Reader muſt pardon me here for this uncouth Phraſe of joining my Book with Men. For as your Lordſhip order'd the matter (pardon me, if I ſay in your new way of writing) ſo as it was, if your own Word may be taken in the caſe: For, to give me Satisfaction, you inſiſt upon this, That you did not join me with thoſe *Gentlemen* in their Opinions, but tell me they uſed *my Notions to other purpoſes than I intended them*; and ſo there was no need for me to *diſtinguiſh my ſelf from them*, when your Lordſhip had done it for me, as you plead all along: Tho' here you are pleas'd to tell me, That I was *join'd* with them, and that *I found my ſelf join'd in ſuch Company, as I did not deſire to be ſeen in.*

My Lord, I could find my ſelf *join'd in* no *Company* upon this occaſion, but what you *join'd me in.* And therefore I beg leave to ask your Lordſhip, Did you *join me in Company* with thoſe, in whoſe Company, you here ſay, *I do not deſire to be ſeen?* If you own that you did, how muſt I underſtand that Paſſage where you ſay, That *you muſt do that Right to the ingenious Author of the* Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, *from whence theſe Notions were borrow'd, to ſerve other Purpoſes than he intended them*; which you repeat again as matter of Satisfaction to me, and as a Proof of *the care you took not to be miſunderſtood?* If you did join me with them, what is become of all the *Satisfaction* in the point, which your Lordſhip has been at ſo much pains about? And If you did not *join* me with them, you could not think I *found* my ſelf *join'd* with them, or *choſe to diſtinguiſh my ſelf from Men* I was never join'd with: for my Book was innocent of what made them *Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning.*

Vindic. p. 239.

Anſw. 1. p. 35.

There ſeems to me ſomething very delicate in this matter. I ſhould be ſuppos'd *join'd* to them, and your Lordſhip ſhould not be ſuppos'd to have *join'd* me to them, upon ſo ſlight or no occaſion; and yet all this comes ſolely from your Lordſhip. How to do this to your Satisfaction, I confeſs my ſelf to be too dull: And therefore I have been at the pains to examine how far I have this Obligation to your Lordſhip, and how far you would be pleas'd to own it, that the World might underſtand your Lordſhip's, to me, incomprehenſible way of writing on this occaſion.

For if you had a mind, by a new and very dextrous way, becoming the Learning and Caution of a great Man, to bring me into *ſuch Company*, which you think *I did not deſire to be ſeen in*; I thought ſuch a Pattern, ſet by ſuch a Hand as your Lordſhip's, ought not to be loſt by being paſs'd over too ſlightly. Beſides, I hope, that you will not take it amiſs, that I was willing to ſee what Obligation I had to your Lordſhip in the Favour you deſign'd me. But I crave leave to aſſure your Lordſhip, I ſhall never be aſham'd to own any Opinion I have, becauſe another Man (of whom perhaps your Lordſhip or others have no very good thoughts) is of it, nor be unwilling to be ſo far *ſeen in his Company*: tho' I ſhall always think I have a right to demand, and ſhall deſire to be ſatisfy'd, why any one makes to himſelf, or takes an occaſion from thence, in manner that favours not too much of Charity, to extend this Society to thoſe Opinions of that Man, with which I have nothing to do; that the World may ſee the Juſtice and Good-will of ſuch Endeavours, and judg whether ſuch Arts favour not a little of the Spirit of the Inquiſition.

For, if I miſtake not, 'tis the method of that holy Office, and the way of thoſe rever'd Guardians of what they call the Chriſtian Faith, to raiſe Reports or ſtart occaſions of ſuſpicion concerning the Orthodoxy of any one they have no very good-will towards, and require him to clear himſelf; gilding all this

with the Care of Religion, and the Profeſſion of Reſpect and Tenderneſs to the Perſon himſelf, even when they deliver him up to be burnt by the Secular Power.

I ſhall not, my Lord, ſay, That you have had any ill-will to me; for I never deſerv'd any from you. But I ſhall be better able to anſwer thoſe, who are apt to think the Method you have taken, has ſome conformity, ſo far as it has gone, with what Proteſtants complain of in the Inquiſition; when you ſhall have *clear'd* this Matter a little otherwiſe, and aſſign'd a more ſufficient Reaſon for bringing me into the Party of thoſe that oppoſe the Doctrine of the Trinity, than only becauſe the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* has, in the beginning of his Book, half a ſcore Lines which you gueſs he borrow'd out of mine. For that, in truth, is all the matter of fact upon which all this Duſt is rais'd; and the matter ſo advanc'd by Degrees, that now I am told, I ſhould have *clear'd my ſelf, by owning the Doctrine of the Trinity:* as if I had been ever accus'd of diſowning it. But that which ſhews no ſmall Skill in this Management, is, That I am call'd upon to *clear my ſelf*, by the very ſame Perſon who, raiſing the whole Diſpute, has himſelf over and over again clear'd me; and upon that grounds the *Satisfaction* he pretends to give to me and others, in anſwer to my Complaint of his having, without any reaſon at all, brought my Book into the Controverſy concerning the Trinity. But to go on.

If the preceding part of this Paragraph had nothing in it of *Defence* of this Propoſition, *That thoſe who offer at clear and diſtinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do*, &c. it is certain, that what follows is altogether as remote from any ſuch Defence.

P. 10. Your Lordſhip ſays, That *Certainty by Senſe, Certainty by Reaſon*, and *Certainty by Remembrance, are to be diſtinguiſh'd from the Certainty* under debate, and to be ſhut out from it: And upon this you ſpend the 11th, 12th, and 13th Pages. Suppoſing it ſo, how does this at all tend to the *defence* of this Propoſition, That *thoſe who offer at clear and diſtinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do?* For whether *Certainty by Senſe, by Reaſon, and by Remembrance*, be or be not comprehended in the *Certainty* under debate, this Propoſition, That *thoſe who offer at clear and diſtinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do*, will not at all be confirm'd or invalidated thereby.

The proving therefore, that *Certainty by Senſe, by Reaſon, and by Remembrance*, is to be excluded from the Certainty under debate, ſerving nothing to the *defence* of the Propoſition to be *defended*, and ſo having nothing to do here; let us now conſider it as a Propoſition that your Lordſhip has a mind to prove, as ſerving to ſome other great purpoſe of your own, or perhaps in ſome other View againſt my Book: for you ſeem to lay no ſmall ſtreſs upon it, by your

P. 9, & 10. way of introducing it. For you very ſolemnly ſet your ſelf to prove, *That the Certainty under debate is the Certainty of Knowledg*, and *that a Propoſition whoſe Ideas are to be compar'd as to their Agreement or Diſagreement, is the proper Object of this Certainty.* From whence your Lordſhip infers, That *therefore this Certainty*

P. 10, 11, 12. *is to be diſtinguiſh'd from a Certainty by Senſe, by Reaſon, and by Remembrance.* But by what Logick this is infer'd, is not eaſy to me to diſcover. For if a *Propoſition, whoſe Ideas are to be compar'd as to their Agreement or Diſagreement, be the proper Object of the Certainty* under debate; if Propoſitions whoſe Certainty we arrive at by *Senſe, Reaſon*, or *Remembrance*, be of *Ideas*, which may be compar'd as to their Agreement or Diſagreement; then they cannot be excluded from that Certainty, which is to be had by ſo comparing thoſe *Ideas:* unleſs they muſt be ſhut out for the very ſame reaſon, that others are taken in.

1. Then as to *Certainty by Senſe*, or Propoſitions of that kind:

The *Object of the Certainty under Debate*, your Lordſhip owns, *is a Propoſition whoſe Ideas are to be compar'd as to their Agreement or Diſagreement.* The Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* of a Propoſition to be compar'd, may be examin'd and perceiv'd by Senſe, and is *Certainty by Senſe:* And therefore how this *Certainty* is to be *diſtinguiſh'd* and *ſhut out* from that which conſiſts in the perceiving the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* of any Propoſition, will not be eaſy to ſhew; unleſs one *Certainty* is *diſtinguiſh'd* from another, by having that which makes the other to be Certainty, *viz.* The Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas*, as expreſs'd in that Propoſition: *v. g.* May I not be certain, that a Ball of Ivory that lies before my Eyes is not ſquare?

And

And is it not my Senſe of Seeing, that makes me perceive the Diſagreement of that ſquare Figure to that round Matter, which are the *Ideas* expreſs'd in that Propoſition? How then is Certainty by Senſe excluded or *diſtinguiſh'd* from that Knowledg, which conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*?

2. Your Lordſhip *diſtinguiſhes* the Certainty which conſiſts in the perceiving the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, as expreſs'd in any Propoſition *from* P. 11. *Certainty by Reaſon.* To have made good this diſtinction, I humbly conceive, you would have done well to have ſhew'd that the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas* could not be perceiv'd by the intervention of a third, which I, and as I gueſs other People, call Reaſoning, or knowing by Reaſon. As for example, Cannot the Sides of a given Triangle be known to be equal by the Intervention of two Circles, whereof one of theſe Sides is a common Radius?

To which, 'tis like, your Lordſhip will anſwer, what I find you do here, a- P. 12. bout the Knowledg of the Exiſtence of Subſtance, by the intervention of the Exiſtence of Modes, *That you grant one may come to Certainty of Knowledg in the caſe; but not a Certainty by Ideas, but by a Conſequence of Reaſon deduc'd from the Ideas we have by our Senſes.* This, my Lord, you have ſaid, and thus you have more than once oppos'd Reaſon and *Ideas* as inconſiſtent; which I ſhould be very glad to ſee prov'd once, after theſe ſeveral occaſions I have given your Lordſhip, by excepting againſt that Suppoſition. But ſince the word *Idea* has the ill luck to be ſo conſtantly oppos'd by your Lordſhip to Reaſon, permit me, if you pleaſe, inſtead of it, to put what I mean by it, *viz.* the immediate Objects of the Mind in thinking (for that is it which I would ſignify by the word *Ideas*) and then let us ſee how your anſwer will run. You grant that from the ſenſible Modes of Bodies *we may come to a certain Knowledg*, that there are *Bodily Subſtances*; but this you ſay is *not* a Certainty by the immediate Objects of the Mind in thinking, *but by a Conſequence of Reaſon deduc'd from* the immediate Objects of the Mind in thinking, *which we have by our Senſes.* When you can prove that we can have a Certainty *by a Conſequence of Reaſon*, which Certainty ſhall not alſo be by the immediate Objects of the Mind in uſing its Reaſon; you may ſay ſuch Certainty is *not by Ideas*, but *by Conſequences of Reaſon.* But that I believe will not be till you can ſhew, That the Mind can think, or reaſon, or know, without immediate Objects of Thinking, Reaſoning, or Knowing; all which Objects, as your Lordſhip knows, I call *Ideas.*

You ſubjoin, *And this can never prove that we have Certainty by Ideas, where the* P. 12. *Ideas themſelves are not clear and diſtinct?* The Queſtion is not whether *we can have Certainty by Ideas that are not clear and diſtinct?* or whether my Words (if by the Particle *This* you mean my words ſet down in the foregoing Page) prove any ſuch thing, which I humbly conceive they do not: But whether *Certainty by Reaſon* be excluded from the Certainty under debate? which I humbly conceive you have not from my words, or any other way, prov'd.

3. The third ſort of Propoſitions that your Lordſhip excludes, are thoſe whoſe P. 12. *Certainty* we know by *Remembrance*, but in theſe two the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* contain'd in them is perceiv'd; not always indeed, as it was at firſt, by an actual View of the Connection of all the intermediate *Ideas*, whereby the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe in the Propoſition was at firſt perceiv'd; but by other intermediate *Ideas*, that ſhew the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* contain'd in the Propoſition, whoſe Certainty we remember.

As in the inſtance you here make uſe of, *viz.* That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones: The Certainty of which Propoſition we know by Remembrance, tho' *the Demonſtration hath ſlipt out of our Minds*; but we know it in a different way from what your Lordſhip ſuppoſes. The Agreement of the two *Ideas*, as join'd in that Propoſition, is perceiv'd; but it is by the intervention of other *Ideas* than thoſe which at firſt produc'd that Perception. I remember, *i. e.* I know (for Remembrance is but the reviving of ſome paſt Knowledg) that I was once certain of the Truth of this Propoſition, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones. The Immutability of the ſame Relations between the ſame immutable things, is now the *Idea* that ſhews me, that if the three Angles of a Triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones; and hence I come to be cer-

tain, that what was once true in the Caſe, is always true; what *Ideas* once agreed, will always agree; and conſequently what I once knew to be true, I ſhall always know to be true as long as I can remember that I once knew it.

P. 9. Your Lordſhip ſays, *That the Debate between us is about Certainty of Knowledg, with regard to ſome Propoſition whoſe Ideas are to be compared as to their Agreement or Diſagreement:* Out of this Debate you ſay, Certainty by *Senſe* by *Reaſon*, and by *Remembrance*, is to be excluded. I deſire you then, my Lord, to tell what ſort of Propoſitions will be within the *Debate*, and to name me one of them; if Propoſitions, whoſe Certainty we know by *Senſe*, *Reaſon*, or *Remembrance*, are excluded.

However, from what you have ſaid concerning them, your Lordſhip in the next Paragraph concludes them *out of the Queſtion*; your words are, *Theſe things then being out of the Queſtion.*

Out of what Queſtion, I beſeech you, my Lord? The Queſtion here, and that of your own propoſing to be defended in the Affirmative, is this, Whether *thoſe who offer at clear and diſtinct Ideas bid much fairer for Certainty than I do?* And how Certainty by Senſe, by Reaſon, and by Remembrance comes to have any particular Exception in reference to this Queſtion, 'tis my misfortune not to be able to find.

But your Lordſhip, leaving the Examination of the Queſtion under debate, by a new State of the Queſtion, would pin upon me what I never ſaid. Your
P. 13. Words are, *Theſe things then being put out of the Queſtion, which belong not to it; the Queſtion truly ſtated is, Whether we can attain to any Certainty of Knowledg as to the Truth of a Propoſition in the way of Ideas, where the Ideas themſelves, by which we came to that Certainty, be not clear and diſtinct?* With Submiſſion, my Lord, that which I ſay in the Point, is, That we may be certain of the Truth of a Propoſition concerning an Idea which is not in all its Parts clear and diſtinct; and therefore if your Lordſhip will have any *Queſtion* with me concerning this Matter, *the Queſtion truly ſtated is, Whether we can frame any Propoſition concerning a thing whereof we have but an obſcure and confus'd Idea, of whoſe Truth we can be certain.*

That this is the Queſtion, you will eaſily agree, when you will give your ſelf the trouble to look back to the Riſe of it.

Your Lordſhip having found out a ſtrange ſort of Men, who had broach'd
Vind. p. 232. *a Doctrine which ſuppos'd that we muſt have clear and diſtinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to a Certainty of in our Minds*, was pleas'd for this to call them the *Gentlemen of a new way of Reaſoning*, and to make me one of them. I anſwer'd, that I plac'd not Certainty only in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, and ſo ought not to have been made one of them, being not guilty of what made *a Gentleman of this new way of Reaſoning*. 'Tis pretended ſtill, that I am guilty; and endeavour'd to be prov'd. To know now whether I am or no, it muſt be conſider'd what you lay to their Charge, as the Conſequence of that Opinion; and that is, That upon this Ground *we cannot come to any Certainty that there is ſuch*
Vind. p. 240. *a thing as Subſtance.* This appears by more Places than one. Your Lordſhip asks, *How is it poſſible that we may be certain that there are both bodily and*
Ibid. *ſpiritual Subſtances, if our Reaſon depend upon clear and diſtinct Ideas?* And again, *How come we to be certain that there are ſpiritual Subſtances in the World, ſince we can have no clear and diſtinct Ideas concerning them?* And your Lordſhip having ſet down ſome Words out of my Book, as if they were inconſiſtent with my
Vind. p. 244. Principle of Certainty founded only in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, you ſay, *From whence it follows that we may be certain of the Being of a ſpiritual Subſtance, tho' we have no clear and diſtinct Ideas of it.*

Other Places might be produc'd, but theſe are enough to ſhew, That thoſe who held clear and diſtinct *Ideas* neceſſary to Certainty, were accus'd to extend it thus far, that where any *Idea* was obſcure and confus'd, there no Propoſition could be made concerning it, of whoſe Truth we could be certain; *v. g.* we could not be certain that there was in the World ſuch a thing as *Subſtance*, becauſe we had but an obſcure and confus'd *Idea* of it.

In this Senſe therefore I deny'd that clear and diſtinct *Ideas* were neceſſary to Certainty, *v. g.* I deny'd it to be my Doctrine, That where an *Idea* was

obſcure

obſcure and confus'd, there no Propoſition could be made concerning it, of whoſe Truth we could be certain. For I held we might be certain of the Truth of this Propoſition, That there was *Subſtance* in the World, tho' we have but an obſcure and confus'd *Idea* of *Subſtance*: And your Lordſhip endeavour'd to prove we could not, as may be ſeen at large in that 10th Chapter of your *Vindication*, &c.

From all which, 'tis evident, that the Queſtion between us *truly ſtated* is this, Whether we can attain Certainty of the Truth of a Propoſition concerning any thing whereof we have but an obſcure and confus'd *Idea?*

This being the Queſtion, The firſt thing you ſay, is, That *Des Cartes* was of your Opinion againſt me. *Anſw.* If the Queſtion were to be decided by Authority, I had rather it ſhould be by your Lordſhip's than *Des Cartes's*: And therefore I ſhould excuſe my ſelf to you, as not having need, that you ſhould have added his Authority to your's, to ſhame me into a Submiſſion; or that you ſhould have been at the pains to have tranſcrib'd ſo much out of him, for my ſake, were it fit for me to hinder the diſplay of the Riches of your Lordſhip's univerſal reading; wherein I doubt not but I ſhould take pleaſure my ſelf, if I had it to ſhew. P. 13.

I come therefore to what I think your Lordſhip principally aim'd at; which, as I humbly conceive, was to ſhew out of my Book, That I founded Certainty only on clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. *And yet*, as you ſay, *I have complain'd of your Lordſhip in near twenty places of my Second Letter, for charging this upon me. By this the World will judg of the Juſtice of my Complaints, and the Conſiſtency of my Notion of Ideas.* P. 15.

Anſw. What *Conſiſtency of my Notion of Ideas has to do here*, I know not; for I do not remember that I made any Complaint concerning that. But ſuppoſing my Complaints were ill-grounded in this one caſe concerning Certainty, yet they might be reaſonable in other Points; and therefore, with Submiſſion, I humbly conceive the Inference was a little too large, to conclude from this Particular againſt my Complaints in general.

In the next place I anſwer, That ſuppoſing the places which your Lordſhip brings out of my Book did prove what they do not, *viz.* That I founded Certainty only in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; yet my Complaints in the Caſe are very juſt. For your Lordſhip at firſt brought me into the Controverſy, and made me one of *the Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning*, for founding all Certainty on clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, only upon a bare *Suppoſition* that I did ſo: which I think your Lordſhip confeſſes in theſe Words, where you ſay, That *you do not deny but the firſt Occaſion of your Charge, was the Suppoſition that clear and diſtinct Ideas were neceſſary in order to any Certainty in our Minds; and that the only way to attain this Certainty, was the comparing* theſe, *i. e.* clear and diſtinct *Ideas, together: but to prove this, my Words*, your Lordſhip ſays, *were produc'd, and my Principles of Certainty laid down, and none elſe. Anſw.* 'Tis ſtrange, that when my *Principles of Certainty were laid down*, this (if I held it) was not found among them. Having look'd therefore, I do not find in that place, that any *Words or Principles of mine were produc'd* to prove that I held, That the only way to attain Certainty, was by comparing only clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; ſo that all that then made me One of *the Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning*, was only your ſuppoſing that I ſuppos'd that clear and diſtinct *Ideas* are neceſſary to Certainty. And therefore I had then, and have ſtill, reaſon to complain, That your Lordſhip brought me into this Controverſy upon ſo ſlight Grounds, which I humbly conceive will always ſhew it to have proceeded not ſo much from any thing you had then found in my Book, as from a great Willingneſs in your Lordſhip at any rate to do it; and of this the Paſſages which you have here now produc'd out of my *Eſſay*, are an evident Proof. P. 9.

For if your Lordſhip had then known any thing that ſeem'd ſo much to your purpoſe, when you *produc'd*, as you ſay, *my Words and my Principles to prove*, That I held clear and diſtinct *Ideas* neceſſary to Certainty; it cannot be believ'd that you would have omitted theſe Paſſages, either then or in your Anſwer to my firſt Letter, and defer'd them to this your Anſwer to my ſecond. Theſe Paſſages therefore now quoted here by your Lordſhip, give me

leave,

leave, my Lord, to ſuppoſe have been by a new and diligent ſearch found out, and are now at laſt brought *poſt factum* to give ſome colour to your way of proceeding with me; tho' theſe Paſſages being, as I ſuppoſe, then unknown to you, they could not be the Ground of making me one of *thoſe* who place Certainty only in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*.

Let us come to the Paſſages themſelves, and ſee what help they afford you.

B. 4. C. 18. §. 8. The firſt Words you ſet down out of my *Eſſay* are theſe; "The Mind not "being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know." From theſe Words, that which I infer in that place, is, "That therefore the "Mind is bound in ſuch Caſes to give up its Aſſent to an unerring Te-

P. 15. "ſtimony." But your Lordſhip from them infers here, *Therefore I make clear Ideas neceſſary to Certainty*; or therefore, by conſidering the immediate Objects of the Mind in thinking, we cannot be certain that *Subſtance* (whereof we have an obſcure and confus'd *Idea*) doth exiſt. I ſhall leave your Lordſhip to make good this Conſequence when you think fit, and proceed to the next

P. 15. Paſſage you alledg, which you ſay proves it *more plainly*. I believe it will be thought it ſhould be prov'd more plainly, or elſe it will not be prov'd at all.

This plainer Proof is out of B. 4. C. 4. §. 8. in theſe Words, "That which "is requiſite to make our Knowledg certain, is the Clearneſs of our *Ideas*." *Anſw.* The Certainty here ſpoken of, is the Certainty of general Propoſitions in Morality, and not of the particular Exiſtence of any thing; and therefore tends not at all to any ſuch Poſition as this, That we cannot be certain of the Exiſtence of any particular ſort of Being, tho' we have but an obſcure and confus'd *Idea* of it: Tho' it doth affirm, That we cannot have any certain Perception of the Relations of general moral *Ideas* (wherein conſiſts the Certainty of general moral Propoſitions) any farther than thoſe *Ideas* are clear in our Minds. And that this is ſo, I refer my Reader to that Chapter for Satisfaction.

The third Place produc'd by your Lordſhip out of B. 4. C. 12. §. 14. is,

P. 15. "For it being evident that our Knowledg cannot exceed our *Ideas*, where "they are only imperfect, confus'd or obſcure; we cannot expect to have "certain perfect or clear Knowledg." To underſtand theſe Words aright, we muſt ſee in what place they ſtand, and that is in a Chapter of the Improvement of our Knowledg, and therein are brought as a reaſon to ſhew how neceſſary it is "for the enlarging of our Knowledg, to get and ſettle in our "Minds as far as we can, clear, diſtinct, and conſtant *Ideas* of thoſe things "we would conſider and know." The Reaſon whereof there given, is this; That as far as they are only imperfect, confuſs'd, and obſcure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear Knowledg; *i. e.* that our Knowledg will not be clear and certain ſo far as the *Idea* is imperfect and obſcure. Which will not at all reach your Lordſhip's purpoſe, who would argue, that becauſe I ſay our *Idea* of *Subſtance* is obſcure and confus'd, therefore upon my Grounds, we cannot know that ſuch a thing as *Subſtance* exiſts; becauſe I plac'd Certainty only in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. Now to this I anſwer'd, That I did not place all Certainty only on clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, in ſuch a

Anſ. 2. p. 50. Senſe as that; and therefore to avoid being miſtaken, I ſaid, "That my No-"tion of Certainty by *Ideas* is, That Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of "the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*; ſuch as we have, whether they "be in all their Parts *perfectly* clear and diſtinct or no." *viz.* If they are clear and diſtinct enough to be capable of having their Agreement or Diſagreement with any other *Idea* perceiv'd, ſo far they are capable of affording us Knowledg, tho' at the ſame time they are ſo obſcure and confus'd, as that there are other *Ideas*, with which we can by no means ſo compare them, as to perceive their Agreement or Diſagreement with them. This was the Clearneſs and Diſtinctneſs which I deny'd to be neceſſary to Certainty.

If your Lordſhip would have done me the honour to have conſider'd what I underſtood by obſcure and confus'd *Ideas*, and what every one muſt underſtand by them, who thinks clearly and diſtinctly concerning them, I am apt to imagine you would have ſpar'd your ſelf the trouble of raiſing this Queſtion, and omitted theſe Quotations out of my Book, as not ſerving to your Lordſhip's Purpoſe.

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The fourth Paſſage, which you ſeem to lay moſt ſtreſs on, proves as little to your purpoſe as either of the former three: The Words are theſe; "But ob- Eſſay, B. IV. "ſcure and confus'd *Ideas* can never produce any clear and certain Knowledg, c. 2. §. 15. "becauſe as far as any *Ideas* are confus'd or obſcure, the Mind can never per- "ceive clearly whether they agree or no." The latter part of theſe Words are a plain Interpretation of the former, and ſhew their meaning to be this, *viz.* Our obſcure and confus'd *Ideas*, as they ſtand in contra-diſtinction to clear and diſtinct, have all of them ſomething in them, whereby they are kept from being wholly imperceptible and perfectly confounded with all other *Ideas*, and ſo their Agreement or Diſagreement, with at leaſt ſome other *Ideas*, may be perceiv'd, and thereby produce Certainty, tho' they are obſcure and confus'd *Ideas*. But ſo far as they are obſcure and confus'd, ſo that their Agreement or Diſagreement cannot be perceiv'd, ſo far they cannot produce Certainty; *v. g.* the Idea of *Subſtance* is clear and diſtinct enough to have its Agreement with that of *actual Exiſtence* perceiv'd: But yet it is ſo far obſcure and confus'd, that there be a great many other *Ideas*, with which, by reaſon of its Obſcurity and Confuſedneſs, we cannot compare it ſo, as to produce ſuch a Perception; and in all thoſe Caſes we neceſſarily come ſhort of Certainty. And that this was ſo, and that I meant ſo, I humbly conceive you could not but have ſeen, if you had given your ſelf the trouble to reflect on that Paſſage which you quoted, *viz.* "That Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſa- P. 7. "greement of *Ideas*, ſuch as we have, whether they be in their Parts per- "fectly clear and diſtinct or no." To which, what your Lordſhip has here brought out of the ſecond Book of my Eſſay, is no manner of Contradiction; unleſs it be a Contradiction to ſay, that an *Idea*, which cannot be well compar'd with ſome *Ideas*, from which it is not clearly and ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable, is yet capable of having its Agreement or Diſagreement perceiv'd with ſome other *Idea*, with which it is not ſo confounded, but that it may be compar'd: And therefore I had, and have ſtill reaſon to complain of your Lordſhip, for charging that upon me which I never ſaid nor meant.

To make this yet more viſible, give me leave to make uſe of an Inſtance in the Object of the Eyes in ſeeing, from whence the Metaphor of obſcure and confus'd is transfer'd to *Ideas*, the Objects of the Mind in Thinking. There is no Object which the Eye ſees, that can be ſaid to be perfectly obſcure, for then it would not be ſeen at all; nor perfectly confus'd, for then it could not be diſtinguiſh'd from any other, no not from a clearer. For Example, one ſees in the Duſk ſomething of that Shape and Size, that a Man in that degree of Light and Diſtance would appear. This is not ſo obſcure, that he ſees nothing; not ſo confus'd, that he cannot diſtinguiſh it from a Steeple or a Star; but it is ſo obſcure, that he cannot, tho' it be a Statue, diſtinguiſh it from a Man; and therefore, in regard of a Man, it can produce no clear and diſtinct Knowledg: But yet as obſcure and confus'd an *Idea* as it is, this hinders not but there may many Propoſitions be made concerning it, as particularly that it exiſts, of the Truth of which we may be certain. And that without any Contradiction to what I ſay in my Eſſay, *viz.* "That obſcure and confus'd *Ideas* can never pro- "duce any clear and certain Knowledg; becauſe as far as they are confus'd or "obſcure, the Mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or no." This Reaſon that I there give, plainly limiting it only to Knowledg, where the Obſcurity and Confuſion is ſuch, that it hinders the Perception of Agreement or Diſagreement, which is not ſo great in any obſcure and confus'd *Idea*; but that there are ſome other *Ideas*, with which it may be perceiv'd to agree or diſagree, and there 'tis capable to produce Certainty in us.

And thus I am come to the end of your *Defence* of your *firſt Anſwer*, as you call it, and deſire the Reader to conſider how much, in the eight Pages imploy'd in it, is ſaid to *defend* this Propoſition, *That thoſe who offer at clear and diſtinct* Ideas, *bid much fairer for Certainty than I do?*

But your Lordſhip having, under this Head, taken occaſion to examine my making clear and diſtinct *Ideas* neceſſary to Certainty, I crave leave to conſider here what you ſay of it in another place. I find one Argument more to prove, that I place Certainty only in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. Your Lordſhip tells me, P. 63. and bids me *obſerve my own words, that I poſitively ſay*, "That the mind not be-

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" ing certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know:" *So that*, ſays your Lordſhip, *it is plain here, that I place Certainty in evident Knowledg*, or in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, *and yet my great Complaint of your Lordſhip was, that you charg'd this upon me, and now you find it in my own words.* *Anſwer.* I do *obſerve* my own words, but do not find in them *or in clear and diſtinct* Ideas, tho' your Lordſhip has ſet theſe down as my words. I there indeed ſay, "The Mind is "not certain of what it does not evidently know." Whereby I place Certainty, as your Lordſhip ſays, only in *evident Knowledg*, but evident Knowledg may be had in the clear and evident Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*; tho' ſome of them ſhould not be in all their Parts perfectly clear and diſtinct, as is evident in this Propoſition, that *Subſtance does exiſt*.

But you give not off this Matter ſo: For theſe Words of mine above quoted
P. 15. by your Lordſhip, *viz.* "It being evident, that our Knowledg cannot exceed our "*Ideas*, where they are imperfect, confus'd or obſcure, we cannot expect to
P. 63. "have certain, perfect or clear Knowledg;" your Lordſhip has here up again: And thereupon charge it on me as a Contradiction, that confeſſing our *Ideas* to be imperfect, confus'd and obſcure, I ſay, I do not yet place Certainty in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. *Anſwer.* The Reaſon is plain, for I do not ſay that all our *Ideas* are imperfect, confus'd and obſcure; nor that obſcure and confus'd *Ideas* are in all their Parts ſo obſcure and confus'd, that no Agreement or Diſagreement between them and any other *Idea* can be perceiv'd; and therefore my Confeſſion of imperfect, obſcure and confus'd *Ideas*, takes not away all Knowledg, even concerning thoſe very *Ideas*.

But, ſays your Lordſhip, *Can Certainty be had with imperfect and obſcure* Ideas, *and yet no Certainty be had by them?* Add if you pleaſe, my Lord, [by thoſe parts of them which are obſcure and confus'd:] And then the Queſtion will be right put, and have this eaſy Anſwer: Yes, my Lord; and that without any Contradiction, becauſe an *Idea* that is not in all its parts perfectly clear and diſtinct, and is therefore an obſcure and confus'd *Idea*, may yet with thoſe *Ideas*, with which, by any obſcurity it has, it is not confounded, be capable to produce Knowledg by the perception of its Agreement or Diſagreement with them. And yet it will hold true, that in that part wherein it is imperfect, obſcure and confus'd, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect or clear Knowledg.

For Example: He that has the *Idea* of a Leopard, as only of a ſpotted Animal, muſt be confeſs'd to have but a very imperfect, obſcure and confus'd *Idea* of that *Species* of Animals; and yet this obſcure and confus'd *Idea* is capable by a Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the clear part of it, *viz.* that of *Animal*, with ſeveral other *Ideas*, to produce Certainty: Tho' as far as the obſcure part of it confounds it with the *Idea* of a Lynx, or other ſpotted Animal, it can, join'd with them, in many Propoſitions, produce no Knowledg.

This might eaſily be underſtood to be my meaning by theſe words, which
P. 122. your Lordſhip quotes out of my *Eſſay*, *viz.* "That our Knowledg conſiſting in "the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas*, its "Clearneſs or Obſcurity conſiſts in the Clearneſs or Obſcurity of that Percep- "tion, and not in the Clearneſs or Obſcurity of the *Ideas* themſelves." Upon
P. 122. which your Lordſhip asks, *How is it poſſible for the Mind to have a clear Perception of the Agreement of* Ideas, *if the* Ideas *themſelves be not clear and diſtinct?* *Anſwer.* Juſt as the Eyes can have a clear Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the clear and diſtinct parts of a Writing, with the clear Parts of another, tho' one, or both of them, be ſo obſcure and blurr'd in other Parts, that the Eye cannot perceive any Agreement or Diſagreement they have one
Lett. 2. p. 50. with another. And I am ſorry that theſe Words of mine, "My Notion of "Certainty by *Ideas*, is, that Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agree- "ment or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, ſuch as we have, whether they be in all their "Parts perfectly clear and diſtinct or no;" were not plain enough to make your Lordſhip underſtand my meaning, and ſave you all this new, and, as it ſeems to me, needleſs trouble.

In your 15th Page, your Lordſhip comes to your ſecond of the three *Anſwers*,
P. 7. *which* you ſay you *had given*, and would *lay together and defend*.

You ſay, (2.) you anſwer'd *That it is very poſſible the Author of* Chriſtianity
P. 15. not Myſterious *might miſtake or miſapply my Notions, but there is too much reaſon*

to

to believe he thought them the ſame; and we have no reaſon to be ſorry that he hath given me this occaſion for the explaining my meaning, and for the Vindication of my ſelf in the Matters I apprehend he had charg'd me with. Theſe words your Lordſhip quotes out of the 36th Page of your firſt Letter. But, as I have already obſerv'd, they are not there given as an Anſwer to this that you make me here ſay; and therefore to what purpoſe you repeat them here is not eaſy to diſcern, unleſs it can be thought that an unſatisfactory Anſwer in one place can become ſatisfactory by being repeated in another, where it is, as I humbly conceive, leſs to the purpoſe, and no Anſwer at all. It was there indeed given as an Anſwer to my ſaying, That I did not place Certainty in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, which I ſaid to ſhew that you had no reaſon to bring me into the Controverſy, becauſe the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* plac'd Certainty in clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. To ſatisfy me for your doing ſo, your Lordſhip anſwers, *That it was very poſſible that Author might miſtake or miſapply my Notions.* A Reaſon indeed, that will equally juſtify your bringing my Book into any Controverſy: For there is no Author ſo infallible, write he in what Controverſy he pleaſes, but *'tis poſſible* he may *miſtake, or miſapply my Notions.*

That was the force of this your Lordſhip's *Anſwer* in that place of your firſt Letter, but what it ſerves for in this place of your ſecond Letter, I have not Wit enough to ſee. The remainder of it I have anſwer'd in the 37th and 38th Pages of my ſecond Letter, and therefore cannot but wonder to ſee it repeated here again, without any notice taken of What I ſaid in anſwer to it, tho' you ſet it down here again, as you ſay, *p.* 7. on purpoſe to *defend*.

But all the *Defence* made, is only to that part of my Reply, which you ſet down as a freſh Complaint that I make in theſe words: "This can be no rea- P. 16.
"ſon why I ſhould be join'd with a Man that had miſapply'd my Notions, and
"that no Man hath ſo much miſtaken and miſapply'd my Notions as your
"Lordſhip; and therefore I ought rather to be join'd with your Lordſhip."
And then you, with ſome warmth, ſubjoin: *But is this fair and ingenuous Dealing, to repreſent this Matter ſo, as if your Lordſhip had join'd us together, becauſe he had miſunderſtood and miſapply'd my Notions? Can I think your Lordſhip a Man of ſo little Senſe to make that the reaſon of it?* No, Sir, ſays your Lordſhip, *It was becauſe he aſſign'd no other Grounds but mine, and that in my own words; however, now I would divert the meaning of them another way.*

My Lord, I did ſet down your words at large in my ſecond Letter, and therefore do not ſee how I could be liable to any Charge of *unfair* or *diſingenuous dealing in repreſenting the Matter*; which I am ſure you will allow as a Proof of my not *miſrepreſenting*, ſince I find you uſe it your ſelf as a ſure Fence againſt any ſuch Acculation; where you tell me, *That you have ſet down my own words at large,* P. 133.
that I may not complain that your Lordſhip miſrepreſents my Senſe. The ſame Anſwer I muſt deſire my Reader to apply for me to your 73d and 90th Pages, where your Lordſhip makes Complaints of the like kind with this here.

The Reaſons you give for joining me with the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, are put down *verbatim* as you gave them; and if they did not give me that *Satisfaction* they were deſign'd for, am I to be blam'd that I did not find them better than they were? You join'd me with that Author, becauſe he plac'd Certainty only in clear and diſtinct *Ideas:* I told your Lordſhip I did not do ſo, and therefore that could be no reaſon for your joining me with him. You anſwer, *'Twas poſſible he might miſtake or miſapply my Notions:* So that our agreeing in the Notion of Certainty (the pretended Reaſon for which we were join'd) failing, all the Reaſon which is left, and which you offer in this Anſwer for your joining of us, is the *poſſibility of his miſtaking my Notions.* And I think it a very natural Inference, that if the mere *poſſibility* of any one's *miſtaking me*, be a reaſon for my being *join'd with him*; any one's actual miſtaking me, is a ſtronger reaſon why I ſhould be join'd with him. But if ſuch an Inference ſhews (more than you would have it) the ſatisfactorineſs and force of your Anſwer, I hope you will not be angry with me, if I cannot change the nature of things.

Your Lordſhip indeed adds in that Place, That *there is too much reaſon to be-* Anſ. 1. p. 36.
lieve that the Author thought his Notions and mine the ſame.

Anſw. When your Lordſhip ſhall produce that *Reaſon*, it will be ſeen whether it were *too much* or too little. 'Till it is produc'd, there appears no Reaſon at

all; and ſuch conceal'd Reaſon, tho' it may be *too much*, can be ſuppos'd, I think, to give very little Satisfaction to me or any body elſe in the caſe.

P. 16. But to make good what you have ſaid in your Anſwer, your Lordſhip here replies, That *you did not join us together, becauſe he had miſunderſtood and miſapply'd my Notions. Anſw.* Neither did I ſay, that therefore you did *join us*. But this I crave leave to ſay, That all the Reaſon you there gave for your *joining* us *together*, was the *poſſibility of his miſtaking and miſapplying my Notions.*

P. 16. But your Lordſhip now tells me, *No, Sir*, this was not the reaſon of your *joining us*; but *it was becauſe he aſſign'd no other Grounds but mine, and in my own Words. Anſw.* My Lord, I do not remember that in that place you give this as a reaſon for your *joining of us*; and I could not anſwer in that place to what you did not there ſay, but to what you there did ſay. Now your Lordſhip does ſay it here, here I ſhall take the liberty to anſwer it.

The Reaſon you now give for your *joining* me with that Author, is *becauſe he aſſign'd no other Grounds but mine*; which however tenderly expreſs'd, is to be underſtood, I ſuppoſe, that he did *aſſign my Grounds*. Of what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, did he *aſſign my Grounds, and in my Words?* If it were not *my Grounds* of Certainty, it could be no manner of Reaſon for your *joining* me with him; becauſe the only Reaſon why at firſt you made him (and me with him) *a Gentleman of the new way of Reaſoning, was his ſuppoſing clear and diſtinct Ideas neceſſary to Certainty*, which was *the Opinion* that you declar'd *you oppos'd*. Now, my Lord, if you can ſhew where that Author has *in my Words aſſign'd my Grounds* of Certainty, there will be ſome Grounds for what you ſay here. But till your Lordſhip does that, it will be pretty hard to believe that to be the Ground of your *joining* us together; which being no where to be found, can ſcarce be thought the true *reaſon* of your doing it.

P. 16. Your Lordſhip adds, *However, now I would divert the meaning of* Them [*i. e.* thoſe my words] *another way.*

Anſw. Whenever you are pleas'd to ſet down thoſe *Words of mine, wherein* that Author *aſſigns my Grounds of Certainty*, it will be ſeen how *I now divert their meaning another way*: till then, they muſt remain with ſeveral other of your Lordſhip's inviſible *Them*, which are no where to be found.

P. 17. But to your asking me, whether *I can think your Lordſhip a Man of that little Senſe?* I crave leave to reply, That I hope it muſt not be concluded, that as often as in your way of writing I meet with any thing that does not ſeem to me ſatisfactory, and I endeavour to ſhew that it does not prove what it is made uſe of for, that I preſently *think your Lordſhip a Man of little Senſe*: This would be a very hard Rule in defending one's ſelf; eſpecially for me, againſt ſo great and learned a Man, whoſe Reaſons and Meaning it is not, I find, always eaſy for ſo mean a Capacity as mine to reach: and therefore I have taken great care to ſet down your words in moſt places, to ſecure my ſelf from the Imputation of *miſrepreſenting* your Senſe, and to leave it fairly before the Reader to judg, whether I miſtake it, and how far I am to be blamed if I do. And I would have ſet down your whole Letter page by page as I anſwer'd it, would not that have made my Book too big.

If I muſt write under this fear, that you apprehend I think meanly of you, as often as I think any reaſon you make uſe of is not ſatisfactory in the point it is brought for; the Cauſes of Uneaſineſs would return too often, and it would be better once for all to conclude your Lordſhip infallible, and acquieſce in what ever you ſay, than in every page to be ſo rude as to tell your Lordſhip, *I think you have little Senſe*; if that be the Interpretation of my endeavouring to ſhew, that your Reaſons come ſhort any where.

My Lord, when you did me the honour to anſwer my firſt Letter (which I thought might have paſs'd for a ſubmiſſive Complaint of what I did not well underſtand, rather than a Diſpute with your Lordſhip) you were pleas'd to inſert into it direct Accuſations againſt my Book; which look'd as if you had a mind to enter into a direct Controverſy with me. This Condeſcenſion in your Lordſhip has made me think my ſelf under the protection of the Laws of Controverſy, which allow a free examining and ſhewing the Weakneſs of the Reaſons brought by the other ſide, without any offence. If this be not permitted me, I muſt confeſs I have been miſtaken, and have been guilty in anſwering

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you any thing at all: for how to anſwer without anſwering, I confeſs, I do not know.

I wiſh you never had writ any thing that I was particularly concern'd to examine; and what I have been concern'd to examine, I wiſh it had given me no occaſion for any other Anſwer, but an Admiration of the Manner and Juſtneſs of your Corrections, and an Acknowledgment of an Increaſe of that great Opinion which I had of your Lordſhip before. But I hope it is not expected from me in this Debate, that I ſhould admit as good and concluſive all that drops from your Pen, for fear of cauſing ſo much diſpleaſure as you ſeem here to have upon this occaſion, or for fear you ſhould object to me the Preſumption of thinking you had but *little Senſe*, as often as I endeavour'd to ſhew that what you ſay is of little force.

When thoſe *Words and Grounds of mine* are produc'd, that the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* aſſign'd, which your Lordſhip thinks a ſufficient *Reaſon* for your *joining me with him*, in oppoſing the Doctrine of the Trinity; I ſhall conſider them, and endeavour to give you Satisfaction about them, as well as I have already concerning thoſe ten Lines, which you have more than once quoted out of him, as taken out of my Book, and which is all that your Lordſhip has produc'd out of him of that kind: in all which there is not one ſyllable of *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, or of *Certainty* founded in them. In the mean time, in anſwer to your other Queſtion, *But is this fair and Ingenuous dealing?* I refer my Reader to *p.* 35——38. of my ſecond Letter, where he may ſee at large all this whole matter, and all the *Unfairneſs* and *Diſingenuity* of it, which I ſubmit to him, to judg whether for any fault of that kind it ought to have drawn on me the marks of ſo much Diſpleaſure. P. 16.

Your Lordſhip goes on here, and tells me, That *altho' you were willing to allow me all reaſonable occaſions for my own Vindication, as appears by your Words; yet you were ſenſible enough that I had given too juſt an occaſion to apply them in that manner, as appears by the next Page.* P. 16.

What was it, I beſeech you, my Lord, that I was to *vindicate* my ſelf from, and what was thoſe *Them* I *had given too juſt an occaſion to apply in that manner*; and what was that *Manner* they were apply'd in, and what was the *Occaſion* they were ſo apply'd? For I can find none of all theſe in that *next Page* to which your Lordſhip refers me. When thoſe are ſet down, the World will be the better able to judg of the *Reaſon* you had *to join me* after the manner you did. However, ſaying, my Lord, without proving, I humbly conceive, is but ſaying; and in ſuch *perſonal Matter* ſo turn'd, ſhews more the Diſpoſition of the Speaker, than any ground for what is ſaid. Your Lordſhip, as a proof of your great Care of me, tells me at the Top of that Page, That you had ſaid ſo much, that nothing *could be ſaid more for my Vindication:* And before you come to the Bottom of it, you labour to perſuade the World, that I have need to vindicate my ſelf. Another poſſibly, who could find in his Heart to ſay two ſuch things, would have taken care they ſhould not have ſtood in the ſame Page, where the Juxta-poſition might enlighten them too much, and ſurprize the Sight. But poſſibly your Lordſhip is ſo well ſatisfy'd of the World's Readineſs to believe your Profeſſions of Good-will to me, as a Mark whereof you tell me here of your Willingneſs *to allow me all reaſonable occaſions to vindicate my ſelf*; that no Body can ſee any thing but Kindneſs in whatever you ſay, tho' it appears in ſo different Shapes. Anſ. 1. *p.* 36. P. 16.

In the following Words, your Lordſhip accuſes me of too *nice a* piece of Criticiſm; and tells me *it looks like Chicaning*. *Anſw.* I did not expect, in a Controverſy begun and manag'd as this which your Lordſhip has been pleas'd to have with me, to be accus'd of *Chicaning*, without great Provocation; becauſe the mentioning that Word might perhaps raiſe in the Reader's Mind ſome odd Thoughts which were better ſpar'd. But this Accuſation made me look back into the Places you quoted in the Margent, and there find the matter to ſtand thus: P. 16.

To a pretty large Quotation ſet down out of the Poſtſcript to my firſt Letter, you ſubjoin; *Which Words ſeem to expreſs ſo much of a Chriſtian Spirit and Temper, that* your Lordſhip *cannot believe I intended to give any advantage to the Enemies of the* Anſw. 1. *p.* 37.

the Chriſtian Faith; but whether there hath not been too juſt occaſion for them to apply Them *in that manner, is a thing very fit for me to conſider.*

Lett. 2. *p.* 45. In my Anſwer, I take notice that the term *Them*, in this Paſſage of your Lordſhip's, can in the ordinary conſtruction of our Language be apply'd to nothing but *which Words* in the beginning of that Paſſage, *i. e.* to my Words immediately
P. 17. preceding. This your Lordſhip calls *Chicaning*; and gives this reaſon for it, *viz.* Becauſe *any one that reads without a Deſign to cavil, would eaſily interpret* Them *of my Words and Notions about which the Debate was. Anſw.* That any one that reads that Paſſage with or without *deſign to cavil* could hardly make it intelligible without interpreting *Them* ſo, I readily grant; but that it is eaſy for me or any body to interpret any one's meaning contrary to the neceſſary Conſtruction and plain Import of the Words, that I crave leave to deny. I am ſure it is not *Chicaning*, to preſume that ſo great an Author as your Lordſhip writes according to the Rules of Grammar, and as another Man writes, who underſtands our Language, and would be underſtood: to do the contrary, would be a Preſumption liable to blame, and might deſerve the Name of *Chicaning* and *Cavil*. And that in this caſe it was not *eaſy* to avoid the interpreting the term *Them* as I did, the reaſon you give why I ſhould have done it, is a farther Proof. Your Lordſhip, to ſhew it was *eaſy*, ſays *the Poſtſcript comes in but as a Parentheſis:* Now I challenge any one living, to ſhew me where in that Place the *Parentheſis* muſt begin, and where end, which can make *Them* applicable to any thing, but the Words of my Poſtſcript. I have try'd with more care and pains than is uſually requir'd of a Reader in ſuch caſes, and cannot, I muſt own, find where to make a Breach in the Thred of your Diſcourſe, with the imaginary *Parentheſis*, which your Lordſhip mentions, and was not, I ſuppoſe, omitted by the Printer for want of Marks to print it. And if this, which you give as the Key that opens to the Interpretation that I ſhould have made, be ſo hard to be found, the Interpretation it ſelf could not be ſo very *eaſy* as you ſpeak of.

But to avoid all blame for underſtanding that Paſſage as I did, and to ſecure my ſelf from being ſuſpected to ſeek a ſubterfuge in the natural Import of your
Lett. 2. *p.* 45. words, againſt what might be conjectur'd to be your Senſe, I added; "But if by any new way of Conſtruction, unintelligible to me, the word *Them* here "ſhall be apply'd to any Paſſages of my *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*; I muſt "humbly crave leave to obſerve this one thing, in the whole courſe of what "your Lordſhip has deſign'd for my *Satisfaction*, That tho' my Complaint be of "your Lordſhip's *manner of applying* what I had publiſh'd in my *Eſſay*, ſo as to "intereſt me in a Controverſy wherein I meddled not; yet your Lordſhip all "along tells me of others, that have *miſapply'd* I know not what words in my "Book, after I know not what *manner*. Now as to this matter, I beſeech your "Lordſhip to believe that when any one, in ſuch a manner applies my words "contrary to what I intended them, ſo as to make them oppoſite to the Do"ctrine of the Trinity, and me a Party in that Controverſy againſt the Trinity, "as your Lordſhip knows I complain your Lordſhip has done; I ſhall complain "of them too, and conſider, as well as I can, what *Satisfaction* they give me and "others in it." This Paſſage of mine your Lordſhip here repreſents thus, *viz.*
P. 17. That I ſay, that if by an unintelligible new way of Conſtruction the word *Them* be apply'd to any Paſſages in my Book, *What then? Why then, whoever they are,* I intended to complain of them too. *But*, ſays your Lordſhip, *the words juſt before tell me who they are, viz. The Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith.* And then your Lordſhip asks, *Whether this be all that I intend*, viz. only to complain of them *for making me* a Party in the Controverſy againſt the Trinity?

My Lord, were I given to *Chicaning*, as you call my being ſtopt by Faults of Grammar that diſturb the Senſe, and make the Diſcourſe incoherent and unintelligible, if we are to take it from the words as they are, I ſhould not want matter enough for ſuch an Exerciſe of my Pen: as for example here again, where your Lordſhip makes me ſay, *That* if the word *Them* be apply'd to any
P. 17. Paſſages in my Book, *then whoever they are, I intend to complain*, &c. Theſe being ſet down for my words, I would be very glad to be able to put them into a Grammatical Conſtruction, and make to my ſelf an intelligible Senſe of them. But *They* being not a word that I have an abſolute Power over, to place where and for what I will, I confeſs I cannot do it. For the term *They* in the words here,

here, as your Lordſhip has ſet them down, having nothing that it can refer to, but *Paſſages*, or *Them*, which ſtand for Words, it muſt be a very ſudden Metamorphoſis that muſt change them into Perſons, for 'tis for Perſons that the word *They* ſtands here; and yet I crave leave to ſay, that as far as I underſtand *English*, *They* is a Word cannot be us'd without reference to ſomething mention'd before. Your Lordſhip tells me, *the Words juſt before tell me who they are.* The Words juſt mention'd *before* are theſe; *If by an unintelligible new way of Conſtruction the Word* Them *be apply'd to any Paſſage of my Book:* for 'tis to ſome Words *before* indeed, but *before* in the ſame Contexture of Diſcourſe, that the Word *They* muſt refer, to make it any where intelligible. But here are no Perſons mention'd in *the Words juſt before*, tho' your Lordſhip tells me the *words juſt before* ſhew *who they are*; but this *juſt before*, where the Perſons are mention'd whom your Lordſhip intends by *They* here, is ſo far off, that 16 Pages of your Lordſhip's ſecond Letter, 174 Pages of my ſecond Letter, and above 100 Pages of your Lordſhip's firſt Letter, come between: So that one muſt read above 280 Pages from *the Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith*, in the 37th Page of your firſt Letter, before one can come to the *They* which refers to them here in the 17th Page of your Lordſhip's ſecond Letter.

My Lord, 'tis my misfortune that I cannot pretend to any Figure amongſt the Men of Learning; but I would not for that reaſon be render'd ſo deſpicable, that I could not write ordinary Senſe in my own Language: I muſt beg leave therefore to inform my Reader, that what your Lordſhip has ſet down here as mine, is neither my Words, nor my Senſe. For,

1. I ſay not, if by any *unintelligible new way of Conſtruction*; but I ſay, "If "by any new way of Conſtruction unintelligible to me:" which are far different Expreſſions. For that may be very intelligible to others, which may be unintelligible to me. And indeed, my Lord, there are ſo many Paſſages in your Writing in this Controverſy with me, which for their Conſtruction, as well as otherwiſe, are ſo unintelligible to me, that if I ſhould be ſo unmannerly as to meaſure your Underſtanding by mine, I ſhould not know what to think of them. In thoſe caſes therefore, I preſume not to go beyond my own Capacity: I tell your Lordſhip often (which I hope Modeſty will permit) what my weak Underſtanding will not reach; but I am far from ſaying it is therefore abſolutely *unintelligible*. I leave to others the benefit of their better Judgments, to be enlighten'd by your Lordſhip, where I am not.

2. The uſe your Lordſhip here makes of theſe Words, "But if by any new "way of Conſtruction unintelligible to me, the Word *Them* be apply'd to any "Paſſages in my Book;" is not the principal, nor the only (as your Lordſhip makes it) uſe for which I ſaid them: But this; that if your Lordſhip by *Them* in that Place were to be underſtood to mean, that there were others that miſapply'd Paſſages of my Book; this was no Satisfaction for what your Lordſhip had done in that kind. Tho' this, I obſerv'd, was your way of defence; That when I complain'd of what your Lordſhip had done, you told me, that others had done ſo too: as if that could be any manner of Satisfaction. I added in the cloſe, "That when any one in ſuch a manner applies my Words contrary Let. 2. p. 46. "to what I intended them, ſo as to make them oppoſite to the Doctrine of "the Trinity, and me a Party in that Controverſy againſt the Trinity, as your "Lordſhip knows I complain your Lordſhip has done; I ſhall complain of them "too, and conſider as well as I can, what *Satisfaction* they give me and others "in it." Of this *any one* of mine, your Lordſhip makes your fore-mention'd *They*, whether with any Advantage of Senſe or Clearneſs to my Words, the Reader muſt judg. However, this latter part of that Paſſage, with the particular Turn your Lordſhip gives to it, is what your Words would perſuade your Reader is all that I ſay here: Would not your Lordſhip, upon ſuch an occaſion from me, cry out again, *Is this fair and ingenuous Dealing?* And would not you think you had reaſon to do ſo? But let us ſee what we muſt gueſs your Lordſhip makes me ſay, and your Exceptions to it.

Your Lordſhip makes me ſay, *whoever they are*, who miſapply my Words, as I complain your Lordſhip has done (for theſe Words muſt be ſupply'd, to make the Sentence to me intelligible) *I intend to complain of them too:* And then you find fault with me for uſing the indefinite Word *whoever*, and as a Reproof for

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the Unreaſonableneſs of it, you ſay, *But the Words juſt before tell me who they are.* But my Words are not *whoever they are:* but my Words are, "When any "one in ſuch a manner applies my Words contrary to what I intended them, *&c.*" Your Lordſhip would here have me underſtand, that there are thoſe that have done it, and rebukes me that I ſpeak as if I knew not any one that had done it; and that I may not plead Ignorance, you ſay your *Words juſt before told me who they were*, viz. *The Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith.*

What muſt I do now to keep my Word, and ſatisfy your Lordſhip? Muſt I complain of *the Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith* in general, that they have apply'd my Words as aforeſaid, and then conſider, as well as I can, what Satisfaction they give me and others in it? For that was all I promis'd to do. But this would be ſtrange, to complain of *the Enemies* of the Chriſtian Faith, for doing what 'tis very likely they never all did, and what I do not know that any one of them has done. Or muſt I, to content your Lordſhip, read over all the Writings *of the Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith*, to ſee whether any one of them has apply'd my Words, *i. e.* in ſuch a manner as I complain'd your Lordſhip has done, that if they have, I may complain of them too? This truly, my Lord, is more than I have time for; and if it were worth while, when it is done, I perceive I ſhould not content your Lordſhip in it. For you ask me here, *Is this all I intend, only to complain of them for making me a Party in the Controverſy againſt the Trinity?* No, my Lord; this is not all. I promis'd too, "To con-"ſider, as well as I can what Satisfaction (if they offer any) they give me and "others for ſo doing." And why ſhould not this content your Lordſhip in reference to others, as well as it does in reference to your ſelf? I have but one meaſure for your Lordſhip and others. When others treat me after the manner you have done, why ſhould it not be enough to anſwer them after the ſame manner I have done your Lordſhip? But perhaps your Lordſhip has ſome dextrous meaning under this, which I am not quick-ſighted enough to perceive, and ſo do not reply right, as you would have me.

I muſt beg my Reader's Pardon as well as your Lordſhip's, for uſing ſo many Words, about Paſſages that ſeem not in themſelves of that Importance. I confeſs, that in themſelves they are not; but yet 'tis my Misfortune, that, in this Controverſy, your way of writing and repreſenting my Senſe forces me to it.

Your Lordſhip's Name in writing is eſtabliſh'd above controul, and therefore 'twould be ill-breeding in one, who barely reads what you write, not to take every thing for perfect in its kind, which your Lordſhip ſays. Clearneſs, and Force, and Conſiſtence are to be preſum'd always, whatever your Lordſhip's Words be: And there is no other Remedy for an Anſwerer, who finds it difficult any where to come at your Meaning or Argument, but to make his Excuſe for it, in laying the Particulars before the Reader, that he may be Judg where the Fault lies; eſpecially where any matter of Fact is conteſted, Deductions from the firſt Riſe are often neceſſary, which cannot be made in few Words, nor without ſeveral Repetitions: an Inconvenience poſſibly fitter to be endur'd, than that your Lordſhip, in the run of your learned Notions, ſhould be ſhackled with the ordinary and ſtrict Rules of Language; and in the Delivery of your ſublimer Speculations, be ty'd down to the mean and contemptible Rudiments of Grammar: Tho' your being above theſe, and freed from a ſervile Obſervance in the uſe of trivial *Particles*, whereon the Connection of Diſcourſe chiefly depends, cannot but cauſe great Difficulties to the Reader. And however it may be an eaſe to any great Man, to find himſelf above the ordinary Rules of Writing, he who is bound to follow the Connection, and find out his Meaning, will have his Task much increas'd by it.

I am very ſenſible how much this has ſwell'd theſe Papers already, and yet I do not ſee how any thing leſs than what I have ſaid, could clear thoſe Paſſages which we have hitherto examin'd, and ſet them in their due Light.

Your next Words are theſe, *But whether I have not made my ſelf too much a Par-*
P. 17. *ty in it* [i. e. the Controverſy againſt the Trinity] *will appear before we have done.* This is an *Item* for me, which your Lordſhip ſeems ſo very fond of, and ſo careful to inculcate, wherever you bring in any Words it can be tack'd to, that if one can avoid thinking it to be the main end of your writing, one cannot yet

but

but ſee, that it could not be ſo much in the Thoughts and Words of a Great Man, who is above ſuch *Perſonal Matters*, and which he knows *the World ſoon grows weary of*, unleſs it had ſome very particular Buſineſs there. Whether it be the Author that has prejudic'd you againſt his Book, or the Book prejudic'd you againſt the Author, ſo it is, I perceive, that both I and my *Eſſay* are fallen under your Diſpleaſure.

I am not unacquainted what great ſtreſs is often laid upon invidious Names by skilful Diſputants, to ſupply the want of better Arguments. But give me leave, my Lord, to ſay, That 'tis too late for me now to begin to value thoſe Marks of good Will, or a good Cauſe; and therefore I ſhall ſay nothing more to them, as fitter to be left to the examination of the Thoughts within your own breaſt, from what Source ſuch Reaſonings ſpring, and whither they tend.

I am going, my Lord, to a Tribunal that has a Right to judg of Thoughts, and being ſecure that I there ſhall be found of no *Party* but that of Truth (for which there is requir'd nothing but the receiving Truth in the love of it) I matter not much of what *Party* any one ſhall, as may beſt ſerve his turn, denominate me here. Your Lordſhip's is not the firſt Pen from which I have receiv'd ſuch Strokes as theſe, without any great harm; I never found freedom of Stile did me any hurt with thoſe who knew me, and if thoſe who know me not will take up borrow'd Prejudices, it will be more to their own harm than mine: So that in this, I ſhall give your Lordſhip little other Trouble but my Thanks ſometimes, where I find you skilfully and induſtriouſly recommending me to the World, under the Character you have choſen for me. Only give me leave to ſay, That if the *Eſſay* I ſhall leave behind me hath no other fault to ſink it but Hereſy and *inconſiſtency with the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith*, I am apt to think it will laſt in the World, and do Service to Truth, even the Truths of Religion, notwithſtanding that Imputation laid on it by ſo mighty a hand as your Lordſhip's.

In your two next Paragraphs your Lordſhip accuſes me of *cavilling* in the 43d and 44th Pages of my ſecond Letter, whither for ſhortneſs I refer my Reader. I ſhall only add, that tho' *in the Debate about Myſteries of Faith*, your Adverſaries, as you ſay, *are not Heathens*; yet any one among us, whom your Lordſhip ſhould ſpeak of as not *owning the Scripture to be the Foundation and Rule of Faith*, would, I preſume, be thought to receive from you a Character very little different from that of a *Heathen*. Which being a part of your Compliment to me, will, I humbly conceive, excuſe what I there ſaid, from being a *cavilling Exception*. P. 18, 19.

Hitherto your Lordſhip, notwithſtanding that *you underſtood the World ſo well*, has employ'd your Pen in *Perſonal Matters*, how unacceptable ſoever to the World you declare it to be: how muſt I behave my ſelf in the Caſe? If I anſwer nothing, my Silence is ſo apt to be interpreted Guilt or Conceſſion, that even the deferring my Anſwer to ſome Points, or not giving it in the *proper Place*, is reflected on as no ſmall Tranſgreſſion, whereof there are two Examples in the two following Pages. And if I do anſwer ſo at large as your way of Writing requires, and as the Matter deſerves, I recal to your Memory *the Springs of* Modena, *by the Ebullition of my Thoughts*. 'Tis hard, my Lord, between theſe two to manage one's ſelf to your good Liking: However, I ſhall endeavour to collect the Force of your Reaſonings, wherever I can find it, as ſhort as I can, and apply my Anſwers to that, tho' with the Omiſſion of a great many Incidents deſerving to be taken notice of: If my ſlowneſs, not able to keep pace every where with your uncommon Flights, ſhall have miſs'd any Argument whereon you lay any ſtreſs; if you pleaſe to point it out to me, I ſhall not fail to endeavour to give you ſatisfaction therein. P. 20, 21.

In the next Paragraph your Lordſhip ſays, *Thoſe who are not ſparing of writing about Articles of Faith, and among them take great care to avoid ſome which have been always eſteemed fundamental*, &c. This ſeems alſo to contain ſomething *Perſonal* in it. But how far I am concern'd in it, I ſhall know, when you ſhall be pleas'd to tell me who *thoſe* are, and then it will be time enough for me to anſwer. P. 19.

This is what your Lordſhip has brought in under your ſecond Anſwer, in theſe four Pages, as a Defence of it; and how much of it is a Defence of that ſecond Anſwer, let the Reader judg.

P. 20. I am now come to the third of thoſe Anſwers, which you ſaid, *pag.* 7. you would *lay together and defend.* And it is this:

That my Grounds of Certainty tend to Scepticiſm, and that, in an Age wherein the Myſteries of Faith are too much expos'd by the Promoters of Scepticiſm and Infidelity; it is a thing of dangerous conſequence to ſtart ſuch new Methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Mens minds more doubtful than before.

This is what you ſet down here to be defended: the Defence follows, wherein your Lordſhip tells me *that I ſay,* "Theſe Words contain a farther Accuſation "of my Book, which ſhall be conſider'd in its due place." *But* this is *the proper place of conſidering it:* For *your Lordſhip ſaid, That hereby I have given too juſt occaſion to the Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith, to make uſe of my Words and Notions, as was evidently prov'd from my own Conceſſions. And if this be ſo, however you were willing to have had me explain'd my ſelf to the general Satisfaction; yet, ſince I decline it, you do inſiſt upon it, That I cannot clear my ſelf from laying that Foundation, which the Author of* Chriſtianity not Myſterious *built upon.*

In which I crave leave to acquaint your Lordſhip with what I do not underſtand.

Firſt, I do not underſtand what is meant, by *this is the proper place*; for in ordinary Conſtruction, theſe words ſeem to denote this 20th Page of your Lordſhip's ſecond Letter, which you were then writing, tho' the ſenſe would make me think the 46th Page of my ſecond Letter, which you were then anſwering, ſhould be meant. This perhaps your Lordſhip may think a *nice Piece of Criticiſm*; but till it be clear'd, I cannot tell what to ſay in my Excuſe. For 'tis likely your Lordſhip would again ask me, whether I could think you *a Man of ſo little Senſe,* if I ſhould underſtand theſe words to mean the 20th Page of your ſecond Letter, which no body can conceive your Lordſhip ſhould think a *proper place* for me to conſider and anſwer what you had writ in your firſt? 'Twould be as hard to underſtand *this is,* to mean a place in my former Letter, which was paſt and done; but 'tis no wonder for me to be miſtaken in your Privileg-word *This.* Beſides, there is this farther Difficulty to underſtand *this is the proper place,* of the 46th Page of my former Letter; becauſe I do not ſee why the 82d Page of that Letter, where I did conſider and anſwer it, was not as proper a place of *conſidering* it as the 46th, where I give a reaſon why I defend it. Farther, if I underſtood what you meant here by *this is the proper place,* I ſhould poſſibly apprehend better the force of your Argument ſubjoin'd to prove *this,* whatever it be, to be the *proper place*; the cauſal Particle *FOR,* which introduces the following Words, making them a Reaſon of thoſe preceding. But in the preſent Obſcurity of this matter, I confeſs I do not ſee how your having *ſaid that I gave occaſion to the Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith,* &c. proves any thing concerning *the proper place* at all.

Another thing that I do not underſtand in this Defence, is your Inference in the next Period, where you tell me, *If this be ſo, you inſiſt upon it that I ſhould clear my ſelf:* For I do not ſee how your having ſaid what you there ſaid (for that is it which *This* here, if it be not within Privilege, muſt ſignify) can be a reaſon for your inſiſting on my *clearing* my ſelf of any thing, tho' I allow this to be your Lordſhip's ordinary way of proceeding, to inſiſt upon your Suggeſtions and Suppoſitions in one place, as if they were Foundations to build what you pleas'd on in another.

Thus then ſtands your Defence: *My Grounds of Certainty tend to Scepticiſm, and to ſtart new Methods of Certainty is of dangerous Conſequence.* Becauſe I did not conſider this your Accuſation *in the proper place of conſidering it, this is the proper place of conſidering it:* Becauſe your Lordſhip *ſaid I had given too juſt occaſion to the Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith to make uſe of my Words and Notions*; and becauſe your Lordſhip *ſaid* ſo, therefore *you inſiſt upon it that I clear my ſelf,* &c. This appears, to me, to be the Connection and Force of your Defence hitherto: If I am miſtaken in it, your Lordſhip's words are ſet down, the Reader muſt judg whether the Conſtruction of the words do not make it ſo.

But before I leave them, there are ſome things that I crave permiſſion to repreſent to your Lordſhip more particularly.

1. That to the Accuſation of *Scepticiſm,* I have anſwered in another, and, as I think, a *proper Place.*

2. That

2. That the Accuſation of *dangerous conſequence*, I have conſider'd and anſwer'd in my former Letter; but that being, it ſeems, not the *proper place of conſidering it*, you have not in this your Defence thought fit to take any notice of it. Lett. 2. p. 82—95, 109.

3. That your Lordſhip has not any where prov'd, That my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas, is apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than they were before*; which is what your Accuſation ſuppoſes.

4. That you ſet down thoſe words of mine, "These words contain a farther "Accuſation of my Book, which ſhall be conſider'd in its due place;" as all the Anſwer which I gave to that new Accuſation, except what you take notice of out of my 95th Page; and take no notice of what I ſay from Page 82 to 95; where I conſider'd it as I promis'd, and, as I thought, fully anſwer'd it.

5. That the too *juſt occaſion*, you ſay, *I have given to the Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith to make uſe of my Words and Notions*, wants to be prov'd.

6. That what *uſe the Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith have made of my Words and Notions*, is no where ſhewn, tho' often talk'd of.

7. That if *the Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith have made uſe of my Words and Notions*, yet that, as I have ſhewn, is no proof, that they are of dangerous conſequence: Much leſs is it a proof, that this Propoſition, "Certainty conſiſts in "the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas," is *of dangerous Conſequence*. For ſome *Words* or *Notions* in a Book, that are *of dangerous conſequence*, do not make all the Propoſitions of that Book to be *of dangerous conſequence*. Lett. 2. p 69. & 85.

8. That your Lordſhip tells me, *You were willing to have had me explain'd my ſelf to the general Satisfaction*; which is what in the place from which the former words are taken, you expreſs'd thus: That *my Anſwer did not come fully up in all things to that which you could wiſh*. To which I have given an Anſwer: and methinks your Defence here ſhould have been apply'd to that, and not the ſame thing (which has been anſwer'd) ſet down again as part of your *Defence*. But pray my Lord, give me leave to ask, Is not this meant for a *Perſonal Matter?* which tho' the *World*, as you ſay, *is ſoon weary of*, your Lordſhip, it ſeems, is not. Anſw. 1. p. 37. Lett. 2. p. 38—41.

9. That you ſay, *You inſiſt upon it, that I cannot clear my ſelf from laying that Foundation which the Author of* Chriſtianity not Myſterious *built upon*. Certainly this *Perſonal Matter* is of ſome very great conſequence, that your Lordſhip, who *underſtands the World ſo well, inſiſts* ſo much *upon it*. But if it be true, that *he built upon my Foundation*, and it be of ſuch moment to your Lordſhip's buſineſs in the preſent Controverſy; methinks, without ſo much Intricacy, it ſhould not be hard to ſhew it: It is but proving what *Foundation* of Certainty (for 'tis of that all this diſpute is) he went upon, which, as I humbly conceive, your Lordſhip has not done; and then ſhewing that to be my *Foundation* of Certainty; and the buſineſs is ended. But inſtead of this your Lordſhip ſays, That *his Account of Reaſon* ſuppoſes *clear and diſtinct Ideas neceſſary to Certainty*; That *he* imagin'd *he built upon my Grounds*; That *he* thought *his and my Notions* of Certainty *to be the ſame*; That *there has been* too juſt occaſion *given, for the Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith to apply my Words* in I know not what *manner*. Theſe and the like Arguments, to prove that he goes *upon my Grounds*, your Lordſhip has uſed; but they are, I confeſs, too ſubtile and too fine for me to feel the force of them, in a Matter of Fact wherein it was ſo eaſy to produce both his and my Grounds out of our Books (without all this talk about Suppoſitions and Imaginations, and Occaſions ſo far remote from any direct Proof) if it were a matter of that conſequence to be ſo *inſiſted upon*, as your Lordſhip profeſſedly does. Vindic. p. 232. Anſw. 1. p. 36. Ibid. p. 37.

Your Lordſhip has ſpent a great *many Pages* to tie me to that Author; and you ſtill *inſiſt upon it, that I cannot clear my ſelf from laying that Foundation which the Author of* Chriſtianity not Myſterious *built upon*. What this great Concern in a matter of ſo little moment means, I leave the Reader to gueſs: For, I beſeech your Lordſhip, of what great conſequence is it to the World? What great intereſt has any Truth of Religion in this, That I and another Man (be he who he will) make uſe of the ſame Grounds to different purpoſes? This I am ſure, it tends not to the clearing or confirming any one material Truth in the World. If the *Foundation* I have *laid* be true, I ſhall neither diſown nor diſ-

like it, whatever this or any other Author ſhall *build* upon it; becauſe, as your Lordſhip knows, ill things may be built upon a good Foundation, and yet the Foundation never the worſe for it. And therefore if that, or any other Author hath *built upon my Foundation*, I ſee nothing in it, that I ought to be concern'd to *clear my ſelf from*.

If you can ſhew that my *Foundation* is falſe, or ſhew me a better Foundation of Certainty than mine, I promiſe you immediately to renounce and relinquiſh mine, with thanks to your Lordſhip: But till you can prove, That he that firſt invented Syllogiſm as a Rule of right Reaſoning, or firſt laid down this Principle, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be*; is anſwerable for all thoſe Opinions which have been endeavour'd to be prov'd by Mode and Figure, or have been built upon that Maxim; I ſhall not think my ſelf concern'd, whatever any one ſhall *build upon* this *Foundation* of mine, That Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas*, as they are expreſs'd in any Proportion: much leſs ſhall I think my ſelf concern'd, for what you ſhall pleaſe to *ſuppoſe* (for that, with ſubmiſſion, is all you have done hitherto) any one has *built upon it*, tho' he were ever ſo oppoſite to your Lordſhip in any of the Opinions he ſhould build on it.

In that caſe, if he ſhould prove troubleſom to your Lordſhip with any Argument pretended to be *built upon my Foundation*, I humbly conceive you have no other Remedy, but to ſhew either the *Foundation* falſe, and in that caſe I confeſs my ſelf concern'd; or his Deduction from it wrong, and that I ſhall not be at all concern'd in. But if, inſtead of this, your Lordſhip ſhall find no other way to ſubvert this Foundation of Certainty, but by ſaying, *The Enemies of the Chriſtian Faith build on it*, becauſe you ſuppoſe one Author *builds on it*; this I fear, my Lord, will very little advantage the Cauſe you defend, whilſt it ſo viſibly ſtrengthens and gives credit to your Adverſaries, rather than weakens any Foundation they go upon. For the *Unitarians*, I imagine, will be apt to ſmile at ſuch a way of arguing, *viz.* That they go on this Ground, becauſe the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* goes upon it, or is ſuppos'd by your Lordſhip to go upon it: and By-ſtanders will do little leſs than ſmile, to find my Book brought into the *Socinian* Controverſy, and the Ground of Certainty laid down in my *Eſſay* condemn'd, only becauſe that Author is ſuppos'd by your Lordſhip to *build* upon it. For this in ſhort is the Caſe, and this the way your Lordſhip has uſed in *anſwering Objections againſt the Trinity in point of Reaſon*. I know your Lordſhip cannot be ſuſpected of writing booty: but I fear, ſuch a way of arguing in ſo great a Man as your Lordſhip, will, *in an Age wherein the Myſteries of Faith are too much expos'd, give too juſt an occaſion to the Enemies*, and alſo to the Friends, *of the Chriſtian Faith*, to ſuſpect that there is a great failure ſomewhere.

But to paſs by that: This I am ſure is *perſonal Matter*, which the World perhaps will think it need not have been troubled with.

Your Defence of your third Anſwer goes on; and to prove that *the Author of* Chriſtianity not Myſterious *built upon my Foundation*, you tell me, *That my Ground*
P. 20, 21. *of Certainty is* the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas*, as expreſs'd in any Propoſitions: *which are my own words. From hence you urg'd, That let the Propoſition come to us any way, either by human or divine Authority, if our Certainty depend upon this, we can be no more certain, than we have clear Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas contain'd in it. And from hence the Author of* Chriſtianity not Myſterious *thought he had reaſon to reject all Myſteries of Faith, which are contain'd in Propoſitions, upon my Grounds of Certainty.*

Since this *perſonal Matter* appears of ſuch weight to your Lordſhip, that it needs to be farther proſecuted; and you think this your Argument, to prove that *that Author built upon my Foundation*, worth the repeating here again; I am oblig'd to enter again ſo far into this *perſonal Matter*, as to examine this Paſſage, which I formerly paſs'd by as of no moment. For it is eaſy to ſhew, that what you ſay viſibly proves not that he built upon my Foundation; and next, 'tis evident, that if it were prov'd that he did ſo; yet this is no Proof that my Method of Certainty is *of dangerous conſequence*; which is what was to be defended.

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As to the firſt of theſe, your Lordſhip would prove, that the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* built upon my Ground; and how do you prove it? *viz.* becauſe *he thought he had reaſon to reject all Myſteries of Faith, which are contain'd in Propoſitions, upon my Ground.* How does it appear, that *he rejected them upon my Grounds?* Does he any where ſay ſo? No! that is not offer'd; there is no need of ſuch an Evidence of matter of Fact, in a caſe which is only of matter of Fact. But *he thought he had reaſon to reject them upon my Grounds of Certainty.* How does it appear that he thought ſo? Very plainly: Becauſe *let the Propoſition come to us by human or divine Authority, if our Certainty depend upon the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas contain'd in it, we can be no more certain than we have clear Perception of that Agreement.* The Conſequence, I grant, is good, that if Certainty, *i. e.* Knowledg, conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, then we can certainly know the Truth of no Propoſition further than we perceive that Agreement or Diſagreement. But how does it follow from thence, that he *thought he had reaſon upon my Grounds to reject* any Propoſition, that contain'd a Myſtery of Faith; or, as your Lordſhip expreſſes it, *all Myſteries of Faith which are contain'd in Propoſitions?*

Whether your Lordſhip by the word *rejecting* accuſes him of not knowing, or of not believing ſome Propoſition that contains an Article of Faith; or what he has done or not done, I concern not my ſelf: that which I deny, is the Conſequence above-mention'd, which I ſubmit to your Lordſhip to be prov'd. And when you have prov'd it, and ſhewn your ſelf to be ſo familiar with the Thoughts of that Author, as to be able to be poſitive what he thought, without his telling you; it will remain farther to be prov'd, that becauſe he thought ſo, therefore he built right upon my Foundation: for otherwiſe no prejudice will come to my Foundation, by any ill uſe he made of it; nor will it be made good, that my method or way of Certainty, is *of dangerous conſequence*; which is what your Lordſhip is here to *defend*. Methinks your Lordſhip's Argument here is all one with this: *Ariſtotle's* Ground of Certainty (except of firſt Principles) lies in this, That thoſe things which agree in a third, agree themſelves: We can be certain of no Propoſition excepting firſt Principles) coming to us either by divine or human Authority, if our Certainty depend upon this, farther than there is ſuch an Agreement: Therefore the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* thought he had reaſon to reject all Myſteries of Faith, which are contain'd in Propoſitions upon *Ariſtotle's* Grounds. This Conſequence, as ſtrange as it is, is juſt the ſame with what is in your Lordſhip's repeated Argument againſt me. For let *Ariſtotle's* Ground of Certainty be this that I have named, or what it will, how does it follow, that becauſe my Ground of Certainty is placed in the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, therefore the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* rejected any Propoſition more upon my Grounds than *Ariſtotle's*? And will not *Ariſtotle*, by your Lordſhip's way of arguing here, from the uſe any one may make or think he makes of it, be guilty alſo of *ſtarting a Method of Certainty of dangerous conſequence*, whether his Method be true or falſe, if that or any other Author whoſe Writings you diſlike, thought he built upon it, or be ſuppos'd by your Lordſhip to think ſo? But, as I humbly conceive, Propoſitions, ſpeculative Propoſitions ſuch as mine are, about which all this ſtir is made, are to be judg'd of by their Truth or Falſhood, and not by the uſe any one ſhall make of them; much leſs by the Perſons who are ſuppos'd to *build on* them. And therefore it may be juſtly wonder'd, ſince you ſay it is *dangerous*, why you never prov'd or attempted to prove it to be falſe.

But you complain here again, that I *anſwer'd not a word to this in the proper place.* My Lord, if I offended your Lordſhip by paſſing it by, becauſe I thought there was no Argument in it; I hope I have now given you ſome ſort of Satisfaction, by ſhewing there is no Argument in it, and letting you ſee, that your Conſequence here could not be infer'd from your Antecedent. If you think it may, I deſire you to try it in a Syllogiſm. For whatever you are pleas'd to ſay in another place, my way of Certainty by *Ideas* will admit of *Antecedents* P. 129. and *Conſequents*, and of *Syllogiſm*, as the proper Form to try whether the Inference be right or no. I ſhall ſet down your following words, that the Reader may ſee your Lordſhip's manner of Reaſoning concerning this matter

in its full Force and Conſiſteney, and try it in a *Syllogiſm* if he pleaſes. Your

P. 21. Words are:

By this it evidently appears, that altho' your Lordſhip was willing to allow me all fair ways of interpreting my own Senſe; yet you by no means thought, that my Words were wholly miſunderſtood *or* miſapply'd *by that Author: but rather that he ſaw into the true Conſequence of them, as they lie in my Book. And what anſwer do I give to this? Not a Word in the proper place for it.*

You tell me, you *were willing to allow me all fair ways of interpreting my own Senſe.* If your Lordſhip had been conſcious to your ſelf, that you had herein meant me any kindneſs, I think I may preſume, you would not have minded me here again of a Favour, which you had told me of but in the preceding Page, and to make it an Obligation, need not have been more than once talk'd of; unleſs your Lordſhip thought the Obligation was ſuch, that it would hardly be ſeen, unleſs I were told of it in words at length, and in more places than one. For what Favour, I beſeech you, my Lord, is it to *allow* me to do that which needed not your Allowance to be done, and I could have done (if it had been neceſſary) of my ſelf without being blam'd for taking that liberty? Whatſoever therefore your meaning was in theſe Words, I cannot think you took this way to make me ſenſible of your Kindneſs.

Your Lordſhip ſays, you *were willing to allow me to interpret my own Senſe.* What you were willing to allow me to do, I have done. My Senſe is, that Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*; and my Senſe therein I have interpreted to be the Agreement or Diſagreement, not only of perfectly clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, but ſuch *Ideas*, as we have, whether they be in all their Parts perfectly clear and diſtinct or no. Farther, in anſwer to your Objection, that it might be *of dangerous Conſequence*; I ſo explain'd my Senſe, as to ſhew, that Certainty in that Senſe was not, nor could be of *dangerous Conſequence*. This, which was the Point in queſtion between us, your Lordſhip might have found at large explain'd in the 82d, and ten or twelve following Pages of my ſecond Letter, if you had been pleas'd to have taken notice of them.

But it ſeems you were more willing to tell me, *That tho' you were willing to allow me all ways of interpreting my own Senſe,* yet *you by no means thought that my Words were wholly miſunderſtood or miſapply'd by that Author, but rather that he ſaw into the true Conſequence of them as they lie in my Book.* I ſhall here ſet

Anſw. 1. p. 35. down your Lordſhip's Words, where (to *give me and others Satisfaction*) you ſay,) *you took care to prevent being miſunderſtood, which will beſt appear by your own Words,* viz. *That you muſt do that right to the ingenious Author of the* Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, *from whom theſe Notions are borrow'd to ſerve other purpoſes than he intended them. It was too plain, that the bold Writer againſt the Myſteries of our Faith took his Notions and Expreſſions from thence, and what could be ſaid more for my Vindication, than that he turn'd them to other Purpoſes than the Author intended them?* This you endeavour to prove, p. 43——46. and

Anſw. 1. p. 46. then conclude; *By which it is ſufficiently prov'd, that you had reaſon to ſay, that my Notion was carry'd beyond my Intention.* Theſe Words out of your firſt Letter, I ſhall leave here, ſet by thoſe out of your ſecond, that you may at your leiſure, if you think fit (for it will not become me to tell your Lordſhip that I am *willing to allow it*) *explain your ſelf to the general Satisfaction*, that it may be known which of them is now your Senſe; for they are, I ſuppoſe, too much to be together in any one's Senſe at the ſame time.

My *Intention* being thus ſo well vindicated by your Lordſhip, that you think

Anſw. 1. p. 36. nothing *could be ſaid more for my Vindication*, the miſunderſtanding or not miſunderſtanding of my Book, by that or any other Author, is what I ſhall not waſte my time about. If your Lordſhip thinks he *ſaw into the true Conſequence* of this Poſition of mine, that Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas* (for 'tis from the Inference that you ſuppoſe he makes from that my Definition of Knowledg, that you are here proving it to be of dangerous Conſequence) he is beholding to your Lordſhip for your good Opinion of his quick Sight: I take no part in that, one way or other. What Conſequences your Lordſhip's quick Sight (which muſt be allow'd

low'd to have out-done what you ſuppoſe of that Gentleman's) has found and charg'd on that Notion as dangerous, I ſhall endeavour to give you Satisfaction in.

You farther add, that tho' *I anſwer'd not a Word in the proper Place*, yet *afterwards*, Lett. 2. p. 95. *(for you would omit nothing that may ſeem to help my Cauſe) I offer ſomething towards an Anſwer.* P. 21.

I ſhall be at a loſs hereafter, what to do with the 82d and following Pages to the 95th; ſince what is ſaid in thoſe Pages of my ſecond Letter goes for nothing, becauſe it is not in its *proper Place*. Tho' if any one will give himſelf the trouble to look into my ſecond Letter, he will find, that the Argument I was upon in the 46th Page, oblig'd me to defer what I had farther to ſay to your new Accuſation: But that I re-aſſum'd it in the 82d, and anſwer'd it in that and the following Pages.

But ſuppoſing every Writer had not that Exactneſs of Method, which ſhew'd, by the natural and viſible Connection of the Parts of his Diſcourſe, that every thing was laid in its proper Place; is it a ſufficient Anſwer, not to take any notice of it? The Reaſon why I put this Queſtion, is, becauſe if this be a Rule in Controverſy, I humbly conceive, I might have paſs'd over the greateſt part of what your Lordſhip has ſaid to me, becauſe the Diſpoſition it has under numerical Figures, is ſo far from giving me a view of the orderly Connection of the Parts of your Diſcourſe, that I have often been tempted to ſuſpect the negligence of the Printer, for miſplacing your Lordſhip's Numbers: ſince ſo rank'd as they are, they do to me, who am confounded by them, loſe all Order and Connection quite.

The next thing in the Defence, which you go on with, is an Exception to my uſe of the word *Certainty*. In the Cloſe of the Anſwer I had made in the Pages you paſs over, I add, "That tho' the Laws of Diſputation allow "bare Denial as a ſufficient Anſwer to Sayings without any offer of a Proof; "yet, my Lord, to ſhew how willing I am to give your Lordſhip all Satisfa"ction in what you apprehend may be of *dangerous Conſequence* in my Book, "as to *that Article*, I ſhall not ſtand ſtill ſullenly, and put your Lordſhip upon "the difficulty of ſhewing wherein that Danger lies; but ſhall on the other "ſide endeavour to ſhew your Lordſhip, That that Definition of mine, whe"ther True or Falſe, Right or Wrong, can be of no *dangerous Conſequence to* "*that Article of Faith*. The Reaſon which I ſhall offer for it, is this; becauſe "it can be of no Conſequence to it at all." Lett. 2. p. 95. And the Reaſon of it was clear from what I had ſaid before, That *Knowing* and *Believing* were two different Acts of the Mind: Lett. 2. p. 90. And that my placing of *Certainty* in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, *i. e.* that my Definition of *Knowledg*, one of thoſe Acts of the Mind; would not at all alter or ſhake the Definition of *Faith*, which was another Act of the Mind diſtinct from it. And therefore I added, "That the *Certainty of Faith* (if your Lordſhip thinks fit to call it "ſo) has nothing to do with the *Certainty of Knowledg*. And to talk of the "*Certainty of Faith*, ſeems all one to me, as to talk of the Knowledg of Be"lieving; a way of ſpeaking not eaſy to me to underſtand." Lett. 2. p. 95.

Theſe and other Words to this Purpoſe in the following Paragraphs, your Lordſhip lays hold on, and ſets down as liable to no ſmall Exception: tho', as you tell me, *the main Strength of my Defence lies in it*. Let what *Strength* you pleaſe lie in it, my *Defence* was ſtrong enough without it. For to your bare ſaying, *my Method of Certainty might be of dangerous Conſequence to any Article of the Chriſtian Faith*, without proving it, it was a Defence ſtrong enough barely to deny, and put you upon ſhewing wherein that Danger lies; which therefore, this *main Strength of my Defence*, as you call it, apart, I inſiſt on. P. 23.

But as to your Exception to what I ſaid on this occaſion, it conſiſts in this, that there is a *Certainty of Faith*, and therefore you ſet down my ſaying, "That to talk of the Certainty of Faith, ſeems all one as to talk of the Know"ledg of Believing;" as that which *ſhews the Inconſiſtency of my Notion of Ideas with the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith*. Theſe are your Words here, and yet you tell me, *That it is not my way of Ideas, but my way of Certainty by Ideas, that your Lordſhip is unſatisfy'd about*. What muſt I do now in the caſe, when P. 23. P. 74.

your

your Words are expreſly, that my *Notion of Ideas* have an Inconſiſtency with the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith? Muſt I preſume that your Lordſhip means my *Notion of Certainty?* All that I can do, is to ſearch out your meaning the beſt I can, and then ſhew where I apprehend it not concluſive. But this Uncertainty, in moſt places, what you mean, makes me ſo much work, that a great deal is omitted, and yet my Anſwer is too long.

P. 23. Your Lordſhip asks in the next Paragraph, *How comes the Certainty of Faith to be ſo hard a Point with me? Anſw.* I ſuppoſe you ask this Queſtion more to give others hard Thoughts of my Opinion of Faith, than to be inform'd your ſelf. For you cannot be ignorant that all along in my *Eſſay* I uſe *Certainty* for *Knowledg*; ſo that for you to ask me, *How comes the Certainty of Faith to become ſo hard a Point with me?* is the ſame thing as for you to ask, How comes the *Knowledg of Faith*, or if you pleaſe, *the Knowledge of Believing*, to be ſo hard a Point with me? A Queſtion which, I ſuppoſe, you will think needs no Anſwer, let your meaning in that doubtful Phraſe be what it will.

I us'd in my Book the term *Certainty* for Knowledg ſo generally, that no body that has read my Book, tho' much leſs attentively than your Lordſhip, can doubt of it. That I us'd it in that Senſe there, I ſhall refer my Reader B.4.C.1.§.1. & C.11.§.9. but to two Places amongſt many to convince him. This, I am ſure, your Lordſhip could not be ignorant of, that by *Certainty* I mean *Knowledg*, ſince I have ſo us'd it in my Letters to you, Inſtances whereof are not a few; ſome Lett.1.p.81, 82, 107, 111, 115, 118, 131, 138, 155, 171, 185. of them may be found in the Places mark'd in the Margent: And in my ſecond Letter, what I ſay in the Leaf immediately preceding that which you quote upon this Occaſion, would have put it paſt a Poſſibility for any one to make ſhew of a doubt of it, had not that been amongſt thoſe Pages of my Anſwer, which for its being out of its *proper Place*, it ſeems you were reſolv'd not to take notice of; and therefore I hope it will not be beſides my purpoſe here to mind you of it again.

After having ſaid ſomething to ſhew why I us'd *Certainty* and *Knowledg* for Lett.2.p.93. the ſame thing, I added, "That your Lordſhip could not but take notice of "this in the 18th Sect. of Chap. 4. of my 4th Book, it being a Paſſage you had "quoted, and runs thus; Wherever we perceive the Agreement or Diſagree- "ment of any of our *Ideas*, there is certain Knowledg; and wherever we "are ſure thoſe *Ideas* agree with the Reality of things, there is certain real "Knowledg: of which having given the Marks, I think I have ſhewn where- "in *Certainty* real Certainty, conſiſts." And I farther add, in the immediately P. 94. following Words; "That my Definition of Knowledge, in the beginning of "the 4th Book of my *Eſſay*, ſtands thus: Knowledg ſeems to be nothing but "the Perception of the Connection, and Agreement or Diſagreement, and "Repugnancy of any of our *Ideas*." Which is the very Definition of *Certainty*, that your Lordſhip is here conteſting.

Since then you could not but know that in this Diſcourſe, *Certainty* with me ſtood for, or was the ſame thing with *Knowledg*; may not one juſtly wonder how you come to ask me ſuch a Queſtion as this, *How comes the Knowledg of Believing to become ſo hard a Point with me?* For that was in effect the Queſtion that you ask'd, when you put in the term *Certainty*, ſince you knew as undoubtedly that I meant *Knowledg* by *Certainty*, as that I meant *Believing* by *Faith*; i. e. you could doubt of neither. And that you did not doubt of it, is plain from what you ſay in the next Page, where you endeavour to prove this an improper way of ſpeaking.

Whether it be a proper way of ſpeaking, I allow to be a fair Queſtion. But when you knew what I meant, tho' I expreſs'd it improperly, to put Queſtions in a Word of mine, us'd in a Senſe different from mine, which could not but be apt to inſinuate to the Reader, that my Notion of Certainty derogated from the πληροφορία or *full Aſſurance of Faith*, as the Scripture calls it; is what, I gueſs, in another, would make your Lordſhip ask again, *Is this fair and ingenuous Dealing?*

Heb. 10. 22. My Lord, by Bible expreſſes the higheſt Degree of Faith, which the Apoſtle recommended to Believers in his time by *full Aſſurance*. But *Aſſurance of Faith*, tho' it be *what Aſſurance ſoever*, will by no means down with your Lordſhip in P. 26. my Writing. You ſay, I allow *Aſſurance of Faith*; God forbid I ſhould do otherwiſe:

otherwiſe: but then you ask, *Why not Certainty as well as Aſſurance?* My Lord, I think it may be a Reaſon not misbecoming a poor Lay-man, and ſuch as he might preſume would ſatisfy a Biſhop of the Church of *England*, that he found his Bible to ſpeak ſo. I find my Bible ſpeaks of the *Aſſurance of Faith*, but no where, that I can remember, of the *Certainty of Faith*, tho' in many Places it ſpeaks of the *Certainty of Knowledg*, and therefore I ſpeak ſo too; and ſhall not, I think, be condemn'd for keeping cloſe to the Expreſſions of our Bible, tho' the Scripture-Language, as it is, does not ſo well ſerve your Lordſhip's turn in the preſent Caſe. When I ſhall ſee in an authentick Tranſlation of our Bible, the Phraſe chang'd, it will then be time enough for me to change it too, and call it not the *Aſſurance*, but *Certainty of Faith*: But till then, I ſhall not be aſham'd of it, notwithſtanding you reproach me with it, by terming it, The Aſſurance of Faith, *as I call it*; when you might as well P. 31. have term'd it, The Aſſurance of Faith, *as* our Bibles *calls it*.

It being plain, that by *Certainty* I meant Knowledg, and by *Faith* the Act of Believing; that theſe Words where you ask, *How comes the Certainty of* P. 23. *Faith ſo hard a Point with me?* and where you tell me, *I will allow no Certainty* P. 26. *of Faith*; may make no wrong Impreſſion in mens Minds, who may be apt to underſtand them of the Object, and not merely of the Act of Believing: I crave leave to ſay with Mr. *Chillingworth*, "That I do heartily acknowledg and C. 6. §. 3. "believe the Articles of our Faith, to be in themſelves Truths as *certain* and "infallible, as the very common Principles of Geometry or Metaphyſicks. "But that there is not requir'd of us a Knowledg of them, and an Adhe-"rence to them, as *certain* as that of Senſe or Science:" And that for this Reaſon (amongſt others given both by Mr. *Chillingworth* and Mr. *Hooker*) *viz.* "That Faith is not Knowledg, no more than three is four, but eminently "contain'd in it: So that he that knows, believes, and ſomething more; "but he that believes, many times does not; nay, if he doth barely and "merely believe, he doth never know." Theſe are Mr. *Chillingworth*'s own Words. C. 6. §. 2.

That this Aſſurance of Faith may approach very near to Certainty, and not come ſhort of it in a ſure and ſteddy Influence on the Mind, I have ſo plainly declar'd, that no body, I think, can queſtion it. In my Chapter Eſſay, B. 4. of Reaſon, which has receiv'd the Honour of your Lordſhip's Animadverſions, C. 17. §. 16. I ſay of ſome Propoſitions wherein Knowledg [*i. e.* in my ſenſe, Certainty] fails us, "That their Probability is ſo clear and ſtrong, that Aſſent as ne-"ceſſarily follows it, as Knowledg does Demonſtration." Does your Lordſhip aſcribe any greater Certainty than this to an Article of mere Faith? If you do not, we are it ſeems agreed in the thing; and ſo all that you have ſo emphatically ſaid about it, is but to correct a Miſtake of mine in the *Engliſh* Tongue, if it prove to be one: A weighty Point, and well worth your Lordſhip's beſtowing ſo many Pages upon! I ſay *mere Faith*, becauſe tho' a Man may be a Chriſtian, who merely believes that there is a God; yet that is not an Article of mere Faith, becauſe it may be demonſtrated that there is a God, and ſo may certainly be known.

Your Lordſhip goes on to ask, *Have not all Mankind, who have talk'd of* P. 23. *Matters of Faith, allow'd a Certainty of Faith as well as a Certainty of Knowledg?* To anſwer a Queſtion concerning what *all Mankind, who have talk'd of Faith, have done*, may be within the reach of your great Learning: As for me, my Reading reaches not ſo far. The Apoſtles and the Evangeliſts, I can anſwer, have *talk'd of Matters of Faith*, but I do not find in my Bible that they have any where ſpoke (for 'tis of ſpeaking here the Queſtion is) of the *Certainty of Faith*; and what they *allow*, which they do not ſpeak of, I cannot tell. I ſay, in my Bible, meaning the *Engliſh* Tranſlation us'd in our Church: tho' what *all Mankind*, who ſpeak not of Faith in *Engliſh*, can do towards the deciding of this Queſtion, I do not ſee; it being about the Signification of an *Engliſh* Word. And whether in Propriety of Speech it can be apply'd to *Faith*, can only be decided by thoſe who underſtand *Engliſh*, which *all Mankind, who have talk'd of Matters of Faith*, I humbly conceive, did not.

To prove that *Certainty* in *Engliſh* may be apply'd to *Faith*, you ſay, *That* P. 24. *among the* Romans *it was oppos'd to doubting*; and for that you bring this *Latin* Sentence,

Sentence, *Nil tam certum eſt quam quod de dubio certum.* Anſw. *Certum*, among the *Romans*, might be *oppos'd to doubting*, and yet not be *apply'd to Faith*, becauſe *Knowledg*, as well as *Believing*, is *oppos'd to doubting*: and therefore unleſs it had pleas'd your Lordſhip to have quoted the Author out of which this *Latin* Sentence is taken, one cannot tell whether *Certum* be not in it ſpoken of a thing known, and not of a thing believ'd: tho' if it were ſo, I humbly conceive, it would not prove what you ſay, *viz.* That *it*, *i. e.* the word *Certainty* (for to that *it* muſt refer here, or to nothing that I underſtand) was *among the* Romans apply'd to Faith; for as I take it, they never uſed the *Engliſh* word *Certainty*: and tho' it be true, that the *Engliſh* word *Certainty* be taken from the *Latin* word *Certus*; yet that therefore *Certainty* in *Engliſh* is uſed exactly in the ſame ſenſe that *Certus* is in *Latin*, that I think you will not ſay; for then Certainty in *Engliſh* muſt ſignify Purpoſe and Reſolution of Mind, for to that *Certus* is apply'd in *Latin*.

P. 24. You are pleas'd here to tell me, *That in my former Letter* I ſaid, "That if "we knew the Original of Words, we ſhould be much help'd to the *Ideas* they were firſt apply'd to, and made to ſtand for.". I grant it true, nor ſhall I unſay it here. For I ſaid not, that a Word that had its Original in one Language, kept always exactly the ſame Signification in another Language, into which it was from thence tranſplanted. But if you will give me leave to remind you of
Vindic. p. 237. it, I remember that you, my Lord, ſay in the ſame place, *That little weight is to be laid upon a bare Grammatical Etymology, when a Word is uſed in another ſenſe by the beſt Authors.* And I think you could not have brought a more proper inſtance to verify that Saying, than that which you produce here.

But pray, my Lord, why ſo far about? Why are we ſent to the antient *Romans?* Why muſt we conſult (which is no eaſy task) *all Mankind, who have talk'd of Faith*, to know whether *Certainty* be properly uſed for *Faith* or no; when to determine it between your Lordſhip and me, there is ſo ſure a Remedy, and ſo near at hand? It is but for you to ſay wherein Certainty conſiſts. This, when I gently offer'd to your Lordſhip in my firſt Letter, you inter-
Anſ. 1. p. 69. preted it to be a deſign to draw you out of your way.

I am ſorry, my Lord, you ſhould think it out of your way to put an end, a ſhort end to a Controverſy, which you think of ſuch moment: Methinks it ſhould not be *out of your way*, with one blow finally to overthrow an Aſſertion, which you think to be *of dangerous conſequence to that Article of Faith, which your*
Lett. 2. p. 94. *Lordſhip has endeavour'd to defend.* I propos'd the ſame again, where I ſay, "For "this there is a very eaſy Remedy: It is but for your Lordſhip to ſet aſide this "Definition of Knowledg, by giving us a better, and this danger is over. But "you chuſe rather to have a Controverſy with my Book, for having it in it, "and to put me upon the Defence of it." This is ſo expreſs, that your taking no notice of it, puts me at a loſs what to think. To ſay that a Man ſo great in Letters does not know wherein *Certainty* conſiſts, is a greater Preſumption than I will be guilty of; and yet to think that you do know and will not tell, is yet harder. Who can think, or will dare to ſay, That your Lordſhip, ſo much concern'd for the Articles of Faith, and engag'd in this Diſpute with me, by your *Duty*, for the preſervation of them, ſhould chuſe to keep up a Controverſy with me, rather than remove that danger, which my wrong Notion of *Certainty* threatens to the Articles of Faith? For, my Lord, ſince the Queſtion is mov'd, and it is brought by your Lordſhip to a publick Diſpute, wherein *Certainty* conſiſts, a great many knowing no better, may take up with what I have ſaid; and rather than have no Notion of *Certainty* at all, will ſtick by mine, till a better be ſhew'd them. And if mine tends to *Scepticiſm*, as you ſay; and you will not furniſh them with one that does not, what is it but to give way to *Scepticiſm*, and let it quietly prevail on Men, as either having my Notion of *Certainty*, or none at all? Your Lordſhip indeed ſays ſomething in excuſe in your 75th Page; which, that my *Anſwer* may be in the *proper place*, ſhall be conſider'd when we come there.

P. 25. Your Lordſhip declares, *That you are utterly againſt any private Mints of Words.* I know not what the Publick may do for your particular Satisfaction in the Caſe; but till publick Mints of Words are erected, I know no Remedy for it, but that you muſt patiently ſuffer this matter to go on in the ſame courſe, that

that I think it has gone in ever ſince Language has been in uſe. Here in this Iſland, as far as my Knowledg reaches, I do not find, that ever ſince the *Saxons* time, in all the Alterations that have been made in our Language, that any one Word or Phraſe has had its Authority from the Great Seal, or paſs'd by Act of Parliament.

When the dazling Metaphor of the *Mint* and *new mill'd Words*, &c. (which mightily, as it ſeems, delighted your Lordſhip when you were writing that Paragraph) will give you leave to conſider this matter plainly as it is, you will find, that the coining of Money in publickly authoriz'd *Mints*, affords no manner of Argument againſt private Mens meddling in the introducing new, or changing the Signification of old *Words*; every one of which Alterations always has its riſe from ſome *private Mint*. The Caſe in ſhort is this; Money, by Virtue of the Stamp receiv'd in the publick *Mint*, which vouches its intrinſick Worth, has Authority to paſs. This Uſe of the publick Stamp would be loſt, if private Men were ſuffer'd to offer Money ſtamp'd by themſelves. On the contrary, Words are offer'd to the Publick by every *private* Man, coin'd in his *private Mint*, as he pleaſes; but 'tis the receiving of them by others, their very paſſing, that gives them their Authority and Currency, and not the Mint they come out of. *Horace*, I think, has given a true account of this matter, in a Country very jealous of any Uſurpation upon the publick Authority: De Arte Poet.

Multa renaſcentur quæ jam cecidere, cadentque
Quæ nunc ſunt in honore vocabula, ſi volet uſus,
Quem penes arbitrium eſt & jus & norma loquendi.

But yet whatever change is made in the Signification or Credit of any Word by publick uſe, this change has always its beginning in ſome *private Mint*; ſo *Horace* tells us it was in the *Roman* Language quite down to his time:

——*Ego cur acquirere pauca*
Si poſſum invideor? quum lingua Catonis & Enni
Sermonem patrium ditaverit, & nova rerum
Nomina protulerit? Licuit *ſemperque* licebit
Signatum præſente nota procudere *nomen.*

Here we ſee *Horace* expreſly ſays, That *private Mints of Words* were always licens'd; and, with *Horace*, I humbly conceive ſo they will always continue, how *utterly* ſoever *your Lordſhip may be againſt them.* And therefore he that offers to the Publick *new mill'd Words* from his own *private Mint*, is not always in that ſo bold an Invader of the publick Authority, as you would make him.

This I ſay not to excuſe my ſelf in the preſent Caſe; for I deny, that I have at all chang'd the Signification of the word *Certainty*. And therefore, if you had pleas'd you might, my Lord, have ſpar'd your ſaying on this occaſion, *That it ſeems our old Words muſt not now paſs in the current ſenſe*; and *thoſe Perſons aſſume too much Authority to themſelves, who will not ſuffer common Words to paſs in their general Acceptation:* and other things to the ſame purpoſe in this Paragraph, till you had prov'd that in ſtrict Propriety of Speech it could be ſaid, That a Man was *certain* of that which he did not know, but only believ'd. P. 24, 25.

If you had had time, in the heat of Diſpute, to have made a little Reflection on the uſe of the *Engliſh* word *Certainty* in ſtrict ſpeaking, perhaps your Lordſhip would not have been ſo forward to have made my uſing it only for preciſe *Knowledge*, ſo enormous an Impropriety; at leaſt you would not have accus'd it of weakening the *Credibility* of any Article of Faith.

'Tis true indeed, People commonly ſay, they are *certain* of what they barely believe, without doubting. But 'tis as true, that they as commonly ſay that they *know* it too. But no body from thence concludes, that *Believing* is *Knowing*. As little can they conclude from the like vulgar way of ſpeaking, that *Believing* is *Certainty*. All that is meant thereby, is no more but this, that the full Aſſurance of their Faith as ſteddily determines their Aſſent to the embracing of that Truth, as if they actually knew it.

But however ſuch Phraſes as theſe are uſed to ſhew the Steddineſs and Aſſurance of

of their Faith, who thus ſpeak; yet they alter not the Propriety of our Language, which I think appropriates *Certainty* only to *Knowledg*, when in ſtrict and philoſophical Diſcourſe it is, upon that account, contra-diſtinguiſh'd to *Faith*; as in this
P. 115. caſe here your Lordſhip knows it is: whereof there is an expreſs Evidence in my firſt Letter, where I ſay, "That I ſpeak of *Belief*, and your Lordſhip of *Certainty*; "and that I meant *Belief*, and not *Certainty*." *And that I made not an improper nor unjuſtifiable uſe of the word* Certainty, *in contra-diſtinguiſhing it thus to Faith, I think I have an unqueſtionable Authority in the learned and cautious Dr.* Cudworth, *who ſo uſes it:* What Eſſence, *ſays he*, is to Generation, the ſame is Certainty of Truth or Knowledg to Faith, *pag.* $\frac{125}{899}$.

P. 25. Your Lordſhip ſays, *Certainty is common to both Knowledg and Faith, unleſs I think it impoſſible to be certain upon any Teſtimony whatſoever.* I think it is poſſible to be *certain* upon the *Teſtimony* of God (for that, I ſuppoſe, you mean) where I know that it is the *Teſtimony* of God; becauſe in ſuch a caſe, that Teſtimony is capable not only to make me believe, but, if I conſider it right, to make me know the thing to be ſo; and ſo I may be *certain*. For the Veracity of God is as capable of making me know a Propoſition to be true, as any other way of Proof can be; and therefore I do not in ſuch a caſe barely *believe*, but know ſuch a Propoſition to be true, and attain *Certainty*.

P. 26. The Sum of your Accuſation is drawn up thus: *That I have appropriated Certainty* to the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas* in any Propoſition; *and now I find this will not hold as to Articles of Faith, and therefore I will allow no Certainty of Faith; which you think is not for the advantage of my Cauſe.* The truth of the matter of Fact is in ſhort this; That I have placed Knowledg in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*. This Definition of Knowledg, your Lordſhip ſaid, might *be of dangerous Conſequence to that Article of Faith, which you have endeavour'd to defend.* This I deny'd, and gave this reaſon for it, *viz.*
Lett. 2. p 94. —98. That a Definition of *Knowledg*, whether a good or bad, true or falſe Definition, could not be of ill or any Conſequence to an Article of Faith: becauſe a Definition of *Knowledg*, which was one Act of the Mind, did not at all concern *Faith*, which was another Act of the Mind quite diſtinct from it. To this then, which was the Propoſition in queſtion between us, your Lordſhip, I humbly conceive, ſhould have anſwer'd. But inſtead of that, your Lordſhip, by the uſe of the word *Certainty* in a ſenſe that I uſed it not, (for you knew I uſed it only for Knowledg) would repreſent me as having ſtrange Notions of Faith. Whether this be *for the advantage of your Cauſe*, your Lordſhip will do well to conſider.

Upon ſuch a uſe of the word *Certainty* in a different Senſe from what I uſe it
P. 27—31. in, the force of all your Lordſhip ſays under your firſt Head, contain'd in the two or three next Paragraphs, depends, as I think; for I muſt own (pardon my Dulneſs) that I do not clearly comprehend the Force of what your Lordſhip there ſays: And it will take up too many Pages, to examine it Period by
P. 27, 28. Period. In ſhort therefore, I take your Lordſhip's meaning to be this:

That there are *ſome Articles of Faith, viz. The fundamental Principles of natural Religion, which Mankind may attain to a Certainty in by Reaſon without Revelation; which, becauſe a Man that proceeds upon my Grounds cannot attain to a Certainty in by Reaſon, their Credibility* to him, when they are conſider'd as purely *Matters of Faith, will be weaken'd.* Thoſe which your Lordſhip inſtances in, are the *Being of a God, Providence*, and *the Rewards and Puniſhments of a future State.*

This is the way, as I humbly conceive, your Lordſhip takes here to prove *my Grounds of Certainty* (for ſo you call my Definition of Knowledg) to be of dangerous conſequence to the Articles of Faith.

To avoid Ambiguity and Confuſion in the examining this Argument of your Lordſhip's, the beſt way, I humbly conceive, will be to lay-by the term *Certainty*; which your Lordſhip and I uſing in different Senſes, is the leſs fit to make what we ſay to one another clearly underſtood; and inſtead thereof, to uſe the term *Knowledg*, which with me, your Lordſhip knows, is equivalent.

Your Lordſhip's Propoſition then, as far as it has any oppoſition to me, is this, That if Knowledge be ſuppos'd to conſiſt in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, a Man cannot attain to the Knowledg that theſe Propoſitions, *viz. That there is a God, a Providence, and Rewards and Puniſhments in a future State*, are true; and therefore the *Credibility* of theſe Articles, conſider'd *purely as matters of Faith*, will be *weaken*'d to him. Wherein there are theſe things to be prov'd by your Lordſhip.

1. That

1. That upon my Grounds of Knowledg, *i. e.* upon a Suppoſition that Knowledg conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, we cannot attain to the Knowledg of the Truth of either of thoſe Propoſitions, viz. *That there is a God, Providence, and Rewards and Puniſhments in a future State.*

2. Your Lordſhip is to prove, That the not knowing the Truth of any Propoſition, leſſens the Credibility of it; which, in ſhort, amounts to this, That want of Knowledge leſſens Faith in any Propoſition propos'd. This is the Propoſition to be prov'd, if your Lordſhip uſes *Certainty* in the ſenſe I uſe it, *i. e.* for Knowledg; in which only uſe of it, will it here bear upon me.

But ſince I find your Lordſhip, in theſe two or three Paragraphs, to uſe the word *Certainty* in ſo uncertain a ſenſe, as ſometimes to ſignify *Knowledg* by it, and ſometimes *Believing* in general, *i. e.* any degree of believing; give me leave to add, that if your Lordſhip means by theſe words, *Let us ſuppoſe a Perſon by natural Reaſon to attain to a Certainty as to the Being of a God*, &c. i. e. *attain to a Belief that there is a God*, &c. *or the Soul's Immortality:* I ſay, if you take Certainty in ſuch a ſenſe, then it will be incumbent upon your Lordſhip to prove, That if a Man finds the natural Reaſon whereupon he entertain'd the Belief of a God, or of the Immortality of the Soul, *uncertain*, that will *weaken the Credibility of thoſe fundamental Articles, as Matters of Faith:* or which is in effect the ſame, That the Weakneſs of the *Credibility* of any Article of Faith from Reaſon, weakens the *Credibility* of it from Revelation. For 'tis this which theſe following words of your's import: *For before, there was a natural Credibility in them on the account of Reaſon; but by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty, all that is loſt.* P. 27. P. 28.

To prove the firſt of theſe Propoſitions, *viz.* That upon the Suppoſition that Knowledg conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, we cannot attain to the Knowledg of the Truth of this Propoſition, *That there is a God*; your Lordſhip urges, that I have ſaid, *That no Idea proves the Exiſtence of the thing without it ſelf:* which Argument reduc'd to form, will ſtand thus; If it be true, as I ſay, that no *Idea* proves the Exiſtence of the thing without it ſelf, then upon the Suppoſition that Knowledg conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, we cannot attain to the Knowledge of the Truth of this Propoſition, *That there is a God:* which Argument ſo manifeſtly proves not, that there needs no more to be ſaid to it, than to deſire that Conſequence to be prov'd.

Again, as to the Immortality of the Soul, your Lordſhip urges, that I have ſaid, that I cannot know but that *Matter may think*; therefore upon my Ground of Knowledg, *i. e.* upon a Suppoſition that Knowledg conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, there is an end of the Soul's Immortality. This Conſequence I muſt alſo deſire your Lordſhip to prove. Only I crave leave by the bye to point out ſome things in theſe Paragraphs, too remarkable to be paſs'd over without any notice. P. 28.

One is, That you *ſuppoſe a Man is made certain upon my general Grounds of Certainty, i. e.* knows by the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, that there is a God; and yet upon *a farther Examination of my Method, he finds that the way of Ideas will not do.* Here, my Lord, if by *my Grounds of Certainty, my Method*, and *my way of Ideas*, you mean one and the ſame thing; then your words will have a conſiſtency, and tend to the ſame Point. But then I muſt beg your Lordſhip to conſider, that your Suppoſition carries a Contradiction in it, *viz.* That your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, that by my *Grounds*, my *Method*, and my *Way* of Certainty, a Man is made *certain*, and not *made certain*, that there is a God. If your Lordſhip means here by my *Grounds of Certainty*, my *Method*, and *my way of Ideas*, different things, (as it ſeems to me you do) then, whatever your Lordſhip may ſuppoſe here, it makes nothing to the Point in hand; which is to ſhew, that by this my Ground of Certainty, *viz.* That Knowledg conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*; a Man firſt attains to a Knowledg that there is a God, and afterwards by the ſame Grounds of Certainty he comes to loſe the Knowledg that there is a God; which to me ſeems little leſs than a Contradiction. P. 28.

'Tis likely your Lordſhip will ſay you mean no ſuch thing; for you alledg this Propoſition, *That no Idea proves the Exiſtence of any thing without it ſelf*, and give

that as an Inſtance that *my way of Ideas will not do, i.e.* will not prove the Being of a God. 'Tis true, your Lordſhip does ſo. But withal, my Lord, 'tis as true, that this Propoſition, ſuppoſing it to be mine, (for it is not here ſet down in my words) contains not my *Method*, or *Way*, or *Notion* of *Certainty*; tho' 'tis in that ſenſe alone, that it can here be uſeful to your Lordſhip to call it my *Method*, or the *Way by Ideas*.

Your Lordſhip undertakes to ſhew, That my defining Knowledg to conſiſt in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas, weakens the Credibility of this fundamental Article of Faith*, That there is a God: What is your Lordſhip's proof of it? Juſt this: The ſaying that *no Idea proves the Exiſtence of the thing without it ſelf*, will not do; *Ergo*, the ſaying that Knowledg conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas, weakens the Credibility* of this fundamental Article. This, my Lord, ſeems to me no Proof; and all that I can find, that is offer'd to make it a Proof, is only your calling theſe Propoſitions my *general Grounds of Certainty, my Method of Proceeding, the Way of Ideas, and my own Principles in point of Reaſon*; as if that made theſe two Propoſitions the ſame thing, and whatſoever were a Conſequence of one, may be charg'd as a Conſequence of the other: tho' it be viſible, that tho' the latter of theſe be ever ſo falſe, or ever ſo far from being a Proof of a God, yet it will by no means thence follow, that the former of them, *viz.* That Knowledg conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, weakens the *Credibility of that fundamental Article*. But 'tis but for your Lordſhip to call them both *the way of Ideas*, and that is enough.

That I may not be accus'd by your Lordſhip for *unfair or diſingenuous Dealing, for repreſenting this matter ſo*; I ſhall here ſet down your Lordſhip's words at
P. 27. large: *Let us now ſuppoſe a Perſon by natural Reaſon to attain to a Certainty, as to the Being of God, and Immortality of the Soul; and he proceeds upon* J. L.*'s general Grounds of Certainty, from the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas: and ſo from the Ideas of God and the Soul, he is made certain of theſe two Points before mention'd. But let us again ſuppoſe that ſuch a Perſon, upon a farther Examination of* J. L.*'s method of proceeding, finds that the way of Ideas in theſe caſes will not do: for* no *Idea* proves the Exiſtence of the thing without it ſelf, no more than the Picture of a Man proves his Being, or the Viſions of a Dream make a true Hiſtory; (*which are* J. L.*'s own Expreſſions. And for the* Soul *he cannot be* certain, but that Matter may think, (*as* J. L. *affirms*) *and then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality (and conſequently Immortality) from its Operations? But for all this, ſays* J. L. his Aſſurance of Faith remains firm on its own Baſis. *Now you appeal to any Man of Senſe, whether the finding the Uncertainty of his own Principles, which he went upon in point of Reaſon, doth not weaken the Credibility of theſe fundamental Articles, when they are conſider'd purely as Matters of Faith? For before, there was a natural Credibility in them on the account of Reaſon; but by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty, all that is loſt; and inſtead of being certain, he is more doubtful than ever.* Theſe are your Lordſhip's own words; and now *I appeal to any Man of Senſe*, whether they contain any other Argument againſt my placing of Certainty as I do, but this, *viz.* A Man miſtakes and thinks that this Propoſition, *No Idea proves the Exiſtence of the thing without it ſelf*, ſhews that in *the way of Ideas* one cannot prove a God; *Ergo*, this Propoſition, *Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas*, weakens the Credibility of this fundamental Article, That there is a God. And ſo of the Immortality of the Soul; becauſe I ſay, I know not but Matter may think: your Lordſhip would infer, *Ergo*, my Definition of Certainty *weakens* the *Credibility* of the Revelation of the Soul's Immortality.

Your Lordſhip is pleas'd here to call this Propoſition, "That Knowledg or "Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of "*Ideas*," *my general Grounds of Certainty*; as if I had ſome more particular Grounds of Certainty. Whereas I have no other *Ground* or *Notion* of Certainty, but this one alone; all my Notion of Certainty is contain'd in that one particular Propoſition: but perhaps your Lordſhip did it, that you might make the Propoſition above-quoted, *viz.* "No *Idea* proves the Exiſtence of the thing "without it ſelf, under the title you give it of *the way of Ideas*, paſs for one "of my particular Grounds of Certainty;" whereas it is no more any Ground

of

of Certainty of mine, or Definition of Knowledg, than any other Propoſition in my Book.

Another thing very remarkable in what your Lordſhip here ſays, is, That you make the failing to attain Knowledg by any way of *Certainty* in ſome particular Inſtances, to be the *finding the Uncertainty* of the way it ſelf; which is all one as to ſay, That if a Man miſſes by *Algebra*, the certain Knowledg of ſome Propoſitions in Mathematicks, therefore he finds the Way or Principles of *Algebra* to be uncertain or falſe. This is your Lordſhip's way of reaſoning here: Your Lordſhip quotes out of me, "That I ſay no *Idea* proves "the Exiſtence of the thing without it ſelf;" and that I ſay, "That one "cannot be certain that Matter cannot think:" from whence your Lordſhip argues, That he who ſays ſo, cannot attain to Certainty that there is a God, or that the Soul is immortal; and thereupon your Lordſhip concludes, *He finds the Uncertainty of the Principles he went upon, in point of Reaſon*, i. e. that P. 28. he finds this *Principle* or *Ground* of *Certainty* he went upon in reaſoning, *viz.* That Certainty or Knowledg conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, to be *uncertain*. For if your Lordſhip means here, *by Principles he went upon in point of Reaſon*, any thing elſe but that Definition of Knowledg, which your Lordſhip calls my *Way*, *Method*, *Grounds*, &c. of *Certainty*, which I and others, to the endangering ſome Articles of Faith, *go upon*; I crave leave to ſay, it concerns nothing at all the Argument your Lordſhip is upon, which is to prove, That the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas may be of dangerous Conſequence to any Article of Faith.

Your Lordſhip, in the next place ſays, *Before we can believe any thing upon* P. 29, 30. *the account of Revelation, we muſt ſuppoſe there is a God.* What uſe does your Lordſhip make of this? Your Lordſhip thus argues; But by my way of Certainty, a Man is made uncertain whether there be a God or no: for that to me is the meaning of thoſe Words, *How can his Faith ſtand firm as to Di-* P. 29. *vine Revelation, when he is made uncertain by his own way, whether there be a God or no?* or they can to me mean nothing to the Queſtion in hand. What is the Concluſion from hence? This it muſt be, or nothing to the purpoſe; *Ergo*, my Definition of Knowledg, or, which is the ſame thing, my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, leaves not the Articles of Faith the ſame Credibility they had before.

To excuſe my Dulneſs in not being able to comprehend this Conſequence, pray, my Lord, conſider, that your Lordſhip ſays; *Before we can believe any* Ibid. *thing upon the account of Revelation, it muſt be ſuppos'd that there is a God.* But cannot he, who places Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement and Diſagreement of *Ideas*, *ſuppoſe there is a God?*

But your Lordſhip means by *ſuppoſe*, that one muſt be *certain* that there is a God. Let it be ſo, and let it be your Lordſhip's Privilege in Controverſy to uſe one Word for another, tho' of a different Signification, as I think to *ſuppoſe* and be *certain* are. Cannot one that places *Certainty* in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, be certain there is a God? I can aſſure you, my Lord, I am *certain* there is a God; and yet I own, That I place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*: Nay, I dare venture to ſay to your Lordſhip, That I have prov'd there is a God, and ſee no Inconſiſtency at all between theſe two Propoſitions, That Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*; and that it is certain there is a God. So that this my Notion of *Certainty*, this Definition of Knowledg, for any thing your Lordſhip has ſaid to the contrary, leaves to this fundamental Article the ſame *Credibility*, and the ſame *Certainty* it had before.

Your Lordſhip ſays farther, *To ſuppoſe Divine Revelation, we muſt be certain* P. 29. *that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World.* Here again, my Lord, your way of writing makes work for my Ignorance; and before I can either admit or deny this Propoſition, or judg what Force it has to prove the Propoſition in queſtion, I muſt diſtinguiſh it into theſe different Senſes, which I think your Lordſhip's way of ſpeaking may comprehend. For your Lordſhip may mean it thus; *To ſuppoſe Divine Revelation, we muſt be certain,*

i. e.

i. e. we muſt believe *that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World.* Or your Lordſhip may mean thus *We muſt be certain,* i. e. we muſt know *that there is ſomething above Matter or Motion in the World.* In the next place, your Lordſhip may mean by ſomething *above Matter and Motion,* either ſimply an intelligent Being; for Knowledg, without determining what Being it is in, is a *Principle above Matter and Motion:* Or your Lordſhip may mean an immaterial intelligent Being. So that this undetermin'd way of expreſſing, includes at leaſt four diſtinct Propoſitions, whereof ſome are true, and others not ſo. For,

1. My Lord, if your Lordſhip means, *That to ſuppoſe a Divine Revelation,* a Man muſt be *certain,* i. e. muſt certainly know that there is an intelligent Being in the World, and that that intelligent Being is immaterial from whence that Revelation comes; I deny it. For a Man may ſuppoſe Revelation upon the *belief* of an intelligent Being from whence it comes, without being able to make out to himſelf, by a ſcientifical Reaſoning, that there is ſuch a Being. A Proof whereof, I humbly conceive, are the *Anthropomorphites* among the Chriſtians heretofore, who nevertheleſs rejected not the Revelation of the New Teſtament: and he that will talk with illiterate People in this Age, will, I doubt not, find many who believe the Bible to be the Word of God, tho' they imagine God himſelf in the Shape of an old Man ſitting in Heaven; which they could not do, if they knew, *i. e.* had examin'd and underſtood any Demonſtration whereby he is prov'd to be immaterial, without which they cannot know it.

2. If your Lordſhip means, That to ſuppoſe a Divine Revelation, it is neceſſary to know, that there is ſimply an intelligent Being; this alſo I deny. For *to ſuppoſe a Divine Revelation,* is not neceſſary that a Man ſhould know that there is ſuch an intelligent Being in the World: I ſay, know, *i. e.* from things, that he does know, demonſtratively deduce the Proof of ſuch a Being: it is enough for the receiving Divine Revelation, *to believe* that there is ſuch a Being, without having by Demonſtration attain'd to the Knowledg that there is a God. Every one that believes right, does not always reaſon exactly, eſpecially in abſtract metaphyſical Speculations: and if no body can believe the Bible to be of Divine Revelation, but he that clearly comprehends the whole Deduction, and ſees the Evidence of the Demonſtration, wherein the Exiſtence of an Intelligent Being, on whoſe Will all other Beings depend, is ſcientifically prov'd; there are, I fear, but few Chriſtians among illiterate People, to look no farther. He that believes there is a God, tho' he does no more than believe it, and has not attain'd to the Certainty of Knowledg, *i. e.* does not ſee the evident Demonſtration of it, has Ground enough to admit of Divine Revelation. The Apoſtle tells us, *That he that will come to God, muſt believe that he is*; but I do not remember the Scripture any where ſays, That he muſt know that he is.

3. In the next place, if your Lordſhip means, That *to ſuppoſe Divine Revelation, a Man muſt be certain,* i. e. explicitly believe, that there is a perfectly immaterial Being; I ſhall leave it to your Lordſhip's Conſideration, whether it may not be Ground enough for the *Suppoſition of Revelation,* to believe that there is an all-knowing unerring Being, who can neither deceive nor be deceiv'd, without a Man's preciſely determining in his Thoughts, whether that unerring omniſcient Being be immaterial or no. 'Tis paſt all doubt, that every one that examines and reaſons right, may come to a Certainty, that God is perfectly immaterial. But it may be a Queſtion, whether every one, who believes a Revelation to be from God, may have enter'd into the Diſquiſition of the Immateriality of his Being: Whether, I ſay, every ignorant Day-labourer, who believes the Bible to be the Word of God, has in his Mind conſider'd Materiality and Immateriality, and does explicitly believe God to be Immaterial, I ſhall leave to your Lordſhip to determine, if you think fit, more expreſsly than your Words do here.

4. If your Lordſhip means, *That to ſuppoſe a Divine Revelation, a Man muſt be certain,* i. e. believe *that there is a ſupreme intelligent Being,* from whence it comes, who can neither deceive nor be deceiv'd; I grant it to be true.

Theſe being the ſeveral Propoſitions, either of which may be meant in your Lordſhip's ſo general, and to me doubtful, way of expreſſing your ſelf; to avoid the length, which a particular Anſwer to each of them would run me into, I will venture (and it is a venture to anſwer to an ambiguous Propoſition in one Senſe, when the Author has the liberty of ſaying he meant it in another; a great Convenience of general, looſe, and doubtful Expreſſions) I will, I ſay, venture to anſwer to it in the Senſe I gueſs moſt ſuited to your Lordſhip's purpoſe; and ſee what your Lordſhip proves by it. I will therefore ſuppoſe your Lordſhip's Reaſoning to be this; That,

To ſuppoſe Divine Revelation, a Man muſt be certain, i. e. believe *that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion,* i. e. an immaterial intelligent Being *in the World.* Let it be ſo; what does your Lordſhip infer? *Therefore upon the Principle of Certainty* by Ideas, he [*i. e.* he that places Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas] *cannot be certain of* [*i. e.* believe] *this.* This Conſequence ſeems a little ſtrange, but your Lordſhip proves it thus; *Becauſe he* does *not know but Matter may think*: Which Argument, put into form, will ſtand thus; P. 29.

If one who places Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, does *not know but Matter may think*; then whoever places Certainty ſo, *cannot* believe there is an immaterial intelligent Being in the World.

But there is one who, placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, *does* not know but Matter may think:

Ergo, Whoever places Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, *cannot* believe that there is an intelligent immaterial Being.

This Argumentation is ſo defective in every part of it, that for fear I ſhould be thought to make an Argument for your Lordſhip in requital for the Anſwer your Lordſhip made for me, I muſt deſire the Reader to conſider, your Lordſhip ſays, We *muſt be certain*, He *cannot be certain, becauſe he* doth *not know*: which in ſhort is, *He* cannot becauſe he *cannot*; and he cannot becauſe he *doth not.* This conſider'd, will juſtify the Syllogiſm I have made to contain your Lordſhip's Argument in its full Force. P. 29.

I come therefore to the Syllogiſm it ſelf, and there firſt I deny the Minor, which is this:

There is one who, placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, doth *not know but Matter may think.*

I begin with this, becauſe this is the Foundation of all your Lordſhip's Argument; and therefore I deſire your Lordſhip would produce any one, who, placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, *does not know but Matter may think.*

The Reaſon why I preſs this, is, becauſe, I ſuppoſe, your Lordſhip means me here, and would have it thought that I ſay, I do not know *but that Matter may think*: But that I do not ſay ſo; nor any thing elſe from whence may be infer'd what your Lordſhip adds in the annex'd Words, if they can be infer'd from it; *And conſequently all Revelation may be nothing but the Effects of an exalted Fancy, or the Heats of a diſorder'd Imagination,* as Spinoſa *affirm'd.* P. 29.

On the contrary, I do ſay, "It is impoſſible to conceive that Matter, either "with or without Motion, could have originally in and from it ſelf Perception and Knowledg". And having in that Chapter eſtabliſh'd this Truth, That there is an eternal, immaterial, knowing Being; I think no body but your Lordſhip could have imputed to me the doubting, that there was ſuch a Being, becauſe I ſay in another place, and to another purpoſe, "It is "impoſſible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas, without *Revelation*, "to diſcover, whether Omnipotency has not given to ſome Syſtems of Matter, fitly diſpos'd, a Power to perceive and think, or elſe join'd and fix'd "to Matter, ſo diſpos'd, a thinking immaterial Subſtance: It being in reſpect "of our Notions not much more remote from our Comprehenſions to conceive, that God can, if he pleaſes, ſuperadd to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he ſhould ſuperadd to it another Subſtance, "with a Faculty of Thinking." From my ſaying thus, That God (whom I B. 4. c. 10. §. 10. B. 4. c. 3. §. 6.

have

have prov'd to be an immaterial Being) by his Omnipotency, may, for ought we know, ſuperadd to ſome Parts of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, it requires ſome Skill for any one to repreſent me as your Lordſhip does here, as one ignorant or doubtful whether *Matter may not think*; to that degree, that I am not *certain*, or I do not believe *that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World*, and *conſequently all Revelation may be nothing but the Effects of an exalted Fancy, or the Heats of a diſorder'd Imagination, as* Spinoſa *affirm'd*. For thus I, or ſome body elſe (whom I deſire your Lordſhip to produce) ſtands painted in this your Lordſhip's Argument from the *Suppoſition of a Divine Revelation*; which your Lordſhip brings here to prove, that the defining of Knowledg, as I do, to conſiſt in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, *weakens the Credibility of the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith*.

But if your Lordſhip thinks it ſo dangerous a Poſition to ſay, "It is not "much harder for us to conceive, that God can, if he pleaſes, ſuperadd to "Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he ſhould ſuperadd to it another "Subſtance with a Faculty of Thinking;" (which is the utmoſt I have ſaid concerning the Faculty of Thinking in Matter:) I humbly conceive it would be more to your purpoſe to prove, That the infinite omnipotent Creator of all things, out of nothing, cannot, if he pleaſes, ſuperadd to ſome Parcels of Matter, diſpos'd as he ſees fit, a Faculty of Thinking, which the reſt of Matter has not; rather than to repreſent me, with that Candour your Lordſhip does, as one, who ſo far makes Matter a thinking thing, as thereby to queſtion the Being of *a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World*, and conſequently to take away all *Revelation*: which how natural and genuine a Repreſentation it is of my Senſe, expreſs'd in the Paſſages of my *Eſſay*, which I have above ſet down, I humbly ſubmit to the Reader's Judgment and your Lordſhip's Zeal for Truth to determine: and ſhall not ſtay to examine whether Man may not have *an exalted Fancy, and the Heats of a diſorder'd Imagination*, equally overthrowing Divine Revelation, tho' the power of Thinking be plac'd only in an immaterial Subſtance.

I come now to the Sequel of your Major, which is this:

I, any one who places Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, does not *know but Matter may think; then whoever places Certainty ſo,* cannot *believe there is an immaterial intelligent Being in the World.*

The Conſequence here is from *does not* to *cannot*, which I cannot but wonder to find in an Argument of your Lordſhip's. For he that *does* not to day believe or know, that Matter cannot be ſo order'd by God's Omnipotency, as to think (if that ſubverts the Belief of an immaterial intelligent Being in the World) may know or believe it to morrow; or if he ſhould never know or believe it, yet others who define Knowledg as he does, may know or believe it. Unleſs your Lordſhip can prove, that it is impoſſible for any one, who defines Knowledg to conſiſt in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, to know or believe that Matter cannot think. But this, as I remember, your Lordſhip has not any where attempted to prove. And yet without this, your Lordſhip's way of Reaſoning is no more than to argue, that one *cannot* do a thing becauſe another *does not* do it. And yet upon this ſtrange Conſequence is built all that your Lordſhip brings here to prove, That my Definition of Knowledg *weakens the Credibility of Articles of Faith*, v. g.

It weakens the Credibility of this fundamental Article of Faith, That there is a God! How ſo? Becauſe I who have ſo defin'd Knowledg, ſay in my *Eſſay*,
B.4.c.11.§.1. "That the Knowledg of the Exiſtence of any other thing [but of God] we "can have only by *Senſation*: For there being no neceſſary Connection of *real* "*Exiſtence* with any *Idea* a Man hath in his Memory, nor of any other Exi- "ſtence but that of *GOD*, with the Exiſtence of any particular Man; no par- "ticular Man can know the *Exiſtence* of any other Being, but only when, by "actual operating upon him, it makes it ſelf perceiv'd by him: For the having "the *Idea* of any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Exiſtence of that "thing, than the Picture of a Man evidences his Being in the World, or the "Viſions of a Dream make thereby a true Hiſtory." For ſo are the words of
P. 28. my Book, and not as your Lordſhip has been pleas'd to ſet them down here:

and

and they were well choſen by your Lordſhip, to ſhew, that the *way of* Ideas *would not do*; i. e. in my way by *Ideas*, I cannot prove there is a God.

But ſuppoſing I had ſaid in that place, or any other, that which would hinder the Proof of a God, as I have not, might I not ſee my Error, and alter or renounce that Opinion, without changing my Definition of Knowledg? Or could not another Man, who defin'd Knowledg as I do, avoid Thinking, as your Lordſhip ſays I ſay, *That no Idea proves the Exiſtence of the thing without it ſelf*; and ſo be able, notwithſtanding my ſaying ſo, to prove that there is a God?

Again, your Lordſhip argues that my Definition of Knowledg weakens the Credibility of the Articles of Faith, becauſe it takes away Revelation; and your Proof of that is, becauſe *I do not know whether Matter may not think.*

The ſame ſort of Argumentation your Lordſhip goes on with in the next Page, where you ſay; *Again, before there can be any ſuch thing as Aſſurance of* P. 304 *Faith upon Divine Revelation, there muſt be a Certainty as to Senſe and Tradition; for there can be no Revelation pretended now, without immediate Inſpiration; and the Baſis of our Faith is a Revelation contain'd in an ancient Book, whereof the Parts were deliver'd at diſtant times, but convey'd down to us by an univerſal Tradition. But now, what if my Grounds of Certainty can give us no Aſſurance as to theſe things? Your Lordſhip ſays you do not mean, That they cannot demonſtrate Matters of Fact, which it were moſt unreaſonable to expect, but that theſe Grounds of Certainty make all things uncertain; for your Lordſhip thinks you have prov'd, that this way of* Ideas *cannot give a ſatisfactory Account, as to the Exiſtence of the plaineſt Objects of the Senſe*; becauſe Reaſon cannot perceive the Connection between the Objects and the *Ideas: How then can we arrive to any Certainty in perceiving thoſe Objects by their* Ideas?

All the force of which Argument lies in this, that I have ſaid (or am ſuppos'd to have ſaid, or to hold; for that I ever ſaid ſo, I do not remember) That *Reaſon cannot perceive the Connection between the Objects and the* Ideas: *Ergo*, whoever holds that Knowledg conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, cannot *have any Aſſurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation.*

My Lord, let that Propoſition, *viz.* That *Reaſon cannot perceive the Connection between the Objects and the* Ideas, be mine as much as your Lordſhip pleaſes, and let it be as inconſiſtent as you pleaſe, with *the Aſſurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation*; how will it follow from thence, that the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas* is the Cauſe that there *cannot be any ſuch thing as the Aſſurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation* to any body? Tho' I who hold Knowledg to conſiſt in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, have the Misfortune to run into this Error, *viz.* That *Reaſon cannot perceive the Connection between the Objects and the* Ideas, which is inconſiſtent *with the Aſſurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation*; yet it is not neceſſary that all others who with me hold, that Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, ſhould alſo hold, *That Reaſon cannot perceive the Connection between the Objects and the* Ideas, or that I my ſelf ſhould always hold it: Unleſs your Lordſhip will ſay, that whoever places Certainty, as I do, in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, muſt neceſſarily hold all the Errors that I *do*, which are inconſiſtent with, or weaken the Belief of any Article of Faith, and hold them incorrigibly. Which has as much Conſequence, as if I ſhould argue, that becauſe your Lordſhip, who lives at *Worceſter*, does ſometime miſtake in quoting me; therefore no body who lives at *Worceſter* can quote my Words right, or your Lordſhip can never mend your wrong Quotations. For, my Lord, the holding Certainty to conſiſt in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, is no more a neceſſary Cauſe of holding thoſe erroneous Propoſitions, which your Lordſhip imputes to me, as weakening the Credibility of the mention'd Articles of Faith, than the place of your Lordſhip's Dwelling is a neceſſary Cauſe of wrong quoting.

I ſhall not here go about to trouble your Lordſhip, with divining again what may be your Lordſhip's preciſe Meaning in ſeveral of the Propoſitions contain'd in the Paſſage above ſet down; eſpecially that remarkably ambiguous, and to me obſcure one, *viz. There muſt be a Certainty as to Senſe and Tradition.* I fear

I have waſted too much of your Lordſhip's, and my Reader's time in that Imployment already; and there would be no end, if I ſhould endeavour to explain whatever I am at a loſs about the determin'd Senſe of, in any of your Lordſhip's Expreſſions.

P. 27—31. Only I will crave leave to beg my Reader to obſerve, That in this firſt Head, which we are upon, your Lordſhip has us'd the Terms *Certain* and *Certainty* near twenty Times, but without determining in any of them, whether you mean *Knowledg*, or the *full Aſſurance of Faith*, or any *degree of believing*; tho' it be evident, that in theſe Pages your Lordſhip uſes *Certainty* for all theſe three: Which ambiguous uſe of the main word in that Diſcourſe, cannot but render your Lordſhip's Senſe clear and perſpicuous, and your Argument very cogent; and no doubt will do ſo to any one, who will be but at the pains to reduce that one word to a clear determin'd Senſe all thro' theſe few Paragraphs.

P. 23. Your Lordſhip ſays, *Have not all Mankind, who have talk'd of Matters of Faith, allow'd a Certainty of Faith, as well as a Certainty of Knowledg? Anſw.* But did ever any one of *all* that *Mankind allow* it as a tolerable way of ſpeaking, that *believing in general* (for which your Lordſhip has us'd it) which contains in it the loweſt degree of Faith, ſhould be call'd *Certainty?* Could he, who ſaid, *I believe, Lord, help my Unbelief!* or any one who is *weak in Faith*, or *of little Faith*, be properly ſaid to be *certain*, or *de dubio certus*, of what he believes but with a weak degree of Aſſent? I ſhall not queſtion what your Lordſhip's great Learning may authorize; but I imagine every one hath not Skill, or will not aſſume the liberty to ſpeak ſo.

If a Witneſs before a Judg, ask'd upon his Oath whether he were *certain* of ſuch a thing, ſhould anſwer, Yes, he was *certain*; and upon farther Demand, ſhould give this Account of his *Certainty*, that he believ'd it; would he not make the Court and Auditors believe ſtrangely of him? For to ſay, that a Man is *certain*, when he barely believes, and that perhaps with no great Aſſurance of Faith, is to ſay that he is *certain*, where he owns an *Uncertainty*. For he that ſays, he barely believes, acknowledges that he aſſents to a Propoſition as true, upon bare probability. And where any one aſſents thus to any Propoſition, his Aſſent excludes not a poſſibility that it may be otherwiſe; and where, in any one's Judgment, there is a poſſibility to be otherwiſe, there one cannot deny but there is ſome Uncertainty; and the leſs cogent the Probabilities appear, upon which he aſſents, the greater the Uncertainty. So that all barely probable Proofs, which procure Aſſent, always containing ſome viſible poſſibility that it may be otherwiſe (or elſe it would be Demonſtration) and conſequently the weaker the Probability appears, the weaker the Aſſent, and the more the Uncertainty; it thence follows, that where there is ſuch a mixture of Uncertainty, there a Man is ſo far uncertain: and therefore to ſay, That a Man is certain, where he barely believes, or aſſents but weakly, tho' he does believe, ſeems to me to ſay, that he is certain and uncertain together. But tho' bare Belief always includes ſome degrees of Uncertainty, yet it does not therefore neceſſarily include any degree of wavering; the evidently ſtrong probability may as ſteddily determine the Man to aſſent to the Truth, or make him take the Propoſition for true, and act accordingly, as Knowledg makes him ſee or be certain that it is true. And he that doth ſo, as to Truths reveal'd in the Scripture, will ſhew his Faith by his Works; and has, for ought I can ſee, all the Faith neceſſary to a Chriſtian, and requir'd to Salvation.

My Lord, when I conſider the length of my Anſwer here, to theſe few Pages of your Lordſhip's, I cannot but bemoan my own Dulneſs, and own my Unfitneſs to deal with ſo learned an Adverſary, as your Lordſhip, in Controverſy: For I know not how to anſwer but to a Propoſition of a determin'd Senſe. Whilſt it is vague and uncertain in a general or equivocal uſe of any of the Terms, I cannot tell what to ſay to it. I know not but ſuch comprehenſive ways of expreſſing one's ſelf, may do well enough in Declamation: but in Reaſoning there can be no Judgment made, till one can get to ſome poſitive determin'd Senſe of the Speaker. If your Lordſhip had pleas'd to have condeſcended ſo far to my low Capacity, as to have deliver'd your meaning here determin'd to any one of the Senſes above ſet down, or any other that you may have in theſe words I gather'd them from; it would have ſav'd me a great deal

deal of writing, and your Lordſhip loſs of time in reading. I ſhould not ſay this here to your Lordſhip, were it only in this one place that I find this Inconvenience. It is every where in all your Lordſhip's Reaſonings, that my want of Underſtanding cauſes me this Difficulty, and againſt my Will multiplies the words of my Anſwer: For notwithſtanding all that great deal that I have already ſaid to theſe few Pages of your Lordſhip's; yet my Defence is not clear, and ſet in its due light, unleſs I ſhew in particular of every one of thoſe Propoſitions (ſome whereof I admit as true, others I deny as not ſo) that it will not prove what is to be prov'd, *viz.* That my placing of Knowledg in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, leſſens the Credibility of any Article of Faith, which it had before.

Your Lordſhip having done with the *Fundamental* Articles of Natural Religion, you come in the next place to thoſe of Revelation; to *enquire*, as your Lordſhip ſays, *Whether thoſe who embrace the Articles of Faith, in the way of* Ideas, *can retain their Certainty of thoſe Articles, when theſe* Ideas *are quitted.* What this Inquiry is, I know not very well, becauſe I neither underſtand what it is to *embrace Articles of Faith in the way of* Ideas, nor know what your Lordſhip means by *retaining their Certainty of thoſe Articles, when theſe* Ideas *are quitted.* But 'tis no ſtrange thing for my ſhort Sight, not always diſtinctly to diſcern your Lordſhip's meaning: Yet here I preſume to know that this is the thing to be prov'd, *viz. That my Definition of Knowledg does not leave to the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith, the ſame Credibility they had before.* The Articles your Lordſhip inſtances in, are, P. 31.

1. *The Reſurrection* of the Dead. And here your Lordſhip proceeds juſt in the ſame Method of arguing, as you did in the former: your Lordſhip brings ſeveral Paſſages concerning Identity out of my *Eſſay*, which you ſuppoſe inconſiſtent with the Belief of the Reſurrection of the ſame Body; and this is your Argument to prove, that my defining of Knowledg to conſiſt in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, *alters the Foundations of this Article of Faith, and leaves it not the ſame Credibility it had before.* Now, my Lord, granting all that your Lordſhip has here quoted out of my Chapter of *Identity and Diverſity*, to be as falſe as your Lordſhip pleaſes, and as inconſiſtent as your Lordſhip would have it, with the Article of the Reſurrection from the Dead; nay, granting all the reſt of my whole *Eſſay* to be falſe; how will it follow from thence, that the placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, *weakens the Credibility* of this Article of Faith, that *the Dead ſhall riſe?* Let it be, that I who place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas* am guilty of Errors, that *weaken the Credibility of this Article of Faith*; others who place Certainty in the ſame Perception, may not run into thoſe Errors, and ſo not have their Belief of this Article at all ſhaken. P. 32.

Your Lordſhip therefore, by all the long Diſcourſe you have made here againſt my Notion of *Perſonal Identity*, to prove that it *weakens the Credibility of the Reſurrection of the Dead*, ſhould you have prov'd it ever ſo clearly, has not, I humbly conceive, ſaid therein any one word towards the proving, That my Definition of Knowledg *weakens the Credibility* of this Article of Faith. For this, my Lord, is the Propoſition to be prov'd, as your Lordſhip cannot but remember, if you pleaſe to recollect what is ſaid in your 21ſt and following Pages, and what, in the 95th Page of my ſecond Letter, quoted by your Lordſhip, it was deſign'd as an Anſwer to. And ſo I proceed to the next Articles of Faith your Lordſhip inſtances in. Your Lordſhip ſays,

2. *The next Articles of Faith which* my *Notion of* Ideas *is inconſiſtent with, are no leſs than thoſe of the Trinity, and the Incarnation of our Saviour.* Where I muſt humbly crave leave to obſerve to your Lordſhip, that in this ſecond Head here, your Lordſhip has chang'd the Queſtion from *my Notion of Certainty*, to *my Notion of* Ideas. For the Queſtion, as I have often had occaſion to obſerve to your Lordſhip, is, whether *my Notion of Certainty*, i. e. my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, alters the Foundation, and leſſens the Credibility of any Article of Faith? This being the Queſtion between your Lordſhip and me, ought, I humbly conceive, moſt eſpecially to have been kept cloſe to in this Article of *the Trinity*; becauſe 'twas P. 44.

upon the account of my Notion of *Certainty*, as prejudicial to the Doctrine of the Trinity, that my Book was firſt brought into this Diſpute. But your Lordſhip offers nothing, that I can find, to prove that my Definition of Knowledg or *Certainty* does any way leſſen the Credibility of either of the Articles here mention'd, unleſs your inſiſting upon ſome ſuppos'd Errors of mine about *Nature* and *Perſon*, muſt be taken for proofs of this Propoſition, That my Definition of *Certainty* leſſens the Credibility of the *Articles of the Trinity, and our Saviour's Incarnation*. And then the Anſwer I have already given to the ſame way of Argumentation uſed by your Lordſhip, concerning the Articles of a *God, Revelation*, and the *Reſurrection*, I think may ſuffice.

Having, as I beg leave to think, ſhewn that your Lordſhip has not in the leaſt prov'd this Propoſition, That the placing of *Certainty* in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, weakens the Credibility of any one Article of Faith, which was your former Accuſation againſt *this* (as your Lordſhip is pleas'd to call it) *new Method of Certainty, of ſo dangerous conſequence to that Article of Faith which your Lordſhip has endeavour'd to defend*; and all that your terrible Repreſentation of it being, as I humbly conceive, come to juſt nothing: I come now to vindicate my Book from your new Accuſation in your laſt Letter, and to ſhew that you no more prove the Paſſages you alledg out of my *Eſſay* to have any inconſiſtency with the *Articles of the Chriſtian Faith* you oppoſe them to, than you have prov'd by them, That my Definition of Knowledg weakens the Credibility of any of thoſe Articles.

1. The *Article of the Chriſtian Faith* your Lordſhip begins with, is that of *the Reſurrection of the Dead*; and concerning that, you ſay, *The Reaſon of believing the Re-*
P. 32. *ſurrection of the ſame Body, upon my Grounds, is from the Idea of Identity. Anſw.* Give me leave, my Lord, to ſay that the *Reaſon of believing* any Article of the Chriſtian Faith (ſuch as your Lordſhip is here ſpeaking of) to me and *upon my Grounds*, is its being a part of Divine Revelation. Upon this Ground I believ'd it, before I either writ that Chapter of *Identity and Diverſity*, and before I ever thought of thoſe Propoſitions which your Lordſhip quotes out of that Chapter, and upon the ſame Ground I believe it ſtill; and not *from my Idea of Identity*. This Saying of your Lordſhip's therefore, being a Propoſition neither ſelf-evident, nor allow'd by me to be true, remains to be prov'd. So that your Foundation failing, all your large Superſtructure built thereon, comes to nothing.

But, my Lord, before we go any farther, I crave leave humbly to repreſent to your Lordſhip, That I thought you undertook to *make out* that my *Notion of Ideas* was *inconſiſtent with the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith*. But that which your Lordſhip inſtances in here, is not, that I yet know, *an Article of the Chriſtian Faith*. The *Reſurrection of the Dead*, I acknowledg to be an Article of the Chriſtian Faith: But that *the Reſurrection of the* ſame *Body*, in your Lordſhip's ſenſe of *the ſame Body*, is an Article of the Chriſtian Faith, is what, I confeſs, I do not yet know.

In the New Teſtament (wherein, I think, are contain'd all the *Articles of the Chriſtian Faith*) I find our Saviour and the Apoſtles to preach *the Reſurrection of the Dead*, and the *Reſurrection from the Dead*, in many places: But I do not remember any place, where the *Reſurrection of the* ſame *Body* is ſo much as mention'd. Nay, which is very remarkable in the caſe, I do not remember in any place of the New Teſtament (where the general Reſurrection at the laſt Day is ſpoken of) any ſuch Expreſſion as *the Reſurrection of the Body*, much leſs of *the* ſame *Body*. *And it may ſeem to be not without ſome ſpecial Reaſon, that where St.* Paul's *Diſcourſe was particularly concerning the Body, and ſo led him to name it; yet when he ſpeaks of the Reſurrection, he ſays*, you, *and not* your Bodies, 1 *Cor.* 6. 14.

I ſay, the general Reſurrection at the laſt Day; becauſe where the Reſurrection of ſome particular Perſons, preſently upon our Saviour's Reſurrection, is
Mat. 27. 52, 53. mention'd, the words are, *The Graves were open'd, and many Bodies of Saints, which ſlept, aroſe and came out of the Graves after his Reſurrection, and went into the Holy City, and appear'd to many.* Of which peculiar way of ſpeaking of this Reſurrection, the Paſſage it ſelf gives a Reaſon in theſe words, *Appear'd to many*; *i. e.* Thoſe who ſlept appear'd, ſo as to be known to be riſen. But this could not be known, unleſs they brought with them the Evidence, that they were thoſe who had been dead, whereof there were theſe two Proofs; their Graves were open'd, and their Bodies not only gone out of them, but appear'd to be

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the ſame to thoſe who had known them formerly alive, and knew them to be dead and buried. For if they had been thoſe who had been dead ſo long, that all who knew them once alive were now gone, thoſe to whom they appear'd might have known them to be Men, but could not have known they were riſen from the dead, becauſe they never knew they had been dead. All that by their appearing they could have known, was, that they were ſo many living Strangers, of whoſe Reſurrection they knew nothing. 'Twas neceſſary therefore, that they ſhould come in ſuch Bodies, as might in Make and Size, &c. appear to be the ſame they had before, that they might be known to thoſe of their Acquaintance whom they appear'd to. And it is probable they were ſuch as were newly dead, whoſe Bodies were not yet diſſolv'd and diſſipated; and therefore 'tis particularly ſaid here (differently from what is ſaid of the general Reſurrection) that their *Bodies aroſe*: becauſe they were the ſame, that were then lying in their Graves, the moment before they roſe.

But your Lordſhip endeavours to prove it muſt be the *ſame Body*: And let us grant, that your Lordſhip, nay, and others too, think you have prov'd it *muſt* be the ſame Body; will you therefore ſay, that he holds what is inconſiſtent with an Article of Faith, who having never ſeen this your Lordſhip's Interpretation of the Scripture, nor your Reaſons for the *ſame Body*, in your ſenſe of *ſame Body*; or, if he has ſeen them, yet not underſtanding them, or not perceiving the force of them, believes what the Scripture propoſes to him, *viz.* That at the laſt Day *the Dead ſhall be raiſed*, without determining whether it ſhall be with the very ſame Bodies or no?

I know your Lordſhip pretends not to erect your particular Interpretations of Scripture, into Articles of Faith; and if you do not, he that believes *the Dead ſhall be raiſed*, believes that Article of Faith which the Scripture propoſes; and cannot be accus'd of holding any thing *inconſiſtent* with it, if it ſhould happen, that what he holds is *inconſiſtent* with another Propoſition, *viz. That the Dead ſhall be raiſed with the ſame Bodies*, in your Lordſhip's ſenſe: which I do not find propos'd in Holy Writ as an Article of Faith.

But your Lordſhip argues, *it muſt be the ſame Body*; which as you explain *ſame Body, is not the ſame individual Particles of Matter, which were united at the point of Death; nor the ſame Particles of Matter, that the Sinner had at the time of the Commiſſion of his Sins. But that it muſt be the ſame material Subſtance, which was vitally united to the Soul here*; *i. e.* as I underſtand it, the ſame individual Particles of Matter, which were, ſome time or other during his Life here, vitally united to his Soul. P. 34, 35.

Your firſt Argument, to prove that *it muſt be the ſame Body* in this ſenſe of the *ſame Body*, is taken from theſe words of our Saviour: *All that are in the Graves ſhall hear his Voice, and ſhall come forth.* From whence your Lordſhip argues, That theſe words, *All that are in the Graves*, relate to no other Subſtance than what was united to the Soul in Life; becauſe *a different Subſtance cannot be ſaid to be in the Graves, and to come out of them.* Which Words of your Lordſhip's, if they prove any thing, prove that the Soul too is lodg'd in the Grave, and rais'd out of it at the laſt Day. For your Lordſhip ſays, *Can a different Subſtance be ſaid to be in their Graves, and come out of them?* So that according to this Interpretation of theſe words of our Saviour, *no other Subſtance* being rais'd, but what hears his Voice; and *no other Subſtance* hearing his Voice, but what being call'd comes out of the Grave; and *no other Subſtance* coming out of the Grave, but what was in the Grave; any one muſt conclude, that the Soul, unleſs it be in the Grave, will make no Part of the Perſon that is rais'd, *unleſs*, as your Lordſhip argues againſt me, *you can make it out that a Subſtance which never was in the Grave may come out of it*, or that the Soul is no *Subſtance*. P. 37. Joh. 5. 28, 29. P. 37. P. 37.

But ſetting aſide the *Subſtance* of the Soul, another thing that will make any one doubt, whether this your Interpretation of our Saviour's words be neceſſarily to be receiv'd as their true Senſe, is, That it will not be very eaſily reconcil'd to your ſaying, you do not mean by the ſame Body, *the ſame individual Particles which were united at the point of Death.* And yet by this Interpretation of our Saviour's words, you can mean no other *Particles*, but ſuch as were united at the point of Death: becauſe you mean no other *Subſtance*, but what *comes out of the Grave*; and no *Subſtance*, no Particles *come out*, you ſay, but P. 34.

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what were *in the Grave*: and I think your Lordſhip will not ſay, that the Particles that were ſeparate from the Body *by Perſpiration*, before the point of Death, were laid up in the Grave.

P. 37. But your Lordſhip, I find, has an Anſwer to this; *viz. That by comparing this with other places, you find that the words* [of our Saviour above quoted] *are to be underſtood of the Subſtance of the Body, to which the Soul was united; and not to* (I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip writ *of*) *thoſe individual Particles*, i. e. *thoſe individual Particles* that are in the Grave at the Reſurrection: For ſo they muſt be read, to make your Lordſhip's Senſe entire, and to the purpoſe of your Anſwer here. And then methinks this Laſt Senſe of our Saviour's words given by your Lordſhip wholly overturns the Senſe which you have given of them above; where from thoſe words you preſs the Belief of the Reſurrection of the ſame Body, by this ſtrong Argument, That a *Subſtance* could not, upon hearing the Voice of Chriſt, *come out of the Grave, which was never in the Grave.* There (as far as I can underſtand your words) your Lordſhip argues, that our Saviour's words muſt be underſtood of the Particles in the Grave, *unleſs*, as your Lordſhip ſays, *one can make it out that a Subſtance which never was in the Grave, may come out of it.* And here your Lordſhip expreſsly ſays, That our Saviour's *words are to be underſtood of the Subſtance of that Body, to which the Soul was* [at any time] *united, and not to thoſe individual Particles that are in the Grave.* Which put together, ſeems to me to ſay, That our Saviour's words are to be underſtood of thoſe Particles only that are in the Grave, and not of thoſe Particles only which are in the Grave; but of others alſo which have at any time been *vitally united to the Soul*, but never were in the Grave.

The next Text your Lordſhip brings, to make the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body*,
2 Cor. 5. 10. in your ſenſe, an Article of Faith, are theſe words of St. *Paul: For we muſt all appear before the Judgment-Seat of Chriſt, that every one may receive the things done in his Body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.* To which
P. 38. your Lordſhip ſubjoins this Queſtion; *Can theſe words be underſtood of any other material Subſtance, but that Body in which theſe things were done? Anſw.* A Man may ſuſpend his determining the Meaning of the Apoſtle to be, that a Sinner ſhall ſuffer for his Sins in the very *ſame Body* wherein he committed them; becauſe St. *Paul* does not ſay he ſhall have the very *ſame Body* when he ſuffers, that he had when he ſinn'd. The Apoſtle ſays indeed, *done in* his *Body*. The Body he had, and did things in at Five or Fifteen, was no doubt *HIS Body*, as much as that which he did things in at Fifty was *HIS Body*, tho' *his* Body were not *the very ſame Body* at thoſe different Ages: And ſo will the Body, which he ſhall have after the Reſurrection, be *his Body*, tho' it be not the very *ſame* with that which he had at Five, or Fifteen, or Fifty. He that at Threeſcore is broke on the Wheel, for a Murder he committed at Twenty, is puniſh'd for what he did in *his* Body; tho' the Body he has, *i. e. his* Body at Threeſcore, be not the ſame, *i. e.* made up of the ſame individual Particles of Matter, that that Body was, which he had forty Years before. When your Lordſhip has reſolv'd with your ſelf, what that ſame immutable *HE* is, which at the laſt Judgment ſhall receive the things done in *his Body*; your Lordſhip will eaſily ſee, that the Body he had, when an *Embrio* in the Womb, when a Child playing in Coats, when a Man marrying a Wife, and when bed-rid dying of a Conſumption, and at laſt, which he ſhall have after his Reſurrection; are each of them *his* Body, tho' neither of them be the *ſame Body*, the one with the other.

But farther to your Lordſhip's Queſtion, *Can theſe Words be underſtood of any other material Subſtance, but that Body in which theſe things were done?* I anſwer, theſe words of St. *Paul may be underſtood of another material Subſtance, than that Body in which theſe things were done*; becauſe your Lordſhip teaches me and gives me
P. 34. a ſtrong Reaſon ſo to underſtand them. Your Lordſhip ſays, That *you do not ſay the ſame Particles of Matter, which the Sinner had at the very time of the Commiſſion of his Sins, ſhall be rais'd at the laſt Day.* And your Lordſhip gives this Reaſon for
P. 35. it: *For then a long Sinner muſt have a vaſt Body, conſidering the continual ſpending of Particles by Perſpiration.* Now, my Lord, if the Apoſtle's words, as your Lordſhip would argue, *cannot be underſtood of any other material Subſtance, but that Body in which theſe things were done*; and no Body, upon the removal or change of ſome of the Particles that at any time make it up, is the ſame material Subſtance,

ſtance, or the ſame Body: it will, I think, thence follow, that either the Sinner muſt have all the ſame individual Particles vitally united to his Soul when he is rais'd, that he had vitally united to his Soul when he ſinn'd: Or elſe St *Paul*'s Words here cannot be underſtood to mean the *ſame Body in which the things were done.* For if there were other Particles of Matter in the Body, wherein the thing was done, than in that which is rais'd, that which is rais'd cannot be the *ſame Body* in which they were done: Unleſs that alone, which has juſt all the ſame individual Particles when any Action is done, being the ſame Body wherein it was done, that alſo, which has not the ſame individual Particles wherein that Action was done, can be the ſame Body wherein it was done; which is in effect to make the ſame Body ſometimes to be the ſame, and ſometimes not the ſame.

Your Lordſhip thinks it ſuffices to make the *ſame Body*, to have not all, but no other Particles of Matter, but ſuch as were ſome time or other vitally united to the Soul before: But ſuch a Body, made up of part of the Particles ſome time or other vitally united to the Soul, is no more the ſame Body wherein the Actions were done in the diſtant Parts of the *long Sinner's* Life, than that is the ſame Body in which a quarter, or half, or three quarters, of the ſame Particles, that made it up, are wanting. For example; A Sinner has acted here in his *Body* an hundred Years; he is rais'd at the laſt Day, but with what Body? The ſame, ſays your Lordſhip, that he acted in; becauſe St. *Paul* ſays, he muſt *receive the things done in* his *Body*. What therefore muſt his Body at the Reſurrection conſiſt of? Muſt it conſiſt of all the Particles of Matter that have ever been vitally united to his Soul? for they, in Succeſſion, have all of them made up *his* Body wherein he did *theſe things*. No, ſays your Lordſhip, That would make his Body too *vaſt*; P. 35. it ſuffices to make the ſame Body in which the things were done, that it conſiſts of ſome of the Particles, and no other but ſuch as were ſome time, during his Life, vitally united to his Soul. But according to this account, *his* Body at the Reſurrection being, as your Lordſhip ſeems to limit it, near the ſame Size it was in ſome part of his Life; it will be no more the *ſame Body* in which *the things were done* in the diſtant parts of his Life, than that is the *ſame Body*, in which half, or three quarters, or more of the individual Matter, that then made it up, is now wanting. For example, let *his* Body, at fifty Years old, conſiſt of a Million of Parts; five Hundred Thouſand at leaſt of thoſe Parts will be different from thoſe which made up *his* Body at ten Years, and at an hundred. So that to take the numerical Particles that made up *his* Body at fifty, or any other Seaſon of his Life; or to gather them promiſcuouſly out of thoſe which at different times have ſucceſſively been vitally united to his Soul; they will no more make the ſame Body, which was *his*, wherein ſome of his Actions were done, than that is the ſame Body, which has but half the ſame Particles: And yet all your Lordſhip's Argument here for the ſame Body, is, becauſe St. *Paul* ſays it muſt be *his* Body, *in which theſe things were done*; which it could not be, *if any other Subſtance were join'd to it*, i. e. if any other Particles of Matter made up the Body, which were not vitally united to the Soul, when the Action was done.

Again, your Lordſhip ſays, *Tha you do not ſay the ſame individual Particles* P. 34. [ſhall make up the Body at the Reſurrection] *which were united at the point of Death; for there muſt be a great Alteration in them in a lingring Diſeaſe, as, if a fat Man falls into a Conſumption.* Becauſe 'tis likely your Lordſhip thinks theſe Particles of a decrepit, waſted, withered Body would be too few, or unfit to make ſuch a plump, ſtrong, vigorous, well-fiz'd Body, as it has pleas'd your Lordſhip to proportion out in your Thoughts to Men at the Reſurrection; and therefore ſome ſmall portion of the Particles formerly united vitally to that Man's Soul, ſhall be re-aſſum'd to make up his Body to the Bulk your Lordſhip judges convenient: but the greateſt part of them ſhall be left out, to avoid the making his Body more *vaſt* than your Lordſhip thinks will be fit, as appears by theſe your Lordſhip's Words immediately following, *viz. That you do not ſay the ſame Particles the Sinner* P. 35. *had at the very time of Commiſſion of his Sins, for then a long Sinner muſt have a vaſt Body.*

But

But then pray, my Lord, what muſt an *Embrio* do, who, dying within a few hours after his Body was vitally united to his Soul, has no Particles of Matter, which were formerly vitally united to it, to make up his Body of that Size and Proportion which your Lordſhip ſeems to require in Bodies at the Reſurrection? or muſt we believe he ſhall remain content with that ſmall Pittance of Matter, and that yet imperfect Body to Eternity; becauſe it is an Article of Faith to believe the *Reſurrection of the very ſame Body?* i. e. made up of only ſuch Particles as have been vitally united to the Soul. For if it be ſo, as your Lordſhip ſays, *That Life is the Reſult of the Union of*
P. 43. *Soul and Body*, it will follow, That the Body of an *Embrio*, dying in the Womb, may be very little, not the thouſandth part of any ordinary Man. For ſince from the firſt Conception and Beginning of Formation, it has Life, and *Life is the Reſult of the Union of the Soul with the Body*; *an Embrio*, that ſhall die either by the untimely Death of the Mother, or by any other accident preſently after it has Life, muſt, according to your Lordſhip's Doctrine, remain a Man not an inch long to Eternity; becauſe there are not Particles of Matter, formerly united to his Soul, to make him bigger; and no other can be made uſe of to that purpoſe: tho' what greater Congruity the Soul hath with any Particles of Matter, which were once vitally united to it, but are now ſo no longer, than it hath with Particles of Matter, which it was never united to; would be hard to determine, if that ſhould be demanded.

By theſe, and not a few other the like Conſequences, one may ſee what ſervice they do to Religion, and the Chriſtian Doctrine, who raiſe Queſtions, and make Articles of Faith about the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, where the Scripture ſays nothing of *the ſame Body*; or if it does, it is with no
1 Cor. 15. 35, &c. ſmall Reprimand to thoſe who make ſuch an Enquiry. *But ſome Man will ſay, How are the Dead rais'd up? and with what Body do they come? Thou Fool, that which thou ſoweſt is not quicken'd except it die. And that which thou ſoweſt, thou ſoweſt not that Body that ſhall be, but bare Grain; it may chance of Wheat or of ſome other Grain: but God giveth it a Body as it hath pleas'd him.* Words, I ſhould think, ſufficient to deter us from determining any thing for or againſt the ſame Body being rais'd at the laſt Day. It ſuffices, that all the *Dead ſhall be rais'd*, and every one appear and anſwer for the things done in this Life, and receive according to the things he hath done in his Body, whether good or bad. He that believes this, and has ſaid nothing inconſiſtent herewith, I preſume may, and muſt be acquitted from being guilty of any thing *inconſiſtent with the Article of the Reſurrection of the Dead.*

But your Lordſhip, to prove *the Reſurrection of the ſame Body to be an Ar-*
P. 38. *ticle of Faith*, farther asks, *How could it be ſaid, if any other Subſtance be join'd to the Soul at the Reſurrection, as its Body, that they were the things done in or by the Body? Anſw.* Juſt as it may be ſaid of a Man at an hundred Years old, that hath then another Subſtance join'd to his Soul, than he had at twenty, that the Murder or Drunkenneſs he was guilty of at twenty, *were things done in the Body*: How *by the Body* comes in here, I do not ſee.

Your Lordſhip adds, *And St. Paul's Diſpute about the manner of raiſing the Body might ſoon have ended, if there were no neceſſity of the ſame Body. Anſw.* When I underſtand what Argument there is in theſe Words to prove the Reſurrection of the ſame Body, without the mixture of one new Atom of Matter, I ſhall know what to ſay to it. In the mean time this I underſtand, That St. *Paul* would have put as ſhort an end to all Diſputes about this Matter, if he had ſaid, That *there was a neceſſity of the ſame Body*, or that it ſhould be the *ſame Body.*

2 Cor. 15. 16. The next Text of Scripture you bring for the ſame Body, is, *If there be no Reſurrection of the* Dead, *then is not Chriſt raiſed.* From which your Lordſhip
P. 38. argues. *It ſeems then other Bodies are to be rais'd as his was.* I grant other *Dead*, as certainly rais'd *as Chriſt was*; for elſe his Reſurrection would be of no uſe to Mankind. But I do not ſee how it follows that they ſhould be *rais'd* with the *ſame* Body, as Chriſt was rais'd with the ſame Body, as your Lordſhip inters in theſe Words annex'd; *And can there be any doubt, whether his Body was the ſame material Subſtance which was united to his Soul before?* I anſwer

none

none at all; nor that it had juſt the ſame undiſtinguiſh'd Lineaments and Marks, yea, and the ſame Wounds that it had at the time of his Death. If therefore your Lordſhip will argue from *other Bodies being rais'd as his was*, That they muſt keep proportion with his in *Sameneſs*; then we muſt believe, that every Man ſhall be rais'd with the ſame Lineaments and other Notes of Diſtinction he had at the time of his Death, even with his Wounds yet open, if he had any, becauſe our Saviour was ſo rais'd; which ſeems to me ſcarce reconcilable with what your Lordſhip ſays of *a fat Man falling into a Conſumption*, and dying. P. 34.

But whether it will conſiſt or no with your Lordſhip's meaning in that Place, this to me ſeems a Conſequence that will need to be better prov'd, *viz.* That our Bodies muſt be rais'd the ſame juſt as our Saviour's was; becauſe St. *Paul* ſays, *If there be no Reſurrection of the* Dead, *then is not Chriſt riſen.* For it may be a good Conſequence, Chriſt is riſen, and therefore there ſhall be a Reſurrection of the Dead; and yet this may not be a good Conſequence, Chriſt was rais'd with the ſame Body he had at his Death, therefore all Men ſhall be rais'd with the ſame Body they had at their Death, contrary to what your Lordſhip ſays concerning *a fat Man* dying *of a Conſumption.* But the Caſe I think far different betwixt our Saviour, and thoſe to be rais'd at the laſt Day.

1. His Body *ſaw not Corruption*, and therefore to give him another Body, new moulded, mix'd with other Particles, which were not contain'd in it as it lay in the Grave, whole and entire as it was laid there, had been to deſtroy his Body, to frame him a new one without any need. But why with the remaining Particles of a Man's Body long ſince diſſolv'd and moulder'd into Duſt and Atoms (whereof poſſibly a great part may have undergone variety of Changes, and enter'd into other Concretions even in the Bodies of other Men) other new Particles of Matter mix'd with them, may not ſerve to make *his* Body again, as well as the mixture of new and different Particles of Matter with the old, did in the Compaſs of his Life make *his* Body; I think no reaſon can be given.

This may ſerve to ſhew, why, tho' the Materials of our Saviour's Body, were not chang'd at his Reſurrection; yet it does not follow, but that the Body of a Man, dead and rotten in his Grave, or burnt, may at the laſt Day have ſeveral new Particles in it, and that without any Inconvenience. Since whatever Matter is vitally united to *his* Soul, is *his* Body, as much as is that, which was united to it when he was born, or in any other part of his Life.

2. In the next place, the Size, Shape, Figure and Lineaments of our Saviour's Body, even to his Wounds into which doubting *Thomas* put his Fingers and his Hand, were to be kept in the rais'd Body of our Saviour, the ſame they were at his Death, to be a Conviction to his Diſciples, to whom he ſhew'd himſelf, and who were to be Witneſſes of his Reſurrection, that their Maſter, the very ſame Man, was crucify'd, dead and buried, and rais'd again; and therefore he was handled by them, and ate before them after he was riſen, to give them in all Points full Satisfaction that it was really he, the ſame, and not another, nor a Specter or Apparition of him: Tho' I do not think your Lordſhip will thence argue, that becauſe *others are to be rais'd as he was*, therefore it is neceſſary to believe, that becauſe he ate after his Reſurrection, others at the laſt Day ſhall eat and drink after they are rais'd from the Dead; which ſeems to me as good an Argument, as becauſe his undiſſolv'd Body was rais'd out of the Grave, juſt as it there lay entire, without the Mixture of any new Particles, therefore the corrupted and conſum'd Bodies of the Dead at the Reſurrection ſhall be new fram'd only out of thoſe ſcatter'd Particles, which were once vitally united to their Souls, without the leaſt mixture of any one ſingle Atom of new Matter. But at the laſt Day, when all Men are rais'd, there will be no need to be aſſur'd of any one particular Man's Reſurrection. 'Tis enough that every one ſhall appear before the Judgment-ſeat of Chriſt, to receive according to what he had done in his former Life; but in what ſort of Body he ſhall appear, or of what Particles made up, the Scripture having ſaid nothing,

but that it ſhall be a *ſpiritual Body rais'd in Incorruption*, it is not for me to determine.

P. 39. Your Lordſhip asks, *Were they* [who ſaw our Saviour after his Reſurrection] *Witneſſes only of ſome material Subſtance then united to his Soul?* In anſwer, I beg your Lordſhip to conſider, whether you ſuppoſe our Saviour was to be known to be the ſame Man (to the Witneſſes that were to ſee him, and teſtify his Reſurrection) by his Soul, that could neither be ſeen, nor known to be the ſame; or by his Body, that could be ſeen, and by the diſcernible Structure and Marks of it, be known to be the ſame? When your Lordſhip has reſolv'd that, all that you ſay in that Page will anſwer it ſelf. But becauſe one Man cannot know another to be the ſame, but by the outward viſible Lineaments, and ſenſible Marks he has been wont to be known and diſtinguiſh'd by; will your Lordſhip therefore argue, That the great Judg, at the laſt Day, who gives to each Man, whom he raiſes, his new Body, ſhall not be able to know who is who, unleſs he give to every one of them a Body, juſt of the ſame Figure, Size and Features, and made up of the very ſame individual Particles he had in his former Life? Whether ſuch a way of arguing for *the Reſurrection of the ſame Body to be an Article of Faith*, contributes much to the ſtrengthening the Credibility of the Article of the Reſurrection of the Dead, I ſhall leave to the Judgment of others.

Farther, for the proving *the Reſurrection of the ſame Body to be an Article*

P. 40. *of Faith*, your Lordſhip ſays; *But the Apoſtle inſiſts upon the* Reſurrection of Chriſt, *not merely as an Argument of the Poſſibility of our's, but of the Certainty*

1 Cor. 15, 20, *of it; becauſe* he roſe, as the Firſt-fruits; Chriſt the Firſt-fruits, afterwards 23. they that are Chriſt's at his coming. *Anſw.* No doubt *the Reſurrection of Chriſt* is a Proof of the *Certainty of our Reſurrection.* But is it therefore a Proof of the Reſurrection of the *ſame Body*, conſiſting of the ſame individual Particles which concur'd to the making up of our Body here, without the mixture of any one other Particle of Matter? I confeſs I ſee no ſuch Conſequence.

P. 40. But your Lordſhip goes on: *St.* Paul *was aware of the Objections in mens Minds, about the Reſurrection of the ſame Body; and it is of great Conſequence as to this Article, to ſhew upon what Grounds he proceeds.* But ſome Man will ſay, How are the *Dead* rais'd up, and with what Body do *they* come? *Firſt, he ſhews, That the ſeminal parts of Plants are wonderfully improv'd by the ordinary Providence of God, in the manner of their Vegetation. Anſw.* I do not perfectly underſtand what it is for the *ſeminal parts of Plants to be wonderfully improv'd by the ordinary Providence of God, in the manner of their Vegetation*; or elſe perhaps I ſhould better ſee how this here tends to the Proof of *the Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, in your Lordſhip's Senſe.

P. 40. It continues, *They* ſow bare Grain of Wheat, or of ſome other Grain, but God giveth it a Body, as it hath pleas'd him, and to every Seed his own Body. *Here*, ſays your Lordſhip, *is an Identity of the material Subſtance ſuppos'd.* It may be ſo. But to me a Diverſity *of the material Subſtance*, i. e. of the component Particles, *is here ſuppos'd*, or in direct Words ſaid. For the

Ver. 37. Words of St. *Paul*, taken all together, run thus; *That which thou ſoweſt, thou ſoweſt not* that *Body which ſhall be, but bare Grain*: and ſo on, as your Lordſhip has ſet down the remainder of them. From which Words of St. *Paul*, the natural Argument ſeems to me to ſtand thus: If the Body that is put in the Earth in ſowing, *is not* that *Body which ſhall be*, then the Body that is put in the Grave, *is not* that, *i. e.* the ſame *Body that ſhall be.*

P. 40. But your Lordſhip proves it to be the *ſame Body*, by theſe three *Greek* Words of the Text, τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, which your Lordſhip interprets thus, *That proper Body which belongs to it. Anſw.* Indeed by thoſe *Greek* Words, τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, whether our Tranſlators have rightly render'd them *his own Body*, or your Lordſhip more rightly, *that proper Body which belongs to it*, I formerly underſtood no more but this; That in the Production of Wheat and other Grain from Seed, God continu'd every Species diſtinct; ſo that from Grains of Wheat ſown, Root, Stalk, Blade, Ear and Grains of Wheat were produc'd, and not thoſe of Barley, and ſo of the reſt: which I took to be the meaning of *to every Seed his own Body.* No, ſays your Lordſhip, theſe Words prove, That to every Plant of Wheat, and to every Grain of Wheat produc'd in it,

it, is given *the proper Body that belongs to it*, which is the ſame Body with the Grain that was ſown. *Anſw.* This, I confeſs, I do not underſtand; becauſe I do not underſtand how one individual Grain can be the *ſame* with twenty, fifty, or an hundred individual Grains, for ſuch ſometimes is the Increaſe.

But your Lordſhip proves it. For, ſays your Lordſhip, *Every Seed having* P. 40. *that Body in little, which is afterwards ſo much inlarg'd, and in Grain the Seed is corrupted before its Germination; but it hath its proper organical Parts, which make it the ſame Body with that which it grows up to. For altho' Grain be not divided into Lobes as other Seeds are, yet it hath been found, by the moſt accurate Obſervations, that upon ſeparating the Membranes theſe ſeminal Parts are diſcern'd in them, which afterwards grow up to that Body which we call Corn.* In which words I crave leave to obſerve, that your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, that a Body may be enlarged by the addition of a hundred or a thouſand times as much in Bulk as its own Matter, and yet continue the *ſame Body*; which, I confeſs, I cannot underſtand.

But in the next place, if that could be ſo, and that the Plant in its full Growth at Harveſt, increas'd by a thouſand or a million of times as much new Matter added to it as it had, when it lay in little conceal'd in the Grain that was ſown, was the very ſame Body; yet I do not think that your Lordſhip will ſay, that every minute, inſenſible and inconceivably ſmall Grain of the hundred Grains, contain'd in that little organiz'd ſeminal Plant, is every one of them the very ſame with that Grain which contains that whole little ſeminal Plant, and all thoſe inviſible Grains in it: For then it will follow, That one Grain is the ſame with an hundred, and an hundred diſtinct Grains the ſame with one; which I ſhall be able to aſſent to, when I can conceive that all the Wheat in the World is but one Grain.

For I beſeech you, my Lord, conſider what it is St. *Paul* here ſpeaks of! It is plain he ſpeaks of *that which is ſown and dies*; i. e. the Grain, that the Husbandman takes out of his Barn to ſow in his Field. And of this Grain, St. *Paul* ſays, that it *is not* that *Body that ſhall be*. Theſe two, *viz. That which is ſown*, and *that Body that ſhall be*, are all the Bodies that St. *Paul* here ſpeaks of, to repreſent the Agreement or Difference of Mens Bodies after the Reſurrection, with thoſe they had before they died. Now I crave leave to ask your Lordſhip, which of theſe two is that little inviſible ſeminal Plant, which your Lordſhip here ſpeaks of? Does your Lordſhip mean by it the Grain *that is ſown?* But that is not what St. *Paul* ſpeaks of; he could not mean this *embrionated* little Plant, for he could not denote it by theſe words, *That which thou ſoweſt*, for that he ſays muſt *die*; but this little *embrionated* Plant, contain'd in the Seed that is ſown, dies not: Or does your Lordſhip mean by it, *the Body that ſhall be?* But neither by theſe words, *The Body that ſhall be*, can St. *Paul* be ſuppos'd to denote this inſenſible little *embrionated* Plant; for that is already in being, contain'd in the Seed that is ſown, and therefore could not be ſpoke of under the name of *the Body that ſhall be*. And therefore, I confeſs, I cannot ſee of what uſe it is to your Lordſhip to introduce here this third Body, which St. *Paul* mentions not; and to make that the ſame or not the ſame with any other, when thoſe which St. *Paul* ſpeaks of, are, as I humbly conceive, theſe two viſible ſenſible Bodies, the Grain ſown, and the Corn grown up to Ear; with neither of which this inſenſible *embrionated* Plant can be the ſame Body, unleſs an inſenſible Body can be the ſame Body with a ſenſible Body, and a little Body can be the ſame Body with one ten thouſand, or an hundred thouſand times as big as it ſelf. So that yet, I confeſs, I ſee not the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body* prov'd, from theſe words of St. *Paul*, to be an *Article of Faith*.

Your Lordſhip goes on; *St.* Paul *indeed ſaith*, That we ſow not that Body P. 41. that ſhall be; *but he ſpeaks not of the* Identity, *but the* Perfection *of it*. Here my Underſtanding fails me again: For I cannot underſtand St. *Paul* to ſay, That the ſame identical ſenſible Grain of Wheat, which was ſown at Seed-time, is the very ſame with every Grain of Wheat in the Ear at Harveſt, that ſprang from it: Yet ſo I muſt underſtand it, to make it prove that the ſame ſenſible Body, that is laid in the Grave, ſhall be the very ſame with that which ſhall be rais'd at the Reſurrection. For I do not know of any ſeminal *Body in little*, contain'd in the dead Careaſe of any Man or Woman; which, as your Lordſhip

ſays, in Seeds having its proper Organical Parts, ſhall *afterwards be enlarg'd*, and at the Reſurrection grow up into the *ſame Man*. For I never thought of any Seed or *Seminal Parts*, either of *Plant* or Animal, *ſo wonderfully improv'd by the Providence of God*, whereby the ſame Plant or Animal ſhould beget it ſelf; nor ever heard, that it was by Divine *Providence* deſign'd to produce the ſame Individual, but for the producing of future and diſtinct Individuals, for the continuation of the ſame Species.

P. 41. Your Lordſhip's next words are, *And altho' there be ſuch a difference from the Grain it ſelf, when it comes up to be perfect Corn, with Root, Stalk, Blade and Ear, that it may be ſaid to outward Appearance not to be the ſame Body; yet with regard to the Seminal and Organical Parts, it is as much the ſame, as a Man grown up is the ſame with the Embrio in the Womb.* *Anſw.* It does not appear, by any thing I can find in the Text, That St. *Paul* here compar'd the *Body* produc'd, with the *Seminal and Organical Parts* contain'd in the Grain it ſprang from, but with the whole ſenſible Grain that was ſown. Microſcopes had not then diſcover'd the little *Embrio* Plant in the Seed; and ſuppoſing it ſhould have been reveal'd to St. *Paul* (tho' in the Scripture we find little Revelation of Natural Philoſophy) yet an Argument taken from a thing perfectly unknown to the *Corinthians* whom he writ to, could be of no manner of uſe to them, nor ſerve at all either to inſtruct or convince them. But granting that thoſe St. *Paul* writ to, knew it as well as Mr. *Lewenhooke*; yet your Lordſhip thereby proves not the raiſing of *the ſame Body*: Your Lordſhip ſays it is as much the *ſame* [I crave leave to add *Body*] *as a Man grown up is the* ſame (*Same* what, I beſeech your Lordſhip?) *with the Embrio in the Womb.* For that the *Body* of the *Embrio* in the Womb, and *Body* of the Man grown up, is the *ſame Body*, I think no one will ſay; unleſs he can perſuade himſelf that a *Body*, that is not the hundredth part of another, is the ſame with that other; which I think no one will do, till having renounc'd this dangerous *way by* Ideas of Thinking and Reaſoning, he has learnt to ſay that a Part and the Whole are the *ſame*.

P. 41. Your Lordſhip goes on: *And altho' many Arguments may be us'd to prove, that a Man is not the ſame, becauſe Life, which depends upon the Courſe of the Blood, and the manner of Reſpiration and Nutrition is ſo different in both States; yet that an would be thought ridiculous, that ſhould ſeriouſly affirm that it was not the* ſame Man. And your Lordſhip ſays, *I grant, that the variation of great Parcels of Matter in Plants, alters not the Identity; and that the Organization of the Parts in one coherent Body, partaking of one common Life, makes the Identity of a Plant.* *Anſw.* My Lord, I think the Queſtion is not about the *ſame Man*, but the *ſame Body*: For tho' I do ſay (ſomewhat differently from what your Lordſhip ſets down as my words here) " That that which has ſuch an Organization, as is " fit to receive and diſtribute Nouriſhment, ſo as to continue and frame the " Wood, Bark and Leaves, &c. of a Plant, in which conſiſts the vegetable " Life; continues to be the ſame Plant, as long as it partakes of the ſame Life, " tho' that Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter, vitally united to " the living Plant:" Yet I do not remember that I any where ſay, that a Plant, which was once no bigger than an Oaten-Straw, and afterwards grows to be above a Fathom about, is the *ſame Body*, tho' it be ſtill the *ſame Plant*.

Eſſay, B. 2. C. 27. §. 4.

The well known Tree in *Epping*-Foreſt, call'd the *King's-Oak*, which, from not weighing an Ounce at firſt, grew to have many Tuns of Timber in it, was all along the ſame Oak, the very *ſame Plant*; but no body, I think, will ſay it was the *ſame Body* when it weigh'd a Tun, as it was when it weigh'd but an Ounce; unleſs he has a mind to ſignalize himſelf by ſaying, That that is the *ſame Body*, which has a thouſand Particles of different Matter in it, for one Particle that is the ſame: which is no better than to ſay, That a thouſand different Particles are but one and the ſame Particle, and one and the ſame Particle is a thouſand different Particles; a thouſand times a greater Abſurdity, than to ſay half is the whole, or the whole is the ſame with the half. Which will be improv'd ten thouſand times yet farther, if a Man ſhall ſay (as your Lordſhip ſeems to me to argue here) That that great Oak is the very ſame Body with the Acorn it ſprang from, becauſe there was in that Acorn an Oak in little, which was *afterwards* (as your Lordſhip expreſſes it) ſo *much enlarg'd*, as to make that mighty Tree: For this *Embrio*, if I may ſo call it, or Oak in little,

tle, being not the hundredth, or perhaps the thouſandth part of the Acorn, and the Acorn being not the thouſandth part of the grown Oak; 'twill be very extraordinary to prove the Acorn and the grown Oak to be the *ſame Body*, by a way wherein it cannot be pretended, that above one Particle of an hundred Thouſand or a Million, is the ſame in the one Body that it was in the other. From which way of Reaſoning, it will follow, that a Nurſe and her Sucking-Child have the ſame Body; and be paſt doubt, that a Mother and her Infant have the ſame Body. But this is a way of *Certainty* found out to eſtabliſh the Articles of Faith, and to overturn the new *Method of Certainty* that your Lordſhip ſays I have *ſtarted, which is apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before.*

And now I deſire your Lordſhip to conſider, of what uſe it is to you in the preſent Caſe to quote out of my *Eſſay* theſe words, " That partaking of one " common Life, makes the Identity of a Plant; " ſince the Queſtion is not about the *Identity of a Plant*, but about the *Identity of a Body*; it being a very different thing to be the *ſame Plant*, and to be the *ſame Body*: For that which makes the ſame Plant, does not make the ſame Body; the one being the partaking in the ſame continu'd vegetable Life, the other the conſiſting of the ſame numerical Particles of Matter. And therefore your Lordſhip's Inference from my words above-quoted, in theſe which you ſubjoin, ſeems to me a very ſtrange one, *viz. So that in things capable of any ſort of Life, the Identity is conſiſtent with a continued Succeſſion of Parts; and ſo the Wheat grown up is the* ſame Body *with the Grain that was ſown*: For, I believe, if my words, from which you infer, *And ſo the Wheat grown up is the* ſame Body *with the Grain that was ſown*, were put into a Syllogiſm, this would hardly be brought to be the Concluſion. P. 42.

But your Lordſhip goes on with Conſequence upon Conſequence, tho' I have not Eyes acute enough every where to ſee the Connection, till you bring it to the Reſurrection of the *ſame Body*. The Connection of your Lordſhip's words is as followeth: *And thus the Alteration of the Parts of the Body, at the Reſurrection, is conſiſtent with its Identity, if its Organization and Life be the ſame; and this is a real Identity of the Body, which depends not upon Conſciouſneſs. From whence it follows, that to make the* ſame Body, *no more is requir'd, but reſtoring Life to the organiz'd Parts of it.* If the Queſtion were about raiſing the ſame Plant, I do not ſay but there might be ſome appearance for making ſuch Inference from my words as this; *Whence it follows, that to make the ſame* Plant, *no more is requir'd, but to reſtore Life to the organiz'd Parts of it.* But this Deduction, wherein from thoſe words of mine, that ſpeak only of the *Identity of a Plant*, your Lordſhip infers there is no more requir'd to make the *ſame Body*, than to make the *ſame Plant*; being too ſubtle for me, I leave to my Reader to find out. P. 41.

Your Lordſhip goes on and ſays, *That I grant likewiſe*, " That the Identity " of the ſame Man conſiſts in a Participation of the ſame continu'd Life, by " conſtantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succeſſion, vitally united to the " ſame organiz'd Body." *Anſw.* I ſpeak in theſe words of the *Identity of the ſame* Man; and your Lordſhip thence roundly concludes, *So that there is no Difficulty of the Sameneſs of the* Body. But your Lordſhip knows, that I do not take theſe two Sounds, *Man* and *Body* to ſtand for the ſame thing; nor the Identity of the *Man* to be the ſame with the Identity of the *Body*. P. 42.

But let us read out your Lordſhip's words: *So that there is no Difficulty as to the Sameneſs of the Body, if Life were continu'd; and if by Divine Power Life be reſtor'd to that material Subſtance, which was before united by a Re-union of the Soul to it, there is no reaſon to deny the Identity of the Body: Not from the Conſciouſneſs of the Soul, but from that Life, which is the Reſult of the Union of the Soul and Body.* P. 42.

If I underſtand your Lordſhip right, you in theſe words, from the Paſſages above-quoted out of my Book, argue, that from thoſe words of mine it will follow, that it is or may be the *ſame Body* that is rais'd at the Reſurrection. If ſo, my Lord, your Lordſhip has then prov'd, that my Book is not inconſiſtent with, but conformable to this Article of the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, which your Lordſhip contends for, and will have to be an Article of Faith: For tho' I do by no means deny that the *ſame* Bodies ſhall be rais'd at the

the laſt Day, yet I ſee nothing your Lordſhip has ſaid to prove it to be an Article of Faith.

P. 43. But your Lordſhip goes on with your Proofs, and ſays; *But St.* Paul *ſtill ſuppoſes that it muſt be that material Subſtance to which the Soul was before united. For ſaith he,* It is ſown in Corruption, it is rais'd in Incorruption; it is ſown in Diſhonour; it is rais'd in Glory; it is ſown in Weakneſs, it is rais'd in Power; it is ſown a natural Body, it is rais'd a ſpiritual Body. *Can ſuch a material Subſtance which was never united to the Body, be ſaid to be* ſown *in* Corruption, *and* Weakneſs, *and* Diſhonour? *Either therefore he muſt ſpeak of the ſame Body, or his meaning cannot be comprehended.* I anſwer, *Can ſuch a material Subſtance which was* never laid in the Grave, *be ſaid to be ſown,* &c? For your Lordſhip

P. 34. ſays, *You do not ſay the ſame individual Particles, which were united at the point of Death, ſhall be rais'd at the laſt Day*; and no other Particles are laid in the Grave, but ſuch as are united at the point of Death: *either therefore your Lordſhip muſt ſpeak* of another *Body* different from that which was *ſown*, which ſhall be rais'd; *or elſe* your *meaning*, I think, *cannot be comprehended.*

But whatever be your meaning, your Lordſhip proves it to be St. *Paul*'s mean-

P. 43. ing, That the *ſame Body* ſhall be rais'd which was *ſown*, in theſe following words; *For what does all this relate to a conſcious Principle? Anſw.* The Scripture being expreſs, that the ſame Perſons ſhould be rais'd and appear before the Judgment-Seat of Chriſt, that every one may receive according to what he had done in his Body; it was very well ſuited to common Apprehenſions (which reſin'd not about *Particles that had been vitally united to the Soul*) to ſpeak of the Body which each one was to have after the Reſurrection, as he would be apt to ſpeak of it himſelf. For it being *his* Body both before and after the Reſurrection, every one ordinarily ſpeaks of *his* Body as the ſame, tho' in a ſtrict and philoſophical ſenſe, as your Lordſhip ſpeaks, it be not the very ſame. Thus it is no Impropriety of Speech to ſay, This Body of mine, which was formerly ſtrong and plump, is now weak and waſted; tho' in ſuch a ſenſe as you are ſpeaking here, it be not the ſame Body. Revelation declares nothing any where concerning *the ſame Body*, in your Lordſhip's ſenſe of *the ſame Body*, which appears not to have been then thought of. The Apoſtle directly propoſes nothing for or againſt *the ſame Body*, as neceſſary to be believ'd: That which he is plain and direct in, is his oppoſing and condemning ſuch curious Queſtions about the Body, which could ſerve only to perplex, not to confirm what was material and neceſſary for them to believe, *viz.* a Day of Judgment and Retribution to Men in a future ſtate; and therefore 'tis no wonder that, mentioning their Bodies, he ſhould uſe a way of ſpeaking ſuited to vulgar Notions, from which it would be hard poſitively to conclude any thing for the determining of this Queſtion (eſpecially againſt Expreſſions in the ſame Diſcourſe that plainly incline to the other ſide) in a matter which, as it appears, the Apoſtle thought not neceſſary to determine, and the Spirit of God thought not fit to gratify any one's Curioſity in.

But your Lordſhip ſays, *The Apoſtle ſpeaks plainly of that Body which was once*

P. 43. *quicken'd, and afterwards falls to Corruption, and is to be reſtor'd with more noble Qualities.* I wiſh your Lordſhip had quoted the words of St. *Paul*, wherein he ſpeaks plainly of that numerical *Body that was once quicken'd*; they would preſently decide this Queſtion. But your Lordſhip proves it by theſe following words of St. *Paul*; *For this Corruption muſt put on Incorruption, and this Mortal muſt put on Immortality*: to which your Lordſhip adds, That *you do not ſee how he could more expreſly affirm the Identity of this corruptible Body with that after the Reſurrection.* How expreſly it is affirm'd by the Apoſtle, ſhall be conſider'd by and by. In the mean time, it is paſt doubt that your Lordſhip beſt knows what you do or *do not ſee.* But this I will be bold to ſay, that if St. *Paul* had any where in this Chapter (where there are ſo many occaſions for it, if it had been neceſſary to have been believ'd) but ſaid in expreſs words, that the *ſame Bodies* ſhould be rais'd; every one elſe who thinks of it, will *ſee* he had *more expreſly affirm'd the Identity* of the Bodies which Men now have, with thoſe they ſhall have after the Reſurrection.

P. 44. The remainder of your Lordſhip's Period, is; *And that without any reſpect to the Principle of Self-conſciouſneſs. Anſw.* Theſe words, I doubt not, have ſome meaning,

meaning, but I muſt own, I know not what; either towards the proof of *the Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, or to ſhew that any thing I have ſaid concerning *Self-conſciouſneſs* is inconſiſtent: For I do not remember that I have any where ſaid, That the *Identity* of *Body* conſiſted in *Self-conſciouſneſs*.

From your preceding words, your Lordſhip concludes thus: *And ſo if the Scripture be the ſole Foundation of our Faith, this is an Article of it.* My Lord, to make the Concluſion unqueſtionable, I humbly conceive, the words muſt run thus: And ſo if *the Scripture*, and your Lordſhip's Interpretation of it, *be the ſole Foundation of our Faith*; the Reſurrection of the ſame Body *is an Article of it*. For with Submiſſion, your Lordſhip has neither produc'd expreſs words of Scripture for it, nor ſo prov'd that to be the meaning of any of thoſe words of Scripture which you have produc'd for it, that a Man who reads and ſincerely endeavours to underſtand the Scripture, cannot but find himſelf oblig'd to believe, as expreſly that *the ſame Bodies of the dead*, in your Lordſhip's Senſe, ſhall be rais'd, as that *the dead ſhall be rais'd*. And I crave leave to give your Lordſhip this one Reaſon for it: P. 44.

He who reads with Attention this Diſcourſe of St. *Paul*, where he diſcourſes of the Reſurrection, will ſee that he plainly diſtinguiſhes between the *Dead* that ſhall be rais'd, and *the Bodies* of the Dead. For it is νεκροὶ, πάντες, οἱ, are the nominative Caſes to ἐγερθήσονται, ζωοποιηθήσονται, ἐγερθήσονται, all along, and not σώματα, *Bodies*; which one may with reaſon think would ſomewhere or other have been expreſs'd, if all this had been ſaid, to propoſe it as an Article of Faith, that the very ſame Bodies ſhould be raiſed. The ſame manner of ſpeaking the Spirit of God obſerves all through the New Teſtament, where it is ſaid, raiſe* the *dead*, *quicken* or make alive the *dead*, the Reſurrection of the *dead*. Nay, theſe very words of our † Saviour, urg'd by your Lordſhip for the Reſurrection of the *ſame Body*, run thus: Πάντες οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις ἀκούσονται τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκπορεύσονται οἱ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ποιήσαντες εἰς ἀνάστασιν ζωῆς, οἱ δὲ τὰ φαῦλα πράξαντες εἰς ἀνάστασιν κρίσεως. Would a well-meaning Searcher of the Scriptures be apt to think, that if the thing here intended by our Saviour were to teach and propoſe it as an Article of Faith, neceſſary to be believ'd by every one, that the very *ſame Bodies of the dead* ſhould be rais'd; would not, I ſay, any one be apt to think, that if our Saviour meant ſo, the words ſhould rather have been, πάντα τὰ σώματα ἃ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις, *i. e.* all the Bodies that *are in the Graves*, rather than *all who are in the Graves*; which muſt denote Perſons, and not preciſely Bodies?

1 Cor. 15. Ver. 15, 22, 23, 29, 32, 35, 52. *Mat. 22. 31. Mark 12. 26. † John 5. 21. Acts 26. Rom. 4. 17. 2 Cor. 1. 9. 1 Theſſ. 4. 14, 16. † Joh. 5. 28, 29.

Another Evidence, that St. *Paul* makes a diſtinction between *the Dead* and the *Bodies of the dead*, ſo that the *Dead* cannot be taken in this, 1 *Cor.* 15. to ſtand preciſely for the Bodies of the dead, are theſe words of the Apoſtle; *But ſome Men will ſay, How are the* dead *rais'd, and with what* Bodies *do* they *come?* Which words *Dead* and *They*, if ſuppos'd to ſtand preciſely for the *Bodies* of the dead, the Queſtion will run thus: *How are the dead* Bodies *rais'd, and with what Bodies do* the dead Bodies *come?* which ſeems to have no very agreeable Senſe. Ver. 35.

This therefore being ſo, that the Spirit of God keeps ſo expreſsly to this Phraſe or Form of ſpeaking in the new Teſtament, of *Raiſing*, *Quickening*, *Riſing*, *Reſurrection*, &c. of the *dead*, where the Reſurrection at the laſt Day is ſpoken of; and that the Body is not mention'd, but in anſwer to this Queſtion, *With what Bodies ſhall thoſe dead* who are rais'd *come?* ſo that by the *Dead* cannot preciſely be meant *the dead Bodies*: I do not ſee but a good Chriſtian, who reads the Scripture with an Intention to believe all that is there reveal'd to him concerning the Reſurrection, may acquit himſelf of his Duty therein, without entring into the inquiry whether the dead ſhall have the *very ſame Bodies* or no; which ſort of inquiry the Apoſtle, by the Appellation he beſtows here on him that makes it, ſeems not much to encourage. Nor, if he ſhall think himſelf bound to determine concerning the Identity of the Bodies of the dead rais'd at the laſt Day, will he, by the Remainder of St. *Paul*'s Anſwer, find the Determination of the Apoſtle to be much in favour of the very *ſame Body*; unleſs the being told, that the Body ſown *is not that Body that ſhall be*; that the Body rais'd is as different from that which was laid down, as the *Fleſh of Man* is from the *Fleſh* of *Beaſts*, *Fiſhes*, and *Birds*, or as the *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Stars* are different one from another; or as different as a corruptible, weak, natural, mortal Body, is from an incorruptible, powerful, ſpiritual, immortal Body;

dy; and laſtly, as evident as a Body that is *Fleſh and Blood*, is from a Body that is not Fleſh and Blood; for *Fleſh and Blood cannot*, ſays St. *Paul* in this very
1 Cor. 15. 50. place, *inherit the Kingdom of God*: Unleſs, I ſay, all this, which is contain'd in St. *Paul*'s words, can be ſuppos'd to be the way to deliver this as an Article of Faith, which is required to be believ'd by every one, *viz.* That the *dead ſhould be rais'd with the very ſame Bodies that they had before in this Life*; which Article, propos'd in theſe or the like plain and expreſs words, could have left no Room for doubt in the meaneſt Capacities, nor for conteſt in the moſt perverſe Minds.

P. 44. Your Lordſhip adds, in the next Words; *And ſo it hath been always underſtood by the Chriſtian Church*, viz. *That the Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, in your Lordſhip's ſenſe of *ſame Body*, *is an Article of Faith. Anſw.* What the *Chriſtian Church has always underſtood*, is beyond my Knowledg. But for thoſe who coming ſhort of your Lordſhip's great Learning, cannot gather their Articles of Faith from the underſtanding of all the whole Chriſtian Church, ever ſince the Preaching of the Goſpel (who make the far greater part of Chriſtians, I think I may ſay, nine hundred ninety and nine of a thouſand) but are forc'd to have recourſe to the Scripture to find them there; I do not ſee, that they will eaſily find there, this propos'd as an Article of Faith, That there ſhall be a *Reſurrection of the ſame Body*; but that there ſhall be *a Reſurrection of the Dead*, without explicitly determining, that they ſhall be rais'd with Bodies made up wholly of the ſame Particles which were once vitally united to their Souls, in their former Life; without the mixture of any one other Particle of Matter, which is that which your Lordſhip means by the *ſame Body*.

But ſuppoſing your Lordſhip to have demonſtrated this to be an Article of Faith, tho' I crave leave to own, that I do not ſee that all that your Lordſhip has ſaid here makes it ſo much as probable; what is all this to me? Yes,
P. 44. ſays your Lordſhip in the following words, *My Idea of perſonal Identity is inconſiſtent with it, for it makes the ſame Body which was here united to the Soul, not to be neceſſary to the Doctrine of the Reſurrection. But any material Subſtance united to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame Body.*

This is an Argument of your Lordſhip's, which I am oblig'd to anſwer to. But is it not fit I ſhould firſt underſtand it, before I anſwer it? Now here I do not well know, what it is *to make a thing not to be neceſſary to the Doctrine of the Reſurrection.* But to help my ſelf out the beſt I can with a Gueſs, I will conjecture (which, in diſputing with learned Men, is not very ſafe) your Lordſhip's meaning is, That *my Idea of perſonal Identity makes it not neceſſary*, that, for the raiſing the ſame Perſon, the Body ſhould be the ſame.

Your Lordſhip's next word is *But*; to which I am ready to reply, *But* what? What does *my Idea* of perſonal Identity do? for ſomething of that kind the adverſative Particle *But* ſhould, in the ordinary Conſtruction of our Language, introduce, to make the Propoſition clear and intelligible: But here is no ſuch thing; *But* is one of your Lordſhip's privileg'd Particles, which I muſt not meddle with, for fear your Lordſhip complain of me again, as ſo *ſevere a Critick*, that *for the leaſt Ambiguity in any Particle, fill up Pages in my Anſwer, to make my Book look conſiderable for the bulk of it.* But ſince this Propoſition here, *My Idea of perſonal Identity makes the ſame Body, which was here united to the Soul, not neceſſary to the Doctrine of the Reſurrection; BUT any material Subſtance being united to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame Body*; is brought to prove *my Idea of perſonal Identity inconſiſtent* with the Article of the Reſurrection: I muſt make it out in ſome direct Senſe or other, that I may ſee whether it be both true and concluſive. I therefore venture to read it thus, *My Idea of perſonal Identity makes the ſame Body which was here united to the Soul, not to be neceſſary* at the Reſurrection; *but* allows, That *any material Subſtance being united to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame Body*: Ergo, *My Idea of perſonal Identity is inconſiſtent with the Article of the Reſurrection of the ſame Body.*

If this be your Lordſhip's Senſe in this Paſſage, as I here have gueſs'd it to be; or elſe I know not what it is: I anſwer,

1. That *my Idea of perſonal Identity* does not allow that *any material Subſtance being united to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame Body.* I ſay no ſuch thing in my Book, nor any thing from whence it may be infer'd; and your Lordſhip would have done me a favour, to have ſet down the words where I ſay ſo,

ſo, or thoſe from which you infer ſo, and ſhew'd how it follows from any thing I have ſaid.

2. Granting that it were a Conſequence from *my Idea of perſonal Identity*, that *any material Subſtance being united to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame Body*; this would not prove that *my Idea of perſonal Identity was inconſiſtent* with this Propoſition, *That the ſame Body ſhall be rais'd*; but on the contrary, affirms it: ſince if I affirm, as I do, That the ſame Perſons ſhall be rais'd, and it be a Conſequence of my *Idea* of perſonal Identity, that *any material Subſtance being united to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame Body*; it follows, that if the ſame Perſon be rais'd, the ſame Body muſt be: And ſo I have herein not only ſaid nothing inconſiſtent with the Reſurrection of the ſame Body, but have ſaid more for it than your Lordſhip. For there can be nothing plainer, than that in the Scripture it is reveal'd, that the ſame Perſons ſhall be rais'd, and appear before the Judgment-Seat of Chriſt, to anſwer for what they have done in their Bodies. If therefore *whatever Matter* be join'd to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame Body; it is demonſtration, That if the ſame Perſons are rais'd, they have the ſame Bodies.

How then your Lordſhip makes this an Inconſiſtency with the Reſurrection, is beyond my Conception. Yes, ſays your Lordſhip, *it is inconſiſtent with it, for it makes the ſame Body which was here united to the Soul, not to be neceſſary.* P. 44.

3. I anſwer therefore, Thirdly, That this is the firſt time I ever learnt, that *not neceſſary* was the ſame with *inconſiſtent*. I ſay, that a Body made up of the ſame numerical Parts of Matter, is not neceſſary to the making of the ſame Perſon; from whence it will indeed follow, that to the Reſurrection of the ſame Perſon, the ſame numerical Particles of Matter are not requir'd. What does your Lordſhip infer from hence? to wit, this: Therefore he who thinks that the ſame Particles of Matter are not neceſſary to the making of the ſame Perſon, cannot believe that the ſame Perſons ſhall be rais'd with Bodies made of the very ſame Particles of Matter, if God ſhould reveal that it ſhall be ſo, *viz.* That the ſame Perſons ſhall be rais'd with the ſame Bodies they had before: Which is all one as to ſay, That he who thought the blowing of Rams-Horns was not neceſſary in it ſelf to the falling down of the Walls of *Jericho*, could not believe that they ſhould fall upon the blowing of Rams-Horns, when God had declar'd it ſhould be ſo.

Your Lordſhip ſays, *My Idea of perſonal Identity is inconſiſtent with the Article of the Reſurrection*; the reaſon you ground it on, is this, becauſe it makes not the ſame Body *neceſſary* to the making the ſame Perſon. Let us grant your Lordſhip's Conſequence to be good, what will follow from it? No leſs than this, That your Lordſhip's Notion (for I dare not ſay your Lordſhip has any ſo dangerous things as *Ideas*) of perſonal Identity, is inconſiſtent with *the Article of the Reſurrection*. The Demonſtration of it is thus; your Lordſhip ſays, It is not neceſſary that the Body, to be rais'd at the laſt Day, ſhould conſiſt of *the ſame Particles of Matter, which were united at the point of Death; for there muſt be a great alteration in them in a lingring Diſeaſe; as if a fat Man falls into a Conſumption: You do not ſay the ſame Particles which the Sinner had at the very time of Commiſſion of his Sins; for then a long Sinner muſt have a vaſt Body, conſidering the continual ſpending of Particles by Perſpiration.* And again, here your Lordſhip ſays, *You allow the Notion of perſonal Identity to belong to the ſame Man under ſeveral Changes of Matter.* From which words it is evident, That your Lordſhip ſuppoſes a Perſon in this World may be continu'd and preſerv'd the ſame, in a Body not conſiſting of the ſame individual Particles of Matter; and hence it demonſtratively follows, That let your Lordſhip's *Notion of perſonal Identity* be what it will, it makes *the ſame Body not to be neceſſary to the ſame Perſon*; and therefore it is, by your Lordſhip's Rule, *inconſiſtent with the Article of the Reſurrection*. When your Lordſhip ſhall think fit to clear your own *Notion of perſonal Identity* from this *Inconſiſtency* with the Article of the Reſurrection, I do not doubt but my *Idea of perſonal Identity* will be thereby clear'd too. Till then, all *Inconſiſtency* with that Article which your Lordſhip has here charg'd on mine, will unavoidably fall upon your Lordſhip's too. P. 34, 35. P. 44.

But for the clearing of both, give me leave to ſay, my Lord, That whatſoever is *not neceſſary*, does thereby become *inconſiſtent*. It is *not neceſſary* to the

ſame *Perſon*, that his Body ſhould always conſiſt of the ſame numerical Particles; this is Demonſtration, becauſe the Particles of the Bodies of the ſame Perſons in this Life change every moment, and your Lordſhip cannot deny it; and yet this makes it not *inconſiſtent* with God's preſerving, if he thinks fit, to the ſame Perſons, Bodies conſiſting of the ſame numerical Particles always from the Reſurrection to Eternity. And ſo likewiſe, tho' I ſay any thing that ſuppoſes it *not neceſſary*, that the ſame numerical Particles, which were vitally united to the Soul in this Life, ſhould be re-united to it at the Reſurrection, and conſtitute the Body it ſhall then have; yet it is not *inconſiſtent* with this, That God may, if he pleaſes, give to every one a Body conſiſting only of ſuch Particles as were before vitally united to his Soul. And thus, I think, I have clear'd my Book from all that *Inconſiſtency* which your Lordſhip charges on it, and would perſuade the World it has with the *Article of the Reſurrection of the Dead.*

Only before I leave it, I will ſet down the remainder of what your Lordſhip ſays upon this Head, that tho' I ſee not the Coherence nor Tendency of it, nor the Force of any Argument in it againſt me; yet nothing may be omitted that your Lordſhip has thought fit to entertain your Reader with on this new Point, nor any one have reaſon to ſuſpect, that I have paſs'd by any Word of your Lordſhip's (on this now firſt introduc'd Subject) wherein he might find your Lordſhip had prov'd what you had promis'd in
P. 44. your Title-page. Your remaining Words are theſe: *The Diſpute is not how far perſonal Identity in it ſelf may conſiſt in the very ſame material Subſtance; for we allow the Notion of perſonal Identity to belong to the ſame Man under ſeveral Changes of Matter; but whether it doth not depend upon a vital Union between the Soul and Body, and the Life which is conſequent upon it: and therefore in the Reſurrection, the ſame material Subſtance muſt be re-united, or elſe it cannot be call'd a Reſurrection, but a* Renovation; *i. e. it may be a new Life, but not a raiſing the Body from the Dead.* I confeſs, I do not ſee how what is here uſher'd in by the words *and therefore*, is a Conſequence from the preceding Words; but as to the Propriety of the Name, I think it will not be much queſtion'd, that if the ſame Man riſe who was dead, it may very properly be call'd the *Reſurrection of the Dead*; which is the Language of the Scripture.

I muſt not part with this Article of the Reſurrection, without returning
P. 62. my Thanks to your Lordſhip for making me take notice of a Fault in my *Eſſay*. When I writ that Book, I took it for granted, as I doubt not but many others have done, that the Scripture had mention'd in expreſs terms, *the Reſurrection of the Body*: But upon the Occaſion your Lordſhip has given me in your laſt Letter to look a little more narrowly into what Revelation has declar'd concerning the *Reſurrection*, and finding no ſuch expreſs Words in the Scripture, as that *the Body ſhall riſe* or *be rais'd*, or the *Reſurrection of the Body*; I ſhall in the next Edition of it change theſe Words of
Eſſay, B. 4. C. 18. §. 7. my Book, *The Dead Bodies of Men ſhall riſe*, into theſe of the Scripture, *The Dead ſhall riſe*. Not that I queſtion, that the Dead ſhall be rais'd with Bodies: But in Matters of Revelation, I think it not only ſafeſt, but our Duty, as far as any one delivers it for Revelation, to keep cloſe to the Words of the Scripture; unleſs he will aſſume to himſelf the Authority of one inſpir'd, or make himſelf wiſer than the holy Spirit himſelf: If I had ſpoke of the Reſurrection in preciſely Scripture-Terms, I had avoided giving your Lordſhip
P. 63. the Occaſion of making here ſuch a verbal Reflection on my Words; *What, not if there be an Idea of Identity as to the Body?*

I come now to your Lordſhip's ſecond Head of Accuſation; your Lord-
P. 44. ſhip ſays,

2. *The next Articles of Faith, which my Notion of Ideas is inconſiſtent with, are no leſs than thoſe of the Trinity and the Incarnation of our Saviour.* But all the Proof of Inconſiſtency your Lordſhip here brings, being drawn from my Notions of *Nature* and *Perſon*, whereof ſo much has been ſaid already, the ſwelling my Anſwer into too great a Volume, will excuſe me from ſetting down at large all that you have ſaid hereupon, ſo particularly, as I have done in the precedent Article of the *Reſurrection* which is wholly new.

Your

Your Lordſhip's way of proving, That *my Ideas of Nature and Perſon cannot conſiſt* with the Articles of the Trinity and Incarnation, is, as far as I can underſtand it, this, That, I ſay, we have no ſimple Ideas, but by Senſation and Reflection, *But, ſays your Lordſhip, we cannot have any ſimple Ideas of Nature and Perſon, by Senſation and Reflection*; Ergo, *We can come to no Certainty about the Diſtinction of Nature and Perſon in my way of Ideas. Anſw.* If your Lordſhip had concluded from thence, that therefore in my way of Ideas, we can have no Ideas at all of *Nature and Perſon*, it would have had ſome appearance of a Conſequence; but as it is, it ſeems to me ſuch an Argument as this: No ſimple Colours in Sir *Godfrey Kneller's* way of Painting come into his exact and lively Pictures but by his Pencil; but no ſimple Colours of a Ship and a Man come into his Pictures by his Pencil; *Ergo, We can come to no Certainty about the Diſtinction of* a Ship and a Man, in Sir *Godfrey Kneller's* way of Painting. P. 45, 46. P. 45.

Your Lordſhip ſays, *It is not poſſible for us to have any ſimple Ideas of Nature and Perſon by Senſation and Reflection*, and I ſay ſo too; as impoſſible as it is to have a true Picture of a Rainbow in one ſimple Colour, which conſiſts in the arangement of many Colours. The Ideas ſignify'd by the Sounds *Nature* and *Perſon*, are each of them complex Ideas; and therefore it is as impoſſible to have a ſimple Idea of either of them, as to have a multitude in one, or a Compoſition in a Simple. But if your Lordſhip means, that by Senſation and Reflection we cannot have the ſimple Ideas, of which the complex ones of *Nature* and *Perſon* are compounded; that I muſt crave leave to diſſent from, till your Lordſhip can produce a Definition (in intelligible Words) either of *Nature* or *Perſon*, in which all that is contained cannot ultimately be reſolv'd into ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection. P. 45.

Your Lordſhip's Definition of *Perſon*, is, *That it is a compleat intelligent Subſtance with a peculiar manner of Subſiſtence.* And my Definition of *Perſon*, which your Lordſhip quotes out of my *Eſſay*, is, " That Perſon ſtands for a thinking " intelligent Being, that has Reaſon and Reflection, and can conſider it ſelf " as it ſelf, the ſame thinking thing in different times and places." When your Lordſhip ſhall ſhew any *Repugnancy in this my Idea* (which I denote by the Sound *Perſon*) to the *Incarnation of our Saviour*, with which your Lordſhip's *Notion* of *Perſon* may not be equally charg'd; I ſhall give your Lordſhip an anſwer to it. This I ſay in anſwer to theſe Words, *which is repugnant to the Article of the Incarnation of our Saviour:* For the preceding reaſoning, to which they refer, I muſt own I do not underſtand. Vind. p. 261. P. 59. P. 46.

The word *Perſon* naturally ſignifies nothing that you allow; your Lordſhip, in your Definition of it, makes it ſtand for a general *abſtract Idea. Perſon* then, in your Lordſhip, is liable to the ſame Default which you lay on it in me, *viz.* That it is *no more than a Notion in the Mind.* The ſame will be ſo of the word *Nature*, whenever your Lordſhip pleaſes to define it; without which you can have no Notion of it. And then *the Conſequence*, which you there draw from their being *no more than Notion of the Mind, will hold* as much in Reſpect of your Lordſhip's Notion of *Nature* and *Perſon* as of mine, *viz. That one Nature and three Perſons can be no more.* This I crave leave to ſay in anſwer to all that your Lordſhip has been pleas'd to urge from Page 46, to theſe words of your Lordſhip's, p. 52. P. 52. Ibid.

General Terms (as *Nature* and *Perſon* are in their ordinary uſe in our Language) are the Signs of general Ideas, and general Ideas exiſt only in the Mind; but particular things (which are the Foundations of theſe general Ideas, if they are abſtracted as they ſhould be) do, or may exiſt conformable to thoſe general Ideas, and ſo fall under thoſe general Names; as he that writes this Paper is a *Perſon* to him, *i. e.* may be denominated a *Perſon* by him to whoſe abſtract Idea of *Perſon* he bears a Conformity; juſt as what I here write, is to him a *Book* or a *Letter*, to whoſe abſtract Idea of a *Book* or a *Letter* it agrees. This is what I have ſaid concerning this matter all along, and what, I humbly conceive, will ſerve for an anſwer to thoſe Words of your Lordſhip, where you ſay, *You affirm that thoſe who make Nature and Perſon to be only abſtract and complex Ideas, can neither defend nor reaſonably believe the Doctrine of the Trinity*; and to all that you ſay, p. 52—58. Only P. 54.

give me leave to wiſh, that what your Lordſhip, out of a miſtake of what I ſay concerning the Ideas of *Nature* and *Perſon*, has urg'd, as you pretend, againſt them, do not furniſh your Adverſaries in that Diſpute, with ſuch Arguments againſt you as your Lordſhip will not eaſily anſwer.

P. 58. Your Lordſhip ſets down theſe Words of mine, "Perſon in it ſelf ſignifies nothing; but as ſoon as the common uſe of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea, then that is the true Idea of a Perſon;" which Words your Lordſhip interprets thus: i. e. *Men may call a Perſon what they pleaſe, for there is nothing but common uſe requir'd to it: They may call a Horſe, or a Tree, or a Stone, a Perſon, if they think fit. Anſw.* Men, before common uſe had appropriated this Name to that complex Idea which they now ſignify by the Sound *Perſon*, might have denoted it by the Sound *Stone*, and *vice verſa*: But can your Lordſhip thence argue, as you do here, Men are at the ſame liberty in a Country where thoſe Words are already in common uſe? There he that will ſpeak properly, and ſo as to be underſtood, muſt appropriate each Sound us'd in that Language to an Idea in his Mind (which to himſelf is defining the Word) which is in ſome Degree conformable to the Idea that others apply it to.

P. 59. Your Lordſhip, in the next Paragraph, ſets down my Definition of the word *Perſon*, viz. "That Perſon ſtands for a thinking intelligent Being that hath "Reaſon and Reflection, and can conſider it ſelf as it ſelf, the ſame thinking "Being in different times and places;" and then asks many Queſtions upon it. I ſhall ſet down your Lordſhip's Definition of *Perſon*, which is this; *A Perſon is a compleat intelligent Subſtance with a peculiar manner of Subſiſtence:* and then crave leave to ask your Lordſhip the ſame Queſtions concerning it, which your Lordſhip here asks me concerning mine; *How comes Perſon to ſtand for this and nothing elſe? From whence comes* compleat Subſtance, or peculiar manner of Subſiſtence *to make up the* Idea *of a Perſon? Whether it be true or falſe, I am not now to enquire; but how it comes into this Idea of a Perſon? Has common uſe of our Language appropriated it to this Senſe? If not, this ſeems to be a mere arbitrary Idea; and may as well be deny'd as affirm'd. And what a fine paſs are we come to,* in your Lordſhip's way, *if a mere arbitrary Idea muſt be taken into the only true Method of Certainty?——But if this be the true Idea of a Perſon, then there can be no Union of two Natures in one Perſon. For if a* compleat intelligent Subſtance *be the Idea of a Perſon, and the divine and human Natures be compleat intelligent Subſtances; then the Doctrine of the Union of two Natures and one Perſon is quite ſunk, for here muſt be two Perſons in this way* of your Lordſhip's. *Again, if this be the Idea of a Perſon, then where there are three Perſons, there muſt be three diſtinct* compleat intelligent Subſtances; *and ſo there cannot be three Perſons in the ſame individual Eſſence. And thus both theſe Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation are paſt recovery gone, if this way* of your Lordſhip's, *hold.* Theſe, my Lord, are your Lordſhip's very Words; what Force there is in them, I will not enquire: but I muſt beſeech your Lordſhip to take them as Objections I make againſt your Notion of *Perſon*, to ſhew the Danger of it, and the Inconſiſtency it has with the Doctrine of the *Trinity* and *Incarnation of our Saviour*; and when your Lordſhip has remov'd the Objections that are in them, againſt your own Definition of *Perſon*, mine alſo, by the very ſame Anſwers, will be clear'd.

P. 61—65. Your Lordſhip's Argument, in the following Words, to Page 65. ſeems to
P. 61. me (as far as I can collect) to lie thus: Your Lordſhip tells me, that I ſay, "That in Propoſitions, whoſe Certainty is built on clear and perfect Ideas, "and evident Deductions of Reaſon, there no Propoſition can be receiv'd for "divine Revelation which contradicts them." This Propoſition, not ſerving your Lordſhip's turn ſo well, for the Concluſion you deſign'd to draw from
P. 62. it, your Lordſhip is pleas'd to enlarge it. For you ask, *But ſuppoſe I have Ideas ſufficient for Certainty, what is to be done then?* From which Words and your following Diſcourſe, if I can underſtand it, it ſeems to me, that your Lordſhip ſuppoſes it reaſonable for me to hold, That wherever we are any how certain of any Propoſitions, whether their Certainty be built on clear and perfect Ideas or no, there no Propoſition can be receiv'd for Divine Revela-
P. 64. tion, which contradicts them. And thence your Lordſhip concludes, That

becauſe

becauſe I ſay we may make ſome Propoſitions, of whoſe Truth we may be certain, concerning things whereof, we have not *Ideas* in all their Parts perfectly clear and diſtinct; therefore *my Notion of Certainty by* Ideas, *muſt overthrow the Credibility of a Matter of Faith in all ſuch Propoſitions, which are offer'd to be believ'd on the account of Divine Revelation:* A Concluſion which I am ſo unfortunate as not to find how it follows from your Lordſhip's Premiſes, becauſe I cannot any way bring them into Mode and Figure with ſuch a Concluſion. But this being no ſtrange thing to me in my want of Skill in your Lordſhip's way of writing, I in the mean time crave leave to ask, Whether there be any Propoſitions your Lordſhip can be certain of, that are not divinely reveal'd? And here I will preſume that your Lordſhip is not ſo ſceptical, but that you can allow Certainty attainable in many things, by your natural Faculties. Give me leave then to ask your Lordſhip, Whether, where there be Propoſitions, of whoſe Truth you have certain Knowledg, you can receive any Propoſition for Divine Revelation, which contradicts that Certainty? Whether that Certainty be built upon the Agreement of *Ideas*, ſuch as we have, or on whatever elſe your Lordſhip builds it? If you cannot, as I preſume your Lordſhip will ſay you cannot, I make bold to return you your Lordſhip's Queſtions here to me, in your own words: *Let us now ſuppoſe that you are to judg of a Propoſition deliver'd as a Matter of Faith, where you have a Certainty by Reaſon from your Grounds, ſuch as they: Can you, my Lord, aſſent to this as a Matter of Faith, when you are already certain of the contrary* by your way? *How is this poſſible? Can you believe that to be true, which you are certain is not true? Suppoſe it be, that there are two Natures in one Perſon, the Queſtion is, Whether you can aſſent to this as a Matter of Faith? If you* ſhould *ſay*, where *there are only Probabilities on the other ſide, I grant that you then* allow *Revelation is to prevail.* But when you ſay you have *Certainty by* Ideas, or without *Ideas to the contrary, I do not ſee how it is poſſible for you to aſſent to a Matter of Faith as true, when you are certain, from your* Method, *that it is not true. For how can you believe againſt Certainty —— becauſe the Mind is actually determin'd by Certainty. And ſo* your Lordſhip's *Notion of Certainty by* Ideas, or without *Ideas*, be it what it will, *muſt overthrow the Credibility of a Matter of Faith in all ſuch Propoſitions, which are offer'd to be believ'd on the account of Divine Revelation.* This Argumentation and Concluſion is good againſt your Lordſhip, if it be good againſt me: For Certainty is Certainty, and he that is certain is certain, and cannot aſſent to that *as true, which he is certain is not true,* whether he ſuppoſes Certainty to conſiſt in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, ſuch as a Man has, or in any thing elſe. For whether thoſe who have attain'd Certainty, not by *the way of* Ideas, can *believe againſt Certainty*, any more than thoſe who have attain'd *Certainty by* Ideas, we ſhall then ſee, when your Lordſhip ſhall be pleas'd to ſhew the World your way to Certainty without *Ideas*. P. 64.

Indeed if what your Lordſhip inſinuates in the beginning of this Paſſage, which we are now upon, be true, your Lordſhip is ſafer (in your way without *Ideas*, i. e. without immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, if there be any ſuch way) as to the underſtanding Divine Revelation right, than thoſe who make uſe of *Ideas:* But yet you are ſtill as far as they from *aſſenting to that as true, which you are certain is not true.* Your Lordſhip's Word's are: *So great a difference is there between forming* Ideas *firſt, and then judging of Revelation by them, and the believing of Revelation on its proper Grounds, and the interpreting the Senſe of it by the due meaſures of Reaſon.* If it be the Privilege of thoſe alone who renounce *Ideas*, i. e. the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, to *believe Revelation on its proper Grounds, and the interpreting the Senſe of it, by the due meaſures of Reaſon*; I ſhall not think it ſtrange, that any one who undertakes to *interpret the Senſe of Revelation*, ſhould renounce *Ideas*, i. e. That he who would think right of the meaning of any Text of Scripture, ſhould renounce and lay by all immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking. P. 60.

But perhaps your Lordſhip does not here extend this Difference of *believing Revelation on its proper Grounds*, and not on its proper Grounds, to all thoſe who are not, and all thoſe who are for *Ideas*. But your Lordſhip makes this Compariſon here, only between your Lordſhip and me, who you think am guilty of *forming* Ideas *firſt, and then judging of Revelation by them.* Anſw. If ſo, then this

this lays the blame not on my Doctrine of *Ideas*, but on my particular ill uſe of them. That then which your Lordſhip would inſinuate of me here, as a dangerous way to miſtaking the Senſe of the Scripture, is, That *I form* Ideas *firſt, and then judg of Revelation by them*; i. e. in plain *Engliſh*, That I get to my ſelf, the beſt I can, the ſignification of the words, wherein the Revelation is deliver'd, and ſo endeavour to underſtand the Senſe of the Revelation deliver'd in them. And pray, my Lord, does your Lordſhip do otherwiſe? Does the *believing of Revelation upon its proper Grounds, and the due meaſures of Reaſon*, teach you to judg of *Revelation*, before you underſtand the words it is deliver'd in; *i. e.* before you have *form'd the* Ideas in your Mind, as well as you can, which thoſe words ſtand for? If the *due Meaſures of Reaſon* teach your Lordſhip this, I beg the Favour of your Lordſhip to tell me thoſe *due Meaſures of Reaſon*, that I may leave thoſe *undue Meaſures of Reaſon*, which I have hitherto follow'd in the interpreting the Senſe of the Scripture, whoſe Senſe it ſeems I ſhould have interpreted firſt, and underſtood the Signification of the words afterwards.

My Lord, I read the Revelation of the Holy Scripture with a full aſſurance, that all it delivers is true: And tho' this be a ſubmiſſion to the Writings of thoſe inſpir'd Authors, which I neither have, nor can have, for thoſe of any other Men; yet I uſe (and know not how to help it, till your Lordſhip ſhew me a better method in thoſe *due meaſures of Reaſon*, which you mention) the ſame way to interpret to my ſelf the *Senſe* of that Book, that I do of any other. Firſt, I endeavour to underſtand the Words and Phraſes of the Language I read it in, *i. e.* to *form Ideas* they ſtand for. If your Lordſhip means any thing elſe by *forming* Ideas *firſt*, I confeſs I underſtand it not. And if there be any Word or Expreſſion, which in that Author, or in that place of that Author, ſeems to have a peculiar meaning, *i. e.* to ſtand for an *Idea*, which is different from that, which the common uſe of that Language has made it a Sign of, that *Idea* alſo I endeavour to form in my Mind, by comparing this Author with himſelf, and obſerving the Deſign of his Diſcourſe, that ſo, as far as I can, by a ſincere Endeavour, I may have the ſame *Ideas* in every place when I read the Words, which the Author had when he writ them. But here, my Lord, I take care not to take thoſe for words of Divine Revelation, which are not the words of inſpired Writers: Nor think my ſelf concern'd with that Submiſſion to receive the Expreſſions of fallible Men, and to labour to find out their meaning, or, as your Lordſhip phraſes it, *interpret their Senſe*; as if they were the Expreſſions of the Spirit of God, by the Mouths or Pens of Men inſpir'd and guided by that infallible Spirit. This, my Lord, is the Method I uſe in *interpreting the Senſe* of the Revelation of the Scriptures; if your Lordſhip knows that I do otherwiſe, I deſire you to convince me of it: And if your Lordſhip does otherwiſe, I deſire you to ſhew me wherein your Method differs from mine, that I may reform upon ſo good a Pattern: For as for what you accuſe me of in the following words, it is that which either has no Fault in it, or if it has, your Lordſhip, I humbly conceive, is as guilty as I. Your words are,

P. 60. *I may pretend what I pleaſe, That I hold the Aſſurance of Faith, and the Certainty by* Ideas, *to go upon very different Grounds; but when a Propoſition is offer'd me out of Scripture to be believed, and I doubt about the Senſe of it, is not Recourſe to be made to my* Ideas? Give me leave, my Lord, with all Submiſſion, to return your Lordſhip the ſame words. Your Lordſhip *may pretend what you pleaſe, that you hold the Aſſurance of Faith, and the Certainty* of Knowledg to ſtand *upon different Grounds* (for I preſume your Lordſhip will not ſay, that believing and knowing ſtand upon the ſame Grounds, for that would, I think, be to ſay, That Probability and Demonſtration are the ſame thing) *but when a Propoſition is offer'd you out of Scripture to be believ'd, and you doubt about the Senſe of it, is not recourſe to be made to your Notions?* What, my Lord, is the difference here between your Lordſhip's and my way in the Caſe? I muſt have *recourſe to my* Ideas, and your Lordſhip muſt have *recourſe to your* Notions. For I think you cannot believe a Propoſition contrary to your own Notions; for then you would have the ſame, and different Notions, at the ſame time. So that all the difference between your Lordſhip and me, is, that we do both the ſame thing; only your Lordſhip ſhews a great Diſlike to my uſing the term *Idea*.

But

But the Inſtance your Lordſhip here gives, is beyond my Comprehenſion. You ſay, *A Propoſition is offer'd me* out of Scripture *to be believed, and I doubt about the Senſe of it.*——*As in the preſent Caſe, whether there can be three Perſons in one Nature, or two Natures and one Perſon.* My Lord, my Bible is faulty again; for I do not remember that I ever read in it either of theſe Propoſitions, in theſe preciſe words, *There are three Perſons in one Nature*, or, *There are two Natures and one Perſon.* When your Lordſhip ſhall ſhew me a Bible wherein they are ſo ſet down, I ſhall then think them a good Inſtance of *Propoſitions offer'd me out of Scripture*; till then, whoever ſhall ſay that they are Propoſitions in the Scripture, when there are no ſuch words, ſo put together, to be found in Holy Writ, ſeems to me to make a new Scripture in Words and Propoſitions, that the Holy Ghoſt dictated not. I do not here queſtion their Truth, nor deny that they may be drawn from the Scripture: But I deny that theſe very Propoſitions are in expreſs words in my Bible. For that is the only thing I deny here; if your Lordſhip can ſhew them me in your's, I beg you to do it. P. 60.

In the mean time, taking them to be as true as if they were the very words of Divine Revelation; the Queſtion then is, how muſt we *interpret the Senſe of them?* For ſuppoſing them to be Divine Revelation, to ask, as your Lordſhip here does, *what Reſolution* I, or any one, *can come to* about their Poſſibility, ſeems to me to involve a Contradiction in it. For whoever admits a Propoſition to be of Divine Revelation, ſuppoſes it not only to be poſſible, but true. Your Lordſhip's Queſtion then can mean only this, What Senſe can I, *upon my principles*, come to, of either of theſe Propoſitions, *but in the way of Ideas?* And I crave leave to ask your Lordſhip, what Senſe of them can your Lordſhip *upon your Principles come to, but in the way of* Notions? Which, in plain *Engliſh*, amounts to no more than this; That your Lordſhip muſt underſtand them according to the Senſe you have of thoſe Terms they are made up of, and I according to the Senſe I have of thoſe Terms. Nor can it be otherwiſe, unleſs your Lordſhip can take a Term in any Propoſition to have one Senſe, and yet underſtand it in another: And thus we ſee, that in effect Men have differently underſtood and interpreted the Senſe of theſe Propoſitions; whether they us'd *the way of Ideas* or not, *i. e.* whether they call'd what any word ſtood for *Notion*, or *Senſe*, or *Meaning*, or *Idea*.

I think my ſelf obliged to return your Lordſhip my Thanks, for the News you write me here, of one who has found *a ſecret way how the ſame Body may be in diſtant Places at once.* It making no part, that I can ſee, of the Reaſoning your Lordſhip was then upon, I can take it only for a piece of News: And the Favour was the greater, that your Lordſhip was pleas'd to ſtop your ſelf in the midſt of ſo ſerious an Argument as the *Articles of the Trinity and Incarnation*, to tell it me. And methinks 'tis pity that that Author had not us'd ſome of the words of my Book, which might have ſerv'd to have ty'd him and me together. For his *Secret* about a Body in two Places at once, which he *does keep up*, and *my Secret about Certainty, which your Lordſhip thinks had been better kept up too*, being all your words; bring me into his Company but very untowardly. If your Lordſhip would be pleas'd to ſhew, that *my Secret about Certainty* (as you think fit to call it) is falſe or erroneous, the World would ſee a good Reaſon why you ſhould *think it better kept up*; till then perhaps they may be apt to ſuſpect, that the Fault is not ſo much in my publiſh'd *Secret* about Certainty, as ſomewhere elſe. But ſince your Lordſhip *thinks it had been better kept up*, I promiſe that as ſoon as you ſhall do me the Favour to make publick a better Notion *of Certainty* than mine, I will by a publick Retraction call in mine: Which I hope your Lordſhip will do, for I dare ſay no Body will think it *good* or *friendly Advice* to your Lordſhip, if you have ſuch a *Secret*, that you ſhould *keep it up*. P. 61.

Your Lordſhip, with ſome Emphaſis, bids me *obſerve my own Words, that I here poſitively ſay*, "That the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it "doth not evidently know." *So that it is plain here, that I place Certainty only in evident Knowledg, or in clear and diſtinct* Ideas; *and yet my great Complaint of your Lordſhip was, That you charg'd this upon me, and now your Lordſhip finds it in my own words.* Anſw. My *own words*, in that place, are, *The mind is not certain of what it doth not evidently know*; but in them, or that Paſſage, as ſet down P. 63.

down by your Lordſhip, there is not the leaſt mention of *clear and diſtinct* Ideas: and therefore I ſhould wonder to hear your Lordſhip ſo ſolemnly call them *my own words*, when they are but what your Lordſhip would have to be a Conſequence of my words; were it not, as I humbly conceive, a way not unfrequent with your Lordſhip to ſpeak of that, which you think a Conſequence from any thing ſaid, as if it were the very thing ſaid. It reſts therefore upon your Lordſhip to prove, that *evident Knowledg* can be only where the *Ideas* concerning which it is, are perfectly clear and diſtinct. I am certain, that I have evident Knowledg, that the *Subſtance* of my Body and Soul exiſts, tho' I am as certain that I have but a very obſcure and confus'd *Idea* of any *Subſtance* at all: So that my Complaint of your Lordſhip, upon that account, remains very well founded, notwithſtanding any thing you alledg here.

P. 65. Your Lordſhip, *ſumming up the force of what you have ſaid*, adds, *That you have pleaded, (1.) That my Method of Certainty ſhakes the Belief of Revelation in general, (2.) That it ſhakes the Belief of particular Propoſitions or Articles of Faith, which depend upon the Senſe of Words contain'd in Scripture.*

That your Lordſhip has *pleaded*, I grant; but with Submiſſion, I deny that you have prov'd,

(1.) That my Definition of Knowledg, which is that which your Lordſhip calls my *Method of Certainty, ſhakes the Belief of Revelation in general.* For all that your Lordſhip offers for Proof of it, is only the alledging ſome other Paſſages out of my Book, quite different from that my Definition of Knowledg, which, you endeavour to ſhew, do ſhake the Belief of Revelation in general: But indeed have not, nor, I humbly conceive, cannot ſhew that they do any ways *ſhake the Belief of Revelation in general.* But if they did, it does not at all follow from thence, that my Definition of Knowledg; *i. e. my Method of Certainty*, at all *ſhakes the Belief of Revelation in general*, which was what your Lordſhip undertook to prove.

P. 65. (2.) As to the *ſhaking the Belief of particular Propoſitions or Articles of Faith, which depend*, as you here ſay, *upon the Senſe of Words*; I think I have ſufficiently clear'd my ſelf from that Charge, as will yet be more evident from what your Lordſhip here farther argues.

Your Lordſhip ſays, my placing *Certainty* in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, *ſhakes the Foundations* of the Articles of Faith [above-mention'd] *which depend upon the Senſe of Words contain'd in the Scripture*: And the reaſon your Lordſhip gives for it, is this, becauſe *I do not ſay we are to believe all that we find there expreſs'd*: My Lord, upon reading theſe words, I conſulted the *Errata*, to ſee whether the Printer had injur'd you: For I could not eaſily believe that your Lordſhip ſhould reaſon after a Faſhion, that would juſtify ſuch a concluſion as this, *viz.* Your Lordſhip, in your Letter to me, *does not ſay that we are to believe all that we find expreſs'd in Scripture*; therefore your Notion of Certainty ſhakes the Belief of this Article of Faith, that Jeſus Chriſt deſcended into Hell. This, I think, will ſcarce hold for a good Conſequence, till the *not ſaying* any Truth, be the denying of it: and then if my *not ſaying* in my Book, *That we are to believe all there expreſs'd*, be to deny, *That we are to believe all that we find there expreſs'd*, I fear many of your Lordſhip's Books will be found to *ſhake the Belief* of ſeveral or all the *Articles of our Faith.* But ſuppoſing this Conſequence to be good, *viz. I do not ſay*, therefore I deny, and thereby *I ſhake the Belief of ſome Articles of Faith*; how does this prove, That my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, ſhakes any Article of Faith? unleſs my ſaying, that Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, in the 301ſt Page of my Eſſay, be a Proof, that *I do not ſay*, in any other Part of that Book, *that we are to believe all that we find expreſs'd in Scripture.*

P. 65. But perhaps the remaining words of the Period will help us out in your Lordſhip's Argument, which all together ſtands thus: *Becauſe I do not ſay we are to believe all that we find there expreſs'd; but* [I do ſay] *in caſe we have any clear and diſtinct* Ideas, *which limit the Senſe another way than the words ſeem to carry it; we are to judg that to be the true Senſe.* My Lord, I do not remember where I ſay, what in the latter part of this Period your Lordſhip makes me ſay; and your Lordſhip would have done me a Favour to have quoted the place. Indeed

deed I do ſay, in the Chapter your Lordſhip ſeems to be upon, " That no " Propoſition can be receiv'd for Divine Revelation, or obtain the Aſſent due " to all ſuch, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledg." This is what I there ſay, and all that I there ſay: which in effect is this, That no Propoſition can be receiv'd for Divine Revelation, which is contradictory to a ſelf-evident Propoſition; and if that be it which your Lordſhip makes me ſay here in the foregoing words, I agree to it, and would be glad to know whether your Lordſhip differs in Opinion from me in it. But this not anſwering your purpoſe, your Lordſhip would, in the following words of this Paragraph, change ſelf-evident Propoſition into a Propoſition we *have attain'd Certainty of*, tho' *by imperfect* Ideas: In which Senſe the Propoſition your Lordſhip argues for as mine, will ſtand thus, That no Propoſition can be receiv'd for *Divine Revelation*, or obtain the Aſſent due to all ſuch, if it be contradictory to any Propoſition, of whoſe Truth we are by any way certain. And then I deſire your Lordſhip to name the two contradictory Propoſitions, the one of *Divine Revelation*, I do not *aſſent* to; the other, that *I have attain'd to a Certainty of by my imperfect* Ideas, which makes me reject, or not aſſent to that of Divine Revelation. The very ſetting down of theſe two contradictory Propoſitions, will be Demonſtration againſt me, and if your Lordſhip cannot (as I humbly conceive you cannot) name any two ſuch Propoſitions, 'tis an Evidence, that all this Duſt, that is rais'd, is only a great deal of talk about what your Lordſhip cannot prove: For that your Lordſhip has not yet prov'd any ſuch thing, I am humbly of Opinion I have already ſhewn. P. 65.

Your Lordſhip's Diſcourſe of *Des Cartes*, in the following Pages, is, I think, as far as I am concern'd in it, to ſhew, that Certainty cannot be had by *Ideas*; becauſe *Des Cartes* uſing the Term *Idea*, miſs'd of it. *Anſw.* The Queſtion between your Lordſhip and me, not being about *Des Cartes*'s, but my Notion of *Certainty*, your Lordſhip will put an end to my Notion of *Certainty* by *Ideas*, whenever your Lordſhip ſhall prove, That *Certainty* cannot be attain'd any way by the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, *i. e. by* Ideas; or that *Certainty* does not conſiſt in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*; or laſtly, when your Lordſhip ſhall ſhew us what elſe *Certainty* does conſiſt in. When your Lordſhip ſhall do either of theſe three, I promiſe your Lordſhip to renounce my *Notion*, or *Way*, or *Method*, or *Grounds* (or whatever elſe your Lordſhip has been pleas'd to call it) *of Certainty by* Ideas. P. 66—69.

The next Paragraph is to ſhew the Inclination your Lordſhip has *to favour me* in the words *it may be*. I ſhall be always ſorry to have miſtaken any one's, eſpecially your Lordſhip's *Inclination to favour me*: But ſince the Preſs has publiſh'd this to the World, the World muſt now be Judg of your Lordſhip's *Inclination to favour me*. P. 69, 70.

The three or four following Pages are to ſhew That your Lordſhip's Exception againſt *Ideas*, was not againſt the Term *Ideas*, and that I miſtook you in it. *Anſw.* My Lord, I muſt own that there are very few Pages of your Letters, when I come to examine what is the preciſe meaning of your words, either as making diſtinct Propoſitions, or a continu'd Diſcourſe, wherein I do not think my ſelf in danger to be miſtaken; but whether, in the preſent Caſe, one much more learned than I would not have underſtood your Lordſhip as I did, muſt be left to thoſe who will be at the Pains to conſider your words, and my Reply to them. Your Lordſhip ſaying, *As I have ſtated my Notion* Ideas, *it may be of dangerous Conſequence*; ſeem'd to me to ſay no more, but that my Book in general *might be of dangerous Conſequence*. This ſeeming too general an Accuſation, I endeavour'd to find what it was more particularly in it, which your Lordſhip *thought might be of dangerous Conſequence*. And the firſt thing I thought you excepted againſt, was the uſe of the Term *Idea*: But your Lordſhip tells me here, I was miſtaken, it was not the Term *Idea* you excepted againſt, *but the way of Certainty by* Ideas. To excuſe my Miſtake, I have this to ſay for my ſelf, that reading in your firſt Letter theſe expreſs words; *When new Terms are made uſe of by ill Men to promote Scepticiſm and Infidelity, and to overthrow the Myſteries of our Faith, we have then Reaſon to enquire into* them, *and to examine the Foundation and Tendency of* them; it could not be very ſtrange, if I underſtood *them* to refer to *Terms*: but it ſeems I was miſtaken, and ſhould have underſtood P. 70—74. Anſ. 1. p. 133. P. 72. Anſ. 1. p. 23.

ſtood by *Them*, *my way of Certainty by Ideas*, and ſhould have read your Lordſhip's words thus: *When new Terms are made uſe of by ill Men, to promote Scepticiſm and Infidelity, and to overthrow the Myſteries of Faith, we have then reaſon to enquire into* Them, *i. e.* Mr. *L*'s Definition of Knowledg, (for that is my way of Certainty by *Ideas*) *and then to examine the Foundation and Tendency of* Them, *i. e.* this Propoſition, *viz.* That Knowledg or Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*. *Them*, in your Lordſhip's words, as I thought (for I am ſcarce ever ſure what your Lordſhip means by *Them*) neceſſarily referring to what *ill Men made uſe of for the promoting of Scepticiſm and Infidelity*, I thought it had refer'd to *Terms*. *Why ſo?* ſays your Lordſhip: *your Quarrel*, you ſay, *was not with the term Ideas*. But that which *you inſiſted upon, was the way of Certainty by Ideas, and the new Terms as employ'd to that purpoſe*; and therefore 'tis that which your Lordſhip muſt be underſtood to mean, by what *ill Men make uſe of*, &c. Now I appeal to my Reader, whether I may not be excus'd, if I took *Them* rather to refer to *Terms*, a word in the plural Number preceding in the ſame Period, than to *way of Certainty by Ideas*, which is of the ſingular Number, and neither preceding, no nor ſo much as expreſs'd in the ſame Sentence? And if by my Ignorance in the uſe of the Pronoun *Them*, 'tis my misfortune to be often at a loſs in the underſtanding of your Lordſhip's Writing, I hope I ſhall be excus'd.

Another Excuſe for my underſtanding that one of the things in my Book which your Lordſhip *thought might be of dangerous Conſequence*, was the term *Idea*, may be found in theſe words of your Lordſhip: *But what need all this great noiſe about Ideas and Certainty, true and real Certainty by Ideas; if after all it comes only to this, That our Ideas only preſent to us ſuch things from whence we bring Arguments to prove the Truth of things? But the World hath been ſtrangely amus'd with Ideas of late; and we have been told, that ſtrange things might be done by the help of Ideas, and yet theſe Ideas at laſt come to be common Notions of things, which we muſt make uſe of in our Reaſoning.* I ſhall offer one Paſſage more for my excuſe, out of the ſame Page. I had ſaid in my Chapter about the Exiſtence of God, I thought it moſt proper to expreſs my ſelf in the moſt uſual and familiar way, by common Words and Expreſſions: *Your Lordſhip wiſhes I had done ſo quite thro' my Book; for then I had never given that occaſion to the Enemies of our Faith, to take up my new way of Ideas, as an effectual Battery (as they imagin'd) againſt the* Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith. *But I might have enjoy'd the Satisfaction of my Ideas long enough, before your Lordſhip had taken notice of them, unleſs you had found them employ'd in doing miſchief.* Thus this Paſſage ſtands in your Lordſhip's former Letter, tho' here your Lordſhip gives us but a part of it; and that part your Lordſhip breaks off into two, and gives us inverted and in other words. Perhaps thoſe who obſerve this, and better underſtand the Arts of Controverſy than I do, may find ſome skill in it. But your Lordſhip breaks off the former Paſſage at theſe words, *ſtrange things might be done by the help of Ideas*: and then adding theſe new ones, *i. e. as to matter of Certainty*, leave out thoſe which contain your wiſh, That *I had expreſs'd my ſelf in the moſt uſual way by common Words and Expreſſions quite thro' my Book*, as I had done in my Chapter of the Exiſtence of a God; *for then*, ſays your Lordſhip, *I had not given that occaſion to the Enemies of our Faith to take up my new way of Ideas, as an effectual Battery*, &c. which Wiſh of your Lordſhip's is, That I had all along left out the term *Idea*, as is plain from my Words which you refer to in your Wiſh, as they ſtand in my firſt Letter; *viz.* "I thought it moſt proper to expreſs my ſelf in the moſt uſual and familiar "way——by common Words and known ways of Expreſſion; and therefore, "as I think, I have ſcarce uſed the word *Idea* in that whole Chapter." Now I muſt again appeal to my Reader, whether your Lordſhip having ſo plainly wiſh'd that I had uſed *common Words and Expreſſions* in oppoſition to the term *Idea*, I am not excuſable if I took you to mean that Term? tho' your Lordſhip leaves out the Wiſh, and inſtead of it puts in, *i. e. as to matter of Certainty*, words which were not in your former Letter; tho' it be for miſtaking you in my Anſwer to that Letter, that you here blame me. I muſt own, my Lord, my Dulneſs will be very apt to miſtake you in Expreſſions ſeemingly ſo plain as theſe, till I can preſume my ſelf quick-ſighted enough to underſtand Mens

Meaning

Anſw. 1. p. 92, 93.

Anſw. 1. p. 93.

P. 72, 73.

P. 72.

Anſw. 1. p. 93.

Lett. 1. p. 127.

Meaning in their Writings not by their Expreſſions; which I confeſs I am not, and is an Art I find my ſelf too old now to learn.

But bare Miſtake is not all; your Lordſhip accuſes me alſo of Unfairneſs and Diſingenuity in underſtanding theſe words of your's, *The World has been ſtrangely amus'd with Ideas, and yet theſe Ideas at laſt come to be only common Notions of things*; as if in them your Lordſhip own'd *Ideas to be only common Notions of things*. To this, my Lord, I muſt humbly crave leave to anſwer, That there was no *Unfairneſs* or *Diſingenuity* in my ſaying your Lordſhip own'd *Ideas* for ſuch, becauſe I underſtood you to ſpeak in that place in your own ſenſe; and thereby to ſhew that the new term *Idea* need not be introduc'd, when it ſignify'd only the *common Notion of things*, *i. e.* ſignify'd no more than *Notion* doth, which is a more uſual word. This I took to be your meaning in that place; and whether I or any one might not ſo underſtand it, without deſerving to be told, That this is a way of *turning things upon your Lordſhip which you did not expect from me*, or ſuch a ſolemn Appeal as this, *Judg now how fair and ingenuous this Anſwer is*; I leave to any one, who will but do me the favour to caſt his eye on the Paſſage above-quoted, as it ſtands in your Lordſhip's own words in your firſt Letter. For I humbly beg leave to ſay, That I cannot but wonder to find, that when your Lordſhip is charging me with want of Fairneſs and Ingenuity, you ſhould leave out, in the quoting of your own words, thoſe which ſerv'd moſt to juſtify the Senſe I had taken them in, and put others in the ſtead of them. In your firſt Letter they ſtand thus: *But the World hath been ſtrangely amus'd with Ideas of late, and we have been told that ſtrange things might be done by the help of Ideas; and yet theſe Ideas at laſt come to be only common Notions of things, which we muſt make uſe of in our Reaſoning*; and ſo on, to the end of what is above ſet down: all which I quoted, to ſecure my ſelf from being ſuſpected *to turn things upon your Lordſhip*, in a ſenſe which your words (that the Reader had before him) would not bear: And in your ſecond Letter, in the place now under conſideration, they ſtand thus; *But the World hath been ſtrangely amus'd with Ideas of late, and we have been told that ſtrange things may be done with Ideas*, i. e. *as to matter of Certainty*: and there your Lordſhip ends. Will your Lordſhip give me leave now to uſe your own words, *Judg now how fair and ingenuous this is!* Words which I ſhould not uſe, but that I find them uſed by your Lordſhip in this very Paſſage, and upon this very Occaſion.

P. 71. P. 73. P. 73. Anſw. 1. p. 92, 93. Anſw. 1. p. 93. Lett. 1. p. 62. P. 73.

I grant my ſelf a mortal Man very liable to Miſtakes, eſpecially in your Writings: but that in my Miſtakes, I am guilty of any *Unfairneſs* or *Diſingenuity*, your Lordſhip will, I humbly conceive, pardon me, if I think it will paſs for want of *Fairneſs* and *Ingenuity* in any one, without clear Evidence, to accuſe me. To avoid any ſuch Suſpicion, in my firſt Letter I ſet down every word contain'd in thoſe Pages of your Book which I was concern'd in; and in my ſecond, I ſet down moſt of the Paſſages of your Lordſhip's firſt Anſwer that I reply'd to. But becauſe the doing it all along in this; would, I find, too much increaſe the Bulk of my Book; I earneſtly beg every one, who will think this my Reply worth his Peruſal, to lay your Lordſhip's Letter before him, that he may ſee whether in theſe Pages I direct my Anſwer to, without ſetting them down at large, there be any thing material unanſwer'd, or *unfairly* or *diſingenuouſly* repreſented.

P. 73.

Your Lordſhip, in the next words, gives a reaſon why I ought to have underſtood your words, as *a Conſequence of my Aſſertion*, and not *as your own Senſe*, viz. Becauſe *you all along diſtinguiſh the way of Reaſon, by deducing one thing from another, from my way of Certainty in the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas*. Anſw. I know your Lordſhip does *all along* talk of *Reaſon*, and *my way by Ideas*, as diſtinct or oppoſite: But this is the thing I have and do complain of, That your Lordſhip does ſpeak of them as diſtinct, without ſhewing wherein they are different, ſince the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, which is *my way of Certainty*, is alſo the way of Reaſon. For the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, is either by an immediate Compariſon of two *Ideas*, as in ſelf-evident Propoſitions; which way of Knowledg of Truth, is the way of Reaſon; or by the Intervention of intermediate *Ideas*, i. e. *by the Deduction of one thing from another*, which is alſo *the way of Reaſon*, as I have ſhewn; where I anſwer to your ſpeaking *of Certainty plac'd in good and ſound Reaſon*, and

Lett. 1. p. 128.

not in Ideas: In which place, as in ſeveral others, your Lordſhip oppoſes *Ideas* and *Reaſon*, which your Lordſhip calls here *diſtinguiſhing* them. But to continue to ſpeak frequently of two things as different, or of two ways as oppoſite, without ever ſhewing any difference or oppoſition in them, after it has been preſs'd for, is a way of Ingenuity which your Lordſhip will pardon to my Ignorance, if I have not formerly been acquainted with: and therefore, when you ſhall have ſhewn, that Reaſoning about *Ideas*, or by *Ideas*, is not the ſame way of Reaſoning, as that about or by *Notions* or *Conceptions*, and that what I mean by *Ideas* is not the ſame that your Lordſhip means by *Notions*; you will have
P. 73. ſome reaſon to blame me for miſtaking you in the Paſſages above-quoted.

For if your Lordſhip, in thoſe words, does not except againſt the term *Ideas*, but allows it to have the ſame Signification with *Notions*, or *Conceptions*, or *Apprehenſions*; then your Lordſhip's words will run thus: *But what need all this great noiſe about Notions, or Conceptions, or Apprehenſions?* and *the World has been ſtrangely amus'd with Notions, or Conceptions, or Apprehenſions of late:* which, whether it be that which your Lordſhip will own to be your meaning, I muſt leave to your Conſideration.

P. 74. Your Lordſhip proceeds to examine *my new Method of Certainty*, as you are pleas'd to call it.

To my asking *whether there be any other or older Method of Certainty*, your Lord-
P. 75. ſhip anſwers, *That is not the point; but whether mine be any at all: which your Lordſhip denies. Anſw.* I grant, to him that barely *denies* it to be *any at all*, it is *not the point*, whether there be any *older*; but to him that calls it *a new Method*, I humbly conceive it will not be thought wholly beſides *the point*, to ſhew an *older*; at leaſt, that it ought to have prevented theſe following words of your Lordſhip's, *viz.* That *your Lordſhip did never pretend to inform the World of new Methods:* which being in anſwer to my Deſire, that you would be pleas'd to ſhew me an older, or another Method, plainly imply, That your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, that whoever will inform the World of another *Method of Certainty* than mine, can do it only by *informing* them of *a new one*. But ſince this is the Anſwer your Lordſhip pleaſes to make to my Requeſt, I crave leave to conſider it a little.

Your Lordſhip having pronounc'd concerning my Definition of Knowledg, which you call *my Method of Certainty*, That *it might be of dangerous conſequence to*
Lett. 2. p. 87, 88. *an Article of the Chriſtian Faith*; I deſir'd you to ſhew in what Certainty lies: and deſir'd it of your Lordſhip by theſe preſſing Conſiderations, That it would ſecure that Article of Faith againſt any *dangerous Conſequence* from my way, and be a great ſervice to Truth in general. To which your Lordſhip replies here,
P. 75. *That you did never pretend to inform the World of* New *Methods; and therefore, are not bound to go any farther than what you found fault with, which was my new Method.*

Anſw. My Lord, I did not deſire any *new Method* of you, I obſerv'd your Lordſhip in more places than one, reflected on me for *writing out of my own Thoughts*: and therefore I could not expect from your Lordſhip what you ſo much condemn in another. Beſides, one of the faults you found with my Method, was, That it was *New*: And therefore if your Lordſhip will look again into
Lett. 2. p. 88. that Paſſage, where I deſire you to *ſet the World right in a thing of that great conſequence*, as it is to know wherein Certainty conſiſts; you will not find, that I mention any thing of a *new Method* of Certainty: my words were *another*, whether old or new, was indifferent. In truth, all that I requeſted, was only ſuch a *Method of Certainty*, as your Lordſhip approv'd of, and was ſecure in; and therefore I do not ſee how your *not pretending to inform the World in any new Methods*, can be any way alledg'd as a Reaſon for refuſing ſo uſeful and ſo charitable a thing.

P. 75. Your Lordſhip farther adds, That *you are not bound to go any farther, than what you found fault with. Anſw.* I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip means, That *you are not bound by the Law of Diſputation*; nor are you, as I humbly conceive, by this Law forbid: or if you were, the Law of the Schools could not diſpenſe with the eternal Divine Law of Charity. The Law of Diſputing, whence had it its ſo mighty a Sanction? It is at beſt but the Law of Wrangling, if it ſhut out the great Ends of Information and Inſtruction; and ſerves only to flatter a little guilty Vanity, in a Victory over an Adverſary leſs skilful in this Art of Fencing.

Who

Who can believe, that upon ſo ſlight an account your Lordſhip ſhould neglect your Deſign of writing againſt me? The great Motives of your Concern for an *Article of the Chriſtian Faith*, and of that *Duty* which you profeſs has made you do *what you have done*, will be believ'd to work more uniformly in your Lordſhip, than to let a Father of the Church, and a Teacher in *Iſrael*, not tell one who asks him, which is the right and ſafe way, if he knows it. No, no, my Lord, a Character ſo much to the prejudice of your Charity, no Body will receive of your Lordſhip; no, not from your ſelf: Whatever your Lordſhip may ſay, the World will believe, That you would have given a better *Method of Certainty*, if you had had one; when thereby you would have ſecur'd Men from the danger of running into Errors in *Articles of Faith*, and effectually have recall'd them from *my way of Certainty*, which leads, as your Lordſhip ſays, to *Scepticiſm* and *Infidelity*. For to turn Men from a way they are in, the bare telling them it is dangerous, puts but a ſhort Stop to their going on in it: There is nothing effectual to ſet them a-going right, but to ſhew them which is the ſafe and ſure way; a piece of Humanity, which when ask'd, no Body, as far as he knows, refuſes another; and this I have earneſtly ask'd of your Lordſhip.

Your Lordſhip *repreſents to me the Unſatisfactorineſs and Inconſiſtency* of my way of Certainty, by telling me, That *it ſeems ſtill a ſtrange thing to you, that I ſhould talk ſo much of a new Method of Certainty by Ideas; and yet allow, as I do, ſuch a want of Ideas, ſo much Imperfection in them, and ſuch a want of Connection between our Ideas, and the things themſelves. Anſw.* This Objection being ſo viſibly againſt the Extent of our Knowledg, and not the *Certainty* of it by *Ideas*, would need no other Anſwer but this, that it prov'd nothing to the Point; which was to ſhew, that *my way by Ideas*, was *no way to* Certainty *at all*; not to *true Certainty*, which is a Term your Lordſhip uſes here, which I ſhall be able to conceive what you mean by, when you ſhall be pleas'd to tell me what *falſe Certainty* is. P. 75. P. 76.

But becauſe what you ſay here, is in ſhort what you ground your Charge of *Scepticiſm* on, in your former Letter; I ſhall here, according to my Promiſe, conſider what your Lordſhip ſays there, and hope you will allow this to be no unfit Place.

Your Charge of *Scepticiſm*, in your former Letter, is as followeth. Anſw. 1. *p.* 125—131.

Your Lordſhip's firſt Argument conſiſts in theſe Propoſitions, *viz.*

1. That *I ſay*, p. 125. That Knowledg is the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*.

2. That *I go about to prove*, That there are very many more Beings, of which we have no *Ideas*, than thoſe of which we have; from whence your Lordſhip draws this Concluſion, *That we are excluded from attaining any Knowledg, as to the far greateſt part of the Univerſe*: which I agree to. But with Submiſſion, this is not the Propoſition to be prov'd, but this, *viz.* That *my way by Ideas*, or *my way of Certainty by Ideas*, for to that your Lordſhip reduces it; *i. e.* my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*; *leads to Scepticiſm.*

Farther, from my ſaying, that the intellectual World is greater and more beautiful certainly than the material, your Lordſhip argues, That if *Certainty* may be had *by general Reaſons without particular Ideas* in one, it may alſo *in other Caſes*. *Anſw.* It may, no doubt: But this is nothing againſt any thing I have ſaid; for I have neither ſaid, nor ſuppoſe, That *Certainty by general Reaſons*, or any Reaſons can be had without *Ideas*; no more than I ſay, or ſuppoſe, that we can reaſon without thinking, or think without immediate Objects of our Minds in thinking, *i. e.* think without *Ideas*. But your Lordſhip asks, *Whence comes this Certainty* (for I ſay certainly) *where there be no particular Ideas*, if Knowledg conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*? I anſwer, we have *Ideas* as far as we are certain; and beyond that, we have neither Certainty, no nor Probability. Every thing which we either know or believe, is ſome Propoſition: Now no Propoſition can be fram'd as the Object of our Knowledg or Aſſent, wherein two *Ideas* are not join'd to, or ſeparated from one another. As for Example, when I affirm that *ſomething exiſts in the World, whereof I have no Idea, Exiſtence* is affirm'd of ſomething, ſome Being: And I have as clear an Idea of *Exiſtence* and *Something*, the two things join'd in that Propoſition, as I have of them in this Propoſition, *Something exiſts in the World*, Anſw. 1. *p.* 126.

World, whereof I have an Idea. When therefore I affirm, that the intellectual World is greater and more beautiful than the material; whether I ſhould know the truth of this Propoſition, either by Divine Revelation, or ſhould aſſert it as highly probable (which is all I do in that Chapter, out of which this Inſtance is brought) it means no more but this, *viz.* That there are more, and more beautiful Beings, whereof we have no *Ideas*, than there are of which we have *Ideas*; of which Beings, whereof we have no *Ideas*, we can, for want of *Ideas*, have no farther Knowledg, but that ſuch Beings do exiſt.

Eſſay, B. 4. C. 3.

If your Lordſhip ſhall now ask me, how I know there are ſuch Beings; I anſwer, that in that Chapter *of the Extent of our Knowledg*, I do not ſay I know, but I endeavour to ſhew, that it is moſt highly probable: But yet a Man is capable of knowing it to be true, becauſe he is capable of having it reveal'd to him by God, that this Propoſition is true, *viz.* That in the Works of God there are more, and more beautiful Beings, whereof we have no *Ideas*, than there are whereof we have *Ideas*. If God, inſtead of ſhewing the very things to St. *Paul*, had only reveal'd to him, that this Propoſition was true, *viz.* That there were things in Heaven, *which neither Eye had ſeen, nor Ear had heard, nor had enter'd into the Heart of Man to conceive*; would he not have known the Truth of that Propoſition of whoſe Terms he had *Ideas*, viz. *of Beings*, whereof he had no other *Ideas*, but barely as ſomething, and of *Exiſtence*; tho' in the want of other *Ideas* of them, he could attain no other Knowledge of them, but barely that they exiſted? So that in what I have there ſaid, there is no Contradiction nor Shadow of a Contradiction, to my placing Knowledg in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*.

Eſſay, B. 4. C. 3.

But if I ſhould any where miſtake, and ſay any thing inconſiſtent with that way of Certainty of mine; how, I beſeech your Lordſhip, could you conclude from thence, that the placing Knowledg in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, *tends to Scepticiſm?* That which is the Propoſition here to be prov'd, would remain ſtill unprov'd: For I might ſay things inconſiſtent with this Propoſition, That *Knowledg conſiſts in the Perception of the Connection and Agreement or Diſagreement and Repugnancy of our Ideas*; and yet that Propoſition be true, and very far from *tending to Scepticiſm*, unleſs your Lordſhip will argue that every Propoſition that is inconſiſtent with what a Man any where ſays, *tends to Scepticiſm*; and then I ſhould be tempted to infer, that many Propoſitions in the Letters your Lordſhip has honour'd me with, will *tend to Scepticiſm.*

Anſw. 1. *p.* 125, 127.

Your Lordſhip's ſecond Argument is from my ſaying, "We have no *Ideas* of "the mechanical Affections of the minute Particles of Bodies, which hinders our "certain Knowledg of univerſal Truths concerning natural Bodies:" from whence your Lordſhip concludes, *That ſince we can attain to no Science, as to Bodies or Spirits, our Knowledg muſt be confin'd to a very narrow compaſs.* I grant it; but I crave leave to mind your Lordſhip again, that this is not the Propoſition to be prov'd: A little Knowledg is ſtill *Knowledg*, and not *Scepticiſm.* But let me have affirm'd our Knowledg to be comparatively very little; how, I beſeech your Lordſhip, does that any way prove, that this Propoſition, "Knowledg "conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Ideas*," any ways *tends to Scepticiſm?* which was the Propoſition to be prov'd. But the Inference your Lordſhip ſhuts up this Head with, in theſe Words: *So that all Certainty is given up in the way of Knowledg, as to the viſible and inviſible World, or at leaſt the greateſt part of them*; ſhewing in the firſt part of it what your Lordſhip ſhould have infer'd, and was willing to infer, does at laſt by theſe Words in the Cloſe, *Or at leaſt the greateſt part of* Them, I gueſs, come juſt to nothing: I ſay, I gueſs; for what *Them*, by Grammatical Conſtruction, is to be refer'd to, ſeems not clear to me.

Anſw. 1. *p.* 127.

Anſw. 1. *p.* 128.

Your third Argument being juſt of the ſame kind with the former, only to ſhew, That I reduce our Knowledg to a very narrow Compaſs, in reſpect of the whole Extent of *Beings*; is already anſwered.

Anſw. 1. *p.* 129.

In the fourth place your Lordſhip ſets down ſome words of mine concerning *Reaſoning* and *Demonſtration*; and then concludes, *But if there be no way of coming to Demonſtration but this, I* doubt *we muſt be content without it.* Which being nothing but a Declaration of your *Doubt*, is, I grant, a very ſhort way of proving

proving any Propoſition; and I ſhall leave to your Lordſhip the Satisfaction your have in ſuch a Proof, ſince I think it will ſcarce convince others.

In the laſt place, your Lordſhip argues, That becauſe I ſay, that the *Idea* in the Mind proves not the Exiſtence of that thing whereof it is an *Idea*, therefore we cannot know the actual Exiſtence of any thing by our Senſes: becauſe we know nothing, but by the perceiv'd Agreement of *Ideas*. But if you had been pleas'd to have conſider'd my Anſwer there to the *Scepticks*, whoſe Cauſe you here ſeem, with no ſmall vigour, to manage; you would, I humbly conceive, have found that you miſtake one thing for another, *viz.* The *Idea* that has by a former Senſation been lodg'd in the Mind, for actually receiving any *Idea*, i. e. *actual Senſation*; which, I think, I need not go about to prove are two diſtinct things, after what you have here quoted out of my Book. Now the two *Ideas*, that in this caſe are perceiv'd to agree, and do thereby produce Knowledg, are the *Idea* of *actual Senſation* (which is an Action whereof I have a clear and diſtinct *Idea*) and the *Idea* of *actual Exiſtence* of ſomething without me that cauſes that Senſation. And what other Certainty your Lordſhip has by your Senſes of the exiſting of any thing without you, but the perceiv'd Connection of thoſe two *Ideas*, I would gladly know. When you have deſtroy'd this Certainty, which I conceive is the utmoſt, as to this matter, which our infinitely Wiſe and Bountiful Maker has made us capable of in this ſtate; your Lordſhip will have well aſſiſted the *Scepticks* in carrying their Arguments againſt Certainty by Senſe, beyond what they could have expected. Anſw. 1. p. 129—131.

I cannot but fear, my Lord, that what you have ſaid here in favour of *Scepticiſm*, againſt Certainty by Senſe (for it is not at all againſt me, till you ſhew we can have no *Idea* of actual Senſation) without the proper Antidote annex'd, in ſhewing wherein that Certainty conſiſts (if the account I give be not true) after you have ſo ſtrenuouſly endeavour'd to deſtroy what I have ſaid for it; will, by your Authority, have laid no ſmall Foundation of *Scepticiſm*: which they will not fail to lay hold of, with advantage to their Cauſe, who have any Diſpoſition that way. For I deſire any one to read this your fifth Argument, and then judg which of us two is a Promoter of *Scepticiſm*; I who have endeavour'd, and, as I think, prov'd Certainty by our Senſes; or your Lordſhip, who has (in your Thoughts at leaſt) deſtroy'd theſe Proofs, without giving us any other to ſupply their place. All your other Arguments amount to no more but this; That I have given Inſtances to ſhew, that the Extent of our Knowledg, in compariſon of the whole Extent of *Being*, is very little and narrow: which, when *your Lordſhip writ your Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, were *very fair and ingenuous Confeſſions of the Shortneſs of Human Underſtanding, with reſpect to the Nature and Manner of ſuch things, which we are moſt certain of the Being of, by conſtant and undoubted Experience*: Tho' ſince you have ſhew'd your diſlike of them in more places than one, particularly *p.* 33. and again more at large, *p.* 43. and at laſt you have thought fit to repreſent them as Arguments for *Scepticiſm*. And thus I have acquitted my ſelf, I hope, to your Lordſhip's Satisfaction, of my Promiſe to anſwer your Accuſation of *a Tendency to Scepticiſm*. Vindic. p. 244. Anſ. 1. p. 33. Ib. p. 43—45.

But to return to your ſecond Letter, where I left off. In the following Pages you have another Argument to prove *my way of Certainty to be none, but to lead to Scepticiſm*: which, after a ſerious peruſal of it, ſeems to me to amount to no more but this, That *Des Cartes* and I go both in *the way of Ideas*, and we differ; *Ergo*, the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, is no way of Certainty, but leads to *Scepticiſm*: which is a Conſequence I cannot admit, and I think is no better than this; Your Lordſhip and I differ, and yet we both go *in the ways of Ideas*; *Ergo*, the placing of Knowledg in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, is *no way of Certainty at all, but leads to Scepticiſm*. P. 76—78.

Your Lordſhip will perhaps think I ſay more than I can juſtify, when I ſay your Lordſhip goes in the *way of Ideas*; for you will tell me, you do not place *Certainty* in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*. *Anſw.* No more does *Des Cartes*; and therefore, in that reſpect, he and I went no more *in the* ſame *way of Ideas*, than your Lordſhip and I do. From whence it follows, That how much ſoever he and I may differ in other Points, our difference is no more an Argument againſt this Propoſition, That Knowledg or Cer-

Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, than your Lordſhip's and my Difference in any other Point, is an Argument againſt the Truth of that my Definition of Knowledg, or that it *tends to Scepticiſm.*

But you will ſay, That *Des Cartes* built his Syſtem of Philoſophy upon Ideas; and ſo I ſay does your Lordſhip too, and every one elſe as much as he, that has any Syſtem of that or any other part of Knowledg. For Ideas are nothing but the immediate Objects of our Minds in thinking; and your Lordſhip, I conclude, in building your Syſtem of any part of Knowledg, thinks on ſomething; and therefore you can no more *build*, or have any *Syſtem* of Knowledg without Ideas, than you can think without ſome immediate Objects of thinking. Indeed, you do not ſo often uſe the word *Ideas* as *Des Cartes* or I have done; but uſing the things ſignify'd by that Term as much as either of us (unleſs you can think without an immediate Object of thinking) your's alſo *is the way of Ideas*, as much as his or mine. Your condemning the *way of Ideas*, in thoſe general Terms, which one meets with ſo often in your Writings on this occaſion, amounts at laſt to no more but an Exception againſt a poor Sound of three Syllables, tho' your Lordſhip thinks fit not to own that you have any Exception to it.

If, beſides this, theſe ten or twelve Pages have any other Argument in them, which I have not ſeen, I humbly deſire you would be pleas'd to put it into a Syllogiſm, to convince my Reader that I have ſilently paſs'd by an Argument of Importance; and then I promiſe an Anſwer to it: And the ſame Requeſt and Promiſe I make to your Lordſhip, in reference to all other Paſſages in your Letter, wherein you think there is any thing of moment unanſwer'd.

P. 87. Your Lordſhip comes to anſwer what was in my former Letter, to ſhew, that what you had ſaid concerning Nature and Perſon, was to me and ſeveral others, whom I had talk'd with about it, hard to be underſtood. To this
P. 87—103. purpoſe the ſixteen next Pages are chiefly employ'd, to ſhew what *Ariſtotle* and others have ſaid about φύσις and *Natura*, a *Greek* and a *Latin* Word; neither of which is the *Engliſh* Word *Nature*, nor can concern it at all, till it be prov'd that *Nature* in *Engliſh* has, in the propriety of our Tongue, pre-
P. 92, & 96. ciſely the ſame Signification that φύσις had among the *Greeks*, and *Natura* among the *Romans*. For would it not be pretty harſh to an *Engliſh* Ear, to ſay with *Ariſtotle*, That *Nature* is a *corporeal Subſtance*, or a *corporeal Subſtance is Nature?* to inſtance but in this one, among thoſe many various Senſes which your Lordſhip proves he us'd the term φύσις in: or with *Anaximander*,
P. 96. That *Nature is Matter*, or *Matter Nature?* or with *Sextus Empericus*, That
P. 98. *Nature is a Principle of Life*, or a *Principle of Life is Nature? So* that tho' *the Philoſophers of old of all kinds* did underſtand the Senſe of the terms φύσις and *Natura*, in the Languages of their Countries; yet it does not follow,
P. 99. what you would here conclude from thence, that they underſtood the proper Signification of the term *Nature* in *Engliſh*. Nor has an *Engliſh* Man any more need to conſult thoſe *Grecians* in their uſe of the Sound φύσις, to know what *Nature* ſignifies in *Engliſh*; than thoſe *Grecians* had need to conſult our Writings, or bring Inſtances of the uſe of the word *Nature* in *Engliſh* Authors, to juſtify their uſing of the term φύσις in any Senſe they had us'd it in
P. 99, 100. *Greek*. The like may be ſaid of what is brought out of the *Greek Chriſtian* Writers; for I think an *Engliſh* Man could ſcarce be juſtify'd in ſaying in *Engliſh*, That the *Angels* were *Natures*, becauſe *Theodoret* and St. *Baſil* calls them φύσεις. *To theſe, I think, there might be added other Senſes, wherein the word*
P. 102. φύσις *may be found made uſe of by the* Greeks, *which are not taken notice of by your Lordſhip: As particularly* Ariſtotle, *if I miſtake not, uſes it for a Plaſtick Power, or a kind of* Anima Mundi, *preſiding over the material World, and producing the Order and Regularity of Motions, Formations and Generations in it.*

Indeed your Lordſhip brings a Proof from an Authority that is proper in the Caſe, and would go a great way in it; for it is of an *Engliſh* Man, who, writing of *Nature*, gives an account of the Signification of the word *Nature* in *Engliſh*. But the miſchief is, that among eight Significations of the word *Nature*, which he gives, that is not to be found, which you quote him for, and had need of. For he ſays not that *Nature* in *Engliſh* is us'd for *Subſtance*; which is the Senſe your Lordſhip has us'd it in, and would juſtify by the Authority of that *ingenious and honourable Perſon*: and to make

it

it out, you tell us, *Mr.* Boyle *ſays the word Eſſence is of great affinity to Nature, if not of an adequate import*; to which your Lordſhip adds, *But the real Eſſence of a thing is a Subſtance.* So that, in fine, the Authority of this excellent Perſon and Philoſopher amounts to thus much, that he ſays that *Nature* and *Eſſence* are two Terms that have a great affinity; and you ſay, that *Nature* and *Subſtance* are two Terms that have a great affinity. For the learned Mr. *Boyle* ſays no ſuch thing, nor can it appear, that he ever thought ſo, till it can be ſhewn, that he has ſaid that *Eſſence* and *Subſtance* have the ſame Signification.

I humbly conceive, it would have been a ſtrange way in any body but your Lordſhip, to have quoted an Author for ſaying that *Nature* and *Subſtance* had the ſame Signification, when one of thoſe Terms, *viz. Subſtance*, he does not, upon that occaſion ſo much as name. But your Lordſhip has this Privilege, it ſeems, to ſpeak of your Inferences as if they were other Mens Words, whereof I think I have given ſeveral Inſtances; I am ſure I have given one, where you ſeem to ſpeak of *clear and diſtinct Ideas* as my Words, when they are only your Words, there infer'd from my Words *evident Knowledg*: and other the like Inſtances might be produc'd, were there any need. P. 63.

Had your Lordſhip produc'd Mr. *Boyle's* Teſtimony, That *Nature*, in our Tongue, had the ſame Signification with *Subſtance*, I ſhould preſently have ſubmitted to ſo great an Authority, and taken it for proper *Engliſh*, and a clear way of expreſſing one's ſelf, to uſe *Nature* and *Subſtance* promiſcuouſly one for another. But ſince, I think, there is no Inſtance of any one who ever did ſo, and therefore it muſt be a new, and conſequently no very clear way of ſpeaking; give me leave, my Lord, to wonder, why in all this Diſpute about the term *Nature*, upon the clear and right underſtanding whereof, you lay ſo much ſtreſs, you have not been pleas'd to define it: which would put an end to all Diſputes about the meaning of it, and leave no Doubtfulneſs, no Obſcurity in your uſe of it, nor any room for any Diſpute what you mean by it. This would have ſav'd many Pages of Paper, tho' perhaps it would have made us loſe your learned Account of what the Ancients have ſaid concerning φύσις, and the ſeveral Acceptations they us'd it in.

All the other Authors, *Greek* and *Latin*, your Lordſhip has quoted, may, for ought I know, have us'd the terms φύσις and *Natura*, properly in their Languages; and have diſcours'd very clearly and intelligibly about what thoſe Terms in their Countries ſignify'd. But how that proves there were no Difficulties in the Senſe or Conſtruction in that Diſcourſe of your's, concerning *Nature*, which I and thoſe I conſulted upon it, did not underſtand; is hard to ſee. Your Lordſhip's Diſcourſe was obſcure, and too difficult then for me, and ſo I muſt own it is ſtill. Whether my Friend be any better enlighten'd by what you have ſaid to him here, out of ſo many ancient Authors, I am too remote from him at the writing of this to know, and ſo ſhall not trouble your Lordſhip with any Converſation, which perhaps, when we meet again, we may have upon it.

The next Paſſage of your Vindication, which was complain'd of to be very hard to be underſtood, was this, where you ſay, *That you grant that by Senſation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of things; but our Reaſon is ſatisfy'd that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe, becauſe it is impoſſible they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. So that the nature of things properly belongs to our Reaſon, and not to mere Ideas.* To rectify the miſtake had been made in my firſt Letter, p. 157. in taking *Reaſon* here to mean the Faculty of Reaſon, you tell me, *I might eaſily have ſeen, that by Reaſon your Lordſhip underſtood Principles of Reaſon allow'd by Mankind.* To which it was reply'd, That then this Paſſage of your's muſt be read thus, *viz.* That *your Lordſhip grants that by Senſation and Reflection we come to know the Properties of things; but our Reaſon*, i. e. the Principles of Reaſon allow'd by Mankind, *are ſatisfy'd that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe; becauſe it is impoſſible they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. So that the Nature of things properly belongs to our Reaſon*, i. e. to the Principles of Reaſon allow'd by Mankind, *and not to mere Ideas*; "which "made it ſeem more unintelligible than it was before." Vindic. p. 253. Anſ. 1. p. 101. Lett. 2. p. 125, 126.

To the Complaint was made of the Unintelligibleneſs of this Paſſage in this laſt Senſe given by your Lordſhip, you anſwer nothing. So that we [*i. e.* my Friends whom I conſulted and I] are ſtill excuſable, if not underſtanding what is ſignify'd by theſe Expreſſions; *The Principles of Reaſon allow'd by Mankind are ſatisfy'd*, and *the Nature of Things properly belongs to the Principles of Reaſon allow'd by Mankind*; we ſee not the *Connection* of the Propoſitions here ty'd together by the words *ſo that*, which was the thing complain'd of in theſe
Lett.2.p.121. words, *viz.* "That the Inference here, both for its Connection and Expreſſion "ſeem'd hard to be underſtood;" and more to the ſame purpoſe, which your Lordſhip takes no notice of.

Indeed your Lordſhip repeats theſe words of mine, "That in both Senſes "of the word *Reaſon*, either taken for a Faculty, or for *the Principles of Reaſon* "*allow'd by Mankind*, Reaſon and *Ideas* may conſiſt together:" and then ſub-
P. 105. joins, That *this leads your Lordſhip to the Examination of that which may be of ſome uſe*, viz. *To ſhew the Difference of my Method of Certainty by* Ideas, *and the Method of Certainty by Reaſon.* Which how it any way juſtifies your oppoſing *Ideas* and *Reaſon*, as you here, and elſewhere often do; or ſhews, that *Ideas* are inconſiſtent *with the Principles of Reaſon allow'd by Mankind*; I leave to the Reader to judg. Your Lordſhip, for the clearing of what you had ſaid in your *Vindication*, &c. from Obſcurity and Unintelligibleneſs, which were complain'd of in it, is to prove, that *Ideas* are inconſiſtent with *the Principles of Reaſon allow'd by Mankind*; and in anſwer to this, you ſay, you *will ſhew the difference of my Method of Certainty by* Ideas, *and the Method of Certainty by Reaſon.*

My Lord, as I remember, the Expreſſion in queſtion was not, *That the Nature of Things properly belongs to our Reaſon, and not to my Method of Certainty by* Ideas; but this, *That the Nature of Things belongs to our Reaſon, and not to mere* Ideas. So that the thing you were here to ſhew, was, That Reaſon, *i. e. the Principles of Reaſon allow'd by Mankind*, and *Ideas*, and not the *Principles of Reaſon*; and *my Method of Certainty by* Ideas, *cannot conſiſt together*. For the *Principles of Reaſon allow'd by Mankind*, and *Ideas*, may conſiſt together; tho' perhaps, *my Method of Certainty by* Ideas, ſhould prove inconſiſtent with thoſe *Principles*. So that if all that you ſay, from this to the 153d Page, *i. e.* forty eight Pages, were as clear Demonſtration, as I humbly conceive it is the contrary; yet it does nothing to clear the Paſſage in hand, but leaves that part of your Diſcourſe, concerning *Nature*, lying ſtill under the Objection was made againſt it, as much as if you had not ſaid one word.

But ſince I am not unwilling that my Method of Certainty ſhould be examin'd, and I ſhould be glad (if there be any Faults in it) to learn the Defects of that my Definition of Knowledg, from ſo great a Maſter as your Lordſhip; I will conſider what you here ſay, *to ſhew the Difference of my Method of Certainty by* Ideas, *and the Method of Certainty by Reaſon.*

P. 105. Your Lordſhip ſays, *That the way of Certainty by Reaſon lies in two things:*

1. *The Certainty of Principles.*
2. *The Certainty of Deductions.*

I grant, that a part of that which is call'd *Certainty of Reaſon*, lies in the Certainty of Principles; which *Principles*, I preſume, your Lordſhip and I are agreed, are ſeveral Propoſitions.

If then theſe Principles are Propoſitions, to ſhew the Difference between your Lordſhip's *way of Certainty by Reaſon*, and my *way of Certainty by* Ideas; I think it is viſible, that you ought to ſhew wherein the Certainty of thoſe Propoſitions conſiſts in your *way by Reaſon*, different from that wherein I make it conſiſt in *my way by* Ideas. As for example: Your Lordſhip and I are agreed, that this Propoſition, *Whatſoever is, is*; is a Principle of Reaſon, or a *Maxim*. Now *my way of Certainty by* Ideas, is, that the *Certainty* of this Propoſition conſiſts in this, that there is a perceivable Connection or Agreement between the *Idea* of *Being* and the *Idea* of *Being*, or between the *Idea* of *Exiſtence* and the *Idea* of *Exiſtence*, as is expreſs in that Propoſition. But now, in your *way of Reaſon*, pray wherein does the Certainty of this Propoſition conſiſt? If it be in any thing different from that perceivable Agreement of the *Ideas*, affirm'd of one another in it, I beſeech your Lordſhip to tell it me; if not, I beg leave to conclude, that your *way of Certainty by Reaſon*, and *my way of Certainty by* Ideas, in this caſe are juſt the ſame.

But

But inſtead of ſaying any thing, to ſhew wherein the *Certainty of Principles* is different, in the way of Reaſon, from the *Certainty of Principles* in the way of *Ideas*, upon my Friend's ſhewing, that you had no Ground to ſay as you did, that *I had no* Idea *of Reaſon*, as it ſtands for Principles of Reaſon; your Lordſhip takes occaſion (as, what will not, in a skilful Hand, ſerve to introduce any thing one has a mind to?) to tell me, *What* Ideas *I have of* them *muſt appear from my Book, and you do there find a Chapter of ſelf-evident Propoſitions and Maxims, which you cannot but think extraordinary for the Deſign of it, which is thus ſumm'd in the Concluſion*, viz. *That it was to ſhew*, "That theſe Maxims, as they are of little uſe, where we have clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, ſo they are of dangerous uſe, where our *Ideas* are not clear and diſtinct." *And is not this a fair way to convince your Lordſhip, that my way of* Ideas *is very conſiſtent with the Certainty of Reaſon, when the way of Reaſon hath been always ſuppos'd to proceed upon general Principles, and I aſſert them to be uſeleſs and dangerous?* P. 106. B. 4. c. 7. §. 2.

In which words I crave leave to obſerve,

1. That the Pronoun *Them* here, ſeems to have reference to *ſelf-evident Propoſitions*, to *Maxims*, and to *Principles*, as Terms us'd by your Lordſhip and me; tho' it be certain, that you and I uſe them in a far different Senſe: For, if I miſtake not, you uſe them all three promiſcuouſly one for another; whereas 'tis plain, that in that Chapter, out of which you bring your Quotations here, I diſtinguiſh ſelf-evident Propoſitions from thoſe, which I there mention under the name of Maxims, which are principally theſe two, *Whatſoever is, is*; and *it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be.* Farther, it is plain, out of the ſame place, that by Maxims I there mean general Propoſitions, which are ſo univerſally receiv'd under the name of Maxims or Axioms, that they are look'd upon as innate; the two chief whereof, principally there meant, are thoſe above-mention'd: But what the Propoſitions are which you comprehend under *Maxims*, or *Principles of Reaſon*, cannot be determin'd, ſince your Lordſhip neither defines nor enumerates them; and ſo 'tis impoſſible, preciſely, to know what you mean by *them* here: And that which makes me more at a loſs, is, That in this Argument, you ſet down for Principles or Maxims, Propoſitions that are not ſo much as ſelf-evident, *viz.* this, *That the eſſential Properties of a Man, are to reaſon and diſcourſe*, &c. Eſſay, B. 4. c. 7. P. 108.

2. I crave leave to obſerve, that you tell me, that in my Book *you find a Chapter of ſelf-evident Propoſitions and Maxims*, whereas I find no ſuch Chapter in my Book: I have in it indeed a Chapter of *Maxims*, but never an one entitled, *Of ſelf-evident Propoſitions and Maxims.* This, 'tis poſſible, your Lordſhip will call *a nice Criticiſm*; but yet it is ſuch an one, as is very neceſſary in the Caſe: For in that Chapter I, as is before obſerv'd, expreſsly diſtinguiſh *ſelf-evident Propoſitions* from *the receiv'd Maxims or Axioms*, which I there ſpeak of: Whereas it ſeems to me to be your Deſign (in joining them in a Title of a Chapter, contrary to what I had done) to have it thought, that I treated of them as one and the ſame thing; and ſo all that I ſaid there, of the Uſeleſsneſs of ſome few general Propoſitions, under the Title of *receiv'd Maxims*, might be apply'd to all *ſelf-evident Propoſitions*; the quite contrary whereof was the Deſign of that Chapter. For that which I endeavour to ſhew there, is, That all our Knowledg is not built on thoſe few receiv'd general Propoſitions, which are ordinarily call'd *Maxims* or *Axioms*; but that there are a great many Truths may be known without them: But that there is any Knowledg, without ſelf-evident Propoſitions, I am ſo far from denying, that I am accus'd by your Lordſhip for requiring in Demonſtration, more ſuch than you think are neceſſary. This ſeems, I ſay, to be your Deſign; and I wiſh your Lordſhip, by entitling my Chapter, as I my ſelf did, and not as it would beſt ſerve your turn, had not made it neceſſary for me to make this *nice Criticiſm.* This is certain, that without thus confounding *Maxims* and *ſelf evident Propoſitions*, what you here ſay would not ſo much, as in appearance, concern me: For,

3. I crave leave to obſerve, That all the Argument your Lordſhip uſes here againſt me to prove, that my way of Certainty by *Ideas*, is inconſiſtent with the *way of Certainty by Reaſon, which lies in the Certainty of Principles*, is this; *That the way of Reaſon hath been alway ſuppos'd to proceed upon general Principles, and I aſſert* them *to be uſeleſs and dangerous.* Be pleas'd, my Lord, to define or enumerate

enumerate your *general Principles*, and then we ſhall ſee whether *I aſſert* them *to be uſeleſs and dangerous*, and whether they, who *ſuppos'd the way of Reaſon was to proceed upon general Principles*, differ'd from me; and if they did differ, whether their's was more the way of Reaſon than mine: But to talk thus of *general Principles, which have always been ſuppos'd the way of Reaſon*, without telling ſo much as which, or what they are, is not ſo much as by Authority to ſhew, that my way of Certainty by *Ideas*, is *inconſiſtent with the way of Certainty by Reaſon*; much leſs is it in reality to prove it. Becauſe admitting I had ſaid any thing contrary to what, as you ſay, *has been always ſuppos'd*, its being ſuppos'd, proves it not to be true; becauſe we know that ſeveral things have been for many Ages generally *ſuppos'd*, which at laſt, upon examination, have been found not to be true.

What *hath been always ſuppos'd*, is fit only for your Lordſhip's great Reading to declare, But ſuch Arguments, I confeſs, are wholly loſt upon me, who have not Time or Occaſion to examine what has *always been ſuppos'd*; eſpecially in thoſe Queſtions which concern Truths, that are to be known from the nature of things: Becauſe, I think, they cannot be eſtabliſh'd by Majority of Votes, not eaſy to be collected; nor if they were collected, can convey Certainty till it can be *ſuppos'd*, that the greater part of Mankind are always in the right. In Matters of Fact, I own we muſt govern our ſelves by the Teſtimonies of others; but in Matters of Speculation, *to ſuppoſe on*, as *others have ſuppos'd* before us, is ſuppos'd by many to be only a way to learned Ignorance, which enables to talk much, and know but little. The Truths, which the Penetration and Labours of others before us have diſcover'd and made out, I own we are infinitely indebted to them for; and ſome of them are of that Conſequence, that we cannot acknowledg too much the Advantages we receive from thoſe great Maſters in Knowledg: But where they only *ſuppos'd*, they left it to us to ſearch, and advance farther. And in thoſe things, I think, it becomes our Induſtry to imploy it ſelf, for the Improvement of the Knowledg, and adding to the Stock of Diſcoveries left us by our inquiſitive and thinking Predeceſſors.

4. One thing more I crave leave to obſerve, *viz.* That to theſe words, "Theſe Maxims, as they are of little uſe where we have clear and diſtinct "*Ideas*, ſo they are of dangerous uſe where our *Ideas* are not clear and diſtinct," P. 106. quoted out of my *Eſſay*; you ſubjoin, *And is not this a fair way to convince your Lordſhip, that my way of* Ideas *is very conſiſtent with the Certainty of Reaſon?* Anſw. My Lord, my *Eſſay*, and thoſe words in it, were writ many Years before I dreamt that you or any body elſe would ever queſtion the Conſiſtency of *my way of Certainty by* Ideas, *with the way of Certainty by Reaſon*; and ſo could not be intended to convince your Lordſhip in this point: And ſince you firſt ſaid, that theſe two ways are inconſiſtent, I never brought thoſe words *to convince you, That my way is conſiſtent with the Certainty of Reaſon:* and therefore why you ask, whether that *be a fair way to convince you*, which was never made uſe of as any *way to convince you* of any ſuch thing, is hard to imagine.

But your Lordſhip goes on in the following words with the like kind of Argument, where you tell me that I ſay, "That my firſt Deſign is to prove, that P. 106, 107. Eſſay, B. 4. c. 7. §. 4. "the Conſideration of thoſe general Maxims adds nothing to the Evidence or "Certainty of Knowledg;" which, ſays your Lordſhip, *overthrows all that which hath been accounted Science and Demonſtration, and muſt lay the Foundation of Scepticiſm; becauſe our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon ſome general Principle of Reaſon. To make this plain, you ſay, you will put a Caſe grounded upon my words; which are, That* I have diſcourſed with very rational Men, who have actually deny'd that they are Men. *Theſe words* J. S. *underſtands as ſpoken of themſelves, and charges them with very ill Conſequences; but you think they are capable of another meaning: However*, ſays your Lordſhip, *let us put the Caſe, That Men did in earneſt queſtion, whether they were Men or not; and then you do not ſee, if I ſet aſide general Maxims, how I can convince them that they are Men. For the way your Lordſhip looks on as moſt apt to prevail upon ſuch extraordinary ſceptical Men, is by general Maxims and Principles of Reaſon.*

Anſw. I can neither in that Paragraph nor Chapter find that I ſay, *That my firſt Deſign is to prove, that theſe general Maxims* [*i. e.* thoſe which your Lordſhip

ſhip calls general Principles of Reaſon] *add nothing to the Evidence and Certainty of Knowledg* in general: for ſo theſe words muſt be underſtood, to make good the Conſequence which your Lordſhip charges on them, *viz. That they overthrow all that has been accounted Science and Demonſtration, and lay the Foundation of Scepticiſm.*

What *my Deſign* in that place is, is evident from theſe words in the foregoing Paragraph; "Let us conſider whether this Self-evidence be peculiar only "to thoſe Propoſitions, which are receiv'd for Maxims, and have the Dignity "of Axioms allowed: and here 'tis plain, that ſeveral other Truths, not al- "low'd to be Axioms, partake equally with them in this Self-evidence." Which ſhews that my Deſign there, was to evince that there were Truths that are not call'd Maxims, that are as ſelf-evident as thoſe receiv'd Maxims. Purſuant to this *Deſign*, I ſay, "That the Conſideration of theſe Axioms [*i. e.* whatſoever is, is; and it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be] "can add nothing to the Evidence and Certainty of its [*i. e.* the Mind's] "Knowledg;" [*i. e.* of the Truth of more particular Propoſitions concerning Identity.] Theſe are my words in that place, and that the Senſe of them is according to the Limitation annexed to them between thoſe Crotchets, I refer my Reader to that fourth Section; where he will find that all that I ſay amounts to no more but what is expreſs'd in theſe words, in the cloſe of it: "I appeal "to every one's own Mind, whether this Propoſition, *A Circle is a Circle*, be not "as ſelf-evident a Propoſition, as that conſiſting of more general Terms, "*Whatſoever is, is:* And again, whether this Propoſition, *Blue is not Red*, be "not a Propoſition that the Mind can no more doubt of, as ſoon as it under- "ſtands the words, than it does of that Axiom, *It is impoſſible for the ſame thing "to be, and not to be:* and ſo of all the like." And now I ask your Lordſhip, whether you do affirm of this, That *it overthrows all that which hath been counted Science and Demonſtration, and muſt lay the Foundation of Scepticiſm?* If you do, I ſhall deſire you to prove it; if you do not, I muſt deſire you to conſider how fairly my Senſe has been repreſented.

Eſſay, B. 4. C. 7. §. 3.

§. 4.

But ſuppoſing you had repreſented my Senſe right, and that the little or dangerous uſe which I there limit to certain Maxims, had been meant of all *Principles of Reaſon* in general, in your Senſe; what had this been, my Lord, to the Queſtion under debate? Your Lordſhip undertakes to ſhew, That your way of Certainty by Reaſon is different from my way of Certainty by *Ideas*. To do this, you ſay in the preceding Page, *That Certainty by Reaſon lies*, 1. *In Certainty of Principles*; 2. *In Certainty of Deductions*. The firſt of theſe you are upon here; and if in order to what you had undertaken, your Lordſhip had ſhewn, That in your way by Reaſon, thoſe Principles were certain; but in my way by *Ideas*, we could not attain to any Certainty concerning them: this indeed had been to ſhew a difference between my way of Certainty, which you call the *way by Ideas*; and your's, which you call the *way by Reaſon*; in this part of Certainty, that lies in the *Certainty of Principles*. I have ſaid in the words quoted by your Lordſhip, That the Conſideration of thoſe two Maxims, *What is, is*; and *it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*; are not of uſe to add any thing to the Evidence or Certainty of our Knowledg of the Truth of Identical Predications; but I never ſaid thoſe Maxims were in the leaſt uncertain: I may perhaps think otherwiſe of their uſe than your Lordſhip does, but I think no otherwiſe of their Truth and Certainty than you do; they are left in their full Force and Certainty for your uſe, if you can make any better uſe of them, than what I think can be made. So that in reſpect of the allowed Certainty of thoſe Principles, my way differs not at all from your Lordſhip's.

P. 105.

Pray, my Lord, look over that Chapter again, and ſee whether I bring their Truth and Certainty any more into queſtion, than you your ſelf do; and 'tis about their *Certainty*, and not Uſe, that the Queſtion here is between your Lordſhip and me: We both agree, That they are both undoubtedly certain; all then that you bring in the following Pages about their Uſe, is nothing to the preſent Queſtion about the *Certainty of Principles*, which your Lordſhip is upon in this place: and you will prove, That your way of *Certainty by Reaſon*, is different from *my way of Certainty by Ideas*; when you can ſhew, That you are certain

of

of the Truth of thoſe, or any other *Maxims*, any otherwiſe than by the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas* as expreſs'd in them.

But your Lordſhip, paſſing by that wholly, endeavours to prove, that my ſaying, That the Conſideration of thoſe two general Maxims can add nothing to the Evidence and Certainty of Knowledg in Indentical Predications, (for that is all that I there ſay) *overthrows all that has been accounted Science and Demonſtration, and muſt lay the Foundation of Scepticiſm*; and 'tis by a very remarkable Proof, viz. *Becauſe our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon ſome general Principles of Reaſon*: which is the very thing I there not only deny, but have diſprov'd; and therefore ſhould not, I humbly conceive, have been reſted on as a Proof of any thing elſe, till my Arguments againſt it had been anſwer'd.

P. 107. But inſtead of that, your Lordſhip ſays, you will put a Caſe that ſhall make it plain; which is the Buſineſs of the ſix following Pages, which are ſpent in this Caſe.

The Caſe is founded upon a Suppoſition, which you ſeem willing to have thought that you borrow'd either from *J. S.* or from me: whereas, truly that Suppoſition is neither that Gentleman's nor mine, but purely your Lordſhip's own. For however groſly Mr. *J. S.* has miſtaken (which he has ſince acknowledg'd in print) the obvious Senſe of thoſe Words of my *Eſſay*, on which you ſay *you ground your Caſe?* yet I muſt do him right herein, that he himſelf ſuppos'd not, that any Man in his Wits ever *in earneſt queſtion'd whether he himſelf were a Man or no*: tho' by a miſtake (which I cannot but wonder at, in one ſo much exercis'd in Controverſy as Mr. *J. S.*) he charg'd me with ſaying it.

B. 4. c. 7. §. 17.

P. 107. Your Lordſhip indeed ſays, *That you think my Words there may have another Meaning.* Would you thereby inſinuate, That you think it poſſible they ſhould have that Meaning which *J. S.* once gave them? If you do not, my Lord, Mr. *J. S.* and his *underſtanding them ſo*, is in vain brought in here to countenance your making ſuch a Suppoſition. If you do think thoſe Words of my *Eſſay* capable of ſuch a Meaning as *J. S.* gave them, there will appear a ſtrange Harmony between your Lordſhip's and Mr. *J. S*'s Underſtanding, when he miſtakes what is ſaid in my Book; whether it will continue, now Mr. *J. S.* takes me right, I know not: but let us come to the Caſe as you put it. Your Words are,

P. 107. *Let us put the Caſe, That Men did in earneſt queſtion whether they were Men or not.* Your Lordſhip ſays, *You do not then ſee, if I ſet aſide general Maxims, how I can convince them that they are Men. Anſw.* And do you, my Lord, ſee that with *Maxims* you can convince them of that or any Thing elſe? I confeſs, whatever you ſhould do, I ſhould think it ſcarce worth while to reaſon with them about any thing. I believe you are the firſt that ever ſuppos'd a Man ſo much beſide himſelf, as to queſtion whether he were a Man or no, and yet ſo rational, as to be thought capable of being convinc'd of that or any thing by Diſcourſe of Reaſon. This, methinks, is little different from ſuppoſing a Man in and out of his Wits at the ſame time.

But let us ſuppoſe your Lordſhip ſo lucky with your Maxims, that you do convince a Man (that doubts of it) that he is a Man; what Proof, I beſeech you, my Lord, is that of this Propoſition, *That our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon ſome general Principles of Reaſon?*

On the contrary, ſuppoſe it ſhould happen, as is the more likely, that your ſetting upon him with your *Maxims*, cannot convince him; are we not by this your Caſe to take this for a Proof, That *general Principles of Reaſon are not the Grounds of Certainty?* For 'tis upon the Succeſs, or not Succeſs of your Endeavours to convince ſuch a Man with Maxims, that your Lordſhip puts the Proof of this Propoſition, *That our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon general Principles of Reaſon*; the Iſſue whereof muſt remain in ſuſpenſe, till you have found ſuch a Man to bring it to trial: and ſo the Proof is far enough off, unleſs you think the Caſe ſo plain, that every one ſees ſuch a Man will be preſently convinc'd by your Maxims, tho' I ſhould think it probable that moſt People may think he will not.

P. 107. Your Lordſhip adds, *For the way you look on as moſt apt to prevail upon ſuch extraordinary ſceptical Men, is by general Maxims and Principles of Reaſon.* Anſw. This indeed is a Reaſon why your Lordſhip ſhould uſe *Maxims*, when you have to do with *ſuch extraordinary ſceptical Men*; becauſe *you look on it as the likelieſt*

way

way to prevail. But pray, my Lord, is your *looking on it as the beſt way to prevail on ſuch extraordinary ſceptical Men*, any Proof, That *our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon ſome general Principles of Reaſon?* for 'twas *to make this plain*, that this *Caſe* was *put*.

Farther, my Lord, give me leave to ask, what have we here to do with the ways of convincing others of what they do not know or aſſent to? Your Lordſhip and I are not, as I think, diſputing of the *Methods* of *perſuading* others of what they are ignorant of, and do not yet aſſent to; but our Debate here, is about the Ground of *Certainty* in what they do know and aſſent to.

However, you go on to ſet down ſeveral *Maxims*, which you look on as moſt apt to prevail upon your *extraordinary ſceptical Man*, to *convince* him, that he exiſts, and that he is a Man. The Maxims are, P. 107, 108.

That nothing can have no Operation. P. 108.

That all different ſorts of Being are diſtinguiſhed by eſſential Properties.

That the eſſential Properties of a Man, are to reaſon, diſcourſe, &c.

That theſe Properties cannot ſubſiſt by themſelves, without a real Subſtance.

I will not queſtion whether a Man cannot know that he exiſts, or be certain (for 'tis of Knowledg and Certainty the queſtion here is) that he is a Man, without the help of theſe Maxims. I will only crave leave to ask, how you know that theſe are *Maxims?* For methinks this, *That the eſſential Properties of a Man are Reaſon, Diſcourſe,* &c. an imperfect Propoſition, with *and ſo forth* at the end of it, is a pretty ſort of Maxim. That therefore which I deſire to be informed here, is, how your Lordſhip knows theſe, or any other Propoſitions to be *Maxims*; and how Propoſitions, that are *Maxims*, are to be diſtinguiſh'd from Propoſitions that are not *Maxims?* And the Reaſon why I inſiſt upon it, is this: Becauſe this, and this only, would ſhew, whether what I have ſaid in my Chapter about *Maxims*, *overthrows all that has been accounted Science and Demonſtration, and lays the Foundation of Scepticiſm.* But I fear my Requeſt, That you would be pleas'd to tell me what you mean by *Maxims*, that I may know what Propoſitions, according to your Lordſhip, are, and what are not *Maxims*, will not eaſily be granted me: becauſe it would preſently put an end to all that you impute to me as ſaid in that Chapter againſt Maxims, in a ſenſe that I uſe not the word there.

Your Lordſhip makes me, out of my Book, anſwer to the uſe you make of the four above-mentioned Propoſitions, which you call *Maxims*, as if I were declar'd of an Opinion, That *Maxims* could not be of any uſe in arguing with others: which methinks you ſhould not have done, if you had conſider'd my Chapter of *Maxims*, which you ſo often quote. For I there ſay, "Maxims "are uſeful to ſtop the Mouths of Wranglers——to ſhew, That wrong Opi- "nions lead to Abſurdities, *&c.*" P. 109. Eſſay, B. 4. C. 7. §. 11.

Your Lordſhip nevertheleſs goes on to prove, That *without the help of theſe Principles or* Maxims, *I cannot prove to any that doubt it, that they are Men, in my way of Ideas. Anſw.* I beſeech you, my Lord, to give me leave to mind you again, that the Queſtion is not what I can prove; but whether, in my way by *Ideas*, I cannot without the Help of *theſe Principles* know that I am a Man; and be certain of the Truth of that, and ſeveral other Propoſitions: I ſay, of ſeveral other Propoſitions; for I do not think you, in your *way of Certainty by Reaſon*, pretend to be certain of all Truths; or to be able to prove (to thoſe who doubt) all Propoſitions, or ſo much as be able to *convince* every one of the Truth of every Propoſition, that you your ſelf are certain of. There be many Propoſitions in Mr. *Newton's* excellent Book, which there are thouſands of People, and thoſe a little more rational than ſuch as ſhould deny themſelves to be Men, whom Mr. *Newton* himſelf would not be able, with or without the uſe of *Maxims* uſed in Mathematicks, to *convince* of the Truth of: And yet this would be no Argument againſt his Method of Certainty, whereby he came to the Knowledg that they are true. What therefore you can conclude, as to *my way of Certainty*, from a Suppoſition of my not being able, in my way by *Ideas*, to *convince* thoſe who doubt of it, that they are Men, I do not ſee. But your Lordſhip is reſolved to prove that I cannot, ſo you go on. P. 109.

Your Lordſhip ſays, That *I ſuppoſe that we muſt have a* clear and diſtinct Idea *of that we are certain of*; and this you prove out of my *Chapter of Maxims*, where P. 110.

I ſay, " That every one knows the *Ideas* that he has, and that diſtinctly and " unconfuſedly one from another." *Anſw.* I ſuſpected all along, that you miſtook what I meant by confus'd *Ideas*. If your Lordſhip pleaſes to turn to my Eſſay, B. 2. C. 29. §. 4, 5, 6. Chapter *of diſtinct and confus'd Ideas*, you will there find, that an *Idea*, which is diſtinguiſh'd in the Mind from all others, may yet be confus'd: the Confuſion being made by a careleſs Application of diſtinct Names to *Ideas*, that are not ſufficiently diſtinct. Which having explain'd at large, in that Chapter, I ſhall not need here again to repeat. Only permit me to ſet down an Inſtance: He that has the *Idea* of the Liquor that, circulating thro' the Heart of a Sheep, keeps that Animal alive, and he that has the *Idea* of the Liquor that circulates thro' the Heart of a Lobſter, has two different *Ideas*; as diſtinct as an *Idea* of an aqueous, pellucid, cold Liquor, is from the *Idea* of a red, opake, hot Liquor: but yet theſe two may be confounded, by giving the name Blood to this vital circulating Liquor of a Lobſter.

This being conſider'd, will ſhew how what I have ſaid there may conſiſt with my ſaying, That to Certainty, Ideas are not requir'd, that are in all their Parts perfectly clear and diſtinct: becauſe Certainty being ſpoken there of the Knowledg of the Truth of any Propoſition; and Propoſitions being made in Words, it may be true, That notwithſtanding all the Ideas we have in our Minds, are, as far as we have them there, clear and diſtinct; yet thoſe which we would ſuppoſe the Terms in the Propoſition to ſtand for, may not be clear and diſtinct: Either:

1. By making the Term ſtand for an uncertain Idea, which we have not yet preciſely determined in our Minds, whereby it comes to ſtand ſometimes for one Idea, ſometimes for another. Which tho', when we reflect on them, they are diſtinct in our Minds, yet by this uſe of a Name undetermin'd in its Signification, come to be confounded. Or,

2. By ſuppoſing the Name to ſtand for ſomething more than really is in the Idea in our Minds, which we make it a Sign of, *v. g.* let us ſuppoſe, That a Man many Years ſince, when he was young, ate a Fruit, whoſe Shape, Size, Conſiſtency and Colour, he has a perfect remembrance of; but the particular Taſte he has forgot, and only remembers, that it very much delighted him. This complex Idea, as far as it is in his Mind, 'tis evident, is there; and as far as he perceives it, when he reflects on it, is in all its Parts clear and diſtinct: but when he calls it a *Pine-Apple*, and will ſuppoſe, that Name ſtands for the ſame preciſe complex Idea, for which another Man (who newly ate of that Fruit, and has the Idea of the Taſte of it alſo freſh in his Mind) uſes it, or for which he himſelf uſed it, when he had the Taſte freſh in his Memory; 'tis plain his complex Idea in that part, which conſiſts in the Taſte, is very obſcure.

P. 110. To apply this to what your Lordſhip here makes me ſuppoſe, I anſwer,

1. I do not ſuppoſe, That to Certainty it is requiſite, that an Idea ſhould be in all its Parts clear and diſtinct. I can be certain, that a *Pine-Apple* is not an Artichoak, tho' my Idea, which I ſuppoſe that Name to ſtand for, be in me obſcure and confus'd, in regard of its Taſte.

2. I do not deny, but on the contrary, I affirm, That I can have a clear and diſtinct Idea of a Man (*i. e.* the Idea I give the name Man to, may be clear and diſtinct) tho' it ſhould be true, that Men are not yet agreed on the determin'd Idea, that the name Man ſhall ſtand for. Whatever Confuſion there may be in the Idea, to which that Name is indeterminately apply'd; I do allow and affirm, That every one, if he pleaſes, may have a clear and diſtinct Idea of a *Man* to himſelf, *i. e.* which he makes the Word *Man* ſtand for: which, if he makes known to others in his Diſcourſe with them about *Man*, all verbal Diſpute will ceaſe, and he cannot be miſtaken when he uſes the Term *Man*, and if this were but done with moſt of the glittering Terms brandiſh'd in Diſputes, it would often be ſeen how little ſome Men have to ſay, who with equivocal Words and Expreſſions, make no ſmall Noiſe in Controverſy.

P. 114. Your Lordſhip concludes this Part by ſaying, *Thus you have ſhewed how inconſiſtent my way of Ideas is with true Certainty*, and of *what uſe and Neceſſity theſe general Principles of Reaſon are*. *Anſw.* By the Laws of Diſputation, which

which in another place you expreſs ſuch a regard to, one is *bound* not to change the Terms of the Queſtion. This I crave leave humbly to offer to your Lordſhip, becauſe, as far as I have look'd into Controverſy, I do not remember to have met with any one ſo apt, ſhall I ſay, to forget or change the Queſtion as your Lordſhip. This, my Lord, I ſhould not venture to ſay, but upon very good Grounds, which I ſhall be ready to give you an account of, whenever you ſhall demand it of me. One Example of it we have here: you ſay, *You have ſhew'd how inconſiſtent my way of Ideas is with true Certainty, and of what Uſe and Neceſſity theſe general Principles of Reaſon are.* My Lord, if you pleaſe to look back to the 105th Page, you will ſee what you there promis'd, was to *ſhew the Difference of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reaſon:* And particularly in the Pages between that and this, the *Certainty of Principles*, which you ſay is one of thoſe *two things, wherein the way of Certainty by Reaſon lies.* Inſtead of that, your Lordſhip concludes here, that you have ſhew'd two things: P. 112.

1. *How inconſiſtent my way of Ideas is with true Certainty.* Whereas it ſhould be *to ſhew the Inconſiſtency or Difference of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reaſon*; which are two very different Propoſitions. And before you undertake to ſhew, That my *Method of Certainty is inconſiſtent with* true *Certainty*; it will be neceſſary for you to define, and tell us wherein *true Certainty conſiſts*, which your Lordſhip hitherto has ſhewn no great Forwardneſs to do.

2. Another thing which you ſay you have done, is, That you have *ſhewn of what Uſe and Neceſſity* theſe *general Principles of Reaſon are. Anſw.* Whether by theſe *general Principles* you mean thoſe Propoſitions which you ſet down, p. 108. and call there *Maxims*, or any other Propoſitions which you have not any where ſet down, I cannot tell. But whatſoever they are, that you mean here by *theſe*, I know not how the Uſefulneſs of *theſe* your *general Principles*, be they what they will, came to be a Queſtion between your Lordſhip and me here. If you have a mind to ſhew any Miſtakes of mine in my Chapter of *Maxims*, which, you ſay, *you think extraordinary for the Deſign of it*, I ſhall not be unwilling to be rectify'd; but that the Uſefulneſs of Principles is not what is here under debate between us, I, with Submiſſion, affirm. That which your Lordſhip is here to prove, is, That the Certainty of Principles, which is the way of Certainty by Reaſon, is different from my way of Certainty by Ideas. Upon the whole, I crave leave to ſay in your Words, That *thus I have*, I humbly conceive, made it appear, that you have not *ſhew'd any Difference, much leſs any Inconſiſtency of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reaſon*, in that firſt part, which you aſſign *of Certainty* by *Reaſon*, viz. *Certainty of Principles.*

I come now to the ſecond part, which you aſſign of *Certainty by Reaſon*, viz. *Certainty of Deductions.* I only crave leave firſt to ſet down theſe Words in the latter end of your Diſcourſe, which we have been conſidering, where your Lordſhip ſays, *You begin to think* J. S. *was in the right, when he made me ſay*, "That I had diſcours'd with very rational Men who deny'd *themſelves* "to be Men." *Anſw.* I do not know what may be done by thoſe who have ſuch a Command over the Pronouns *They* and *Them*, as to put *they themſelves* for *they.* I ſhall therefore deſire my Reader to turn to that Paſſage of my Book, and ſee whether he too can be ſo lucky as your Lordſhip, and can with you *begin to think*, that by theſe Words, "Who have actually deny'd, that *they*, i. e. Infants and Changelings, are Men;" I meant, *who actually deny'd that* they themſelves *were Men.* P. 105. Eſſay, B. 4. C. 7. §. 17.

Your Lordſhip, to prove my *Method of Certainty by Ideas to* be different from, and inconſiſtent with your ſecond Part *of the Certainty by Reaſon*, which, you ſay, *lies in the Certainty of Deductions*, begins thus: *That you come now to the Certainty of Reaſon, in making Deductions; and here you ſhall briefly lay down the Grounds of Certainty, which the antient Philoſophers went upon, and then compare my way of Ideas with them.* To which give me leave, my Lord, to reply; (1.) That, I humbly conceive, it ſhould have been *Grounds of Certainty* [in making Deductions] *which the antient Philoſophers went upon*; or elſe they will be nothing to the Propoſition, which your Lordſhip has undertaken here to P. 114.

prove. Now of the Certainty in making Deductions, I ſee none of the Antients produc'd by your Lordſhip, who ſay any thing to ſhew, wherein it
P. 116. conſiſts, but *Ariſtotle*; who, as you ſay, in his Method *of inferring one thing from another, went upon this common Principle of Reaſon, that what things agree in a third, agree among themſelves.* And it ſo falls out, That ſo far as he goes towards the ſhewing wherein the *Certainty of Deductions* conſiſts, he and I agree,
B.4.C.2.§.2. as is evident by what I ſay in my Eſſay. And if *Ariſtotle* had gone any far-
&C.17.§.15. ther to ſhew, how we are certain, that thoſe two things agree with a third, he would have plac'd that Certainty in the Perception of that Agreement, as I have done, and then he and I ſhould have perfectly agreed. I preſume to ſay, if *Ariſtotle* had gone farther in this matter, he would have plac'd our Knowledg or Certainty of the Agreement of any two things in the Perception of their Agreement. And let not any one from hence think, I attribute too much to my ſelf in ſaying, That that acute and judicious Philoſopher, if he had gone farther in that matter, would have done as I have done. For if he omitted it, I imagine it was not that he did not ſee it, but that it was ſo obvious and evident, that it appear'd ſuperfluous to name it. For who can doubt that the Knowledge, or being certain, that any two things agree, conſiſts in the perception of their Agreement? What elſe can it poſſibly conſiſt in? It is ſo obvious, that it would be a little extraordinary to think, that he that went ſo far could miſs it. And I ſhould wonder, if any one ſhould allow the *Certainty of Deduction* to conſiſt in the Agreement of two things in a third, and yet ſhould deny that the Knowledg or Certainty of that Agreement conſiſted in the Perception of it.

(2.) In the next place, my Lord, ſuppoſing my Method of Certainty, in making Deductions, were different from thoſe of the Antients; this, at beſt,
Eſſay, B. 4. would be only, that which I call, *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*; which proves
C. 17. §. 19. not on which ſide Reaſon is, tho' I, in Modeſty, ſhould anſwer nothing to their Authorities.

(3.) The Antients, as it ſeems by your Lordſhip, not agreeing one among another about the Grounds of Certainty; what can their Authorities ſignify in the Caſe? or, how will it appear, that I differ from Reaſon, in differing from any of them more than that they differ from Reaſon, in differing one from another? And therefore, after all the different Authorities produc'd by you out of your great meaſure of reading, the matter will at laſt reduce it ſelf to this Point, That your Lordſhip ſhould tell us wherein *the Certainty of Reaſon, in making Deductions*, conſiſts; and then ſhew wherein my *Method of making Deductions*, differs from it: which, whether you have done or no, we ſhall ſee in what follows.

Your Lordſhip cloſes your very Learned, and to other Purpoſes very Uſeful, Account of the Opinions of the Antients, concerning Certainty, with
P. 120. theſe Words; *That thus you have, in as few Words as you could, laid together thoſe old Methods of Certainty, which have obtain'd greateſt Reputation in the World.* Whereupon I muſt crave leave to mind you again, That the Propoſition you are here upon, and have undertaken to prove in this place, is concerning the *Certainty of Deductions*, and not concerning *Certainty* in general. I ſay not this, that I am willing to decline the Examination of *my Method of Certainty* in general, any way, or in any place: But I ſay it to obſerve, that in Diſcourſes of this nature, the Laws of Diſputation have wiſely order'd the Propoſition under debate, to be kept to, and that in the ſame Terms, to avoid Wandring, Obſcurity and Confuſion.

I therefore proceed now to conſider what uſe your Lordſhip makes of the Antients, againſt *my way of Certainty in general*; ſince you think fit to make no uſe of them, as to *the Certainty of Reaſon in making Deductions*: tho' it is under this your ſecond Branch *of Certainty by Reaſon*, that you bring them in.

P. 120. Your firſt Objection here, is that old one again, That *my way of Certainty by Ideas is new. Anſw.* Your calling of it *New*, does not prove it to be different
Ibid. from *that of Reaſon*: But your Lordſhip proves it to be *New*:

1. *Becauſe here* [i. e. in my way] *we have no general Principles. Anſw.* I do, as your Lordſhip knows, own the Truth and Certainty of the receiv'd gene-

ral

ſal Maxims; and I contend for the Uſefulneſs and Neceſſity of ſelf-evident Propoſitions in all Certainty, whether of Inſtitution or Demonſtration. What therefore thoſe *general Principles* are, which *you have not* in my way of Certainty by Ideas, which your Lordſhip has in your way of Certainty by Reaſon, I beſeech you to tell, and thereby to make good this Aſſertion againſt me.

2. Your Lordſhip ſays, *That here* [i. e. in my way] *we have no Antecedents and Conſequents, no ſyllogiſtical Methods of Demonſtration. Anſw.* If your Lordſhip here means, That there be no *Antecedents and Conſequents* in my Book, or that I ſpeak not, or allow not of *Syllogiſm* as a Form of Argumentation, that has its uſe, I humbly conceive the contrary is plain. But if by *here we have no Antecedents and Conſequents, no ſyllogiſtical Methods of Demonſtration*, you mean, That I do not place Certainty, in *having Antecedents and Conſequents*, or in making of *Syllogiſms*, I grant I do not; I have ſaid Syllogiſms inſtead of your Words, *Syllogiſtical Methods of Demonſtration*; which examin'd, amount here to no more than *Syllogiſms*: For *ſyllogiſtical Methods* are nothing but *Mode and Figure*, i. e. *Syllogiſms*; and the Rules of *Syllogiſms* are the ſame, whether the *Syllogiſms* be us'd in Demonſtration or in Probability. But 'twas convenient for you to ſay, *Syllogiſtical Methods of Demonſtration*, if you would have it thought, that Certainty is plac'd in it: For to have nam'd bare *Syllogiſm*, without annexing *Demonſtration* to it, would have ſpoil'd all, ſince every one, who knows what Syllogiſm is, knows it may as well be us'd in topical or fallacious Arguments, as in *Demonſtration*. P. 120.

Your Lordſhip charges me then, That *in my way by Ideas*, I do not place Certainty, in having *Antecedents and Conſequents*. And pray, my Lord, do you in your *way by Reaſon* do ſo? If you do, this is certain, That every body has, or may have *Certainty* in every thing he diſcourſes about: For every one, in any Diſcourſe he makes, has, or may, if he pleaſes, have *Antecedents and Conſequents*.

Again, your Lordſhip charges me, That I do not place *Certainty in Syllogiſm*. I crave leave to ask again, And does your Lordſhip? And is this the difference between your way of Certainty by Reaſon, and my way of Certainty by Ideas? Why elſe is it objected to me, That I do not, if your Lordſhip does not, place *Certainty in Syllogiſm?* And if you do, I know nothing ſo requiſite, as that you ſhould adviſe all People, Women and all, to betake themſelves immediately to the Univerſities, and to the learning of Logick; to put themſelves out of the dangerous State of *Scepticiſm*: For there young Lads, by being taught *Syllogiſm*, arrive at Certainty; whereas, without Mode and Figure, the World is in perfect Ignorance and Uncertainty, and is ſure of nothing. The Merchant cannot be certain that his Account is right caſt up, nor the Lady that her Coach is not a Wheel-barrow, nor her Dairy-maid that one and one Pound of Butter are two Pounds of Butter, and two and two four; and all for want of Mode and Figure: Nay, according to this Rule, whoever liv'd before *Ariſtotle*, or him, whoever it was, that firſt introduc'd *Syllogiſm*, could not be certain of any thing; no, not that there was a God, which will be the preſent State of the far greateſt part of Mankind (to paſs by whole Nations of the Eaſt, as *China* and *Indoſtan*, &c.) even in the Chriſtian World, who to this day have not the *Syllogiſtical Methods of Demonſtration*, and ſo cannot be certain of any thing.

3. Your Lordſhip farther ſays, That in *my way of Certainty by Ideas we have no Criterion. Anſw.* To perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, and not to perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, is, I think, a Criterion to diſtinguiſh what a Man is *certain* of, from what he is not *certain* of. Has your Lordſhip any other or better *Criterion* to diſtinguiſh Certainty from Uncertainty? If you have, I repeat again my earneſt Requeſt, That you would be pleas'd to do that Right to your *way of Certainty by Reaſon*, as not to conceal it. If your Lordſhip has not, why is the want of a *Criterion*, when I have ſo plain a one, objected to my way of Certainty, and my way ſo often accus'd of a Tendency to *Scepticiſm* and *Infidelity*, when you your ſelf have not a better? And I think I may take the liberty to ſay, if your's be not the ſame, you have not one ſo good.

Perhaps your Lordſhip will cenſure me here, and think it is more than becomes me, to preſs you ſo hard concerning your own way; and to ask, whether your way of Certainty lies in having *Antecedents* and *Conſequents*, and *Syllogiſms*; and whether it has any other or better *Criterion*, than what I have given: Your Lordſhip will poſſibly think it enough, that you have *laid down the Grounds of Certainty which the ancient* Grecians *went upon*. My Lord, if you think ſo, I muſt be ſatisfy'd with it: tho' perhaps others will think it ſtrange, that in a Diſpute about a *Method of Certainty*, which, for its ſuppos'd coming ſhort of Certainty, you charge with a Tendency to *Scepticiſm* and *Infidelity*, you ſhould produce only the different Opinions of other Men, concerning Certainty, to make good this Charge, without declaring any of thoſe different Opinions or Grounds of Certainty to be true or falſe: And ſome may be apt to ſuſpect that you your ſelf are not yet reſolv'd wherein to place it.

But, my Lord, I know too well what your diſtance above me requires of me, to ſay any ſuch thing to your Lordſhip. Your own Opinions are to your ſelf, and your not diſcovering them, muſt paſs for a ſufficient Reaſon for your not diſcovering them: and if you think fit to over-lay a poor infant modern Nation with the great and weighty Names of *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Plutarch*, and the like; and heaps of Quotations out of the Antients; who is not preſently to think it dead, and that there is an end of it? Eſpecially when it will have too much Envy for any one to open his Mouth in defence of a Notion, which is declar'd by your Lordſhip to be different from what thoſe great Men ſaid, whoſe Words are to be taken without any more ado, and who are not to be thought ignorant or miſtaken in any thing. Tho' I crave leave to ſay, That however infallible Oracles they were, to take things barely upon their, or any Man's Authority, is barely to believe, but not to know or be *certain*.

Thus your Lordſhip has ſufficiently prov'd *my way of Certainty by Ideas* to be inconſiſtent with the *way of Certainty by Reaſon*, by proving it *new*; which you prove only by ſaying, That it *is ſo wholly new, that here we have no general Principles; no Criterion; no Antecedents and Conſequents; no ſyllogiſtical Methods of Demonſtration: And yet we are told of a better way of Certainty to be attain'd merely by the help of Ideas*; add, if your Lordſhip pleaſes, ſignify'd by Words: which put into Propoſitions, whereof ſome are *general Principles*, ſome are or may be *Antecedents*, and ſome *Conſequents*, and ſome put together in Mode and Figure, *ſyllogiſtical Methods of Demonſtration*. For, pray my Lord, may not Words, that ſtand for *Ideas*, be put into Propoſitions as well as any other? And may not thoſe Propoſitions, wherein the Terms ſtand for *Ideas*, be as well put into *Antecedents* and *Conſequents*, or *Syllogiſms*, and make *Maxims*, as well as any other Propoſitions, whoſe Terms ſtand not for *Ideas*, if your Lordſhip can find any ſuch? And if thus *Ideas* can be brought into *Maxims*, *Antecedents* and *Conſequents*, and *ſyllogiſtical Methods of Demonſtration*, what Inconſiſtency has the way of Certainty by *Ideas*, with thoſe *ways of Certainty by Reaſon*; if at laſt your Lordſhip will ſay, That Certainty conſiſts in Propoſitions put together as *Antecedents and Conſequents, and in Mode and Figure*? For as for *Principles* or *Maxims*, we ſhall know whether your *Principles* or *Maxims* are a way to Certainty, when you ſhall pleaſe to tell us what it is that, to your Lordſhip, makes a *Maxim* or *Principle*, and diſtinguiſhes it from other Propoſitions; and whether it be any thing but an immediate Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas*, as expreſs'd in that Propoſition. To conclude, by all that your Lordſhip has alledg'd out of the Antients, you have not, as I humbly conceive, prov'd that my way of Certainty is new, or that they had any way of Certainty different from mine; much leſs have you prov'd that my way of Certainty by *Ideas* is *inconſiſtent with the way of Certainty by Reaſon*, which was the Propoſition to be prov'd.

Your Lordſhip having thought it enough againſt my way of Certainty by *Ideas*, thus to prove its *Newneſs*, you betake your ſelf preſently to your old Topick
P. 120. of *obſcure and confus'd Ideas*; and ask, *But how comes there to be ſuch a way of Certainty by Ideas, and yet the Ideas themſelves are ſo uncertain and obſcure?*

Anſw.

Anſw. No *Idea*, as it is in the Mind, is *uncertain*; tho' to thoſe who uſe Names uncertainly, it may be *uncertain* what *Idea* that Name ſtands for. And, as to obſcure and confus'd *Ideas*, no *Idea* is ſo obſcure in all its Parts, or ſo confounded with all other *Ideas*, but that one, who, in a Propoſition, joins it with another in that part which is clear and diſtinct, may perceive its Agreement or Diſagreement, as expreſs'd in that Propoſition: Tho' when Names are us'd for *Ideas*, which are in ſome part obſcure or confounded with other *Ideas*, there can be no Propoſitions made which can produce Certainty concerning that, wherein the *Idea* is obſcure and confus'd. And therefore to your Lordſhip's Queſtion, *How is it poſſible for us to have a clear Perception of the Agreement of* Ideas, *if the* Ideas *themſelves be not clear and diſtinct?* I anſwer, very well; becauſe *an obſcure or confus'd* Idea, *i. e.* that is not perfectly clear and diſtinct in all its Parts, may be compar'd with another in that Part of it which is clear and diſtinct: which will, I humbly conceive, remove all thoſe Difficulties, Inconſiſtencies and Contradictions, which your Lordſhip ſeems to be troubled with from my words quoted in thoſe two Pages. P. 122. P. 121, 122.

Your Lordſhip having, as it ſeems, quite forgot that you were to ſhew wherein the *Certainty of Deductions in the way of* Ideas, was inconſiſtent with the Certainty of Deductions *in the way of Reaſon*, brings here a new *Charge upon my way of Certainty*, viz. *That I have no Criterion to diſtinguiſh falſe and doubtful* Ideas, *from true and certain.* Your Lordſhip ſays, the *Academicks* went upon *Ideas*, or *Repreſentations of things to their Minds*; and pray, my Lord, does not your Lordſhip do ſo too? Or has Mr. *J. S.* ſo won upon your Lordſhip, by his *ſolid Philoſophy againſt the Fancies of the Ideiſts*, that *you begin to think him in the right* in this too; where he ſays, *That Notions are the Materials of our Knowledg*; and *that a Notion is the very thing it ſelf exiſting in the Underſtanding?* for ſince I make no doubt but that, in all your Lordſhip's Knowledg, you will allow, that you have ſome immediate Objects of your Thoughts, which are the Materials of that Knowledg, about which it is employ'd, thoſe immediate Objects, if they are not as Mr. *J. S.* ſays, the *very things themſelves*, muſt be *Ideas*. Not thinking your Lordſhip therefore yet ſo perfect a Convert of Mr. *J. S*'s that you are perſuaded, that as often as you think of your Cathedral Church, or of *Des Cartes*'s Vortices, that the very Cathedral Church at *Worceſter*, or the Motion of thoſe Vortices, *it ſelf exiſts* in your Underſtanding; when one of them never exiſted but in that one Place at *Worceſter*, and the other never exiſted any where in *rerum natura*. I conclude your Lordſhip has immediate Objects of your Mind, which are not *the very things themſelves exiſting in your Underſtanding*: which if, with the *Academicks*, you will pleaſe to call *Repreſentations*, as I ſuppoſe you will, rather than with me *Ideas*, it will make no difference. P. 122. P. 123. Solid Philoſophy, *p.* 24, & 27.

This being ſo, I muſt then make the ſame Objection againſt your *way of Certainty by Reaſon*, that your Lordſhip does againſt *my way of Certainty by* Ideas (for upon the compariſon of theſe two we now are) and then I return your words here again, *viz.* That *you have no Criterion to diſtinguiſh falſe and doubtful Repreſentations from true and certain; how then can any Man be ſecure, that he is not impos'd upon in your Lordſhip's way of Repreſentations?* P. 122, 123.

Your Lordſhip ſays, *I tell you of a way of Certainty by* Ideas, *and never offer any ſuch Method for examining them, as the Academicks requir'd for their Probability.* *Anſw.* I was not, I confeſs, ſo well acquainted with what the *Academicks went upon* for the *Criterion* of *a greater Probability*, as your Lordſhip is; or if I had, I writing, as your Lordſhip knows, *out of my own thoughts*, could not well tranſcribe out of them. But that you ſhould tell me, I never offer any *Criterion* to diſtinguiſh falſe from true *Ideas*, I cannot but wonder; and therefore crave leave to beg your Lordſhip to look again into *B.* 2. *c.* 32. of my *Eſſay*; and there, I perſuade my ſelf, you will find a *Criterion*, whereby true and falſe *Ideas* may be diſtinguiſhed. P. 124, 125.

Your Lordſhip brings for Inſtance the *Idea* of *Solidity*; but what it is an Inſtance of, I confeſs, I do not ſee: *Your Lordſhip charges on my way of Certainty, that I have no Criterion to diſtinguiſh falſe and doubtful* Ideas *from true and certain*; which is follow'd by an Account you give, how the Academicks *examin'd their* Ideas *or Repreſentations, before they allow'd them to prevail on them to give an Aſſent, as to a greater Probability.* And then you tell me, that *I never offer any* P. 125. P. 123, 124. P. 125.

Such

ſuch Method for examining them, as the Academicks requir'd for their Probability: to which your Lordſhip ſubjoins theſe words; *As for Inſtance, my firſt* Idea, *which I go upon, of Solidity.* Would not one now expect, that this ſhould be an Inſtance to make good your Lordſhip's Charge, that I had no *Criterion* to diſtinguiſh, whether my *Idea* of Solidity were falſe and doubtful, or true and certain?

To ſhew that I have no ſuch Criterion, your Lordſhip asks me two Queſtions;
P. 125. the firſt is, *How my* Idea *of Solidity comes to be clear and diſtinct?* I will ſuppoſe for once, that I know not *how it comes to be clear and diſtinct*: How will this prove, that I have no *Criterion* to know whether it be *true or falſe?* For the Queſtion here is not about knowing *how an* Idea *comes to be clear and diſtinct*; but how I ſhall know whether it be *true or falſe.* But your Lordſhip's following words ſeem to aim at a farther Objection; your words altogether are, *How this* Idea [*i. e.* my *Idea* of Solidity, which conſiſts in Repletion of Space, with an Excluſion of all other ſolid Subſtances] *comes to be clear and diſtinct to me, when others who go in the ſame way of* Ideas, *have quite another* Idea *of* it? My Lord, I deſire your Lordſhip to name who thoſe *Others* are, who *go in the ſame way of* Ideas *with me*, who *have quite another* Idea *of* this my *Idea* than I have; for to *this Idea* I could be ſure that *It*, in any other Writer but your Lordſhip, muſt here refer: But my Lord, it is one of your privileg'd Particles, and I have nothing to ſay to it. But let it be ſo, that *others have quite another* Idea *of* it than I; how does that prove, that I have no *Criterion* to diſtinguiſh whether *my* Idea *of Solidity* be true or no?

P. 125. Your Lordſhip farther adds, That thoſe *other think that they have as plain and diſtinct an* Idea, *that Extenſion and Body are the ſame*: And then your Lordſhip asks, *Now what Criterion is there to come to a Certainty in* this *Matter*? *Anſw.* In what Matter, I beſeech your Lordſhip? If it be whether my *Idea* of Solidity be a *true Idea*, which is the Matter here in queſtion, in *this Matter* I have given a
B. 2. c. 32. *Criterion* to know in my *Eſſay*: If it be to decide the Queſtion, whether the word *Body* more properly ſtands for the ſimple *Idea* of *Space*, or for the complex *Idea* of *Space* and *Solidity* together, that is not the Queſtion here; nor can there be any other *Criterion* to decide it by, but the Propriety of our Language.

P. 126. But your Lordſhip adds, *Ideas can have no way of Certainty in themſelves, if it be poſſible for even Philoſophical and Rational Men to fall into ſuch contrary* Ideas *about the ſame thing*; and both ſides *think their* Ideas *to be clear and diſtinct.* If this were ſo, I do not ſee how this would any way prove, that I had no *Criterion* whereby it might be diſcerned, whether my *Idea* of Solidity were true or no; which was to be prov'd.

But at laſt, this which your Lordſhip calls *contrary* Ideas *about the ſame thing*, is nothing but a difference about a Name. For I think no body will ſay, That the *Idea* of Extenſion, and the *Idea* of Solidity are the ſame *Ideas*: All the difference then between *thoſe Philoſophical and Rational Men*, which your Lordſhip mentions here, is no more but this, whether the ſimple *Idea* of pure Extenſion ſhall be call'd *Body*, or whether the complex *Ideas* of Extenſion and Solidity join'd together, ſhall be call'd *Body*; which will be no more than a bare verbal Diſpute to any one, who does not take Sounds for Things, and make the word *Body* ſomething more than a Sign of what the Speaker would ſignify by it. But what the Speaker makes the Term *Body* ſtand for, cannot be preciſely known, till he has determin'd it in his own Mind, and made it known to another; and then there can between them be no longer a Diſpute about the ſignification of the word: *v. g.* If one of thoſe *Philoſophical Rational Men* tells your Lordſhip, that he makes the Term *Body* to ſtand preciſely for the ſimple *Idea* of pure Extenſion, your Lordſhip or he can be in no Doubt or Uncertainty concerning this thing; but whenever he uſes the word, *Body* your Lordſhip muſt ſuppoſe in his Mind the ſimple *Idea* of Extenſion, as the thing he means by *Body*. If, on the other ſide, another of thoſe *Philoſophical Rational Men* ſhall tell your Lordſhip, that he makes the Term *Body* to ſtand preciſely for a complex *Idea* made up of the ſimple *Ideas* of *Extenſion* and *Solidity* join'd together; your Lordſhip or he can be in no Doubt or Uncertainty concerning this thing: but

when-

whenever he uſes the word Body, your Lordſhip muſt think on, and allow the *Idea* belonging to it, to be that complex one.

As your Lordſhip can allow this different uſe of the Term Body in theſe different Men, without changing any *Idea*, or any thing in your own Mind, but the Application of the ſame Term to different *Ideas*, which changes neither the *Truth* nor *Certainty* of any of your Lordſhip's *Ideas*, from what it was before: So thoſe two *Philoſophical Rational Men* may, in Diſcourſe one with another, agree to uſe that Term *Body*, for either of thoſe two *Ideas*, which they pleaſe, without at all making their *Ideas*, on either ſide, *falſe or uncertain*. But if they will conteſt which of theſe *Ideas* the Sound *Body* ought to ſtand for, 'tis viſible their Difference is not about any Reality of Things, but the Propriety of Speech; and their Diſpute and Doubt is only about the ſignification of a word.

Your Lordſhip's ſecond Queſtion is, *Whether by this Ideas of Solidity, we may come to know what it is. Anſw.* I muſt ask you here again, what you mean by it? If your Lordſhip by it means *Solidity*, then your Queſtion runs thus: Whether by this [*i. e.* my] *Idea of Solidity, we may come to know what Solidity is? Anſw.* Without doubt, if your Lordſhip means by the Term *Solidity*, what I mean by the Term *Solidity*; for then I have told you what *it is*, in the Chapter above-cited by your Lordſhip: If you mean any thing elſe by the Term *Solidity*, when your Lordſhip will pleaſe to tell me what you mean by it, I will tell your Lordſhip what *Solidity* is. This, I humbly conceive, you will find your ſelf obliged to do, if what I have ſaid of Solidity does not ſatisfy you *what it is*. For you will not think it reaſonable I ſhould tell your Lordſhip what a thing is, when expreſs'd by you in a Term, which I do not know what your Lordſhip means by, nor what you make it ſtand for. P. 126. B. 2. c. 4.

But your Lordſhip aſks, *Wherein it conſiſts*; if you mean wherein the *Idea* of it conſiſts, that I have already told your Lordſhip, in the Chapter of my *Eſſay* above-mentioned. If your Lordſhip means what is the real internal Conſtitution, that phyſically makes *Solidity* in things; If I anſwer I do not know, that will no more make my *Idea* of *Solidity* not to be *true* or *certain* (if your Lordſhip thinks Certainty may be attributed to ſingle *Ideas*) than the not knowing the phyſical Conſtitution, whereby the parts of Bodies are ſo fram'd as to cohere, makes my *Idea* of Coheſion not *true* or *certain*. P. 126.

To my ſaying in my Eſſay, "That if any one ask me what this Solidity is, I "ſend him to his Senſes to inform him;" your Lordſhip replies, *You thought the Deſign of my Book would have ſent him to his Ideas for Certainty: and are we*, ſays your Lordſhip, *ſent back again from our Ideas to our Senſes? Anſw.* I cannot help it, if your Lordſhip miſtakes the *Deſign of my Book*: For what concerns *Certainty*, i. e. the Knowledg of the Truth of Propoſitions, my Book ſends every one to his *Ideas*; but for the getting of ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation, my Book ſends him only to his Senſes. But your Lordſhip uſes *Certainty* here, in a Senſe I never us'd it, nor do underſtand it in; for what the *Certainty* of any ſimple *Idea* is, I confeſs I do not know, and ſhall be glad you would tell me what you mean by it. B. 2. c. 4. §. 6. P. 126.

However, in this Senſe you ask me, and that as if your Queſtion carry'd a Demonſtration of my contradicting my ſelf; *And are we ſent back again, from our Ideas to our Senſes? Anſw.* My Lord, every one is ſent to his Senſes to get the ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation, becauſe they are no other way to be got. P. 127.

Your Lordſhip preſſes on with this farther Queſtion, *What do theſe Ideas ſignify then?* i. e. if a Man be ſent to his Senſes for the *Idea* of Solidity. I anſwer, to ſhew him the Certainty of Propoſitions, wherein the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas* is perceiv'd; which is the Certainty I ſpeak of, and no other: But what the Certainty is which your Lordſhip ſpeaks of in this and the following Page, I confeſs I do not underſtand. For, Ibid. P. 127. 128.

Your Lordſhip adds, that *I ſay farther*, "That if this be not a ſufficient Ex- "plication of Solidity, I promiſe to tell any one what it is, when he tells me "what Thinking is; or explains to me, what Extenſion and Motion are." *Are we not now in the true way to Certainty, when ſuch things as theſe are given over, of which we have the cleareſt Evidence by Senſation and Reflection? For here I make it as impoſſible to come to certain, clear and diſtinct Notions of theſe Things*, as to diſcourſe into a blind Man the *Ideas* of Light and Colours. *Is not this a* P. 127.

rare

rare way of Certainty? Anſw. What *Things*, my Lord, I beſeech you, are *thoſe* which you here tell me *are given over*, of which *we have the cleareſt Evidence by Senſation or Reflection?* 'Tis likely you will tell me, they are *Extenſion* and *Motion*. But, my Lord, I crave the liberty to ſay, that when you have conſider'd again, you will be ſatisfied, there are no *things given over* in the Caſe, but only the names *Extenſion* and *Motion*; and concerning them too, nothing is *given over*, but a power of defining them. When you will be pleas'd to lay by a little the Warmth of thoſe Queſtions of Triumph, which I meet with in this Paſſage, and tell me what *Things* your Lordſhip makes theſe Names *Extenſion* and *Motion* to ſtand for; you perhaps will not find, that *I make it impoſſible* for thoſe, who have their Senſes, to get the ſimple *Ideas*, ſignify'd by theſe Names, very clear and diſtinct by their Senſes: tho' I do ſay, that theſe, as well as all other Names of ſimple *Ideas*, cannot be defin'd; nor any ſimple *Ideas* be brought into our Minds by Words, any more than the *Ideas* of Light and Colours can be diſcours'd into a blind Man: which is all I do ſay in thoſe Words of mine, which your Lordſhip quotes, as ſuch wherein I have *given over things, whereof we have the cleareſt Evidence.* And ſo from my being of opinion, That the Names of ſimple *Ideas* cannot be defin'd, nor thoſe *Ideas* got by any Words whatſoever, which is all that I there ſay; your Lordſhip very pathetically expreſſes your ſelf as if in *my way* all were gone, Certainty were loſt; and if my Method ſhould be allow'd, there is an end of all Knowledg in the World.

P. 127. The Reaſon your Lordſhip gives againſt my way of Certainty, is, That *I here make it as impoſſible to come to certain, clear, and diſtinct Notions of theſe things,* [*i. e.* Extenſion and Motion] *as to diſcourſe into a blind Man the Idea of Light and Colours. Anſw.* What *clear* and *diſtinct* Notions or *Ideas* are, I do underſtand: but what your Lordſhip means by *certain Notions*, ſpeaking here, as you do, of ſimple *Ideas*, I muſt own I do not underſtand. That for the attaining thoſe ſimple *Ideas* I *ſend Men to their Senſes*, I ſhall think I am in the right, till I hear from your Lordſhip better Arguments to convince me of my Miſtake, than

P. 127. theſe: *Are we not now in the true way to Certainty? Is not this a rare way of Certainty?* And if your Lordſhip has a better way to get clear and diſtinct ſimple *Ideas*, than by the Senſes, you will oblige me, and I think the World too, by a Diſcovery of it. Till then, I ſhall continue in the ſame Mind I was of, when

Eſſay, B. 2. c. 4. §. 5, 6. I writ that Paſſage, *viz.* That Words can do nothing towards it, and that for the Reaſon which I there promiſed, and is to be found, *Eſſay*, B. 3. C. 4. §. 7,

P. 127. *&c.* And therefore to your Lordſhip's ſaying, That *thus you have ſhew'd, that I have no ſecurity againſt falſe and uncertain Ideas, no Criterion to judge them by*; I think I may ſecurely reply, that with Submiſſion *thus ſhewing* it, is no ſhewing it at all; nor will ever ſhew, That I have no ſuch *Criterion*, even when we ſhall

P. 128. add your Lordſhip's *farther* Inference, *Now here again our Ideas deceive us.* Which ſuppoſing it a good Inference from theſe words of mine, "That moſt of our "ſimple *Ideas* are not the Likeneſs of things without us;" yet it ſeems to me, to come in here, a little out of ſeaſon: becauſe the Propoſition to be prov'd, is, as I humbly conceive, not that *our Ideas deceive us*, but that *I have not a Criterion to diſtinguiſh true from falſe Ideas.*

If it be brought to prove that I have no *Criterion*, I have this to ſay, That I neither well underſtand what it is for our *Ideas to deceive us in the way of Certainty*; nor, in the beſt Senſe that I can give it, do I ſee how it proves that I have no *Criterion*; nor, laſtly, how it follows from my ſaying that moſt of our ſimple *Ideas* are not Reſemblances.

P. 128. Your Lordſhip ſeems by the following words to mean, That in this way by *Ideas*, which are confeſs'd not to be Reſemblances, Men are hinder'd, and cannot go far in the Knowledg of what *they deſire to know of the Nature of thoſe Objects, of which we have the Ideas in our Minds.* If this ſhould be ſo, what is this, I beſeech your Lordſhip, to your ſhewing that I have no *Criterion?* But that this is a fault in the way by *Ideas*, I ſhall be convinc'd, when your Lordſhip ſhall be pleas'd to ſhew me, how in *your way of Certainty by Reaſon*, we can know more of the *Nature of things without us*; or *of that which cauſes theſe Ideas or Perceptions in us.* But, I humbly conceive, 'tis no Objection to the *way of Ideas*, if any one will *deceive himſelf*, and expect Certainty by *Ideas*, in things where Certainty is not to be had; becauſe he is told how Knowledg or Certainty is got

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by *Ideas*, as far as Men attain to it. And ſince your Lordſhip is here comparing the ways of Certainty by *Ideas* and by *Reaſon*, as two different and inconſiſtent ways, I humbly crave leave to add, That when you can ſhew me any one Propoſition, which you have attain'd to a Certainty of, in *your way of Certainty by Reaſon*, which I cannot attain to a Certainty of in my *way of Certainty by Ideas*; I will acknowledg my *Eſſay* to be guilty of whatever your Lordſhip pleaſes.

Your Lordſhip concludes, *So that theſe Ideas are really nothing but Names, if they be not Repreſentations.* P. 128. *Anſw.* This does not yet *ſhew*, that I have no *Criterion to diſtinguiſh true from falſe Ideas*; the thing that your Lordſhip is *thus ſhewing*. For I may have a *Criterion* to diſtinguiſh true from falſe *Ideas*, tho' that *Criterion* concern not *Names* at all. For your Lordſhip, in this Propoſition, allowing none to be *Ideas*, but what are *Repreſentations*; the other, which you ſay are *nothing but Names*, are not concern'd in the Criterion, that is to diſtinguiſh true from falſe *Ideas*: becauſe it relates to nothing but *Ideas*, and the diſtinguiſhing of them one from another; unleſs *true and falſe Ideas* can be any thing but *Ideas*, i. e. *Ideas* and not *Ideas* at the ſame time.

But farther, I crave leave to anſwer, That your Lordſhip's Propoſition, *viz. That theſe Ideas are really nothing but Names, if they be not the Repreſentations of things*; ſeems to me no Conſequence from my words, to which it is ſubjoin'd, tho' introduc'd with *ſo that*: for, methinks, it carries ſomething like a Contradiction in it. I ſay, "Moſt of our ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation, are not the Likeneſs of ſomething without us:" Your Lordſhip infers, if ſo, *theſe Ideas are really nothing but Names*; which, as it ſeems to me, is as much as to ſay, *Theſe Ideas*, that are *Ideas*, are not *Ideas*, but *Names* only. Methinks they might be allow'd to be *Ideas*, and that is all they pretend to be, tho' they do not reſemble that which produces them. I cannot help thinking a Son ſomething really more than a bare *Name*, tho' he has not the luck to reſemble his Father, who begot him: And the Black and Blue which I ſee, I cannot conclude but to be ſomething beſides the words *Black* and *Blue* (wherever your Lordſhip ſhall place that Something, either in my Perception only, or in my Skin) tho' it reſemble not at all the Stone, that with a knock produc'd it.

Should your Lordſhip put your two Hands, whereof one is hot and the other cold, into lukewarm Water; it would be hard to think, that the *Idea* of Heat produc'd in you by one of your Hands, and the *Idea* of Cold by the other, were the Likeneſſes and very Reſemblances of ſomething in the ſame Water, ſince the ſame Water could not be capable of having at the ſame time ſuch real Contrarieties. Wherefore ſince, as 'tis evident, they cannot be Repreſentations of any thing in the Water, it follows by your Lordſhip's Doctrine here, that if you ſhould declare what you feel, *viz.* That you feel *Heat* and *Cold* in that Water, *viz.* Heat by one Hand, and Cold by the other; you mean nothing by *Heat* and *Cold*: *Heat* and *Cold* in the caſe are nothing but Names; and your Lordſhip, in truth, feels nothing but theſe two Names.

Your Lordſhip, in the next place, proceeds to *examine my way of Demonſtration.* P. 129. Whether you do this to *ſhew* that I have no Criterion, whereby to diſtinguiſh true from falſe *Ideas*; or to ſhew, that *my way of Certainty by Ideas is inconſiſtent with the Certainty of Deductions by Reaſon*; (for theſe were the things you ſeem'd to me to have undertaken to *ſhew*, and therefore to be upon in this place) does not appear: but this appears by the words wherewith you introduce this Examen, that it is to avoid *doing me wrong.* P. 129.

Your Lordſhip, as if you had been ſenſible that your former Diſcourſe had led you towards doing me wrong, breaks it off of a ſudden, and begins this new one of Demonſtration, by telling me, *you will do me no wrong.* Can it be thought now, that you forget this Promiſe, before you get half through your Examen? Or is a miſ-citing my Words, and miſrepreſenting my Senſe, no Wrong? Your Lordſhip, in this very Examen, ſets down a long Quotation out of my *Eſſay*, and in the cloſe you tell me; *Theſe are my own Words which your Lordſhip has ſet down at large, that I may not complain that you miſrepreſent my Senſe.* P. 133. This one would think Guaranty enough in a leſs Man than your Lordſhip: And yet, my Lord, I muſt crave leave to complain, that not only my Senſe, but my very Words, are in that Quotation *miſrepreſented.*

To ſhew that my Complaint is not groundleſs, give me leave, my Lord, to ſet down my Words, as I read them in that place of my Book which your Lordſhip quotes for them, and as I find them here in your ſecond Letter.

Eſſay, B. 4. c. 7. §. 10. Anſw. 2. p. 132.

" If we add all the ſelf-evident Propoſitions may " be made about all our diſtinct *Ideas*, *Principles* will " be almoſt infinite, at leaſt innumerable, which " Men arrive to the knowledg of at different Ages; " and a great many of theſe innate *Principles* they " never come to know all their lives. But whether " they come in view of the Mind earlier or later, " this is true of them, that they are all known by " their native Evidence, are wholly independent, " receive no light, nor are capable of any Proof, " one from another, &c."

That it is true of our particular diſtinct Ideas, *that they are all known by their native Evidence, are wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any proof, one from another*, &c.

By their ſtanding thus together, the Reader will without any pains ſee whether thoſe your Lordſhip has ſet down in your Letter are *my own Words*; and whether in that place, which ſpeaks only of *ſelf-evident Propoſitions* or *Principles*, I have any thing in Words or in Senſe like this, *That our* particular diſtinct Ideas *are known by their native Evidence*, &c. Tho' your Lordſhip cloſes the Quotation with that ſolemn Declaration above-mention'd, *That they are my own Words, which you have ſet down at large, that I may not complain you miſrepreſent my Senſe*. And yet nothing can more miſrepreſent my Senſe than they do, applying all that to *particular Ideas*, which I ſpeak there only of *ſelf-evident Propoſitions* or *Principles*; and that ſo plainly, that I think I may venture any one's miſtaking it in my own words: And upon this Miſrepreſentation of my Senſe, your Lordſhip raiſes a Diſcourſe, and manages a Diſpute for, I think, a dozen Pages following, againſt my *placing Demonſtration on ſelf-evident Ideas*; tho' *ſelf-evident Ideas* are things wholly unknown to me, and are no where in my Book, nor were ever in my Thoughts.

P. 133—146.

But let us come to your Exceptions againſt my way of *Demonſtration*, which your Lordſhip is pleas'd to call *Demonſtration without Principles*. *Anſw.* If you mean by *Principles* ſelf-evident Propoſitions, then you know my Demonſtration is not without *Principles*, in that ſenſe of the term *Principles*: For your Lordſhip in the next Page blames my way, becauſe I ſuppoſe every intermediate *Idea* in Demonſtration to have a *ſelf-evident Connection* with the other *Idea*; for two ſuch *Ideas* as have a *ſelf-evident Connection*, join'd together in a Propoſition, make a *ſelf-evident Propoſition*. If your Lordſhip means by *Principles*, thoſe which in the place there quoted by your Lordſhip I mean, viz. *Whatever is, is*; and *it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be*; and ſuch other general Propoſitions, as are receiv'd under the name of *Maxims*: I grant, that I do ſay, That they are not abſolutely requiſite in every *Demonſtration*; and I think I have ſhewn, that there be Demonſtrations which may be made without them: tho' I do not, that I remember, ſay, That they are excluded, and cannot be made uſe of in Demonſtration.

P. 129. P. 130. Eſſay, B. 4. C. 2. §. 8.

Your Lordſhip's firſt Argument againſt my way of Demonſtration, is, *That it muſt ſuppoſe Self-evidence muſt be in the Ideas of my Mind; and that every intermediate Idea, which I take to demonſtrate any thing by, muſt have a ſelf-evident Connection with the others*. *Anſw.* Taking *Self-evidence in the Ideas of the Mind*, to mean in the perceiv'd Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas* in the Mind; I grant, I do not only ſuppoſe, but ſay ſo.

P. 129.

To prove it not to be ſo in *Demonſtration*, your Lordſhip ſays, *That it is ſuch a way of Demonſtration, as the old Philoſophers never thought of*. *Anſw.* No body, I think, will queſtion, that your Lordſhip is very well read in the old Philoſophers: But he that will anſwer for what *the old Philoſophers* ever did, *or did not think of*, muſt not only underſtand their extant Writings better than any Man ever did; but muſt have ways to know their Thoughts, that other Men have not. For all of them thought more than they writ; ſome of them writ not at all, and others writ a great deal more than ever came to us. But if it ſhould happen that any of them placed the Proof of any Propoſition in the Agreement of two things

P. 130.

things in a third, as I think ſome of them did; then it will, I humbly conceive, appear, that they did think of my way of Demonſtration; unleſs your Lordſhip can ſhew, that they could ſee that two things agreed in a third, without perceiving their Agreement with that third: and if they did in every Syllogiſm of a Demonſtration perceive that Agreement, then there was a *ſelf-evident Connection*; which is that which your Lordſhip ſays *they never thought of.*

But ſuppoſing *they never thought of it*, muſt we put out our Eyes, and not ſee whatever they over-look'd? Are all the Diſcoveries made by *Galileo*, my Lord *Bacon*, Mr. *Boyle*, and Mr. *Newton*, &c. to be rejected as falſe, becauſe they teach us what *the old Philoſophers never thought of?* Miſtake me not, my Lord, in thinking that I have the Vanity here to rank my ſelf, on this occaſion, with theſe great Diſcoverers of Truth, and Advancers of Knowledge. On the contrary, I contend, that my way of Certainty, my way of Demonſtration, which your Lordſhip ſo often condemns for its Newneſs, is not *New*; but is the very ſame that has always been uſed, both by Antients and Moderns. I am only conſidering here your Lordſhip's Argument, of *never having been thought of by the old Philoſophers*; which is an Argument, that will make nothing for or againſt the Truth of any Propoſition advanc'd by a modern Writer, till your Lordſhip has prov'd, that thoſe old Philoſophers (let the happy Age of old Philoſophers determine where your Lordſhip pleaſes) did diſcover all Truth, or that they had the ſole Privilege to ſearch after it, and beſides them no body was to ſtudy Nature, no body was to think or reaſon for himſelf; but every one was to be barely a reading Philoſopher, with an implicit Faith.

Your Objection in the next words, That *then every Demonſtration* carries *its own Light with it*, ſhews that your *way by Reaſon* is what I do not underſtand. For this I thought heretofore was the Property of *Demonſtration*, and not a Proof that it was not a Demonſtration, *that it carry'd its own Light with it*: But yet tho' in every Demonſtration there is a *ſelf-evident Connection* of the *Ideas*, by which it is made; yet that it does not follow from thence, as your Lordſhip here objects, that then every Demonſtration would be as clear and unqueſtionable as that *two and two make four*, your Lordſhip may ſee in the ſame Chapter, and the reaſon of it. P. 130. Eſſay, B. 4. c. 2. §. 4, 5, 6.

You ſeem in the following words to allow, that there is ſuch a Connection of the *intermediate Ideas in Mathematical Demonſtrations*; but ſay, *You ſhould be glad to ſee any Demonſtration (not about Figures and Numbers) of this kind.* And if that be a good Argument againſt it, I crave leave to uſe it too on my ſide; and to ſay, *That I would be glad to ſee any Demonſtration (not about Figures and Numbers) not of this kind, i. e.* wherein there is not a ſelf-evident Connection of all the intermediate *Ideas*. If you have any ſuch, I earneſtly beg your Lordſhip to favour me with it; for I crave liberty to ſay, That the Reaſon, and Form, and Way of Evidence in *Demonſtration*, wherever there is *Demonſtration*, is always the ſame. P. 130.

But you ſay, *THIS is a quite different Caſe from mine*: I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip means by *THIS*, *Mathematical Demonſtration*, the thing mention'd in the preceding Period; and then your Senſe will run thus: *Mathematical Demonſtrations*, wherein Certainty is to be had by the Intuition of the ſelf-evident Connection of all the intermediate *Ideas*, are *different from* that Demonſtration which I am there treating of. If you mean not ſo, I muſt own, I know not what you mean by ſaying, *THIS is a quite different Caſe from mine.* And if your Lordſhip does mean ſo, I do not ſee how it can be ſo as you ſay: your Words taken all together run thus; *My principal Ground is from Mathematical Demonſtrations, and my Examples are brought from them. But* this *is quite a different Caſe from mine: i. e.* I am ſpeaking in that Chapter of my *Eſſay* concerning Demonſtration in general, and the Certainty we have by it. The Examples I uſe, are brought from Mathematicks, and yet you ſay, *Mathematical Demonſtrations are quite a different Caſe from mine.* If I here miſunderſtand your Lordſhip's *THIS*, I muſt beg your pardon for it; it is one of your privileg'd *Particles*, and I am not Maſter of it. Miſrepreſent your Senſe, I cannot; for your very Words are ſet down, and let the Reader judg. P. 130.

But your Lordſhip gives a Reaſon for what you had ſaid in theſe Words ſubjoin'd, where you ſay, *I grant that thoſe Ideas, on which Mathematical Demonſtrations* P. 130.

monſtrations proceed, are wholly in the Mind, and do not relate to the Exiſtence of things; but our Debate goes upon a Certainty of Knowledg of things as really exiſting. In which Words there are theſe things remarkable:

1. That your Lordſhip's Exception here, is againſt what I have ſaid concerning Demonſtration in my Eſſay, and not againſt any thing I have ſaid in either of my Letters to your Lordſhip. If therefore your Lordſhip and I have ſince, in our Letters, had any *Debate* about *the Certainty of the Knowledg of things as really exiſting*; that which was writ before that *Debate*, could have no relation to it, nor be limited by it. If therefore your Lordſhip makes any Exception (as you do) to my way of Demonſtration, as propos'd in my Eſſay, you muſt, as I humbly conceive, take it as deliver'd there, comprehending Mathematical Demonſtrations; which cannot be excluded, becauſe your Lordſhip ſays, *Our Debate* now *goes upon a Certainty of the Knowledg of things as really exiſting*, ſuppoſing *Mathematical Demonſtrations* did not afford *a Certainty of Knowledg of things as really exiſting.*

2. But in the next place *Mathematical Demonſtrations* do afford a Certainty of the Knowledg of things as really exiſting, as much as any other Demonſtrations whatſoever; and therefore they afford your Lordſhip no Ground upon that account to ſeparate them, as you do here, from Demonſtrations in other Subjects.

Your Lordſhip indeed thinks I have given you ſufficient Grounds to charge
P. 130. me with the contrary: For you ſay, *I grant that thoſe Ideas, on which Mathematical Demonſtrations proceed*, are *wholly in the Mind*; this indeed I grant: *and do not relate to the Exiſtence of things*; but theſe latter Words I do not remember that I any where ſay. And I wiſh you had quoted the place where I *grant* any ſuch thing; I am ſure it is not in that place, where it is likelieſt to be found: I mean, where I examine, whether the Knowledg we have of *Mathematical Truths*, be the *Knowledg of Things as really exiſting*: There
Eſſay, B. 4. C. 4. §. 6. I ſay (and I think I have prov'd) that it is, tho' it conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas* that are only in the Mind; becauſe it takes in all thoſe things, really exiſting, which anſwer thoſe *Ideas*.
§. 7. Upon which Ground it was, That I there affirm'd moral Knowledg alſo capable of Certainty. And pray, my Lord, what other way can your Lordſhip proceed, in any Demonſtration you would make, about any other thing but *Figures and Numbers*, but the ſame that you do in *Demonſtrations about Figures and Numbers?* If you would demonſtrate any thing concerning *Man* or *Murder*, muſt you not firſt ſettle in your Mind the *Idea* or Notion you have of that Animal or that Action, and then ſhew what you would demonſtrate neceſſarily to belong to that *Idea* in your Mind, and to things exiſting only as they correſpond with, and anſwer that *Idea* in your Mind? How elſe can you make any general Propoſition, that ſhall contain the Knowledg of things as really exiſting, I that am ignorant ſhould be glad to learn, when your Lordſhip ſhall do me the favour to ſhew me any ſuch.

In the mean time, there is no reaſon why you ſhould except *Demonſtrations about Figures and Numbers* from Demonſtrations about other Subjects, upon the account that *I grant, that thoſe Ideas, on which Mathematical Demonſtrations proceed, are wholly in the Mind*, when I ſay the ſame of all other Demonſtrations. For the *Ideas* that other Demonſtrations proceed on, are wholly in the Mind: And no Demonſtration whatſoever concerns things as really exiſting, any farther than as they correſpond with, and anſwer thoſe *Ideas in the Mind*, which the *Demonſtration proceeds on.* This Diſtinction therefore here of your Lordſhip's, between *Mathematical* and other *Demonſtrations*,
P. 131. having no Foundation, your Inference founded on it falls with it; *viz. So that altho' we ſhould grant all that I ſay about the Intuition of Ideas in Mathematical Demonſtrations, yet it comes not at all to my Buſineſs, unleſs I can prove, that we have as clear and diſtinct Ideas of Beings, as we have of Numbers and Figures.* Tho' how *Beings* here and *Numbers and Figures* come to be oppos'd againſt one another, I ſhall not be able to conceive, till I am better inſtructed than hitherto I am, that *Numbers and Figures* are no *Beings*; and that the Mathematicians and Philoſophers, *old* ones and all, have, in all the Pains taken about them, employ'd their Thoughts about nothing. And I would

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be glad to know what thoſe *Things* are, which your Lordſhip ſays *our Debate goes upon here as really exiſting*, that are *Beings* more than *Numbers and Figures*.

Your Lordſhip's next Exception againſt my way of Demonſtration, is, That *in it I am inconſiſtent with my ſelf*. For Proof of it, you ſay, *I deſign to prove Demonſtrations without general Principles; and yet every one knows that general Principles are ſuppos'd in Mathematicks*. *Anſw.* Every one may know that general Principles are ſuppoſed in Mathematicks, without knowing, or ever being able to know, that I, who ſay alſo that Mathematicians do often make uſe of them, am inconſiſtent with my ſelf; tho' I alſo ſay, That a Demonſtration about Numbers and Figures may be made without them. P. 131.

To prove me inconſiſtent with my ſelf, you add; *And that Perſon would be thought ridiculous, who ſhould go about to prove, That general Principles are of little, or of dangerous Uſe in Mathematical Demonſtrations*. *Anſw.* A Man may make other ridiculous Faults in writing, beſides Inconſiſtency, and there are Inſtances enough of it: But by good luck I am in this place clear of what *would be thought ridiculous*, which yet is no Proof of Inconſiſtency. For I never *went about to prove, That general Principles are of little or dangerous Uſe in Mathematical Demonſtrations*. P. 131.

To prove me inconſiſtent with my ſelf, your Lordſhip uſes one Argument more, and that is, That *I confeſs that the way of Demonſtration in Morality, is from Principles, as thoſe of Mathematicks, by neceſſary Conſequences*. *Anſw.* With Submiſſion, my Lord, I do not ſay in the place quoted by your Lordſhip, *That the way of Demonſtration in Morality* is *from Principles, as thoſe of the Mathematicks, by neceſſary Conſequences*. But this is that which I ſay, "That I "doubt not but in Morality, from Principles as *inconteſtable* as thoſe of the "Mathematicks, by neceſſary Conſequences, the meaſures of Right and "Wrong might be made out." Which Words, I humbly conceive, have no Inconſiſtency with my ſaying, there may be Demonſtrations without the help of *Maxims*; whatever Inconſiſtency the Words which you here ſet down for mine, may have with it. B. 4. C. 3. §. 18.

My Lord, the Words you bring out of my Book are ſo often different from thoſe I read in the places which you refer to, that I am ſometimes ready to think, you have got ſome ſtrange Copy of it, whereof I know nothing, ſince it ſo ſeldom agrees with mine. Pardon me, my Lord, if with ſome care I examine the Objection of *Inconſiſtency with my ſelf*; that if I find any, I may retract the one part or the other of it. Human Frailty, I grant, and Variety of Thoughts in long Diſcourſes, may make a Man unwittingly advance Inconſiſtencies. This may conſiſt with Ingenuity, and deſerve to be excus'd: But for any one to perſiſt in it, when it is ſhew'd him, is to give himſelf the Lye; which cannot but ſtick cloſer to him in the Senſe of all rational Men, than if he receiv'd it from another.

I own, I have ſaid, in my Eſſay, That there be Demonſtrations, which may be made without thoſe general Maxims, that I there treated of. But I cannot recollect, that I ever ſaid, that thoſe general Maxims could not be made uſe of in Demonſtration: for they are no more ſhut out of my way of Demonſtration, than any other ſelf-evident Propoſitions. And therefore there is no Inconſiſtency in thoſe two Propoſitions, which are mine, *viz. Some Demonſtrations may be made without the help of thoſe general Maxims*; and *Morality, I doubt not, may be demonſtrated from Principles*; whatever Inconſiſtency may be in theſe two following Propoſitions, which are your Lordſhip's and not mine, *viz. The way of Demonſtration in Morality is from Principles*, and *general Maxims are not the way to proceed on in Demonſtration, as to other parts of Knowledg*. For to admit *ſelf evident Propoſitions*, which is what I mean by *Principles*, in the place of my Eſſay, which your Lordſhip quotes for the firſt of my inconſiſtent Propoſitions, and to ſay (as I do in the other place quoted by your Lordſhip) "That thoſe magnified Maxims are not the Principles and Foundations "of all our other Knowledg;" has no manner of Inconſiſtency. For tho' I think them not neceſſary to every Demonſtration, ſo neither do I exclude them any more than other ſelf-evident Propoſitions out of any Demonſtration, wherein any one ſhould make uſe of them. P. 138, 139. B. 4. C. 3. §. 18. B. 4. C. 7. §. 10.

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P. 133. The next Objection againſt my way of Demonſtration, from *my placing Demonſtration on the Self-evidence of Ideas*, having been already anſwer'd, I ſhall need to ſay nothing in defence of it; or in anſwer to any thing rais'd againſt it, in your twelve or thirteen following Pages upon that Topick. But that your Lordſhip may not think I do not pay a due reſpect to all that you ſay, I ſhall not wholly paſs thoſe Pages over in ſilence.

P. 134. 1. Your Lordſhip ſays, That *I confeſs that ſome of the moſt obvious Ideas are far from being ſelf-evident. Anſw.* Suppoſing I did ſay ſo, how, I beſeech your Lordſhip, does it prove, That *it is impoſſible to come to a Demonſtration about real Beings, in this way of Intuition by Ideas?* Which is the Propoſition P. 134. you promiſe *to make appear*, and you bring this as the *firſt Reaſon* to make it appear. For ſhould *I confeſs* a thouſand times over, *That ſome of the moſt obvious Ideas are far from being ſelf-evident*; and ſhould I, which I do not, make *ſelf-evident Ideas* neceſſary to Demonſtration: how will it thence follow, That *it is impoſſible to come to a Demonſtration*, &c? Since tho' I ſhould *confeſs ſome of the moſt obvious Ideas not to be ſelf-evident*; yet my Confeſſion being but of *ſome*, it will not follow from my Confeſſion, but that there may be alſo ſome *ſelf-evident*: and ſo ſtill it might be poſſible to come to a Demonſtration by Intuition, becauſe *ſome* in my uſe of the Word never ſignifies *all*.

In the next place, give me leave to ask, where it is that I confeſs, That *ſome Ideas are not ſelf-evident?* Nay, where it is, that I once mention any ſuch thing as a *ſelf evident Idea?* For ſelf-evident is an Epithet, that I do not remember I ever gave to any *Idea*, or thought belong'd at all to *Ideas*. In all the places you have produc'd out of my Eſſay, concerning *Matter*, *Motion*, *Time*, *Duration* and *Light*; which are thoſe *Ideas* your Lordſhip is pleas'd to inſtance in, to prove, That *I have confeſs'd it of ſome*; I crave leave humbly to offer it to your Lordſhip, that there is not any ſuch Confeſſion. However, you go on to prove it. The Propoſition then to be prov'd, is, That *I confeſs that theſe are far from being ſelf-evident Ideas.* 'Tis neceſſary to ſet it down, and carry it in our Minds; for the Propoſition to be prov'd, is, I find, a very ſlippery thing, and apt to ſlide out of the way.

P. 134. Your Lordſhip's Proof is, That according to me, *we can have no Intuition of theſe Things which are ſo obvious to us, and conſequently we can have no ſelf-evident Ideas of them.* The Force of which Proof, I confeſs I do not underſtand. *We have no Intuition of the obvious thing Matter, and the obvious thing Motion*; Ergo, we have no ſelf-evident *Ideas* of them. Granting that they are *obvious Things*, and that *obvious* as they are, we have, as you expreſs it, no *Intuition* of them; it will not follow from thence, that we have no *Intuition* of the *Ideas* we ſignify by the names *Matter* and *Motion*, and ſo have no *ſelf-evident Ideas* of them. For whoever has in his Mind an *Idea* which he makes the name *Matter* or *Motion* ſtand for, has no doubt that *Idea* there, and ſees, or has, in your Phraſe, an *Intuition* of it there; and ſo has a *ſelf-evident Idea* of it, if *Intuition*, according to your Lordſhip, makes a *ſelf-evident Idea* (for of ſelf-evident *Ideas*, as I have before remark'd, I have ſaid nothing, nor made any ſuch diſtinction as *ſelf-evident* and not *ſelf-evident Ideas*) and if *Intuition* of an *Idea* does not make a *ſelf-evident Idea*, the want of it is in vain brought here to prove the *Idea* of *Matter* or *Motion* not *ſelf-evident*.

But your Lordſhip proceeds to Inſtances, and your firſt Inſtance is in *Matter*; and here, for fear of miſtaking, let us remember what the Propoſition to be prov'd, is, *viz.* That *according to me, we have no Intuition, as you call it,* P. 135. *of the Idea of Matter.* Your Lordſhip begins and tells me, that I give this account of the *Idea* of Matter, That *it conſiſts in a ſolid Subſtance, every where* P. 135. *the ſame.* Whereupon you tell me, You *would be glad to come to a certain Knowledg of theſe two things*; Firſt, *The manner of the Coheſion of the Parts of Matter,* P. 137. and *the Demonſtration of the Diviſibility of it in the way of Ideas. Anſw.* It happen'd juſt as I fear'd, the Propoſition to be prov'd is ſlip'd already quite out of ſight: You own that I ſay Matter is a ſolid Subſtance, every where the ſame. This *Idea*, which is the *Idea* I ſignify by the word *Matter*, I have in my Mind, and have an *Intuition* of it there: How then does this prove, That according to me, there *can be no Intuition of the Idea of Matter!* Leaving therefore this Pro- P. 135—137. poſition, which was to be prov'd, you bring places out of my Book to ſhew,

That

That we do not know wherein the Union and Coheſion of the parts of Matter conſiſt; and that the Diviſibility of Matter involves us in Difficulties: neither of which either is, or proves, That, according to me, we cannot have *an Intuition of the Idea of Matter*; which was the Propoſition to be prov'd, and ſeems quite forgotten during the three following Pages, wholly imploy'd upon this Inſtance of Matter. You ask indeed, whether *I can imagine, That* P. 136. *we have Intuition into the Idea of Matter?* But thoſe Words ſeem to me to ſignify quite another thing, than having *an Intuition of the Idea of Matter, as* appears by your Explication of them in theſe Words ſubjoin'd; *Or that it is* P. 136. *poſſible to come to a Demonſtration about* it, *by the help of any intervening Ideas:* whereby it ſeems to me plain, that by *Intuition into it*, your Lordſhip means *Demonſtration about it*, i. e. ſome Knowledg concerning Matter, and not a bare View or Intuition of the *Idea* you have of it. And that your Lordſhip ſpeaks of *Knowledg* concerning ſome Affection of Matter, in this and the following Queſtion, and not of the bare *Intuition* of the *Idea* of Matter; is farther evident from the Introduction of your two Queſtions, wherein you ſay, *There are two things concerning Matter, that you would be glad to come to a certain* Know- P. 135. ledg *of*. So that all that can follow, or in your Senſe of them does follow from my Words quoted by you, is, that I own, that the Coheſion of its Parts is an Affection of Matter that is hard to be explain'd; but from them it can neither be infer'd, nor does your Lordſhip attempt to infer, That any one cannot view or *have an Intuition* of the *Idea* he has in his own Mind, which he ſignifies to others by the word *Matter*: and that you did not make any ſuch Inference from them, is farther plain, by your asking, in the place above-quoted, not only whether *I can imagine, That it is poſſible to come to a Demonſtration about it*; but your Lordſhip alſo adds, *By the help of intervening Ideas*. For I do not think you demand a *Demonſtration by the help of intervening Ideas*, to make you ſo ſee, *i. e.* have an *Intuition* of, your own *Idea of Matter*. It would miſ-become me to underſtand your Lordſhip in ſo ſtrange a Senſe: for then you might have juſt Occaſion to ask me again, whether *I could think you a Man of ſo little Senſe*. I therefore ſuppoſe, as your Words import, That you demand a *Demonſtration by the help of intervening Ideas*, to ſhew you, how the parts of that thing, which you repreſent to your ſelf by that *Idea*, to which you give the name Matter, cohere together; which is nothing to the Queſtion of the *Intuition of the Idea*: tho' to cover the Change of the Queſtion as dexterouſly as might be, *Intuition of the Idea* is chang'd into *Intuition into the Idea*; as if there were no difference between looking upon a *Watch* and looking into a *Watch*, i. e. between the *Idea* that, taken from an obvious View, I ſignify by the name *Watch*, and have in my Mind when I uſe the word *Watch*; and the being able to reſolve any Queſtion that may be propos'd to me, concerning the inward Make and Contrivance of a Watch. The *Idea* which taken from the outward viſible Parts, I give the name Watch to, I perceive, or *have an Intuition of*, in my Mind equally, whether or no I know any thing more of a Watch, than what is repreſented in that *Idea*.

Upon this Change of the Queſtion, all that follows to the bottom of the next Page, being to ſhew, that from what I ſay it follows, that there be many P. 137. Difficulties concerning Matter, which I cannot reſolve; many Queſtions concerning it, which I think cannot be demonſtratively decided; and not to ſhew, that any one cannot perceive, or have an *Intuition*, as you call it, of his own *Idea* of Matter: I think I need not trouble your Lordſhip with an Anſwer to it.

In this one Inſtance of *Matter*, you have been pleas'd to ask me two hard Queſtions. To ſhorten your Trouble concerning this Buſineſs of *Intuition of Ideas*, will you, my Lord, give me leave to ask you this one eaſy Queſtion concerning all your four Inſtances, *Matter*, *Motion*, *Duration* and *Light*, viz. what you mean by theſe four Words? That your Lordſhip may not ſuſpect it to be either captious or impertinent, I will tell you the uſe I ſhall make of it: If your Lordſhip tell me what you mean by theſe Names, I ſhall preſently reply, That there then are the *Ideas* that you have of them in your Mind; and 'tis plain you ſee or *have an Intuition* of them, as they are in your Mind,

Mind, or, as I ſhould have expreſs'd it, perceive them as they are there, becauſe you can tell them to another. And ſo it is with every one, who can tell what he means by thoſe words; and therefore to all ſuch (amongſt which I crave leave to be one) there can be no doubt of the *Intuition of thoſe Ideas.* But if your Lordſhip will not tell me what you mean by theſe Terms, I fear you will be thought to uſe very hard meaſure in diſputing, by demanding to be ſatisfied concerning Queſtions put in Terms, which you your ſelf cannot tell the meaning of.

This conſider'd, will perhaps ſerve to ſhew, that all that you ſay in the following Paragraphs, to *N.* 2. *p.* 141. contains nothing againſt *Intuition of Ideas*, which is what you are upon, tho' it be no Notion of mine; much leſs does it contain any thing againſt *my way of Demonſtration by Ideas*, which is the Point under Proof. For,

1. What Your Lordſhip has ſaid about the *Idea* of *Matter*, hath been conſider'd already.

P. 138. 2. From *Motion*, which is your ſecond Inſtance, your Argument ſtands thus, That becauſe I ſay the Definitions I meet with of *Motion* are inſignificant, therefore *the Idea fails us.* This ſeems to me a ſtrange Conſequence; and all one as to ſay, That a deaf and dumb Man, becauſe he could not underſtand the words us'd in the Definitions that are given of Motion, therefore he could not have the *Idea* of *Motion*, or the *Idea* of Motion *fail'd him.* And yet this Conſequence, as foreign as it is to that Antecedent, is forc'd from it to no purpoſe: The Propoſition to be infer'd being this, that then *we can have no Intuition of the Idea of Motion.*

3. *As to Time*, tho' the *Intuition of the Idea* of Time be not my way of ſpeaking, yet what your Lordſhip here infers from my words, granting it to be a right Inference, with Submiſſion, proves nothing againſt the *Intuition of* that *Idea.* The Propoſition to be prov'd, is, That *we can have no Intuition* of the *Idea* of Time; and the Propoſition which from my words you infer, is, That

P. 139. *we have not the Knowledg of the Idea of Time by Intuition, but by rational Deduction.* What can be more remote than theſe two Propoſitions? The one of them ſignifying (if it ſignifies any thing) the View the Mind has of it; the other, as I gueſs, the Original and Riſe of it. For what it is *to have the Knowledg of an Idea, not by Intuition, but by Deduction of Reaſon*, I confeſs I do not well underſtand; only I am ſure, in Terms it is not the ſame with *having the Intuition of an Idea*: But if changing of Terms were not ſome Men's Privilege, perhaps ſo much Controverſy would not be written. The meaning of either of theſe Propoſitions I concern not my ſelf about, for neither of them is mine. I only here ſhew, that you do not prove the Propoſition that you your ſelf fram'd, and undertook to prove.

Since, my Lord, you are ſo favourable to me, as to ſeem willing to correct whatever you can find any way amiſs in my *Eſſay*: Therefore I ſhall endeavour to ſatisfy you concerning the Riſe of our *Idea* of *Duration*, from the *Succeſſion of Ideas* in our Minds. Againſt this, tho' it be nothing to the matter in hand,

P. 139. you object, that *ſome People reckoned Succeſſion of Time right by Knots, and Notches, and Figures, without ever thinking of Ideas. Anſw.* 'Tis certain that Men, who wanted better ways, might, by *Knots* or *Notches*, keep Accounts of the Numbers of certain ſtated lengths of Time, as well as of the Numbers of Men in their Country, or of any other Numbers; and that too without ever conſidering the immediate Objects of their Thoughts under the Name of *Ideas*: but that they ſhould count Time, without ever thinking of ſomething, is very hard to me to conceive; and the things they thought on, or were preſent in their Minds when they thought, are what I call *Ideas*: thus much in anſwer to what your Lordſhip ſays. But to any one that ſhall put the Objection ſtronger, and ſay, Many have had the *Idea* of Time, who never reflected on the conſtant Train of *Ideas*, ſucceeding one another in their Minds, whilſt waking, I grant it: but add, that want of Reflection makes not any thing ceaſe to be: if it did, many Mens Actions would have no Cauſe, nor Riſe, nor Manner; becauſe many Men never reflect ſo far on their own Actions, as to conſider what they are bottom'd on, or how they are perform'd. A Man may meaſure Duration by Motion, of which he has no other *Idea*, but of a conſtant Succeſſion of

Ideas

Ideas in train; and yet never reflect on that Succeſſion of *Ideas* in his Mind. A Man may gueſs at the length of his ſtay by himſelf in the dark; here is no Succeſſion to meaſure by, but that of his own Thoughts; and without ſome Succeſſion, I think there is no Meaſure of Duration. But tho' in this caſe he meaſures the length of the Duration by the Train of his *Ideas*, yet he may never reflect on that, but conclude he does it he knows not how.

You add, *But beſides* ſuch *arbitrary Meaſures of Time, what need any recourſe* P. 140. *to Ideas, when the returns of Days, and Months, and Years, by the Planetary Motions, are ſo eaſy and ſo univerſal? Such* here, as I ſuppoſe, refers to the *Knots*, P. 140. and *Notches*, and *Figures* before-mention'd: If it does not, I know not what it refers to; and if it does, it makes thoſe *Knots* and *Notches* Meaſures of Time, which I humbly conceive they were not, but only arbitrary ways of recording (as all other ways of recording are) certain Numbers of known lengths of Time: For tho' any one ſets down by *arbitrary* Marks, as *Notches* on a Stick, or *Strokes* of Chalk on a Trenchard, or Figures on Paper, the Number of Yards of Cloth, or Pints of Milk that are deliver'd to a Cuſtomer; yet I ſuppoſe no body thinks, that the Cloth or Milk were meaſur'd by thoſe *Notches*, Strokes of Chalk, or *Figures*, which therefore are by no means the *arbitrary Meaſures* of thoſe things. But what this is againſt, I confeſs I do not ſee: This, I am ſure, it is not againſt any thing I have ſaid. For, as I remember I have ſaid (tho' not the *planetary Motions*, yet) that the Motions of the Sun and the Moon, are the beſt Meaſures of Time. But if you mean, That the *Idea* of Duration is rather taken from the *Planetary Motions*, than from the Succeſſion of *Ideas* in our Minds, I crave leave to doubt of that; becauſe Motion no other way diſcovers it ſelf to us, but by a Succeſſion of *Ideas*.

Your next Argument againſt my thinking the *Idea* of Time to be deriv'd from the Train of *Ideas* ſucceeding one another in our Minds, is, That your P. 140. Lordſhip *thinks the contrary*. This, I muſt own, is an Argument by way of Authority, and I humbly ſubmit to it; tho' I think ſuch Arguments produce no *Certainty*, either in my way *of Certainty by Ideas*, or in *your way of Certainty by Reaſon*.

4. As to your fourth Inſtance, you having ſet down my Exceptions to the P. 141. Peripatetick and Carteſian Definitions of *Light*, you ſubjoin this Queſtion: *And is this a ſelf-evident Idea of Light?* I beg leave to anſwer in the ſame way by a Queſtion, And who ever ſaid or thought that it was, or meant that it ſhould be? He muſt have a ſtrange *Notion of ſelf-evident Ideas*, let them be what they will (for I know them not) who can think, that the ſhewing others Definitions of *Light* to be unintelligible, is a *ſelf-evident Idea of Light*. But farther, my Lord, what, I beſeech you, has a *ſelf-evident Idea of Light to do here?* I thought in this your Inſtance of *Light*, you were making good what you undertook *to prove from my ſelf, that we can have no Intuition of Light*. But becauſe P. 134. that perhaps would have ſounded pretty oddly, you thought fit (which I with all Submiſſion crave leave ſometimes to take notice of) to change the Queſtion; but the Misfortune is, that put as it is, not concerning our *Intuition*, but *the ſelf-evidence* of the *Idea* of *Light*, the one is no better prov'd than the other: And yet your Lordſhip concludes this your firſt Head according to your uſual form; Thus *we have ſeen what Account* the Author of the Eſſay *himſelf has given* P. 141. *of theſe ſelf-evident* Ideas, *which are the Ground-work of Demonſtration*. With Submiſſion, my Lord, he muſt have good Eyes, who has ſeen an *Account I have given* in my *Eſſay* of *ſelf evident Ideas*, when neither in all that your Lordſhip has quoted out of it, no nor in my whole *Eſſay*, *ſelf-evident Ideas* are ſo much as once mention'd. And where the *Account I have given* of a thing, which I never thought upon, is to be *ſeen*, I cannot imagine. What your Lordſhip farther tells me concerning them, *viz.* That *ſelf evident Ideas are the Ground work of Demonſtration*, I alſo aſſure you is perfect News to me, which I never met with any where but in your Lordſhip: Tho' if I had made them *the Ground-work of Demonſtration*, as you ſay, I think they might remain ſo, notwithſtanding any thing your Lordſhip has produc'd to the contrary.

We are now come to your ſecond Head, where I expected to have found this P. 141. Conſequence made good, *That there may be contradictory Opinions about* Ideas, *which I account moſt clear and* diſtinct; Ergo, *it is impoſſible to come to a Demonſtra-*

tion about real Beings in the way of Intuition of Ideas. For this you told me was
P. 134. your ſecond Reaſon to prove this Propoſition. This Conſequence your Lord-
ſhip, it ſeems, looks upon as ſo clear, that it needs no Proof; I can find none
P. 141. here where you take it up again. To prove ſomething, you ſay, *Suppoſe an Idea happen to be thought by ſome to be clear and diſtinct, and others ſhould think the contrary to be ſo:* In obedience to your Lordſhip, *I do ſuppoſe it.* But, when it is ſuppos'd, will that make good the above-mention'd Conſequence? You your ſelf, my Lord, do not ſo much as pretend it; but in this Queſtion ſubjoin'd,
Ibid. (*What hopes of Demonſtration by clear and diſtinct Ideas then?*) infer a quite different Propoſition. For, *It is impoſſible to come to a Demonſtration about real Beings in the way of Intuition of Ideas*; and, *There is no hopes of Demonſtration by clear and diſtinct Ideas*; appear to me two very different Propoſitions.

There appears ſomething to me yet more incomprehenſible in your way of managing this Argument here. Your Reaſon is, as we have ſeen, in theſe words, *There may be* contradictory *Opinions about ſome Ideas, that I account moſt clear and diſtinct:* And your Inſtance of it is in theſe words, *Suppoſe an Idea happen to be thought by ſome to be clear and diſtinct, and others ſhould think the* contrary *to be ſo. Anſw.* So they may, without *having any* contradictory *Opinions about any Idea, that I account moſt clear and diſtinct.* A Man may think his *Idea* of Heat to be clear and diſtinct, and another may think his *Idea* of Cold (which I take to be the contrary *Idea* to that of Heat) to be clear and diſtinct, and be both in the right, without the leaſt appearance of any *contradictory Opinions.* All therefore that your Lordſhip ſays, in the remaining part of this Paragraph, having nothing in it of *contradictory Opinions* about *Ideas* that *I think moſt clear*, ſerves not at all to make good your ſecond Reaſon. The truth is, all that you ſay here concerning *Des Cartes's Idea of Space*, and *another Man's Idea of Space*, amounts to no more but this; That different Men may ſignify different *Ideas* by the ſame Name, and will never fix on me what your Lordſhip would perſuade the World I ſay, that *both Parts of a Contradiction may be true.* Tho' I do ſay, that in ſuch a looſe uſe of the Terms *Body* and *Vacuum*, it may be demonſtrated both that there is, and is not a *Vacuum*: Which is a Contradiction in words, and is apt to impoſe, as if it were ſo in Senſe, on thoſe who miſtake Words for Things; who are a kind of Reaſoners, whereof I perceive there is a greater Number than I thought there had been. All that I have ſaid in that place
Eſſay, B. 4. quoted by your Lordſhip, is nothing but to ſhew the Danger of relying upon
C. 7. §. 12. Maxims, without a careful Guard upon the uſe of words, without which they will ſerve to make Demonſtrations on both ſides. That this is ſo, I dare appeal to any Reader, ſhould your Lordſhip preſs me again, as you do here, with
P. 143. all the force of theſe Words, *Say you ſo? What! Demonſtrations on both ſides? And in the way of Ideas too? This is extraordinary indeed!*

That all the Oppoſition between *Des Cartes* and *thoſe others*, is only about the naming of *Ideas*, I think may be made appear from theſe words of your Lordſhip
P. 143. in the next Paragraph; *In the Ideas of Space and Body, the Queſtion ſuppos'd, is, whether they be the ſame or no.* That this is a Queſtion only about Names, and not about *Ideas* themſelves, is evident from hence, that no body can doubt whether the ſingle *Idea* of pure Diſtance, and the two *Ideas* of *Diſtance* and *Solidity*, are one and the ſame *Idea*, or different *Ideas*, any more than he can doubt whether *one* and *two* are different. The Queſtion then in the Caſe, is not whether *Extenſion* conſider'd ſeparately by it ſelf, or *Extenſion* and *Solidity* together, be the ſame *Idea* or no; but whether the ſimple *Idea* of *Extenſion* alone ſhall be call'd *Body*, or the complex *Idea* of *Solidity* and *Extenſion* together ſhall be call'd *Body*. For that theſe *Ideas* themſelves are different, I think I need not go about to prove to any one, who ever thought of *Emptineſs* or *Fulneſs*: for whether in Fact the Bottle in a Man's Hand be empty or no, or can by him be empty'd or no; this, I think, is plain, That his *Idea* of Fulneſs, and his *Idea* of Emptineſs, are not the ſame. This the very Diſpute concerning a *Vacuum* ſuppoſes; for if Mens *Idea* of pure Space were not different from their *Idea* of *Solidity* and *Space* together, they could never ſo far ſeparate them in their Thoughts, as to make a Queſtion, whether they did always exiſt together, any more than they could queſtion, whether the ſame thing exiſted with it ſelf. Motion cannot be ſeparated in Exiſtence from Space; and yet no body ever took

the

the *Idea* of *Space* and the *Idea* of *Motion* to be the ſame. *Solidity* likewiſe cannot exiſt without *Space*; but will any one from thence ſay, the *Idea* of *Solidity* and the *Idea* of *Space* are one and the ſame?

Your Lordſhip's third Reaſon, to prove that *it is impoſſible to come to a Demonſtration about real Beings in this way of Intuition of Ideas*, is, *That granting the Ideas to be true, there is no Self-evidence of the Connection of them, which is neceſſary to made a Demonſtration.* This, I muſt own, is to me as incomprehenſible a Conſequence as the former; as alſo is that which your Lordſhip ſays to make it out, which I ſhall ſet down in your own words, that its Force may be left entire to the Reader: *But granting the Ideas to be true, yet when their Connection is not ſelf-evident, then an intermediate Idea muſt compleat the Demonſtration. But how doth it appear, that this middle Idea is ſelf-evidently connected with them? For 'tis ſaid*, if that intermediate Idea be not known by Intuition, that muſt need a proof; *and ſo there can be no Demonſtration: which your Lordſhip is very apt to believe in this way of Ideas; unleſs theſe Ideas get more light by being put between two others.* Whatever there be in theſe words to prove the Propoſition in queſtion, I leave the Reader to find out: but that he may not be led into a Miſtake, that there is any thing in my words that may be ſerviceable to it, I muſt crave leave to acquaint him, That theſe words ſet down by your Lordſhip, as out of my *Eſſay*, are not to be found in that place, nor any where in my Book, or any thing to this purpoſe, *That the intermediate Idea is to be known by Intuition*; but this, That there muſt be an intuitive Knowledg or Perception of *the Agreement* or *Diſagreement* of the intermediate *Idea* with thoſe, whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement by its intervention it domonſtrates.

P. 134. P. 143. B. 4. C. 2. §. 7.

Leaving therefore all that your Lordſhip brings out of *Gaſſendus*, the *Carteſians*, *Morinus*, and *Bernier*, in their Argument from *Motion*, for or againſt a *Vacuum*, as not being at all concern'd in it; I ſhall only crave leave to obſerve, that you ſeem to make uſe here of the ſame way of Argumentation, which I think I may call your main, if not only one, it occurs ſo often, *viz.* That when I have ſaid any thing to ſhew wherein *Certainty* or *Demonſtration*, &c. conſiſts, you think it ſufficiently overthrown, if you can produce any Inſtance out of my Book, of any thing advanc'd by me, which comes ſhort of Certainty or Demonſtration: Whereas, my Lord, I humbly conceive, it is no proof againſt my Notion of *Certainty*, or my way of *Demonſtration*, that I cannot attain to them in all Caſes. I only tell wherein they conſiſt, wherever they are; but if I miſs of either of them, either by reaſon of the Nature of the Subject, or by Inadvertency in my way of Proof, that is no Objection to the Truth of my Notions of them: For I never undertook that *my way* of Certainty or Demonſtration, if it ought to be call'd *my way*, ſhould make me or any one Omniſcient or Infallible.

That which makes it neceſſary for me here again to take notice of this your way of Reaſoning, is the Queſtion wherewith you wind up the account you have given of the Diſpute of the Parties above-named about a *Vacuum*; *And is it poſſible to imagine, that there ſhould be a ſelf-evident Connection in the Caſe? Anſw.* It concerns not me to examine, whether, or on which ſide, in that Diſpute, ſuch a *ſelf-evident Connection* is, or is not poſſible. But this I take the liberty to ſay, That wherever it is not, there is no Demonſtration, whether it be the *Carteſians* or the *Gaſſendiſts* this fail'd in this Point. And I humbly conceive, that to conclude from any one's failing in this, or any other Caſe, of a ſelf-evident Connection in each ſtep of his Proof, that therefore it is not neceſſary in Demonſtration, is a Concluſion without Grounds, and a way of arguing that proves nothing.

P. 145.

In the next Paragraph you come to wind up the Argument, which you have been ſo long upon, *viz.* to make good what you undertook; i. e. *To ſhew the difference of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reaſon*; in anſwer to my ſaying, I can find no Oppoſition between them: which Oppoſition, according to the account you give of it, after forty Pages ſpent in it, amounts at laſt to this;

P. 145. P. 105.

(1.) That I affirm, That general Principles and Maxims of Reaſon are of little or no uſe; and your Lordſhip ſays, *they are of very great uſe, and the only proper Foundation of Certainty.* To which I crave leave to ſay, That if by *Principles*

P. 146.

and Maxims your Lordſhip means all ſelf evident Propoſitions, our ways are even in this part the ſame; for as you know, my Lord, I make my ſelf-evident Propoſitions neceſſary to Certainty, and found all Certainty only in them. If by *Principles and Maxims* you mean a ſelect number of ſelf-evident Propoſitions, diſtinguiſh'd from the reſt by the name *Maxims*, which is the ſenſe in which I uſe the term *Maxims* in my *Eſſay*; then to bring it to a Deciſion, which of us two, in this point, is in the right, it will be neceſſary for your Lordſhip to give a Liſt of thoſe *Maxims*; and then to ſhew, That a Man can be certain of no Truth, without the help of thoſe *Maxims*. For to affirm *Maxims* to be the *only Foundation of Certainty*, and yet not to tell which are thoſe *Maxims*, or how they may be known; is, I humbly conceive, ſo far from laying any ſure Grounds of Certainty, that it leaves even the very Foundations of it uncertain. When your Lordſhip has thus ſettled the Grounds of *your way of Certainty by Reaſon*, one may be able to examine, whether it be truly the way of Reaſon, and how far my *way of Certainty by Ideas* differs from it.

P. 146. The ſecond Difference that you aſſign, between my *way of Certainty by Ideas*, and your's by *Reaſon*, is, That *I ſay, that Demonſtration is by way of Intuition of Ideas, and that Reaſon is only the Faculty employ'd in diſcovering and comparing Ideas with themſelves, or with others intervening; and that this is the only way of Certainty.* Whereas your Lordſhip *affirms, and*, as you ſay, *have prov'd, That there can be no Demonſtration by Intuition of Ideas; but that all the Certainty we can attain to, is from general Principles of Reaſon, and neceſſary Deductions made from them.* Anſw. I have ſaid, that Demonſtration conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the intermediate *Idea*, with thoſe whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement it is to ſhew, in each ſtep of the Demonſtration: And if you will ſay this is different from the way of Demonſtration by Reaſon, it will then be to the point above-mention'd, which you have been ſo long upon. If this be your Meaning here, it ſeems pretty ſtrangely expreſs'd, and remains to be prov'd: But if any thing elſe be your Meaning, that Meaning not being the Propoſition to be prov'd, it matters not whether you have prov'd it or no.

P. 146. Your Lordſhip farther ſays here, *That all the* Certainty we can attain *to, is from general Principles of Reaſon, and neceſſary Deductions made from them.* This, you ſay, you *have prov'd.* What has been prov'd, is to be ſeen in what has been already conſider'd. But if your Proof, *That all the Certainty we can attain to, is from general Principles of Reaſon, and neceſſary Deductions made from them*, were as clear and cogent, as it ſeems to me the contrary; this will not reach to the point in debate, till your Lordſhip has prov'd, that this is oppoſite to my way of Certainty by *Ideas*. 'Tis ſtrange (and perhaps to ſome may be matter of thought) that in an Argument wherein you lay ſo much ſtreſs on *Maxims, general Principles of Reaſon*, and *neceſſary Deductions from them*, you ſhould never once tell us, what, in your account, a *Maxim* or *general Principle of Reaſon* is, nor the Marks it is to be known by; nor offer to ſhew what a *neceſſary Deduction* is, nor how it is to be made, or may be known. For I have ſeen Men pleaſe themſelves with *Deductions* upon *Deductions*, and ſpin Conſequences, it matter'd not whether out of their own or other Mens Thoughts; which, when look'd into, were viſibly nothing but mere Ropes of Sand.

P. 114. 'Tis true, your Lordſhip ſays, *you now come to Certainty of Reaſon by Deductions.* But when all that truly learned Diſcourſe which follows, is read over and over again, I would be glad to be told, what it is your Lordſhip calls a *neceſſary Deduction*; and by what *Criterion* you diſtinguiſh it from ſuch Deductions, as come ſhort of Certainty, or even of Truth it ſelf. I confeſs I have read over thoſe Pages more than once, and can find no ſuch *Criterion* laid down in them by your Lordſhip, tho' a *Criterion* be there much talk'd of. But whether it be my want of Capacity for your way of writing, that makes me not find any light given by your Lordſhip into this matter; or whether in truth you have not ſhew'd, wherein what you call a *neceſſary Deduction* conſiſts, and how it may be known from what is not ſo, the Reader muſt judg. This I crave leave to ſay, That when you have ſhewn what *general Principles of Reaſon* and *neceſſary Deductions* are, the world will then ſee, and not till then, whether this your way of *Certainty by Reaſon, from general Principles and neceſſary Deductions made from them*,

them, be oppoſite to, or ſo much as different from, my way of Certainty by *Ideas*, which was the thing to be ſhewn.

In the Paragraph under Conſideration, you blame me, that in my Chapter concerning *Reaſon* I have treated it only as a *Faculty*, and not in the other *Senſes* which I there give of that Word. This Exception to my Book, is, I ſuppoſe, only from your Lordſhip's general Care of letting nothing paſs in my *Eſſay*, which you think needs an amendment. For any particular Reaſon, that brings it in here, or ties it on to this part of your Diſcourſe, I confeſs I do not ſee. However, to this I anſwer, P. 145.

1. The Underſtanding as a Faculty, being the Subject of my *Eſſay*, it carry'd me to treat directly of Reaſon no otherwiſe than as a Faculty. But yet *Reaſon* as ſtanding for true and clear Principles, and alſo as ſtanding for clear and fair Deductions from thoſe Principles, I have not wholly omitted; as is manifeſt from what I have ſaid of ſelf-evident Propoſitions, intuitive Knowledg, and Demonſtration, in other parts of my *Eſſay*. So that your Queſtion, *Why in a Chapter of Reaſon are the two other Senſes of the word neglected?* P. 145. blaming me for no other fault that I am really guilty of, but want of Order, and not putting every thing in its *proper place*; does not appear to be of ſo mighty weight, but that I ſhould have thought it might have been left to the little Nibblers in Controverſy, without being made uſe of by ſo great a Man as your Lordſhip. But the putting things out of their *proper place*, being that which your Lordſhip thinks fit to except againſt in my Writings, it ſo falls out, that to this too I can plead not guilty. For in that very Chapter of Reaſon, I have not omitted to treat of *Principles* and *Deductions*; and what I have ſaid there, I preſume is enough to let others ſee, that I have not neglected to declare my poor Senſe about ſelf-evident Propoſitions, and the Cogency and Evidence of demonſtrative or probable Deductions of Reaſon: Tho' what I have ſaid there, not being back'd with Authorities, nor warranted by the Names of ancient Philoſophers, was not worth your Lordſhip's taking notice of. §. 2, 3, 4, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,

I have, I confeſs, been ſo unwary to write out of my own Thoughts, which your Lordſhip has, more than once, with ſome ſort of Reprimand taken notice of. I own it, your Lordſhip is much in the right: the ſafer way is, never to declare one's own Senſe in any material point. If I had fill'd my Book with Quotations and Collections of other Mens Opinions, it had ſhewn much more Learning, and had much more ſecurity in it; and I my ſelf had been ſafe from the Attacks of the Men of Arms, in the Commonwealth of Letters: But in writing my Book, I had no Thoughts of War, my Eye was fix'd only on Truth, and that with ſo ſincere and unbiaſs'd an Endeavour, that I thought I ſhould not have incur'd much blame, even where I had miſs'd it. This I perceive, too late, was the wrong way: I ſhould have kept my ſelf ſtill ſafe upon the reſerve. Had I learnt this Wiſdom of *Thraſo* in *Terence*, and reſolv'd with my ſelf, *Hic ego ero poſt principia*; perhaps I might have deſerv'd the Commendation was given him, *Illuc eſt ſapere ut hos inſtruxit ipſus ſibi cavit loco.* But I deſerv'd to be ſoundly corrected, for not having profited by Reading, ſo much as this comes to.

But to return to your Accuſation here, which all together ſtands thus: *Why in a Chapter of Reaſon are the other two Senſes neglected? We might have expected here full Satisfaction as to the Principles of Reaſon, as diſtinct from the Faculty, but* the Author of the *Eſſay wholly avoids* it. What I gueſs theſe words accuſe me to have *avoided*, I think I have ſhewn already that I did not *avoid*. P. 145.

Before you conclude, you ſay, *you muſt obſerve that I prove, That Demonſtration muſt be by Intuition, in an extraordinary manner from the ſenſe of the word.* He that will be at the pains to read that Paragraph which you quote for it, will ſee that I do not prove that *it muſt be by Intuition*, becauſe it is call'd *Demonſtration*; but that it is call'd *Demonſtration*, becauſe it is *by Intuition*. And as to the Propriety of it, what your Lordſhip ſays in the following words, *It would be moſt proper for ocular Demonſtration or by the Finger*, will not hinder it from being *proper* alſo in mental Demonſtration, as long as the Perception of the Mind is properly expreſs'd by ſeeing. P. 146. Eſſay, B. 4. C. 2. §. 3. P. 147.

Againſt my obſerving, that the *Notation* of the word imported ſhewing or making to ſee, your Lordſhip farther ſays, *Demonſtration among ſome Philoſophers* P. 152.

ſignify'd

ſignify'd only the Concluſion of an Argument, *whereby we are brought from ſomething we did perceive, to ſomething we did not*; which ſeems to me to agree with what I ſay in the caſe, *viz.* That by the Agreement of *Ideas* which we do perceive, we are brought to perceive the Agreement of *Ideas* which before we did
P. 152. not perceive. To which no doubt will be anſwer'd, as in a like caſe, *Not by a way of Intuition, but by a Deduction of Reaſon*; i. e. we perceive not in a way that affords us *Intuition* or a Sight, but by Deductions of Reaſon, wherein we ſee nothing. Whereas, my Lord, I humbly conceive, that the Force of a Deduction of Reaſon conſiſts in this, That in each ſtep of it we ſee what a Connection it has, *i. e.* have an Intuition of the certain Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas*, as in Demonſtration; or an Intuition or Perception, that they have a probable, or not ſo much as a probable Connection, as in other Deductions of Reaſon.

P. 147. You farther overthrow the neceſſity of intuitive Knowledg, in every ſtep of a Demonſtration, by the Authority of *Ariſtotle*, who ſays, *Things that are ſelf-evident cannot be demonſtrated.* And ſo I ſay too, in ſeveral places of my *Eſſay.* When your Lordſhip can ſhew any Inconſiſtency between theſe two Propoſitions, viz. *That intuitive Knowledg is neceſſary in each ſtep of a Demonſtration*, and *Things that are ſelf-evident cannot be demonſtrated*; then I ſhall own you have overthrown the neceſſity of Intuition in every ſtep of a Demonſtration by Reaſon, as well as by *Ariſtotle*'s Authority.

B. 4. C. 7. §. 10, 19. and elſewhere. B. 4. C. 2.

P. 148--150. In the remainder of this Paragraph, I meet with nothing but your Lordſhip finding fault with ſome, who, *in this Age*, have made uſe of Mathematical Demonſtrations in Natural Philoſophy. Your Lordſhip's two Reaſons againſt this way of advancing Knowledg upon the ſure Grounds of Mathematical Demonſtration, are theſe:

P. 148. (1.) That *Des Cartes, a Mathematical Man, has been guilty of Miſtakes* in his *Syſtem. Anſw.* When *Mathematical Men* will build Syſtems upon Fancy, and not upon Demonſtration, they are as liable to Miſtakes as others. And that *Des Cartes* was not led into his Miſtakes by Mathematical Demonſtrations, but for want of them, I think has been demonſtrated by * ſome of thoſe Mathematicians who ſeem to be meant here.

*Mr. *Newton* Phil. Natur. Princip. Mathemat. *l.* 2. §. 9.

(2.) Your ſecond Argument againſt *accommodating Mathematicks to the nature of material things*, is, *That Mathematicians cannot be certain of the manner and degrees of Force given to Bodies, ſo far diſtant as the fix'd Stars; nor of the Laws of Motion in other Syſtems.* A very good Argument why they ſhould not proceed demonſtratively in this our Syſtem upon Laws of Motion, obſerv'd to be eſtabliſh'd here: A Reaſon that may perſuade us to put out our Eyes, for fear they ſhould miſlead us in what we do ſee, becauſe there be things out of our ſight.

P. 149. 'Tis great pity *Ariſtotle* had not underſtood Mathematicks as well as Mr. *Newton*, and made uſe of it in Natural Philoſophy with as good ſucceſs: His Example had then authoriz'd *the accommodating of it to material things.* But 'tis not to be ventur'd, by a Man of *this Age*, to go out of the Method which *Ariſtotle* has preſcrib'd, and which your Lordſhip, out of him, has ſet down in the following Pages, as that which ſhould be kept to: For it is a dangerous Preſumption to go out of a track chalk'd out by that ſuppos'd Dictator in the Commonwealth of Letters, tho' it led him to the Eternity of the World. I ſay not this, that I do not think him a very great Man; he made himſelf ſo, by not keeping preciſely to beaten Tracks: which ſervile Subjection of the Mind, if we may take my Lord *Bacon*'s word for it, kept the little Knowledg the World had from growing greater, for more than a few Ages. That the breaking looſe from it in *this Age*, is a Fault, is not directly ſaid; but there is enough ſaid, to ſhew there is no great Approbation of ſuch a Liberty. Mathematicks in groſs, 'tis plain, are a Grievance in Natural Philoſophy, and with reaſon: For Mathematical Proofs, like Diamonds, are hard as well as clear, and will be touch'd with nothing but ſtrict Reaſoning. Mathematical Proofs are out of the reach of topical Arguments, and are not to be attack'd by the equivocal uſe of Words or Declamation, that make ſo great a part of other Diſcourſes; nay, even of Controverſies. How well you have prov'd my way by *Ideas* guilty of any Tendency to Scepticiſm, the Reader will ſee; but this I will crave leave to ſay, That the ſecluding Mathematical Reaſoning from Philoſophy, and inſtead thereof

thereof reducing it to *Ariſtotelian* Rules and Sayings, will not be thought to be much in favour of Knowledg againſt Scepticiſm.

Your Lordſhip indeed ſays, *You did not by any means take off from the laudable Endeavours of thoſe, who have gone about to reduce Natural Speculations to Mathematical Certainty.* What can we underſtand by this, but your Lordſhip's great Complaiſance and Moderation? who, notwithſtanding you ſpend four Pages to ſhew that the Endeavours of *Mathematical Men, to accommodate the Principles of that Science to the Nature of material things, has been the occaſion of great Miſtakes in the Philoſophy of this Age*; and that therefore *Ariſtotle's* Method is to be follow'd: Yet you make this Compliment to the Mathematicians, That you leave them to their Liberty to go on, if they pleaſe, in their *laudable Endeavours to reduce Natural Speculations to Mathematical Certainty.* P. 149.

And thus we are come to the end of your Lordſhip's *clearing* this Paſſage; *That you grant that by Senſation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of things; but our Reaſon* [i. e. *the Principles of Reaſon agreed on by Mankind*] *is ſatisfy'd, that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe; becauſe it is impoſſible they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves: So that the Nature of things properly belongs to Reaſon* [i. e. *the Principles of Reaſon agreed on by Mankind*] *and not to mere Ideas.* Which if any one be ſo lucky as to underſtand by theſe your Lordſhip's fifty Pages ſpent upon it, better than my Friend did, when he confeſs'd himſelf gravel'd by it, as it ſtands here recited, he ought to enjoy the Advantage of his happy Genius, whilſt I miſs that Satisfaction by the Dulneſs of mine; which hinders me alſo from ſeeing how the Oppoſition of the *way of Certainty by Ideas*, and the *way of Certainty by Reaſon*, comes in, in the Explication of this Paſſage: or at leaſt, if it does belong to it, yet I muſt own, what is a greater misfortune, That I do not ſee what the Oppoſition or Difference is, which your Lordſhip has ſo much talk'd of between the *way of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reaſon.* For my Excuſe, I think others will be as much in the dark as I, ſince you no where tell wherein you your ſelf, my Lord, place Certainty. So that to talk of a Difference between *Certainty by Ideas*, and Certainty that is not by *Ideas*, without declaring in what that other Certainty conſiſts; is like to have no better ſucceſs, than might be expected from one who would compare two things together, the one whereof is not known.

You now return to your Diſcourſe of *Nature and Perſon*, and tell me, That, to what you ſaid about the *general Nature in diſtinct Individuals*, I object theſe three things: P. 154.

(1.) "That I cannot put together one and the ſame and diſtinct:" This I own to be my Objection; *And conſequently there is no Foundation for the Diſtinction of Nature and Perſon.* This, with Submiſſion, I deny to be any Objection of mine, either in the place quoted by your Lordſhip, or any where elſe. There may be foundation enough for Diſtinction, as there is of theſe two, and yet they may be treated of in a way ſo obſcure, ſo confus'd, or perhaps ſo ſublime, that an ordinary Capacity may not from thence get, as your Lordſhip expreſſes it, *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of them.* This was that which my Friend and I complain'd of in that place, want of Clearneſs in your Lordſhip's Diſcourſe, not of want of Diſtinction in the things themſelves. Lett. 2. p. 127.

(2.) "That what your Lordſhip ſaid about *common Nature*, and *particular* "*Subſtance in Individuals*, was wholly unintelligible to me and my Friends." To which, my Lord, you may add if you pleaſe, That it is ſtill ſo to me.

(3.) That I ſaid, "That to ſpeak truly and preciſely of this matter as in reali-"ty it is, there is no ſuch thing as *one and the ſame common Nature in ſeveral Indi-"viduals*; for all that in truth is in them, is particular, and nothing but par-"ticular, *&c.*" *Anſw.* This was ſaid, to ſhew how unapt theſe Expreſſions, *The ſame common Nature in ſeveral Individuals*; *and ſeveral Individuals being in the ſame common Nature*; were to give true and clear Notions of *Nature*. To this your Lordſhip anſwers, That other, and thoſe *very rational Men*, have ſpoken ſo: To which I ſhall ſay no more, but that it is an Argument, with which any thing may be defended, and all the Jargon of the Schools be juſtify'd; but, I preſume, not ſtrong enough to bring it back again, let *Men* ever ſo *rational* make uſe of it. P. 156.

Your

P. 146. Your Lordſhip adds, *But now, it ſeems, nothing is intelligible but what ſuits with the new way of Ideas.* My Lord, *the new way of Ideas*, and the old way of ſpeaking *intelligibly*, was always, and ever will be the ſame. And if I may take the liberty to declare my Senſe of it, herein it conſiſts: (1.) That a Man uſe no words but ſuch as he makes the Signs of certain determin'd Objects of his Mind in thinking, which he can make known to another. (2.) Next, that he uſe the ſame word ſteddily for the Sign of the ſame immediate Object of his Mind in Thinking. (3.) That he join thoſe words together in Propoſitions, according to the Grammatical Rules of that Language he ſpeaks in. (4.) That he unite thoſe Sentences in a coherent Diſcourſe. Thus, and thus only, I humbly conceive, any one may preſerve himſelf from the Confines and Suſpicion of Jargon, whether he pleaſes to call thoſe immediate Objects of his Mind, which his words do or ſhould ſtand for, *Ideas* or no.

P. 156. You again accuſe the way of *Ideas*, to make a *common Nature no more than a common Name.* That, my Lord, is not my way by *Ideas.* When your Lordſhip ſhews me where I have ſaid ſo, I promiſe your Lordſhip to ſtrike it out: and the like I promiſe when you ſhew me where *I preſume that we are not to judg of*
P. 156. *things by the general Principles of Reaſon*, which you call my *Fundamental Miſtake.*

P. 157. *Theſe Principles of Reaſon*, you ſay, *muſt be the Standard to Mankind.* If they are of ſuch conſequence, would it not have been convenient we ſhould have been inſtructed ſomething more particularly about them, than by barely being told their name; that we might be able to know what are, and what are not *Principles of Reaſon?*

But be they what they will, becauſe they muſt be the Standard to Mankind,
P. 157. your Lordſhip ſays, You *ſhall in* this *Debate proceed upon the following Principles, to make it appear that the Difference between Nature and Perſon is not imaginary and fictitious, but grounded upon the real Nature of things.* With Submiſſion, my Lord, you need not be at the pains to draw up your great Artillery of ſo many *Maxims*, where you meet with no Oppoſition. The thing in Debate, whether in *this Debate* or no, I know not, but what led into *this Debate*, was about theſe Expreſſions; *One common Nature in ſeveral Individuals, and ſeveral Individuals in one common Nature:* and the Queſtion, I thought, was, whether a general or *common Nature* could be *in Particulars, i. e.* exiſt in Individuals? But ſince your Lordſhip turns your Artillery againſt thoſe who deny that there is any *Foundation of Diſtinction between Nature and Perſon*, I am out of Gun-ſhot; for I am none of thoſe, who ever ſaid or thought there was no *Foundation of Diſtinction between Nature and Perſon.*

P. 158. The Maxims you lay down in the following Paragraph, are to make me underſtand how *one and the ſame and diſtinct may conſiſt*; I confeſs, I do not ſee how your Lordſhip's words there at all make it out. This, indeed, I do underſtand, that ſeveral particular Beings may have a conformity in them to one general abſtract *Idea*, which may, if you pleaſe, be call'd their general or *common Nature:* But how that *Idea* or general Nature can *be the ſame and diſtinct*, is ſtill paſt my Comprehenſion.

To my ſaying, That your Lordſhip had not told me what *Nature* is, I am
P. 159. told, That *if I had a mind to underſtand you, I could not but ſee*, that by *Nature you meant the Subject of eſſential Properties.* A Lady asking a learned Phyſician what the Spleen was, receiv'd this anſwer, That it was the Receptacle of the melancholy Humour. She had a mind to underſtand what the Spleen was, but by this Definition of it found her ſelf not much enlighten'd; and therefore went on to ask, what the melancholy Humour was: and by the Doctor's anſwer found that the Spleen and the melancholy Humour had a relation one to another; but what the Spleen was, ſhe knew not one jot better than ſhe did before he told her any thing about it. My Lord, relative Definitions of Terms that are not relative, uſually do no more than lead us into a Circuit to the ſame place from whence we ſet out, and there leave us in the ſame Ignorance we were in at firſt. So I fear it would fall out with me here, if I, willing as I am to *underſtand* what your Lordſhip means by *Nature*, ſhould go on to ask what you mean by *eſſential Properties.*

P. 159--161. Lett. 2. p. 132--135. The three or four next Pages, I hope, your Lordſhip does not think contain any ſerious Anſwer to what my Friend ſaid concerning *Peter, James*, and *John*; and

and as for the Pleaſantry of your *Countryman*, I ſhall not pretend to meddle with that, ſince your Lordſhip, who knows better than any body his way of *chopping of Logick*, was fain to give it off, becauſe it was growing too rough. What work ſuch a dangerous *Chopper of Logick* would make, with an Argument that ſuppos'd the names *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, to ſtand for Men; and then without ſcruple affirm'd, That the Nature of Man was in them; if he were let looſe upon it: who can tell? Eſpecially if he might have the liberty ſtrenuouſly to uſe the Phraſe *for his Life*, and to obſerve what a turn the chiming of words, without determin'd *Ideas* annex'd to them, *give to the Underſtanding, when they are gone deep into a Man's Head*, and paſs there for things.

To ſhew that the *common* or general *Nature of Man* could not be in *Peter* or *James*, I alledg'd, That whatever exiſted (as whatever was in *Peter* or *James* did) was particular; and that it confounded my Underſtanding, to make a General a Particular. In anſwer, your Lordſhip tells me, That to make me underſtand this, you had told me in your Anſwer to my firſt Letter, *That we are to conſider Beings as God had order'd them in their ſeveral ſorts and ranks*, &c. And thereupon you ask me, *Why it was not anſwer'd in the proper place for it?* Anſw. I own I am not always ſo fortunate, as to ſay things in that, which your Lordſhip thinks the *proper place*; but having been rebuked for Repetitions, I thought your Lordſhip could not be ignorant, that I had *conſider'd Beings as God had order'd them in their ſeveral ſorts and ranks*, &c. ſince you could not but have read theſe words of mine: "I would not here be thought to forget, much leſs to "deny, that Nature in the production of things makes ſeveral of them alike. "There is nothing more obvious, eſpecially in the Races of Animals, and all "things propagated by Seed, *&c.*" And I have expreſs'd my Senſe in this point ſo fully here, and in other places, particularly *B.* 3. *C.* 6. that I dare leave it to my Reader, without any farther Explication.

P. 164. P. 165. Eſſay, B. 3. C. 3. §. 13.

Your Lordſhip farther asks, *Is not that a real Nature, which is the Subject of real Properties? And is not the Nature really in thoſe who have the eſſential Properties?* I anſwer to both thoſe Queſtions, Yes; ſuch as is the *Reality* of the Subject, ſuch is the Reality of its Properties: the abſtract general *Idea* is *really* in the Mind of him that has it, and the Properties that it has are *really* and inſeparably annex'd to it; let this *Reality* be whatever your Lordſhip pleaſes: But this will never prove, that this general Nature exiſts in *Peter* or *James*. Thoſe *Properties*, with ſubmiſſion, do not, as your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, exiſt in *Peter* and *James*: Thoſe Qualities indeed may exiſt in them, which your Lordſhip calls *Properties*; but they are not *Properties* in either of them, but are *Properties* only of that ſpecifick abſtract Nature, which *Peter* and *James*, for their ſuppos'd conformity to it, are rank'd under. For example, *Rationality*, as much a *Property* as it is of a *Man*, is no *Property* of *Peter*. He was rational a good part of his Life, could *write and read, and was a ſharp Fellow at a Bargain*; but about Thirty, a knock ſo alter'd him, that for theſe twenty Years paſt he has *been able to do none of theſe things*: there is to this day not ſo much appearance of Reaſon in him, as in his Horſe or Monkey, and yet he is *Peter* ſtill.

P. 165.

Your Lordſhip asks, *Is not that a real Nature, that is the Subject of real Properties? And is not that Nature really in thoſe who have the ſame eſſential Properties?* Give me leave, I beſeech you, to ask, Are not thoſe diſtinct real Natures, that are the Subjects of diſtinct eſſential Properties? For example, the Nature of an Animal is the *Subject of eſſential Properties* of an Animal, with the excluſion of thoſe of a Man or a Horſe; for elſe the Nature of an Animal, and the Nature of a Man, and the Nature of a Horſe, would be the ſame: and ſo, wherever the Subject of the eſſential Properties of an Animal is, there alſo would be the Subject of the eſſential Properties of a Man, and of a Horſe; and ſo, in effect, whatever is an Animal, would be a Man: the *real Nature* of an Animal, and the *real Nature* of a Man, being the ſame. To avoid this, there is no other way (if this Reality your Lordſhip builds ſo much on, be any thing beyond the Reality of two abſtract diſtinct *Ideas* in the Mind) but that there be one *real Nature* of an Animal, the *Subject of the eſſential Properties* of an Animal; and another *real Nature* of a Man, the *Subject of the eſſential Properties* of a Man: both which *real Natures* muſt be in *Peter*, to make him a Man. So that every individual Man or Beaſt, muſt, according to this account, have two *real Natures* in him, to

P. 165.

make him what he is: nay, if this be ſo, two will not ſerve the turn. *Bucephalus* muſt have the *real Natures* of *Ens* or *Being*, and the *real Nature* of *Body*, and the *real Nature* of *Vivens*, and the *real Nature* of *Animal*, and the *real Nature* of a *Horſe*, *i. e.* Five diſtinct *real Natures in him*, to make him *Bucephalus*: For theſe are all *really* diſtinct *common Natures*, whereof one is not the *Subject* of preciſely the ſame *eſſential Properties* as the other. This, tho' very hard to my Underſtanding, muſt be really ſo, if every diſtinct, *common*, or general *Nature*, be a *real* Being, that really exiſts any where but in the Underſtanding: *Common*

P. 164. *Nature, taken in my way of Ideas, your Lordſhip truly ſays, will not make me underſtand ſuch a common Nature as you ſpeak of, which ſubſiſts in ſeveral* Individuals, *becauſe I can have no Ideas of real Subſtances, but ſuch as are particular; all others are only abſtract Ideas, and made only by the Act of the Mind.* But what your Lordſhip farther promiſes there, I find, to my ſorrow, does not hold, *viz.* That in your Lordſhip's way (as far as you have diſcover'd it) which you call *the way of Reaſon, I may come to a better underſtanding of this matter.*

P. 166. Your Lordſhip in the next Paragraph declares your ſelf *really aſham'd to be put to explain theſe things*, that which you had ſaid being ſo very plain and eaſy: And yet I am not *aſham'd* to own, *that for my Life* I cannot underſtand them, as they are now farther explain'd. Your Lordſhip thinks it prov'd, That every *common Nature* is a *real* Being: Let it be ſo, that it is the Subject of *real Properties*, and that thereby it is demonſtrated to be a *real* Being; this makes it harder for me to conceive, that this *common Nature of a Man*, which is a *real* Being, and but one, ſhould yet *be really in* Peter, *in* James, *and in* John. Had *Amphitruo* been able to conceive this, he had not been ſo much puzzled, or thought *Sofia* to talk idle, when he told him, *Domi ego ſum inquam & apud te adſum Sofia idem.* For the *common Nature of Man*, is a *real* Being as your Lordſhip ſays, and *Sofia* is no more: And he that can conceive any *one and the ſame real Being* to be in divers places at once, can have no difficulty to conceive it of another *real* Being. And ſo *Sofia* may at the ſame time be at home, and with his Maſter abroad: And *Amphitruo* might have been *aſham'd* to demand the Explication of ſo plain a matter; or at leaſt, if he had ſtuck a little at *here* and *there* too, ought he not to have been ſatisfy'd, as ſoon as *Sofia* had told him, *I am another diſtinct I* here, *from the ſame I that I am* there? Which, no doubt, *Sofia* could have made out: let your Lordſhip's *Countryman chop Logick* with him, and try whether he cannot. *Countryman.* But how is it poſſible, *Sofia*, that thou the *real ſame*, as thou ſay'ſt, ſhould'ſt be at home and here too? *Sofia.* Very eaſily, becauſe I am *really* the *ſame*, and yet *diſtinct*. *Countrym.* How can this be? *Sofia.* By a Trick that I have. *Countrym.* Canſt thou teach me the Trick? *Sofia.* Yes: 'Tis but for thee to get *a particular Subſiſtence proper to thy real* ſelf at home, and another *particular Subſiſtence proper* to thy *ſame real* ſelf abroad, and the buſineſs is done: thou wilt then eaſily be the ſame *real* thing, and *diſtinct* from thy ſelf; and thou mayſt be in as many places together, as thou canſt get *particular Subſiſtences*, and be ſtill the ſame one *real* Being. *Countrym.* But what is that *particular Subſiſtence? Sofia.* Hold ye, hold ye, Friend, that's the Secret! I thought once it was *particular Exiſtence*, but that I find is an ineffectual Drug, and will not do: Every one ſees it will not make the *ſame real* Being *diſtinct* from it ſelf, nor bring it into two different places at once, and therefore it is laid aſide, and *Subſiſtence* is taken to do the feat. *Countrym.* Exiſtence my Boy's Schoolmaſter made me underſtand, the other day, when my grey Mare foled. For he told me that a Horſe, that never was before, began then to exiſt; and when the poor Fole died, he told me the ſame Horſe ceas'd to exiſt. *Sofia.* But did he tell thee what became of the *real common Nature* of an Horſe that was in it when the Fole died? *Countrym.* No: But this I know, that my *real* Horſe was really deſtroy'd. *Sofia.* There's now thy Ignorance! So much of thy Horſe as had a *real Exiſtence*, was really deſtroy'd, that's true: But there was ſomething in thy Horſe, which having a real *particular Subſiſtence*, was not deſtroy'd; nay, and the beſt part of thy Horſe too: for it was that, which had in it all thoſe Properties that made thy Horſe better than a Broomſtick. *Countrym.* Thou tell'ſt me wonders of this ſame *Subſiſtence*; what, I pray thee, is it? *Sofia.* I beg your pardon for that; it is the very Philoſopher's Stone: thoſe who are *Adepti*, and can do ſtrange things with it, are wiſer than to tell what it is. *Countrym.* Where

may

may it be bought then? *Sofia.* That I know not: But I will tell thee where thou mayſt meet with it. *Countrym.* Where? *Sofia.* In ſome of the ſhady Thickets of the Schoolmen; and 'tis worth the looking after. For if *particular Subſiſtence* has ſuch a power over a *real Being*, as to make one and the *ſame real Being* to be *diſtinct*, and in divers places at once, it may perhaps be able to give thee an Account what becomes of that *real Nature* of thy Horſe after thy Horſe is dead; and if thou canſt but find whither that retires, who knows but thou mayſt get as uſeful a thing as thy Horſe again? ſince to that *real Nature* of thy Horſe, inſeparably adheres the Shape and Motion, and other Properties of thy Horſe.

I hope, my Lord, your *Countryman* will not be diſpleas'd to have met with *Sofia* to *chop Logick* with, who, I think, has made it as intelligible, how his *real* ſelf might be the *ſame* and *diſtinct*, and be really in diſtinct places at once, by the help of a *particular Subſiſtence proper to him* in each place; as it is intelligible how any *real Being* under the name of *a common Nature*, or under any other name beſtow'd upon it, may be the *ſame* and *diſtinct*, and *really* be in divers places at once, by the help of *a particular Subſiſtence proper to each of thoſe diſtinct ſames.* At leaſt, if I may anſwer for my ſelf, I underſtand one as well as the other: And if my Head be turn'd from *common Senſe* (as I find your Lordſhip very apt to think) ſo that it is *great News to you that I underſtand a-* P. 169. *ny thing*; if in my way of *Ideas* I cannot underſtand words, that appear to me either to ſtand for no *Ideas*, or to be ſo join'd, that they put inconſiſtent *Ideas* together; I think your Lordſhip uſes me right, to turn me off for deſperate, and *leave me, as you do, to the Reader's Underſtanding.* P. 169.

To your Lordſhip's many Queſtions concerning *Men* and *Drills*, in the Paragraph where you begin to explain what my Friend and I found difficult in your Diſcourſe concerning *Perſon*; I anſwer, that theſe two *Names*, *Man* and *Drill*, P. 169, 170. are perfectly *arbitrary*, whether *founded* on real *diſtinct Properties* or no: ſo perfectly *arbitrary*, that, if Men had pleas'd, *Drill* might have ſtood for what *Man* now does, and *vice verſa*. I anſwer farther, That theſe two Names ſtand for two abſtract *Ideas*, which are (to thoſe who know what they mean by theſe two Names) the diſtinct Eſſences of two diſtinct *Kinds*; and as particular Exiſtences, or things exiſting are found by Men (who know what they mean by theſe Names) to agree to either of thoſe *Ideas* which theſe Names ſtand for; theſe Names reſpectively are apply'd to thoſe particular things, and the things ſaid to be of that *Kind*. This I have ſo fully and at large explain'd in my *Eſſay*, that I ſhould have thought it needleſs to have ſaid any thing again of it here, had it not been to ſhew my readineſs to anſwer any Queſtions you ſhall be pleas'd to ask concerning any thing I have writ, which your Lordſhip either finds difficult, or has forgot.

In the next place, your Lordſhip comes to clear what you had ſaid in anſwer to this Queſtion put by your ſelf, *What is this Diſtinction of* Peter, James, *and* Vindic. p. John *founded upon?* To which you anſwer'd, *That they may be diſtinguiſh'd from* 259. *each other by our Senſes, as to Difference of Features, Diſtance of Place, &c. But* Ibid. *that is not all; for ſuppoſing there was no external Difference, yet there is a Difference between them, as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature.* Theſe Words when my Friend and I came to conſider, we own'd, as your Lordſhip here takes P. 171. notice, that we could underſtand no more by them but this; "That the Ground "of Diſtinction between ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature, is, "That they are ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature." Hereupon your Lordſhip tells me, *The Queſtion now is, What this Diſtinction is founded upon?* P. 171. *Whether on our obſerving the Difference of Features, Diſtance of Place, &c. or on ſome antecedent Ground?*

Purſuant hereunto, as if this were the Queſtion, you in the next Paragraph (as far as I can underſtand it) make *the Ground of the Diſtinction between theſe In-* P. 171. *dividuals*, or the *Principium Individuationis*, to be the *Union of the Soul and Body*. But with Submiſſion, my Lord, the Queſtion is, Whether I and my Friend were to blame, becauſe when your Lordſhip, in the words above-cited, having remov'd all other Grounds of Diſtinction, ſaid, *There was yet a Difference between* Peter *and* James, *as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature*; we could underſtand no more by it, but this, "That the Ground of Diſtinction

" between ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature, is, that they are " ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature."

Let the Ground that your Lordſhip now aſſigns of the Diſtinction of Individuals be what it will, or let what you ſay be as clear as you pleaſe, *viz.* That *the Ground of their Diſtinction* is in *the Union of Soul and Body*; it will, I humbly conceive, be nevertheleſs true, that what you ſaid before might amount to no more but this, " That the Ground of the Diſtinction between ſeveral Indi- " viduals in the ſame common Nature, is, That they are ſeveral Individuals " in the ſame common Nature:" and therefore we might not be to blame for ſo underſtanding it. For the words which our Underſtandings were then employ'd about, were thoſe which you had there ſaid, and not thoſe which you would ſay five Months after: Tho' I muſt own, that thoſe which your Lordſhip
P. 171—173. here ſays concerning the *Diſtinction of Individuals*, leave it as much in the dark to me as what you ſaid before. But perhaps I do not underſtand your Lordſhip's words right, becauſe I conceive that the *Principium Individuationis* is the ſame in all the ſeveral Species of Creatures, Men as well as others; and therefore if the *Union of Soul and Body* be that which diſtinguiſhes two Individuals in the human Species one from another, I know not how two Cherries, or two Atoms of Matter, can be diſtinct Individuals; ſince I think there is in them no *Union of a Soul and Body*. And upon this ground it will be very hard to tell what made the *Soul* and the *Body Individuals* (as certainly they were) before their Union.

But I ſhall leave what your Lordſhip ſays concerning this matter to the Examination of thoſe, whoſe Health and Leiſure allows them more time than I have for this weighty Queſtion, Wherein the Diſtinction of two Men or two Cherries conſiſts: for fear I ſhould make your Lordſhip's *Countryman* a little wonder again, to find a *grave Philoſopher make a ſerious Queſtion of it.*

P. 173, 174. To your next Paragraph, I anſwer, That if the *true Idea of a Perſon*, or the true Signification of the word Perſon *lies in this*, That *ſuppoſing* there was no other *Difference in the ſeveral Individuals of the ſame kind*, yet there is *a Difference between them as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature*; it will follow from hence, that the name *Perſon* will agree to *Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, as well as to *Alexander* and *Hector*. But whether this Conſequence will agree with what your Lordſhip ſays concerning *Perſon* in another place, I am not concern'd; I am only anſwerable for this Conſequence.

P. 173. Your Lordſhip is pleas'd here to call my Endeavour to find out the meaning of your words, as you had put them together, *trifling Exceptions*. To which I muſt ſay, That I am heartily ſorry, that either my Underſtanding, or your Lordſhip's way of Writing obliges me ſo often to ſuch *trifling*. I cannot, as I have ſaid, anſwer to what I do not underſtand; and I hope here my *trifling*, in ſearching out your Lordſhip's meaning, was not much out of the way, becauſe I think every one will ſee by the Steps I took, that the Senſe I found out by it was that which your words imply'd; and your Lordſhip does not diſown it, but only replies, That I ſhould not have drawn that which was the natural Conſequence from it, becauſe that Conſequence would not well conſiſt with what you had ſaid in another Place.

P. 174, 175. What your Lordſhip adds farther to clear your ſaying, *That an individual intelligent Subſtance is rather ſuppos'd to the making of a Perſon, than the proper Definition of it*; tho' in your Definition of *Perſon*, you put *a compleat intelligent Subſtance*, muſt have its Effect upon others Underſtandings; I muſt ſuffer under the ſhort-ſightedneſs of my own, who neither underſtood it as it ſtood in your firſt Anſwer, nor do I now as it is explain'd in your ſecond.

P. 176. Your Lordſhip being here, as you ſay, come to the end of this Debate, I ſhould here have ended too; and it was time, my Letter being grown already to too great a Bulk: But I being ingag'd by Promiſe to anſwer ſome things in your firſt Letter, which in my Reply to it I had omitted, I now come to them, and ſhall endeavour to give your Lordſhip Satisfaction in thoſe Points; tho' to make room for them, I leave out a great deal that I had writ in anſwer to this your Lordſhip's ſecond Letter. And if, after all, my Anſwer ſeems too long, I muſt beg your Lordſhip and my Reader to excuſe it, and impute it to thoſe occaſions

occaſions of length, which I have mention'd in more places than one, as they have occur'd.

The original and main Queſtion between your Lordſhip and me, being, whether there were any thing in my Eſſay repugnant to the Doctrine of the Trinity; I endeavour'd, by examining the Grounds and manner of your Lordſhip's drawing my Book into that Controverſy, to bring that Queſtion to a Deciſion. And therefore in my Anſwer to your Lordſhip's firſt Letter, I inſiſted particularly on what had a relation to that point. This Method your Lordſhip in your ſecond Letter cenſur'd, as if it contain'd only *Perſonal Matters*, which were fit to be laid aſide. And by mixing new Matter, and charging my Book with new Accuſations, before the firſt was made out, avoided the Deciſion of what was in Debate between us; a ſtrong Preſumption to me, that your Lordſhip had little to ſay to ſupport what began the Controverſy, which you were ſo willing to have me let fall; whilſt on the other ſide, my Silence to other Points which I had promis'd an Anſwer to, was often reflected on, and I rebuk'd for not anſwering *in the proper Place.*

Your Lordſhip's calling upon me on this occaſion ſhall not be loſt; 'tis fit your Expectation ſhould be ſatisfy'd, and your Objections conſider'd; which, for the Reaſons above mention'd, were not examin'd in my former Anſwer: and which, whether true or falſe, as I humbly conceive, make nothing for or againſt the Doctrine of the Trinity. I ſhall therefore conſider them barely as ſo many philoſophical Queſtions, and endeavour to ſhew your Lordſhip where, and upon what Grounds 'tis I ſtick; and what it is that hinders me from the Satisfaction it would be to me, to be in every one of them of your mind.

Your Lordſhip tells me, *Whether I do not own Subſtance or not, is not the point before us; but whether by virtue of theſe Principles I can come to any Certainty of Reaſon about it. And your Lordſhip ſays, the very Places I produce do prove the contrary; which you ſhall therefore ſet down in my own Words, both as to Corporeal and Spiritual Subſtances.* Anſw. 1. p. 7.

Here again, my Lord, I muſt beg your pardon, that I do not diſtinctly comprehend your meaning in theſe Words, *viz. That by virtue of theſe Principles one cannot come to Certainty of Reaſon about Subſtance:* For it is not very clear to me, whether your Lordſhip means, that we cannot *come to Certainty* that there is ſuch a thing in the World as *Subſtance*; or whether we cannot make any other Propoſition about *Subſtance*, of which we can be *certain*; or whether we cannot by my Principles eſtabliſh any *Idea* of *Subſtance*, of which we can be *certain*. For to come to *Certainty of Reaſon about Subſtance* may ſignify either of theſe, which are far different Propoſitions: And I ſhall waſte your Lordſhip's time, my Reader's, and my own (neither of which would I willingly do) by taking it in one Senſe, when you mean it in another, leſt I ſhould meet with ſome ſuch Reproof as this; That I *miſrepreſent your meaning, or might have underſtood it if I had a mind to it*, &c. And therefore cannot but wiſh, that you had ſo far condeſcended to the Slowneſs of my Apprehenſion, as to have given me your Senſe ſo determin'd, that I might not trouble you with Anſwers to what was not your preciſe meaning.

To avoid it in the preſent Caſe, and to find in what Senſe I was here to take theſe Words, *come to no Certainty of Reaſon about Subſtance*, I look'd into what follow'd, and when I came to the 13th Page, I thought I had there got a clear Explication of your Lordſhip's Meaning, and that by *no Certainty of Reaſon about Subſtance*, your Lordſhip here meant *no certain Idea of Subſtance.* Your Lordſhip's Words are, *I do not charge them* (*i. e.* me as one of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reaſoning) *with diſcarding the Notion of Subſtance, becauſe they have but an imperfect Idea of it; but becauſe, upon thoſe Principles, there can be* no certain Idea *at all of it.* Here I thought my ſelf ſure, and that theſe Words plainly interpreted the meaning of your Propoſition, p. 7. to be, *That upon my Principles there can be no certain Idea at all of Subſtance.* But before I came to the end of that Paragraph, I found my ſelf at a loſs again; for that Paragraph goes on in theſe Words: *Whereas your Lordſhip aſſerts it to be one of the moſt natural and certain Ideas in our Minds becauſe it is a Repugnance to our firſt Conception of things, that Modes or Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves;* Anſw. 1. p. 13. Anſw. 1. p. 13.

themſelves; and therefore you ſaid, the rational Idea of Subſtance is one of the firſt Id as in our Minds: and however imperfect and obſcure our Notion be, yet we are as certain *that Subſtances* are *and muſt* be, *as that there* are *any Beings in the World.* Here the *Certainty*, which your Words ſeem to mean, is *Certainty of the Being of Subſtance.*

In this Senſe therefore I ſhall take it, till your Lordſhip ſhall determine it otherwiſe: And the Reaſon why I take it ſo, is, becauſe what your Lordſhip goes on to ſay, ſeems to me to look moſt that way. The Propoſition then that your Lordſhip undertakes to prove, is this; *That by Virtue of my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty of Reaſon, that there is any ſuch thing as Subſtance:* And your Lordſhip tells me, *That the very Places I produce do prove the contrary, which you therefore will ſet down in my own Words, both as to Corporeal and Spiritual Subſtances.*

Anſw. 1. *p.* 7, 8.

Anſw. 1. *p.* 7.

Anſw. 1. *p.* 6. The firſt your Lordſhip brings, are theſe Words of mine: "When we talk "or think of any particular ſort of Corporeal Subſtances, as Horſe, Stones, *&c.* "tho' the *Idea* we have of either of them be but the Complication or Collection "of thoſe ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* of ſenſible Qualities, which we uſe to find united "in the thing call'd Horſe or Stone; yet becauſe we cannot conceive how "they ſhould ſubſiſt alone, nor one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in, "and ſupported by ſome common Subject; which Support we denote by the "name Subſtance: tho' it be certain, we have no clear and diſtinct *Idea* of that "thing we ſuppoſe a Support." And again,

"The ſame happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, *viz.* Think- "ing, Reaſoning, Fearing, *&c.* which we conſidering not to ſubſiſt of them- "ſelves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produc'd by "it, we are apt to think theſe the Actions of ſome other Subſtance, which "we call Spirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other *Idea* or No- "tion of Matter, but ſomething wherein thoſe many ſenſible Qualities, which "affect our Senſes, do ſubſiſt; by ſuppoſing a Subſtance, wherein Thinking, "Knowing, Doubting, and a Power of Moving, *&c.* do ſubſiſt; we have as "clear a Notion of the Nature or Subſtance of Spirit, as we have of Body; "the one being ſuppos'd to be (without knowing what it is) the *Subſtratum* "to thoſe ſimple *Ideas* we have from without; and the other ſuppos'd (with "alike Ignorance of what it is) to be the *Subſtratum* to thoſe Operations "which we experiment in our ſelves."

But how theſe Words prove, That *upon my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty of Reaſon, that there is any ſuch thing as Subſtance in the World*; I confeſs I do not ſee, nor has your Lordſhip, as I humbly conceive, ſhewn. And I think it would be a hard matter from theſe Words of mine to make a Syllogiſm, whoſe Concluſion ſhould be, Ergo, *From my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty of Reaſon that there is any Subſtance in the World.*

Anſw. 1. *p.* 9. Your Lordſhip indeed tells me, that *I ſay*, "That theſe and the like "Faſhions of ſpeaking, that Subſtance is always ſuppos'd ſomething;" *and grant that I ſay over and over*, That Subſtance is ſuppos'd: but *that*, your Lordſhip ſays, *is not what you looked for, but ſomething in the way of Certainty by Reaſon.*

What your Lordſhip looks for, is not, I find, always eaſy for me to gueſs. But what I brought that, and ſome other Paſſages to the ſame purpoſe for, out of my Eſſay, that, I think, they prove, *viz.* That I did not *diſcard*, nor *almoſt diſcard Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World.* For he that ſuppoſes in every Species of material Beings, Subſtance to be always ſomething, doth not *diſcard* or *almoſt diſcard* it out of the World, or deny any ſuch thing to be. The Paſſages alledg'd, I think, prove this; which was all I brought them for. And if they ſhould happen to prove no more, I think, you can hardly infer from thence, That therefore *upon my Principles we can come to no Certainty that there is any ſuch thing as Subſtance in the World.*

Anſw. 1. *p.* 9. Your Lordſhip goes on to inſiſt mightily upon my *ſuppoſing*; and to theſe Words of mine, "We cannot conceive how theſe ſenſible Qualities ſhould "ſubſiſt alone, and therefore we ſuppoſe a Subſtance to ſupport them," your Lordſhip replies, *It is but ſuppoſing ſtill; becauſe we cannot conceive it otherwiſe: But what Certainty follows from not being barely able to conceive? Anſw.*

The

The ſame *Certainty* that *follows from the Repugnancy to our firſt Conceptions of things*, upon which your Lordſhip grounds the relative *Idea* of Subſtance. Your words are, *It is a mere Effect of Reaſon, becauſe it is a Repugnancy to our firſt Conceptions of things, that Modes or Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves.* Your Lordſhip then, if I underſtand your Reaſoning here, concludes that there is Subſtance, *becauſe it is a Repugnancy to our Conceptions of things* (for whether that *Repugnancy* be to our firſt or ſecond Conceptions, I think that's all one) *that Modes or Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves*; and I conclude the ſame thing, becauſe we cannot conceive how ſenſible Qualities ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. Now what the difference of *Certainty* is from *a Repugnancy to our Conceptions*, and from our not being able to conceive; I confeſs, my Lord, I am not acute enough to diſcern. And therefore it ſeems to me, that I have laid down the ſame *Certainty* of the Being of Subſtance, that your Lordſhip has done. Anſw. 1. p. 25.

Your Lordſhip adds, *Are there not multitudes of things which we are not able to conceive? and yet it would not be allow'd us to ſuppoſe what we think fit upon that account. Anſw.* Your Lordſhip's is certainly a very juſt Rule; 'tis pity it does not reach the Caſe. *But becauſe it is not allow'd us to ſuppoſe what we think fit in things, which we are not able to conceive*; it does not therefore follow, That we may not with certainty ſuppoſe or infer, that which is a natural and undeniable Conſequence of ſuch an Inability to conceive, as I call it, or *Repugnancy to our Conceptions*, as you call it. We cannot conceive the Foundation of *Harlem* Church to ſtand upon nothing; but becauſe it is not allow'd us to ſuppoſe what we think fit, *viz.* That it is laid upon a Rock of Diamond, or ſupported by Fairies; yet I think all the World will allow the infallible Certainty of this Suppoſition from thence, that it reſts upon ſomething. This I take to be the preſent Caſe; and therefore your next words, I think, do leſs concern Mr. *L.* than my Lord B. of *W.* I ſhall ſet them down, that the Reader may apply them to which of the two he thinks they moſt belong. They are, *I could hardly conceive that Mr.* L. *would have brought ſuch Evidence as this againſt himſelf; but I muſt ſuppoſe ſome unknown* Subſtratum *in this Caſe.* For theſe words, that your Lordſhip has laſt quoted of mine, do not only not prove, That *upon my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty, that there is any ſuch thing as Subſtance in the World*; but prove the contrary, That there muſt certainly be Subſtance in the World, and upon the very ſame Grounds that your Lordſhip takes it to be certain. Anſw. 1. p. 9. Anſw. 1. p. 9.

Your next Paragraph, which is to the ſame purpoſe, I have read more than once, and can never forbear, as often as I read it, to wiſh my ſelf young again; or that a Livelineſs of Fancy, ſuitable to that Age, would teach me to ſport with words for the Diverſion of my Readers. This I find your Lordſhip thinks ſo neceſſary to the quickning of Controverſy, that you will not truſt the Debate to the Greatneſs of your Learning, nor the Gravity of your Subject without it, whatever Authority the Dignity of your Character might give to what your Lordſhip ſays: For you having quoted theſe words of mine; "As long as "there is any ſimple *Idea*, or ſenſible Quality left, according to my way of "arguing, Subſtance cannot be diſcarded; becauſe all ſimple *Ideas*, all ſenſible "Qualities *carry* with them a Suppoſition of a Subſtratum to exiſt in, and a "Subſtance wherein they inhere:" You add, *What is the meaning of* carrying with them a Suppoſition of a Subſtratum and a Subſtance? *Have theſe* ſimple Ideas *the Notion of a* Subſtance *in them? No*, but they *carry* it with them: *How ſo? Do* ſenſible Qualities *carry* a Corporeal Subſtance *along with them? Then* a Corporeal Subſtance *muſt be* intromitted *by the Senſes together with them: No, but they* carry the Suppoſition with them; *and truly that is* burden *enough for them. But which way do they* carry *it? It ſeems it's only* becauſe we cannot conceive it otherwiſe: *What is this* Conceiving? *It may be ſaid it is* an Act of the Mind, *not built on ſimple Ideas, but lies in the comparing the Ideas of Accident and Subſtance together; and from thence finding that an Accident muſt* carry *Subſtance along with it: But this will not clear it; for the Ideas of* Accidents *are* ſimple Ideas, *and* carry *nothing along with them, but the Impreſſion made by ſenſible Objects.* Anſw. 1. p. 10. Anſw. 1. p. 10.

In this Paſſage, I conclude, your Lordſhip had ſome regard to the Entertainment of that part of your Readers, who would be thought Men, as well by being riſible as rational Creatures. For I cannot imagine you meant this for an Argument; if you did, I have this plain ſimple anſwer, That by *carrying with them*

them a Suppoſition, I mean, according to the ordinary Import of the Phraſe, that ſenſible Qualities imply a *Subſtratum* to exiſt in. And if your Lordſhip pleaſe to change one of theſe equivalent Expreſſions into the other, all the Argument here, I think, will be at an end: What will become of the Sport and Smiling, I will not anſwer.

Hitherto, I do not ſee any thing in my words brought by your Lordſhip that proves, *That upon my Principles we can come to no Certainty of Reaſon, that there is Subſtance in the World*; but the contrary.

Anſw. 1. *p.* 11, 12. Your Lordſhip's next words are to tell the World, that my Simile about the Elephant and Tortoiſe, *is to ridicule the Notion of Subſtance, and the* European *Philoſophers for aſſerting it.* But if your Lordſhip pleaſe to turn again to my

B. 2. C. 13. §. 19. *Eſſay*, you will find thoſe Paſſages were not intended to ridicule the *Notion of Subſtance*, or thoſe who *aſſerted it*, whatever that *It ſignifies*: But to ſhew, that tho' *Subſtance* did ſupport Accidents, yet Philoſophers, who had found ſuch a Support neceſſary, had no more a clear *Idea* of what that Support was, than the *Indian* had of that which ſupported his Tortoiſe, tho' ſure he was it was ſome-

Anſw. 1. *p.* 11. thing. Had your Pen, which quoted ſo much of the nineteenth Section of the thirteenth Chapter of my ſecond Book, but ſet down the remaining Line and a half of that Paragraph, you would by theſe words which follow there, "So "that of Subſtance we have no *Idea* of what it is, but only a confus'd and ob- "ſcure one of what it does;" have put it paſt doubt what I meant. But your Lordſhip was pleas'd to take only thoſe which you thought would ſerve beſt to your purpoſe; and I crave leave to add now theſe remaining ones, to ſhew my Reader what was *mine*.

B. 2. C. 23. §. 2. 'Tis to the ſame purpoſe I uſe the ſame Illuſtration again in that other place, which you are pleas'd to cite likewiſe; which your Lordſhip ſays you did, *only to ſhew that it was a deliberate and* (*as I thought*) *lucky Similitude.* It was upon ſerious Conſideration, I own, that I entertain'd the Opinion, that we had no clear and diſtinct *Idea* of *Subſtance*. But as to that *Similitude*, I do not remember that it was much deliberated on; ſuch inaccurate Writers as I am, who aim at nothing but Plainneſs, do not much ſtudy Similes: and for the *Fault of Repetition*, you have been pleas'd to pardon it. But ſuppoſing you had prov'd, That that Simile was to *ridicule the Notion of Subſtance*, publiſh'd in the Writings of ſome *European* Philoſophers; it will by no means follow from thence, That *upon my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty of Reaſon, that there is any ſuch thing as Subſtance in the World.* Mens Notions of a thing may be laugh'd at by thoſe, whoſe Principles eſtabliſh the Certainty of the thing it ſelf; and one may laugh at *Ariſtotle's* Notion of an Orb of Fire under the Sphere of the Moon, without Principles that will make him uncertain whether there be any ſuch thing as Fire. *My Simile* did perhaps ſerve to ſhew, that there were Philoſophers, whoſe Knowledg was not ſo clear, nor ſo great as they pretended. If your Lordſhip thereupon thought, that the Vanity of ſuch a Pretenſion had ſomething ridiculous in it, I ſhall not conteſt your Judgment in the Caſe: For, as human Nature is fram'd, 'tis not impoſſible that whoever is diſcover'd to pretend to know more than really he does, will be in danger to be laugh'd at.

Anſw. 1. *p.* 12. In the next Paragraph, your Lordſhip beſtows the Epithet of *Dull* on *Burgerſdicius* and *Sanderſon, and the Tribe of Logicians.* I will not queſtion your Right to call any Body *Dull*, whom you pleaſe: But if your Lordſhip does it to inſinuate that I did ſo, I hope I may be allow'd to ſay thus much in my own defence, That I am neither ſo ſtupid or ill-natur'd, to diſcredit thoſe whom I quote, for being of the ſame Opinion with me. And he that will look into the eleventh and twelfth Pages of my *Reply*, which your Lordſhip refers to, will find that I am very far from calling them *Dull*, or ſpeaking diminiſhingly of them. But if I had been ſo ill-bred or fooliſh, as to have call'd them *Dull*; I do not ſee how that does at all ſerve to prove this Propoſition, That *upon my Principles we can come to as Certainty of Reaſon, that there is any ſuch thing as Subſtance*;

Anſw. 1. *p.* 13. any more than what follows in the next Paragraph.

Your Lordſhip in it asks me, as if it were of ſome great importance to the Propoſition to be prov'd, whether *there be no difference between the bare Being of a thing, and its Subſiſtence by it ſelf?* I anſwer, Yes; there is a difference, as I underſtand thoſe Terms: and then I beſeech your Lordſhip to make uſe of it, to

prove

prove the Propoſition before us. But becauſe you ſeem by this Queſtion to conclude, That the *Idea* of a *thing that ſubſiſts by it ſelf*, is a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of *Subſtance*; I beg leave to ask, Is the *Idea* of the manner of *Subſiſtence* of a thing, the *Idea* of the thing it ſelf? If it be not, we may have a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of the manner, and yet have none but a very obſcure and confus'd one of the thing. For example, I tell your Lordſhip, that I know a thing that cannot ſubſiſt without a Support, and I know another thing that does ſubſiſt without a Support, and ſay no more of them; can you, by having the clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of having a Support, and not having a Support, ſay, that you have a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of the thing, that I know, which has, and of the thing, that I know, which has not a Support? If your Lordſhip can, I beſeech you to give me the clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of theſe, which I only call by the general name *Things*, that have or have not Supports: for ſuch there are, and ſuch I ſhall give your Lordſhip clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of, when you ſhall pleaſe to call upon me for them; tho' I think your Lordſhip will ſcarce find them by the general and confus'd *Idea* of *Thing*, nor in the clearer and more diſtinct *Idea* of having or not having a Support.

To ſhew a blind Man that he has no clear and diſtinct *Idea* of Scarlet, I tell him, that his Notion of it, That it is a *Thing* or *Being*, does not prove he has any clear or diſtinct *Idea* of it; but barely that he takes it to be *ſomething*, he knows not what. He replies, that he knows more than that; *v. g.* he knows that it ſubſiſts or inheres in another thing: *And is there no difference*, ſays he in your Lordſhip's words, *between the bare Being of a thing, and its Subſiſtence in another?* Yes, ſay I to him, a great deal; they are very different *Ideas*. But for all that, you have no clear and diſtinct *Idea* of *Scarlet*, not ſuch a one as I have, who ſee and know it, and have another kind of *Idea* of it beſides that of Inherence.

Your Lordſhip has the *Idea* of *ſubſiſting by it ſelf*, and therefore you conclude you have a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of the thing that *ſubſiſts by it ſelf*; which methinks is all one, as if your Countryman ſhould ſay, he hath an *Idea* of a Cedar of *Lebanon*, that it is a Tree of a nature to need no Prop to lean on for its Support, therefore he hath a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of a Cedar of *Lebanon*: which clear and diſtinct *Idea*, when he comes to examine, is nothing but a general one of a Tree, with which his indetermin'd *Idea* of a Cedar is confounded. Juſt ſo is the *Idea* of *Subſtance*, which, however call'd clear and diſtinct, is confounded with the general indetermin'd *Idea* of *Something*. But ſuppoſe that the manner of ſubſiſting by it ſelf, give us a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of *Subſtance*, how does that prove, That *upon my Principles we can come to no Certainty of Reaſon, that there is any ſuch thing as Subſtance in the World?* Which is the Propoſition to be prov'd.

In what follows, your Lordſhip ſays, *You do not charge any one with diſcarding the Notion of Subſtance, becauſe he has but an imperfect Idea of it; but becauſe upon thoſe Principles there can be no certain Idea at all of it.* Anſw. 1. p. 13.

Your Lordſhip ſays here *thoſe Principles*, and in other places *theſe Principles*, without particularly ſetting them down, that I know. I am ſure, without laying down Propoſitions that are mine, and proving that, thoſe granted, *we cannot come to any Certainty that there is any ſuch thing as Subſtance*, which is the thing to be prov'd; your Lordſhip proves nothing in the Caſe againſt me. What therefore the *certain Idea*, which I do not underſtand, or *Idea* of Subſtance, has to do here, is not eaſy to ſee. For that which I am charg'd with, is the *diſcarding Subſtance*. But the *diſcarding Subſtance*, is not the *diſcarding the Notion of Subſtance*. Mr. *Newton* has diſcarded *Des Cartes's Vortices*, i. e. laid down Principles from which he proves there is no ſuch thing; but he has not thereby diſcarded the *Notion* or *Ideas* of thoſe *Vortices*, for that he had when he confuted their Being, and every one who now reads and underſtands him, will have. But, as I have already obſerv'd, your Lordſhip here, I know not upon what ground, nor with what intention, confounds the *Ideas of Subſtance* and *Subſtance* it ſelf: for to the words above ſet down, your Lordſhip ſubjoins, *That you aſſert it to be one of the moſt natural and certain Ideas in our Minds, becauſe it is a Repugnance to our firſt Conception of things, that Modes or Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves; and therefore your Lordſhip ſaid, the rational Idea of Subſtance is one of* Anſw. 1. p. 13, 14.

the firſt Ideas in our Minds, and however imperfect and obſcure our Notion be, yet we are as certain that Subſtances are and muſt be, *as that there are any Beings in the World.* Herein I tell your Lordſhip that I agree with you, and therefore I hope this is no Objection againſt the Trinity. *Your Lordſhip ſays, you never thought it was: but to lay all Foundations of Certainty, as to matters of Faith, upon clear and diſtinct Ideas, which was the Opinion you oppos'd, does certainly overthrow all Myſteries of Faith, and excludes the Notion of Subſtance out of rational Diſcourſe; which* your Lordſhip affirms *to have been your Meaning.*

How theſe words, *as to matters of Faith*, came in, or what they had to do againſt me in an Anſwer only to me, I do not ſee: neither will I here examine what it is to be *one of the moſt natural and certain Ideas in our Minds.* But be it what it will, this I am ſure, That neither that, nor any thing elſe contain'd in this Paragraph, any way proves, that *upon my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty that there is any ſuch thing as Subſtance in the World:* Which was the Propoſition to be prov'd.

In the next place then, I crave leave to conſider how that is prov'd, which tho' nothing to the Propoſition to be prov'd, is yet what you here aſſert; *viz. That the Idea of Subſtance is one of the moſt natural and certain Ideas in our Minds:* Your proof of it is this, *becauſe it is a Repugnancy to our firſt Conception of things, that Modes and Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves, and therefore the rational Idea of Subſtance is one of the firſt Ideas in our Minds.* From whence I grant it to be a good Conſequence, that to thoſe who find this *Repugnance*, the *Idea* of a Support is very neceſſary; or, if you pleaſe to call it ſo, very *rational.* But a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of the thing it ſelf, which is the Support, will not thence be prov'd to be one of the *firſt Ideas in our Minds*; or that any ſuch *Idea* is ever there at all. He that is ſatisfy'd that *Pendennis*-Caſtle, if it were not ſupported, would fall into the Sea, muſt think of a Support that ſuſtains it: But whether the thing that it reſts on be Timber, or Brick, or Stone, he has by his bare *Idea* of the neceſſity of ſome Support that props it up, no clear and diſtinct *Idea* at all.

In this Paragraph you farther ſay, *That the laying all Foundation of Certainty as to Matters of Faith on clear and diſtinct Ideas, does certainly exclude the Notion of Subſtance out of rational Diſcourſe. Anſw.* This is a Propoſition that will need a Proof; becauſe every body at firſt ſight will think it hard to be prov'd. For it is obvious, That let *Certainty in matters of Faith*, or any matters whatſoever, be laid on what it will, it *excludes not the Notion of Subſtance certainly out of rational Diſcourſe*; unleſs it be certainly true, that we can *rationally diſcourſe* of nothing but what we certainly know. But whether it be a Propoſition eaſy or not eaſy to be prov'd, this is certain, that it concerns not me; for I *lay not all Foundation of Certainty, as to matters of Faith, upon clear and diſtinct Ideas:* and therefore if it does *diſcard Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World*, as your Lordſhip phraſes it above, or *excludes the Notion of Subſtance out of rational Diſcourſe*; whatever havock it makes of *Subſtance*, or its *Idea*, no one jot of the Miſchief is to be laid at my door, becauſe that is no Principle of mine.

Anſw. 1. p. 14. Your Lordſhip ends this Paragraph with telling me, that *I at length apprehend your Lordſhip's Meaning.*

I wiſh heartily that I did, becauſe it would be much more for your eaſe, as well as my own. For in this caſe of *Subſtance*, I find it not eaſy to know your *Meaning*, or what it is I am blamed for. For in the beginning of this Diſpute, it is the *Being of Subſtance*; and here again, it is *Subſtance* it ſelf is *diſcarded.* And in this very Paragraph, writ as it ſeems to explain your ſelf, ſo that in the cloſe of it you tell me that at *length I apprehend your Meaning to be that the Notion of Subſtance is excluded out of rational Diſcourſe*; the Explication is ſuch, that it renders your Lordſhip's Meaning to me more obſcure and uncertain than it was before. For in the ſame Paragraph your Lordſhip ſays, That *upon my Principles there can be no certain* Idea *at all of Subſtance*; and alſo that *however imperfect and obſcure our Notions be, yet we are as certain that Subſtances are and muſt be, as that there are any* Beings *in the World.* So that ſuppoſing I did know (as I do not) what your Lordſhip means by *certain Idea of Subſtance*; yet I muſt own ſtill, that what *your Meaning* is by *diſcarding* of *Subſtance*, whether it be the *Idea* of *Subſtance*, or the *Being* of *Subſtance*, I do not know. But that, I think, need not much trouble me, ſince your Lordſhip does not, that I ſee, ſhew how

Vindic. p. 236. P. 7. P. 13, 14.

how any Poſition or Principle of mine overthrows either *Subſtance* it ſelf, or the *Idea* of it, or excludes either of them *out of rational Diſcourſe.*

In your next paragraph, you ſay, *I declare*, p. 35. *That if any one aſſert that we can have no Ideas but from Senſation and Reflection, it is not my Opinion.* My Lord, I have look'd over that 35th Page, and find no ſuch words of Mine there: but refer my Reader to that and the following Pages, for my Opinion concerning *Ideas* from Senſation and Reflection, how far they are the Foundation and Materials of all our Knowledg. And this I do, becauſe to thoſe Words which your Lordſhip has ſet down as mine, out of the 35th Page, but are not there, you ſubjoin, That *you are very glad of it, and will do me all the right you can in this matter*; which ſeems to imply, That it is a matter of great conſequence, and therefore I deſire my Meaning may be taken in my own words, as they are ſet down at large. Anſw. 1. p. 14. Anſw. 1. p. 14. Lett. 1. p. 35—38.

The Promiſe your Lordſhip makes me, *of doing me all the right you can*, I return my humble Thanks for, becauſe it is a piece of Juſtice ſo ſeldom done in Controverſy; and becauſe I ſuppoſe you have here made me this Promiſe, to authorize me to mind you of it, if at any time your haſte ſhould make you miſtake my Words or Meaning: to have one's Words exactly quoted, and their Meaning interpreted by the plain and viſible Deſign of the Author in his whole Diſcourſe, being a *Right* which every Writer has a juſt Claim to, and ſuch as a Lover of Truth will be very wary of violating. An inſtance of ſome ſort of intrenchment on this, I humbly conceive, there is in the next Page but one, where you interpret my Words, as if I excus'd a Miſtake I had made, by calling it a Slip of my Pen; whereas, my Lord, I do not own any Slip of my Pen in that place, but ſay that the Meaning of my Expreſſion there is to be interpreted by other places, and particularly by thoſe where I treat profeſſedly of that Subject: And that in ſuch caſes, where an Expreſſion is only incident to the matter in hand, and may ſeem not exactly to quadrate with the Author's Senſe, where he deſignedly treats of that Subject, it ought rather to be interpreted as a Slip of his Pen, than as his Meaning. I ſhould not have taken ſo particular a notice of this, but that you, by having up theſe Words with an Air, that makes me ſenſible how wary I ought to be, ſhew what uſe would be made of it, if ever I had pleaded *the Slip of my Pen.* Anſw. 1. p. 16.

In the following Pages I find a Diſcourſe drawn up under ſeveral Ranks of Numbers, to prove, as I gueſs, this Propoſition, That *in my way of Ideas we cannot come to any Certainty as to the Nature of Subſtance.* I ſhall be in a condition to anſwer to this Accuſation, when I ſhall be told what particular Propoſition, *as to the Nature of Subſtance*, it is, which *in my way of Ideas we cannot come to any Certainty of.* Becauſe probably it may be ſuch a Propoſition concerning the Nature of Subſtance, as I ſhall readily own, that *in my way of Ideas we can come to no Certainty of*; and yet I think the way of *Ideas* not at all to be blamed, till there can be ſhewn another way, different from that of *Ideas*, whereby we may come to a *Certainty* of it. For 'twas never pretended, that by *Ideas* we could come to Certainty concerning every Propoſition, that could be made concerning Subſtance or any thing elſe. Anſw. 1. p. 15—29. Anſw. 1. p. 20.

Beſides the Doubtfulneſs viſible in the Phraſe it ſelf, there is another Reaſon that hinders me from underſtanding preciſely what is meant by theſe words, *to come to a Certainty as to the Nature of Subſtance*; *viz.* Becauſe your Lordſhip makes *Nature* and *Subſtance* to be *the ſame*: ſo that to *come to a Certainty as to the Nature of Subſtance*, is, in your Lordſhip's ſenſe of *Nature*, *to come to a Certainty as to the Subſtance of Subſtance*; which, I own, I do not clearly underſtand. p. 100, 101.

Another thing that hinders me from giving particular Anſwers to the Arguments that may be ſuppos'd to be contain'd in ſo many Pages, is, that I do not ſee, how what is diſcours'd in thoſe thirteen or fourteen Pages is brought to prove this Propoſition, *That in my way of Ideas we cannot come to any Certainty as to the Nature of Subſtance*: and it would require too many words, to examine every one of thoſe Heads, Period by Period, to ſee what they prove; when you your ſelf do not apply them to the direct Probation of any Propoſition, that I underſtand.

Indeed you wind up this Diſcourſe with theſe words, *That you leave the Reader to judg whether this be a tolerable account of the Idea of Subſtance by Senſation and* Anſw. 1. p. 29.

and Reflection. Answ. That which your Lordship has given in the preceding Pages, *I think is not a very tolerable account of my Idea of Substance*; since the account you give over and over again of my *Idea* of Substance, is, that it *is nothing but a complex Idea of Accidents.* This is your account of my *Idea* of Substance, which you insist so much on, and which you say, you took out of those places, *I my self produc'd* in my first Letter. But if you had been pleas'd to have set down this one, which is to be found there amongst the rest produc'd by me out of *B.* 2. *Ch.* 12. *Sect.* 6. of my Essay, *viz.* "That the *Ideas* of Substances are such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are taken to represent "distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which, the suppos'd "or confus'd *Idea* of Substance is *always* the *first* and *chief.*" This would have been a full Answer to all that I think you have under that variety of Heads objected against my *Idea* of Substance. But your Lordship, in your Representation of my *Idea* of Substance, thought fit to leave this Passage out; tho' you are pleas'd to set down several others produc'd both before and after it in my first Letter: which, I think, gives me a right humbly to return your Lordship your own words; *And now I freely leave the Reader to judg whether this, which your Lordship has given, be a tolerable account of my Idea of Substance.*

Answ. 1. p. 47—79. Answ. 1. p. 67. The next Point to be consider'd, is concerning the Immateriality of the Soul; whereof there is a great deal said. The Original of this Controversy, I shall set down in your Lordship's own words: You say, *The only Reason you had to engage in this matter, was this bold Assertion, That the Ideas we have by Sensation or Reflection, are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning, and that our Certainty lies in perceiving the Agreement and Disagreement of Ideas, as expres'd in any Proposition: which last,* you say, *are my own words.*

Answ. 1. p. 68. Lett. 1. p. 67. Ibid. To overthrow *this bold Assertion,* you urge my acknowledgment, "That upon "my Principles it cannot be demonstratively prov'd, That the Soul is immaterial, tho' it be in the highest degree probable:" And then ask, *Is not this the giving up the Cause of Certainty? Answ.* Just as much *the giving up the Cause of Certainty* on my side, as it is on your Lordship's: who, tho' you will not please to tell wherein you place *Certainty*, yet it is to be suppos'd you do place *Certainty* in something or other. Now let it be what you will that you place *Certainty* in, I take the liberty to say, that you cannot certainly prove, *i. e.* demonstrate, that the Soul of Man is immaterial: I am sure you have not so much as offer'd at any such proof, and therefore you *give up the Cause of Certainty* upon your Principles. Because if the not being able to demonstrate that the Soul is immaterial, upon his Principles who declares wherein he thinks Certainty consists, be the *giving up of the Cause of Certainty*; the not being able to demonstrate the Immateriality of the Soul, upon his Principles, who does not tell wherein Certainty consists, is no less *a giving up of the Cause of Certainty.* The only odds between these two, is more Art and Reserve in the one than the other. And therefore, my Lord, you must either upon your Principles of Certainty demonstrate that the Soul is immaterial, or you must allow me to say, that you too *give up the Cause of Certainty*, and your Principles *tend to Scepticism* as much as mine. Which of these two your Lordship shall please to do, will to me be advantageous; for by the one I shall get a Demonstration of the Soul's Immateriality, (of which I shall be very glad) and that upon Principles, which reaching farther than mine, I shall embrace, as better than mine, and become your Lordship's professed Convert. Till then, I shall rest satisfy'd that my Principles, be they as weak and fallible as your Lordship please, are no more guilty of any such Tendency, than their's, who talking more of Certainty, cannot attain to it in cases where they condemn the *way of Ideas* for coming short of it.

Answ. 1. p. 68. You a little lower in the same Page set down these as my words, *That I never offer'd it as a way of Certainty, where we cannot reach Certainty.* I have already told you, that I have been sometimes in doubt what Copy you had got of my *Essay*; because I often found your Quotations out of it, did not agree with what I read in mine: But by this Instance here, and some others, I know not what to think; since in my Letter, which I did my self the Honour to send your Lordship, I am sure the words are not as they are here set down. For I say not that I *offer'd* the way of Certainty there spoken of; which looks as if it were

were a new way of Certainty that I pretended to teach the World. Perhaps the Difference in theſe, from my words, is not ſo great, that upon another occaſion I ſhould take notice of it: But it being to lead People into an Opinion, that I ſpoke of the way of Certainty by *Ideas*, as ſomething new which I pretended to teach the World, I think it worth while to ſet down my words themſelves; which I think are ſo pen'd, as to ſhew a great Caution in me to avoid ſuch an Opinion. My words are, "I think it is a way to bring us to a "Certainty in thoſe things, which I have offer'd as certain; but I never "thought it a way to Certainty, where we cannot reach Certainty." Lett. 1. p. 81.

What uſe your Lordſhip makes of the Term *Offer'd*, apply'd to what I apply'd it not, is to be ſeen in your next words, which you ſubjoin to thoſe which you ſet down for mine: *But did you not* offer *to put us into a way of Certainty? And what is that but to attain Certainty in ſuch things where we could not otherwiſe do it? Anſw.* If this your way of Reaſoning here carries Certainty in it, I humbly conceive, in your *way of Certainty by Reaſon*, Certainty may be attain'd where it could not otherwiſe be had. I only beg you, my Lord, to ſhew me the place, where I ſo *offer to put you in a way of Certainty* different from what had formerly been the way of Certainty, that Men by it might *attain to Certainty in things*, which they could not before my Book was writ. No body, who reads my *Eſſay* with that Indifferency which is proper to a Lover of Truth, can avoid ſeeing, that what I ſay of *Certainty* was not to teach the World *a new way of Certainty* (tho' that be one great Objection of your's againſt my Book) but to endeavour to ſhew wherein the old and only way of Certainty conſiſts. What was the Occaſion and Deſign of my Book, may be ſeen plainly enough in the Epiſtle to the Reader, without any need that any thing more ſhould be ſaid of it. And I am too ſenſible of my own Weakneſs not to profeſs, as I do, "That I pretend not to teach, but to enquire." I cannot but wonder what Service you, my Lord, who are a *Teacher* of Authority, mean to Truth or Certainty, by condemning the way of Certainty by *Ideas*; becauſe I own by it I cannot demonſtrate that the Soul is immaterial. May it not be worth your conſidering, what advantage this will be to *Scepticiſm*, when upon the ſame grounds, your words here ſhall be turn'd upon you; and it ſhall be ask'd, *What a ſtrange way of Certainty is this* [your Lordſhip's way by Reaſon] *if it fails us in ſome of the firſt Foundations of the real Knowledg of our ſelves?* Anſw. 1. p. 68. Eſſay, B. 2. C. 11. §. 17. Anſw. 1. p. 68.

To avoid this, you undertake to *prove from my own Principles, that we may be certain*, "That the firſt eternal Thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, cannot "if he would, give to certain Syſtems of created ſenſible Matter, put to-"gether as he ſees fit, ſome degrees of Senſe, Perception and Thought." For this, my Lord, is my Propoſition, and this the utmoſt that I have ſaid concerning the Power of Thinking in Matter. Anſw. 1. p. 69. Eſſay, B. 4. C. 3. §. 6.

Your firſt Argument I take to be this, That, according to me, the Knowledg we have being by our *Ideas*, and our *Idea* of Matter in general being a ſolid Subſtance, and our *Idea* of Body a ſolid extended figur'd Subſtance; if I admit Matter to be capable of Thinking, I confound the *Idea* of Matter with the *Idea* of a Spirit: To which I anſwer, No; no more than I confound the *Idea* of Matter with the *Idea* of an Horſe, when I ſay that Matter in general is *a ſolid extended Subſtance*; and that an Horſe is a material Animal, or an extended ſolid Subſtance with Senſe and ſpontaneous Motion. Anſw. 1. p. 69—73.

The *Idea* of Matter is an extended ſolid Subſtance; wherever there is ſuch a Subſtance, there is Matter, and the Eſſence of Matter, whatever other Qualities not contain'd in that Eſſence, it ſhall pleaſe God to ſuperadd to it. For example, God creates an extended ſolid Subſtance, without the ſuperadding any thing elſe to it, and ſo we may conſider it at reſt: To ſome parts of it he ſuperadds Motion, but it has ſtill the Eſſence of Matter: Other Parts of it he frames into Plants, with all the Excellencies of Vegetation, Life and Beauty, which is to be found in a Roſe or Peach-Tree, &c. above the Eſſence of Matter in general, but it is ſtill but Matter: To other Parts he adds Senſe and ſpontaneous Motion, and thoſe other Properties that are to be found in an Elephant. Hitherto 'tis not doubted but the Power of God may go, and that the Properties of a Roſe, a Peach, or an Elephant, ſuperadded to Matter, change not the Properties of Matter; but Matter is in theſe things Matter ſtill. But

if

if one venture to go one ſtep further, and ſay, God may give to Matter, Thought, Reaſon and Volition, as well as Senſe and ſpontaneous Motion, there are Men ready preſently to limit the Power of the Omnipotent Creator, and tell us he cannot do it; becauſe it deſtroys the Eſſence, or *changes the eſſential Properties* of Matter. To make good which Aſſertion, they have no more to ſay, but that Thought and Reaſon are not included in the Eſſence of Matter. I grant it; but whatever Excellency, not contain'd in its Eſſence, be ſuperadded to Matter, it does not deſtroy the Eſſence of Matter, if it leaves it an extended ſolid Subſtance; wherever that is, there is the Eſſence of Matter: and if every thing of greater Perfection, ſuperadded to ſuch a Subſtance, deſtroys the Eſſence of Matter, what will become of the Eſſence of Matter in a Plant, or an Animal, whoſe Properties far exceed thoſe of a mere extended ſolid Subſtance?

But 'tis farther urg'd, That we cannot conceive how Matter can think. I grant it; but to argue from thence, that God therefore cannot give to Matter a Faculty of thinking, is to ſay God's Omnipotency is limited to a narrow Compaſs, becauſe Man's Underſtanding is ſo; and brings down God's infinite Power to the ſize of our Capacities. If God can give no power to any Parts of Matter, but what Men can account for from the Eſſence of Matter in general; if all ſuch Qualities and Properties muſt deſtroy the Eſſence, or *change the eſſential Properties* of Matter, which are to our Conceptions above it, and we cannot conceive to be the natural Conſequence of that Eſſence: it is plain, that the Eſſence of Matter is deſtroy'd, and its *eſſential Properties chang'd* in moſt of the ſenſible Parts of this our Syſtem. For 'tis viſible, that all the Planets have Revolutions about certain remote Centers, which I would have any one explain, or make conceivable by the bare Eſſence or natural Powers depending on the Eſſence of Matter in general, without ſomething added to that Eſſence, which we cannot conceive: for the moving of Matter in a crooked Line, or the Attraction of Matter by Matter, is all that can be ſaid in the Caſe; either of which, it is above our Reach to derive from the Eſſence of Matter, or Body in general; tho' one of theſe two muſt unavoidably be allow'd to be ſuperadded in this Inſtance to the Eſſence of Matter in general. The Omnipotent Creator adviſ'd not with us in the making of the World, and his ways are not the leſs excellent, becauſe they are paſt our finding out.

In the next place, the Vegetable Part of the Creation is not doubted to be wholly material; and yet he that will look into it, will obſerve Excellencies and Operations in this part of Matter, which he will not find contain'd in the Eſſence of Matter in general, nor be able to conceive how they can be produc'd by it. And will he therefore ſay, That the Eſſence of Matter is deſtroy'd in them, becauſe they have Properties and Operations not contain'd in the eſſential Properties of Matter as Matter, nor explicable by the Eſſence of Matter in general?

Let us advance one Step farther, and we ſhall, in the Animal World, meet with yet greater Perfections and Properties, no ways explicable by the Eſſence of Matter in general. If the Omnipotent Creator had not ſuperadded to the Earth, which produc'd the irrational Animals, Qualities far ſurpaſſing thoſe of the dull dead Earth out of which they were made, Life, Senſe and ſpontaneous Motion, nobler Qualities than were before in it, it had ſtill remain'd rude ſenſleſs Matter; and if to the Individuals of each Species, he had not ſuperadded a Power of Propagation, the Species had periſh'd with thoſe Individuals: But by theſe Eſſences or Properties of each Species, ſuperadded to the Matter which they were made of, the Eſſence or Properties of Matter in general were not deſtroy'd or chang'd, any more than any thing that was in the Individuals before was deſtroy'd or chang'd by the Power of Generation, ſuperadded to them by the firſt Benediction of the Almighty.

In all ſuch Caſes, the Superinducement of greater Perfections and nobler Qualities, deſtroys nothing of the Eſſence or Perfections that were there before, unleſs there can be ſhew'd a manifeſt Repugnancy between them; but all the Proof offer'd for that, is only, that we cannot conceive how Matter, without ſuch ſuperadded Perfections, can produce ſuch Effects; which is, in truth, no more than to ſay, Matter in general, or every part of Matter, as Matter, has

them

them not; but is no Reaſon to prove that God, if he pleaſes, cannot ſuperadd them to ſome parts of Matter: unleſs it can be prov'd to be a Contradiction, that God ſhould give to ſome Parts of Matter Qualities and Perfections, which Matter in general has not; tho' we cannot conceive how Matter is inveſted with them, or how it operates by virtue of thoſe new Endowments. Nor is it to be wonder'd that we cannot, whilſt we limit all its Operations to thoſe Qualities it had before, and would explain them by the known Properties of Matter in general, without any ſuch ſuperinduc'd Perfections. For if this be a right Rule of Reaſoning to deny a thing to be, becauſe we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be; I ſhall deſire them who uſe it to ſtick to this Rule, and ſee what Work it will make both in Divinity as well as Philoſophy; and whether they can advance any thing more in favour of *Scepticiſm*.

For to keep within the preſent Subject of the Power of Thinking and Self-Motion, beſtow'd by Omnipotent Power on ſome Parts of Matter: The Objection to this is, I cannot conceive how Matter ſhould think. What is the Conſequence? *Ergo*, God cannot give it a Power to think. Let this ſtand for a good Reaſon, and then proceed in other Caſes by the ſame. You cannot conceive how Matter can attract Matter at any diſtance, much leſs at the diſtance of 1000000 Miles; *ergo*, God cannot give it ſuch a Power. You cannot conceive how Matter ſhould feel, or move it ſelf, or affect an immaterial Being, or be mov'd by it; *ergo*, God cannot give it ſuch Powers: which is in effect to deny Gravity and the Revolution of the Planets about the Sun; to make Brutes mere Machines, without Senſe or ſpontaneous Motion; and to allow Man neither Senſe nor voluntary Motion.

Let us apply this Rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how an extended ſolid Subſtance ſhould think, therefore God cannot make it think: Can you conceive how your own Soul, or any Subſtance thinks? You find indeed, that you do think, and ſo do I; but I want to be told how the Action of Thinking is perform'd: This, I confeſs, is beyond my Conception; and I would be glad any one, who conceives it, would explain it to me. God, I find, has given me this Faculty; and ſince I cannot but be convinc'd of his Power in this Inſtance, which tho' I every moment experiment in my ſelf, yet I cannot conceive the manner of; what would it be leſs than an inſolent Abſurdity, to deny his Power in other like Caſes, only for this Reaſon, becauſe I cannot conceive the manner how?

To explain this matter a little farther: God has created a Subſtance: let it be, for example, a ſolid extended Subſtance: Is God bound to give it, beſides Being, a Power of Action? that, I think, no body will ſay. He therefore may leave it in a ſtate of Inactivity, and it will be nevertheleſs a Subſtance; for Action is not neceſſary to the Being of any Subſtance that God does create. God has likewiſe created and made to exiſt, *de novo*, an immaterial Subſtance, which will not loſe its Being of a Subſtance, tho' God ſhould beſtow on it nothing more but this bare Being, without giving it any Activity at all. Here are now two diſtinct Subſtances, the one material, the other immaterial, both in a ſtate of perfect Inactivity. Now, I ask, what Power God can give to one of theſe Subſtances (ſuppoſing them to retain the ſame diſtinct Natures, that they had as Subſtances in their State of Inactivity) which he cannot give to the other? In that ſtate, 'tis plain, neither of them thinks; for Thinking being an Action, it cannot be deny'd, that God can put an end to any Action of any created Subſtance, without annihilating of the Subſtance whereof it is an Action: and if it be ſo, he can alſo create or give Exiſtence to ſuch a Subſtance, without giving that Subſtance any Action at all. By the ſame Reaſon it is plain, that neither of them can move it ſelf. Now I would ask, why Omnipotency cannot give to either of theſe Subſtances, which are equally in a ſtate of perfect Inactivity, the ſame Power that it can give to the other? Let it be, for example, that of ſpontaneous or Self-Motion, which is a Power that 'tis ſuppos'd God can give to an unſolid Subſtance, but deny'd that he can give to a ſolid Subſtance.

If it be ask'd, why they limit the Omnipotency of God, in reference to the one rather than the other of theſe Subſtances; all that can be ſaid to it, is, That they cannot conceive how the ſolid Subſtance ſhould ever be able to move it ſelf.

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And as little, ſay I, are they able to conceive how a created unſolid Subſtance ſhould move it ſelf; but there may be ſomething in an immaterial Subſtance, that you do not know. I grant it; and in a material one too: For example, Gravitation of Matter towards Matter, and in the ſeveral Proportions obſervable, inevitably ſhews, that there is ſomething in Matter that we do not underſtand, unleſs we can conceive Self-Motion in Matter; or an inexplicable and inconceivable Attraction in Matter, at immenſe and almoſt incomprehenſible Diſtances: It muſt therefore be confeſs'd, that there is ſomething in ſolid, as well as unſolid Subſtances, that we do not underſtand. But this we know, that they may each of them have their diſtinct Beings, without any Activity ſuperadded to them, unleſs you will deny, That God can take from any Being its Power of acting, which 'tis probable will be thought too preſumptuous for any one to do; and, I ſay, it is as hard to conceive Self-Motion in a created immaterial, as in a material Being, conſider it how you will: And therefore this is no Reaſon to deny Omnipotency to be able to give a Power of Self-Motion to a material Subſtance, if he pleaſes, as well as to an immaterial; ſince neither of them can have it from themſelves, nor can we conceive how it can be in either of them.

The ſame is viſible in the other Operation of Thinking; both theſe Subſtances may be made, and exiſt without Thought; neither of them has, or can have the Power of Thinking from it ſelf: God may give it to either of them, according to the good Pleaſure of his Omnipotency; and in which-ever of them it is, it is equally beyond our Capacity to conceive, how either of thoſe Subſtances thinks. But for that Reaſon, to deny that God, who had Power enough to give them both a Being out of nothing, can, by the ſame Omnipotency, give them what other Powers and Perfections he pleaſes; has no better a Foundation than to deny his Power of Creation, becauſe we cannot conceive how it is perform'd: and there at laſt this way of Reaſoning muſt terminate.

That Omnipotency cannot make a Subſtance to be ſolid and not ſolid at the ſame time, I think, with due Reverence, we may ſay; but that a ſolid Subſtance may not have Qualities, Perfections and Powers, which have no natural or viſibly neceſſary Connection with Solidity and Extenſion, is too much for us (who are but of yeſterday, and know nothing) to be poſitive in. If God cannot join things together by Connections inconceivable to us, we muſt deny even the Conſiſtency and Being of Matter it ſelf; ſince every Particle of it having ſome Bulk, has its Parts connected by ways inconceivable to us. So that all the Difficulties that are rais'd againſt the Thinking of Matter from our Ignorance or narrow Conceptions, ſtand not at all in the way of the Power of God, if he pleaſes to ordain it ſo; not prove any thing againſt his having actually endu'd ſome Parcels of Matter, ſo diſpos'd as he thinks fit, with a Faculty of Thinking, till it can be ſhewn that it contains a Contradiction to ſuppoſe it.

Tho' to me Senſation be comprehended under Thinking in general, yet in the foregoing Diſcourſe, I have ſpoke of Senſe in Brutes, as diſtinct from Thinking: Becauſe your Lordſhip, as I remember, ſpeaks of Senſe in Brutes. But here I take liberty to obſerve, That if your Lordſhip allows Brutes to have Senſation, it will follow, either that God can and doth give to ſome Parcels of Matter a Power of Perception and Thinking; or that all Animals have immaterial, and conſequently, according to your Lordſhip, immortal Souls, as well as Men: and to ſay that Fleas and Mites, *&c.* have immortal Souls as well as Men, will poſſibly be look'd on as going a great way to ſerve an Hypotheſis, and it would not very well agree with what your Lordſhip ſays, *Anſw.* 2. *p.* 64. to the words of *Solomon*, quoted out of *Eccleſ. c.* 3.

I have been pretty large in making this matter plain, that they who are ſo forward to beſtow hard Cenſures or Names on the Opinions of thoſe who differ from them, may conſider whether ſometimes they are not more due to their own: And that they may be perſuaded a little to temper that Heat, which, ſuppoſing the Truth in their current Opinions, gives them (as they think) a Right to lay what Imputations they pleaſe on thoſe who would fairly examine the Grounds they ſtand upon. For talking with a Suppoſition and Inſinuations, that Truth and Knowledg, nay, and Religion too, ſtands and falls with their Syſtems, is at beſt but an imperious way of begging the Queſtion, and aſſuming

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to themſelves, under the pretence of Zeal for the Cauſe of God, a Title to Infallibility. It is very becoming that Mens Zeal for Truth ſhould go as far as their Proofs, but not go for Proofs themſelves. He that attacks receiv'd Opinions, with any thing but fair Arguments, may, I own, be juſtly ſuſpected not to mean well, nor to be led by the Love of Truth; but the ſame may be ſaid of him too, who ſo defends them. An Error is not the better for being common, nor Truth the worſe for having lain neglected: And if it were put to the Vote any where in the World, I doubt, as things are manag'd, whether Truth would have the Majority; at leaſt, whilſt the Authority of Men, and not the Examination of things, muſt be its Meaſure. The Imputation of *Scepticiſm*, and thoſe broad Inſinuations to render what I have writ ſuſpected, ſo frequent as if that were the great Buſineſs of all this Pains you have been at about me, has made me ſay thus much, my Lord, rather as my Senſe of the way to eſtabliſh Truth in its full Force and Beauty, than that I think the World will need to have any thing ſaid to it, to make it diſtinguiſh between your Lordſhip's and my Deſign in writing; which therefore I ſecurely leave to the Judgment of the Reader, and return to the Argument in hand.

What I have above ſaid, I take to be a full Anſwer to all that your Lordſhip would infer from my *Idea* of Matter, of Liberty, and of Identity, and from the power of abſtracting. You ask, *How can my Idea of Liberty agree with the Idea that Bodies can operate only by Motion and Impulſe? Anſw.* By the Omnipotency of God, who can make all things agree, that involve not a Contradiction. 'Tis true, I ſay, "That Bodies operate by Impulſe, and no "thing elſe." And ſo I thought when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their Operation. But I am ſince convinc'd by the judicious Mr. *Newton*'s incomparable Book, that 'tis too bold a Preſumption to limit God's Power, in this point, by my narrow Conceptions. The Gravitation of Matter towards Matter, by ways unconceivable to me, is not only a Demonſtration that God can, if he pleaſes, put into Bodies, Powers, and Ways of Operation, above what can be deriv'd from our *Idea* of Body, or can be explain'd by what we know of Matter, but alſo an unqueſtionable and every where viſible Inſtance, that he has done ſo. And therefore in the next Edition of my Book, I ſhall take care to have that Paſſage rectify'd.

Anſw. 1. p. 73. Eſſay, B. 2. C. 8. §. 11.

As to *Self-conſciouſneſs*, your Lordſhip asks, *What is there like Self-conſciouſneſs in Matter?* Nothing at all in Matter as Matter. But that God cannot beſtow on ſome Parcels of Matter a Power of thinking, and with it Self-conſciouſneſs, will never be prov'd by asking, *How is it poſſible to apprehend that mere Body ſhould perceive that it doth perceive?* The Weakneſs of our Apprehenſion I grant in the Caſe: I confeſs as much as you pleaſe; that we cannot conceive how a ſolid, no, nor how an unſolid created Subſtance thinks; but this Weakneſs of our Apprehenſions reaches not the Power of God, whoſe Weakneſs is ſtronger than any thing in Men.

Anſw. 1. p. 74. Ibid.

Your Argument from Abſtraction we have in this Queſtion, *If it may be in the power of Matter to think, how comes it to be ſo impoſſible for ſuch organiz'd Bodies as the Brutes have, to enlarge their Ideas by Abſtraction? Anſw.* This ſeems to ſuppoſe, that I place Thinking within the natural Power of Matter. If that be your Meaning, my Lord, I neither ſay, nor ſuppoſe, that all Matter has naturally in it a Faculty of Thinking, but the direct contrary. But if you mean that certain Parcels of Matter, order'd by the Divine Power, as ſeems fit to him, may be made capable of receiving from his Omnipotency the Faculty of Thinking; that indeed I ſay, and that being granted, the Anſwer to your Queſtion is eaſy, ſince, if Omnipotency can give Thought to any ſolid Subſtance, it is not hard to conceive, that God may give that Faculty in an higher or lower Degree, as it pleaſes him, who knows what Diſpoſition of the Subject is ſuited to ſuch a particular way or degree of Thinking.

Anſw. 1. p. 76.

Another Argument to prove, That God cannot endue any Parcel of Matter with the Faculty of Thinking, is taken from thoſe Words of mine, where I ſhew by what Connection of *Ideas* we may come to know, That God is an immaterial Subſtance. They are theſe: "The *Idea* of an eternal, actual,

Lett. 1. p. 139.

"knowing Being, with the *Idea* of Immateriality, by the intervention of the "*Idea* of Matter, and of its actual Division, Divisibility, and want of Per-
Answ. 2. p. 77. "ception, &c. From whence your Lordship thus argues, *Here the want of Perception is own'd to be so essential to Matter, that God is therefore concluded to be Immaterial.* *Answ.* Perception and Knowledge in that one Eternal Being, where it has its Source, 'tis visible, must be essentially inseparable from it; therefore the actual want of Perception in so great part of the particular Parcels of Matter, is a Demonstration, that the first Being, from whom Perception and Knowledg is inseparable, is not Matter. How far this makes the *want of Perception an essential Property of Matter*, I will not dispute; it suffices, that it shews, That Perception is not an essential Property of Matter; and therefore Matter cannot be that eternal original Being, to which Perception and Knowledg is essential. Matter, I say, naturally is without Perception: *Ergo*, says your Lordship, *Want of Perception is an essential Property of Matter, and God doth not change the essential Properties of things, their Nature remaining.* From whence you infer, That God cannot bestow on any Parcel of Matter (the Nature of Matter remaining) a Faculty of Thinking. If the Rules of Logick, since my days, be not chang'd, I may safely deny this Consequence. For an Argument that runs thus, *God does not, Ergo*, he cannot; I was taught, when I came first to the University, would not hold. For I
B. 4. C. 3. §. 6. never said God *did*; but "That I see no Contradiction in it, that he should, "if he pleas'd, give to some Systems of senseless Matter, a Faculty of Think-"ing:" and I know no body, before *Des Cartes*, that ever pretended to shew that there was any Contradiction in it. So that at worst, my not being able to see in Matter any such Incapacity, as makes it impossible for Omnipotency to bestow on it a Faculty of Thinking, makes me opposite only to the *Cartesians*. For as far as I have seen or heard, the Fathers of the Christian Church never pretended to demonstrate that Matter was incapable to receive a Power of Sensation, Perception and Thinking, from the Hand of the omnipotent Creator. Let us therefore, if you please, suppose the Form of your Argumentation right, and that your Lordship means, *God cannot*: And then if your Argument be good, it proves, That God could not give to *Baalam*'s Ass a Power to speak to his Master as he did; for the want of rational Discourse, being natural to that Species, 'tis but for your Lordship to call it an *essential Property*, and then God cannot change the *essential Properties of things, their Nature remaining*: whereby it is prov'd, That God cannot, with all his Omnipotency, give to an Ass a Power to speak as *Baalam*'s did.

Answ. 2. p. 78. You say, my Lord, *You do not set Bounds to God's Omnipotency: For he may, if he please, change a Body into an immaterial Substance*; i. e. take away from a Substance the Solidity which it had before, and which made it Matter, and then give it a Faculty of Thinking, which it had not before, and which makes it a Spirit, the same Substance *remaining*. For if the same Substance remains not, *Body* is not *chang'd into an immaterial Substance*, but the solid Substance, and all belonging to it, is annihilated, and an immaterial Substance created; which is not a change of one thing into another, but the destroying of one, and making another *de novo*. In this Change therefore of a Body, or material Substance, into an immaterial, let us observe these distinct Considerations:

First, you say, *God may, if he pleases*, take away from a solid Substance Solidity, which is that which makes it a material Substance or *Body*; and may make it *an immaterial Substance*, i. e. a Substance without Solidity. But this Privation of one Quality, gives it not another: the bare taking away a lower or less noble Quality, does not give it an higher or nobler; that must be the Gift of God. For the bare Privation of one, and a meaner Quality, cannot be the Position of an higher and better: unless any one will say, that Cogitation, or the Power of Thinking, results from the Nature of Substance it self; which if it do, then wherever there is Substance, there must be Cogitation or a Power of thinking. Here then, upon your Lordship's own Principles, is an *immaterial Substance* without the Faculty of thinking.

In the next place, you will not deny, but God may give to this Substance, thus depriv'd of Solidity, a Faculty of thinking; for you suppose it made capable of that, by being made immaterial: whereby you allow, that the same numerical

numerical Subſtance may be ſometimes wholly incogitative, or without a Power of thinking, and at other times perfectly cogitative, or endu'd with a Power of thinking.

Farther, you will not deny but God can give it Solidity, and make it material again. For I conclude it will not be deny'd, that God can make it again what it was before. Now I crave leave to ask your Lordſhip, why God having given to this Subſtance the Faculty of thinking after Solidity was taken from it, cannot reſtore to it Solidity again, without taking away the Faculty of thinking. When you have reſolv'd this, my Lord, you will have prov'd it impoſſible for God's Omnipotence to give to a ſolid Subſtance a Faculty of thinking; but till then, not having prov'd it impoſſible, and yet denying that God can do it, is to deny that he can do what is in it ſelf poſſible: which, as I humbly conceive, is viſibly *to ſet Bounds to God's Omnipotency*; tho' you ſay here, *You do not ſet Bounds to God's Omnipotency.* Anſw. 2, p. 78.

If I ſhould imitate your Lordſhip's way of Writing, I ſhould not omit to bring in *Epicurus* here, and take notice that this was his way, *Deum verbis ponere, re tollere:* And then add, that *I am certain you do not think he promoted the great Ends of Morality and Religion.* For 'tis with ſuch candid and kind Inſinuations as theſe, that you bring in both * *Hobbes* and † *Spinoſa*, into your Diſcourſe here about God's being able, if he pleaſe, to give to ſome Parcels of Matter, order'd as he thinks fit, a Faculty of thinking: neither of thoſe Authors having, as appears by any Paſſages you bring out of them, ſaid any thing to this Queſtion, nor having, as it ſeems, any other buſineſs here, but by their Names skilfully to give that Character to my Book, with which you would recommend it to the World. * Anſw. 1. p. 55. † Ibid. p. 79.

I pretend not to enquire what meaſure of Zeal, nor for what, guides your Lordſhip's Pen in ſuch a way of writing, as your's has all along been with me: Only I cannot but conſider what Reputation it would give to the Writings of the Fathers of the Church, if they ſhould think Truth requir'd, or Religion allow'd them to imitate ſuch Patterns. But God be thanked, there be thoſe amongſt them who do not admire ſuch ways of managing the Cauſe of Truth or Religion: They being ſenſible, that if every one, who believes or can pretend he has Truth on his ſide, is thereby authoriz'd without Proof to inſinuate whatever may ſerve to prejudice mens Minds againſt the other ſide; there will be great ravage made on Charity and Practice, without any gain to Truth or Knowledg. And that the Liberties frequently taken by Diſputants to do ſo, may have been the cauſe that the World, in all Ages, has receiv'd ſo much harm, and ſo little advantage from Controverſies in Religion.

Theſe are the Arguments which your Lordſhip has brought to confute one Saying in my Book, by other Paſſages in it; which therefore being all but *Argumenta ad Hominem*, if they did prove what they do not, are of no other uſe, than to gain a Victory over me: a thing, methinks, ſo much beneath your Lordſhip, that it does not deſerve one of your Pages. The Queſtion is, whether God can, if he pleaſes, beſtow on any Parcel of Matter order'd as he thinks fit, a Faculty of Preception and Thinking. You ſay, *You look upon a Miſtake herein to be of dangerous Conſequence, as to the great Ends of Religion and Morality.* If this be ſo, My Lord, I think one may well wonder why your Lordſhip has brought no Arguments to eſtabliſh the Truth it ſelf, which *you look on to be of ſuch dangerous Conſequence to be miſtaken in*; but have ſpent ſo many Pages only in a *Perſonal Matter*, in endeavouring to ſhew, that I had Inconſiſtencies in my Book: which, if any ſuch thing had been ſhew'd, the Queſtion would be ſtill as far from being decided, and the danger of miſtaking about it as little prevented, as if nothing of all this had been ſaid. If therefore your Lordſhip's Care of the *great Ends of Religion and Morality* have made *you think it neceſſary* to clear this Queſtion, the World has reaſon to conclude there is little to be ſaid againſt that Propoſition, which is to be found in my Book concerning the Poſſibility, that ſome parcels of Matter might be ſo order'd by Omnipotence, as to be endu'd with a Faculty of thinking, if God ſo pleas'd; Anſw. 1. p. 79.

since

ſince your Lordſhip's Concern for the *promoting the great Ends of Religion and Morality*, has not enabled you to produce one Argument againſt a Propoſition, *that you think of ſo dangerous conſequence to them.*

And here I crave leave to obſerve, That tho' in your Title-Page you promiſe to prove, that my *Notion of Ideas is inconſiſtent with it ſelf* (which if it were, it could hardly be prov'd to be inconſiſtent with any thing elſe) *and with the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith*; yet your Attempts all along have been to prove me in ſome Paſſages of my Book inconſiſtent with my ſelf, without having ſhewn any Propoſition in my Book inconſiſtent with any *Article of the Chriſtian Faith.*

I think, your Lordſhip has indeed made uſe of one Argument of your own: But it is ſuch an one, that I confeſs I do not ſee how it is apt much to promote Religion, eſpecially the Chriſtian Religion founded on Revelation. I ſhall ſet down your Lordſhip's words, that they may be conſider'd. You ſay, *That you are of opinion, that the great Ends of Religion and Morality are beſt ſecured by the Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul from its Nature and Properties; and which, you think, proves it immaterial. Your Lordſhip does not queſtion whether God can give Immortality to a Material Subſtance; but you ſay, it* takes off *very much from the Evidence of Immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own nature it is not capable of*, &c. So likewiſe you ſay, *If a Man cannot be certain, but that Matter may think (as I affirm) then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality (and conſequently Immortality) from its Operations? But for all this, ſay I,* his Aſſurance of Faith remains on its own Baſis. *Now you appeal to any Man of Senſe, whether the finding the Uncertainty of his own Principles which he went upon in point of Reaſon, doth not weaken the Credibility of theſe fundamental Articles, when they are conſider'd purely as Matters of Faith? For before, there was a natural Credibility in them on the account of Reaſon; but by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty, all that is loſt; and inſtead of being certain, he is more doubtful than ever. And if the Evidence of Faith falls ſo much ſhort of that of Reaſon, it muſt needs have leſs effect upon Mens Minds, when the Subſerviency of Reaſon is taken away; as it muſt be, when the Grounds of Certainty by Reaſon are vaniſh'd. Is it at all probable, that he who finds his Reaſon deceive him in ſuch fundamental Points, ſhould have his Faith ſtand firm and unmovable on the account of Revelation? For in matters of Revelation, there muſt be ſome antecedent Principles ſuppos'd, before we can believe any thing on the account of it.*

Anſw. 1. *P.* 54, 55.

Anſw. 2. *p.* 28.

More to the ſame purpoſe we have ſome Pages farther, where from ſome of my words your Lordſhip ſays, *You cannot but obſerve, That we have no Certainty upon my grounds, that ſelf-conſciouſneſs depends upon an individual immaterial Subſtance, and conſequently that a material Subſtance may, according to my Principles, have Self-conſciouſneſs in it; at leaſt, that I am not certain of the contrary. Whereupon your Lordſhip bids me conſider, whether this doth not a little affect the whole Article of the Reſurrection?* What does all this tend to? but to make the World believe, that I have *leſſen'd the Credibility* of the Immortality of the Soul and the Reſurrection, by ſaying, That tho' it be moſt highly probable, that the Soul is immaterial, yet upon my Principles it cannot be demonſtrated; becauſe it is not impoſſible to God's Omnipotency, if he pleaſes, to beſtow upon ſome parcels of Matter, diſpos'd as he ſees fit, a Faculty of Thinking.

Ibid. *p.* 35.

This your Accuſation of my *leſſening the Credibility* of theſe Articles of Faith, is founded on this, That the Article of the Immortality of the Soul abates of its Credibility, if it be allow'd, that its Immateriality (which is the ſuppos'd Proof from Reaſon and Philoſophy of its Immortality) cannot be demonſtrated from natural Reaſon. Which Argument of your Lordſhip's bottoms, as I humbly conceive, on this, That Divine Revelation abates of its *Credibility* in all thoſe Articles it propoſes, proportionably as human Reaſon fails to ſupport the Teſtimony of God. And all that your Lordſhip in thoſe Paſſages has ſaid, when examin'd, will I ſuppoſe be found to import thus much, *viz.* Does God propoſe any thing to Mankind to be believ'd? It is very fit and credible to be believ'd, if Reaſon can demonſtrate it to be true. But if human Reaſon comes ſhort in the Caſe, and cannot make it out, its *Credibility* is thereby *leſſen'd*: which is in effect to ſay, That the Veracity of God is not a firm and ſure Foundation of Faith to rely upon, without the concurrent Teſtimony of Reaſon;

i. e.

i. e. with Reverence be it ſpoken, God is not to be believ'd on his own Word, unleſs what he reveals be in it ſelf credible, and might be believ'd without him.

If this be a way to promote Religion, the Chriſtian Religion in all its Articles, I am not ſorry that it is not a way to be found in any of my Writings; for I imagine any thing like this would (and I ſhould think deſerv'd) to have other Titles than bare *Scepticiſm* beſtow'd upon it, and would have rais'd no ſmall Outcry againſt any one, who is not to be ſuppos'd to be in the right in all that he ſays, and ſo may ſecurely ſay what he pleaſes. Such as I, the *Profanum Vulgus*, who take too much upon us, if we would examine, have nothing to do but to hearken and believe, tho' what he ſaid ſhould ſubvert the very Foundations of the Chriſtian Faith.

What I have above obſerv'd, is ſo viſibly contain'd in your Lordſhip's Argument, That when I met with it in your Anſwer to my firſt Letter, it ſeem'd ſo ſtrange from a man of your Lordſhip's Character, and in a Diſpute in defence of the Doctrine of the Trinity, that I could hardly perſuade my ſelf, but it was a Slip of your Pen: But when I found it in your ſecond Letter made uſe of again, and ſeriouſly enlarg'd as an Argument of weight to be inſiſted upon, I was convinc'd, that it was a Principle that you heartily embrac'd, how little favourable ſoever it was to the Articles of the Chriſtian Religion, and particularly thoſe which you undertook to defend. Anſw. 2. *p.* 28, 29.

I deſire my Reader to peruſe the Paſſages as they ſtand in your Letters themſelves, and ſee whether what you ſay in them does not amount to this, That a Revelation from God is more or leſs credible, according as it has a ſtronger or weaker Confirmation from human Reaſon. For,

1. Your Lordſhip ſays, *You do not queſtion whether God can give Immortality to a material Subſtance; but you ſay it* takes off very much *from the Evidence of Immortality, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that which of its own nature it is not capable of.* Anſw. 1. *p.* 55.

To which I reply, any one's not being able to demonſtrate the Soul to be immaterial, *takes off* not *very much*, nor at all from the *Evidence of its Immortality*, if God has reveal'd that it ſhall be immortal; becauſe the Veracity of God is a Demonſtration of the Truth of what he has reveal'd, and the want of another Demonſtration of a Propoſition that is demonſtratively true, takes not off from the Evidence of it. For where there is a clear Demonſtration, there is as much Evidence as any Truth can have, that is not ſelf-evident. God has reveal'd that the Souls of Men ſhall live for ever: but ſays your Lordſhip, from this *Evidence it* takes off *very much, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that which of its own nature it is not capable of*; *i. e.* The Revelation and Teſtimony of God loſes much of its Evidence, if this depends wholly upon the good pleaſure of God, and cannot be demonſtratively made out by natural Reaſon, that the Soul is immaterial, and conſequently in its own nature immortal. For that is all that here is or can be meant by theſe words, *which of its own nature it is not capable of*, to make them to the purpoſe. For the whole of your Lordſhip's Diſcourſe here, is to prove, That the Soul cannot be material, becauſe then the Evidence of its being immortal would be *very much leſſen'd*. Which is to ſay, That 'tis not as credible upon Divine Revelation, that a material Subſtance ſhould be immortal, as an immaterial; or which is all one, That God is not equally to be believ'd, when he declares that a material Subſtance ſhall be immortal, as when he declares that an immaterial ſhall be ſo; becauſe the Immortality of a material Subſtance cannot be demonſtrated from natural Reaſon.

Let us try this Rule of your Lordſhip's a little farther. God hath reveal'd, that the Bodies Men ſhall have after the Reſurrection, as well as their Souls, ſhall live to Eternity: Does your Lordſhip believe the eternal Life of the one of theſe more than of the other, becauſe you think you can prove it of one of them by natural Reaſon, and of the other not? Or can any one, who admits of Divine Revelation in the caſe, doubt of one of them more than the other? Or think this Propoſition leſs credible, The Bodies of Men, after the Reſurrection, ſhall live for ever; than this, That the Souls of Men ſhall, after the Reſurrection, live for ever? For that he muſt do, if he thinks either of them is leſs credible than the other. If this be ſo, Reaſon is to be conſulted, how far God is to be believ'd, and the Credit of Divine Teſtimony muſt receive its force from

from the Evidence of Reaſon; which is evidently to take away the Credibility of Divine Revelation, in all ſupernatural Truths wherein the Evidence of Reaſon fails. And how much ſuch a Principle as this tends to the Support of the Doctrine of the Trinity, or the promoting the Chriſtian Religion, I ſhall leave it to your Lordſhip to conſider. This I think I may be confident in, that few Chriſtians have founded their Belief of the Immortality of the Soul upon any thing but Revelation: ſince if they had entertain'd it upon natural and philoſophical Reaſons, they could not have avoided the believing its Pre-exiſtence before its Union to the Body, as well as its future Exiſtence after its Separation from it. This is juſtify'd by that Obſervation of Dr. *Cudworth*, *B.* 1. *C.* 1. §. 31. where he affirms, *That there was never any of the Antients before Chriſtianity, that held the Soul's future Permanency after Death, who did not likewiſe aſſert its Pre-exiſtence.*

I am not ſo well read in *Hobbes* or *Spinoza*, as to be able to ſay what were their Opinions in this matter. But poſſibly there be thoſe, who will think your Lordſhip's Authority of more uſe to them in the caſe than thoſe juſtly decry'd Names; and be glad to find your Lordſhip a Patron of the *Oracles of Reaſon*, ſo little to the advantage of the *Oracles* of Divine Revelation. This at leaſt, I think, may be ſubjoin'd to the words at the bottom of the next Page, That *thoſe who have gone about* to leſſen the Credibility of the Articles of Faith, which evidently they do, who ſay they are leſs credible, becauſe they cannot be made out demonſtratively by natural Reaſon; have not been thought to ſecure ſeveral of the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith: eſpecially thoſe of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, and *Reſurrection* of the Body, which are thoſe upon the account of which I am brought by your Lordſhip into this Diſpute.

Anſw. 1. p. 65.

I ſhall not trouble the Reader with your Lordſhip's Endeavours in the following words, to prove, That if the Soul be not an immaterial Subſtance, it can be *nothing but Life*; your very firſt words viſibly confuting all that you alledg to that purpoſe. They are, *If the Soul be a material Subſtance, it is really nothing but Life*; which is to ſay, That if the Soul be really a *Subſtance*, it is not really a *Subſtance*, but *really nothing* elſe but an Affection of a Subſtance: for the Life, whether of a material or immaterial Subſtance, is not the Subſtance it ſelf, but an Affection of it.

Anſw. 1. p. 55.

Anſw. 1. p. 57.

2. You ſay, *Altho' we think the ſeparate State of the Soul after Death, is ſufficiently reveal'd in the Scripture; yet it creates a great difficulty in underſtanding it, if the Soul be nothing but Life, or a material Subſtance which muſt be diſſolv'd when Life is ended. For if the Soul be a material Subſtance, it muſt be made up, as others are, of the Coheſion of ſolid and ſeparate Parts, how minute and inviſible ſoever they be. And what is it which ſhould keep them together, when Life is gone? So that it is no eaſy matter to give an account*, how *the Soul ſhould be capable of Immortality, unleſs it be an immaterial Subſtance; and then we know the Solution and Texture of Bodies cannot reach the Soul, being of a different nature.*

Let it be as hard a *matter* as it will, *to give an account what it is that ſhould keep the Parts of a material Soul together*, after it is ſeparated from the Body; yet it will be always as eaſy to give an account of it, as to *give an account what it is which ſhall keep together* a material and immaterial Subſtance: And yet the difficulty that there is *to give an account of that*, I hope does not, with your Lordſhip, *weaken the Credibility* of the inſeparable Union of Soul and Body to Eternity: And I perſuade my ſelf, that *the Men of Senſe*, to whom your Lordſhip *appeals* in the caſe, do not find their Belief of this *fundamental Point* much *weaken'd* by that difficulty. I thought heretofore (and by your Lordſhip's permiſſion would think ſo ſtill) that the Union of Parts of Matter one with another, is as much in the hands of God, as the Union of a material and immaterial Subſtance; and that it does not *take off very much*, or at all, *from the Evidence of Immortality*, which depends on that Union, that *it is no eaſy matter to give an account what it is that ſhould keep them together*: tho' its *depending wholly upon the Gift and Good pleaſure of God*, where the manner *creates great difficulty in the Underſtanding*, and our Reaſon cannot diſcover in the *Nature* of things *how* it is, be that which your Lordſhip ſo poſitively ſays, *leſſens the Credibility of the Fundamental Articles of the Reſurrection and Immortality.*

But,

But, my Lord, to remove this Objection a little, and to ſhew of how ſmall force it is even with your ſelf; give me leave to preſume, That your Lordſhip as firmly believes the Immortality of the Body after the Reſurrection, as any other Article of Faith: If ſo, then it being *no eaſy matter to give an account what it is that ſhall keep together* the Parts of a material Soul, to one that believes it is material, can no more *weaken the Credibility* of its Immortality, than the like difficulty *weakens the Credibility* of the Immortality of the Body. For when your Lordſhip ſhall find it *an eaſy matter to give an account, what* it is beſides the Good-pleaſure of God, *which ſhall keep together* the Parts of our material Bodies to Eternity, or even Soul and Body; I doubt not but any one, who ſhall think the Soul material, will alſo find it as *eaſy to give an account, what it is that* ſhall *keep* thoſe Parts of Matter alſo *together* to Eternity.

Were it not that the Warmth of Controverſy is apt to make Men ſo far forget, as to take up thoſe Principles themſelves (when they will ſerve their turn) which they have highly condemn'd in others, I ſhould wonder to find your Lordſhip to argue, That becauſe it is a difficulty to *underſtand what ſhould keep together the minute Parts of a material Soul, when Life is gone*; *and* becauſe *it is not an eaſy matter to give an account* how *the Soul ſhould be capable of Immortality, unleſs it be an immaterial Subſtance*: therefore it is not ſo credible, as if it *were eaſy to give an account*, by natural Reaſon, how *it could be*. For to this it is, that all this your Diſcourſe tends, as is evident by what is already ſet down out of Page 55. and will be more fully made out by what your Lordſhip ſays in other places, tho' there needs no ſuch Proofs, ſince it would all be nothing againſt me in any other ſenſe.

I thought your Lordſhip had in other places aſſerted, and inſiſted on this Truth, That no part of Divine Revelation was the leſs to be believ'd, becauſe the thing it ſelf *created great difficulty in the Underſtanding*, and the manner of it was hard to be explain'd, *and it was no eaſy matter to give an account* how *it was*. This, as I take it, your Lordſhip condemn'd in others, as a very unreaſonable Principle, and ſuch as would ſubvert all the Articles of the Chriſtian Religion that were mere matters of Faith, as I think it will: And is it poſſible, that you ſhould make uſe of it here your ſelf, againſt the Article of *Life and Immortality*, that Chriſt hath brought to light thro' the Goſpel; and neither was, nor could be made out by natural Reaſon without Revelation? But you will ſay, you ſpeak only of the Soul; and your words are, That *it is no eaſy matter to give an account* how *the Soul ſhould be capable of Immortality, unleſs it be an immaterial Subſtance*. I grant it; but crave leave to ſay, That there is not any one of thoſe Difficulties that are, or can be rais'd, about the manner *how* a material Soul can be immortal, which do not as well reach the Immortality of the Body.

But if it were not ſo, I am ſure this Principle of your Lordſhip's would reach other Articles of Faith, wherein our natural Reaſon finds it not ſo eaſy to give an account *how* thoſe Myſteries are; and which therefore, according to your Principles, muſt be leſs *credible* than other Articles, that *create leſs difficulty to the Underſtanding*. For your Lordſhip ſays, That *you appeal to any Man of Senſe*, Anſw. 2. p. 28. *whether* to a Man who thought by his Principles he could from natural Grounds demonſtrate the Immortality of the Soul, the *finding the Uncertainty of thoſe Principles he went upon in point of Reaſon, i. e.* the finding he could not certainly prove it by natural Reaſon, *doth not weaken the Credibility of that fundamental Article, when it is conſider'd purely as a Matter of Faith*. Which in effect, I humbly conceive, amounts to this; That a Propoſition divinely reveal'd, that cannot be prov'd by natural Reaſon, is leſs credible than one that can: which ſeems to me to come very little ſhort of this, with due Reverence be it ſpoken, That God is leſs to be believ'd when he affirms Propoſition a that cannot be prov'd by natural Reaſon, than when he propoſes what can be prov'd by it. The direct contrary to which, is my Opinion; tho' you endeavour to make it good by theſe following words: *If the Evidence of Faith falls ſo much ſhort of* Anſw. 2. p. 29. *that of Reaſon, it muſt needs have leſs effect upon Mens Minds, when the Subſerviency of Reaſon is taken away; as it muſt be, when the Grounds of Certainty by Reaſon are vaniſh'd. Is it at all probable, that he who finds his Reaſon deceive him in ſuch fundamental Points, ſhould have his Faith ſtand firm and unmovable on the account of Revelation?* Than which, I think, there are hardly plainer words to be found

our,

out, to declare, that the Credibility of God's Teſtimony depends on the natural Evidence or Probability of the things we receive from Revelation, and riſes and falls with it; and that the Truths of God, or the Articles of mere Faith, loſe ſo much of their *Credibility*, as they want Proof from Reaſon: which if true, Revelation may come to have no *Credibility* at all. For if in this preſent caſe, the Credibility of this Propoſition, The Souls of Men ſhall live for ever, reveal'd in the Scripture, be leſſen'd by confeſſing it cannot be demonſtratively prov'd from Reaſon, tho' it be aſſerted to be moſt highly probable; muſt not, by the ſame Rule, its Credibility dwindle away to nothing, if natural Reaſon ſhould not be able to make it out to be ſo much as probable, or ſhould place the Probability from natural Principles on the other ſide? For if mere want of Demonſtration *leſſens the Credibility* of any Propoſition divinely reveal'd, muſt not want of Probability, or contrary Probability from natural Reaſon, quite take away its *Credibility?* Here at laſt it muſt end, if in any one caſe the Veracity of God, and the *Credibility* of the Truths we receive from him by Revelation, be ſubjected to the Verdicts of human Reaſon, and be allow'd to receive any acceſſion or diminution from other Proofs, or want of other Proofs of its Certainty or Probability.

If this be your Lordſhip's way to promote Religion, or defend its Articles, I know not what Argument the greateſt Enemies of it could uſe, more effectual for the Subverſion of thoſe you have undertaken to defend; this being to reſolve all Revelation perfectly and purely into natural Reaſon, to bound its *Credibility* by that, and leave no room for Faith in other things, than what can be accounted for by natural Reaſon without Revelation.

Anſw. 1. p. 48—54. B. 2. C. 23.

Your Lordſhip inſiſts much upon it, as if I had contradicted what I had ſaid in my *Eſſay*, by ſaying, That upon my Principles it cannot be demonſtratively prov'd, that it is an immaterial Subſtance in us that thinks, however probable it be. He that will be at the pains to read that Chapter of mine, and conſider it, will find, that my buſineſs there was to ſhew, that it was no harder to conceive an immaterial than a material Subſtance; and that from the *Ideas* of Thought, and a Power of moving of Matter, which we experienc'd in our ſelves (*Ideas* originally not belonging to Matter as Matter) there was no more difficulty to conclude there was an immaterial Subſtance in us, than that we had material Parts. Theſe *Ideas* of Thinking, and Power of moving of Matter, I in another place ſhew'd, did demonſtratively lead us to the certain knowledg of the Exiſtence of an immaterial thinking Being, in whom we have the *Idea* of Spirit in the ſtricteſt ſenſe; in which ſenſe I alſo apply'd it to the Soul, in that 23d Chapter of my *Eſſay*: the eaſily conceivable Poſſibility, nay, great Probability, that that thinking Subſtance in us is immaterial, giving me ſufficient Ground for it. In which ſenſe, I ſhall think I may ſafely attribute it to the thinking Subſtance in us, till your Lordſhip ſhall have better prov'd from my words, that it is impoſſible it ſhould be immaterial. For I only ſay, That it is poſſible, *i. e.* involves no Contradiction, That God the omnipotent immaterial Spirit ſhould, if he pleaſes, give to ſome parcels of Matter, diſpos'd as he thinks fit, a Power of Thinking and Moving: which parcels of Matter ſo endu'd with a Power of Thinking and Motion, might properly be call'd Spirits, in contradiſtinction to unthinking Matter. In all which, I preſume, there is no manner of Contradiction.

I juſtify'd my uſe of the word *Spirit* in that ſenſe, from the Authorities of *Cicero* and *Virgil* applying the *Latin* word *Spiritus*, from whence *Spirit* is deriv'd, to a Soul as a thinking thing, without excluding Materiality out of it.

Anſw. 1. p. 58—60.

To which your Lordſhip replies, *That* Cicero, in his *Tuſculan* Queſtions, *ſuppoſes the Soul not to be a finer ſort of Body, but of a different nature from the Body.*—*That he calls the Body the Priſon of the Soul.*—And ſays, *That a wiſe Man's buſineſs is to draw off his Soul from his Body.* And then your Lordſhip concludes, as is uſual, with a Queſtion, *Is it poſſible now to think ſo great a Man look'd on the Soul but as a Modification of the Body, which muſt be at an end with Life?* Anſw. No; it is impoſſible that a Man of ſo good Senſe as *Tully*, when he uſes the word *Corpus* or *Body* for the groſs and viſible parts of a Man, which he acknowledges to be mortal; ſhould *look on the Soul to be a Modification of that Body*, in a Diſcourſe wherein he was endeavouring to perſuade another, that it was immor-

tal.

tal. It is to be acknowledg'd that truly *great Men*, ſuch as he was, are not wont ſo manifeſtly to contradict themſelves. He had therefore no thought concerning the *Modification of the Body* of Man in the caſe, he was not ſuch a Trifler as to examine, whether the Modification of the Body of a Man was immortal, when that Body it ſelf was mortal: And therefore that which he reports as *Dicæarchus*'s Opinion, he diſmiſſes in the beginning without any more ado, *c.* 11 But *Cicero*'s was a direct, plain and ſenſible Enquiry, *viz.* What the Soul was; to ſee whether from thence he could diſcover its Immortality. But in all that Diſcourſe in his firſt Book of *Tuſculan Queſtions*, where he lays out ſo much of his Reading and Reaſon, there is not one ſyllable ſhewing the leaſt thought, that the Soul was an immaterial Subſtance; but many things directly to the contrary.

Indeed (1) he ſhuts out the *Body*, taken in the ſenſe he uſes *Corpus* all along, for the ſenſible organical parts of a Man, and is poſitive that is not the Soul: And *Body* in this ſenſe, taken for the Human Body, he calls the *Priſon of the Soul*; and ſays a wiſe man, inſtanceing in *Socrates* and *Cato*, is glad of a fair opportunity to get out of it. But he no where ſays any ſuch thing of Matter: He calls not Matter in general the Priſon of the Soul, nor talks a word of being ſeparate from it. Chap. 19, 22, 30, 31, &c. *So ſpeaks* Ennius; Terra corpus eſt, at mens ignis eſt.

(2.) He concludes, That the Soul is not like other things here below, made up of a Compoſition of the Elements, *c.* 27.

(3.) He excludes the two groſs Elements, Earth and Water, from being the Soul *c.* 26.

So far he is clear and poſitive: but beyond this he is uncertain; beyond this he could not get. For in ſome places he ſpeaks doubtfully, whether the Soul be not Air or Fire: *Anima ſit animus igniſve neſcio*, c. 25. And therefore he agrees with *Panætius*, that, if it be at all elementary, it is, as he calls it, *inflammata Anima, inflamed Air*; and for this he gives ſeveral Reaſons, *c.* 18, 19. And tho' he thinks it to be of a *peculiar nature of its own*, yet he is ſo far from thinking it immaterial, that he ſays, *c.* 19. That the admitting it to be of an *aerial* or *igneous nature*, would not be inconſiſtent with any thing he had ſaid.

That which he ſeems moſt to incline to, is, That the Soul was not at all elementary, but was of the ſame Subſtance with the Heavens: which *Ariſtotle*, to diſtinguiſh from the four Elements and the changeable Bodies here below, which he ſuppos'd made up of them, call'd *Quanta Eſſenta*, That this was *Tully*'s Opinion, is plain from theſe words: *Ergo*, Animus *qui ut ego dico, divinus eſt, ut Euripides audet dicere Deus; & quidem ſi Deus, aut anima aut ignis eſt, idem eſt animus hominis. Nam ut illa natura cæleſtis & terra vacat & humore; ſic utriuſque harum rerum humanus animus eſt expers. Sin autem eſt quinta quædam natura ab Ariſtotele inducta; primum hæc & deorum eſt & animorum. Hanc nos ſententiam ſecuti, his ipſis verbis in conſolatione hæc expreſſimus*; c. 26. And then he goes on, *c.* 27. to repeat thoſe his own words, which your Lordſhip has quoted out of him, wherein he had affirm'd, in his Treatiſe *de Conſolatione*, the Soul not to have its Original from the Earth, or to be mix'd or made of any thing earthly; but had ſaid, *Singularis eſt igitur quædam natura & vis animi ſejuncta ab his uſitatis notiſque naturis.* Whereby, he tells us, he meant nothing but *Ariſtotle*'s *Quanta Eſſentia*; which being unmix'd, being that of which the Gods and Souls conſiſted, he calls it *Divinum, Cæleſte*, and concludes it eternal; it being as he ſpeaks, *Sejuncta ab omni mortali concretione.* From which it is clear, That in all his Enquiry about the Subſtance of the Soul, his Thoughts went not beyond the four Elements, or *Ariſtotle*'s *Quanta Eſſentia*, to look for it. In all which there is nothing of Immateriality, but quite the contrary.

He was willing to believe (as good and wiſe Men have always been) that the Soul was immortal; but for that, 'tis plain, he never thought of its Immateriality, but as the Eaſtern People do, who believe the Soul to be immortal, but have nevertheleſs no Thought, no Conception of its Immateriality. It is remarkable, what a very conſiderable and judicious Author ſays in the Caſe: *No Opinion*, ſays he, *has been ſo univerſally receiv'd, as that of the Immortality of the Soul; but its Immateriality is a Truth, the Knowledg whereof has not ſpread ſo far. And indeed it is extremely difficult, to let into the Mind of a* Siamite, *the Idea of a pure Spirit. This the Miſſionaries, who have been longeſt among them, are poſitive in: All the Pagans of the Eaſt do truly believe, That there remains ſomething of a* Loubere du Royaume de Siam, *T.* 1. *c.* 19. §. 4.

Man after his Death, which ſubſiſts independently and ſeparately from his Body. But they give Extenſion and Figure to that which remains, and attribute to it all the ſame Members, all the ſame Subſtances both ſolid and liquid, which our Bodies are compos'd of. They only ſuppoſe that the Souls are of a matter ſubtile enough to eſcape being ſeen or handled.—— Such were the Shades *and the* Manes *of the* Greeks *and the* Romans. *And 'tis by theſe Figures of the Souls, anſwerable to thoſe of the Bodies, that* Virgil *ſuppos'd* Æneas *knew* Palinurus, Dido *and* Anchiſes, *in the other World.*

This Gentleman was not a Man that travel'd into thoſe Parts for his Pleaſure, and to have the Opportunity to tell ſtrange Stories, collected by Chance, when he return'd; but one choſen on purpoſe (and he ſeems well choſen for the purpoſe) to enquire into the Singularities of *Siam*. And he has ſo well acquitted himſelf of the Commiſſion, which his Epiſtle Dedicatory tells us he had, to inform himſelf exactly of what was moſt remarkable there; that had we but ſuch an Account of other Countries of the *Eaſt*, as he has given us of this Kingdom, whichhe was an Envoy to, we ſhould be much better acquainted than we are, with the Manners, Notions and Religions of that part of the World, inhabited by civiliz'd Nations, who want neither good Senſe nor Acuteneſs of Reaſon, tho' not caſt into the Mould of the Logick and Philoſophy of our Schools.

But to return to *Cicero*: 'Tis plain, that in his Enquiries about the Soul, his Thoughts went not at all beyond Matter. This the Expreſſions, that drop from him in ſeveral Places of this Book, evidently ſhew: For example, That the Souls of excellent Men and Women aſcended into Heaven; of others, that they remain'd here on Earth, *c.* 12. That the Soul is hot, and warms the Body: That at its leaving the Body, it penetrates and divides, and breaks thro' our thick, cloudy, moiſt Air: That it ſtops in the Region of Fire, and aſcends no farther, the Equality of Warmth and Weight making that its proper place, where it is nouriſh'd and ſuſtain'd with the ſame things, wherewith the Stars are nouriſh'd and ſuſtain'd; and that by the convenience of its Neighbourhood, it ſhall there have a clearer View and fuller Knowledg of the heavenly Bodies, *c.* 19. That the Soul alſo from this height ſhall have a pleaſant and fairer Proſpect of the Globe of the Earth, the Diſpoſition of whole Parts will then lie before it in one View, *c.* 20. That it is hard to determine what Conformation, Size and Place the Soul has in the Body: That it is too ſubtile to be ſeen: That it is in the human Body as in a Houſe, or a Veſſel, or a Receptacle, *c.* 22. All which are Expreſſions that ſufficiently evidence, that he who uſed them had not in his Mind ſeparated Materiality from the *Idea* of the Soul.

It may perhaps be reply'd, That a great part of this, which we find in *chap.* 19. is ſaid upon the Principles of thoſe who would have the Soul to be *Anima Inflammata, inflamed Air*. I grant it: But it is alſo to be obſerv'd, That in this 19th, and the two following Chapters, he does not only not deny, but even admits, that ſo material a thing as inflam'd Air may think.

The Truth of the Caſe in ſhort is this: *Cicero* was willing to believe the Soul immortal, but when he ſought in the Nature of the Soul it ſelf ſomething to eſtabliſh this his Belief into a Certainty of it, he found himſelf at a loſs. He confeſs'd he knew not what the Soul was; but the not knowing what it was, he argues *c.* 2. was no Reaſon to conclude it was not. And thereupon he proceeds to the Repetition of what he had ſaid in his 6th Book *de Repub.* concerning the Soul. The Argument, which borrow'd from *Plato* he there makes uſe of, if it have any force in it, not only proves the Soul to be immortal, but more than, I think, your Lordſhip will allow to be true: For it proves it to be eternal, and without beginning, as well as without end; *Neque nata certe eſt, & æterna eſt*, ſays he.

Indeed from the Faculties of the Soul he concludes right, That it is of *Divine Original*: But as to the Subſtance of the Soul, he at the end of this Diſcourſe concerning its Faculties, *c.* 25. as well as at the beginning of it, *c.* 22. is not aſham'd to own his Ignorance of what it is; *Anima ſit animus, ignisve, neſcio; nec me pudet ut iſtos, fateri neſcire quod neſciam. Illud, ſi ulla alia de re obſcura affirmare poſſum, ſive anima, ſive ignis ſit animus, cum juravem eſſe divinum, c.* 25. So that all the Certainty he could attain to about the Soul, was, that he was confident

confident there was ſomething divine in it; *i. e.* there were Faculties in the Soul that could not reſult from the Nature of Matter, but muſt have their Original from a Divine Power: but yet thoſe Qualities, as Divine as they were, he acknowledg'd might be plac'd in Breath or Fire, which I think your Lordſhip will not deny to be material Subſtances. So that all thoſe Divine Qualities, which he ſo much and ſo juſtly extols in the Soul, led him not, as appears, ſo much as to any the leaſt Thought of Immateriality. This is Demonſtration, that he built them not upon an Excluſion of Materiality out of the Soul; for he avowedly profeſſes, he does not know but Breath or Fire might be this thinking thing in us: And in all his Conſiderations about the Subſtance of the Soul it ſelf, he ſtuck in *Air* and *Fire*, or *Ariſtotle's Quinta Eſſentia*; for beyond thoſe, 'tis evident, he went not.

But with all his Proofs out of *Plato*, to whoſe Authority he defers ſo much, with all the Arguments his vaſt Reading and great Parts could furniſh him with for the Immortality of the Soul, he was ſo little ſatisfy'd, ſo far from being certain, ſo far from any Thought that he had, or could prove it, that he over and over again profeſſes his Ignorance and Doubt of it. In the beginning he enumerates the ſeveral Opinions of the Philoſophers, which he had well ſtudy'd about it: And then, full of Uncertainty, ſays, *Harum Sententiarum quæ vera ſit, Deus aliquis viderit, quæ veri ſimillima magna quæſtio*, c. 11. And towards the latter end having gone them all over again, and one after another examin'd them, he profeſſes himſelf ſtill at a loſs, not knowing on which to pitch, nor what to determine: *Mentis acies*, ſays he, *ſeipſam intuens nonnunquam hebeſcit*, ob eamque cauſam *contemplandi diligentiam omittimus. Itaque dubitans, circumſpectans, hæſitans, multa adverſa revertens tanquam in rate in mari immenſo, noſtra vehitur oratio*, c. 30. And to conclude this Argument, when the Perſon he introduces as diſcourſing with him, tells him he is reſolv'd to keep firm to the Belief of Immortality; *Tully* anſwers, c. 82. *Laudo id quidem, etſi nihil animis oportet confidere; movemur enim ſæpe aliquo acute concluſo, labamus, mutamuſque ſententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his eſt enim aliqua obſcuritas.*

So unmovable is that Truth deliver'd by the Spirit of Truth, that tho' the Light of Nature gave ſome obſcure Glimmering, ſome uncertain Hopes of a future State; yet human Reaſon could attain to no Clearneſs, no Certainty about it, but that it was JESUS CHRIST alone who had *brought Life and Immortality to Light thro' the Goſpel.* Tho' we are now told, That to own the Inability of Natural Reaſon to bring *Immortality to Light*, or, which paſſes for the ſame, to own Principles upon which the Immateriality of the Soul (and, as 'tis urg'd, conſequently its Immortality) cannot be demonſtratively prov'd; *does leſſen the Belief of* this Article of Revelation, which JESUS CHRIST alone *has brought to Light*, and which conſequently the Scripture aſſures us is eſtabliſh'd and made certain only by Revelation. This would not perhaps have ſeem'd ſtrange from thoſe who are juſtly complain'd of, for ſlighting the Revelation of the Goſpel, and therefore would not be much regarded, if they ſhould contradict ſo plain a Text of Scripture in favour of their all-ſufficient Reaſon: But what uſe the *Promoters of Scepticiſm and Infidelity, in an Age* ſo much ſuſpected by your Lordſhip, may make of what comes from one of your great Authority and Learning, may deſerve your Conſideration. 2 Tim. 1. 10.

And thus, my Lord, I hope I have ſatisfy'd you concerning *Cicero's* Opinion about the Soul, in his firſt Book of *Tuſculan* Queſtions; which tho' I eaſily believe, as your Lordſhip ſays, *you are no Stranger to*, yet I humbly conceive you have not ſhewn (and upon a careful Peruſal of that Treatiſe again, I think I may boldly ſay you cannot ſhew) one word in it, that expreſſes any thing like a Notion in *Tully* of the Soul's Immateriality, or its being an immaterial Subſtance.

From what you bring out of *Virgil*, your Lordſhip concludes, *That he no more than* Cicero *does me any Kindneſs in this matter, being both Aſſertors of the Soul's Immortality.* My Lord, were not the Queſtion of the Soul's Immateriality, according to Cuſtom, chang'd here into that of its *Immortality*, which I am no leſs an Aſſertor of than either of them, *Cicero* and *Virgil*, do me all the *kindneſs* I deſir'd of *them in this matter*; and that was to ſhew, that they attributed Anſw. 1. p. 62, 63.

the word *Spiritus* to the Soul of Man, without any thought of it's Immateriality: and this the Verſes you your ſelf bring out of *Virgil*,

Æneid. 4. 385.

Et cum frigida mors animæ ſeduxerit artus
Omnibus umbra locis adero, dabis improbe pœnas;

confirm, as well as thoſe I quoted out of his 6th Book: and for this Monſieur *de la Loubere* ſhall be my Witneſs, in the words above ſet down out of him; where he ſhews, that there be thoſe amongſt the Heathens of our days, as well as *Virgil* and others amongſt the antient *Greeks* and *Romans*, who thought the Souls or Ghoſts of Men departed did not die with the Body, without thinking them to be perfectly immaterial; the latter being much more incomprehenſible to them than the former. And what *Virgil*'s Notion of the Soul is, and that *Corpus*, when put in Contra-diſtinction to the Soul, ſignifies nothing but the groſs Tenement of Fleſh and Bones, is evident from this Verſe of his *Æneid. 6.* where he calls the Souls which yet were viſible,

—— *Tenues ſine corpore vitæ.*

Anſw. 1. p. 64, 65.

Your Lordſhip's Anſwer concerning what is ſaid, *Eccleſ.* 13. turns wholly upon *Solomon*'s taking the Soul to be immortal, which was not what I queſtion'd: All that I quoted that place for, was to ſhew, that *Spirit* in *Engliſh* might properly be apply'd to the Soul, without any Notion of its Immateriality, as רוח was by *Solomon*; which whether he thought the Souls of Men to be immaterial, does little appear in that Paſſage, where he ſpeaks of the Souls of Men and Beaſts together, as he does. But farther, what I contended for, is evident from that place, in that the word *Spirit* is there apply'd, by our Tranſlators, to the Souls of Beaſts, which your Lordſhip, I think, does not rank amongſt the immaterial, and conſequently immortal *Spirits*, tho' they have Senſe and ſpontaneous Motion.

Anſw. 1. p. 65.

But you ſay, *If the Soul be not of it ſelf a free-thinking Subſtance, you do not ſee what Foundation there is in Nature for a Day of Judgment. Anſw.* Tho' the Heathen World did *not of* old, nor do to this day, *ſee a Foundation in Nature for a Day of Judgment*; yet in Revelation, if that will ſatisfy your Lordſhip, every one may *ſee a Foundation for a Day of Judgment*, becauſe God has poſitively declar'd it; tho' God has not by that Revelation taught us, what the Subſtance of the Soul is; nor has any where ſaid, that *the Soul* of it ſelf *is a free* Agent. Whatſoever any created Subſtance is, it is not *of it ſelf*, but is by the good pleaſure of its Creator: Whatever Degrees of Perfection it has, it has from the bountiful Hand of its Maker. For it is true, in a natural as well as a ſpiritual Senſe, what St. *Paul* ſays, *Not that we are ſufficient* of our ſelves *to think any thing* as of our ſelves, *but our Sufficiency is of God.*

2 Cor. 3. 5.

But your Lordſhip, as I gueſs by your following words, would argue, That a material Subſtance cannot be a free Agent; whereby I ſuppoſe you only mean, that you cannot *ſee* or conceive how a ſolid Subſtance ſhould begin, ſtop, or change its own Motion. To which give me leave to anſwer, That when you can make it conceivable, how any created, finite, dependent Subſtance, can move it ſelf, or alter or ſtop its own Motion, which it muſt, to be *a free* Agent; I ſuppoſe you will find it no harder for God to beſtow this Power on a ſolid, than an unſolid created Subſtance. *Tully*, in the place above quoted, could not conceive this Power to be in any thing, but what was from Eternity; *Cum pateat igitur æternum id eſſe quod ſeipſum moveat, quis eſt qui hanc naturam animis eſſe tributam neget?* But tho' you cannot *ſee* how any created Subſtance, ſolid or not ſolid, can be *a free* Agent (pardon me, my Lord, if I put in both, till your Lordſhip pleaſe to explain it of either, and ſhew the manner how either of them can, *of it ſelf*, move it ſelf or any thing elſe) yet I do not think you will ſo far deny Men to be *free* Agents, from the difficulty there is to *ſee* how they are free Agents, as to doubt whether *there be Foundation* enough *for a Day of Judgment.*

Tuſculan. Quæſt. l. 1. c. 23.

It is not for me to judg how far your Lordſhip's Speculations reach: But finding in my ſelf nothing to be truer than what the wiſe *Solomon* tells me; *As thou*

thou knoweſt not what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the Bones do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child; even ſo thou knoweſt not the Works of God who maketh all things: I gratefully receive and rejoice in the Light of Revelation, which ſets me at reſt in many things; the manner whereof my poor Reaſon can by no means make out to me: Omnipotency, I know, can do any thing that contains in it no Contradiction; ſo that I readily believe whatever God has declar'd, tho' my Reaſon find Difficulties in it which it cannot maſter. As in the preſent Caſe, God having reveal'd that there ſhall be a Day of Judgment, I think that *Foundation* enough, to conclude Men are *free* enough to be made anſwerable for their Actions, and to receive according to what they have done; tho' how Man is *a free* Agent, ſurpaſs my Explication or Comprehenſion. Eccl. 11. 5.

In anſwer to the place I brought out of St. *Luke*, your Lordſhip asks, *Whether from theſe words of our Saviour, it follows that a Spirit is only an Appearance?* I anſwer, No; nor do I know who drew ſuch an Inference from them: But it follows, that in *Apparitions* there is ſomething that appears, and that that which appears is not wholly immaterial; and yet this was properly call'd πνεῦμα, and was often look'd upon by thoſe who call'd it πνεῦμα in *Greek*, and now call it *Spirit* in *Engliſh*, to be the Ghoſt or Soul of one departed: which, I humbly conceive, juſtifies my uſe of the word *Spirit*, for a thinking voluntary Agent, whether material or immaterial. Chap. 24. ver. 39. Anſw. 1. p. 66.

Your Lordſhip ſays, *That I grant*, that it cannot, upon theſe Principles, be demonſtrated, that the ſpiritual Subſtance in us is immaterial: From whence you conclude, *That then my Grounds of Certainty from Ideas are plainly given up.* This being a way of arguing that you often make uſe of, I have often had occaſion to conſider it, and cannot after all ſee the force of this Argument. I acknowledg, that this or that Propoſition cannot upon my Principles be demonſtrated; *ergo*, I grant this Propoſition to be falſe, That Certainty conſiſts in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*: For that is my Ground of Certainty, and till that be given up, *my Grounds of Certainty* are not *given up.* Anſw. 1. p. 67.

You farther tell me, *That I ſay*, the Soul's Immateriality may be prov'd probable to the higheſt degree; to which your Lordſhip replies, *That is not the Point: For it is not Probability, but Certainty, that you are promis'd in this way of Ideas, and that the Foundation of our Knowledg and real Certainty lies in them; and is it dwindled into a Probability at laſt?* This is alſo what your Lordſhip has been pleas'd to object to me more than once, that *I promis'd Certainty.* I would be glad to know in what words this *Promiſe* is made, and where it ſtands, for I love to be a Man of my Word. I have indeed told wherein I think Certainty, real Certainty does conſiſt, as far as any one attains it; and I do not yet, from any thing your Lordſhip has ſaid againſt it, find any reaſon to change my Opinion therein: But I do not remember that I promis'd Certainty in this Queſtion, concerning the Soul's Immateriality, or in any of thoſe Propoſitions, wherein you, thinking I come ſhort of Certainty, infer from thence, that my *way of Certainty by Ideas is given up.* And I am ſo far from *promiſing Certainty* in all things, that I am accus'd by your Lordſhip of *Scepticiſm*, for ſetting too narrow Bounds to our Knowledg and Certainty. Why therefore your Lordſhip asks me, *And is the Certainty* [of the Soul's being immaterial] *dwindled into a Probability at laſt?* will be hard to ſee a Reaſon for, till you can ſhew that I promis'd to demonſtrate that it is immaterial; or that others, upon their Principles without *Ideas*, being able to demonſtrate it immaterial, it comes *to dwindle into bare Probability*, upon my Principles by *Ideas*. Ibid.

One thing more I am oblig'd to take notice of. I had ſaid, "That the Belief of God being the Foundation of all Religion and genuine Morality, I "thought no Arguments, that are made uſe of to work the Perſuaſion of a "God into Mens Minds, ſhould be invalidated, which, I grant, is of ill Con-"ſequence." To which words of mine I find, according to your particular Favour to me, this Reply; *That here I muſt give your Lordſhip leave to ask me, what I think of the univerſal Conſent of Mankind, as to the Being of God? Hath not this been made uſe of as an Argument, not only by Chriſtians, but by the wiſeſt and greateſt Men among the Heathens? And what then would I think of one who ſhould go about to invalidate this Argument? And that by proving, that it hath been diſcover'd* Lett. 1. p. 113. Anſw. 1. p. 89.

cover'd in these latter Ages by Navigation, that there are whole Nations at the Bay of Soldania, *in* Brasil, *in the* Caribbee-Islands *and* Paraquaria, *among whom there was found no Notion of a God: And even the Author of the* Essay of Human Understanding *hath done this.*

To this your Question, my Lord, I answer, That *I think that the universal Consent of Mankind, as to the Being of a God*, amounts to thus much, that the vastly greater Majority of Mankind, have, in all Ages of the World, actually believ'd a God; that the Majority of the remaining part have not actually disbelievd it, and consequently those who have actually oppos'd the Belief of a God, have truly been very few. So that comparing those that have actually disbelievd with those who have actually believ'd a God, their Number is so inconsiderable, that in respect of this incomparably greater Majority of those who have own'd the Belief of a God, it may be said to be the universal Consent of Mankind.

This is all the *universal Consent* which Truth of Matter of Fact will allow, and therefore all that can be made use of to prove a God. But if any one would extend it farther, and speak deceitfully for God; if this Universality should be urg'd in a strict Sense, not for much the Majority, but for a general *Consent* of every one, even to a Man in all Ages and Countries: this would make it either no Argument, or a perfectly useless and unnecessary one. For if any one deny a God, such a perfect Universality of Consent is destroy'd; and if no body does deny a God, what need of Arguments to convince Atheists?

I would crave leave to ask your Lordship, Were there ever in the World any Atheist or no? If there were not, what need is there of raising a Question about the Being of a God, when no body questions it? What need of provisional Arguments against a Fault, from which Mankind are so wholly free; and which, by an universal Consent, they may be presum'd to be secure from? If you say (as I doubt not but you will) that there have been Atheists in the World, then your Lordship's *universal Consent* reduces it self to only a great Majority; and then make that Majority as great as you will, what I have said in the place quoted by your Lordship, leaves it in its full force, and I have not said one word that does in the least *invalidate this Argument* for a God. The Argument I was upon there, was to shew, That the *Idea* of God was not innate; and to my purpose it was sufficient, if there were but a less Number found in the World, who had no *Idea* of God, than your Lordship will allow there have been of profess'd Atheists: for whatsoever is innate, must be universal in the strictest Sense; one Exception is a sufficient Proof against it. So that all that I said, and which was quite to another purpose, did not at all tend, nor can be made use of to *invalidate the Argument* for a Deity, grounded on such an *universal Consent* as your Lordship, and all that build on it must own, which is only a very disproportion'd Majority: Such *an universal Consent* my Argument there neither affirms nor requires to be less, than you will be pleas'd to allow it. Your Lordship therefore might, without any prejudice to those Declarations of Good-will and Favour you have for the *Author of the Essay of Human Understanding*, have spar'd the mentioning his quoting Authors that are in Print, for Matters of Fact, to quite another purpose, *as going about to invalidate the Argument* for a Deity *from the universal Consent of Mankind*; since he leaves that *universal Consent* as entire, and as large as you your self do, or can own, or suppose it. But here I *have no reason to be sorry that* your Lordship *has given me this occasion for the Vindication of* this Passage of my Book, if there should be any one besides your Lordship who should so far mistake it, as to think it in the least *invalidates the Argument* for a God, *from the universal Consent of Mankind.*

But because you question the Credibility of those Authors I have quoted,
Answ. 1. p. 89. which, you say in the next Paragraph, *were very ill chosen*; I will crave leave to say, That he whom I rely'd on for his Testimony concerning the *Hotentots* of *Soldania*, was no less a Man than an Ambassador from the King of *England* to the *Great Mogul*: Of whose Relation, Monsieur *Thevenot*, no ill Judg in the Case, had so great an Esteem, that he was at the pains to translate it into *French*, and publish it in his (which is counted no unjudicious) Collection of Travels. But to intercede with your Lordship for a little more favourable allowance

lowance of Credit to Sir *Thomas Roe*'s Relation, *Coore*, an Inhabitant of the Country who could ſpeak *Engliſh*, aſſur'd Mr. *Terry*, That they of *Soldania* had no God. But if he too have the ill luck to find no Credit with you, I hope you will be a little more favourable to a Divine of the Church of *England* now living, and admit of his Teſtimony in confirmation of Sir *Tho. Roe*'s. This worthy Gentleman, in the Relation of his Voyage to *Surat*, printed but two years ſince, ſpeaking of the ſame People, has theſe words; *They are ſunk even below Idolatry, are deſtitute of both Prieſt and Temple, and ſaving a little Shew of Rejoicing, which is made at the full and new Moon, have loſt all kind of religious Devotion. Nature has ſo richly provided for their Convenience in this Life, that they have drown'd all Senſe of the God of it, and are grown quite careleſs of the next.*

Terry's Voyage, p. 17, & 23.

Mr. *Ovington*, p. 489.

But to provide againſt the cleareſt Evidence of Atheiſm in theſe People, you ſay, *That the Account given of them makes them not fit to be a Standard for the Senſe of Mankind.* This, I think, may paſs for nothing, till ſome body be found, that *makes them to be a Standard for the Senſe of Mankind:* All the uſe I made of them was to ſhew, That there were Men in the World that had no innate *Idea* of a God. But to keep ſomething like an Argument going (for what will not that do?) you go near denying thoſe *Cafers* to be Men: what elſe do theſe words ſignify? *A People ſo ſtrangely bereft of common Senſe, that they can hardly be reckon'd among Mankind; as appears by the beſt Accounts of the* Cafers *of* Soldania, *&c.* I hope if any of them were call'd *Peter*, *James* or *John*, it would be paſt ſcruple that they were *Men*; however *Courvee*, *Wewena*, and *Couſheda*, and thoſe others who had Names, that had no place in your *Nomenclator*, would hardly paſs muſter with your Lordſhip.

Anſw. p. 90.

Ibid.

My Lord, I ſhould not mention this, but that what you your ſelf ſay here may be a Motive to you to conſider, That what you have laid ſuch ſtreſs on, concerning the *general Nature of Man*, as a *real Being, and the Subject of Properties*, amounts to nothing for the diſtinguiſhing of *Species*; ſince you your ſelf own that there may be *Individuals, wherein there is a common Nature with a particular Subſiſtence proper to each of them:* whereby you are ſo little able to know of which of the *Ranks* or *Sorts* they are, into which you ſay, *God has order'd Beings*, and which he *hath diſtinguiſh'd by eſſential Properties*, that you are in doubt whether *they ought to be reckon'd among Mankind or no.*

P. 165.

Give me leave now to think, My Lord, that I have given an Anſwer to all that is any way material in either of the Letters you have honour'd me with. If there be any Argument which you think of weight, that you find omitted, upon the leaſt Intimation from your Lordſhip where it is, I promiſe to conſider it, and to endeavour to give you Satisfaction concerning it, either by owning my Conviction, or ſhewing what hinders it. This Reſpect I ſhall think due from me to your Lordſhip: Tho' I know better to imploy the little time my Buſineſs and Health afford me, than to trouble my ſelf with the little Cavillers, who may either be ſet on, or be forward (in hope to recommend themſelves) to meddle in this Controverſy.

Before I conclude, 'tis fit I take notice of the Obligation I have to you, for the Pains you have been at about my *Eſſay*, which I conclude could not have been any way ſo effectually recommended to the World, as by your manner of writing againſt it. And ſince your Lordſhip's ſharp Sight, ſo carefully employ'd for its Correction, has, as I humbly conceive, found no Faults in it, which your Lordſhip's great Endeavours this way have made out to be really there; I hope I may preſume it will paſs the better in the World, and the Judgment of all conſidering Men, and make it for the future ſtand better even in your Lordſhip's Opinion. I beg your Lordſhip's Pardon for this long Trouble, and am,

My LORD,

Oates, May 4. 1698.

Your Lordſhip's moſt Humble, and

Moſt Obedient Servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

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FINIS.





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